Over time, the Gulf countries have spent large amounts of money to build modern defense systems, especially missile protection. They have also improved their security relations with the United States and increased cooperation in the region. At the same time, they tried to develop better relations with Iran because they clearly wanted to lower the risk of conflict and reduce the chances of Iran attacking them. The Gulf countries became involved in the war itself, even though they publicly did not support an attack on Iran not because they thought it was wrong, but because they expected that the war would cost them a lot and bring serious negative effects for them. Their resistance might also have come from worries that reaching the desired outcome would be very difficult, or even not possible at all namely, creating a major shift in Iran’s behavior, especially on the matters they care about most: missile capabilities and affiliated armed groups or bringing a different leadership to power in Tehran. For this reason, the Gulf countries aimed to push forward a deal that would place restrictions on Iran while also stopping tensions from rising further. They avoided making public comments about the internal protests in Iran. In addition, they tried to present themselves as neutral and clearly stated that they would not permit any attacks against Iran to be launched from their land.
But right from the start of the conflict, Iran decided to strike the Gulf countries, even hitting civilian places. Still, up to now, this situation has not pushed them to clearly take part in the military operations against Iran. Instead, they continued their balancing approach: they kept communication channels open with Iran and stayed away from actions that could draw them into a larger clash with it. This behavior comes from their comparatively limited military strength and fragile economic situation, as well as their doubts about the goals of the United States in the war and whether those goals can be reached. The Gulf countries would rather see Iran, by the end of the operation, become less powerful, controlled, and busy with its own domestic issues, without its people uniting strongly behind the government.
Because of that, the Gulf countries want to prevent a drawn-out and draining confrontation, which would create greater problems for the region’s financial system and energy security and damage the foundation needed for progress, which their large-scale national visions depend on. The fighting has already created an appearance of unity, at least in public, among the Gulf countries that are part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Still, this sense of togetherness is not expected to remain for long; tensions especially between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia are likely to come back after the fighting stops, and possibly even earlier if the conflict continues.
Saudi Arabia’s situation is especially significant for grasping how Iran interacts with its neighboring states. Treating Iran as a primary strategic threat especially after Iranian attacks hit its territory the kingdom has in fact stepped up talks with Tehran and aimed to prevent a direct military clash. This strategy arose from worries about fighting on multiple fronts, including assaults coming from Yemen, alongside threats from Iran and Iraq. In the eyes of Riyadh, actively joining an offensive against Iran carries far more danger than the potential gains it might offer. Taking such a step would not radically transform the conflict itself, but it could certainly trigger harsher Iranian countermeasures. Like its neighbors in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, after being targeted, has let the United States operate from its facilities, yet up to now has avoided active engagement in the fighting. For the smaller Gulf nations, Riyadh’s approach was a strong signal: Even amid a serious regional clash, it is safer to hold back from aggressive action toward Iran and minimize participation.
The Gulf nations view the strike against Iran as a pivotal moment experts portray the assaults on their territory as a critical point that might force them to rethink their entire security strategy. Yet, it is important to consider whether this will really bring substantial change. The conflict does not uncover a new situation but instead makes more visible a reality that has long been recognized. For years, it has been evident that Iran possesses an uneven military advantage in the Gulf, especially regarding missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles. Iran’s weapons stock was specifically designed to confront adversaries armed with advanced conventional forces. Indeed, the war revealed major weaknesses in interceptor supplies and in the capacity to defend against large-scale missile and drone strikes weaknesses also experienced by other Middle Eastern powers, including the United States and Israel. Still, this reflects a structural feature of modern warfare: It is simpler and less expensive to manufacture basic offensive weapons than to develop defenses capable of stopping them. This disparity is expected to remain a factor in the regional security landscape for the foreseeable future.
Up until now, since the onset of the conflict, the Gulf nations have seen little benefit in taking open and aggressive measures against Iran, worried that eventually they would face a hurt yet retaliatory Iranian leadership alone. The cost of openly aligning with the United States and Israel has been considered too steep, especially given doubts about the longevity of American support. As a result, they try to back the military campaign, including limited attacks on Iran, while staying below the level of full-scale war and maintaining diplomatic ties with Tehran. Persisting with this cautious approach during the conflict does not stem from underestimating Iran’s intentions but from a practical assessment of the situation. In this context, Iranian strikes on the Gulf countries do not reveal a flaw in their security framework but rather confirm that their strategy is essentially effective while also showing its constraints. At the same time, it must be understood that ongoing restraint carries consequences, and refraining from retaliation can signal vulnerability.
Trends and public opinion in the United Arab Emirates are also essential for grasping the regional situation during the war, given its close connection with Israel and its role as a leading state in the Gulf. The UAE experienced a higher number of Iranian strikes than any of its neighbors, even more than those targeting Israel. One plausible reason is the federation’s strong bond with Israel, which Tehran sees as a threat. After the fighting, Gulf states may increasingly conclude that ties with Israel involve costs that must be considered when deciding whether to expand relations or make them more publicly visible. Within Emirati discussions, many called for a swift end to the conflict and even offered indirect criticism of Israel: “This is not our fight. We did not choose this war, yet we are bearing the cost to our security and economy. A matter of even greater importance now facing the Gulf countries is whether Israel and the United States previously viewed as stabilizing forces protecting the existing order have become actors that challenge it, sometimes in unexpected ways, and thus represent potential threats to regional stability. At the same time, other perspectives within the Gulf focus on Iran’s declining military capacity and see it as a historic chance to improve the regional balance. From this perspective, even if the Iranian government remains in place, its weakened condition will lower the danger it poses to the Gulf states
According to the Pentagon and the United States, regardless of the situation, for the Gulf countries, the long-term effects of the ongoing struggle will be evaluated not just by the level of destruction suffered by Iran’s forces but also by whether that destruction is turned into a stable regional and international system that prevents Iran from regaining power and posing a renewed threat. Historical patterns show that battlefield victories without solid political backing quickly lose their impact. As a result, their top priority is to ensure that the conflict concludes with arrangements that place enduring limits on Iran’s military potential particularly in the areas of missile programs and allied proxy networks. A key question is whether the Gulf nations will adjust their cautious balancing approach once the war concludes. From their perspective, if the Iranian government remains in power, it would suggest that the strategic landscape in the Gulf has stayed largely the same. In that scenario, they are expected to keep following a risk-avoidance strategy to prevent future conflicts. Concerns about Iran could even grow stronger, meaning initiatives to ease tensions with Tehran will persist, alongside increased spending on defense and efforts to broaden both regional and global alliances.
A number of Gulf countries also perceive that the United States entered the war despite their hesitations and, so far, has been unable to stop assaults targeting them. Consequently, if the Iranian leadership stays in place after the conflict, this could motivate the Gulf states to resume a strategy of balancing the region’s main powers also because they want to avoid a scenario where Israel dominates as the regional superpower. At least some Gulf nations are likely to attempt to offset Israel’s influence by expanding strategic ties, potentially through stronger cooperation with Pakistan and, in certain cases, Turkey.
The deployment of NATO Patriot air defence systems including Spanish batteries already at İncirlik Air Base and additional systems coordinated from Ramstein, Germany underscores how Turkey’s southern airspace has become a focal point of collective defence in the face of Iranian missile threats, with NATO successfully intercepting multiple ballistic missiles over Turkish skies. While İncirlik remains under Turkish ownership and command, even as it hosts multinational personnel including U.S., Spanish, Polish, and Qatari forces, its operational integration within NATO’s Eastern Mediterranean defence network exemplifies Ankara’s reliance on allied capabilities to safeguard its territory. This alliance‑based protective umbrella also conveys reassurance to energy‑rich Gulf states, whose security calculus increasingly factors in regional deterrence architectures that extend beyond their own borders. In this environment, bolstered air defences and NATO’s protective mantle can serve as a confidence‑building element for Gulf‑Turkish security cooperation, helping bridge Ankara’s strategic role as a frontline NATO member with the Gulf states’ interests in containing shared threats while avoiding direct entanglement in wider conflict dynamics.
Historically, İncirlik Air Base has been pivotal not only for NATO but also as a lynchpin in Western military operations that intersect with Gulf security most notably during the 1991 Gulf War, when it functioned as a staging and logistics hub supporting coalition air missions against Iraq. This legacy of strategic facilitation informs current efforts to build a more interconnected defence posture linking Turkey, NATO, and Gulf partners. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which have been deepening ties with Ankara in areas ranging from energy to defence partnerships, may increasingly view Türkiye’s integrated air defence role as complementary to broader regional risk management frameworks. Under such a concept, Turkey’s geostrategic position combining NATO‑enabled air defence, shared threat perceptions with Gulf countries, and historically proven operational platforms like İncirlik positions Ankara as a nodal node for future collective security collaborations. Such collaborations could see expanded joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and air defence interoperability that bind Turkish and Gulf strategic interests more closely, while also balancing Gulf investment in indigenous missile defence with alliance‑backed protective infrastructures.
The conflict with Iran has starkly revealed how fragile the Gulf’s hydrocarbon‑dependent economies are when exposed to prolonged hostilities. Because oil and gas exports constitute the lifeblood of these states, disruptions in maritime transit especially through the Strait of Hormuz rapidly translated into logistical bottlenecks. Local storage terminals filled to capacity, forcing some producers to throttle back output due to limited buffer space. For instance, Saudi Arabia curtailed crude shipments by approximately two million barrels per day after key installations were knocked offline, even as it rerouted fuel through the East–West Pipeline to Red Sea export points. Although Gulf governments had contingency plans for trade interruptions, the hostilities demonstrated that their safeguards are inadequate for extensive, enduring disturbances in critical energy corridors. This vulnerability directly pressures Washington to push for a de‑escalation, not only to stabilize global energy markets but also to prevent a spillover that would jeopardize U.S. and allied security commitments in the region. Moreover, reliance on NATO‑integrated air defence platforms with assets deployed at Turkey’s strategically located İncirlik Air Base has become part of the broader deterrent architecture that Gulf capitals are simultaneously encouraging and assessing for gaps.
In parallel, the conflict is damaging the Gulf’s coveted reputation as a reliable global investment destination. The United Arab Emirates, among others, has long branded itself as a stable nexus for finance, logistics, and trade. Yet ongoing warfare, recurrent missile threats, and instability perceptions are prompting multinational corporations to reevaluate operational footprints in the region. Firms may increasingly hedge geopolitical risk by relocating functions to jurisdictions deemed safer, which could inadvertently shift commercial momentum toward larger markets like Saudi Arabia if it appears comparatively insulated. In addition, cyber intrusions against data centers in the UAE and Bahrain highlight the increasing targeting of digital systems, undermining ambitions to cultivate knowledge‑economy hubs. These attacks not only cause immediate service disruptions but also erode investor confidence in cloud, storage, and secure infrastructure, compelling Gulf governments to allocate more fiscal resources toward cyber‑hardening and resilience at the expense of other development goals.
While the Gulf states continue to regard the United States as the principal guarantor of their defence, the war has exposed limits to U.S. capacity to intercept every threat, even with advanced Patriot batteries and Aegis systems in play. At the same time, the nexus between Ankara, Washington, has become more significant. İncirlik Air Base historically a pivotal staging ground in the 1991 Gulf War now functions as a node linking NATO, U.S., Turkish, and regional air defence coordination, which Gulf governments view as a hedge against Iranian escalation. However, Turkey’s ownership of the installation, its independent foreign policy orientation, and its complex bilateral ties with both Washington and Gulf capitals also introduce strategic ambiguity that energy‑rich states must factor into their security calculus. Similarly, Israel’s advanced missile defence and airpower projection contribute to Gulf deterrence narratives, but Gulf states are wary of being drawn fully into Israeli‑Iranian antagonisms.
Given these intersecting dynamics, a strategically significant recommendation emerging from Gulf capitals would be to target the Iranian long‑range strike platforms that are inflicting damage on energy and civilian infrastructure thereby creating operational “breathing room,” reducing the urgency of diplomatic pressure on Washington, and strengthening the credibility of both regional deterrence and collective defence frameworks involving NATO components, allied partners and Türkiye.
The emerging debate over new trade corridors reflects a broader geopolitical tension tied to regional exclusion and shifting power balances. In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean has increasingly become a multidimensional arena where economic competition overlaps with security concerns. The continued militarization of Aegean islands by Greece despite longstanding legal disputes alongside growing military activity in Southern Cyprus, reinforces Ankara’s perception of strategic encirclement. At the same time, the reported incident of a missile allegedly launched from Iran and landing in Southern Cyprus demonstrates how conflicts originating in the Middle East are increasingly extending into the Eastern Mediterranean. This spillover effect is reshaping the regional threat environment and forcing actors to reassess their security postures.
Within this evolving landscape, Turkey’s deployment of F-16 Fighting Falcon jets to Cyprus should be interpreted as part of a broader strategic adjustment rather than a purely tactical move. The deployment strengthens rapid response capabilities against aerial and missile threats while also signaling an intent to preserve deterrence in a shifting regional order influenced by actors such as the United States and Israel. In addition, it serves as a countermeasure to Greece’s expanding military presence in disputed zones. Taken together, these developments indicate that Ankara is advancing an integrated defence concept linking forward operational areas like Cyprus with key strategic hubs such as İncirlik Air Base. This approach aims not only to reinforce national security but also to secure critical energy routes, emerging trade corridors, and the stability of NATO’s southern flank amid increasing regional volatility.
The war, particularly in the context of disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, has significantly reshaped perceptions of regional power distribution and exposed long-term strategic advantages for Israel. Israel’s demonstrated military-technological edge—especially in missile defense and precision strike capabilities—has shifted the regional balance in its favor, while the depth of its strategic alignment with the United States has been reinforced through high-level coordination and operational cooperation. This dual advantage not only strengthens Israel’s deterrence posture but also elevates its status as a uniquely capable security actor in the region. For the Gulf states, whose energy security has been directly threatened by instability in maritime routes such as Hormuz, Israel’s capabilities may appear increasingly relevant. However, while interest in Israeli defense systems—particularly missile interception technologies—may grow, political sensitivities tied to the Palestinian issue will continue to constrain overt normalization. Furthermore, if Iran emerges from the conflict in a weakened state, the urgency driving Gulf-Israel security convergence may gradually decline.
At the same time, the conflict has opened new geopolitical maneuvering space, particularly regarding Qatar’s positioning between regional actors. Iranian strikes targeting Qatar could incentivize Doha to explore more cautious and indirect engagement channels with Israel, even if a fundamental policy shift remains unlikely. From Israel’s perspective, this presents a strategic opportunity to weaken the alignment between Qatar and Hamas, which maintains close ties with Iran. By leveraging the broader security environment and offering conditional cooperation potentially in areas such as de-escalation or technological support Israel may attempt to create political distance between these actors. In the longer term, Israel’s strategic gains from the conflict extend beyond immediate battlefield outcomes: the erosion of Iran’s deterrence, the strain on Gulf economic and security resilience, and the gradual repositioning of Gulf states toward diversified partnerships all contribute to a regional order in which Israel’s role as a central security provider becomes more pronounced, albeit still contested and politically constrained.
