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Friday, March 27, 2026

 

South Africa’s morass of unemployment: Causes, consequences and the need for communes

Abahlali baseMjondolo

South Africa faces a staggering unemployment crisis, far exceeding the levels of joblessness during the Great Depression in the United States and even in Weimar Germany. The consequences of this have been catastrophic for the working class — its members are mired in poverty, social cohesion is breaking down, and despair has become widespread.

Despite campaigns by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the state has proved unwilling to address the crisis, beyond offering some temporary and below minimum wage work in its Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). Meanwhile capitalists in South Africa have generated unemployment, and arguably benefit from it. Indeed, capitalists — along with the state, which has played a central role — have shaped the economy in a way that has led to high unemployment and placed downward pressure on wages. Financialisation has only further exacerbated the situation.

In the face of all this, some community-based movements are experimenting with projects such as communes, to address dire poverty due to unemployment. It is here that hope lies for greater organising and working class communities building mutual aid, communalism and movements that can alleviate the symptoms of unemployment while building a base to confront capital and the state.

The scale of South Africa's unemployment crisis can be gleaned from the latest official jobless figures, which indicate that 31.4% of working age people are without work. This figure, though, does not tell the full story. If people who have given up seeking work due to despair are included, the rate rises to 42.1%, giving a more accurate picture.

Within this sea of unemployment, it is Black working class women and youth that are disproportionately impacted. For instance, the expanded definition rate of unemployment among youth in 2024 was 60.2%.

Genesis and development of South African capitalism

The manner capitalism developed in South Africa, and subsequently evolved, has led to a propensity towards high unemployment.

Capitalism had its origins in South Africa with the discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape province in 1867 and gold in the Gauteng area in 1886.

Gold mining in particular shaped the economy. Shortly after its genesis, large corporations, with strong links to finance, came to dominate the industry. This was due to the vast amounts of capital required — along with the extremely cheap labour of Black workers — to make deep level mining (the dominant form of gold mining in South Africa) profitable.

The key mining sector was therefore highly monopolised, centralised and capital intensive, barring the possibility of smaller competitors arising and suppressing labour levels. From the start, capitalism in South Africa had an in-built trend towards high unemployment levels.

To create a large pool of cheap workers, colonial and apartheid states seized the bulk of the land from the Black population and imposed hut and poll taxes to force people into wage labour. Small-scale farming that could sustain families became unviable for the majority of the Black population, who were forced to sell their labour to the mines, factories and farms owned by white capitalists. Cheap labour — with high unemployment and racial oppression driving down wages — defined capitalism in South Africa.

Between 1940 and the 1970s, unemployment rates dropped. Much of the decline was related to some diversification of the economy, fuelled by a global economic boom in the two decades after World War II. Between 1945 and the late 1960s, the unemployment rate fell, while wages for Black workers, although still extremely low, began to climb.

Nonetheless, much of the diversification and development of an industrial base remained tied to mining. Energy, chemical, oil and explosive sectors emerged — driven by the state and private capital — but these largely remained geared to meeting the needs of the expanding mining sector.

Beyond light manufacturing, robust steel, arms and automotive industries, a large heavy industrial base did not fully emerge. The economy remained largely tethered to the model of exporting raw materials and importing machinery and manufactured industrial goods. It remained vulnerable to high unemployment when raw material prices declined or key mineral reserves became exhausted.

Gold production expanded with the development of new reefs up until the late 1960s, but by the 1970s the global economy began to experience a crisis largely due to over-accumulation. This was exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis and 1979 Volcker shock. By the 1980s gold reserves in South Africa began to decline.

The consequences for the economy were devastating. Profit levels dropped along with investment in productive sectors of the economy, including industry. Unemployment rose rapidly as corporations cut their workforces to raise profits under crisis conditions and shied away from new investments.

Although unemployment figures for the 1960s and ’70s may not be accurate (unemployment in the Bantustans was high), the expanded unemployment rate rose from an estimated 6.7% in 1960 to 10.6% in 1983.

The declining economic situation was compounded by the political situation in the country. As pressure mounted in the 1980s against apartheid, several multinational companies, such as British Leyland, Barclays Bank and General Motors, withdrew from South Africa. The apartheid state, which worked closely with South African capital, came to an understanding that leading local corporations would purchase these multinationals’ South African entities.

Feeding into this was the reality that it was extremely difficult for South African corporations to expand internationally due to sanctions. Large corporations were therefore already inclined to expand into other sectors of the economy.

The 1980s was defined by the largest corporations snapping up the assets of multinationals exiting South Africa and becoming conglomerates with holding interests in the finance, food processing, industrial, mining, services, property and agricultural sectors.

By the end of the 1980s, six conglomerates — Anglo-American, Sanlam, SA Mutual, Rembrandt, Liberty Life and AngloVaal — owned 84% of the shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Anglo-American alone controlled 52.5% of all shares listed on the JSE at its peak.

This extreme monopolisation meant any potential new competitor in any sector of the economy was either crowded out or taken over by one of the conglomerates. Consequently, the conglomerates embarked on a spree of mergers and acquisitions of smaller entities, as opposed to greenfield investments in the 1980s. Job creation was anemic and the expanded unemployment rate grew to an estimated 23% by 1991.

Compounding the situation, conglomerates also increasingly, and often illegally, whisked money into tax havens or sat on cash in the run up to the 1994 elections, fearing nationalisation might occur under an African National Congress (ANC) government. (Currently, non-financial South African corporations may be sitting on up to R 1,8 trillion in cash rather than re-investing in the productive sector)

Financialisation and unemployment

From the mid-1990s onwards, the South African economy experienced even more profound changes that not only did not alleviate high unemployment rates, but entrenched them even further.

While elements of trade and financial liberalisation were experimented with by the apartheid government, full trade and investment liberalisation was only implemented post-1994, in particular with the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program of the ANC-led state in 1996.

Trade liberalisation had a negative impact on light industry, such as the footwear and textile sectors, resulting in huge job losses. In the textile industry alone, more than 38,000 jobs were lost between 1995–2001. With import tariffs being halved over this period, local manufacturers simply could not compete with cheap imports. Many closed their doors and retrenched their entire workforces.

The biggest changes, nonetheless, occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the conglomerates relisted in Britain or Australia, unbundled and financialised. By the late 1990s, Anglo-American had shifted its primary listing to the London Stock Exchange, while Gencor purchased Billiton and shifted its listing to Australia. In the process vast amounts of capital were withdrawn from South Africa by these corporations rather than being reinvested in production, thereby adding to unemployment.

Simultaneously, these conglomerates unbundled. Part of this saw these corporations focusing on sectors they saw as core to their business and selling or simply closing subsidiaries in sectors they identified as non-core.

Anglo-American sold its subsidiaries in the retail, industrial, financial, agricultural, food processing and service sectors to focus on the mining sector. Coupled with this, it transformed its London head office into a holding company and broke its mining operations into specific companies, such as Anglo-Gold, Anglo-Platinum and Anglo-Coal.

This was aimed at increasing shareholder value — as a conglomerate the assets of Anglo-American were larger than its share value up until 2000; unbundling the conglomerate was intended to reverse this situation to the benefit of shareholders. Financial institutions and hedge funds increasingly became the dominant shareholders from the late 1990s onwards.

By the mid-2000s, most conglomerates in South Africa had unbundled and used the funds to focus on core sectors, including importantly on expanding globally. Sectors including gold mining, platinum mining, chemicals, explosives and banking remained highly centralised and monopolised, centred around the new companies created from unbundling.

Linked to the process, high share prices and regular, large dividend payouts became the key goals of restructured companies. To assist in achieving this, barriers to foreign speculators purchasing shares on the JSE were eased. Foreign ownership of shares rose dramatically, from almost zero in the late 1980s to more than 38% by 1999 and a high of 52% in the years before the COVID-19 pandemic (this has now declined to about 32%).

This influx of foreign shareholding was of a short-term and speculative nature. Linked to boosting share prices, since 2000 all companies listed on the JSE have undertaken frequent bouts of share buybacks to inflate the prices, which is at the heart of financialisation.

Increasingly financialised companies have spent vast sums of capital on buying their own shares to inflate prices, at the expense of investing in production or greenfield projects. This has contributed to weak job creation and high unemployment.

Adding to the process of financialisation has been the deregulation of insurance companies, pension fund companies and mutual societies since the 2000s. Up until this point, a portion of the investments of these corporations, such as Sanlam, Old Mutual and Liberty Life, had to be made in productive sectors and greenfield projects. This helped to ensure at least some new employment.

However, after requirements were dropped, these companies almost solely focused on speculating on financial instruments, such shares, bonds and derivatives, or at best property. This reduction in investments in productive sectors contributed to high unemployment.

Another feature of financialisation is the changes to the way management is remunerated. Prior to financialisation, managers in most corporations were paid mainly via cash; few owned shares in the companies they managed. Today, in financialised companies, a significant portion of managers’ remuneration is paid via share options to incentivise management to focus on high share-prices and regular dividend payouts.

One way to ensure high share prices is to hire as few workers as possible: in a financialised economy, company share prices tend to rise when they retrench workers. Lean workforces are a feature of financialised companies, even in the manufacturing sector. Via payment through share options, managers are incentivised to maintain lean workforces.

For example, in 1999 the largest explosives and chemicals company in South Africa, AECI, had a workforce of 9850. After financialisation, the number of workers employed dropped to 7186 in 2024.

The legacy of land dispossession, an extremely centralised and monopolised economy, along with financialisation and slow or stagnant growth, has marked the liberalisation of the economy, which led to an expanded unemployment rate of 42.1%.

Impact of unemployment on working-class communities

High levels of unemployment have had devastating consequences for sections of the working class, especially youth, Blacks and women. Due to huge unemployment, South Africa continues to be among the most unequal countries: while the wealthiest 10% own an estimated 85% of the wealth, more than 55% of the population lives in poverty (using the upper-bound poverty line) and 17.6% live in extreme poverty.

More than 2 million households do not have formal housing and are either homeless or live in shacks. It is also estimated that the poorest 40% spends at least half their income on food and non-alcoholic beverages, and cannot afford even the most basic basket of foodstuffs.

We are now in a situation where more than 50% of all South Africans experience hunger or are at risk of going hungry. There is no greater confirmation of a country in crisis than when a majority do not have enough to eat.

The fact that such a large portion of people are unemployed and live in desperate and deprived circumstances poses dangers and leads to fragmentation in society. Under intense pressure to survive in a neoliberal system that values a person according to their wealth and blames unemployment on the individual, many communities, including in rural areas, are increasingly suffering from mental health issues.

Other problems such as alcohol and drug abuse, especially among youth seeking some escape from the dire reality, have become increasing problems in communities. Many youth are becoming involved in gangsterism, which is one of the few routes that offers instant wealth.

Along with substance abuse, gender-based violence has become prevalent: South Africa now has one of the highest rates of violence against women, rivaling some war zones.

The rise of xenophobia and ethno-nationalism

While individuals are blamed as lazy or unskilled for being unemployed, there is a growing number of politicians and local capitalists attempting to attract the support of unemployed people by using xenophobia and tribalism to scapegoat “others” for the unemployment crisis.

Politicians are trying to use national and ethno-nationalism/tribalism — which was central to the apartheid system — to gain support for reactionary and divisive agendas. Politicians and business people avoid discussions about the real cause of unemployment (government policies, the centralisation of the economy and financialisation) by blaming people they identify as foreign or from other ethnic groups for taking jobs or receiving benefits from the state at other’s expense.

One of the saddest ironies is that, in a country where the majority of people fought apartheid and received support from neighbouring countries, working people seeking employment from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho are loathed as “others” by a significant section of the population, while they see South African capitalists as kindred.

Such scapegoating is a local form of the extreme right wing that has emerged internationally, with movements such as Make America Great Again, and poses a real danger that could lead to violence and the balkanisation of the country.

Understanding, addressing and organising to alleviate the worst material, emotional and mental impacts of unemployment on working class youth and women is key. It is also vital to stem growing xenophobia and tribalism, through which “others” are blamed for the unemployment crisis.

Communes address unemployment and more

While several NGOs and social movements have lobbied the state and protested against unemployment, the state has not taken decisive measures to address unemployment, beyond employing people in work such as cleaning streets, cutting grass on road verges and picking up litter at below minimum wage and on three-month contracts.

The state has instead implemented austerity for the working class (while assisting capitalists), which has exacerbated aspects of the unemployment crisis.

While not letting the state and capital off the hook for the high levels of unemployment, some community-based organisations, such as Abahlali baseMjondolo, have formed communes to address the poverty associated with unemployment and grow and sustain their organisation.

Without addressing the material conditions people face, including hunger and unemployment, it is very difficult for movements to retain and expand membership. Unless you can show that people can improve their lives by being a member, it is extremely difficult to keep members.

The experiments that Abahlali baseMjondolo have conducted in establishing and building communes in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal have seen community members in settlements coming together to establish food gardens, community centres, libraries and even communal kitchens. These are democratically run, and while they cannot in and of themselves end hunger and totally end unemployment, they can and do alleviate it.

Linked to the political education that is run in the community centres, they also help to build communal living and provide a sense of community that directly addresses working class fragmentation. They provide a sense of belonging to something bigger than oneself that is progressive and offers hope.

This can be used to concretely combat xenophobia and tribalism, and the unemployment and hopelessness that is feeding it. Throughout its history, Abahlali baseMjondolo has been successful in addressing xenophobia and tribalism in the settlements it organises. Its members deeply identify with their movement, creating a sense of unity.

Abahlali baseMjondolo’s communes offer an example for other community organisations. While demands must be made for the state and capital to address unemployment, organisations need to materially address poverty if they are to grow. Communes can do this.

Communes can also provide a progressive sense of belonging and hope, and generate resources to help sustain organisations in a context of high unemployment.

Communes also show that a communal life based on solidarity is possible. They show — even if in a limited way — that the working class is capable of self-governing and producing with a focus on need. In this, they offer a glimpse of what building blocks of working-class self-governance could look like beyond capitalism and the state.

As such, they can be used as springboards to extend working class self-governance against the state, and hopefully one day be part of the structures that the working class use to take over and co-ordinate the means of production — and put a permanent end to unemployment.

To paraphrase the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), by organising through communes we can alleviate poverty, build unity and combat nationalism, but we can also form the structures of the new society within the shell of the old.

Saturday, March 21, 2026

FE

UK to cut steel import quotas, raise tariffs to protect domestic industry

Stock image.

Britain will lower its tariff-free quota on imported steel and double the tariff on imports exceeding that quota, the government said on Thursday, launching a plan to protect its small but strategically and politically sensitive steel sector.

Steelmakers have struggled to survive in the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution after decades of decline driven by long-term de-industrialization and, more recently, by high energy costs and a global glut of cheap steel.

The government will cut the amount of steel that can be imported without incurring tariffs by 60%. Imports above that new level will face a 50% tariff – twice the previous rate of 25%. The changes will come into force on July 1.

The move brings Britain’s tariff rates into line with recent increases in the United States and proposals by the European Union, against a backdrop of heightened global trade tensions as US President Donald Trump uses trade measures to further his “America First” agenda.

The British government also said that its National Wealth Fund would make up to 2.5 billion pounds ($3.33 billion) available to help finance investment in the sector and that it wanted 50% of steel used in Britain to be produced domestically, up from the current target of 30%.

“Making steel in the UK is vital for national security, critical infrastructure and the wider economy,” Business Secretary Peter Kyle said in a statement.

“With this strategy we are closing the decades-long chapter of destructive de-industrialization and committing instead to strengthening and sustaining Britain as a steel-making nation.”

Unions and industry bodies welcomed the measures.

The sector only accounted for 0.1% of UK economic output in 2024 but supported 37,000 jobs, many in heartlands of the governing Labour Party which grew from a trade union movement deeply rooted in Britain’s industrial heritage.

Two of the country’s biggest steelmakers have faced financial troubles in recent years.

Tata Steel has closed its blast furnaces at Port Talbot, while the government had to seize control of British Steel to prevent the shutdown of its Scunthorpe plant under Chinese owner Jingye, taking on huge costs in the process.

($1 = 0.7502 pounds)

(By William James; Editing by Edmund Klamann)


U.K. Bets on Tariffs to Rebuild Its Steel Industry


  • The U.K. will cut tariff-free steel import quotas by 60% and impose 50% tariffs beyond limits to boost domestic output.

  • The policy aims to meet 50% of national steel demand locally, backed by £2.5 billion in state support.

  • Critics warn that higher costs and flawed carbon pricing rules could hurt competitiveness and investment.

The UK government has reduced steel import quotas and raised tariffs to 50 per cent outside unit limits as part of a strategy to save the industry, an “bold” move that is likely to draw criticism from economists and opposition groups. 

Quotas for imports free from the higher tariffs will be reduced by 60 per cent from July. The government has set a target for domestic production to support half of steel demand in the UK.

“Making steel in the UK is vital for national security, critical infrastructure and the wider economy,” Business Secretary Peter Kyle said. 


“With this strategy we are closing the decades-long chapter of destructive de-industrialisation and committing instead to strengthening and sustaining Britain as a steel-making nation.” 

The move to introduce tariffs has already led to backlash from the Conservatives, with shadow business secretary Andrew Griffith hitting out at the government’s decision to introduce a new tax on businesses. 

“Raising the cost of imported steel means more cost for the construction industry, less infrastructure investment, and is a further blow to the diminishing number of firms making things in the UK,” Griffith said. 

“Astonishingly, almost a year on, the government seems no closer to making the Chinese owner of British Steel Scunthorpe step up to their liabilities.”

“Labour don’t understand business and these tariffs now join the list of taxes and employment red tape which are choking growth and making us all poorer.”

Steel industry’s mixed response

UK Steel, the main industry body for the sector, said the government’s reforms were “incredibly bold” but warned that a net zero pricing scheme for trade and higher energy prices could undermine businesses’ competitiveness. 

Gareth Stace, the director general of UK Steel, said: “The government’s bravery in taking the required measures represents a real shift in the culture of Westminster from protecting the ideology of free trade at any cost, to defending critical industries and national security.

But an energy policy chief at the body said the government strategy’s approach to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which attempts to equalise net zero costs between domestic products and imports, risked “achieving precisely the opposite” of the scheme’s aim. 

“As it stands, the UK CBAM could favour imported Chinese steel over steel made in the UK,” Frank Aaskov, the energy policy director at UK Steel, said. 

The government is also set to finance steel production through the national Wealth Fund, with £2.5bn set to be injected into manufacturers by 2030. 

Some of the cash would go towards investments in building electric arc furnaces, which the government said would “support net zero”. 

It will also go towards supporting operations at Scunthorpe after the government took control of manufacturing under Chinese company Jingye Group’s ownership, with British Steel on the brink of collapse until Labour stepped in to keep blast furnaces on in April 2025. 

National Audit Office report said this week that operations were costing the Department of Business and Trade about £1.3m a day, with the government already spending £377m in nine months.

By City AM


Column: China’s robust iron ore imports are going into storage, not steel


Port Zhuhai, China. Stock image.

China increased imports of iron ore at the start of this year, but the extra volumes are being used to build inventories to record highs rather than lift steel production.

The increase in imports appears largely driven by softer prices for the key steel ​raw material, but it is also fortuitous given the potential for the fallout from the US and Israeli attacks on Iran to spread ‌beyond energy markets.

China, which buys about three-quarters of global seaborne iron ore, saw arrivals of 210.02 million metric tons in the first two months of 2026, up 10% from the same period a year earlier, according to customs data released on March 10.

The robust start to the year came after imports hit a record monthly high of 119.65 million tons in December, which took ​arrivals for 2025 to an all-time annual high of 1.26 billion tons.

The strength in iron ore imports isn’t because of higher steel production, with output ​in the first two months dropping 3.6% from the same period in 2025 to 160.34 million tons, according to official data released ⁠on March 16.

The weaker steel production continued the trend from 2025, when annual output dropped to a seven-year low of 960.81 million tons.

Rather than being consumed by steel ​mills, China has been building stockpiles, with port inventories monitored by consultants SteelHome rising to 166.91 million tons in the week to March 13.

This is up 28% from ​the recent low of 130.1 million tons in early August and is the highest in SteelHome data going back to 2012, eclipsing the previous record of 161.98 million in June 2018.

There are several factors driving China’s strong imports of iron ore, but the primary one is likely price.

Singapore Exchange contracts had been on a declining trend since reaching a 14-month high of $108.89 a ton ​on January 12.

The decline in prices ended at $98.20 a ton on February 20, but it lasted long enough to boost arrivals at the start of the year ​and likely into March as well, with commodity analysts Kpler estimating seaborne imports of around 109 million tons.

Strong supply from top exporters Australia and Brazil in the absence of usual seasonal ‌weather disruptions ⁠also boosted the availability of cargoes and China acts as a clearing house for any surplus iron ore.

Since the low in late February prices have shifted higher, partly in response to the conflict in the Middle East, reaching $107.10 a ton on March 17, before easing slightly to end at $106.30 on Wednesday.

Iran risks

So far the impact on iron ore flows to China from the US and Israeli war on Iran is limited to higher freight charges as the price of fuel oil soars along with ​prices for other oil products such as ​diesel and jet fuel.

But there is ⁠the potential for wider disruptions, especially if top exporter Australia and number four South Africa start to run short of diesel.

Both countries are major importers of refined products and in Australia mining accounts for about 40% of total diesel demand.

In a situation ​where refined fuel cargoes become hard to source at any price, Australia will have to ration fuel and prioritize food ​production and distribution, and ⁠emergency services.

While shutting down the mining industry would be a radical step, it would be the only option left if fuel-exporting countries limit or halt shipments, as China has already done.

For now, China is likely to continue iron ore imports at robust levels as prices aren’t yet high enough to act as a disincentive.

A further incentive to continue imports is ⁠the potential ​for disruption to supplies from diesel shortages, even though that is still a fairly small possibility.

(The views expressed here are those of the author, Clyde Russell, a columnist for Reuters.)

(Editing by Jacqueline Wong)


Wednesday, March 18, 2026


Is Trump’s Iran War the US Version of the Suez Crisis?

The crisis saw Britain’s aura of imperial power had evaporated, and its global empire headed for extinction. Trump may have similarly hastened US decline.


Iranian military personnel take part in an exercise titled “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz,” launched by the Naval Forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is being carried out in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz on February 16, 2026.
(Photo by Press Office of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps / Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images)

Alfred W. Mccoy
Mar 17, 2026
TomDispatch


In the first chapter of his 1874 novel The Gilded Age, Mark Twain offered a telling observation about the connection between past and present: “History never repeats itself, but the… present often seems to be constructed out of the broken fragments of antique legends.”

Among the “antique legends” most helpful in understanding the likely outcome of the current US intervention in Iran is the Suez Crisis of 1956, which I describe in my new book Cold War on Five Continents. After Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, a joint British-French armada of six aircraft carriers destroyed Egypt’s air force, while Israeli troops smashed Egyptian tanks in the sands of the Sinai Peninsula. Within less than a week of war, Nasser had lost his strategic forces and Egypt seemed helpless before the overwhelming might of that massive imperial juggernaut.

But by the time Anglo-French forces came storming ashore at the north end of the Suez Canal, Nasser had executed a geopolitical masterstroke by sinking dozens of rusting ships filled with rocks at the canal’s northern entrance. In doing so, he automatically cut off Europe’s lifeline to its oil fields in the Persian Gulf. By the time British forces retreated in defeat from Suez, Britain had been sanctioned at the United Nations, its currency was at the brink of collapse, its aura of imperial power had evaporated, and its global empire was heading for extinction.

Historians now refer to the phenomenon of a dying empire launching a desperate military intervention to recover its fading imperial glory as “micro-militarism.” And coming in the wake of imperial Washington’s receding influence over the broad Eurasian land mass, the recent US military assault on Iran is starting to look like an American version of just such micro-militarism.

Washington’s fading influence across Eurasia will undoubtedly prove catalytic for the emergence of a new world order, which is likely to move far beyond the old order of US global hegemony.

Even if history never truly repeats itself, right now it seems all too appropriate to wonder whether the current US intervention in Iran might indeed be America’s version of the Suez Crisis. And should Washington’s attempt at regime change in Tehran somehow “succeed,” don’t for a second think that the result will be a successfully stable new government that will be able to serve its people well.
70 Years of Regime Change

Let’s return to the historical record to uncover the likely consequences of regime change in Iran. Over the past 70 years, Washington has made repeated attempts at regime change across the span of five continents—initially via CIA covert action during the 44 years of the Cold War and, in the decades since the end of that global conflict, through conventional military operations. Although the methods have changed, the results—plunging the affected societies into decades of searing social conflict and incessant political instability—have been sadly similar. This pattern can be seen in a few of the CIA’s most famous covert interventions during the Cold War.

In 1953, Iran’s new parliament decided to nationalize the British imperial oil concession there to fund social services for its emerging democracy. In response, a joint CIA-MI6 coup ousted the reformist prime minister and installed the son of the long-deposed former Shah in power. Unfortunately for the Iranian people, he proved to be a strikingly inept leader who transformed his country’s oil wealth into mass poverty—thereby precipitating Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

By 1954, Guatemala was implementing an historic land reform program that was investing its mostly Mayan Indigenous population with the requisites for full citizenship. Unfortunately, a CIA-sponsored invasion installed a brutal military dictatorship, plunging the country into 30 years of civil war that left 200,000 people dead in a population of only 5 million.

External intervention, whether covert or open, seems to invariably be the equivalent of hitting an antique pocket watch with a hammer and then trying to squeeze all its gears and springs back into place.

Similarly, in 1960, the Congo had emerged from a century of brutal Belgian colonial rule by electing a charismatic leader, Patrice Lumumba. But the CIA soon ousted him from power, replacing him with Joseph Mobutu, a military dictator whose 30 years of kleptocracy precipitated violence that led to the deaths of more than 5 million people in the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and continues to take a toll to this day.

In more recent decades, there have been similarly dismal outcomes from Washington’s attempts at regime change via conventional military operations. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, US forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Over the next 20 years, Washington spent $2.3 trillion—and no, that “trillion” is not a misprint!—in a failed nation-building effort that was swept away when the resurgent Taliban captured the capital, Kabul, in August 2021, plunging the country into a mix of harsh patriarchy and mass privation.

In 2003, Washington invaded Iraq in search of nonexistent nuclear weapons and sank into the quagmire of a 15-year war that led to the slaughter of a million people and left behind an autocratic government that became little more than an Iranian client state. And in 2011, the US led a NATO air campaign that toppled Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s radical regime in Libya, precipitating seven years of civil war and ultimately leaving that country divided between two antagonistic failed states.

When Washington’s attempts at regime change fail, as they did in Cuba in 1961 and in Venezuela last year, that failure often leaves autocratic regimes even more entrenched, with their control over the country’s secret police strengthened and an ever-tighter death grip on the country’s economy.

Why, you might wonder, do such US interventions invariably seem to produce such dismal results? For societies struggling to achieve a fragile social stability amid volatile political change, external intervention, whether covert or open, seems to invariably be the equivalent of hitting an antique pocket watch with a hammer and then trying to squeeze all its gears and springs back into place.
The Iran War’s Geopolitical Consequences

By exploring the geopolitical implications of Washington’s latest intervention in Iran, it’s possible to imagine how President Donald Trump’s war of choice might well become Washington’s very own version of the Suez crisis.

Just as Egypt snatched a diplomatic victory from the jaws of military defeat in 1956 by shutting the Suez Canal, so Iran has now closed off the Middle East’s other critical choke point by firing its Shahed drones at five freighters in the Straits of Hormuz (through which 20% of global crude oil and natural gas regularly passes) and at petroleum refineries on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf. Iran’s drone strikes have blocked more than 90% of tanker departures from the Persian Gulf and shut down the massive Qatari refineries that produce 20% of the world supply of liquafied natural gas, sending natural gas prices soaring by 50% in much of the world and by 91% in Asia—with the price of gasoline in the US heading for $4 a gallon and the cost of oil likely to reach a staggering $150 per barrel in the near future. Moreover, through the conversion of natural gas to fertilizer, the Persian Gulf is the source for nearly half the world’s agricultural nutrients, with prices soaring by 37% for urea fertilizer in markets like Egypt and threatening both spring planting in the Northern Hemisphere and food security in the Global South.

The extraordinary concentration of petroleum production, international shipping, and capital investment in the Persian Gulf makes the Straits of Hormuz not only a choke point for the flow of oil and natural gas but also for the movement of capital for the entire global economy. To begin with the basics, the Persian Gulf holds about 50% of the world’s proven oil reserves, estimated at 859 billion barrels or, at current prices, about $86 trillion.

Time is not on Washington’s side if this war drags on for more than a few weeks.

To give you an idea of the scale of capital concentration in the region’s infrastructure, the national oil companies of the Gulf Cooperation Council invested $125 billion in their production facilities in 2025 alone, with plans to continue at that rate for the foreseeable future. To keep the global oil tanker fleet of 7,500 vessels that largely serves the Persian Gulf afloat, it costs nearly $100 million for a single large “Suezmax” tanker—of which there are about 900 normally on the high seas, worth a combined $90 billion (with frequent replacements required by the corrosion of steel in harsh maritime conditions). Moreover, Dubai has the world’s busiest international airport at the center of a global network with 450,000 flights annually—now shut down by Iranian drone strikes.

Despite all the White House media hype about the terrible swift sword of America’s recent airstrikes, the 3,000 US-Israeli bombing runs against Iran (which is two-thirds the size of Western Europe) in the war’s first week pale before the 1,400,000 bombing sorties over Europe during World War II. The striking contrast between those numbers makes the current US air attacks on Iran seem, from a strategic perspective, like shooting at an elephant with a BB gun.

Moreover, the US has limited stocks of about 4,000 interceptor missiles, which cost up to $12 million each and can’t be rapidly mass-produced. By contrast, Iran has an almost limitless supply of some 80,000 Shahed drones, 10,000 of which it can produce each month for only $20,000 each. In effect, time is not on Washington’s side if this war drags on for more than a few weeks.

Indeed, in a recent interview, pressed about the possibility that Iran’s vast flotilla of slow, low-flying Shahed drones might soon exhaust the US supply of sophisticated interceptor missiles, Pentagon leader General Dan Caine was surprisingly evasive, saying only, “I don’t want to be talking about quantities.”
Whose Boots on the Ground?

While economic and military pressures build for a shorter war, Washington is trying to avoid sending troops ashore by mobilizing Iran’s ethnic minorities, who make up about 40% of that country’s population. As the Pentagon is silently but painfully aware, US ground forces would face formidable resistance from a million-strong Basij militia, 150,000 Revolutionary Guards (who are well-trained for asymmetric guerrilla warfare), and Iran’s 350,000 regular army troops.

With other ethnic groups (like the Azeris in the north) unwilling or (like the Baloch tribes in the southeast, far from the capital) unable to attack Tehran, Washington is desperate to play its Kurdish card, just as it has done for the past 50 years. With a population of 10 million astride the highland borders of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without their own state. As such, they have long been forced to play the imperial Great Game, making them a surprisingly sensitive bellwether for larger changes in imperial influence.

Since the rise of Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy in 2016, major and medium powers along that entire Eurasian rimland have been actively disengaging from US influence.

Although President Trump made personal calls to the top leaders in Iraq’s Kurdistan region during the first week of the latest war, offering them “extensive US aircover” for an attack on Iran, and the US even has a military airbase at Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital, the Kurds are so far proving uncharacteristically cautious.

Indeed, Washington has a long history of using and abusing Kurdish fighters, dating back to the days of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who turned their betrayal into a diplomatic art form. After he ordered the CIA to stop aiding the Iraqi Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein in 1975, Kissinger told an aide, “Promise them anything, give them what they get, and f… them if they can’t take a joke.”

As Iraqi forces fought their way into Kurdistan, killing helpless Kurds by the hundreds, their legendary leader Mustafa Barzani, grandfather of the current head of Iraqi Kurdistan, pleaded with Kissinger, saying, “Your Excellency, the United States has a moral and political responsibility to our people.” Kissinger did not even dignify that desperate plea with a reply and instead told Congress, “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.”

Last January, in an amazingly ill-timed decision, the Trump White House betrayed the Kurds one time too many, breaking Washington’s decade-long alliance with the Syrian Kurds by forcing them to give up 80% of their occupied territory. In southeastern Turkey, the radical Kurdish PKK Party has made a deal with Prime Minister Recep ErdoÄŸan and is actually disarming, while Iraq’s Kurdistan region is staying out of the war by respecting a 2023 diplomatic entente with Tehran for a peaceful Iran-Iraq border. President Trump has called at least one leader of the Iranian Kurds, who constitute about 10% of Iran’s population, to encourage an armed uprising. But most Iranian Kurds seem more interested in regional autonomy than regime change.

As Trump’s calls upon the Kurds to attack and the Iranian people to rise up are met with an eloquent silence, Washington is likely to end this war with Iran’s Islamic regime only furthe

r entrenched, showing the world that America is not just a disruptive power, but a fading one that other nations can do without. Over the past 100-plus years, the Iranian people have mobilized six times in attempts to establish a real democracy. At this point, though, it seems as if any seventh attempt will come long after the current US naval armada has left the Arabian Sea.
From the Granular to the Geopolitical

If we move beyond this granular view of Iran’s ethnic politics to a broader geo-strategic perspective on the Iran war, Washington’s waning influence in the hills of Kurdistan seems to reflect its fading geopolitical influence across the vast Eurasian land mass, which remains today the epicenter of geopolitical power, as it has been for the past 500 years.

For nearly 80 years, the United States has maintained its global hegemony by controlling the axial ends of Eurasia through its NATO alliance in Western Europe and four bilateral defense pacts along the Pacific littoral from Japan to Australia. But now, as Washington focuses more of its foreign policy on the Western Hemisphere, US influence is fading fast along the vast arc of Eurasia stretching from Poland, through the Middle East to Korea that scholars of geopolitics like Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman once dubbed the “rimland” or “the zone of conflict.” As Spykman put it succinctly once upon a time, “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”

Just as Sir Anthony Eden is remembered ruefully today in the United Kingdom as the inept prime minister who destroyed the British Empire at Suez, so future historians may see Donald Trump as the president who degraded US international influence.

Since the rise of Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy in 2016, major and medium powers along that entire Eurasian rimland have been actively disengaging from US influence—including Europe (by rearming), Russia (by challenging the West in Ukraine), Turkey (by remaining neutral in the present war), Pakistan (by allying with China), India (by breaking with Washington’s Quad alliance), and Japan (by rearming to create an autonomous defense policy). That ongoing disengagement is manifest in the lack of support for the Iran intervention, even from once-close European and Asian allies—a striking contrast with the broad coalitions that joined US forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the occupation of Afghanistan in 2002. With Trump’s micro-militarism in Iran inadvertently but clearly exposing the limits of American power, Washington’s fading influence across Eurasia will undoubtedly prove catalytic for the emergence of a new world order, which is likely to move far beyond the old order of US global hegemony.

Just as Sir Anthony Eden is remembered ruefully today in the United Kingdom as the inept prime minister who destroyed the British Empire at Suez, so future historians may see Donald Trump as the president who degraded US international influence with, among other things, his micro-military misadventure in the Middle East. As empires rise and fall, such geopolitics clearly remains a constant factor in shaping their fate–a lesson I try to teach in Cold War on Five Continents.

In difficult times like these, when events seem both confused and confusing, Mark Twain’s “broken fragments of antique legends” can remind us of historical analogies like the collapse of the power and influence of Great Britain or of the Soviet Union that can help us understand how the past often whispers to the present—as it indeed seems to be doing these days in the Straits of Hormuz.

© 2023 TomDispatch.com


Alfred W. Mccoy
Alfred W. McCoy is professor of history at the University of Wisconsin-Madison is the author of "In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of U.S. Global Power". Previous books include: "Torture and Impunity: The U.S. Doctrine of Coercive Interrogation" (University of Wisconsin, 2012), "A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror (American Empire Project)", "Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State", and "The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade".
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Monday, March 16, 2026

Imperial Decline in the Straits of Hormuz

 March 16, 2026

Strait of Hormuz, Google Maps.

In the first chapter of his 1874 novel The Gilded Age, Mark Twain offered a telling observation about the connection between past and present: “History never repeats itself, but the… present often seems to be constructed out of the broken fragments of antique legends.”

Among the “antique legends” most helpful in understanding the likely outcome of the current U.S. intervention in Iran is the Suez Crisis of 1956, which I describe in my new book Cold War on Five Continents. After Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956, a joint British-French armada of six aircraft carriers destroyed Egypt’s air force, while Israeli troops smashed Egyptian tanks in the sands of the Sinai Peninsula. Within less than a week of war, Nasser had lost his strategic forces and Egypt seemed helpless before the overwhelming might of that massive imperial juggernaut.

But by the time Anglo-French forces came storming ashore at the north end of the Suez Canal, Nasser had executed a geopolitical masterstroke by sinking dozens of rusting ships filled with rocks at the canal’s northern entrance. In doing so, he automatically cut off Europe’s lifeline to its oil fields in the Persian Gulf. By the time British forces retreated in defeat from Suez, Britain had been sanctioned at the U.N., its currency was at the brink of collapse, its aura of imperial power had evaporated, and its global empire was heading for extinction.

Historians now refer to the phenomenon of a dying empire launching a desperate military intervention to recover its fading imperial glory as “micro-militarism.” And coming in the wake of imperial Washington’s receding influence over the broad Eurasian land mass, the recent U.S. military assault on Iran is starting to look like an American version of just such micro-militarism.

Even if history never truly repeats itself, right now it seems all too appropriate to wonder whether the current U.S. intervention in Iran might indeed be America’s version of the Suez Crisis. And should Washington’s attempt at regime change in Tehran somehow “succeed,” don’t for a second think that the result will be a successfully stable new government that will be able to serve its people well.

70 Years of Regime Change

Let’s return to the historical record to uncover the likely consequences of regime change in Iran. Over the past 70 years, Washington has made repeated attempts at regime change across the span of five continents — initially via CIA covert action during the 44 years of the Cold War and, in the decades since the end of that global conflict, through conventional military operations. Although the methods have changed, the results — plunging the affected societies into decades of searing social conflict and incessant political instability — have been sadly similar. This pattern can be seen in a few of the CIA’s most famous covert interventions during the Cold War.

In 1953, Iran’s new parliament decided to nationalize the British imperial oil concession there to fund social services for its emerging democracy. In response, a joint CIA-MI6 coup ousted the reformist prime minister and installed the son of the long-deposed former Shah in power. Unfortunately for the Iranian people, he proved to be a strikingly inept leader who transformed his country’s oil wealth into mass poverty — thereby precipitating Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution.

By 1954, Guatemala was implementing an historic land reform program that was investing its mostly Mayan indigenous population with the requisites for full citizenship. Unfortunately, a CIA-sponsored invasion installed a brutal military dictatorship, plunging the country into 30 years of civil war that left 200,000 people dead in a population of only five million.

Similarly, in 1960, the Congo had emerged from a century of brutal Belgian colonial rule by electing a charismatic leader, Patrice Lumumba. But the CIA soon ousted him from power, replacing him with Joseph Mobutu, a military dictator whose 30 years of kleptocracy precipitated violence that led to the deaths of more than five million people in the Second Congo War (1998-2003) and continues to take a toll to this day.

In more recent decades, there have been similarly dismal outcomes from Washington’s attempts at regime change via conventional military operations. After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. forces toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Over the next 20 years, Washington spent $2.3 trillion — and no, that “trillion” is not a misprint! — in a failed nation-building effort that was swept away when the resurgent Taliban captured the capital, Kabul, in August 2021, plunging the country into a mix of harsh patriarchy and mass privation.

In 2003, Washington invaded Iraq in search of nonexistent nuclear weapons and sank into the quagmire of a 15-year war that led to the slaughter of a million people and left behind an autocratic government that became little more than an Iranian client state. And in 2011, the U.S. led a NATO air campaign that toppled Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s radical regime in Libya, precipitating seven years of civil war and ultimately leaving that country divided between two antagonistic failed states.

When Washington’s attempts at regime change fail, as they did in Cuba in 1961 and in Venezuela last year, that failure often leaves autocratic regimes even more entrenched, with their control over the country’s secret police strengthened and an ever-tighter death grip on the country’s economy.

Why, you might wonder, do such U.S. interventions invariably seem to produce such dismal results? For societies struggling to achieve a fragile social stability amid volatile political change, external intervention, whether covert or open, seems to invariably be the equivalent of hitting an antique pocket watch with a hammer and then trying to squeeze all its gears and springs back into place.

The Iran War’s Geopolitical Consequences

By exploring the geopolitical implications of Washington’s latest intervention in Iran, it’s possible to imagine how President Donald Trump’s war of choice might well become Washington’s very own version of the Suez crisis.

Just as Egypt snatched a diplomatic victory from the jaws of military defeat in 1956 by shutting the Suez Canal, so Iran has now closed off the Middle East’s other critical choke point by firing its Shahed drones at five freighters in the Straits of Hormuz (through which 20% of global crude oil and natural gas regularly passes) and at petroleum refineries on the southern shore of the Persian Gulf. Iran’s drone strikes have blocked more than 90% of tanker departures from the Persian Gulf and shut down the massive Qatari refineries that produce 20% of the world supply of Liquified Natural Gas, sending natural gas prices soaring by 50% in much of the world and by 91% in Asia — with the price of gasoline in the U.S. heading for $4 a gallon and the cost of oil likely to reach a staggering $150 per barrel in the near future. Moreover, through the conversion of natural gas to fertilizer, the Persian Gulf is the source for nearly half the world’s agricultural nutrients, with prices soaring by 37% for urea fertilizer in markets like Egypt and threatening both spring planting in the northern hemisphere and food security in the global south.

The extraordinary concentration of petroleum production, international shipping, and capital investment in the Persian Gulf makes the Straits of Hormuz not only a choke point for the flow of oil and natural gas but also for the movement of capital for the entire global economy. To begin with the basics, the Persian Gulf holds about 50% of the world’s proven oil reserves, estimated at 859 billion barrels or, at current prices, about $86 trillion.

To give you an idea of the scale of capital concentration in the region’s infrastructure, the national oil companies of the Gulf Cooperation Council invested $125 billion in their production facilities in 2025 alone, with plans to continue at that rate for the foreseeable future. To keep the global oil tanker fleet of 7,500 vessels that largely serves the Persian Gulf afloat, it costs nearly $100 million for a single large “Suezmax” tanker — of which there are about 900 normally on the high seas, worth a combined $90 billion (with frequent replacements required by the corrosion of steel in harsh maritime conditions). Moreover, Dubai has the world’s busiest international airport at the center of a global network with 450,000 flights annually — now shut down by Iranian drone strikes.

Despite all the White House media hype about the terrible swift sword of America’s recent airstrikes, the 3,000 U.S.-Israeli bombing runs against Iran (which is two-thirds the size of Western Europe) in the war’s first week pale before the 1,400,000 bombing sorties over Europe during World War II. The striking contrast between those numbers makes the current U.S. air attacks on Iran seem, from a strategic perspective, like shooting at an elephant with a BB gun.

Moreover, the U.S. has limited stocks of about 4,000 interceptor missiles, which cost up to $12 million each and can’t be rapidly mass-produced. By contrast, Iran has an almost limitless supply of some 80,000 Shahed drones, 10,000 of which it can produce each month for only $20,000 each. In effect, time is not on Washington’s side if this war drags on for more than a few weeks.

Indeed, in a recent interview, pressed about the possibility that Iran’s vast flotilla of slow, low-flying Shahed drones might soon exhaust the U.S. supply of sophisticated interceptor missiles, Pentagon leader General Dan Caine was surprisingly evasive, saying only, “I don’t want to be talking about quantities.”

Whose Boots on the Ground?

While economic and military pressures build for a shorter war, Washington is trying to avoid sending troops ashore by mobilizing Iran’s ethnic minorities, who make up about 40% of that country’s population. As the Pentagon is silently but painfully aware, U.S. ground forces would face formidable resistance from a million-strong Basij militia, 150,000 Revolutionary Guards (who are well-trained for asymmetric guerrilla warfare), and Iran’s 350,000 regular army troops.

With other ethnic groups (like the Azeris in the north) unwilling or (like the Baloch tribes in the southeast, far from the capital) unable to attack Tehran, Washington is desperate to play its Kurdish card, just as it has done for the past 50 years. With a population of 10 million astride the highland borders of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the Middle East without their own state. As such, they have long been forced to play the imperial Great Game, making them a surprisingly sensitive bellwether for larger changes in imperial influence.

Although President Trump made personal calls to the top leaders in Iraq’s Kurdistan region during the first week of the latest war, offering them “extensive U.S. aircover” for an attack on Iran, and the U.S. even has a military airbase at Erbil, Kurdistan’s capital, the Kurds are so far proving uncharacteristically cautious.

Indeed, Washington has a long history of using and abusing Kurdish fighters, dating back to the days of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who turned their betrayal into a diplomatic art form. After he ordered the CIA to stop aiding the Iraqi Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein in 1975, Kissinger told an aide: “Promise them anything, give them what they get, and f… them if they can’t take a joke.”

As Iraqi forces fought their way into Kurdistan, killing helpless Kurds by the hundreds, their legendary leader Mustafa Barzani, grandfather of the current head of Iraqi Kurdistan, pleaded with Kissinger, saying, “Your Excellency, the United States has a moral and political responsibility to our people.” Kissinger did not even dignify that desperate plea with a reply and instead told Congress: “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.”

Last January, in an amazingly ill-timed decision, the Trump White House betrayed the Kurds one time too many, breaking Washington’s decade-long alliance with the Syrian Kurds by forcing them to give up 80% of their occupied territory. In southeastern Turkey, the radical Kurdish PKK Party has made a deal with Prime Minister Recep ErdoÄŸan and is actually disarming, while Iraq’s Kurdistan region is staying out of the war by respecting a 2023 diplomatic entente with Tehran for a peaceful Iran-Iraq border. President Trump has called at least one leader of the Iranian Kurds, who constitute about 10% of Iran’s population, to encourage an armed uprising. But most Iranian Kurds seem more interested in regional autonomy than regime change.

As Trump’s calls upon the Kurds to attack and the Iranian people to rise up are met with an eloquent silence, Washington is likely to end this war with Iran’s Islamic regime only further entrenched, showing the world that America is not just a disruptive power, but a fading one that other nations can do without. Over the past 100-plus years, the Iranian people have mobilized six times in attempts to establish a real democracy. At this point, though, it seems as if any seventh attempt will come long after the current U.S. naval armada has left the Arabian Sea.

From the Granular to the Geopolitical

If we move beyond this granular view of Iran’s ethnic politics to a broader geo-strategic perspective on the Iran war, Washington’s waning influence in the hills of Kurdistan seems to reflect its fading geopolitical influence across the vast Eurasian land mass, which remains today the epicenter of geopolitical power, as it has been for the past 500 years.

For nearly 80 years, the United States has maintained its global hegemony by controlling the axial ends of Eurasia through its NATO alliance in Western Europe and four bilateral defense pacts along the Pacific littoral from Japan to Australia. But now, as Washington focuses more of its foreign policy on the Western Hemisphere, U.S. influence is fading fast along the vast arc of Eurasia stretching from Poland, through the Middle East to Korea that scholars of geopolitics like Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman once dubbed the “rimland” or “the zone of conflict.” As Spykman put it succinctly once upon a time: “Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”

Since the rise of Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy in 2016, major and medium powers along that entire Eurasian rimland have been actively disengaging from U.S. influence — including Europe (by rearming), Russia (by challenging the West in Ukraine), Turkey (by remaining neutral in the present war), Pakistan (by allying with China), India (by breaking with Washington’s Quad alliance), and Japan (by rearming to create an autonomous defense policy). That ongoing disengagement is manifest in the lack of support for the Iran intervention, even from once-close European and Asian allies — a striking contrast with the broad coalitions that joined U.S. forces in the 1991 Gulf War and the occupation of Afghanistan in 2002. With Trump’s micro-militarism in Iran inadvertently but clearly exposing the limits of American power, Washington’s fading influence across Eurasia will undoubtedly prove catalytic for the emergence of a new world order, which is likely to move far beyond the old order of U.S. global hegemony.

Just as Sir Anthony Eden is remembered ruefully today in the United Kingdom as the inept prime minister who destroyed the British Empire at Suez, so future historians may see Donald Trump as the president who degraded U.S. international influence with, among other things, his micro-military misadventure in the Middle East. As empires rise and fall, such geopolitics clearly remains a constant factor in shaping their fate –- a lesson I try to teach in Cold War on Five Continents.

In difficult times like these, when events seem both confused and confusing, Mark Twain’s “broken fragments of antique legends” can remind us of historical analogies like the collapse of the power and influence of Great Britain or of the Soviet Union that can help us understand how the past often whispers to the present — as it indeed seems to be doing these days in the Straits of Hormuz.

Existential Attrition: Iran’s Closure of the Strait of Hormuz


 March 16, 2026


The Strait showing maritime political boundaries and shipping lanes – Public Domain

“The geopolitical genie is out of the bottle: by capitalizing on geography to disrupt global trade, countries can strengthen their strategic position at relatively low cost.”

– Alex Mills, The Atlantic Council, March 12, 2026

With each day of glorified actions against Iran, with each cloudy press session claiming supreme success through sheer force, the Trump administration is struggling to keep up appearances.  Through an approach of existential attrition, the clerical regime in Tehran is now causing shocks and tingles in the global market, striking where influence is strongest: the petrol pump, the cash register, the hip pocket.  Its missiles, drones or projectiles may not be able to reach the United States or Australia, but a note of panic is setting in.

Even before shipping was attacked (threats sufficed), the Strait of Hormuz was already being emptied of traffic.  Fearing losses, major shipping firms such as Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd and CMA CGM ceased transiting cargo through the waterways.  Since the war commenced on February 28, transits through the Strait have virtually stopped.  This putative closure imperils the transfer of a fifth of the world’s oil supply, a fifth of the global trade in liquified natural gas, and some 13% of the global share in chemicals, including essential fertilisers.  Freight rates for oil tankers, war risk insurance premiums and costs of marine fuel are all rising steeply.

social media post from Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi brimming with satisfaction captured the mood: “9 days into Operation Epic Mistake, oil prices have doubled while all commodities are skyrocketing.  We know the US is plotting against our oil and nuclear sites in hopes of containing huge inflationary shock. Iran is fully prepared.”  He also promised that Iran had “many surprises in store.”

On March 11, a spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters resolutely declared that any vessel linked to Israel, the United States or their allies would be “considered a legitimate target”.  He also rejected the effectualness of efforts to suppress price rises.  “You will not be able to artificially lower the price of oil.  Expect oil at $200 per barrel,” he warned.  “The price of oil depends on regional security, and you are the main source of insecurity in the region.”

An effort to halt the rise of the oil price was made with a decision by 32 member states of the International Energy Agency (IEA) to release 400 million barrels of oil.  “This is a major action aiming to alleviate the immediate impacts of the disruption in markets,” IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol explained in his address.  “But to be clear, the most important thing for the return to stable flows of oil and gas is the resumption of transit through the Strait of Hormuz.”

Over March 11 and 12, in what seemed to be an effort to counter this move, the IRGC made good its word, attacking some six vessels, using projectiles and explosive-laden unmanned surface vessels.  Targets included the Marshall Islands-flagged Safesea Vishu and the Malta-flagged Zefyros, both carrying fuel cargoes from Iraq.  The Thai-flagged Mayuree Naree dry bulk vessel was hit by what was described as “two projectiles of unknown origin”.  Mines have also been deployed to further complicate the prospect of transit.

The response from President Donald Trump and his officials to the price rises has been one of unrelenting fantasy.  “The recent increase of oil and gas prices is temporary,” stated White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, “and this operation [attacking Iran] will result in lower gas prices in the long term”.  Energy Secretary Chris Wright was also unjustifiably confident that the price shocks would endure for a matter of “weeks, not months”.

After attending a classified and seemingly confused briefing on the war on March 10, Democratic Senator Chris Murphy from Connecticut was left unimpressed.  “I can’t go into more detail about how Iran gums up the Strait,” he revealed, “but suffice to say, right now, they don’t know how to get it safely back open.”  This was “unforgivable, because this part of the disaster was 100% foreseeable.”  The primary war goal of the administration, as Murphy understood, was “destroying lots of missiles and boats and drone factories.”  Such visionaries.

The Trump credo of estranged reality ignores the growing and enduring consequences of the strait’s closure and the war.  A backlog of tankers on both sides of the waterway is growing.  Ports are becoming congested with overstaying vessels.  Production of oil and gas, impaired by Iranian attacks and continued closure, will have to resume in such states as Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.  Anas Alhajji, a global energy markets boffin, offers a grim analysis: “Ending the war does not mean ending the crisis.  We have countries that literally shut down production because their storage is full.  To bring back that oil to a pre-crisis level takes time.  For [liquified natural gas] in particular, it takes a very long time.”

Asked on whether vessels should still brave the journey through the Strait of Hormuz, Trump spoke with unfounded optimism.  “I think they should. I think you’re going to see great safety”.  The new round of strikes on shipping by Iran, initiated at a fraction of the cost of the US-Israel campaign against it, coupled with the inexorable rise of prices, suggests otherwise.  In this regard at least, economics may well prove to be destiny.

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com