Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif with Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian.
Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency
March 24, 2026
By Dure Akram
That Pakistan is among a small group of capitals being considered as a possible venue for contacts between U.S. and Iranian officials, even as both sides continue to deny that formal negotiations are underway, should not have come as a surprise to those with a finger on the region’s pulse.
Officials familiar with the discussions indicate that Islamabad has remained in sustained contact with Tehran over the past year, including engagements involving Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi and senior Pakistani leadership, while also maintaining a working line to Washington. Pakistan’s additional role in representing Iranian diplomatic interests in the United States has further reinforced its utility in any indirect process.
One need not look further than the fact that Pakistan was one of the first countries to officially denounce strikes on Iran, as it constantly rallied for an end to attacks on civilians in global peacekeeping organisations. An Urdu tweet from Mr Araghchi, not of acknowledgement from Iran’s ambassador in the UN and constant rounds of shutter diplomacy between Deputy Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and his counterparts in the Gulf are enough to further convince the international community about where Pakistan actually stands on the spectrum.
Analysts following the region note that Pakistan’s emergence is not unexpected. Michael Kugelman, for instance, has publicly argued that Pakistan is “far from an unlikely US-Iran mediator,” citing a steady pattern of Pakistan-Iran engagement alongside a perceptible warming of ties between Islamabad and Washington. Some officials in Washington policy circles have also suggested that President Donald Trump views Pakistan as a pragmatic interlocutor, and has spoken favourably of Pakistan’s military leadership—particularly Field Marshall Asim Munir—as having a deeper understanding of Iran than many of his counterparts.
That broader context has fed into what appears to be an expanding, though still opaque, diplomatic effort.
Media reports say Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt are among the countries relaying messages between Washington and Tehran. Islamabad has publicly stated that it is ready to host talks if both parties agree, a position officials describe as procedural rather than aspirational. People briefed on the matter say that this offer has been conveyed quietly through multiple channels.
At the same time, the contours of the effort remain fluid.
Diplomatic chatter in Islamabad suggests that Gulf foreign ministers could visit Pakistan in the coming days as consultations intensify, though no official schedule has been announced. Separate reports circulating in diplomatic and media circles indicate that senior U.S. envoys, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have figured in backchannel contacts linked to Islamabad, with some accounts placing them in the city for discussions with Iranian-linked interlocutors. These claims may not have been formally confirmed. Yet, a reassuring silence from the White House is the signal we need to read between the lines.
There is also increasing talk of a possible summit format, with one senior regional official cited in media discussions as saying that preliminary contacts are underway to explore an eventual meeting in Islamabad between U.S. and Iranian representatives. Names are already being floated in this context. U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance has been mentioned in several accounts as a potential representative if talks advance, while Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has appeared in political chatter as one of several possible Iranian participants. Of course, anyone thinking of him as Iran’s version of Delcy Rodríguez — someone ready to talk business with President Trump — needs to think again: far from a pliable interlocutor, Ghalibaf is a product of Iran’s hardline security establishment, operating within a system where ultimate authority lies elsewhere and where even perceived pragmatism does not translate into political latitude.
Sources familiar with Iranian internal discussions also note that any delegation from Tehran would likely include multiple senior figures rather than a single negotiator, reflecting the political sensitivity of the process. Public denials from Iranian officials, including Ghalibaf, underscore that no formal configuration has yet been agreed.
Alongside these developments, a parallel stream of more tentative reporting has added to the sense of movement.
According to Al Arabiya News Channel’s bureau chief in South and East Asia, Baker Atyani, Pakistan may have been positioning itself for a mediatory role since the early days of the crisis, with indications of a quiet visit by Iranian officials to Pakistan roughly ten days ago. Other accounts, including commentary from former Pakistani ambassador to Oman, Imran Chaudhry, point to similar contacts in Oman involving Munir, Witkoff and Kushner, described as a possible prelude to Munir’s subsequent telephonic engagement with Trump and discussions around Islamabad as a venue.
These claims remain unverified in official terms, but they broadly align with the pattern of incremental, deniable contacts that typically characterise early-stage conflict diplomacy.
What is clearer is the underlying logic driving Pakistan’s role.
Officials say Islamabad has strong incentives to prevent further escalation, given its geographic proximity to Iran, economic exposure to Gulf instability, and domestic sensitivity to regional tensions. At the same time, its maintained ties with Tehran, working relationships with Gulf capitals, and renewed access in Washington give it a degree of diplomatic flexibility that is currently in short supply.
Even so, people familiar with the discussions caution that the process remains at an exploratory stage. Tehran has continued publicly to reject the idea of direct negotiations while setting out firm conditions for any engagement, while Washington has signalled openness to dialogue without easing pressure.
In that environment, officials in Islamabad say, any role played by Pakistan is likely to remain informal and incremental, focused on facilitating contact rather than brokering a comprehensive settlement.
Diplomats involved in regional consultations stress that early-stage mediation often unfolds in precisely this manner, with overlapping channels, partial disclosures and public denials running in parallel until a clearer political opening emerges.
For now, Pakistan appears to have positioned itself as a credible and useful node in that evolving network.
Whether that role develops into a formal mediation effort—or remains a quieter exercise in message-carrying—will at the end of the day depend on the willingness of Washington and Tehran to move beyond the current phase of guarded engagement.
Dure Akram
Dure Akram is a journalist based in Pakistan with a decade of experience in print and digital media, and at present, heads Daily Times, one of the leading and oldest English newspapers in Pakistan, as opinion and consulting editor.
March 24, 2026
By Dure Akram
That Pakistan is among a small group of capitals being considered as a possible venue for contacts between U.S. and Iranian officials, even as both sides continue to deny that formal negotiations are underway, should not have come as a surprise to those with a finger on the region’s pulse.
Officials familiar with the discussions indicate that Islamabad has remained in sustained contact with Tehran over the past year, including engagements involving Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi and senior Pakistani leadership, while also maintaining a working line to Washington. Pakistan’s additional role in representing Iranian diplomatic interests in the United States has further reinforced its utility in any indirect process.
One need not look further than the fact that Pakistan was one of the first countries to officially denounce strikes on Iran, as it constantly rallied for an end to attacks on civilians in global peacekeeping organisations. An Urdu tweet from Mr Araghchi, not of acknowledgement from Iran’s ambassador in the UN and constant rounds of shutter diplomacy between Deputy Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and his counterparts in the Gulf are enough to further convince the international community about where Pakistan actually stands on the spectrum.
Analysts following the region note that Pakistan’s emergence is not unexpected. Michael Kugelman, for instance, has publicly argued that Pakistan is “far from an unlikely US-Iran mediator,” citing a steady pattern of Pakistan-Iran engagement alongside a perceptible warming of ties between Islamabad and Washington. Some officials in Washington policy circles have also suggested that President Donald Trump views Pakistan as a pragmatic interlocutor, and has spoken favourably of Pakistan’s military leadership—particularly Field Marshall Asim Munir—as having a deeper understanding of Iran than many of his counterparts.
That broader context has fed into what appears to be an expanding, though still opaque, diplomatic effort.
Media reports say Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt are among the countries relaying messages between Washington and Tehran. Islamabad has publicly stated that it is ready to host talks if both parties agree, a position officials describe as procedural rather than aspirational. People briefed on the matter say that this offer has been conveyed quietly through multiple channels.
At the same time, the contours of the effort remain fluid.
Diplomatic chatter in Islamabad suggests that Gulf foreign ministers could visit Pakistan in the coming days as consultations intensify, though no official schedule has been announced. Separate reports circulating in diplomatic and media circles indicate that senior U.S. envoys, including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have figured in backchannel contacts linked to Islamabad, with some accounts placing them in the city for discussions with Iranian-linked interlocutors. These claims may not have been formally confirmed. Yet, a reassuring silence from the White House is the signal we need to read between the lines.
There is also increasing talk of a possible summit format, with one senior regional official cited in media discussions as saying that preliminary contacts are underway to explore an eventual meeting in Islamabad between U.S. and Iranian representatives. Names are already being floated in this context. U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance has been mentioned in several accounts as a potential representative if talks advance, while Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has appeared in political chatter as one of several possible Iranian participants. Of course, anyone thinking of him as Iran’s version of Delcy Rodríguez — someone ready to talk business with President Trump — needs to think again: far from a pliable interlocutor, Ghalibaf is a product of Iran’s hardline security establishment, operating within a system where ultimate authority lies elsewhere and where even perceived pragmatism does not translate into political latitude.
Sources familiar with Iranian internal discussions also note that any delegation from Tehran would likely include multiple senior figures rather than a single negotiator, reflecting the political sensitivity of the process. Public denials from Iranian officials, including Ghalibaf, underscore that no formal configuration has yet been agreed.
Alongside these developments, a parallel stream of more tentative reporting has added to the sense of movement.
According to Al Arabiya News Channel’s bureau chief in South and East Asia, Baker Atyani, Pakistan may have been positioning itself for a mediatory role since the early days of the crisis, with indications of a quiet visit by Iranian officials to Pakistan roughly ten days ago. Other accounts, including commentary from former Pakistani ambassador to Oman, Imran Chaudhry, point to similar contacts in Oman involving Munir, Witkoff and Kushner, described as a possible prelude to Munir’s subsequent telephonic engagement with Trump and discussions around Islamabad as a venue.
These claims remain unverified in official terms, but they broadly align with the pattern of incremental, deniable contacts that typically characterise early-stage conflict diplomacy.
What is clearer is the underlying logic driving Pakistan’s role.
Officials say Islamabad has strong incentives to prevent further escalation, given its geographic proximity to Iran, economic exposure to Gulf instability, and domestic sensitivity to regional tensions. At the same time, its maintained ties with Tehran, working relationships with Gulf capitals, and renewed access in Washington give it a degree of diplomatic flexibility that is currently in short supply.
Even so, people familiar with the discussions caution that the process remains at an exploratory stage. Tehran has continued publicly to reject the idea of direct negotiations while setting out firm conditions for any engagement, while Washington has signalled openness to dialogue without easing pressure.
In that environment, officials in Islamabad say, any role played by Pakistan is likely to remain informal and incremental, focused on facilitating contact rather than brokering a comprehensive settlement.
Diplomats involved in regional consultations stress that early-stage mediation often unfolds in precisely this manner, with overlapping channels, partial disclosures and public denials running in parallel until a clearer political opening emerges.
For now, Pakistan appears to have positioned itself as a credible and useful node in that evolving network.
Whether that role develops into a formal mediation effort—or remains a quieter exercise in message-carrying—will at the end of the day depend on the willingness of Washington and Tehran to move beyond the current phase of guarded engagement.
Dure Akram
Dure Akram is a journalist based in Pakistan with a decade of experience in print and digital media, and at present, heads Daily Times, one of the leading and oldest English newspapers in Pakistan, as opinion and consulting editor.
Pakistan’s Balancing Act In The US-Israel War On Iran – Analysis
March 24, 2026
Observer Research Foundation
By Mohammed Sinan Siyech
With the US-Israel war on Iran now entering its third week, several countries have seen their foreign policies put to the test. Among those facing the greatest challenges is Pakistan. A close ally of Saudi Arabia and a neighbour of Iran — sharing hundreds of kilometres of border with it — Pakistan has found itself stuck between a rock and a hard place. Given its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, which necessitates a military response to any act of aggression against either party, Pakistan’s foreign policy calculations require significant recalibration.
Pakistan has maintained a long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia, having provided military support to the kingdom for decades. In addition, a significant number of Pakistani nationals work in Saudi Arabia, sending home crucial remittances that support Pakistan’s domestic economy. Pakistan’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia amounts to nearly US$5 billion, constituting a substantial share of its external trade.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has long been a provider of financial assistance to Pakistan, which has struggled with persistent economic challenges. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has also invested in Pakistan’s mineral sector and other key infrastructure projects, including electricity, further increasing its strategic importance to Islamabad. The SMDA emerged in the immediate aftermath of an Israeli missile attack on Qatar, signalling Saudi Arabia’s growing uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to the security of its Gulf partners. This arrangement benefited Pakistan as well, as it translated into increased Saudi investments in the country.
On the other hand, Pakistan and Iran also share a long and complex history. Bilateral trade between the two stands at roughly US$3 billion, with both sides aiming to increase it to US$10 billion. Prior to the war, ties had been gradually improving, evidenced by 25 high-level bilateral visits between officials from both countries over the past two years. At the same time, tensions have periodically surfaced, with 2024 witnessing a brief tit-for-tat exchange of missile strikes between the two nations. Nonetheless, the geographic proximity of the two countries makes their relationship important.
Pakistan’s Limitations
In the current scenario, with Saudi Arabia sustaining multiple strikes from Iran, there is a possibility that Riyadh may turn to Pakistan for military support. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has already expressed his country’s “full solidarity and support” for Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Sharif placed a call to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian following the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader. The central question, therefore, is: what considerations must Pakistan weigh if it were to come to Saudi Arabia’s defence?
For Islamabad, several constraints complicate any decision to become directly involved in the conflict. First, while Pakistan may be obligated under the SMDA to support Saudi Arabia, it is already engaged in ongoing hostilities with Afghanistan, an issue that has received comparatively little attention amid news coverage dominated by the Iran conflict. Tensions with Afghanistan have imposed significant military and operational costs on Pakistan, requiring Islamabad to concentrate substantial security resources on that front. Entering a second conflict against another state would severely strain Pakistan’s military capabilities and resources.
Second, Pakistan cannot afford to ignore its geography and open a sustained war front with Iran. Iran has demonstrated its military capabilities, challenging American, Israeli, and Gulf defence systems alike. In addition, Tehran has shown a strong willingness to strike its adversaries forcefully. For Pakistan, the risk of prolonged tensions with neighbouring Iran is especially unattractive, given its simultaneous security challenges with Afghanistan and India.
Third, Pakistan must also factor in domestic political sensitivities, including a sizeable segment of its population that is sympathetic towards Iran. Pakistan’s Shia population constitutes roughly 20 percent of the country, at approximately 35 million people, with longstanding religious and social ties to Iran. Many Pakistani Shias regularly travel to Iran, and some have previously fought alongside Iran-backed forces in Syria. Alienating this constituency by participating in a conflict against Iran could prove destabilising for Pakistan, which has historically experienced significant sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia communities.
Difficult Decisions
For Pakistan, as for many other countries, including India and several Gulf states, there are no easy answers in this war. Despite the constraints outlined above, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on Saudi Arabia for aid and economic support, particularly at a time when its domestic economic situation remains fragile. Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford disruptions to fuel imports from Gulf nations, which supply a significant share of its energy requirements.
The fact that Pakistan has negotiated with Iran to ensure safe passage for fuel shipments through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that, despite offering political support to Saudi Arabia, it continues to engage pragmatically with Iran to safeguard its energy security. Another factor working in Pakistan’s favour is the presence of substantial Chinese investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For Iran, which exports most of its oil to China and has reportedly received intelligence support from Beijing during the conflict, targeting Chinese investments in Pakistan and alienating a key partner would be counterproductive. This is particularly true at a time when Tehran faces increasingly strained regional relations following its attacks on several states across the Middle East.
Ultimately, Pakistan appears to be pursuing a cautious and calibrated approach towards both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is likely to avoid escalation, particularly as it has introduced domestic austerity measures to conserve energy resources. Direct military involvement is therefore an outcome Pakistan would prefer to avoid, opting instead for diplomatic engagement aimed at easing tensions. Saudi Arabia, too, appears hesitant to formally invoke the defence agreement, as doing so would require a declaration of war — an escalation Riyadh is keen to avoid in order to prevent deeper entanglement in US-Israeli military action against Iran.
March 24, 2026
Observer Research Foundation
By Mohammed Sinan Siyech
With the US-Israel war on Iran now entering its third week, several countries have seen their foreign policies put to the test. Among those facing the greatest challenges is Pakistan. A close ally of Saudi Arabia and a neighbour of Iran — sharing hundreds of kilometres of border with it — Pakistan has found itself stuck between a rock and a hard place. Given its Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia, which necessitates a military response to any act of aggression against either party, Pakistan’s foreign policy calculations require significant recalibration.
Pakistan has maintained a long-standing relationship with Saudi Arabia, having provided military support to the kingdom for decades. In addition, a significant number of Pakistani nationals work in Saudi Arabia, sending home crucial remittances that support Pakistan’s domestic economy. Pakistan’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia amounts to nearly US$5 billion, constituting a substantial share of its external trade.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia has long been a provider of financial assistance to Pakistan, which has struggled with persistent economic challenges. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has also invested in Pakistan’s mineral sector and other key infrastructure projects, including electricity, further increasing its strategic importance to Islamabad. The SMDA emerged in the immediate aftermath of an Israeli missile attack on Qatar, signalling Saudi Arabia’s growing uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to the security of its Gulf partners. This arrangement benefited Pakistan as well, as it translated into increased Saudi investments in the country.
On the other hand, Pakistan and Iran also share a long and complex history. Bilateral trade between the two stands at roughly US$3 billion, with both sides aiming to increase it to US$10 billion. Prior to the war, ties had been gradually improving, evidenced by 25 high-level bilateral visits between officials from both countries over the past two years. At the same time, tensions have periodically surfaced, with 2024 witnessing a brief tit-for-tat exchange of missile strikes between the two nations. Nonetheless, the geographic proximity of the two countries makes their relationship important.
Pakistan’s Limitations
In the current scenario, with Saudi Arabia sustaining multiple strikes from Iran, there is a possibility that Riyadh may turn to Pakistan for military support. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has already expressed his country’s “full solidarity and support” for Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Sharif placed a call to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian following the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader. The central question, therefore, is: what considerations must Pakistan weigh if it were to come to Saudi Arabia’s defence?
For Islamabad, several constraints complicate any decision to become directly involved in the conflict. First, while Pakistan may be obligated under the SMDA to support Saudi Arabia, it is already engaged in ongoing hostilities with Afghanistan, an issue that has received comparatively little attention amid news coverage dominated by the Iran conflict. Tensions with Afghanistan have imposed significant military and operational costs on Pakistan, requiring Islamabad to concentrate substantial security resources on that front. Entering a second conflict against another state would severely strain Pakistan’s military capabilities and resources.
Second, Pakistan cannot afford to ignore its geography and open a sustained war front with Iran. Iran has demonstrated its military capabilities, challenging American, Israeli, and Gulf defence systems alike. In addition, Tehran has shown a strong willingness to strike its adversaries forcefully. For Pakistan, the risk of prolonged tensions with neighbouring Iran is especially unattractive, given its simultaneous security challenges with Afghanistan and India.
Third, Pakistan must also factor in domestic political sensitivities, including a sizeable segment of its population that is sympathetic towards Iran. Pakistan’s Shia population constitutes roughly 20 percent of the country, at approximately 35 million people, with longstanding religious and social ties to Iran. Many Pakistani Shias regularly travel to Iran, and some have previously fought alongside Iran-backed forces in Syria. Alienating this constituency by participating in a conflict against Iran could prove destabilising for Pakistan, which has historically experienced significant sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia communities.
Difficult Decisions
For Pakistan, as for many other countries, including India and several Gulf states, there are no easy answers in this war. Despite the constraints outlined above, Pakistan remains heavily reliant on Saudi Arabia for aid and economic support, particularly at a time when its domestic economic situation remains fragile. Moreover, Pakistan cannot afford disruptions to fuel imports from Gulf nations, which supply a significant share of its energy requirements.
The fact that Pakistan has negotiated with Iran to ensure safe passage for fuel shipments through the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that, despite offering political support to Saudi Arabia, it continues to engage pragmatically with Iran to safeguard its energy security. Another factor working in Pakistan’s favour is the presence of substantial Chinese investments under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For Iran, which exports most of its oil to China and has reportedly received intelligence support from Beijing during the conflict, targeting Chinese investments in Pakistan and alienating a key partner would be counterproductive. This is particularly true at a time when Tehran faces increasingly strained regional relations following its attacks on several states across the Middle East.
Ultimately, Pakistan appears to be pursuing a cautious and calibrated approach towards both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Islamabad is likely to avoid escalation, particularly as it has introduced domestic austerity measures to conserve energy resources. Direct military involvement is therefore an outcome Pakistan would prefer to avoid, opting instead for diplomatic engagement aimed at easing tensions. Saudi Arabia, too, appears hesitant to formally invoke the defence agreement, as doing so would require a declaration of war — an escalation Riyadh is keen to avoid in order to prevent deeper entanglement in US-Israeli military action against Iran.
About the author: Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Non–Resident Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
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