15 Years Since Devastating Famine, Somalia Faces New Disaster: Drought Without Aid

Africa Uganda Kids Children Water Drought Poverty

 May 5, 2026  

By Eurasia Review

Families in Somalia are confronting a new catastrophe, with hunger and humanitarian needs soaring, a worsening drought, and aid levels at unprecedented lows, said Save the Children.

In a new report, When Aid Disappears, Childhood Disappears Too, Save the Children reveals how the collapse of international aid funding to Somalia in 2025 may soon lead to catastrophic outcomes for children not seen since the 2011 famine, which killed over 257,000 people.  

Early in 2025, projections estimated that 3.4 million people were facing crisis-level food insecurity. A year later, this figure has almost doubled with a projection of 6.5 million people — a jump directly correlated with massive cuts in international funding as well as the predicted poor October-December 2025 rains. 

Meanwhile, in 2024, Somalia’s Humanitarian Response Plan was 57.7% funded, which, while still below overall needs, was sufficient to sustain critical programmes. In 2025, coverage fell to just 28.8%. Now, in April 2026, only around 15% of the response plan is funded – the lowest level on record at this time of the year.  

As a result, food and nutrition services have been heavily reduced – including the closure of more than 300 nutrition facilities across the country, which are critical for treating child hunger and malnutrition – and preventive programmes have been significantly scaled back. 

Without immediate funding, more treatment centres will close, supply chains will be disrupted, and children in need of care will be turned away. At the same time, conflict in the Middle East risks further strain on global supply chains, increasing the likelihood of delays and shortages. 

The report also reveals that while Somalia’s children have grown up under the shadow of repeated crisis – such as the famine of 2011, recurrent droughts, conflict, and disease outbreaks – families have also shown extraordinary resilience. This includes sharing resources, improvising to meet basic needs, and supporting one another even when formal aid has been delayed, insufficient, or absent. The report confirms that while Somali families endure with remarkable strength, sustained external support is essential to prevent avoidable suffering and protect the next generation. 

Save the Children’s Country Director for Somalia, Mohamud Mohamed Hassan, said:  

“What we are seeing is not a slow deterioration, but a preventable crisis unfolding right now. In Somalia, the crisis is the result of a dire combination of protracted conflict and accelerating climate shocks, compounded by the decision to cut aid to record low levels in 2025. That choice was not inevitable; it had predictable, deadly consequences. Fifteen years of experience in Somalia show what happens when funding changes: when aid is scaled up, lives are saved; when it disappears, so do childhoods. 

“Drawing on lessons from the past 15 years, this report warns that current funding cuts risk reversing hard-won progress, including gains in immunisation and reductions in child mortality. Without immediate additional funding, more treatment centres will close, supply chains will break, and children who could have been saved will simply be turned away. Funding must return now — to protect children, prevent the crisis from worsening, and uphold the principle of “never again”. 

Fazia*, 15, attends a Save the Children-supported school in Baidoa. She has benefitted from humanitarian aid, but is concerned about the future:  

“Before, education was not something I thought about. My life has changed significantly. I used to feel uneducated and unaware, but now I have access to free education. 

“Now water is scarce, and the drought is extreme. Livestock are dying due to lack of water. Food has also become scarce, and the drought has deeply affected us.  

“For the past three years, we have been struggling with hunger.”  

Save the Children is calling on the international community to urgently increase humanitarian funding to meet the needs of over 6.5 million people requiring assistance, prioritise support for nutrition and health programs to prevent child deaths, invest in education to give children the skills they need now and into the future,  invest in longer-term resilience programming, and ensure aid reaches the most affected populations. 

Romania’s Government Ousted By Parliamentary No-Confidence Vote

May 6, 2026 
Balkan Insight
By Marian Chiriac

Romania’s pro-European government, led by Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, collapsed on Tuesday after parliament passed a no-confidence motion initiated by the left-leaning Social Democratic Party, PSD, and the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians, AUR.

The motion was supported by 281 votes, well above the 233 needed to dismiss the Prime Minister, while only four lawmakers voted against. Although Bolojan’s allies were present, they abstained.

“We aim to form a new government as soon as possible. All options for a future coalition remain open,” PSD leader Sorin Grindeanu said shortly after the vote.

Following this outcome, the government will continue in a caretaker capacity with limited powers for up to 45 days. During this period, President Nicusor Dan is expected to nominate a new prime minister-designate tasked with securing a parliamentary majority.

The vote caps weeks of escalating tensions within Romania’s fragile ruling coalition, strained by policy disagreements, internal rivalries and eroding support in parliament.

Bolojan assembled a four-party coalition in June 2025 to contain the rise of the AUR, led by George Simion. The alliance came in the wake of the Constitutional Court decision to annul the November 2024 first-round presidential election over suspected Russian interference benefiting nationalist candidate Călin Georgescu.

The PSD was the dominant force in the coalition, which included Bolojan’s centre-right National Liberal Party and two smaller centre-right parties. Its mandate was to stabilise the economy – currently facing the highest budget deficit in the EU – unlock 11 billion euros in EU recovery funds, and preserve the country’s investment-grade rating.

However, a series of unpopular austerity measures aimed at reducing last year’s budget deficit strained relations with the Social Democrats who ultimately withdrew from the coalition. Bolojan accused their leadership of seeking to remove him to “protect their own interests.”

Last month, the PSD joined forces with AUR to file the no-confidence motion.

The political crisis has unsettled investors and weakened the national currency, with the leu hitting a historic low against the euro on Tuesday.

President Dan sought to reassure domestic and international audiences on Monday, stressing that Romania would remain firmly on its pro-European path.

Analysts warn that the situation is volatile.

“We are already facing a historic depreciation of the national currency, which may deepen further,” economic analyst Adrian Negrescu wrote on social media.

He added that the current crisis adds to broader concerns over governance stability and fiscal policy direction, so that “Romania risks sliding into an economic recession”.

 

Romania's pro-EU coalition collapses after prime minister fails no-confidence vote

By Gavin Blackburn

Published on 05/05/2026 - EURONEWS

Romania has faced a long period of instability and the country is grappling with one of the highest budget deficits in the EU, rampant inflation and a technical recession.

Romania's pro-European coalition government collapsed on Tuesday after lawmakers voted in favour of a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, triggering a fresh period of turmoil in the less than a year after the coalition was sworn in.

The joint effort was launched last week when the leftist Social Democratic Party (PSD), which withdrew from the coalition in late April, and the hard-right opposition Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), submitted the motion to Parliament.

After a parliamentary debate, 281 lawmakers voted in favour of the motion and four against.

Lawmakers from Bolojan's centre-right National Liberal Party (PNL) and coalition partners Save Romania Union party and the small ethnic Hungarian UDMR party did not cast votes.

Bolojan called the motion "cynical and artificial" and said before the vote that it "seems to be written by people who were not in government every day and did not participate in all the decisions."

Romanian Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan grimaces during a parliament session ahead of a no confidence vote in Bucharest, 5 May, 2026 AP Photo

"It is cynical, because it does not take into account the context in which we find ourselves," he said.

"I assumed the position of prime minister, being aware that it comes with enormous pressure and that I would not receive applause from the citizens. But I chose to do what was urgent and necessary for our country."

Romania has faced a long period of instability after a presidential election was annulled in December 2024 and the country is grappling with one of the highest budget deficits in the EU, rampant inflation and a technical recession.

In June, when the coalition was voted in, it pledged to make reducing the budget deficit a top priority.

The PSD often found itself at loggerheads with Bolojan over some of the austerity measures, which included tax hikes, public sector wage and pension freezes, and cutting public spending and public administration jobs.

Romanian lawmakers vote in parliament in Bucharest, 5 May, 2026 AP Photo

PSD said Bolojan had "failed to implement any genuine reform" in his 10 months leading the government and said Romania needs a leader who is "capable of collaboration."

Bolojan said that he took tough but necessary fiscal measures that effectively "regained the trust of the markets in the Romanian government."

The PSD would be needed to form a pro-European parliamentary majority. The party has previously ruled out entering a government with AUR.

George Simion, the AUR leader, said on Tuesday that voters had "supported and wanted water, food, energy," but had "received taxes, war and poverty."

"We assume the future of this country, a future government and restore the hope of the Romanians," he said. "Romania must go back to the vote of the Romanians."

Romanian lawmakers vote in parliament in Bucharest, 5 May, 2026 AP Photo

Cristian Andrei, a Bucharest-based political consultant, said the crisis will likely lead to a stalemate, since "no one has a majority, or a coalition, and it will take the president...weeks to find such a majority and name a new prime minister, prolonging the indecision."

"At this moment, there are two tentative options for a new Cabinet, both difficult to achieve; either a reshuffled coalition, without Bolojan, in the same formation...or a minority Cabinet, rather led by PSD and satellites from populist parties, like AUR, or other small groups," he said.

"A PSD-AUR official Cabinet is not a possibility today because the president will not endorse it."

UK Restaurant Chains Falling Short On Healthy Nutrition Targets

 May 6, 2026  

By Eurasia Review

Only 43% of menu items at the UK’s highest-grossing restaurant chains met all their voluntary targets for sugar, salt, and calorie reduction, as set by the UK Government. These findings are published on May 5th in a study in the open-access journal PLOS Medicine by Alice O’Hagan of the University of Oxford, UK, and colleagues.

The purchasing and consumption of foods high in energy, saturated fat, free sugars, and salt, is associated with an increased risk of obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases. In recent years, the UK Government has set a series of voluntary targets for manufacturers, retailers, and restaurants to reduce the sugar, salt, and calorie content of food. The sugar targets were intended to be met by 2020, the salt targets by 2024, and the calorie targets by 2025. Few studies have assessed the nutritional quality of foods in the restaurant sector, despite an increasing percentage of weekly food intake coming from takeaway or restaurant meals.

In the new study, researchers gathered nutritional information from the 21 highest-grossing restaurant chains in the UK in 2024, using PDF menus or nutritional information on restaurant websites. They calculated the proportion of menu items from each restaurant and food subcategory that met the nutritional targets. Nine of the 21 restaurants had more than half of their menu items meeting all applicable targets. Menu items from Papa John’s were the lowest adhering to the calorie (35%) and salt (8%) targets, while menu items from Burger King, KFC, Nando’s, and Vintage Inns had zero adherence to the sugar targets.

Food within the same subcategory varied in adherence to the targets, with salads and breakfast items having the highest overall adherence, and desserts and pizzas the lowest. However, there were examples of companies across all subcategories performing well, indicating that performance is not constrained by the type of cuisine being offered.

“Our findings demonstrate that there was low adherence to the UK Government’s sugar, salt, and calorie reduction targets in 2024,” the authors say. “This is consistent with other research that finds limited effectiveness of voluntary regulation on reformulation, suggesting that mandatory regulation may be a more effective approach to improving the nutritional quality of out-of-home food.”

Alice O’Hagan adds, “Our study shows that the UK Government’s voluntary sugar, salt, and calorie reduction targets were not being met consistently across the highest-grossing UK restaurant chains, in 2024. Only 43% of menu items met all of the targets they were eligible for, and adherence to the targets varied widely between restaurants and food categories, showing that healthier menus are achievable but are not yet the norm.”

“Interestingly, restaurants with similar menu styles performed quite differently in meeting the targets. This shows the nutritional quality of menus is not fixed by cuisine type, making the shift towards healthier menus a more attainable goal for food companies.”

Co-author Lauren Bandy adds, “Voluntary targets alone are not delivering consistent improvements in the salt, sugar or calorie content of food items on offer in UK restaurants. Our findings highlight the potential value of stricter regulation in the out-of-home sector, and show that improving transparency and accountability of individual food companies will be key in supporting healthier food provision for the UK population.”

How Small States Can Survive Big Changes: Laos, Mekong And ASEAN In The Age Of Might Makes Right – Analysis

May 6, 2026 
 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Anoulak Kittikhoun


We live in an uncertain world in which “might makes right” is back in fashion. It was always there in substance and episodes, but past transgressions had at least been couched in internationally acceptable terms. Presently, even successful regional institutions such as the EU and ASEAN feel lost in the realist world of big power politics.

One response to this change came from middle-power Canada, whose Prime Minister, in a January 2026 World Economic Forum speech to the world’s richest countries and companies, called for “variable geometry,” meaning the building and sustaining of different coalitions for different issues.[1] Middle powers may be able to do this with sufficient capacity and resources, as well as a reasonable size that enables them to withstand adverse consequences. Mark Carney’s speech, however, had little to say about smaller states, such as Laos, which make up most of the world’s countries, and it certainly did not raise the need to reform or strengthen regional or international institutions that traditionally amplify their voices.

In this global “rupture” where capable middle powers are rethinking the world order, what do states with weaker capacity and smaller size do? If big countries do what they wish, and middle powers do what they can, would smaller ones have to suffer what they must? Consider Laos, a small, landlocked country bordered by larger neighbours, historically exposed to external intervention and repeatedly exploited as a battlefield. Laos cannot play the same game as middle powers can. It has little room for manoeuvre, small margins for error, and high exposure to pressure.

Shaped by regional powers’ expansions, by French colonial rule, and by the US–Soviet Cold War, including the US’ “Secret War” when it became the most bombed country on earth,[2] Laos learned that caution, balance, and the post-Cold War rules-based international order anchored in the UN, WTO, and ASEAN brought stability. To survive the age of might makes right, Laos should indeed be “realist” in its assessments of the world, but remain “liberal” in its belief that cooperative institutions do amplify the actions of individual states, and most importantly, “constructivist” in its optimism that visionary and bold leadership bring about meaningful outcomes. In short, four principles are key: geopolitical competence, cooperative institutions, strategic partnership and visionary leadership.

GEOPOLITICAL COMPETENCE

Small states must be especially competent geopolitically. It must recognise how its size, location, regional context, and historical experience shape its identity and options in ways that turn vulnerability into leverage.[3] Every small state is faced with a different mix of geographical jinxes and blessings. Historically, Laos’s geography had been more a drawback than an asset. Yet geography also offers Laos a strategic set of opportunities. Born landlocked, it is building up to be land-linked, cultivating political and economic relationships with its immediate neighbours over the last three decades. As a result, Vietnam is a long-standing political ally with which it has strong defence ties. If there is any doubt about the depth of the mutually beneficial relations and affections between the two countries, this should be stilled by the fact that the top three Vietnamese leaders – Party General Secretary, Prime Minister, and President of the General Assembly – travelled to Vientiane together for the first time to meet their Laotian counterparts in February 2026.[4] Laos-Vietnam relations have been upgraded to “strategic cohesion”[5] – the special of the special – aligning political, security and economic relations and outlook. Laos’ military capacity, built on its joint struggle with Vietnam during their revolutions and subsequent security pact, ensure Laos’ successful military defence against another neighbour in the 1980s. Economic cooperation with Vietnam, a rising economic engine of ASEAN, has made it one of Laos’ top three trading partners and investors, whose impact can only increase with more connectivity through the planned expressway from Vientiane to Hanoi and high-speed Laos-Vietnam railway to Vung Ang on the South China Sea.[6]


Despite a more complicated Laos-China relationship during the Cold War, the situation has dramatically improved. China is now a central ideological, economic, and connectivity partner of Laos, with the flagship BRI project, the Laos-China Railway, connecting Laos and the region to the huge Chinese market.[7] Where Thailand is concerned, notwithstanding the complex bilateral history, the peoples on both sides of the Mekong River basin share strong ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties, and the two countries have had excellent political and economic relations for the past 30 years. Laos and Thailand have built five “Friendship Bridges” across their shared Mekong mainstream, and regional connectivity and trade are set to upgrade once the Thailand-China Railway is complete and linked to the Laos-China Railway.[8] Laos also shares historical and religious affinities with Cambodia, and economic ties between the two are now increasing. Tensions do sometimes rise between Laos and its neighbours, such as the controversies around Xayaburi dam, funded by Thailand and initially opposed by Vietnam, and Don Sahong dam, opposed at first by Cambodia. These were managed by Laos’ strong relations with these neighbours, and by its strategic use of regional cooperative mechanisms such as the Mekong River Commission.[9]

One strategic area not currently optimised for regional connectivity is Laos’ geographical advantage as the Mekong’s central riparian state. With much of the mainstream and key tributaries on its side, Laos can accelerate its role as an energy battery of ASEAN not only through hydropower, which sometimes causes concerns, but other green energies such as solar, wind and possibly hydrogen; with expanded storage, it can build itself to be a water tower, managing water for irrigation, navigation and flood and drought relief. Doing so would not only contribute to regional sustainable development but also strategic outcomes in augmenting Laos’ indispensability to the region and the interests of its neighbours and partners.


How can this be done? By pursuing what the author has called “a New Deal for the Mekong,” managing and developing Southeast Asia’s largest river as one interconnected and interdependent system rather than a patchwork of separate national sectoral projects.[10] Integrated development and management of the Mekong would benefit not only riparian countries but also non-riparian ASEAN states in terms of food, energy, environment and eco-tourism.

To make the deal beneficial for all of ASEAN, two critical actions are needed: first, Laos can operate its existing dams in coordination with China (as the two have the most storage capacity in the Mekong), and second, build new ones jointly (e.g. with Thailand). Coordinating dam operation (i.e. when to store water, when to release, which dam and where) and developing more water storages jointly, will ensure there is more reliable energy generation (benefiting importing countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore), greater dry-season water availability for irrigation (benefiting Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as importing countries in the rest of ASEAN), reduced flood peaks and droughts (benefiting Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), improved navigation potential throughout the basin (benefiting China and Cambodia, and China-ASEAN connectivity), and environmental flows and preserved wetlands and watersheds for eco-tourism (benefiting the millions of ASEAN citizens who travel to the Mekong annually).

To achieve all this, Laos must work with concerned countries to strengthen regional institutions such as the MRC and ASEAN to assemble the technical parts of the deal, build strategic partnerships and coalitions that align incentives and prevent isolated deal-making in one sector or between two countries, which historically have led to large trade-offs. To make it optimal, the deal would need to be multi-sector and multi-country, which could only be carefully studied (i.e. in comprehensive economic, social and environmental aspects) and proposed by institutions having the best interests of the region at heart.

COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Strong institutions, ideally at both the international and regional levels, and their secretariats are critical for small states. Institutions reduce information asymmetry, create predictable procedures, and make it harder for stronger actors to impose purely bilateral terms. Whether it is the UN, ASEAN or MRC, experienced staff of these organisations’ international secretariats have the knowledge, expertise, and institutional memory at their fingertips. While larger countries field extensive diplomatic missions in key international organisations, many small countries lack the capacity to cover all issues in sufficient depth or breadth. Hence, it is critical for small states’ missions, especially if they wish to play a facilitation and brokerage role, to learn from and work with the experienced staff of these secretariats.

Furthermore, many international secretariat officials are naturally sympathetic to the plight of smaller and poorer members. Laos has benefited from this repeatedly. The UN Secretariat helped sustain the landlocked developing countries’ agenda on transit rights and sea access across years of negotiation, and the MRC’s technical credibility and facilitation have provided data, modelling, and procedures that make Mekong cooperation possible even when politics were tense. In ASEAN, Laos received support from the ASEAN Secretariat during its chairmanships in 2004, 2016, and 2024, to ensure continuity and process management.

A stronger ASEAN Secretariat can better support smaller member states when these are faced with regional and global crises, especially when these states are not acting as Chair and are unable to drive coordination and a united response. The recent US tariff is a case in point. When a superpower applies trade pressure, small members (with Cambodia and Laos being hit initially with 49% and 48% of tariffs) are the most vulnerable if they face one-on-one bargaining. ASEAN (the world’s fifth largest economy), backed by rapid analysis and recommendations from ASEC and other ASEAN institutions, could aggregate its voice and capability and attempt to get better trade deals as a bloc. Despite issuing statements and setting up a geoeconomic task force, individual members were instead currying favours to get the best deals for themselves.

A stronger ASEAN can still redeem itself, but only if it treats its Secretariat as a strategic body rather than an administrative overhead. This means resourcing ASEC through a budgeted, multi-year strategic plan, upgrading staffing in both quantity and quality, and building stronger coordinating and monitoring mechanisms so that ASEAN commitments – including centrality and solidarity – may better translate into implementation.[11] The Secretariat’s analytical tool kit must also be modernised, including data platforms and AI-enabled analytics for early warning, policy tracking, and rapid scenario support. With that capability, ASEAN would be better positioned to protect smaller members when external shocks hit and to deliver regional public goods that they cannot secure on their own. Programmes like the Initiative for ASEAN Integration would help, but more importantly, stronger and well-resourced ASEC and ASEAN institutions would be better able to think for the region, especially with regards to its weaker members, than ASEAN chair(s) rotating in and out within a year and being primarily concerned about national interests.

The above kinds of ASEAN institutions would be able to drive a New Mekong Deal to reality by working with Mekong institutions such as the MRC, the Mekong Institute, and the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center, to upgrade decision-support systems, data-sharing protocols, and to commission long-term assessments, joint studies, and refine options on each aspect of the deal. Those technical packages would then be elevated systematically through senior officials’ and ministerial meetings across Mekong platforms and into ASEAN processes, so the deal becomes an ASEAN-level public good rather than a fragmented set of riparian agreements.

 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Small states have real agency when they coalesce and forge strategic partnerships. Several regional and global agendas would not have advanced without small-state leadership – to name just a few: climate ambition and finance by Small Island Developing States, law of the sea and ocean governance by coastal and island states, including Singapore,[12] and landlocked countries’ development and transit rights by a coalition of states, including Laos. Laos has historically been skilled at widening options with multiple parties, big and small, without provoking a backlash.

For the cause of landlocked developing countries, Laos worked with sympathetic transit countries and supportive donors to move reluctant actors. In the Mekong, it has built issue-specific alignments to advance hydropower development, and has drawn on certain development partners when technical credibility or financing was needed. In ASEAN, it applied the same method during its chairmanships, especially in periods of heightened tension when ASEAN unity was at risk. The 2016 South China Sea episode, in which the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favour of the Philippines against China, showed that it could broker agreements on a joint communiqué (in light of the failure during 2012 on a similar issue) and the chair’s statement of the East Asia Summit through quiet consultation, careful drafting, and compromises anchored in ASEAN principles and international law, and calibrated to avoid bias but that kept all parties on board (or rather left them equally unhappy).[13]


For the Mekong’s new deal, Laos should therefore work deliberately with fellow small states that stand to gain the most from a basin-wide bargain. For example, with Cambodia, Laos can support coordinated reservoir operations that stabilise flows to protect fisheries and livelihoods tied to the Tonle Sap, and even improve navigation potential, including the economic viability of the proposed Funan canal, if done cooperatively. In return, Cambodia can buy more energy from Laos and help advance practical pathways for ASEAN power connectivity, including sub-sea cables to Singapore. With Singapore, Laos can position coordinated dam operations as a regional resilience project that increases reliable clean power and supports food security through more stable downstream agriculture (i.e. Mekong delta rice which Singapore import significantly). For its part, Singapore can support the MRC’s work, protecting the “water tower” of Laos, and accelerating the ASEAN Power Grid agenda to obtain more Lao energy.

 
VISIONARY LEADERSHIP

In the end, small states will have better chances of survival if they invest in excellent leaders. A new Mekong deal certainly will not materialise without bold and visionary leadership. Albert Einstein once observed that powerful states need no ambassadors, their force speaks for itself. But for small states, it matters how they express themselves. “Through the sheer force of their abilities,” it has long been noted, statesmen and diplomats from small states can ensure their arguments are heard and acted upon.[14] In today’s world, when the President of the United States speaks or when the leader of a middle power like Canada says something extraordinary, people listen. Leaders of many small states, however, struggle to command global attention. The UN General Assembly Hall are sometimes half emptied when they take the stage.

History tells an interesting story. At pivotal moments, visionary leaders from small states have commanded attention and shaped global debates. Think Ghana, which had leaders including Kwame Nkrumah in Pan-African nation-building, and Kofi Annan at the United Nations. Think Lee Kuan Yew, whose Singapore the United States took seriously and whose model even influenced China’s thinking on governance and development; or Fidel Castro, who compelled the Soviet Union to reckon with Cuba’s brand of communism that inspired movements across the developing world; or Czech leader Václav Havel, who galvanised much of the West. Despite their different ideologies, these giants from small places proved that clarity and leadership transformed their countries, inspired their own officials to fight the same fights across institutions, and moved outcomes that would otherwise not have happened. It is precisely this kind of leadership that small states need today.

Laos can build a pipeline of leaders and officials who can operate under pressure with skill, and who can translate national interests into broader interests that others can endorse. That pipeline must include the ministries that matter most for regional bargaining – foreign affairs, finance, commerce, transport, and environment – and be reinforced through specialised training in negotiation, drafting, economic statecraft, international law, and technical literacy on climate, water, agriculture, energy, connectivity and technology.

Equally important, Laos should place competent nationals inside regional and international secretariats. This is where agendas are prepared, options framed, texts drafted, assessments conducted, projects initiated and implementation monitored. Over time, a cadre of capable Lao officials at home and within institutions becomes the most reliable way for a small country to not only survive but thrive.

CONCLUSION

In a harsh world, small states cannot survive by fending alone and for themselves, pretending that the rules and institutions that they and others build do not matter, or by bandwagoning with the strongest. They survive, and can even shape outcomes, by becoming geopolitically competent, by strengthening cooperative institutions, by building strategic partnerships, and by investing in leaders who can turn geographical advantage into bankable bargains.

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.Source: 

This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Can US law stop Trump from withdrawing troops from Europe?

By Tamsin Paternoster

Published on 05/05/2026 - EURONEWS

A 2026 US defence law does not prevent troop withdrawals from Europe, but imposes consultations and justifications for major cuts that make such a move more difficult.

The US is set to withdraw around 5,000 troops from Germany, according to the Pentagon — a move that has raised concerns about a broader reduction of US forces across Europe

There are around 36,000 US troops currently in Germany alongside several key military hubs, including Ramstein Air Base, command headquarters and a medical centre that treated casualties from wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

An estimated 80,000 to 100,000 US service members are stationed across Europe, depending on rotations.

Such bases consolidate NATO's presence in Europe, hosting US forces and supporting joint training and operations with allies.00:01

The planned reduction of 5,000 troops amounts to around 14% of the total number of service members stationed in Germany. Those set to withdraw include a brigade combat team and a long-range fires battalion that the Biden administration planned to deploy when it was in power. They will now not be stationed in Europe.

Sean Parnell, spokesperson for the Pentagon, which houses the US Department of Defense, said that the decision follows a "thorough review of the Department's force posture in Europe and is in recognition of theatre requirements and conditions on the ground."

The announcement to withdraw troops — which came after German leader Friedrich Merz issued a rebuke of the Trump administration's actions in Iran — is in line with threats US President Donald Trump has made in the past.

At the end of his first term in 2020, the president announced plans to withdraw around 9,500 US troops from Germany. The idea faced backlash from Congress before it was ultimately halted by the Biden administration, which took power in 2021.

Despite criticism from Republican and Democratic lawmakers of his recent proposal to pull troops, Trump doubled down on Saturday, telling reporters in Florida that his administration would be "cutting a lot further" than the 5,000 already mentioned.

Is Trump able to wind down large numbers of US troops in Europe?

Several analysts and commentators have pointed out that a piece of US defence legislation, which became law this year, places restrictions on the Pentagon from making significant cuts to the number of troops deployed in Europe.

Under Section 1249 of the National Defense Authorisation Act for 2026, administrations are limited in how they can use Pentagon funds to cut troop numbers.

According to the law, the Pentagon cannot use its budget to reduce troop levels in Europe to below 76,000 for more than 45 days unless it meets certain conditions.

These include certifying that the cuts are in the interests of US national security, consulting NATO allies on the move beforehand and submitting a detailed report to Congress.

There is also a waiting period, meaning large reductions in troop numbers cannot take place immediately.

Beyond legal limits, analysts note that withdrawing troops from Europe is complex and expensive.

Analysis by Liana Fix from independent US think tank the Council on Foreign Relations, notes that US forces in Germany are embedded in global command structures, meaning that relocating them is logistically complex, costly and could weaken military readiness.

On the German side, officials have so far downplayed the immediate impact of losing 5,000 troops, with Defence Minister Boris Pistorius describing the move as "foreseeable", and pushing for Europe to take more responsibility for its own safety.

German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul and Chancellor Friedrich Merz equally projected calm in the wake of the news, with Merz telling a television interview on Sunday: "They are constantly redeploying their troop units worldwide, and we are affected by that too."

Critics and politicians pointed out that the threat of not stationing Tomahawk missiles on German soil poses a bigger risk than troop withdrawal, as it leaves Berlin with a missile gap that it could not replace on its own accord.

US Troop Withdrawal Dominates European Leaders’ Meeting

 May 5, 2026 

By EurActiv

By Pietro Guastamacchia

(EurActiv) — The announcement of US troop withdrawals from Germany overshadowed the start of the European Political Community (EPC) meeting on Monday, shifting the focus from a broad discussion on regional cooperation to the more urgent debate over Europe’s security dependence on the United States.

The meeting in Armenia’s capital marks the first occasion for European leaders to meet face-to-face following the White House’s sudden announcement.

Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative, said the timing of the announcement came as a “surprise,” though she said that the debate over the US presence in Europe was not new.

“It shows that we really need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and that we need to do more,” she said, noting however that “the American troops are not in Europe only for protecting the European interests but also American interests.”

European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen did not mention the US troops’ withdrawal but also called for greater European independence when it comes to defence.

“We have to step up our military capabilities to be able to defend ourselves,” she said, pointing to available funding and urging faster production of military capabilities.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told reporters that “Europeans have now received the message” that there was “disappointment from the United States” over their response to the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Rutte also said that “the allies are now making sure that all bilateral agreements on bases are implemented.”

During the weekend, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz sought to play down the American announcement, telling ARD that “not everything we’ve been hearing over the last few days is actually new.”

“It might be a bit more exaggerated, but it’s nothing new,” he said.

The Italian government also sought to downplay concerns, stating that it sees “no immediate consequences” from the announcement. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio will on Thursday visit Rome for a series of meetings at the Vatican. He is also expected also to meet Defence Minister Guido Crosetto.

The EPC summit also became an opportunity for key European and allied leaders to coordinate on Ukraine. Antonio Costa, European Council President, convened a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer on the sidelines of the gathering.