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Saturday, November 14, 2026

Rare Earth Wars: U.S. General Sounds Alarm Over China's Military Leverage

By Josh Owens - Nov 12, 2026

On November 3, retired four-star General Jack Keane, the Army's former Vice Chief of Staff, put a warning on the record: China "has made clear it is prepared to use [America’s] dependence as leverage."

The dependence he's talking about is America's reliance on Chinese rare earths. And he didn't say it from a cable news set.

He said it as a director of REalloys [NASDAQ: ALOY], the company the Army recently selected for exclusive negotiations to build a plant to process dysprosium and terbium on one of its own military bases.

And the timing couldn't be more critical. According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the truce that has kept Beijing's widest rare earth rules on hold now runs only until January 10, 2027.


That's just nine days after the Pentagon's new magnet rules take effect.

In short, Keane is warning about a pressure tactic China has already used, and one it could use again this winter. And the Army is preparing as if that threat will be around for decades.

China Has Already Shown What It's Willing to Do

Beijing has spent the last year and a half showing exactly what that leverage against America looks like.

In April 2025, it put seven rare earth elements under special export licenses, and dysprosium and terbium were on the list. Western factories felt the impact within weeks.

Ford CEO Jim Farley said the company "shut down plants for three weeks because we cannot get high power magnets."

If a company the size of Ford couldn't get the magnets it needed, it's easy to see what the same shortage would mean for the companies building America's weapons.


Then, in October 2025, China went even further. Its new rules would have required Beijing's approval to export even magnets made outside China if they contained trace amounts of Chinese rare earths, and they took direct aim at the military.

Under those rules, requests to use rare earths for military purposes "will be automatically rejected," according to Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at CSIS. She called the measures "a sharp escalation in Beijing's long-running strategy to weaponize its dominance in rare earths."

The truce between Washington and Beijing has kept those October 2025 rules on hold for now, but they could come back in place as soon as January 10, 2027.

And Beijing hasn't waited on the truce to go after the defense industry.

On June 22, 2026, China's Commerce Ministry banned exports of goods with military uses to 10 U.S. companies and organizations it tied to the American military, two of them U.S. rare earth companies.

It even barred anyone, anywhere in the world, from passing those Chinese goods along to them.

In other words, Beijing has moved past squeezing overall supply and is now picking which American companies get cut off. So, for American defense planners, the real question is not if, but when China will use that leverage next.


Why the Pentagon Can't Build Without These Two Metals


Dysprosium and terbium aren't household names, but the Pentagon can't do without them. They go into the heat-resistant magnets inside radar and sonar, electric motors, and precision-guided munitions.

So, when the supply of those metals tightens, the companies building those weapons can end up waiting on Beijing just to keep their production lines running.

This is the vulnerability Keane, and the rest of the REalloys team, are pointing at. "For too long," he said, "the United States has depended on adversaries and others for the materials inside its most advanced defense technology."

And he spelled out what's at stake. "Our ability to deter conflict, and to prevail if deterrence fails, depends on producing munitions and weapons systems at scale," he said, "and that requires supply chains we control."

Washington has now written that idea into its own rules. From January 1, 2027, defense contractors can't deliver magnets containing materials from China, Russia, North Korea or Iran at any stage, from the mine to the finished magnet.

For big defense contractors like Lockheed Martin (NYSE: LMT) and RTX (NYSE: RTX), that deadline is now only weeks away, and you can't simply build that kind of supply chain overnight.

What that means is the hardest thing to find in this market right now is processed metal with a paper trail that never touches China.

Why the Army Is Planning 75 Years Ahead

That’s exactly what the Army is trying to lock down at Tooele, and the length of the proposed deal says a lot.

The Army first named REalloys to a short list of four companies cleared to negotiate for critical mineral plants on Army land back in June. On November 3, the two sides tentatively agreed on terms for roughly 200 acres at Utah's Tooele Army Depot.

The non-binding term sheet sets an initial 50-year lease with the option to renew for 25 more, even though federal law normally caps leases like this at five years.

In other words, the Army isn’t planning around this winter’s deadlines. It’s planning for a world where China’s leverage lasts for generations, and it wants a supplier on its own land for just as long.

Under the deal, the Army gets the first shot at buying any dysprosium and terbium made on the base. It isn't required to buy, but this term would mean no other customer gets ahead of it.

But Tooele isn't REalloys' only door into the Pentagon. Earlier this year, the Defense Logistics Agency tapped its Ohio unit to design a plant for samarium and gadolinium metal, two more rare earths the company wants to bring back to U.S. production.

None of this depends on what Beijing decides in January, though. Even if China extends the truce, the Pentagon's 2027 rules still apply, and if it doesn't, contractors will need a domestic source even more.

The 75-year deal is still pending, and site plans, environmental reviews, permits and approvals all have to come before it becomes a binding lease.

But the size and scale of that deal signals just how serious the Pentagon is about securing its supply chain over the next century.

Why Keane Isn't the Only Name Worth Noticing


The people behind REalloys know exactly what’s at stake, starting with Keane himself.

Keane spent 37 years in uniform, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, serving as acting Chief of Staff and Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and helping shape the "Surge" strategy in Iraq.

Today he chairs the Institute for the Study of War, and in 2020 he received the Presidential Medal of Freedom.

But he isn't the only heavyweight in the room.

The chairman is Steve duMont, president of GM Defense, who describes the company's mission as securing "the industrial foundation of the free world."

Former Saskatchewan Premier Brad Wall and David MacNaughton, Canada's former ambassador to the United States, also sit on the board.

Put together, that's a board with deep roots in both the U.S. defense world and Canada, where REalloys' first new production is taking shape.

But a board only matters if the company can deliver, and that comes down to one hard step in the supply chain.


The Step Most Rare Earth Companies Skip

Most rare earth headlines are about mining the minerals still in the ground. New mines and processing plants get all the attention.

But rock in the ground is still a long way from something a defense contractor can use in its weapons and defense systems.

It has to be turned into metal and then approved by a buyer who needs to trace it every step of the way.

That’s the step REalloys has built its business around. And because those buyers need to trace every gram’s origin, where REalloys gets its raw material matters just as much.

So far, that answer runs through Canada and Greenland. In Saskatchewan, REalloys has supply rights to most of the output from the Saskatchewan Research Council's fully funded expansion, which is built to turn out dysprosium and terbium.

The first metal production from Saskatchewan is targeted for early 2027, just as the Pentagon's new rules kick in.

And in Greenland, Critical Metals has locked in 15% of its Tanbreez rare earth output for REalloys for 15 years, starting once the mine is up and running.

In other words, REalloys is lining up its supply in places well outside China's reach.

What sets REalloys apart, it argues, is that it's bringing the technology, the raw material, the know-how and the factories together under one company. And it plans to go all the way to finished magnets.

What Happens the Next Time Beijing Pulls the Lever

China has already shown it's willing to use its rare earth leverage, first against carmakers and then against the defense industry itself. What's yet to be seen is whether America will have its own supply of these metals the next time Beijing pulls that lever.

The calendar is already set. The Pentagon's sourcing rule takes effect January 1, and REalloys' first metal from Saskatchewan is targeted for the same quarter.

Keane called the Tooele terms "an important step toward bringing heavy rare earth processing onto a U.S. defense installation."

With the Army’s selection in hand, a potential 75-year lease on the table and its first production months away, REalloys is lining up to be one of the first companies to give the Pentagon a supply of these metals that China can't switch off.

By. Josh Owens

 

Naval Blockade Fuels Mass Micro-Smuggling into Pakistan

Small-boat smugglers waiting to cross by sea at Gwadar and by land in Baluchistan (@BashaReport)
Small-boat smugglers waiting to cross by sea at Gwadar and by land in Baluchistan (@BashaReport / Iranian social media)

The US naval blockade of Iranian ports and ships is being complemented by growing restrictions on the flow of traffic across Iran’s land borders, even before CENTCOM’s Task Force Iron Gate has settled into its new mandate.

80% of Iran’s imports previously arrived by sea, none of which are now getting through. There are huge volumes of goods now being pushed through Iran’s land border crossings. Even in the best of circumstances, and if they doubled or tripled their throughput, land border crossing could only handle a very small fraction of the goods now forced off the high seas. But as it is, many Iranian border crossing points are struggling to maintain import volumes even at pre-war levels, let alone any increased traffic diverted by the naval blockade.

To illustrate, at the Iran-Turkey crossing at Barzagan, Iranian trucks are waiting three weeks to cross into Turkey, and Turkish trucks are waiting one week to get into Iran. On the Iraq border, the Shib border checkpoint has just reopened after a three week closure – only for the crossing at Sumar to be shut indefinitely. There have been widespread closures of crossings on the Pakistani border, at Gabd-Rimdan, Taftan, Mand and Chagai.

But these are all official crossing points, manned by customs and border control officers. And whenever there is widening arbitrage across borders between supply and demand, and in prices for similar commodities, then there tends to be an up-tick in smuggling.

At present there are huge differences in supply and demand, and in prices, for petroleum products. Iran cannot export its production, and is drowning in domestically produced petrol, diesel and gas, whereas Pakistan is suffering drastic shortages of the same commodities. So while such a trade existed before the war, the micro-smuggling trade is booming across the Pakistan-Iran border, and is no doubt replicated on the border with Iraq. The price differential makes it worthwhile to smuggle even a five-gallon jerrycan of petrol across land or sea borders, with smugglers loading up using small boats, pickups, motorcycles and even donkeys.

@BashaReport and Iran International carry estimates that about 40,000 barrels of Iranian fuel enter Pakistan daily, rivaling President Trump’s planned imports of diesel from Russia. Whereas Iran’s IRGC elite are largely isolated from any shortages, this is perhaps one of the few areas where ordinary Iranians benefit from Iran’s isolation

THE AXIS OF EVIL

Trump, Xi, Putin to hold historic meeting in China: White House

Washington (United States) (AFP) – Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping will hold the first three-way meeting between the leaders of the United States, Russia and China at a summit in Shenzhen next week, the White House said Friday.


Issued on: 14/11/2026 - RFI


Trump wants to talk about reducing nuclear arsenals at the trilateral talks on Thursday and is also set to bring up his war in Iran -- but he is not expected to discuss Russia's war in Ukraine, US officials said.

The three leaders will meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in the southern Chinese city, White House spokeswoman Olivia Wales told reporters.

"The president has made it clear that, among other topics, he will discuss the reduction of nuclear weapons in the world. This proliferation, President Trump believes, is very dangerous," Wales said.

One of the major conflicts dominating Trump's second term as president will feature, but the other will not, the US officials said.


"I think the president does intend to talk about Iran in the trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin," a senior US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told reporters on a call.

Washington has a "whole other track" of negotiations with Kyiv and Moscow aimed at ending the war in Ukraine, the official added, referring to talks that US envoys have had in recent days with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

"China is not really a part of that track, so it doesn't seem appropriate to have the Ukraine discussion there," the official added.
Yalta redux?

The meeting calls back to the 1945 Yalta summit in the Soviet Union, where then-US president Franklin D. Roosevelt, Britain's Winston Churchill and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin laid out the post-WWII settlement and new territorial boundaries in Europe.

Zelensky has raised the alarm that the meeting in Shenzhen could be a Yalta-like "redistribution of spheres of influence" for the 21st century.

The Trump administration has sought to reassert US dominance over the "Western hemisphere" -- including by capturing Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in January -- but splitting the world among great powers like it's 1945 may not guarantee security.

Trump will also hold a bilateral working lunch and meeting with the Chinese president on Thursday -- their fourth meeting since the US president's return to power last year.

But Trump is not scheduled to have a separate one-on-one with Putin.

Among other topics, Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang's resignation over an affair with an alleged Chinese spy is not expected to come up in Trump's meetings with Xi, the officials said.

"The situation with Nvidia should not really have any bearing on the trip," a second US senior official said.

The United States also did not plan to discuss export controls on sensitive chip technology, which were at the heart of the Nvidia scandal.

"We do not negotiate American export controls. These are national security matters that we develop in the administration... and we don't expect it to figure at all in any of our conversations with the Chinese while we're there," the second official said.

Tesla and SpaceX boss Elon Musk will accompany Trump on his trip to China but will not be involved in the meeting with Xi and Putin, the officials said.

Trump will leave Washington on Monday and arrive in the Philippines on Tuesday for a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) before heading to Shenzhen.
Interview

What Trump’s midterms debacle could mean for US support for Ukraine


The Republican Party's crushing defeat in midterm elections has left Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky optimistic about future support for Kyiv and stronger transatlantic relations. But with US President Donald Trump retaining broad foreign policy powers, the Democratic majority in Congress may have limited scope to bring about substantial change.


Issued on: 06/11/2026 - 
FRANCE24
By: Simon FEISTHAUER FOURNET

US President Donald Trump meets with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky during the 81st United Nations General Assembly in New York on September 22, 2026. © Kylie Cooper, Reuters


The Democrats’ sweeping victory in US midterm elections this week is already reshaping the political map, both domestically and abroad. In Kyiv, the mood is cautiously optimistic, shared FRANCE 24’s correspondent Emmanuelle Chaze, who said Ukrainians understand that US foreign policy still runs through the White House. Few of them expect an immediate shift in how the US approaches the war with Russia, especially given US President Donald Trump’s tense relationship with Ukraine as of late.


Ukrainians 'not expecting drastic change in US policy' after midterms

Cover image: US midterms unlikely to change the war in Ukraine © agences
03:29



Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told German public broadcaster ZDF on Thursday that Democrats were “speaking very clearly about supporting Ukraine” and “renewing the connection between the US and Europe”. He added he was hopeful to be able to push for more funding and aid with defence. While the Democrats’ control of Congress could indeed lead to financial relief for Ukraine and more sanctions on Russia, their room for manoeuvre remains limited.

Trump said Friday that a “big, beautiful agreement” to end the war is close – one he claims could involve “all of Europe” – and US-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine are due in Abu Dhabi next week. But the European Union (EU) said “a lot of work” was still needed and EU spokeswoman Paula Pinho noted it would “obviously be up to the EU to decide on matters which affect its security”.

FRANCE 24 spoke with James M. Lindsay, a senior fellow in US foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, about what the results could mean for the war in Ukraine and US-Europe relations.


FRANCE 24: Now that the Democrats have gained control of Congress, how much room will they have to push for greater support for Ukraine? And how likely is it that they will make it a priority?

James M. Lindsay: The incoming Democratic Congress will be more supportive of Ukraine than the Trump administration has been. Congressional Democrats, however, are going to find it difficult to translate their policy preferences on Ukraine into actual policy change. The reason for that is because the president of the US – despite seeing his party lose in historic fashion on election day – retains significant authority over US foreign policy.

But I would anticipate that the Democrats will put ending the war with Iran, reaffirming US support for Ukraine, and reining in President Trump's use of tariffs high on their to-do list.

Read moreTrump’s stillborn diesel deal: Why Russian oil tankers are not heading to the US

How much power does Trump hold over foreign policy and how might he leverage it following the midterms defeat?

First and foremost, the president alone decides who the United States negotiates with and what to negotiate over. Congress can have views on these issues. It can criticise the president in the hope it can persuade him to change his mind. But it cannot dictate the terms of the negotiations. So the big unknown that remains after election day – now that we know what Congress will look like in January – is how President Trump will respond.

Donald Trump prides himself as a dealmaker. Perhaps he will view the results as an opportunity to show how he can negotiate with the Democratic Congress. If so, the desire of many Democrats and many Republicans: to take a tougher line with Russia and to do more to help Ukraine, could have great success.

But if you look at President Trump, he is someone who historically when challenged, doubles down rather than backs down. So perhaps he will continue to push ahead with his policy towards Russia and hostility towards Ukraine.

Read moreDemocrats warn Trump camp to ‘lawyer up’ as anger over corruption drives midterms wipeout

What other challenges will the Democrats face trying to set their foreign policy agenda in Congress?

For Democrats, the victory on Tuesday has sent expectations soaring both inside the United States and abroad about how much a Democratic Congress will be able to redirect US foreign policy. They will find it very hard to satisfy these expectations, which could lead to very big disappointment down the road, both at home and overseas.

One challenge congressional Democrats are going to have – on Ukraine, as well as on the Iran War – is that they won the election in November, but they don't take office until the beginning of January.

Congress is going to have a hard time putting its stamp on policy – no matter how many speeches senators and representatives give, affirming their faith in things like the transatlantic relationship. So in essence, if the president decides that he is going to persist with the disruptive foreign policies he has championed during the first two years of his second term, Congress will find it difficult to rein him in.

This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
Germany Is Dismantling a Nord Stream Power Plant for Ukraine

By RFE/RL staff - Nov 13, 2026

Germany is dismantling the Greifswald power plant in Lubmin for transfer to Ukraine by early 2027.

The facility became economically unviable after Russian gas supplies through Nord Stream ended in 2022.

European countries are donating retired power plants and equipment to help Ukraine repair infrastructure damaged by Russian strikes.



A power plant built at the landfall of the Nord Stream gas pipelines in northeastern Germany was shut down after the pipelines were sabotaged. Now the facility is being dismantled and sent to Ukraine.

The Greifswald industrial power plant in Lubmin is majority owned by Germany’s Securing Energy for Europe (SEFE). Adrianne Montgobert, a spokesperson for the state-owned company, confirmed to RFE/RL that dismantling of the plant is currently under way, with its transfer being managed by a team from Naftogaz, Ukraine’s oil and gas giant.

The Nord Stream pipelines, which run under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, are no longer operational.

The spokesperson said in an e-mail, “all reuse and sale options [for the Lubmin plant] were explored including actual sales negotiations, but no commercially viable solution emerged.” Donating the facility to Ukraine, Montgobert added, was seen as “the best alternative to scrapping it,” after it ceased operation in April 2023.



A September 2022 file photo of the Greifswald industrial power plant, beside the German landfall of the Nord Stream gas pipelines from Russia. The facility heated gas arriving through Nord Stream 1 and supplied electricity to Germany’s power grid.

Ukraine's energy infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted by Russian strikes in recent weeks in a concerted effort to weaponize the coming months of cold and darkness. The Lubmin facility's transfer is set to be completed within "the first quarter" of 2027, Montgobert said.

An unsuccessful motion to halt the plant's transfer to Ukraine was made in May by the main opposition party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), who claimed the plant's removal would "impair future energy policy options." The AfD has supported ending military aid to Ukraine and lifting sanctions on Russia.

Gerold Juergens, president of the Western Pomerania Business Association, appeared to reference allegations Ukraine was behind the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines when he told a German media outlet, "many people's impression is: First they blow up the pipeline and then they take away the power plant. You can't explain that to anyone."

The trial of a Ukrainian special forces officer accused of leading a team in sabotaging the Nord Stream pipelines is currently under way in Hamburg. Kyiv has denied involvement in the explosions that ruptured three of the four undersea Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022.

Montgobert said the decision to gift the Greifswald facility to Kyiv “has been met with understanding” from the workers who ran the plant. Its dismantling has “proceeded smoothly, with no reported concerns from long-time employees or managers,” Montgobert said.



An autotransformer being loaded for shipment from Lithuania to Ukraine in 2023.

The transfer of the Lubmin plant is part of a wider EU-led initiative to transfer components of energy facilities, and in some cases entire decommissioned plants, to Ukraine.

In September, Lithuania pledged to donate hundreds of tons of hardware from the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, which was decommissioned in 2009. In December 2025, the EU completed the dismantling and relocation of a complete gas-fired thermal power plant from Lithuania to Ukraine.

The Vilnius Combined Heat and Power Plant was delivered through 149 separate shipments with a total weight of 2,399 tons. It was not reconstituted, but used for parts at Ukrainian energy facilities.

An EU spokesperson told RFE/RL that more than 4 billion euros ($4.42 billion) of energy security aid has been supplied to Ukraine since Russia's 2022 invasion, which "could generate power capable of supporting up to approximately 9.6 million people."

“We continue to stand firmly with Ukraine, and we are helping Ukrainians get through this winter,” the spokesperson added, declining to comment on how much of the donated energy infrastructure has been destroyed by Russian missile and drone strikes.


An electrical transformer being prepared for shipment to Ukraine at a warehouse in the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism’s logistic hub in Romania in July 2023.

A July statement from Ukraine’s energy ministry thanked the EU countries involved for donations of energy plant components and said at the time that further decommissioned energy facilities in Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Austria, Croatia, and the Netherlands had been inspected for possible transfers.

The next facility in line for transfer to Ukraine will be the Riga CHP-2 power plant in Latvia. A source in Brussels told RFE/RL on November 11 that two decommissioned coal-fired plants in Germany are currently being looked at for likely transfer. The EU insider declined to name the German plants due to sabotage concerns.

By RFE/RL

 

Zelensky rejects neutral status for Ukraine

14.11.2026, 

Photo: Irish Defence Forces/PA Wire/dpa

Ukraine continues to reject neutral status, one of Russia's main demands for ending the war, President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Saturday.

"If Russian President Vladimir Putin assumes that Ukraine's neutrality will be enshrined, then this will not happen," Zelensky said according to the Interfax-Ukraine news agency. He rejected a constitutional amendment, which would be required for such status.

Since Ukraine is not a NATO member it has no long-range security guarantees, he noted.

Zelensky said US negotiators had offered, as an option, NATO membership for his country in exchange for Ukrainian withdrawal from the parts of the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbass that Kiev still controls.

The Kremlin insists on a complete Ukrainian withdrawal from the Donbass, which includes the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

With Western support, Ukraine has been defending itself against a full-scale Russian invasion since February 2022. Moscow says it started the war to prevent its neighbour from joining NATO, and it demands neutral status for Ukraine.

This past week brought a resumption of US-mediated direct talks between the Russians and Ukrainians, which raised hopes of an early end to the war. 

However, apart from renewed prisoner exchanges, there appears to have been little progress. European representatives are set to take part in the next round of talks.

Russia's plan for Europe seeks all of Donbas, Finland out of NATO, Bild reports

Russia's plan for Europe seeks all of Donbas, Finland out of Nato, Bild reports
One of several proposals in unofficial circulation would trade a Russian nuclear pull-back from Belarus for a Nato rollback on the alliance's north-eastern flank and a federal Moldova. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook
By Ben Aris in Berlin November 13, 2026

Russia wants Finland out of NATO and the rest of Donbas handed over as part of a "new European security order", Bild reported on November 13, in an account carried by Interfax-Ukraine, citing its own sources.

Russian representatives presented the conditions to European officials during the talks in Abu Dhabi on November 10-11, according to the German daily. Moscow would keep the Ukrainian territory it occupies and take the parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions still under Kyiv's control, while Nato would be barred from setting up military bases in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The list reaches far beyond Ukraine. It would reverse the 2023 enlargement that brought Finland into Nato, and give Moscow a say over the security of three EU members and an EU candidate. It surfaces as European capitals push for a seat at the table, with Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy urging them to name a single envoy by the end of November.

Ukraine would adopt non-aligned status and drop its bid to join Nato, although its accession to the EU would not be challenged, Bild reported. Russia also wants the ports of Odesa and Mykolaiv demilitarised and agreements guaranteeing freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and the Baltic. Moldova would become a federal republic, with Transnistria and Gagauzia given the right to hold independence referendums if the country joins the EU.

In return, Russia would withdraw its nuclear weapons from Belarus, refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles there and pull its troops out of Transnistria.

The paper stressed that this is only one of several proposals being discussed in unofficial negotiating circles, where several groups of intermediaries, including some linked to the military, are working in parallel and competing with one another. It is not clear whether President Vladimir Putin has endorsed this particular plan.

The account sits awkwardly with Moscow's own. Vladimir Medinsky, who led Russia's delegation in Abu Dhabi, has said the Russian side held no talks with European representatives there, while calling for a sweeping overhaul of Europe's security arrangements on the grounds that they ignore Russia's interests. He has also said Russia could regard as its own any territory its troops have set foot on.

The Abu Dhabi round brought together Ukraine, the US, Europe and Russia and produced agreement on a large prisoner exchange, possibly 1,000 for 1,000 or more. US envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner then met Putin in Moscow and Zelenskiy in Dublin, and Kushner said the final terms of the swap had been agreed. Washington has been exploring changes to the Donbas line as part of a settlement, and Zelenskiy said the next round could be held in the United Arab Emirates or Switzerland.

Russia’s Demands Are A Big Barrier To A Ukraine Peace Deal: What Are They? – Analysis


November 14, 2026

RFE RL

By Steve Gutterman


Key Takeaways:

After U.S.-mediated talks, Russian officials reiterated hardline demands for full control of the Donbas and the other regions Moscow claims, rejecting partial withdrawals or “gray zones” and insisting the border is the line of demarcation as Russia defines it.

Moscow has also signaled it will not cede territory in Ukraine’s Kharkiv, Sumy or Dnipropetrovsk regions and continues to demand a broader European security architecture resembling a “new Yalta,” including limits on NATO expansion and force posture.

Putin stated that any post-deal deployment of Western troops in Ukraine would be treated as a legitimate target, underscoring the gap between Russian positions and Ukrainian or Western requirements for security guarantees.


After three days of talks with Ukrainian and Russian negotiators and the presidents of both countries, US special envoy Jared Kushner said the diplomacy produced “meaningful progress” toward an elusive agreement to end Moscow’s war against Ukraine.

But there was no public sign that Russia is ready to make concessions that could bring a deal closer. In fact, both President Vladimir Putin and his chief negotiator have sent at times extremely uncompromising signals on key issues, including territorial demands in Ukraine and desired changes in the longstanding European security architecture.


Following two days of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi and separate US meetings with Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on November 12, here is a look at Russia’s stated positions on matters that could be crucial to concluding a peace pact.
The Donbas And A Lot More

For many months, Putin and other officials have emphasized that full Russian control over the Donbas, which encompasses the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine, is a prerequisite for any peace agreement.

Russia fomented war in the Donbas in 2014 after seizing the Crimean Peninsula, and it controlled portions of Donetsk and Luhansk long before Putin launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

It now occupies virtually all of Luhansk and about 80 percent of Donetsk. But its forces have been unable to capture the rest of that region, including a “fortress belt” that includes the cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, in years of deadly fighting.


Putin has repeatedly said Russia will take the rest of the region by force if it cannot gain it through diplomacy. Zelenskyy says Kyiv will not, formally or de facto, relinquish land its soldiers have fought hard to defend.

The Kremlin’s appetite does not stop at Crimea and the Donbas, however. In September 2022, Moscow baselessly claimed that the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson regions were all part of Russia.

Russia controls a majority of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhya regions, but it does not hold their eponymous capital cities. Its forces seized Kherson early in the full-scale war but were pushed out, back across the Dnieper River, in November 2022.
Borderlands

At times, Russia has sent mixed signals over whether it is willing to settle for partial control over Kherson and Zaporizhzhya or even potentially retreat from them as part of a peace deal.

There was no such ambiguity this week.

Meeting in the Kremlin on November 12 with Kushner and the other US envoy, Steve Witkoff, Putin claimed Kyiv had been “raising questions about gray zones” and added: “For us, there is only one line of demarcation: the line of the state border.”

The actual state border, since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, is clear and puts all five regions that Russia claims inside Ukraine, no question.


But Putin wasn’t talking about the actual border. He meant the border as Russia has seen it since 2022, and he meant Moscow wants a peace that would make those regions Russian in their entirety — including the parts now held by Kyiv.

On Russian state TV, Moscow’s chief negotiator Vladimir Medinsky made belligerent remarks on the same issue, saying that “wherever the Russian flag has been raised, it must not be lowered” and echoing a past comment by Putin that “wherever the foot of [a] Russian soldier has stepped, that is ours.”

More specifically, he suggested that in addition to the regions Russia formally claims as its own, Moscow doesn’t plan to relinquish its hold on territory along the state border in Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy regions, north of the Donbas. Along with Russian-occupied land in the Dnipropetrovsk region, these swaths of territory have been seen by observers as land Russia might cede as part of a compromise.

But Medinsky noted that Putin had ordered Russian forces to create a “security zone” along the border inside Ukraine, adding: “This zone is now quite substantial. It is expanding, and it will continue to expand. I don’t see any possibility of exchanging these territories.”

Rhetoric is rhetoric, and after the trilateral US-Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi on November 10-11, a US negotiator speaking on condition of anonymity reported detecting “a little bit of flexibility” from both sides.

But whatever Moscow’s intentions, the remarks set an uncompromising tone.

Putin’s statement was “a clear reiteration of the hardline position on territory that has emerged over the last year” and “doesn’t leave a lot of negotiating space — on this issue at least,” Samuel Charap, senior political scientist at the Rand Corporation, wrote on X.
A ‘New, Modern Yalta’

Russian officials have been a little less specific about what, exactly, they want from talks on a subject that is now central to the US-led negotiation process: the potential creation of a new European security architecture.

On November 5, Trump spoke of prospects for a “big, beautiful agreement” that is “going to involve more than Ukraine.” Kushner followed up by writing of what he said was “the need for a broader European security architecture that can help establish conditions for lasting peace.”

While it has emerged only now as a focus of the talks, the idea is far from new for Russia. It goes back at least as far as Putin’s ascent to power over a quarter-century ago, with Moscow seeking a reversal of its Cold War geopolitical losses and a restoration of its clout on the European continent.

Without going into detail, Medinsky sent a menacing message to Kyiv and Europe on the matter by telling Russian TV that Moscow’s goal is to create a “new, modern Yalta and Potsdam” — a reference to meetings in 1945 in which the United States, the USSR, and Britain decided the fate of parts of postwar Europe.


It comes amid Russian hopes for a summit between Putin, Trump, and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the November 18-19 APEC summit in China, which Zelenskyy warned could be a “redistribution of spheres of influence.”

Medinsky said a comprehensive new security system could “preserve peace for decades, perhaps centuries.” But the initiative has raised fears in Europe and Ukraine that larger powers could seek to decide their fate for them — and that Russia, rather than being punished for its aggression, could be rewarded with broader influence.
No Troops Allowed

A clue to Russia’s specific hopes can be found in the draft treaties it sent to Washington and NATO in December 2021, cast by Moscow as proposals but seen as ultimatums delivered as Russia amassed troops on Ukraine’s borders. The full-scale invasion followed two months later.

Russia’s demands were dramatic, amounting to a reversal of some of the Cold War’s outcomes. Agreement would have meant forswearing any further NATO enlargement, barring members from conducting military activity in Ukraine or other regional countries, and pulling military deployments back behind the borders of nations that were part of the alliance in 1997 — before any former Soviet satellites joined.

Even at the time, before the death and destruction Moscow has caused with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it was astounding to many in the West that Russia would make such demands. But Kremlin aide Yury Ushakov said on November 12 that Putin, at his meeting with Kushner and Witkoff, described them as the foundations of Russia’s vision of an effective security architecture.

“The key provisions [are] the non-expansion of the NATO bloc; non-deployment of weapons systems that pose a threat to us near Russia’s borders; and a return of the alliance’s force posture to the configuration that existed” when a Russia-NATO agreement was signed in 1997, Ushakov said.

And on November 13, The New York Times reported that Russian officials circulated a paper this week that echoed the stance Moscow set out in the December 2021 documents — “sometimes word for word” — including the call for a NATO troop pullback.

The Times said it obtained a copy of the paper from a person involved in the talks, and that another person with knowledge of the negotiations confirmed its authenticity.

In some cases, it’s unclear how close Russia’s current positions in the talks hew to proposals it has made at previous talks during the war such as a call for the size of Ukraine’s military to be strictly limited.

At a conference in Moscow on November 11, a Russian Foreign Ministry official described several types of agreements that could be part of a new European security system, Reuters reported, including a collective defense alliance and bilateral nonaggression or mutual assistance pacts between Moscow and individual NATO members.


Analysts say the Kremlin prefers dealing with European nations on a bilateral basis than with NATO or the EU in part because it enables Moscow to sow divisions.

Meanwhile, Russia has continued to demand Ukraine be barred from ever joining NATO. It has bristled at the idea of security guarantees for Kyiv that would amount to anything close to the alliance treaty’s Article 5, which states an armed attack against one member is considered an attack against all.

And at his meeting with Kushner and Witkoff, Putin suggested any plans for Western troops to be deployed in Ukraine after a peace deal would be unacceptable to Russia, saying: “We have already talked about this: 
For us, they are a legitimate target, meaning the war [would] resume immediately.”


Steve Gutterman is Russia/Ukraine/Belarus editor in RFE/RL’s Central Newsroom in Prague and the author of The Week In Russia newsletter. He lived and worked in Russia and elsewhere in the region for nearly 20 years between 1989 and 2014, including postings in Moscow with the Associated Press and Reuters and over a year based in Kyiv. He has also reported from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other parts of Asia, as well as Europe and the United States.

 

EU Renewables growth fails to oust fossil fuels as France alone hits transition target - Energy Institute

Renewables growth fails to oust fossil fuels as France alone hits transition target - Energy Institute
Renewable energy use grew by more than 60% between 2017 and 2025, but still met only 8.6% of global demand as fossil fuel consumption kept rising. / bne IntelliNews
By Ben Aris in Berlin November 13, 2026

Most big energy users now burn less energy per dollar of output, but global fossil fuel use is still up 8% since 2017, the Energy Institute said on November 10.

Since 2017, 83% of the countries covered by the Institute's Country Transition Tracker have cut the energy intensity of their economies and 86% have lowered the carbon intensity of the energy they consume. Over the same period fossil fuel use rose by 40 exajoules (EJ), with natural gas demand up by nearly 15%, coal by 7% and oil by 5%, while energy-related greenhouse gas emissions grew by nearly 1% a year on average between 2017 and 2025.

The tracker, published on Energy Day at the COP31 climate summit, shows clean energy being added on top of fossil fuels, which are still growing. Renewables have grown faster than fossil fuels for years, yet the world burns more coal, oil and gas than it did in 2017, and fossil fuels supplied more than 85% of the energy consumed worldwide in 2025, according to the Institute's Statistical Review of World Energy published in June.

"The message from this year's Country Transition Tracker is that there is no single global energy transition moving at one speed. Progress is real, particularly on energy efficiency, carbon intensity and the growth of renewable energy, but it is uneven between countries and between different parts of the energy system," said Gemma Regniez, the Energy Institute's director of external affairs.

The tracker draws on the Statistical Review to assess around 80 of the world's largest energy-consuming countries, which account for more than 96% of global energy consumption and 95% of emissions. It scores them on eight measures: energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, fossil fuel consumption, renewable energy consumption, power sector decarbonisation, the carbon intensity of the energy system, energy consumption per capita, economy-wide energy intensity and economy-wide carbon intensity.

Efficiency is the one broad win

Energy intensity, the amount of energy needed to produce a dollar of GDP, is where the progress is most widespread. Hydrocarbon producers dominate the bottom of the table. Trinidad and Tobago, whose economy is built around gas-based petrochemicals and LNG, used about 15 megajoules per dollar of GDP in 2025, followed by Iceland at about 13, Turkmenistan at about 12.5 and Venezuela at about 11.5. Oman, Kuwait, Iran, Qatar, Russia and the UAE make up the rest of the ten most energy-intensive economies, with Russia at about 7.2 megajoules per dollar and the UAE at about 6.9.

The ten most energy-intensive economies in 2025, in megajoules per dollar of GDP. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy Country Transition Tracker

Iceland is the outlier on that list: its energy is almost entirely renewable, but it runs energy-hungry aluminium smelters on cheap geothermal and hydro power, which pushes up its use of energy per unit of output.

At the other end, Ireland is the least energy-intensive economy at under 1 megajoule per dollar, ahead of Sri Lanka, Switzerland and Denmark, all at under 1.5. Bangladesh, Luxembourg, Romania, Lithuania, the UK and Portugal complete the ten, all at about 2 megajoules per dollar or less. Ireland's figure is flattered by the profits that multinational companies book there, which inflate its GDP, and several of the European names on the list have long since moved heavy industry offshore.

The ten least energy-intensive economies in 2025, in megajoules per dollar of GDP. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy Country Transition Tracker

Renewables are still a sliver

Renewable energy consumption, including hydroelectricity, increased in 74 of the 79 leading countries between 2017 and 2025. Globally it grew by more than 60% over the period, but it still met only around 8.6% of energy demand in 2025, the tracker found.

Global energy demand passed 600EJ for the first time in 2025, according to the Statistical Review, and renewables were the largest source of additional demand outside a recession. That growth has not been big enough to push fossil fuels out of the mix: the extra demand has been met by both.

Europe leads the rankings

Europe performs strongly across several of the tracker's measures. The UK, Spain, France and Germany rank among the top five performers on five or six of the eight metrics, while Italy and Brazil are top-five performers on four. Germany achieved the largest absolute cut in emissions, at 222mn tonnes of CO2-equivalent between 2017 and 2025.

The tracker's comparison of the 21 countries that consume the most energy shows the split clearly. The European countries are pale across most of the eight measures, while Indonesia and India are among the darkest on emissions and fossil fuel consumption, and Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UAE score badly on renewables, power sector decarbonisation and carbon intensity. The UAE has the heaviest energy consumption per capita in the group.

Comparative energy transition performance across the 21 highest energy-consuming countries on the tracker's eight measures; darker shading marks weaker performance. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy Country Transition Tracker

Power is far ahead of the rest

The power sector is much further along than the energy system as a whole. France has the most decarbonised power sector among the countries itemised, with 95% of generation coming from low- and zero-carbon sources, including 68% from nuclear. Brazil, which relies heavily on hydropower, comes second at 89%.

The big emitters keep growing

Some of the largest energy consumers continue to drive emissions growth. Between 2017 and 2025, China's energy-related emissions rose by 2,096mn tonnes and India's by 783mn tonnes. China's rise comes even though it is the world's green energy champion, building most of the world's new wind and solar capacity as it turns itself into an electrostate, because its overall demand has grown even faster.

The US alone was responsible for 36% of the increase in global energy-related greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 compared with 2024, the tracker found. Its coal consumption rose for the first time since the rebound in energy demand after the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021.

France alone in the target zone

The tracker plots the 21 biggest energy consumers, which account for around 80% of global energy demand, on two axes: economy-wide energy intensity and the share of low-carbon sources in total energy consumption, with the size of each bubble showing the change in its emissions since 2017. The target is the bottom right-hand quadrant, combining low energy intensity with a low-carbon share of more than half.

When all three measures are considered together, France is the only country in the target quadrant, with low-carbon sources, mostly nuclear, supplying just over half of its energy and an energy intensity of under 3 megajoules per dollar. Every other big consumer gets less than a quarter of its energy from low-carbon sources. China sits on the boundary of the high-intensity half at about 5 megajoules per dollar with a low-carbon share of around 10%, and its emissions bubble dwarfs every other country's. Iran is the most energy-intensive of the group at about 9 megajoules per dollar, with Russia and the UAE close behind, and all three increased their emissions over the period, as did India, Indonesia and Turkey.

Energy intensity against low-carbon share of total energy consumption for the 21 highest energy-consuming countries; bubble size shows the change in energy-related CO2-equivalent emissions from 2017 to 2025, green for a fall and grey for a rise. Source: Energy Institute Statistical Review of World Energy Country Transition Tracker

"As governments gather at COP31, the data also underline the scale of the challenge still ahead. Global fossil fuel consumption and energy-related emissions have continued to rise since 2017. The transition will ultimately be judged not simply by how much clean energy we add, but by whether countries can meet growing demand for energy while driving emissions decisively down," Regniez said.