Wednesday, May 06, 2026

Remembering The Costs Of War – OpEd


May 6, 2026 
 MISES
By Dr. Wanjiru Njoya
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April marks the time when the guns of war began to fall silent across the South in 1865, after four years of war. On April 9, General Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia. General Nathan Bedford Forrest stood down his cavalry on May 9. By June 23, General Stand Watie had surrendered the last of the Confederate soldiers still fighting, the First Indian Brigade which included his own Cherokee Braves.

When the guns fall silent, it does not suffice simply to forget about the war and move on. It is necessary to pause and reflect on what we can do to promote lasting peace.

As John V. Denson argues in The Costs of War: America’s Pyrrhic Victories, war is ever the greatest enemy of liberty. Denson reminds us that, “We need to understand the ‘total’ costs of war in order to appreciate the true dangers that war in general, and the New World Order in particular, pose to individual liberty.” The New World Order—whose dangers he highlights—is one in which “the United States is to become a permanent garrison state and also the world policeman…”

There are growing signs that the lessons of history are not being heeded. The USA is introducing automatic military draft registration. Under Germany’s new Military Service Modernisation Act, military service is being reintroduced:

The [German] law that came into force in January brings back conscription in principle, though it will be implemented only if not enough people sign up for the army voluntarily.

Germany’s Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said he wants to create Europe’s strongest conventional army.

As of January this year, all 18-year-olds in Germany are being sent a questionnaire asking if they are interested and willing to join the armed forces.

The questionnaire is mandatory for men and voluntary for women.

Denson does not argue in favor of pacifism or isolationism. He recognizes that war may be just when fought in defense of home and hearth. The point he emphasizes is that no matter how just a war may be, we must remember that it is inevitably deleterious to liberty. For example, Murray Rothbard regarded the Southern cause as just, but even so, we must recognize that when the South lay in ashes much more had been lost than the Southern bid for independence.

Lord Acton, in his letter to Robert E. Lee, wrote that, “I deemed that you were fighting the battles of our liberty, our progress, and our civilization; and I mourn for the stake which was lost at Richmond more deeply than I rejoice over that which was saved at Waterloo.” As Jefferson Davis, the Confederate President, put it, the cause that was lost was “not that of the South only, but the cause of constitutional government, of the supremacy of law, of the natural rights of man.”

One of the residual threats to liberty highlighted by Denson is the “abuse of the presidential powers regarding wars.” The convention seems to have arisen that the president has power to do whatever he deems necessary to police the world’s criminals and tyrants. Denson explains:

We have now reached a point in our history where it is strongly asserted that the president of the United States claims the power to declare a crisis and then send troops wherever he pleases without Congressional authority or approval. Shakespeare dramatized this same point with Mark Antony in Julius Caesar where he states: “Cry ‘Havoc!’ and let slip the dogs of war.”

Denson also highlights the danger posed by war propaganda, reminding us—in the words of US Senator Hiram Johnson—that, “When war is declared, truth is the first casualty.”

First comes the spin. For example, the Trump administration insists that their attack on Iran is not a war requiring congressional approval, but merely a “military operation.” Then follows the slander against any who dissent. In recent weeks the neo-conservative radio host, Mark Levin, has been calling anyone who disagrees with President Trump’s latest war a “traitor” to America. He believes any opinions that differ from his own are “anti-American.” Do people who warn against the dangers of war thereby become traitors to their country?

What is meant by love of country? In his book Capitalism and Freedom, the economist Milton Friedman offered some remarks that may shed some light on this issue. Readers will be aware that Murray Rothbard was no admirer of Friedman. He described Friedman as “a favorite of the Establishment,” a “Court Libertarian,” and a “statist.” But statist though he was, Friedman deserves some credit for reminding his statist followers that love of country and loyalty to a common heritage do not entail worship of government. Friedman rejected the notion that “free men in a free society” should view their government as synonymous with their country. He observed:

To the free man, the country is the collection of individuals who compose it, not something over and above them. He is proud of a common heritage and loyal to common traditions. But he regards government as a means, an instrumentality, neither a grantor of favors and gifts, nor a master or god to be blindly worshipped and served.

Although Friedman did not agree with the libertarian view of the state as inherently criminal and tyrannical, he argued that “the scope of government must be limited” and that “government power must be dispersed.” He favored decentralizing political power. He drew Rothbard’s ire for viewing the government as essentially well-intentioned, but he did at least recognize that good intentions do not mitigate harm. He wrote:

The power to do good is also the power to do harm; those who control the power today may not tomorrow; and, more important, what one man regards as good, another may regard as harm. The great tragedy of the drive to centralization, as of the drive to extend the scope of government in general, is that it is mostly led by men of good will who will be the first to rue its consequences.

That being the case, disagreeing with government policy certainly does not make one a traitor to his country. The historian Clyde Wilson argued, in Defending Dixie: Essays in Southern History and Culture, that even the Pledge of Allegiance, which is popularly seen as a way to express love of country, may be viewed as superfluous because “the virtuous do not need a Pledge and the rest will not honor it anyway.” Wilson argues that in that light, the pledge ironically amounts in reality to “a pledge of allegiance not to the country or people but to the federal government.” He remarked that:

Such pledges did not mark the early years of the United States. They were unknown until they were employed as coercive devices in the South during the War Between the States and Reconstruction.… The present Pledge was written in 1892 by Francis Bellamy, a defrocked Boston minister and Marxist… It was taken up and promoted by the National Education Association as a way to enforce conformity to “Americanism” among its captive students, especially the first and second generation immigrants.

Wilson, like Denson, is no pacifist. He remarked in his Defending Dixie essays that his direct forefathers on both sides of his family fought in every major war since America was founded, including the American Revolutionary War, the War for Southern Independence, and both World Wars. With that ancestry, Wilson is as good an authority as any on what counts as loyalty to America. His comment on the recent attack on Iran, in his essay “Marching to Persepolis,” is that it “fails every rule of Christian ‘just war’ theory. It trashes what little is left of the Constitution. And possibly worst of all, it is stupid.”


About the author: 
Dr. Wanjiru Njoya is the Walter E. Williams Research Fellow for the Mises Institute. She is the author of Economic Freedom and Social Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), Redressing Historical Injustice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, with David Gordon), “You Stole Our Land: Common Law, Private Property, and Rothbardian Principles of Justice” (Journal of Libertarian Studies, 28 (1): 91–119 (2024) and “Individual Liberty, Formal Equality, and the Rule of Law” (Palgrave Handbook of Classical Liberalism, forthcoming, 2026).
 
Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

DARPA’s SPRINT X-76 Enters Build Phase: Jet Speed With Helicopter Freedom



Artist’s concept for the SPRINT X-76, a proof-of-concept technology demonstrator that aims to demonstrate technologies and concepts needed for runway-independent, high-speed flight. Source: DARPA | Colie Wertz


By 

Eliminating one of the battlefield’s most difficult choices – between the high speed of an aircraft that needs a runway and the go-anywhere flexibility of a slower helicopter – is the goal of DARPA’s SPeed and Runway INdependent Technologies (SPRINT) program.

SPRINT’s experimental aircraft, officially revealed as the X-76, is now being built by Bell Textron, Inc. following a successful Critical Design Review (CDR). The designation places it within the historic lineage of X-planes that have long served to test the boundaries of aviation. Coinciding with the country’s 250th anniversary, the X-76 designation is a deliberate nod to the revolutionary spirit of 1776, DARPA said..

The SPRINT program is a joint effort between DARPA and U.S. Special Operations Command to advance technologies that could break the long-standing military trade-off between the high speed of fixed-wing aircraft and the agile, runway-independent operations of vertical takeoff and landing platforms. The design, construction, and flight testing of the X-76 will drive innovative, runway-independent, vertical-lift capability with jet-like cruise performance and inform future needs.

The Mission: Breaking Aviation’s Oldest Trade-Off

SPRINT began its second phase (Phase 2) in May 2025 following the downselect to Bell. With the successful completion of the CDR, the program will shift focus to manufacturing, integration, assembly, and ground testing of the X-76 demonstrator. The demonstrator will mature technologies necessary for a transformational combination of the following capabilities:

  • Achieve cruise at speeds exceeding 400 knots
  • Hover in austere environments 
  • Operate from unprepared surfaces

“For too long, the runway has been both an enabler and a tether, granting speed but creating a critical vulnerability,” said Cmdr. Ian Higgins, U.S. Navy, serving as the DARPA SPRINT program manager. “With SPRINT, we’re not just building an X-plane; we’re building options. We’re working to deliver the option of surprise, the option of rapid reinforcement, and the option of life-saving speed, anywhere on the globe, without needing any runway.”

Phase 2 will be followed by a flight test program in Phase 3, which is planned for early 2028.

US Companies Come Together For ‘Gas-Plus-Nuclear’ Solution


By 

Blue Energy has announced it is partnering with GE Vernova in a collaboration aimed at pairing nuclear and gas-fired generating capacity as a near-term approach to meeting AI-driven energy demand.

Bringing together Blue Energy’s project financing and nuclear construction techniques with GE Vernova’s reactor technology and turbines, the companies plan to design and develop a nuclear power plant using GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy’s (GVH) BWRX-300 small modular reactor at Blue Energy’s first planned site in Texas, subject to a final investment decision in 2027, Blue Energy said. The companies have signed a slot reservation agreement for site delivery in 2029 of two GE Vernova 7HA.02 gas turbines for early site energisation.

At the beginning of this year, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved a licensing topical report supporting Blue Energy’s model for nuclear plant construction, which would see the separation of the nuclear and non-nuclear portions of the plant and begin by fabricating offsite and installing onsite non-nuclear, non-safety-significant infrastructure needed for its natural-gas-to-nuclear conversion. Blue Energy says this approach could potentially cut at least five years off the conventional nuclear construction timeline. Energising turbines with a “natural gas bridge” that later converts to nuclear power can slash “time to power” as well as helping to unlock project financing.

“Combining our industry-leading HA gas turbines with the BWRX-300, the only small modular nuclear reactor under construction in the Western world today, provides an effective solution aimed to meet the demands of rapid AI expansion in the United States while decreasing time to power,” said Eric Gray, CEO of GE Vernova’s Power Segment. “Our collaboration with Blue Energy on this project exemplifies the innovative approaches required to help deliver the scale of electricity needed for this extraordinary demand.”

The companies will enter into further agreement “in the near future” on preliminary safety analysis work as well as other detailed and necessary development and characterisation work to support Blue Energy’s nuclear construction permit application. 

Blue Energy said it could begin early site works on its first planned project in Texas in 2026, to support a final investment decision and a construction permit application to the NRC in 2027. GE Vernova gas turbines are expected to provide around 1 GW of power to the site as early as 2030 before the steam supply is switched and ramped up to some 1.5 GW of nuclear power as GE Vernova’s BWRX-300s come online as early as 2032. Blue Energy then plans to deliver nuclear energy to power a nearby data centre campus.

“By collaborating with GE Vernova, we’re bringing together critical infrastructure, safe reactor technology, and a financeable delivery model,” Blue Energy CEO and co-founder Jake Jurewicz said.

In April, Blue Energy raised USD380 million in financing to advance its turnkey approach to nuclear plant development in a fundraise led by VXI Capital with significant backing from Engine Ventures and participation from other existing investors.

INDIA

After The 2026 Verdict In Kerala: What The Elections Reveal About Power, Decline, And The Future Of The Left – Analysis

May 6, 2026 
By K.M. Seethi


The recently concluded Assembly elections in India, across Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and the Union Territory of Puducherry, carry implications far beyond a routine democratic exercise. They point to a major churn in India’s political system, one where established certainties are weakening, new actors are emerging, and old ideological anchors, particularly the Left, are losing ground at a pace that demands serious reflection.

Among these states, Kerala stands out, both for the scale of the electoral shift and for its larger significance. For decades, Kerala remained the last major bastion of the Left in India. That bastion has now been shaken decisively. The defeat of the Left Democratic Front (LDF) after ten years in power is a major turning point for the Left in India as a whole.
Beyond a Routine Alternation

Kerala has historically witnessed cyclical changes in power. However, the 2026 verdict carries a different weight. The Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) has returned with a commanding majority, with 102 seats in a 140-member Assembly, while the LDF has been reduced to a marginal presence with 35. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), though still a minor player in the state, has managed to enter the Assembly with 3 seats, an outcome that was once considered unlikely.

This shift was not a sudden one. The electoral shift had been building over time. The 2024 Lok Sabha elections, where the UDF secured an overwhelming majority of seats from Kerala, had already indicated a shift. The 2025 local body elections reinforced this trend. The 2026 Assembly verdict merely completed the trend.

However, to reduce this outcome to a simple case of anti-incumbency would be misleading. The electorate did not reject the LDF because it had done nothing. On the contrary, the LDF’s earlier terms were marked by visible achievements—effective crisis management during floods and pandemics, welfare expansion, and administrative continuity. But electoral politics rarely rewards continuity alone. Over time, performance becomes routine, and expectations rise faster than delivery.

Voters began to measure the LDF not against its predecessors, but against its own promises, and its ability to imagine the future. It is here that the gap widened.

The Limits of Governance

One of the defining features of the LDF’s decline was not simply governance exhaustion, but a growing distance between leadership and the electorate. The tone of politics matters. A leadership style that once appeared decisive began to seem rigid and unresponsive. Over-centralisation weakened local engagement. Internal dissent was contained rather than debated. Cadres, once the backbone of mobilisation, appeared less energised.

This disconnect was amplified during moments that required political sensitivity. The handling of issues involving religious communities, particularly in the context of education reforms and broader identity concerns, created unease among sections of Christian and Muslim voters, who together constitute more than 50 per cent of the state’s population. Rather than abrupt changes, these were gradual realignments influenced by emerging concerns and perceptions.

Similarly, the failure to clearly distance the party from controversial statements by allies created confusion about its ideological positioning. In a state where minorities form a substantial share of the electorate, silence was often interpreted as consent.

The result was a steady erosion of trust across social groups that had once formed the LDF’s core support base. Its approach towards certain agitations (such as by ASHA workers) showed the insensitivity of the ruling dispensation. There were similar charges against the left government on a variety of issues.
 
Economic Anxiety and the New Middle Class

Another critical factor was the changing social and economic profile of Kerala. The rise of a new, educated middle class has altered the political calculus. This segment is less dependent on welfare and more concerned with opportunities—employment, entrepreneurship, and global mobility.

Kerala’s economy, however, has struggled to keep pace with these aspirations. High youth unemployment, fiscal stress, and delays in major infrastructure projects created a perception of stagnation. Welfare measures, once a source of political strength, began to appear insufficient in addressing deeper structural issues.

The situation was further complicated by external shocks. The ongoing instability in West Asia affected Kerala’s large expatriate population, creating uncertainty in remittances and employment. For many families, the central concern became future security.

In this context, the UDF’s campaign—framed around opportunity, employment, and engagement—appeared more aligned with emerging aspirations, even if its promises were not fully detailed.

The BJP’s Incremental Entry

While the BJP remains far from becoming a dominant force in Kerala, its limited electoral success carries symbolic significance. By securing a few seats and consolidating its vote share in select constituencies, it has demonstrated that the state is no longer entirely immune to its expansion.

This does not yet amount to a structural change. Kerala’s political culture remains distinct, with strong traditions of secularism and social pluralism. However, the emergence of triangular contests in certain constituencies indicates a gradual transformation. Even a modest BJP presence can alter electoral dynamics by redistributing votes and reshaping alliances.

West Bengal and the Wider Pattern

The developments in Kerala must also be read alongside broader trends in other states. In West Bengal, the decline of entrenched political forces has continued, with the BJP making significant gains and changing the state’s political future. The weakening of older formations, including remnants of Left influence, reflects a major structural shift in voter behaviour.

In Tamil Nadu, while the Dravidian parties still dominate, the emergence of new actors and shifting voter alignments suggest that even long-standing political binaries are under pressure. In Assam, the BJP’s consolidation points to the effectiveness of sustained organisational work combined with identity-based mobilisation.

Across these states, a common thread emerges: voters are less bound by historical loyalties and more responsive to immediate concerns, leadership style, and perceived credibility.

The Shrinking Space for the Left

The most significant implication of these elections is the continued marginalisation of the Left in Indian politics. Once a powerful force shaping national discourse—on labour rights, federalism, and secularism—the Left today finds itself confined to shrinking pockets of influence.

Kerala was its last major stronghold. Its weakening here raises fundamental questions about the future of Left politics in India.

This decline cannot be explained solely by external factors such as the rise of the BJP or the adaptability of regional parties. It also reflects internal challenges. For example, in attempting to broaden its electoral appeal, the Left often blurred its core positions, weakening its distinctiveness. Centralised decision-making reduced internal debate and innovation. The Left struggled to address new socio-economic realities, particularly the aspirations of a changing middle class. Its messaging often remained rooted in older frameworks, failing to influence younger voters.


Lessons for Leadership


The 2026 elections offer a clear lesson for political leadership across the spectrum. Power cannot be sustained by record alone. It requires constant engagement, humility, and the ability to listen.

Leaders who see themselves as the final authority on every issue risk isolating themselves from the very people they seek to represent. Elections are not merely evaluations of policy; they are judgments on attitude, responsiveness, and credibility.

For the Left, this moment demands serious introspection. It must ask not only how it lost, but why its message no longer connects with large sections of society. Rebuilding will require more than organisational adjustments. It will require a rethinking of its relationship with people—how it listens, how it speaks, and how it adapts without losing its core principles.

Consequences Beyond Electoral Arithmetic

The decline of the Left has implications that go beyond party politics. It affects the balance of India’s democratic system. The Left has historically played a role as a critical voice—raising questions about inequality, labour rights, and state accountability.

Its weakening creates a vacuum in these areas. While other parties may adopt some of these concerns, the absence of a strong ideological counterweight could narrow the space for alternative perspectives.

At the same time, the fluidity of the current political setting also creates opportunities. New alignments, new leadership, and new ideas can emerge. But whether the Left can be part of this renewal depends on its willingness to confront uncomfortable truths.

The 2026 elections go beyond simple questions of victory and defeat. The verdicts clearly showed that voters are more demanding, more mobile, and less forgiving of complacency.

Kerala’s verdict reflects a healthy democratic spirit, where political formations are continually renewed through public choice. The decline of the Left in its last stronghold is not inevitable or irreversible. But reversing this trend will require introspection, humility, renewal, and a genuine reconnection with society.

15 Years Since Devastating Famine, Somalia Faces New Disaster: Drought Without Aid


Africa Uganda Kids Children Water Drought Poverty

By 


Families in Somalia are confronting a new catastrophe, with hunger and humanitarian needs soaring, a worsening drought, and aid levels at unprecedented lows, said Save the Children.

In a new report, When Aid Disappears, Childhood Disappears Too, Save the Children reveals how the collapse of international aid funding to Somalia in 2025 may soon lead to catastrophic outcomes for children not seen since the 2011 famine, which killed over 257,000 people.  

Early in 2025, projections estimated that 3.4 million people were facing crisis-level food insecurity. A year later, this figure has almost doubled with a projection of 6.5 million people — a jump directly correlated with massive cuts in international funding as well as the predicted poor October-December 2025 rains. 

Meanwhile, in 2024, Somalia’s Humanitarian Response Plan was 57.7% funded, which, while still below overall needs, was sufficient to sustain critical programmes. In 2025, coverage fell to just 28.8%. Now, in April 2026, only around 15% of the response plan is funded – the lowest level on record at this time of the year.  

As a result, food and nutrition services have been heavily reduced – including the closure of more than 300 nutrition facilities across the country, which are critical for treating child hunger and malnutrition – and preventive programmes have been significantly scaled back. 

Without immediate funding, more treatment centres will close, supply chains will be disrupted, and children in need of care will be turned away. At the same time, conflict in the Middle East risks further strain on global supply chains, increasing the likelihood of delays and shortages. 

The report also reveals that while Somalia’s children have grown up under the shadow of repeated crisis – such as the famine of 2011, recurrent droughts, conflict, and disease outbreaks – families have also shown extraordinary resilience. This includes sharing resources, improvising to meet basic needs, and supporting one another even when formal aid has been delayed, insufficient, or absent. The report confirms that while Somali families endure with remarkable strength, sustained external support is essential to prevent avoidable suffering and protect the next generation. 

Save the Children’s Country Director for Somalia, Mohamud Mohamed Hassan, said:  

“What we are seeing is not a slow deterioration, but a preventable crisis unfolding right now. In Somalia, the crisis is the result of a dire combination of protracted conflict and accelerating climate shocks, compounded by the decision to cut aid to record low levels in 2025. That choice was not inevitable; it had predictable, deadly consequences. Fifteen years of experience in Somalia show what happens when funding changes: when aid is scaled up, lives are saved; when it disappears, so do childhoods. 

“Drawing on lessons from the past 15 years, this report warns that current funding cuts risk reversing hard-won progress, including gains in immunisation and reductions in child mortality. Without immediate additional funding, more treatment centres will close, supply chains will break, and children who could have been saved will simply be turned away. Funding must return now — to protect children, prevent the crisis from worsening, and uphold the principle of “never again”. 

Fazia*, 15, attends a Save the Children-supported school in Baidoa. She has benefitted from humanitarian aid, but is concerned about the future:  

“Before, education was not something I thought about. My life has changed significantly. I used to feel uneducated and unaware, but now I have access to free education. 

“Now water is scarce, and the drought is extreme. Livestock are dying due to lack of water. Food has also become scarce, and the drought has deeply affected us.  

“For the past three years, we have been struggling with hunger.”  

Save the Children is calling on the international community to urgently increase humanitarian funding to meet the needs of over 6.5 million people requiring assistance, prioritise support for nutrition and health programs to prevent child deaths, invest in education to give children the skills they need now and into the future,  invest in longer-term resilience programming, and ensure aid reaches the most affected populations. 

Romania’s Government Ousted By Parliamentary No-Confidence Vote

May 6, 2026 
Balkan Insight
By Marian Chiriac

Romania’s pro-European government, led by Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, collapsed on Tuesday after parliament passed a no-confidence motion initiated by the left-leaning Social Democratic Party, PSD, and the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians, AUR.


The motion was supported by 281 votes, well above the 233 needed to dismiss the Prime Minister, while only four lawmakers voted against. Although Bolojan’s allies were present, they abstained.

“We aim to form a new government as soon as possible. All options for a future coalition remain open,” PSD leader Sorin Grindeanu said shortly after the vote.

Following this outcome, the government will continue in a caretaker capacity with limited powers for up to 45 days. During this period, President Nicusor Dan is expected to nominate a new prime minister-designate tasked with securing a parliamentary majority.

The vote caps weeks of escalating tensions within Romania’s fragile ruling coalition, strained by policy disagreements, internal rivalries and eroding support in parliament.

Bolojan assembled a four-party coalition in June 2025 to contain the rise of the AUR, led by George Simion. The alliance came in the wake of the Constitutional Court decision to annul the November 2024 first-round presidential election over suspected Russian interference benefiting nationalist candidate Călin Georgescu.

The PSD was the dominant force in the coalition, which included Bolojan’s centre-right National Liberal Party and two smaller centre-right parties. Its mandate was to stabilise the economy – currently facing the highest budget deficit in the EU – unlock 11 billion euros in EU recovery funds, and preserve the country’s investment-grade rating.

However, a series of unpopular austerity measures aimed at reducing last year’s budget deficit strained relations with the Social Democrats who ultimately withdrew from the coalition. Bolojan accused their leadership of seeking to remove him to “protect their own interests.”

Last month, the PSD joined forces with AUR to file the no-confidence motion.

The political crisis has unsettled investors and weakened the national currency, with the leu hitting a historic low against the euro on Tuesday.

President Dan sought to reassure domestic and international audiences on Monday, stressing that Romania would remain firmly on its pro-European path.

Analysts warn that the situation is volatile.

“We are already facing a historic depreciation of the national currency, which may deepen further,” economic analyst Adrian Negrescu wrote on social media.

He added that the current crisis adds to broader concerns over governance stability and fiscal policy direction, so that “Romania risks sliding into an economic recession”.

UK Restaurant Chains Falling Short On Healthy Nutrition Targets


By 

Only 43% of menu items at the UK’s highest-grossing restaurant chains met all their voluntary targets for sugar, salt, and calorie reduction, as set by the UK Government. These findings are published on May 5th in a study in the open-access journal PLOS Medicine by Alice O’Hagan of the University of Oxford, UK, and colleagues.

The purchasing and consumption of foods high in energy, saturated fat, free sugars, and salt, is associated with an increased risk of obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases. In recent years, the UK Government has set a series of voluntary targets for manufacturers, retailers, and restaurants to reduce the sugar, salt, and calorie content of food. The sugar targets were intended to be met by 2020, the salt targets by 2024, and the calorie targets by 2025. Few studies have assessed the nutritional quality of foods in the restaurant sector, despite an increasing percentage of weekly food intake coming from takeaway or restaurant meals.

In the new study, researchers gathered nutritional information from the 21 highest-grossing restaurant chains in the UK in 2024, using PDF menus or nutritional information on restaurant websites. They calculated the proportion of menu items from each restaurant and food subcategory that met the nutritional targets. Nine of the 21 restaurants had more than half of their menu items meeting all applicable targets. Menu items from Papa John’s were the lowest adhering to the calorie (35%) and salt (8%) targets, while menu items from Burger King, KFC, Nando’s, and Vintage Inns had zero adherence to the sugar targets.

Food within the same subcategory varied in adherence to the targets, with salads and breakfast items having the highest overall adherence, and desserts and pizzas the lowest. However, there were examples of companies across all subcategories performing well, indicating that performance is not constrained by the type of cuisine being offered.

“Our findings demonstrate that there was low adherence to the UK Government’s sugar, salt, and calorie reduction targets in 2024,” the authors say. “This is consistent with other research that finds limited effectiveness of voluntary regulation on reformulation, suggesting that mandatory regulation may be a more effective approach to improving the nutritional quality of out-of-home food.”

Alice O’Hagan adds, “Our study shows that the UK Government’s voluntary sugar, salt, and calorie reduction targets were not being met consistently across the highest-grossing UK restaurant chains, in 2024. Only 43% of menu items met all of the targets they were eligible for, and adherence to the targets varied widely between restaurants and food categories, showing that healthier menus are achievable but are not yet the norm.”

“Interestingly, restaurants with similar menu styles performed quite differently in meeting the targets. This shows the nutritional quality of menus is not fixed by cuisine type, making the shift towards healthier menus a more attainable goal for food companies.”

Co-author Lauren Bandy adds, “Voluntary targets alone are not delivering consistent improvements in the salt, sugar or calorie content of food items on offer in UK restaurants. Our findings highlight the potential value of stricter regulation in the out-of-home sector, and show that improving transparency and accountability of individual food companies will be key in supporting healthier food provision for the UK population.”

How Small States Can Survive Big Changes: Laos, Mekong And ASEAN In The Age Of Might Makes Right – Analysis


May 6, 2026 
 ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
By Anoulak Kittikhoun


We live in an uncertain world in which “might makes right” is back in fashion. It was always there in substance and episodes, but past transgressions had at least been couched in internationally acceptable terms. Presently, even successful regional institutions such as the EU and ASEAN feel lost in the realist world of big power politics.

One response to this change came from middle-power Canada, whose Prime Minister, in a January 2026 World Economic Forum speech to the world’s richest countries and companies, called for “variable geometry,” meaning the building and sustaining of different coalitions for different issues.[1] Middle powers may be able to do this with sufficient capacity and resources, as well as a reasonable size that enables them to withstand adverse consequences. Mark Carney’s speech, however, had little to say about smaller states, such as Laos, which make up most of the world’s countries, and it certainly did not raise the need to reform or strengthen regional or international institutions that traditionally amplify their voices.

In this global “rupture” where capable middle powers are rethinking the world order, what do states with weaker capacity and smaller size do? If big countries do what they wish, and middle powers do what they can, would smaller ones have to suffer what they must? Consider Laos, a small, landlocked country bordered by larger neighbours, historically exposed to external intervention and repeatedly exploited as a battlefield. Laos cannot play the same game as middle powers can. It has little room for manoeuvre, small margins for error, and high exposure to pressure.

Shaped by regional powers’ expansions, by French colonial rule, and by the US–Soviet Cold War, including the US’ “Secret War” when it became the most bombed country on earth,[2] Laos learned that caution, balance, and the post-Cold War rules-based international order anchored in the UN, WTO, and ASEAN brought stability. To survive the age of might makes right, Laos should indeed be “realist” in its assessments of the world, but remain “liberal” in its belief that cooperative institutions do amplify the actions of individual states, and most importantly, “constructivist” in its optimism that visionary and bold leadership bring about meaningful outcomes. In short, four principles are key: geopolitical competence, cooperative institutions, strategic partnership and visionary leadership.

GEOPOLITICAL COMPETENCE

Small states must be especially competent geopolitically. It must recognise how its size, location, regional context, and historical experience shape its identity and options in ways that turn vulnerability into leverage.[3] Every small state is faced with a different mix of geographical jinxes and blessings. Historically, Laos’s geography had been more a drawback than an asset. Yet geography also offers Laos a strategic set of opportunities. Born landlocked, it is building up to be land-linked, cultivating political and economic relationships with its immediate neighbours over the last three decades. As a result, Vietnam is a long-standing political ally with which it has strong defence ties. If there is any doubt about the depth of the mutually beneficial relations and affections between the two countries, this should be stilled by the fact that the top three Vietnamese leaders – Party General Secretary, Prime Minister, and President of the General Assembly – travelled to Vientiane together for the first time to meet their Laotian counterparts in February 2026.[4] Laos-Vietnam relations have been upgraded to “strategic cohesion”[5] – the special of the special – aligning political, security and economic relations and outlook. Laos’ military capacity, built on its joint struggle with Vietnam during their revolutions and subsequent security pact, ensure Laos’ successful military defence against another neighbour in the 1980s. Economic cooperation with Vietnam, a rising economic engine of ASEAN, has made it one of Laos’ top three trading partners and investors, whose impact can only increase with more connectivity through the planned expressway from Vientiane to Hanoi and high-speed Laos-Vietnam railway to Vung Ang on the South China Sea.[6]


Despite a more complicated Laos-China relationship during the Cold War, the situation has dramatically improved. China is now a central ideological, economic, and connectivity partner of Laos, with the flagship BRI project, the Laos-China Railway, connecting Laos and the region to the huge Chinese market.[7] Where Thailand is concerned, notwithstanding the complex bilateral history, the peoples on both sides of the Mekong River basin share strong ethnic, linguistic, and cultural ties, and the two countries have had excellent political and economic relations for the past 30 years. Laos and Thailand have built five “Friendship Bridges” across their shared Mekong mainstream, and regional connectivity and trade are set to upgrade once the Thailand-China Railway is complete and linked to the Laos-China Railway.[8] Laos also shares historical and religious affinities with Cambodia, and economic ties between the two are now increasing. Tensions do sometimes rise between Laos and its neighbours, such as the controversies around Xayaburi dam, funded by Thailand and initially opposed by Vietnam, and Don Sahong dam, opposed at first by Cambodia. These were managed by Laos’ strong relations with these neighbours, and by its strategic use of regional cooperative mechanisms such as the Mekong River Commission.[9]

One strategic area not currently optimised for regional connectivity is Laos’ geographical advantage as the Mekong’s central riparian state. With much of the mainstream and key tributaries on its side, Laos can accelerate its role as an energy battery of ASEAN not only through hydropower, which sometimes causes concerns, but other green energies such as solar, wind and possibly hydrogen; with expanded storage, it can build itself to be a water tower, managing water for irrigation, navigation and flood and drought relief. Doing so would not only contribute to regional sustainable development but also strategic outcomes in augmenting Laos’ indispensability to the region and the interests of its neighbours and partners.


How can this be done? By pursuing what the author has called “a New Deal for the Mekong,” managing and developing Southeast Asia’s largest river as one interconnected and interdependent system rather than a patchwork of separate national sectoral projects.[10] Integrated development and management of the Mekong would benefit not only riparian countries but also non-riparian ASEAN states in terms of food, energy, environment and eco-tourism.

To make the deal beneficial for all of ASEAN, two critical actions are needed: first, Laos can operate its existing dams in coordination with China (as the two have the most storage capacity in the Mekong), and second, build new ones jointly (e.g. with Thailand). Coordinating dam operation (i.e. when to store water, when to release, which dam and where) and developing more water storages jointly, will ensure there is more reliable energy generation (benefiting importing countries such as Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia and Singapore), greater dry-season water availability for irrigation (benefiting Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, as well as importing countries in the rest of ASEAN), reduced flood peaks and droughts (benefiting Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), improved navigation potential throughout the basin (benefiting China and Cambodia, and China-ASEAN connectivity), and environmental flows and preserved wetlands and watersheds for eco-tourism (benefiting the millions of ASEAN citizens who travel to the Mekong annually).

To achieve all this, Laos must work with concerned countries to strengthen regional institutions such as the MRC and ASEAN to assemble the technical parts of the deal, build strategic partnerships and coalitions that align incentives and prevent isolated deal-making in one sector or between two countries, which historically have led to large trade-offs. To make it optimal, the deal would need to be multi-sector and multi-country, which could only be carefully studied (i.e. in comprehensive economic, social and environmental aspects) and proposed by institutions having the best interests of the region at heart.

COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Strong institutions, ideally at both the international and regional levels, and their secretariats are critical for small states. Institutions reduce information asymmetry, create predictable procedures, and make it harder for stronger actors to impose purely bilateral terms. Whether it is the UN, ASEAN or MRC, experienced staff of these organisations’ international secretariats have the knowledge, expertise, and institutional memory at their fingertips. While larger countries field extensive diplomatic missions in key international organisations, many small countries lack the capacity to cover all issues in sufficient depth or breadth. Hence, it is critical for small states’ missions, especially if they wish to play a facilitation and brokerage role, to learn from and work with the experienced staff of these secretariats.

Furthermore, many international secretariat officials are naturally sympathetic to the plight of smaller and poorer members. Laos has benefited from this repeatedly. The UN Secretariat helped sustain the landlocked developing countries’ agenda on transit rights and sea access across years of negotiation, and the MRC’s technical credibility and facilitation have provided data, modelling, and procedures that make Mekong cooperation possible even when politics were tense. In ASEAN, Laos received support from the ASEAN Secretariat during its chairmanships in 2004, 2016, and 2024, to ensure continuity and process management.

A stronger ASEAN Secretariat can better support smaller member states when these are faced with regional and global crises, especially when these states are not acting as Chair and are unable to drive coordination and a united response. The recent US tariff is a case in point. When a superpower applies trade pressure, small members (with Cambodia and Laos being hit initially with 49% and 48% of tariffs) are the most vulnerable if they face one-on-one bargaining. ASEAN (the world’s fifth largest economy), backed by rapid analysis and recommendations from ASEC and other ASEAN institutions, could aggregate its voice and capability and attempt to get better trade deals as a bloc. Despite issuing statements and setting up a geoeconomic task force, individual members were instead currying favours to get the best deals for themselves.

A stronger ASEAN can still redeem itself, but only if it treats its Secretariat as a strategic body rather than an administrative overhead. This means resourcing ASEC through a budgeted, multi-year strategic plan, upgrading staffing in both quantity and quality, and building stronger coordinating and monitoring mechanisms so that ASEAN commitments – including centrality and solidarity – may better translate into implementation.[11] The Secretariat’s analytical tool kit must also be modernised, including data platforms and AI-enabled analytics for early warning, policy tracking, and rapid scenario support. With that capability, ASEAN would be better positioned to protect smaller members when external shocks hit and to deliver regional public goods that they cannot secure on their own. Programmes like the Initiative for ASEAN Integration would help, but more importantly, stronger and well-resourced ASEC and ASEAN institutions would be better able to think for the region, especially with regards to its weaker members, than ASEAN chair(s) rotating in and out within a year and being primarily concerned about national interests.

The above kinds of ASEAN institutions would be able to drive a New Mekong Deal to reality by working with Mekong institutions such as the MRC, the Mekong Institute, and the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center, to upgrade decision-support systems, data-sharing protocols, and to commission long-term assessments, joint studies, and refine options on each aspect of the deal. Those technical packages would then be elevated systematically through senior officials’ and ministerial meetings across Mekong platforms and into ASEAN processes, so the deal becomes an ASEAN-level public good rather than a fragmented set of riparian agreements.
 
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Small states have real agency when they coalesce and forge strategic partnerships. Several regional and global agendas would not have advanced without small-state leadership – to name just a few: climate ambition and finance by Small Island Developing States, law of the sea and ocean governance by coastal and island states, including Singapore,[12] and landlocked countries’ development and transit rights by a coalition of states, including Laos. Laos has historically been skilled at widening options with multiple parties, big and small, without provoking a backlash.

For the cause of landlocked developing countries, Laos worked with sympathetic transit countries and supportive donors to move reluctant actors. In the Mekong, it has built issue-specific alignments to advance hydropower development, and has drawn on certain development partners when technical credibility or financing was needed. In ASEAN, it applied the same method during its chairmanships, especially in periods of heightened tension when ASEAN unity was at risk. The 2016 South China Sea episode, in which the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favour of the Philippines against China, showed that it could broker agreements on a joint communiqué (in light of the failure during 2012 on a similar issue) and the chair’s statement of the East Asia Summit through quiet consultation, careful drafting, and compromises anchored in ASEAN principles and international law, and calibrated to avoid bias but that kept all parties on board (or rather left them equally unhappy).[13]


For the Mekong’s new deal, Laos should therefore work deliberately with fellow small states that stand to gain the most from a basin-wide bargain. For example, with Cambodia, Laos can support coordinated reservoir operations that stabilise flows to protect fisheries and livelihoods tied to the Tonle Sap, and even improve navigation potential, including the economic viability of the proposed Funan canal, if done cooperatively. In return, Cambodia can buy more energy from Laos and help advance practical pathways for ASEAN power connectivity, including sub-sea cables to Singapore. With Singapore, Laos can position coordinated dam operations as a regional resilience project that increases reliable clean power and supports food security through more stable downstream agriculture (i.e. Mekong delta rice which Singapore import significantly). For its part, Singapore can support the MRC’s work, protecting the “water tower” of Laos, and accelerating the ASEAN Power Grid agenda to obtain more Lao energy.
 
VISIONARY LEADERSHIP

In the end, small states will have better chances of survival if they invest in excellent leaders. A new Mekong deal certainly will not materialise without bold and visionary leadership. Albert Einstein once observed that powerful states need no ambassadors, their force speaks for itself. But for small states, it matters how they express themselves. “Through the sheer force of their abilities,” it has long been noted, statesmen and diplomats from small states can ensure their arguments are heard and acted upon.[14] In today’s world, when the President of the United States speaks or when the leader of a middle power like Canada says something extraordinary, people listen. Leaders of many small states, however, struggle to command global attention. The UN General Assembly Hall are sometimes half emptied when they take the stage.

History tells an interesting story. At pivotal moments, visionary leaders from small states have commanded attention and shaped global debates. Think Ghana, which had leaders including Kwame Nkrumah in Pan-African nation-building, and Kofi Annan at the United Nations. Think Lee Kuan Yew, whose Singapore the United States took seriously and whose model even influenced China’s thinking on governance and development; or Fidel Castro, who compelled the Soviet Union to reckon with Cuba’s brand of communism that inspired movements across the developing world; or Czech leader Václav Havel, who galvanised much of the West. Despite their different ideologies, these giants from small places proved that clarity and leadership transformed their countries, inspired their own officials to fight the same fights across institutions, and moved outcomes that would otherwise not have happened. It is precisely this kind of leadership that small states need today.

Laos can build a pipeline of leaders and officials who can operate under pressure with skill, and who can translate national interests into broader interests that others can endorse. That pipeline must include the ministries that matter most for regional bargaining – foreign affairs, finance, commerce, transport, and environment – and be reinforced through specialised training in negotiation, drafting, economic statecraft, international law, and technical literacy on climate, water, agriculture, energy, connectivity and technology.

Equally important, Laos should place competent nationals inside regional and international secretariats. This is where agendas are prepared, options framed, texts drafted, assessments conducted, projects initiated and implementation monitored. Over time, a cadre of capable Lao officials at home and within institutions becomes the most reliable way for a small country to not only survive but thrive.

CONCLUSION

In a harsh world, small states cannot survive by fending alone and for themselves, pretending that the rules and institutions that they and others build do not matter, or by bandwagoning with the strongest. They survive, and can even shape outcomes, by becoming geopolitically competent, by strengthening cooperative institutions, by building strategic partnerships, and by investing in leaders who can turn geographical advantage into bankable bargains.

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.Source: 

This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute