China Added 34 GW of Nuclear in a Decade

By Haley Zaremba - May 14, 2026

• China added 34 GW of nuclear capacity over the past decade versus a single new plant in the U.S., and is on track to overtake both the U.S. and France as the world's top nuclear producer within ten years.
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• Beijing's 15th Five-Year Plan prioritizes advanced reactor development, domestic nuclear fuel independence, and expanding China's nuclear footprint across emerging markets via the Belt and Road Initiative.
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• Both countries are racing toward next-gen nuclear tech -- SMRs and commercial fusion -- but China's state-backed spending and regulatory agility give it a structural edge Washington can't easily close.
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China and the United States are facing off for nuclear energy dominance on the world stage. The United States has the world’s largest nuclear energy production capacity, but China has the fastest-growing nuclear fleet. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (15FYP), released back in March, sets out a bold nuclear power strategy for Beijing, aiming to continue to build the nation’s own nuclear fleet while also intensifying China’s presence in international nuclear energy markets, particularly in emerging economies.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the Trump administration is also rushing to loosen regulations on nuclear power development in order to revive the nation’s aging and slowing nuclear power sector. While the United States has added just one nuclear plant in the last decade, China added a staggering 34 gigawatts of capacity over the same time period. As a result, China is set to overtake the United States (and France) to become the world’s single biggest producer of nuclear energy within the next ten years based on current projections.

Beijing’s latest five year plan shows that China has no intentions of slowing down. “With innovation and security as its leading themes, the latest FYP illuminates how nuclear energy underpins multiple strategic priorities for China in the context of not only energy security but also technological innovation and global engagement,” the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a nonprofit policy research organization and bipartisan think tank recently reported.

The CSIS summarizes China’s recently unveiled nuclear power strategy for the years 2026 through 2030 and compares the rhetoric around nuclear power to previous five year plans. Based on this analysis, the report highlights seven key takeaways:

• China is investing heavily into nuclear energy as a part of an ultra-diverse energy portfolio in order to shore up domestic energy security and resilience.
• The Chinese government is propping up the nation’s nuclear sector in a big way, funding manufacturing as well as research and development of next-gen nuclear energy models like small modular reactors.
• While China is intent on expanding its nuclear energy influence on a global scale, its exports of nuclear reactors are struggling – the country has seemingly abandoned plans for exporting large-scale reactors, and is apparently delaying the rollout of modular models.
• While China’s desire to build up nuclear energy supply chains in other countries is central to its own interests in terms of energy security and (geo)political influence, Beijing is spinning this strategy as a contribution to energy security in poor countries in Global South under the banner of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a decadeslong development/soft-power-building infrastructural program.
• China is focused on developing advanced nuclear reactors as a key priority of the domestic nuclear program, with particular attention to new reactor models that use less water and rely on alternative fuels, thereby reducing the sector’s resource needs as well as its dependence on nuclear fuel imports.
• Speaking of those nuclear fuel imports, Beijing’s reliance on them means that China’s trade relationship with Russia remains critical to the country’s energy strategy – a dynamic that Beijing is eager to shift.
• Finally, we can expect a major research and development push toward unlocking commercial nuclear fusion, the ‘holy grail of clean energy’, building upon the long list of fusion breakthroughs that Chinese labs have already been stacking up.

The United States’ nuclear energy ambitions are extremely similar to those laid out by China in March. The Trump administration is eager to “produce lasting American dominance in the global nuclear energy market” and is taking a Chinese approach to this goal, by issuing executive orders to reshape the national nuclear energy regulatory framework. The Trump administration is likewise bullish on developing next-gen nuclear reactors and nuclear fusion technology on its own home turf in order to stay at the technological vanguard of the nascent sector. Finally, the United States is also fighting to free itself from international nuclear fuel supply chains by building up domestic uranium extraction and enrichment capacities.

However, despite similar goals and leadership styles, China is a clear frontrunner in the nuclear energy race over the next few decades. Beijing has simply been outspending Washington for decades, and has the authoritarian ability to continue to prop up the sector without the pesky inertia of checks and balances. But the result of the nuclear energy race between the world’s two biggest economies could end up being a boon for the entire planet, nuclear expansion represents a key tenant of global decarbonization pathways.

By Haley Zaremba for Oilprice.com

Financial Strains and Mining Disputes Cloud Russia-Kazakhstan Nuclear Ties

By Eurasianet - May 14, 2026

• Kazatomprom alleges that Rosatom-linked SGCC failed to meet uranium production targets and contribute adequately to an environmental remediation fund.
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• Despite the dispute, the Budenovskoye uranium joint venture remains profitable and expects stable operations in 2026.
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• Financing uncertainty surrounding Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant reflects broader economic pressure on Russia following Western sanctions.

Kazakh officials are haggling with a Rosatom subsidiary, asserting that the Russian entity has failed to fulfill contractual obligations under a uranium mining agreement.

Kazatomprom, Kazakhstan’s nuclear energy entity, filed a complaint in early 2026, asserting that the Rosatom-associated company, identified as Stepnogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine (SGCC), violated an agreement covering the Budenovskoye joint venture, which is engaged in uranium mining in Kazakhstan’s Turkestan Region. 

SGCC was accused of various financial shortcomings, including failure to contribute to a “liquidation fund” established to remediate potential environmental damage caused by mining operations. The complaint also states that SGCC failed to meet its uranium extraction quota in 2024.

SGCC has disputed the Kazakh complaint, according to an annual report for 2025, which was published last February by the joint venture and quoted by the Kazakh news outlet, InBusiness.kz. “The issue is under consideration, the final decision of the competent authority has not been made,” the financial report states.

Despite the dispute, the annual report indicates that Budenovskoye JV is profitable and has manageable debt, although liabilities currently outweigh assets by almost 60 million tenge (about $127,000). Kazatomprom owns a 51 percent stake in the JV.

“The company expects positive flows from operating activities in 2026. In addition, the management received appropriate assurances from the company’s participants that they would provide financial and other support, if necessary,” the report states. “Accordingly, the management of the group does not expect that the company will have risks associated with the repayment of financial obligations and the execution of the company’s investment plans for 2026.”

The liquidation fund at the end of 2025 stood at 1.4 billion Kazakh tenge (almost $3 million), up from 666 million tenge (about $1.4 million) in 2024, according to the report.

Rosatom was long a financial rainmaker for the Russian government. But Western sanctions imposed because of the Kremlin’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine in 2022 have caused Rosatom’s financial muscle to atrophy.

Kazakhstan awarded Rosatom the contract in 2025 to build the country’s first nuclear power plant on the shores of Lake Balkhash, but financing woes have clouded the construction timetable. In April, Kazakh officials announced that the Russian government had pledged to provide 85 percent of the financing for the project, but an agreement has not been finalized. The overall cost of the nuclear project is estimated at $15 billion.

Russia’s economy is starting to show signs of severe strain, due to fiscal demands of the Ukraine war.

By Eurasianet

Electricity Industry Faces Risks from Three New Technologies

By Leonard Hyman & William Tilles - May 13, 2026

• Utilities face growing long-term disruption risks from emerging technologies like advanced batteries, perovskite solar cells, and nuclear fusion that could reduce dependence on centralized power grids.
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• Cheap storage and next-generation solar could enable more homes and businesses to self-generate electricity, threatening utility revenues and potentially triggering a “utility death spiral.”
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• Analysts warn the industry is underestimating technological disruption, with utilities spending very little on R&D.
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Electric company annual reports describe technological risk in the vaguest of terms, asserting that firms face numerous, generalized risks— boiler plate to provide legal cover just in case something happens, such as an ET invasion. What specific risks do the companies face? You’ll never know from reading their reports. Anyway, it often takes years for something to happen in the utility industry, so why bother worrying now? Brokerage reports, generally optimistic, focus on a utility’s rate base growth (mostly their assets), AI demand, ongoing regulatory complacency all within a 3-5 year horizon. Technological disruption of business that may be 5-10 years out seems beyond the decision time horizon of big investors. They can always sell out ahead of time, right? “What, me worry?” sums up the picture, aided by lofty market valuations.

This relaxed attitude of utilities toward technology risk and their present business makes little sense for three reasons. First, tech innovation can sneak up faster than expected, so the investor (the capital provider) might not have enough time to exit in an orderly fashion, and the company might not have enough time to prepare to deal with the financial disruption. Second, a likely or probable event even five years in the future affects the value of utility capital investments made today that have expected 20-30 year lives. Third, the utility industry overall pays so little attention to science and technology (it spends a pathetic 0.1% of revenues on R&D) that it may be the last to know when new technologies are about to emerge and disrupt their business. We could go into other reasons why the industry and its investors will tardily perceive or act on risks, including herd mentality, cultural issues, indexing, paradigm shifts, and regulation, but why bother? Simply put, we think that emerging technological developments, all staring us in the face right now, could start to disrupt the electricity industry’s structure and market in the coming 5-10 years. This should affect the industry’s financing picture even sooner. Investors will react to possible adverse business developments sooner than entrenched utility managers and quickly reflect those new worries about the industry’s declining prospects into stock prices and interest rates.

Before going on, though, let’s accept two academic definitions of risk: either the possibility of loss or the possibility that actual returns will not rise to expected levels.  If your investment cannot earn its expected return, it probably will decline in value, whether you sell it or not, so the second definition really says the same thing as the first, but less directly.

Now, let us examine a trio of obvious risks. There are more, of course.

Risk one: Batteries

Batteries have already changed the electricity industry, reducing the need for transmission and redundant generating capacity and enabling the industry to treat renewable resources in the same way as ordinary generation. We expect more change and not just from lower costs. The battery industry suffers from massive overcapacity while in the midst of a huge product improvement program. Surely it will seek more markets, with residential and small commercial customers as likely targets. They consume over half the electricity output and pay the highest prices of any customer class. Imagine combining inexpensive solar (see RISK TWO) with inexpensive, compact, safe storage. Many customers, especially in rural areas, might finally cut the cord that ties them (expensively) to the electrical grid. If enough customers begin to exit and self generate, the grid will become more and more a provider of last resort for those who cannot install or afford to own their own on-site equipment, in other words, small and low income consumers. This prospect should really alarm public policy makers. A grid with a shrinking customer base of this sort is likely to require meaningful government support (or face financial distress). We’d bet on commercial development of low cost, small residential and commercial batteries within five years.

Risk Two: Perovskites

Photovoltaic cells made with perovskite mineral compounds are more efficient than silicon cells but they are not as durable and have not achieved flexibility targets. Manufacturers and researchers have launched an impressive effort to solve those problems in order to produce high efficiency, durable, and flexible perovskite cells within a few years. These improvements will do more than increase the efficiency of the cells. Buyers of the new flexible cells could install them anywhere, wrap them around buildings, put them in window blinds or even on clothes, making the perovskite cells ubiquitous. Think about it. The new cells will produce 30-50% more electricity per cell than the old ones, and wrapping an entire building might increase installation surface by 50-100%. That would permit twice the power production on the site. Combined with a low cost battery, the perovskite cell will make off-the-grid electricity even more attractive. Is this science fiction? No, read the technical papers. Commercialization seems likely within five years.

Risk Three: Nuclear Fusion

Privately financed firms have announced plans to build fusion reactors within 5-10 years — plants roughly the size of planned small modular reactors (SMRs) which will, supposedly, enter commercial operation within the same time period. SMRs are like present day fission reactors, just smaller, with a modular build out, and even more expensive than current gigawatt scale nuclear designs. And, if you don’t like existing nukes for environmental, national security, ideological or safety reasons, you probably won’t like SMRs, either. However, fusion reactors won’t require uranium, emit carbon dioxide, produce long-lived radioactive wastes, enable nuclear proliferation and can’t melt down — a list which might convince even hard core anti-nuclear activists to give them a pass. Fusion is nuclear power without the baggage. (And it's not based on a recycled submarine propulsion technology either.)  It does not present a threat to central station electricity, per se, but rather to SMR development (fusion and SMRs are competitors) and ultimately to fossil-fueled power plants which fusion could replace. Opponents of renewables insist that the country and the utility industry need base load power plants. Fusion could provide base load power without either carbon dioxide emissions or the nuclear fission liabilities. Of course, fusion is all talk, right now but as we previously pointed out, a lot of new capital is entering the field. If it should work, and produce competitively priced electricity, though, the age of electrification will really come.  Renewables and fusion reactors would power the economy. But that seems unlikely for at least a decade. Best advice: rest easy but be wary.

Why Worry?

Admittedly, we did not discuss all technological risks, such as plug-in solar (already big in Europe), which will dampen utility sales, or solar power satellites (a goal for billionaire space entrepreneurs), which could upend the generation market. You can never tell what will come along. Nor did we consider the risks to the natural gas industry, which are substantial, given that electric generators consume 40% of gas sold, and that is the only gas market that has shown any dynamism. Technological innovation in the electricity sector (mostly batteries right now) will reduce natural gas sales to the power sector and sales of gas for heating and cooking, too. The natural gas industry will have to export a lot of gas to make up for those losses. Then there is the impact of tech change on the consumption patterns of high-tech electricity users. Try this one. Quantum computers or space-based computer centers render earth-bound AI obsolete.  For that matter, what might happen if the next administration in Washington takes environmental issues seriously, thereby forcing tech change on the industry? And finally, we admit it, we did not discuss technological changes that might offset the risks posed in this essay, or technological changes that might boost industry prospects. That is because risk was the topic. Anyway, everyone touts the benefits, so they probably are in the stock prices.

Finally, why worry? The short answer is that the utility industry we know is fragile in ways we don’t often talk about. Capital-intensive industries are often like that. So, how about this back- of- the -envelope calculation that takes into account that much of the industry’s costs are fixed, that is, won’t decline proportionately with the loss of sales. We concluded that a 5% loss of residential and commercial sales (if consumers deserted the grid) could reduce electric company pretax net income by 15-20%. Plus, the now distressed utility would also have to account for losses on assets rendered redundant after a meaningful decline in sales. (These are not assets that could be transferred to an AI customer.)  Finally, consider that once a consumer trend begins, and people see that their neighbors are on board, the trend can snowball. In other words, 5% may be the beginning. We have repeated here a form of the utility “death spiral" argument to show how these new and emerging technologies represent a real and persistent threat to future utility revenues and business prospects.

This discussion may sound like science fiction to you, an inventory of non-existent risks based on academic musings and commercial hyperbole, but we already live in a world resembling that of science fiction: rockets to the moon, autonomous vehicles, thinking machines, people with mechanical parts. So, what is so outlandish about people making their own electricity from the sun, storing it in boxes, or producing power in machines fueled by products extracted from water and left over from a nuclear reaction. And what are the risks of those technologies to a nineteenth-century industry model? We may find out sooner than you expect.

By Leonard Hyman and William Tilles for Oilprice.com

Middle East War Threatens Renewable Energy Rollout

By Rystad Energy - May 13, 2026

• Renewable energy projects across the Middle East face delays of three to 12 months.
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• Solar imports into Gulf markets have collapsed as maritime disruption and cost pressures intensify.
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• Higher oil and LNG prices strengthen the long-term case for Gulf states to deploy renewables domestically.

War in the Middle East has reshaped near-term energy market expectations, with direct implications for hydrocarbon supply affecting power sectors across liquified natural gas (LNG) imports, oil imports, and spot gas-dependent economies, mainly in Europe and Asia. While Middle Eastern countries retain access to abundant domestic fossil fuels, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the crisis extends disruption beyond hydrocarbons. The combination of conflict proximity, supply chain vulnerability, capital diversion, and institutional resilience is critical for renewables deployment. Rystad Energy analyzes how the conflict is affecting renewable energy deployment across key Middle Eastern markets.

The crisis is expected to result in a net delay of between three and 12 months across the active renewable energy pipeline in the Middle East, while simultaneously strengthening the medium to long-term strategic commitment to the energy transition. The overall effect is a short-term delay followed by a sharper medium-term acceleration in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Turkiye, while Qatar, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, and Jordan are expected to face moderate delays with recovery contingent on market stabilization. Additionally, Iran, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen remain high risk and are likely to face prolonged delays in renewables deployment (Figure 1).

Supply chain disruption

There is a clear disruption across key maritime routes that is already pushing back project timelines. While other regions have registered high module imports due to China's elimination of the VAT export rebate on 1 April, the Middle East region lagged behind. The March 2026 solar PV imports collapsed against 2025 monthly averages across every Persian Gulf market- the UAE fell 608 MW from 767 MW to just 160 MW, Saudi Arabia dropped 625 MW from 704 MW to 80 MW, and Oman fell to zero from 77 MW. The contrast with Türkiye importing 248 MW (+166 MW above its 2025 average) and Israel at 220 MW (+118 MW), reflecting their independence from Hormuz and Red Sea routing (Figure 2).

The impact is more severe because multiple cost pressures have materialized simultaneously. The freight rates for the Asia-Mediterranean route are up from $2,826/FEU in late February to $3,594/FEU by early April. Additionally, China's elimination of the VAT export rebate on 1 April added a direct 9% cost impact on module pricing, while silver prices in the USD 70–80/oz range are pushing up cell costs, prompting OEM suppliers, EPC contractors and developers to revisit signed contracts, repricing risk, and consider redirecting capital toward more stable, lower-risk markets within the Middle East.

The region's highly competitive auction market, which results in world-record bids in the range of USD 10.5 - USD 20/MWh, gives a thin margin to the developers. To achieve this, the CAPEX intensity for these projects is already at a lower end. Multiple cost pressures and with war risk premium now being embedded into project finance, EPC contractors are repricing force majeure and logistics exposure into new bids. Countries like Kuwait, progressing to awarding their first large-scale solar projects totaling 1.6 GW, are particularly vulnerable to this repricing. For projects that have already reached financial close across the Middle East, the result is margin compression.

Middle East solar module manufacturing capacity is expected to grow from 4.7 GW in 2025 to 35.8 GW by 2030 — a sevenfold expansion in five years. Türkiye, already plateaued at 22.2 GW of domestic manufacturing capacity from 2026 onward, is effectively import-independent for solar modules and fully insulated from any future Hormuz disruption.

The financial incentive for renewables deployment for oil and gas-exporting Gulf states such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq has strengthened under this crisis. At more than $90 per barrel of Brent crude oil and between $15 and $20 per million British thermal units of LNG, every megawatt of solar or wind deployed domestically frees up hydrocarbons for export at elevated prices. The opportunity cost of burning liquids/gas in a domestic power station has never been higher. However, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains a significant constraint for countries reliant on the route for exports. Gulf renewables programs are facing logistical and financial delays, not strategic ones, and striking the right balance between restoring hydrocarbon exports and renewables deployment will result in an optimal outcome.

By Rystad Energy

Who Really Rules Iran Now?

By RFE/RL staff - May 14, 2026

• The IRGC has emerged as the dominant force in Iran following Ali Khamenei’s death and Mojtaba Khamenei’s limited public role.
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• Hard-line military and security figures now wield growing influence over Iran’s domestic politics and foreign policy.
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• Reformists and moderates remain sidelined as competing power centers shape Iran’s postwar future.
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For decades, power in Iran was centralized in the hands of a single man: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. But since his killing at the onset of the US-Israeli war with Iran on February 28, decision-making in Tehran has become increasingly decentralized, experts say.

Mojtaba Khamenei has not been seen in public since he succeeded his father in early March. In his absence, a cohort of senior Iranian officials have been effectively running the country.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a dominant political player, has now become the decisive force in Iran, experts say. Reformists and moderates have been relegated to the political fringes, leading to a more hard-line and ideologically rigid system.

Key power centers and figures have emerged in what some observers call the Islamic republic 3.0. While many of these figures are aligned on major policies, some fissures have surfaced.

Mojtaba Khamenei: New Supreme Leader

As supreme leader, the 56-year-old has the ultimate say on all state matters. But his authority has been undermined from the outset.

Khamenei was a controversial pick as supreme leader. The cleric had never held public office, and some argued a move toward "hereditary rule" would betray the very anti-monarchist roots of the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

Seriously wounded in the same Israeli air strike that killed his father, Khamenei has also been absent from public view since his appointment on March 8. He suffered injuries to his head, lower back, and foot but was now "in complete health," Mazahar Hosseini, head of protocol in the supreme leader's office, said on May 8.

US intelligence has said it believes Khamenei plays a prominent role in war strategy and managing peace talks with the United States. But in a system where the supreme leader is omnipresent -- issuing audio messages, making video addresses, and appearing in public to display his authority -- his absence is striking.

"Iran has entered a period of transition after the death of Ali Khamenei and the end of his 36-year leadership," Ali Afshari, an Iranian political analyst based in Washington, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda. [It's] a challenging period in which the postwar alignment of forces will be decisive."

Hossein Taeb: Behind-The-Scenes Operator

A hard-line cleric, Taeb led the IRGC's intelligence branch for 13 years until 2022, when he was dismissed as part of a major security shakeup.

Hossein Taeb is a longtime confidant of Iran's new supreme leader and considered a key figure behind the scenes.

Taeb, who is blacklisted by the United States and European Union for his alleged role in state repression, worked in the supreme leader's office before he was appointed as the IRGC's intelligence chief in 2009.

A longtime confidant of the younger Khamenei, Taeb is considered a key figure behind the scenes. Experts say he could play an important role in managing Khamenei's relationships with key players inside the system.

Ahmad Vahidi: IRGC Chief

The IRGC, the elite branch of Iran's armed forces, has always played a key role in politics. But it is now the dominant political force in the Islamic republic after the killing of Ali Khamenei.

That's despite Israel and the United decimating the leadership of the IRGC, including killing its commander in chief, Mohammad Pakpour.

Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior and defense minister, took over the IRGC in March.

Pakpour's deputy, Ahmad Vahidi, a former interior and defense minister, took over the IRGC in early March. But experts say it is unclear if Vahidi has the clout and credibility to unite the competing factions within the IRGC.

Experts say the war and the securitization of Iran following Ali Khamenei's death has allowed the IRGC to pay a central role in the domestic and foreign affairs of the country.

"The era after Ali Khamenei remains ambiguous. However, one key fact is visible: the increasing role and power of the IRGC in the administration of the Islamic republic," Mojtaba Najafi, a France-based Iranian political commentator, told RFE/RL's Radio Farda.

"Today, a significant part of the country's administration is in the hands of the IRGC," he added. "Militarization in the economy, politics, culture, and society has also now reached a stage of maturity."

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf: The Intermediator

Qalibaf is a conservative politician and former military commander who spent decades cultivating ties to Iran's supreme leadership and the IRGC.

After a career overshadowed by corruption scandals and failed presidential bids, he arguably finds himself as the most powerful figure left standing in the Islamic republic.

Experts describe the role of Qalibaf, the parliament speaker who is also Iran's top negotiator with the United States, as a mediator between the different centers of power in Iran. He is considered close to the new supreme leader.

Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the parliament speaker who is also Iran's top negotiator with the United States, is as a mediator between the different centers of power in Iran.

This was the role played by Iran's powerful security chief Ali Larijani before his assassination in March. Larijani was a unifying figure who brought together competing political factions and maintained strong ties with the IRGC, intelligence apparatus, and clerical establishment.

"Qalibaf has always been a pawn" used by the leadership, Hossein Razzaq, a political analyst based in Germany, told Radio Farda.

"Today, with the elimination of other key pawns, the role he plays for the system has become more prominent."

Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr: Security Chief

A former commander in the IRGC, Zolqadr succeeded Larijani as the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, the country's key policymaking body.

While Larijani was known as a shrewd and pragmatic politician, Zolqadr is a hard-line security and military official.

Razzaq considers the general's appointment as an attempt by Khamenei to divide power among his loyalists. His selection, he said, also underscored the dominance of the IRGC in the different centers of power in Iran.

Masud Pezeshkian: The Powerless President

The reformist president is not a major political player and not considered a threat by the hard-liners who dominate the system.

Iranian President Masud Pezeshkian

Pezeshkian's role is administrative, running the day-to-day affairs of the government. But the final decision on major issues, including war and diplomacy, is made elsewhere.

He and Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi are the only members of the reformist and moderate political camps to play a visible role in the new power structure. Like Pezeshkian, Araqchi does not have decision-making power but follows orders from above.

Still, differences have emerged that pit figures like Pezeshkian and Araqchi who are pushing for diplomacy against generals who oppose making concessions to the United States in negotiations to end the war.

By RFE/RL