Wagner in Africa: the impact of Prighozin's presumed death

Russia's presence in Africa depends heavily on the Wagner Group, headed by Yevgeny Prighozin. But now there is uncertainty about the private military's role after his apparent death in a plane crash in Russia.



Philipp Sandner

Malians welcomed the Wagner Group in the hope they would help defeat the Islamist insurgency

Florent Vergnes/AFP/Getty Images

Russia's influence in Africa is intertwined with the mercenary activities of the Wagner Group in various countries, particularly in West and Central Africa. Next to China, Russia has become the main global player exerting its influence on the continent through aid and economic development, but also through trade and military cooperation.

But following reports that Wagner's leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, might have died in a plane crash in Russia, many now wonder if military support from Russia in Africa will remain unchanged.

How could Wagner Group revolt impact Africa?  02:12

Business as usual in CAR

In an exclusive interview with DW, Fidele Gouandjika, an advisor to Central African Republic (CAR) President Faustin-Archange Touadera, said that bilateral relations between his country and Russia would remain the same.

"We have a defense agreement with Russia, and the paramilitarias who are with us will continue their work as before. They will find another chief," he told DW.

"As for trade relations, we have a mining license, a brewery and a forestry license with the Russians. That will not change, even if Yevgeny Prigozhin is no longer there."

However, not everyone shares this optimistic view: Since a comprehensive peace agreement was reached in CAR only in February 2019 after decades of civil war, the Wagner Group's influence has extended even further. Wagner mercenaries have been in charge of protecting — and guiding — Touadera,whose advisors have long included a man with closer ties to Prigozhin.

This monument of Russian soldiers was erected in CAR's capital Bangui in honor of Russia's security contribution

Barbara Debout/AFP

CAR: A hostage of Wagner?

Former Communications Minister Adrien Poussou, who is also the author of the book "Africa Doesn't Need Putin," regards Wagner as practically pulling every string in the country now: "President Touadera is a hostage of Wagner, and he knows it," Poussou told DW.

"So despite the aborted rebellion of the Wagner Group, the situation remains deadlocked until an even bigger power interferes in this dance."

The CAR government has described the idea that it has lost control as "nonsense."

Still, even more measured voices have expressed their concern over the extent of Wagner's influence — with or without Prigozhin — in CAR: Paul Crescent Beninga, a civil society representative, says that the Wagner Group's interference in CAR's internal political affairs has now led to "a point where this undermines the ability of the Central African state to conduct its politics without pressure."

"The Central African Republic is not profiting from these developments," he added. "Rather, the winners are the Russians."

Russia's silence on the latest developments

Meanwhile, Moscow remains silent on the circumstances surrounding the plane crash. The Russian aviation authority claims that Wagner boss Prigozhin was on board and that all 10 occupants are believed dead.

But much is still unclear, including whether foul play was involved.

Before the Prigozhin's attempted coup against Russian President Vladimir Putin in June, the Kremlin had praised Wagner's activities in Africa, especially in Mali and the Central African Republic. Its operations were expected to continue and even expand.

Jean-Pierre Mara, a former lawmaker in the Central African Republic, said there was "no question" that Wagner would continue its operations in Africa, as this was also in Russia's best interest.
Win-win relationship for Russia and Wagner

Russian historian Irina Filatova described Russia's relationship with the Wagner Group in Africa as a "win-win situation," with Wagner benefiting from Russia's prestige and Russian weapons and Russia having preferential access to Africa's natural resources.

"The relationship is very much like the pattern of European trading companies in the 19th century," Filatova told DW, drawing parallels to colonial times.

"They got a mandate from their respective state, acted independently, but the state benefited from their presence in Africa."

Cooperation between the private military and the Russian government occurs, especially where raw materials are abundant, with Wagner controlling the business interests on the continent.

Filatova explained that Russia benefitted from this relationship through Wagner's extensive network of sub-companies: "They can be rebranded or remain under the same name, as they are already a brand in Africa. They can act independently."

Mali's jaw-dropping Wagner bill

Meanwhile, in Mali there's even more financial entanglement between the government and Wagner and its subsidiaries: In late 2021, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a US think tank, identified a new military base being built in the country.

Eyewitnesses on the ground then confirmed that the base was for Wagner troops.

On top of this, reports showed that Mali — one of the poorest countries in the world — was spending $10 million (€9 million) a month on Wagner mercenaries in the country, amounting to more than €100 million annually.

Wagner also has a significant stake in Mali's oil sector, effectively controlling the price of the fossil fuels for export.

Elsewhere, the group is active in mining other riches, including gold. In recent years, a Canadian and a South African company lost their mining licenses, while a Madagascan company — closely linked to Russia — received a new concession.

How each arm of Wagner may position itself in a potential post-Prigozhin future "is totally unclear," historian Filatova stressed, while suggesting that Russia would continue to seek to deepen its influence in Africa.

Mara took it further, explaining that Russia's activities through Wagner in Africa were part of its war strategy in Ukraine: "(Russia) needs the Central African gold, the Malian gold, to finance the war. So nothing will change."

Martina Schwikowski, Bob Barry, Sandrine Blanchard, Jean-Michel Bos and Mahamadou Kane in Bamako contributed to this article

This article was adapted from German by Chrispin Mwakideu and edited by Sertan Sanderson.

It was first published on June 30, 2023, and updated on August 24, 2023

Wagner's brutal work in Africa will be tough for the Kremlin to replace

Roland Oliphant
Thu, 24 August 2023 

Wagner's presence in Syria has been much coveted by the Kremlin

For nearly a decade, it was a piratical linchpin of Russian foreign policy: fronting deniable wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and Africa, and growing rich in the process.

But with the death of its chief and his closest deputies, the Wagner private military company may have come to the end of the road.

But the Kremlin may also find the Wagner brand – with its unique mix of hard power and influence in the Middle East and Africa – hard to replace.

Although Yevgeny Prigozhin did not found the Wagner group (he came on board later), he was – as financier and manager – its corporate mastermind and largely responsible for its commercial success.

It was his connections to the Kremlin and gift for building personal connections and corrupt “understandings” that transformed it from one of many rag-tag gangs fighting Russia’s 2014 invasion of Donbas into a globe-trotting mercenary empire.

“Prigozhin had the rare ability to command the loyalty of fighting men and also run deals with local elites,” said Mark Galeotti, an expert on the Russian security services who is currently writing a book about Prigozhin.

“He would not have risen as far and as fast without Vladimir Putin’s patronage. But he was already doing relatively well. In his own way, he was effective as an entrepreneur especially in the environments where Wagner operates.”

Wagner’s global footprint is as broad as it is violent.

In Libya, it works with Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, the head of the Libyan National Army, and played a major role in his failed assault on Tripoli in 2019. Wagner mercenaries were, at one point, spotted at the Sharara oil field, the country’s largest.

Wagner mercenaries have also been present in Sudan since 2017, where they control a gold processing plant and are reported to have backed the Rapid Support Forces in the civil war that broke out there in April.

In West Africa, Wagner has a contract with the governments of the Central African Republic and Mali, and has obtained gold and other mineral exploitation rights in both.

Burkina Faso has been forced to deny hiring Wagner, but has hailed Russia as a strategic ally, and the group’s “consultants” were rumoured to be in touch with the military officers who carried out a coup in Niger last month – testament to the brand’s notoriety, whatever their real involvement.

This empire was already in trouble before Prigozhin and Wagner’s military founder, Dmitry Utkin, presumably died on Wednesday.

The secret to Prigozhin’s rapid business success – one he shares with a large number of Russian “tycoons” – was Vladimir Putin’s patronage.

It was a generous catering contract with the ministry of defence that provided the seed capital for Wagner’s overseas expansion.

A tight relationship with Russia’s military intelligence (GRU) and the Kremlin ensured Wagner’s access to training facilities, weapons, and the nod for jobs in Syria, Libya, and the central African Republic.

That patronage vanished the moment Prigozhin, Utkin, and many of their fighters rashly decided to mutiny two months ago.

In the treacherous realm where business and government merge, personal connections are vital and losing Putin’s trust is toxic.

Some Wagner bases in Syria were surrounded last month and their commanders interrogated, presumably to assess how much of a threat they posed to Putin’s rule and whether a further coup was being plotted from Damascus.

In July, Reuters reported that many Wagner fighters were forced to sign new contracts with the Russian defence ministry or were simply kicked out of Syria, citing Syrian regime officials. The crackdown suggests that both Bash al-Assad and Putin feel threatened by restive Wagner fighters inside the country.

On Tuesday, one day before Prigozhin’s jet crashed, Yunnus-bek Yevkurov, Russia’s deputy ministry of defence, arrived in Libya for talks with Gen Haftar.

Wagner has been contracted to train Syrian mercenaries

The ministry said in a press release that it was the “first official visit of a Russian military delegation to Libya,” and that the purpose was “to discuss prospects for cooperation in combating international terrorism and other issues of joint action”.

There could be no clearer signal that the army intends to muscle in on Wagner’s turf.

The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based military think tank, said that the Russian ministry of defence had recently begun forming new mercenary groups to replace Wagner in Africa.

Wagner personnel and commanders were being headhunted for the new groups. Prigozhin’s trip to Africa was probably an attempt to fend off Russian military plans and drum up new missions for Wagner, one Russian insider source told the ISW.

The institute said: “The source claimed that GRU deputy head (head of the special activities service) Colonel General Andrei Averyanov led the effort to completely block Wagner from operating in Africa and that there were plans to create and train an army corps of more than 20,000 people as Wagner replacements.”

The source added that Prigozhin was deeply opposed to these efforts and “made every effort to prevent them”.

Wagner group mercenaries in Mali - French Army via AP

The ministry of defence’s own mercenary outfit, Redoubt, can easily take over Wagner’s fighting roles overseas.

Its founder, GRU general Vladimir Alexeyev, is reported to have clashed with Prigozhin repeatedly over what could be called mercenary market share.

But he lacks Prigozhin’s own knack for finding a rapport and making a deal with local leaders. And Wagner was not simply offering guns for hire.

Prigozhin’s Concord group could provide autocrats with paid internet trolls to paint them as legitimate leaders standing up to al-Qaeda and Islamic State, and “political consultants” to help rig elections.

The commercial structure would provide the business architecture not only to run mines and oil fields, but to smuggle it out of the country, launder the proceeds, and distribute kickbacks.

“It was a whole package of services for the budding autocrat,” said Mr Galeotti. The rewards in terms of Russian influence in Africa have been significant.

Wagner's soldiers in Syria were asked to sign contracts with the Russian military

In short, the Kremlin made Wagner indispensable. Now, they may have crippled it.

They may try to keep the operation running in some form. But the company is already minus some of its other key leaders. Andrei Troshev, the man often named as executive director of Wagner, has reportedly already jumped ship to Redoubt.

Vanda Felbab-Brown, a security and armed conflict analyst for the US think tank Brookings, has said that Wagner under a new leadership will likely still be used as a tool to protect Russian interests.

“Predictions of the end of the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa and the Middle East in the aftermath of its ill-fated rebellion in Russia are premature,” she wrote in a post for the think tank Brookings in July.

“More likely, Wagner’s Middle East and Africa operations will persist: they still serve multiple interests of the Russian state and can be separated from Wagner’s Ukraine and Russia operations.”

BACKGROUNDER & UPDATES

Wagner Group’s Post-Mutiny Crack-Up Is a Threat to Afrika

Jason Nichols

 The Daily Beast.
Fri, July 14, 2023

Photo Illustration by Erin O'Flynn/The Daily Beast/Getty Images

The Wagner Group, a Russian state-funded private military corporation filled with mercenaries and led by ignoble billionaire Yevgeny Prigozhin, entered the American consciousness with Vladimir Putin’s Feb. 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Even more people came to know them when Prigozhin staged a short-lived mutiny where his forces briefly took the city of Rostov in southwestern Russia. Putin was able to end the mutiny without any damage, except to his fearsome reputation.

Since then, Wagner fighters in the region have turned over their arms to the Russian military and have avoided being imprisoned or executed for their role in the mutiny. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has stated the paramilitary groups would train the Belarusian military in weapons and tactics.


How Did We Get Putin So Wrong?

What’s less discussed about the Wagner Group is their activities in other parts of the world—namely war-torn areas in the Middle East and Africa.

Wagner is known to have operated in many areas throughout the African continent, including Chad, Libya, Central African Republic, and Mali. (There are unconfirmed rumors they may be invited into Burkina Faso by its new military leadership.)

Many believe that Wagner’s purpose is not only to extract key valuable resources from the mineral and oil-rich continent, but to extend Russia’s diplomatic influence by supporting a bloc of African states militarily. With the whereabouts of Yevgeny Prigozhin unknown and the status of Wagner unclear, their presence in these volatile areas present potentially grave security risks. In other words, having heavily armed soldiers of fortune open to the highest bidder and untethered to any nation-state in regions where human rights abuses are already common is incredibly dangerous.

Russia has assured some African leaders that they would not lose their fighting forces. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has promised the leadership in African nations like Chad and Mali that the “work will continue.” Russia extracts valuable resources from Africa as a result of Wagner’s presence.

However, questions remain about whether the loyalties of Wagner mercenaries are split between the Kremlin and Prigozhin. Though it has been reported that Prigozhin and Putin met in person days after the attempted mutiny—and more than likely worked out a deal for control of the Wagner Group—it is unclear how the mercenaries who are thousands of miles from the Kremlin feel about it.

Even if Putin is in charge, his image as a strongman was severely weakened by the mutiny attempt itself. Whether the Wagner mercenaries will accept his leadership without Prigozhin is anyone's guess.

America’s Tragedy Is Its Culture of Fear—Armed With Millions of Guns

Retired U.S. four-star General Robert Abrams told ABC News that he believes that Prigozhin is already dead and that the meeting between him and Putin was faked. While there’s no evidence to back up this assumption at the time, were it to be true, it’s unclear how Wagner mercenaries would accept their leader and cofounder being killed by the Russian state. The potential for desertion or illicit weapon sales rises as morale plummets.

Wagner already has a presence in the Central African Republic (CAR), a state whose political atmosphere was described by the United Nations as “fragile.” Religious-based sectarian violence has been commonplace since its independence in 1960. A Muslim rebel group called Seleka led a successful coup in late 2012. Seleka was disbanded soon after it gained control of Bangui, but violence between its former members and Christian “anti-balaka” fighters has continued. Both groups have since splintered off, causing more confusion and violence.

The Wagner Group has helped the CAR government to put down and deter insurgency efforts by these rebel factions. The CAR is one of the poorest nations in the world, with 71 percent of its population below the poverty line, but is home to an abundance of natural resources including oil, gold, and diamonds.

While it appears that some Wagner forces have left the country on planes, the government of CAR has said that these are rotations, and indicated that Wagner still has some structure despite the nebulous chain of command in Prigozhin’s absence. What is unclear is if CAR officials are bluffing about Wagner personnel rotations in order to deter the insurgents from mounting an offensive.

Debunking the Right-Wing Lie That Black Lives Matter Got $82 Billion From Corporations

If remaining Wagner mercenaries do not have a clear chain of command, or divided loyalties, or even lower morale since the removal of Prigozhin, they are more susceptible to offers from CAR’s many ex-Seleka and anti-balaka groups. (It is believed by the UN and human rights organizations that both ex-Seleka and anti-balaka groups have committed war crimes.)

Countries like CAR and Chad were violent and unstable and prone to coup attempts long before the arrival of Wagner. The west’s contributions to less stability and security in Africa also predate Russia and Wagner.

However, the potential human cost of an unstable mercenary group like Wagner in countries that are already struggling with Boko Haram and sectarian warring factions is very high.

While the world is rightly focused upon the unjust invasion of Ukraine, we must not lose sight of how the fallout could affect Africa and its people. We see how the developed world and its media has prioritized the lives of Ukrainians, it’s time they show the same regard for Black African lives.

Russia’s Wagner mercenaries hire Gurkha soldiers spurned by India

Samaan Lateef
Sat, July 15, 2023 

Nepal's young soldiers have begun looking elsewhere for employment since the launch of India's controversial Agnipath Scheme

Dozens of elite Gurkhas have joined Russia’s Wagner mercenary group after India tightened the rules governing the recruitment of Nepalese troops into its army.

Gurkha soldiers have shared videos online showing them training with firearms at bases in Russia and Belarus, dining in military canteens and discussing the potential risks of fighting in Ukraine.

The mercenary force’s new recruits have become a cause for embarrassment for the government in Kathmandu, which has come under fire for failing to stop Nepalese citizens from joining Russia’s war effort.

Kamal Acharya, 22, left the small Nepalese village of Chisapani for Moscow in early May to join the Wagner Group.


On May 29, he shared a picture of himself holding an assault rifle inside a Russian military installation. A later TikTok video shows him effortlessly disassembling and reassembling the weapon.

Footage of the Russian training sessions has been shared on TikTok

Umesh Shahi, a friend of Mr Acharya, told The Telegraph he had travelled to Russia after learning that Moscow was paying good salaries for mercenary fighters.

“He told us it’s a risk but the money lured him to go,” he said.

Other Gurkhas who have joined up with the Kremlin’s forces have done so after completing university studies in Russia.

“I had two choices after finishing my studies: to remain unemployed or to join the Russian Army,” one man, who completed his medical degree in Russia and joined its military instead of returning home, told Nepal TV.

The Gurkha said his physical fitness was key to his acceptance into the army after he applied to join at the end of May.

He said more than a dozen Nepali citizens were undergoing intensive training alongside other foreign fighters at a base near the border with Ukraine.

“Our training encompasses the use of advanced weaponry, and it spans throughout the day and sometimes extends into the night,” he said.

“After one year, citizenship is also available. If I don’t die in one year, I will live here,” he said, adding that he is receiving a monthly payment equivalent to 50,000 Nepalese rupees (£290), along with insurance coverage, during the rigorous training.

The young men are choosing to join Russia's mercenary troops

A former Nepali Army soldier from Karnali Province, who has joined the mercenary group, told Nepal TV that he had found out about “opportunities in the Russian Army” while working as a security guard in Dubai.

Now enrolled in the Russian military, he found his prior training in the Nepali Army to be advantageous, as it eased his transition into the Russian forces.

“We are more than two hundred foreign comrades and three Nepali friends,” he said.

He had considered joining the French Foreign Legion, but was put off by a lengthy and challenging recruitment process.

At least 50 Gurkhas are believed to have joined the Wagner Group since the beginning of the war, with as many as 200 Nepalese citizens travelling to Russia to join its army.

A source in the Nepalese government said it did not know exactly how many Gurkhas had joined the mercenary force, but said “we have identified some of these youths and contacted their families to persuade them to return home”.
‘It should be stopped’

The Gurkhas, renowned around the world for their combat prowess, have served in the British Army since 1815. Tens of thousands of Gurkhas also serve in the Indian Army.

But last year, India replaced long-term employment with shorter contracts and eliminated pension benefits through the controversial Agnipath Scheme.

In response, Nepal temporarily suspended the recruitment process under the 1947 Tripartite Treaty involving Britain, India and Nepal.

The disruption to the established recruitment procedure has pushed Gurkha fighters towards Russia, which has also loosened its requirements for citizenship in an effort to entice volunteer fighters to join its forces in Ukraine.

Now, Nepal’s government is being urged to take action to stop its elite warriors from joining the Russian military.

“A Gurkha joining a Russian mercenary army tarnishes the pride of my nation. It should be stopped,” said Prem Singh Basnyat, a retired Nepalese Brigadier General.

“They might have been lured with good money and joined the mercenary group in disregard of the national interest,” he told The Telegraph.

Retired Major General Binoj Basnyat, a strategic analyst for the Nepal Army, said: “The Nepalese government should take immediate action and implement measures to prevent its citizens from joining the Russian military.

“Such participation goes against Nepal’s foreign policy of neutrality and non-alignment.”

The disruption to recruitment opportunities in the Indian Army have played a significant role in influencing the Gurkhas’ decision to join the Wagner Group, he added.

The Indian government has also been criticised for failing to protect the recruitment process that has helped Gurkhas find their way into service abroad for centuries.

“Gurkhas are universally acknowledged to be among the finest soldiers in the world,” said Jairam Ramesh, a spokesman for India’s main opposition Congress party. “Yet the ill-conceived Agnipath Scheme has interrupted a 200-year-old recruitment process and no Gurkha soldiers will be entering the Indian Army in 2023.”

He added: “This disruption is leading to Gurkhas being recruited by private military companies like the Wagner Group.”

Ukraine, Poland say Wagner fighters arrive in Belarus


Wagner fighters are training Belarusian soldiers in Belarus

Reuters
Updated Sun, July 16, 2023

(Reuters) -Fighters from the Wagner group have arrived in Belarus from Russia, Ukrainian and Polish officials said on Saturday, a day after Minsk said the mercenaries were training the country's soldiers southeast of the capital.

"Wagner is in Belarus," Andriy Demchenko, a spokesman for the Ukrainian border agency, said in a statement on the Telegram messaging app. He said the movement of "separate groups" from Russia had been observed in Belarus.

Some Wagner fighters have been in Belarus since at least Tuesday, two sources close to the fighters told Reuters.

The Belarusian defence ministry released a video on Friday, showing what it said were Wagner fighters instructing Belarusian soldiers at a military range near the town of Osipovichi.

Wagner's move to Belarus was part of a deal that ended the group's mutiny attempt in June - when they took control of a Russian military headquarters, marched on Moscow and threatened to tip Russia into civil war - President Vladimir Putin said.

Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin has not been seen in public since he left the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don late on June 24.

Poland's deputy minister coordinator of special services, Stanislaw Zaryn, said Warsaw also has confirmation of Wagner fighters' presence in Belarus.

"There may be several hundred of them at the moment," Zaryn said on Twitter.

Poland said this month it was bolstering its border with Belarus to address any potential threats.

While not sending his own troops to Ukraine, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko allowed Moscow to use Belarusian territory to launch its full-scale invasion on Ukraine in February 2022 and has since let his country be used as a base for Russian nuclear weapons.

The Belarusian Hajun project, which monitors military activity in the country and which is viewed as an extremist formation by Belarusian authorities, said a large column of at least 60 vehicles entered Belarus overnight Friday from Russia.

It said the vehicles, including trucks, pickups, vans and buses, had licence plates of the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics in what is internationally recognised as eastern Ukraine. In a move widely condemned as illegal, Moscow moved last year to annex the republics, which have been Russian proxies since 2014.

Hajun said it appeared that a Wagner column was headed to Tsel in central Belarus, where foreign reporters were last week shown a camp with hundreds of empty tents.

Video shared by Russian war correspondent Alexander Kotz on Saturday evening appeared to show a convoy of trucks and military vehicles on a highway in southern Russia, some of which were flying the Wagner flag.

Reuters could not independently verify the Belarusian Hajun report. There was no immediate comment from Russia or Belarus on the reports.

(Writing by Lidia Kelly in Melbourne and Mark Trevelyan in London; Additional reporting by Caleb Davis in Gdansk;)

Lukashenko's Calls To Prigozhin Tapped; But German Intel Failed To Predict Russian Mutiny I Details

According to a recent inquiry, the German intelligence service was aware of the Wagner insurrection before it happened. The German intelligence agency BND tapped the phone calls between Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko and Wagner Chief Yevgeny Prigozhin. However, BND is under fire for learning too late about the recent Wagner Group coup attempt in Russia. Watch this video to know more. 

‘It is like a virus that spreads’: business as usual for Wagner group’s extensive Africa network

Story by Jason Burke • Jul 6, 2023

THE GUARDIAN

Photograph: AP© Provided by The Guardian

Four days after Wagner group mercenaries marched on Moscow, a Russian envoy flew into Benghazi to meet a worried warlord. The message from the Kremlin to Khalifa Haftar, the self-styled general who runs much of eastern Libya, was reassuring: the more than 2,000 Wagner fighters, technicians, political operatives and administrators in the country would be staying.

“There will be no problem here. There may be some changes at the top but the mechanism will stay the same: the people on the ground, the money men in Dubai, the contacts, and the resources committed to Libya,” the envoy told Haftar in his fortified palatial residence. “Don’t worry, we aren’t going anywhere.”

The conversation, relayed to the Guardian by a senior Libyan former official with direct knowledge of the encounter, underlines the degree to which the Wagner group’s deployments and its extensive network of businesses across Africa is yet to be hit by the fallout from the rebellion of its founder and commander, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

The resilience of Wagner’s commercial operations despite the turmoil in Russia strongly suggests Vladimir Putin’s regime will seek to appropriate and exploit the lucrative web of hundreds of companies that Prigozhin built, rather than shut it down, experts believe.

Related: ‘He lived by the troll, he dies by the troll’: Putin takes on Prigozhin’s business empire

In Libya, there has been no abnormal movement of Wagner personnel, other than the redeployment of a small detachment of 50 closer to the border with Sudan.

The situation is similar elsewhere in the continent, according to sources in half a dozen African countries with knowledge of its operations.

“For the moment, it looks like Wagner’s operations are on hold. But they are successful and not so expensive, so it is very likely Wagner will be rebranded [by Moscow] while maintaining most of its assets and systems,” said Nathalia Dukhan, the author of a recent report on Wagner’s operations in Central African Republic (CAR) published by The Sentry, a US-based investigative organisation. “It is like a virus that spreads. They do not appear to be planning to leave. They are planning to continue.”

Though attention has mainly focused on Wagner’s combat role, particularly in Ukraine in recent months, analysts and western intelligence officials say that in Africa it is the group’s economic and political activities that are important to Putin’s regime.

“Since its first deployments in 2017, Wagner has really become much more widespread and high profile. Now the Kremlin certainly seems to be trying to emphasise continuity, if not immediate expansion,” said Julia Stanyard, an expert on Wagner at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, last week reassured allies in Africa that Wagner group fighters deployed to the continent would not be withdrawn. In an interview with Russia Today, Lavrov promised that “instructors” and “private military contractors” would remain in CAR and Mali, the two countries in sub-Saharan Africa where Wagner has the biggest presence.



A demonstration in Bangui, Central African Republic, in support of the Russian offensive against Ukraine, in May 2022. 

Photograph: Carol Valade/AFP/Getty Images© Provided by The Guardian

The most developed commercial operation run by Wagner is in CAR, where the group’s mercenaries arrived in 2018 to bolster the regime of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, which was struggling to fight off a rebel offensive.

From multiple bases in and around Bangui, CAR’s capital, Wagner has run an extensive mining operation across the country. The group has also begun making and selling beer and spirits, and has been granted a hugely profitable concession to exploit rainforests in the south of CAR.

The biggest single project is the vast Ndassima goldmine, which has been taken over by Wagner and is being developed. Poor infrastructure is thought to have restricted output at Ndassima, however, forcing Wagner to seek profits through the takeover of smaller mines along CAR’s remote eastern frontier region. Last year, Wagner fighters launched raids on goldmines there that killed dozens of people, witnesses interviewed by the Guardian said.

These operations are thought to be the primary responsibility of a small detachment of Wagner fighters, which also oversees the smuggling of gold and much else into Sudan, where the Wagner group has close contacts with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo currently fighting for control of the state.

Last month the US Treasury imposed a new round of sanctions that aimed to “disrupt key actors in the Wagner group’s financial network and international structure”.

Three companies were targeted, all involved in Africa. One was Midas Ressources, a CAR-based mining company linked to Prigozhin, which the US Treasury said “maintains ownership of CAR-based mining concessions and licenses for prospecting and extracting minerals, precious and semi-precious metals, and gems”, including the Ndassima mine.



A man waves a flag thanking Wagner in Mali, where the military group has a growing presence. Photograph: Florent Vergnes/AFP/Getty Images© Provided by The Guardian

Related video: Wagner troops surrender arms after aborted mutiny (France 24)
Duration 1:51  View on Watch


A second company targeted was Diamville, described by the Treasury as “a gold and diamond purchasing company based in the CAR and controlled by Prigozhin”, which the US alleges shipped diamonds mined in the CAR to buyers in the UAE and in Europe, using a third company under sanctions called Industrial Resources.

Experts have said diamonds would be useful for evading sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. “You can buy any goods anywhere with diamonds,” Dukhan, the analyst, said.

An earlier round of US and EU sanctions targeted Wagner’s holdings in Sudan, in particular a company called Meroe Gold. Recent EU sanctions listed further companies alleged to be “illegally trading gold and diamonds looted by force from local traders”.

Until fighting between rival factions in Sudan broke out in April, Wagner operatives ran an office near the airport in the capital, Khartoum, with bullion flown out from an airbase a short distance away in the desert, local officials and diplomats told the Guardian last year. Bullion is sent to the United Arab Emirates and Moscow for sale on to international markets.

The conflict in Sudan is thought to have constrained – but not entirely halted – Wagner’s extensive operations there, which are focused on gold mining and refining in collaboration with the paramilitary RSF.

The small Wagner detachment in Sudan has also had sporadic contacts in recent months with RSF, and may have supplied them with weapons, according to local sources, but has otherwise stayed away from significant involvement in the fighting.

“The priority is basically to keep the gold moving,” said one western security source who was recently forced to leave Khartoum by the fighting.

Last weekend, observers with multiple sources on the ground in CAR said there had been no evidence of movement of Wagner personnel on any of the poverty-hit country’s few major roads, nor at its principal airport.

On the Sudanese frontier, it was “business as usual”, according to Enrica Picco, central Africa director of the International Crisis Group.


A truck belonging to the Wagner group at an abandoned military base in Bangassou, Central African Republic.

 Photograph: Alexis Huguet/AFP/Getty Images© Provided by The Guardian

In Mali, where Wagner’s commercial operation is less well-developed, the group is thought to have struggled to make significant profits since deploying in December 2021. Diplomatic sources told the Guardian that Wagner had experienced difficulty accessing the goldmines they were allowed to exploit under the deal struck with the regime of military ruler Assimi Goïta but had been paid handsomely by the military regime.

The US believes Mali’s transition government has paid more than $200m (£157m) to Wagner since late 2021, the White House national security spokesperson, John Kirby, told reporters last week.

Political dividends have also been significant. Last week, the UN security council voted to withdraw its peacekeeping mission in Mali after a decade, allowing the country to swing further under the influence of Moscow. Earlier this month, Mali had asked the UN peacekeeping force to leave “without delay”, citing a “crisis of confidence” between Malian authorities and the UN mission.

Kirby said Prigozhin had helped engineer the UN’s departure “to further Wagner’s interests. We know that senior Malian officials worked directly with Prigozhin employees to inform the UN secretary general that Mali had revoked consent for the [UN] mission,” he said.

Local sources in Mali said a routine rotation of Wagner staff had been completed without incident in the days after the mutiny and mercenaries had continued operations with Malian forces fighting insurgents across the centre and north of the country.

In Libya, another sizeable contingent of Wagner mercenaries is deployed in the eastern part of the country controlled by the warlord Khalifa Haftar. The deployment has earned hundreds of millions of dollars in direct payments since the group participated in an abortive offensive to seize Tripoli in 2019, but has also offered opportunities to engage in oil smuggling on a massive scale, potentially earning similar sums.

There have been no abnormal movements of Wagner personnel in Libya either, since Prigozhin’s “mutiny”, according to a well-placed former official and analysts. Low-level fuel and weapons trafficking is thought to be continuing across Libya’s vast and largely unpoliced southern borders.

Speculation has been rife on social media accounts used by Wagner fighters in Mali, CAR and elsewhere that the group’s employees would be offered new contracts with the Russian state.

However, any process of “nationalisation” could lead to tensions, analysts said. Alia Brahimi, an expert on mercenaries at the Atlantic Council, said: “In theory, this should be quite straightforward, given the Wagner group’s origins as the Kremlin’s creature. But the commanders who ran the day to day in Africa, like [Ivan] Maslov in Mali who’s been personally sanctioned, were elevated by Prigozhin.

“They will have to reconcile the personal debt they owe to Prigozhin and their tribal identity as private operatives rather than public soldiers with more centralised Kremlin control,” he added.

“From the Kremlin’s side, the whole point and draw of letting Wagner off the leash in Africa was that they were a deniable force. Now the horrific crimes and abuses, as well as the economic predation, will have a clear return address.”

The destabilising effects on local regimes are already evident. There have been public disputes in CAR between ministers over Wagner’s exact role there, and senior officials have sought assurances that Russia will continue its support for Touadéra’s campaign to change the constitution to allow a third term as president. A referendum is due next month.

US officials believe Wagner in Mali has been using false documentation to hide the acquisition and transit of mines, uncrewed aerial vehicles, radar and counterbattery systems for use in Ukraine.

As the head of Wagner in Mali, Maslov “arranges meetings between Prigozhin and government officials from several African nations”, sanctions documents claim.

In the weeks before Prigozhin’s mutiny in Russia, there was evidence that Wagner was committing new resources and reinforcements to Mali and CAR, where Moscow wants to ensure a successful result for Touadéra’s ally in a coming referendum. Officials and diplomats in CAR have described Russia’s plan for a new major base, with capacity for up to 5,000 fighters, which would be a launchpad for Moscow’s geopolitical interests and operations in the surrounding countries.

Two other targets for the Kremlin are believed to be Burkina Faso and Chad, but the biggest prize would be the vast and resource-rich Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Last year, approaches were made by Wagner representatives to the president of DRC, Félix Tshisekedi, who eventually decided against hiring the group to fight against rebels in the vast country’s restive east in return for giving Wagner access to lucrative mining concessions. The bid to win new contracts and business opportunities in DRC was preceded by a significant influence operation masterminded by Prigozhin’s media specialists in St Petersburg.

Just four months ago, Wagner was mounting recruitment campaigns specifically for African operations, as evidence suggested deployments were being reinforced in CAR, Mali and elsewhere.

Wagner’s operations have always been closely aligned with Russia’s longer-term foreign policy objectives, analysts point out. In 2019, leaked memos obtained by the Guardian revealed the Kremlin’s aim to use clandestine influence operations in Africa to build relations with existing rulers, strike military deals, and groom a new generation of “leaders” and undercover “agents” in Africa. One goal was to “strong arm” the US and the former colonial powers the UK and France out of the region. Another was to see off “pro-western” uprisings, the documents said.

 

WHAT ABOUT ERIC PRINCE?!

Guest Post: “Wagner Group Atrocities – Holding Russia Accountable Under Prosecutor v. Tadic?”  

BY CHARLIE DUNLAP, J.D. · 13 AUGUST 2022

Today’s guest post is by Army judge advocate LTC Alex Kostin (writing in his personal capacity).  He argues for accountability for the atrocities allegedly committed in Ukraine by the Russian military company, the Wagner Group, and provides a path for doing so. 

What is the Wagner Group?  Last April the BBC reported on its origins and said this:

“British military intelligence says 1,000 mercenaries from the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, are being deployed to eastern Ukraine. The group has been active over the past eight years in Ukraine, Syria and African countries, and has repeatedly been accused of war crimes and human rights abuses.”

Notably, in the U.S. view merely being a mercenary is not illegal under international law.  The DoD Law of War Manual (¶ 4.21) says:

“The act of being a mercenary is not a crime in customary international law nor in any treaty to which the United States is a Party.Under the customary law of war and the GPW, “mercenaries” receive the rights, duties, and liabilities of combatant status on the same basis as other persons.” 

The U.S. does recognize that there are a “number of treaty provisions [that] are intended to repress mercenary activities” but points out that the “United States has not accepted any such provision because these efforts are not consistent with fundamental principles of the law of war.” (¶ 4.21.1).   

For a variety of technical and other reasons, even those States parties to treaties intended to repress mercenary activities have nevertheless had little success in prosecuting the Group for being mercenaries.

However, the focus of this post is not simply about being a “mercenary,” per se, but rather the commission of war crimes.  On that score the U.S. insists:

“Mercenaries must comply with the law of war and may be tried and punished for violations of the law of war on the same basis as other persons. States that employ mercenaries are responsible for their conduct, including their compliance with the law of war.” (¶ 4.21) 

LTC Kostin concludes that the Group is, de facto, an entity of the Russian state, and it is responsible for the Wagner Group’s actions. 

Importantly, he further contends that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) case of the Prosecutor v. Tadic provides a useful blueprint as to how a prosecution might be framed, to include holding the Russian state accountable. 

Lots to think about here, so take a look at his argument!

Wagner Group Atrocities – Holding Russia Accountable Under Prosecutor v. Tadic?  

by LTC Alex A, Kostin, USAR, JAGC*

February 24, 2022, marked a dark page in the world’s history when Russia launched an unprovoked war against Ukraine. The international community should not let Russia get away with the gross international humanitarian law (IHL) violations committed by its Wagner mercenaries, Russia’s de facto state actors. 

There is clear evidence that Russian state actors, such as the military, have violated IHL, and the recent buzz surrounding the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor’s opened investigation suggests the international community will not let these abuses go entirely unexcused (though it is relevant to note the ICC is a court of individual criminal responsibility, not state responsibility).

However, the international community must also punish the IHL violations committed by Russia’s de facto state actors, the Wagner mercenaries.  Wagner, while an officially private military contractor, is, I will show below, a paramilitary group under overall Russian state control acting as a de facto unit of the Russian military. 

Were an international tribunal adjudicating such atrocities to apply Tadic’s “overall control” test, it would likely succeed in holding Moscow responsible for the Wagner group’s actions.

In recent years, Wagner has committed gross IHL violations in Ukraine and worldwide. 

Wagner is actively fighting in Ukraine after sending most of its foot soldiers there.  To boost its Ukrainian presence, the group opened its ranks to men with criminal histories, those with unpaid debts sought by Russian law enforcement, and foreigners. While the current war in Ukraine is its latest battlefield, the group participated in Russia’s proxy wars in eastern Ukraine in 2014-15, Libya, and Syria (where it attacked American-backed forces resulting in mass casualties among the mercenaries).

The group maintains an active presence in the Central African Republic (per the 2019 investigation by Novaya Gazeta, Wagner was suspected of murdering Russian journalists who came to investigate its activities there) and other African countries.  Further, Wagner’s atrocities are well documented. In 2017, an Assad army deserter was brutally murdered by Wagner members.  

BBC collected at least two eyewitness’ accounts that Wagner intentionally killed prisoners in Libya in 2019. As of March of 2022, Wagner has been accused of murdering 300 civilians in Mali and scores of civilians in the Central African Republic. 

Prior to the war in Ukraine, Russia was able to avoid accountability for Wagner’s atrocities.

The Russian state has consistently denied any connection to the group, and no authoritative tribunal has made a formal ruling regarding attribution. In September of 2021, Putin’s spokesperson falsely claimed Russian private military companies were providing solely “consultative and security” services.

Putin falsely claimed that private Russian military companies in Syria had nothing to do with the Russian state. These denials indicate that Russia is aware of the 1986 International Court of Justice decision, Nicaragua v. United States of America (“Nicaragua”).

Nicaragua created an exceptionally high attribution threshold. Under Nicaragua, a paramilitary unit can only be found a de facto state organ when 1) the state paid, financed, and coordinated/supervised the group’s actions, and 2) the state “specifically ‘directed or enforced’ the perpetuation” of IHL violations by the group “with respect to the specific operation in the course of which [IHL] breaches may have been committed.”  Tadic at 40.  In other words, under Nicaragua, the unit’s action could be attributed to the State only if it was completely dependent on the State.

After committing mass IHL violations in Ukraine, it should be harder for Russia to escape attribution. 

Things changed after Putin’s army executed and tortured Ukrainian civilians en masse in the town of Bucha, leading to the investigations of Russian war crimes.  Further, evidence of Wagner’s atrocities in Ukraine is becoming available – in May of 2022, the Ukrainian state charged Wagner fighters with the brutal murder of a Ukrainian village mayor and her family. The group committed the crime alongside Russian soldiers.

The Tadic attribution test should be used to hold Russia responsible for Wagner’s gross IHL violations.

If an international tribunal for prosecution of Russian war crimes in Ukraine is established to adjudicate, among other things, whether gross IHL violations committed by Wagner should be attributed to Russia, there are several reasons why Tadic should be applied to determine whether Russia should be held responsible. 

Russia is not entitled to escape responsibility for the HL violations committed by its mercenaries.

a) Tadic explains that “states are not allowed on the one hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other to dissociate themselves from such conduct when these individuals breach international law.”  at 48.

Attributing Wagner’s IHL violations is particularly important for this war of aggression.  To avoid application of the Geneva Conventions (GC), Russia refuses to acknowledge that this war is an international armed conflict. The state claims it never invaded Ukraine, but is conducting a “special operation.”   Russia has also made calling the war an invasion a domestic offense punishable by up to 15 years in prison.

The international community should not reward Russia by accepting this blatantly false characterization.  As Prof. Alexander Proelss of the University of Hamburg Faculty of Law explained at the May 2022 Cushing International Law conference (which this author was privileged to attend), “the aggressor is not entitled to ‘downgrade conflict’ and thus escape the requirements of the international humanitarian law.”  

b.) Under Tadic, it is easier to establish state control over an actor when the state attempts to occupy another state.

Tadic holds that a state is in overall control of an organized paramilitary group if it finances and militarily assists such a group and coordinates or helps in the general planning of the group’s military activity. Id. at 56. For the state to be held responsible, it is not necessary for it to issue specific instructions to commit IHL violations.  Id. at 56, 59.  

Where the state controlling the paramilitary group is a geographically adjacent state with territorial ambitions in the area where the conflict is taking place, and it is attempting to achieve its territorial enlargement through armed forces which it formally controls, it may be easier to meet the threshold for establishing control over a paramilitary group.  Id. at 59-60. 

c) The relationship between the Wagner group and the Russian state meets the overall control test.  Under Tadic, the degree of state control needed to attribute a group’s gross IHL violations to a state may vary depending on the factual circumstances of each case. Id. at 47-48. Tadic drew a distinction between an individual (or an unorganized group of individuals) and a paramilitary group. 

The threshold for establishing control over individuals is higher, because it would be necessary to show that the state issued specific instructions to each individual. Id. at 48-49.  Paramilitary groups during war, on the other hand, have a structure, a chain of command, a corresponding set of rules, and outward symbols of authority. 

The individuals in these groups normally do not act on their own but are subject to the authority of the group’s commander.  Id. at 49. To hold a state responsible for IHL violations committed by a paramilitary group, it is sufficient to show that the group was under overall control of the state.  Id.  The Tadic distinction is correctly drawn.  When a paramilitary group is equipped, financed and organized by the state, it is reasonable to assume the group’s commanders are controlled by that state.

Its commanders ensure its fighters act per their directions, which they receive from the controlling state.  Consequently, when overall state control is shown, the state is responsible regardless of whether the state directed the specific IHL violations and even in situations when the group performs contrary to the state’s instructions.  Id. at 49-50.

d) Finally, unlike Nicaragua, Tadic is grounded in international precedent.  Tadic explained that the test proposed by Nicaragua is at variance with the international judicial and State precedent that held States responsible in the circumstances where a lower degree of control that that demanded by the Nicaragua test was exercised.  at 51. 

In support of this argument, Tadic cited multiple decisions which held countries responsible for the actions of paramilitary groups on the basis of overall control, without inquiring whether the countries specifically directed the groups to commit IHL violations. Id. at 51- 56.

To hold Russia accountable for Wagner’s gross IHL violations, a Tadic-based framework should be used.

The prosecution should establish that: a) Wagner is a currently existing Russia-authorized mercenary paramilitary group; b) the mercenaries committing gross IHL violations belong to Wagner; c) Russia financed, supplied, and provided training and/or medical treatment for Wagner; and d) Russia has overall control of Wagner – i.e. that Wagner is operating with Russian military forces with the Russian goal of occupying Ukraine and defeating Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF)). 

a) Wagner is a mercenary group authorized by Russia. Contrary to Russia’s boldfaced denials, Wagner exists.  In 2021, the European Union imposed sanctions against some of its commanders. In Syria, its mercenaries attacked US-supported Syrian positions at Deir Ezzor in February of 2018. It fought as a de facto Russian army’s auxiliary unit during the Russia-sponsored war in eastern Ukraine in 2014-2015, Syria, Libya, and other African countries. The best proof  that Wagner’s existence is fully authorized by Russia is, that under Russian law, the group is a criminal organization.  

The Russian Constitution’s Art. 13 prohibits “existence and activities of … public organizations whose goals are …creation of paramilitary units….”  So, Russian law makes recruiting, training and financing mercenaries and serving as a mercenary in combat a felony.  Thus, if the Russian state followed its own law, Wagner would have been banned as a criminal organization with its members serving long felony prison terms. 

Quite the opposite is happening in Russia – Wagner is openly recruiting and training in Russia (see subsection c, below) and is fighting in Ukraine and elsewhere.  Considering the extreme centralization of decision-making in Russia in the hands of its strongman, the only reasonable explanation for Wagner’s thriving in Russia is that the group was created and authorized by the Russian state and Putin personally.

b) Wagner mercenaries are committing gross IHL breaches.  Its members are mercenaries as defined by the GC AP Art. 47(2).  They are recruited to and take part in the armed conflict. They are motivated to do so by the desire for private gain (they were paid around $5000 a month in Libya), are not parties to a conflict, are not members of the Russian armed forces, and have not been sent by a State that is a non-party to the conflict on official duty as members of its armed forces. 

To establish that the mercenaries committing gross IHL breaches in Ukraine belong to Wagner, the prosecution would need to present evidence of the Wagner-identifiable items found on the fighters, their confessions, and the information they post on social networks. 

Combat military medals awarded by Russia (a 2021 investigation showed its commanders were awarded Russia’s most prestigious military awards reserved for military/law enforcement),  paraphernalia such as distinctive dog tags (according to the official UAF’s intelligence directorate channel, a Wagner dog tag was taken off the body of a mercenary in March of 2022), and identifiable Wagner patches could offer compelling identification of Wagner individuals.

c) Russia finances, trains, and provides army-grade weaponry and medical treatment to Wagner.  To hide Wagner’s connection to the government, candidates apply for civilian jobs through shell companies and are not recruited directly.  However, Wagner members are openly training at the site next to the airborne unit’s base.  Its fighters were also evacuated and treated in Russian military hospitals after fighting in Syria.

It would be difficult to track down Russian state financing of Wagner, as it is financed through a string of shell companies connected to Mr. Prigozhin, a member of Putin’s inner circle.  Information obtained from Wagner’s records, confessions of Wagner’s fighters, and investigation of Prigozhin’s group of companies would likely help prosecutors trace Wagner’s direct financing to Russia.

The prosecution would also need to produce evidence of Wagner’s active participation in combat and use of Russian army-grade modern military equipment/weaponry to set it apart from the military and security contactors Russia claims they are. 

The internationally recognized 2008 Montreux document explains legitimate contractors can provide “armed guarding and protection of persons and objects…; maintenance and operation of weapons systems; prisoner detention; and advice to or training of local forces and security personnel.” 

The Russian-army grade heavy weaponry Wagner is using in combat is by definition not used by contractors.  The documented combat use of such equipment by Wagner operatives indicates it is a de facto Russian military unit. Wagner’s attack at Deir Ezzor using heavy weaponry indicates it is equipped with the weapons available solely to the Russian army. 

The BBC exposé on Wagner’s activities shows it commonly requests and uses such heavy weaponry.  The information BBC obtained indicated Wagner planted several types of Russian-made anti-personnel mines, and its supply order included advanced weaponry such as assault rifles, night vision goggles, compact radar systems, T-72 tanks, and 120-mm mortars. 

d) Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s territory shows it is in overall control of Wagner. The Ukrainian war made proving the second Tadic prong easier.  The Russian army’s occupation in southeastern Ukraine shows that Putin’s goal is annexation of the Donbass region of Ukraine and connecting Crimea to Russia via Donbass. 

To prove that Russia has “overall control”, prosecutors would need to demonstrate that Wagner participated in combat operations along with the Russian forces pursuing joint goals of defeating the UAF and occupying Ukraine’s territory. This would be prima facie evidence that the group and Russia have shared military objectives in Ukraine, and consequently that Russia has overall control of Wagner.

Conclusion

With the mounting evidence of Russia’s atrocities, the need for an international tribunal for prosecution of Russian war crimes became more urgent. Use of Tadic’s “overall control” test by such a tribunal would allow the international community to hold Putin’s regime responsible so it can no longer hide behind the back of its thugs-for-hire.

About the author 

LTC Alex Kostin, USAR, is a reserve judge advocate currently serving in the National Security Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, as a National Security Law attorney.  On his 5th active duty tour, he previously served an Integrated Disability Evaluation System (IDES) counsel, trial counsel, and as a legal assistance/administrative law attorney, both in the U.S. and overseas.  In the reserves, he served as a CJA for the IO Brigade and the Division, and in other capacities.  As a civilian, he works as a post-conviction attorney representing Washington Department of Corrections in federal and state courts.  He is bilingual (Russian is his native language) and that allowed him to use Russian sources for this post.

Disclaimers:

*The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or any part of the US Government.

The views expressed by guest authors do not necessarily reflect my views or those of the Center on Law, Ethics and National Security, or Duke University.  See also here.

Remember what we like to say on Lawfire^®: gather the facts, examine the law, evaluate the arguments – and then decide for yourself!