Showing posts sorted by date for query Cockroach Janata Party. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Cockroach Janata Party. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Sunday, August 09, 2026

 INDIA

The Cockroaches: A new insecure class in struggle


Cockroach protests

First published at Alternative Viewpoint.

On May 15, the Chief Justice of India, hearing a routine contempt matter about fraudulent legal credentials, reached for an aside about the country’s unemployed youth. They were, he said, like cockroaches parasites feeding on a system. It was the kind of remark a powerful man makes when he assumes no one who matters is listening. Within a day, thirty one year old graduate named Abhijeet Dipke had turned the insult into a name: the Cockroach Janta Party. Within three days it had crossed a million followers. By July it had more Instagram followers than the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party. It had no office, no treasury, no manifesto beyond a joke that refused to stop being funny.

Then, on June 4, the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test, the exam that decides which of India’s medical aspirants get to become doctors, was compromised by yet another leak. Roughly 2.2 million young people had sat for 130,000 seats. It was not the first leak. It was the seventieth in seven years, and this time the joke found its grievance. What had been an online meme became an occupation of Delhi’s protest grounds, then a march on Jantar Mantar, then a march toward Parliament itself, through tear gas and baton charges broadcast in real time on the same phones that had built the movement. On July 25, eight weeks after a judge compared them to insects, India’s education minister resigned. It was the first time in Narendra Modi’s twelve years in power that a street movement had taken a minister’s head.

This is the part of the story that travels well: the satire, the speed, the improbable scalp. It is also the smaller part. The more important story is what kind of country produces a movement like this, from exactly the students it does, at exactly this moment in its economic life. That story does not start with a judge’s bad joke. It starts with a boom.

A generation nobody expected to fight

For a decade, India’s Gen Z has been the subject of a specific kind of contempt from its elders: too online, too individualist, too busy building a personal brand to organize for anything larger than itself. The cockroach movement did not so much refute this as reroute it. The same instincts that supposedly made this generation self-absorbed irony, meme fluency, and an ease with performing a persona for an audience became the movement’s actual weapons. A student marched dressed as Gandhi and said nothing; the image did the political work language usually does. Protesters filmed themselves “confessing,” in a register of deadpan sarcasm, that Chinese operatives had wired them sixty rupees for bus fare and Pakistani handlers forty for lunch, a satirical pre-emption of the anti-national charge before the state could even finish making it. This was not spontaneous cleverness. It was a generation using the only organizing language it had ever needed to build a following, and discovering that the same language could hold a crowd in the street.

What the movement actually revealed, underneath the wit, was fear, a specific, generational, previously unspoken fear that had been circulating privately for years and had never before found a collective form. Not the fear of poverty in the abstract, which Indian politics has always managed to keep at arm’s length as someone else’s problem. The fear of having done everything asked of you the exams, the coaching classes, the degree and finding that none of it converts into a future. That is a harder feeling to organize around than hunger, because it doesn’t look like deprivation from the outside. It looks, on paper, like credentialed success. The movement’s real achievement was making that private, embarrassing fear visible and collective at the same moment.

The boom that stopped hiring

The backdrop to all this is not an economy in crisis, in the way that phrase usually gets used. India’s GDP grew 7.7 percent in the last financial year, up from 7.1 percent the year before, and the most recent quarter came in at 7.8 percent, a three-year high, beating market expectations. Manufacturing has posted double-digit growth in two of the last three years. By the government’s own labor force survey, the overall unemployment rate fell to 3.1 percent in 2025, an eight-year low. On every headline number the finance ministry likes to cite, India is not slowing down. It is accelerating.

And yet: unemployment among graduates runs at roughly 29 percent nine times the rate among people who never learned to read. At some of the country’s most selective engineering institutes, more than a third of the graduating class registers for campus placement and finds nothing. Between 2021 and 2024, twenty-two of India’s twenty-three IITs saw their placement rates fall, in some cases by more than twenty percentage points; the overall share of engineering graduates dropped from over 90 percent to just above 80. Youth unemployment nationally sits somewhere between 15 and 16 percent depending on the month you check, and in urban India it runs closer to 18 nearly six times the headline rate the government advertises. These are not the numbers of an economy failing to grow. They are the numbers of an economy that has learned to grow without them.

This is worth dwelling on precisely because it is not a paradox but a mechanism. None of this is happening against a backdrop of currency collapse or fiscal panic though there is real stress layered on top, and it is worth naming honestly. The rupee hit an all-time low against the dollar this spring, battered by an oil shock and a historic flight of foreign capital out of Indian markets. External debt has climbed past $760 billion. These pressures are real, and they compound the mood of precarity radiating out from every family with a graduate in it. But they are weather, not climate. The climate is that credentials have been manufactured faster than jobs, because credentials are cheap for the state to supply a university seat, an entrance exam, a certificate and jobs are not. What growth produces, under these conditions, is not shared prosperity. It is a widening reservoir of the certified and idle: people declassed in advance of ever holding a job, and increasingly aware of it before they turn twenty-five.

A new insecure class

Here is what the BJP did not calculate. Its electoral coalition since the 2000s has rested heavily on India’s upper-middle and middle classes precisely because the organized left and caste-based parties held stronger, older footholds among the working class and the rural poor. That coalition was built by a specific generation, the one that came of age inside India’s liberalization years and the software-export boom, and that used the escalator of neoliberal growth to lift its own household into a durable, if modest, comfort. For that generation the promise of the market economy was, on the whole, kept. Not lavishly, but visibly enough to be believed.

Communalism did real work for this constituency for a long time, and it is worth being honest about why. A majoritarian identity offered a kind of psychic compensation status, belonging, the sense of being the nation’s default citizen that could sit comfortably alongside modest, rising material comfort. It did not need to substitute for that comfort; it supplemented it. But that arrangement depends on the material floor holding. It cannot manufacture the thing it was never designed to provide, which is an income. Once a generation’s insecurity stops being abstract and becomes as concrete as an empty placement cell or a cancelled exam, communal consolation has nothing left to compensate for, and it starts to lose its grip precisely where it once worked best.

Their children are living a different story, on the same ideological script. It has been the accepted wisdom for years now that not every graduate will find work. The market absorbed this as a kind of background noise, a cost of scale that neoliberal common sense normalized as simply how a large, young country’s labor market behaves. What broke that acceptance was who started failing to find work. When the unplaced are exiting a Tier-3 college, the state has had two decades of practice absorbing that story into fatalism. When they are exiting an IIT, a National Law University or premiere management institute like IIM, the institutions that are themselves the country’s promise of meritocratic ascent, the reward for having played by every rule the system set, the fatalism stops working. This is a demographic the BJP’s growth story was written for, and it is the demographic now discovering that the story has an ending it was never told about.

For many of these students, medicine was the last door that still seemed to open on merit rather than connections hence the ferocity attached to a leaked exam that, on its own, might read as a minor administrative scandal. The NEET leak did not create the crisis. It reached a generation already standing at a wall with nowhere else to go, and it took away the last direction they thought they could walk. What followed has been described, not wrongly, as a social movement, a generational revolt, a digital-native uprising. It is also something more specific: a visible sharpening of class contradiction inside a bloc of the well-off, credentialed, urban middle class that Indian politics has for thirty years treated as post-political, safely arrived, no longer available for radicalization. That assumption no longer holds.

What the movement cannot yet do

The cockroach movement’s great structural strength was also its great vulnerability: it had no center. There was no politburo to arrest, no headquarters to raid, no single leader whose silence could end it. When the stage at Jantar Mantar was dismantled and internet access was cut during the march toward Parliament, the movement did not have a command structure to fall back on it had thousands of small, improvised, overlapping acts of leadership: someone directing the crowd here, someone carrying the injured there, no one in charge of the whole. This is precisely what let the state’s usual playbook fail in sequence. Delegitimization didn’t stick because there was no organization to accuse of foreign funding. Enforcement action, the machinery that has spent a decade disciplining Indian opposition politicians through prosecutions that rarely convict but reliably exhaust, has no leverage over nineteen-year-olds with no career left to protect. What was left was simply force batons, tear gas, over a hundred injured by the movement’s own count deployed against a target that could absorb the blow and re-form somewhere else the next day.

But a movement organized this way also has no mechanism for consolidating what it wins, and no natural bridge to anyone outside its own social position. The people who filled Sansad Marg were disproportionately urban, credentialed, and from households with something to lose: parents, professionals, the retired, a student in a Gandhi costume, alongside the actual test-takers. That composition is not a moral failing; it is a structural fact about who this movement’s grievance directly touches. It means the movement, as constituted, has very little organic contact with the country’s larger working population: the informal laborer, the contract worker on an industrial corridor, the migrant on a construction site, the person for whom “jobless growth” was never news. Where the farmers’ movement of 2020–21 grew directly out of an agrarian class defending its material position for over a year at Delhi’s borders, the cockroach movement is closer to Brazil’s June 2013 a leaderless, ironic, extraordinarily fast-moving revolt built on a single sectoral demand, brilliant at disruption and comparatively fragile once that demand is even partially met. Brazil’s energy, released without an organized left prepared to receive it, was harvested instead by the right. India’s Hindu-nationalist government could not communalize this particular uprising; it carries no religious marker, and its base is drawn from the regime’s own core constituency but that difficulty will not repeat itself indefinitely, and the government will try again.

The settlement that ended the march followed exactly this logic: concede a person, keep the structure. The prime minister never appeared. Two ministers negotiated. A minister resigned and compensation was promised. The testing agency remains untouched. The four Labour Codes remain untouched. The underlying question of where a graduating generation is supposed to work remains completely unaddressed. A day after the resignation, the protest ground was empty.

What comes next

Students and Gen Z have already done the only thing a movement without organization can do well: they made the discomfort visible, undeniable, and impossible to dismiss as somebody else’s problem. That is not nothing: twelve years of an unbroken government just lost a minister to a joke about insects. But the resignation was always the recoverable part. The real product of these eight weeks was the demonstration, delivered live and in public, that this government can be made to move.

Whether that demonstration becomes a force rather than a memory is not a question this movement can answer by itself, because it was never built to answer it. That work belongs to whoever is serious about connecting a declassed, credentialed youth to the working class whose insecurity is older, deeper, and far less telegenic the informal worker, the contract laborer, the migrant on the industrial corridors of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, for whom jobless growth has never been a discovery but a lifelong condition. The bridge between them does not build itself. Whether the Indian left does that work deliberately, and before this particular pulse of anger fades back into the scroll it came from will decide whether the cockroaches’ summer was a beginning or simply the loudest word in a very long sentence that ends, once again, in nothing changing.


 

India’s Cockroach movement shows when people stand up against corruption and authoritarianism, they can win



This also includes recruitment exams. For example, I am from the state of Uttar Pradesh, a northern Hindi-speaking state. The paper for admission as a constable, the lowest ranking police official, was leaked. This went up to admission papers for top administrative posts and higher examination papers for the position of assistant professor, which were also leaked.

Not a single exam has gone through a transparent and fair process and this led to a strong resentment among students, and all people who are concerned about education and employment.

There are already minimal vacancies for government positions, because there are less public funded government jobs. Students and youth, who are experiencing the golden era of their life from their 20s to their 30s and should be getting opportunities for education and employment, are instead getting paper leaks, corruption and loot prevailing in the system.

This despair and hopelessness has led to some to commit suicide.

This dysfunction has created a strong resentment among the people which culminated when Surya Kant, Chief Justice of India, compared the youth and those who are speaking out for justice and demanding accountability to cockroaches and parasites.

Abhijeet Dipke made a social media page called Cockroach Janata Party as a satirical response, playing on the name of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, and that got millions of supporters within a few days.

From there they started demanding accountability, fairness and transparency in the education system, they started raising the question of corruption. People started questioning the government policies and its insensitivity, having not said a single word about the people who committed suicide.

Why did you decide to join a hunger strike at the Jantar Mantar protest camp in Delhi?

The cockroach label that was put on unemployed youth and the political and social activists started to generate social momentum, which became a mass movement centred around a site called Jantar Mantar, about one kilometre from the Parliament of India in Delhi. There we staged a protest, which continued for weeks.

Sonam Wangchuk, a renowned scientist, educator, scholar and climate activist declared that if the government is not listening to the CJP movement he would start a hunger strike. A hunger strike is the ultimate, last form of political communication we have to make this system accountable.

We, as AISA student activists, decided that if Wangchuk, who is not directly involved as a student, is concerned enough to go on hunger strike, then why are we not? Six AISA members joined the hunger strike: Neha, AISA National president and PhD student at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU); Danish Ali, PhD scholar and Joint Secretary of the JNU student union; Ameen Amitoj, PhD scholar at Ambedkar University Delhi; Deepak from Delhi University; and myself.

Several other individuals who have no political or ideological affiliation, but have decided that our system has been polluted by corruption, also decided to go on hunger strike.

Myself, Neha and Ameen continued our hunger strike for 23 days. We lost a lot of weight. I personally lost 11.5kg of weight and became underweight. My body started the ketosis process where it begins to consume not only fat but also muscle. Our gums started bleeding because of lack of nutrition, our glucose levels dropped below safe levels. It was a very alarming condition.

While our hunger strike continued, we heard that more papers had leaked in several states including Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The government was not taking any kind of accountability, it was not listening to us or paying attention to what we were saying.

Delhi Police grabbed Sonam Wangchuck from Jantar Mantar and threw him in the back of a white van, it looked like a dead body was being picked up, and he was detained in a hospital in the name of medical treatment.

Delhi Police tried to vacate the Jantar Mantar site, but our comrades and colleagues showed us solidarity both physically and on social media, they continued their strong support for this movement and the government had to step back, they could not vacate us from the Jantar Mantar site.

There was a march on parliament on July 20 which was met with brutality and repression from the police. What happened on that day?

July 20 was declared a march on the parliament because the government was not listening, we had lost dozens of kilograms but the government was totally ignoring us.

We began our march and the government started to crack down on the students and youth, those who were demanding fair examination processes, transparent education system and accountability from those ministers who were invisible, inefficient and incompetent to prevent the paper leak.

Those students who are demanding this accountability had to face the brutal lathi (baton) charge, water cannons and tear gas. That created a stampede situation, where many were crushed. Even pellet guns were used to demoralise us, and to say that our dissenting voices will not be tolerated.

This was a very heavy crackdown. It was disgusting, many students had their hands broken, their legs broken and were hit directly on the head. Women had their clothes torn off by the male police.

It was a scene in which this government was treating us like cockroaches, they were hitting us just like how you might hit a cockroach in your house. They want to show that this would be the outcome of protesting against the Modi government.

But even after this barbaric cruelty, students and youth haven’t stopped. Their heads, legs and hands might have been broken, but their commitment, resilience, valour was not broken. They continue to protest. Protest camps like Jantar Mantar began to rise in many different parts of the nation. In every district, every state, every city, people came out on the street and demanded the resignation of the incompetent education minister Dharmendra Pradhan.

Finally, on July 24, this government had to step back and the lead minister had to resign from his post.

What is next for India’s youth movement?

The CJP is not a political party, it is a movement in which people from all different identities are all involved. We collectively participated and have beaten back this authoritarian regime. Students and youth will not tolerate more. Our demand for Pradhan to resign was achieved, but this was not our sole demand, our protests must continue for accountability, but also for structural reforms.

The National Testing Agency (NTA) is the private agency that conducts the NEET and other exams. It only has two dozen permanent employees, it has no office, it conducts more than 2.2 million students exams without permanent employees, without permanent structure. That results in corruption and paper leaks. We are demanding urgent structural reform to scrap the NTA, and our demand is not fulfilled.

We are also calling for the repeal of the National Education Policy 2020 (NEP), which is directly dictating that the government not take any more responsibility for education. That’s why you see the fees for courses going higher, dropout rates are rising, and the government is stepping back and giving the private players more opportunities to rot these institutions and get more profits by extracting more money from the masses. The government is creating favourable conditions for these private institutions while destroying public universities, destroying secure, guaranteed, dignified employment.

This shows our democracy is being bulldozed, and this government, with a nexus of media, corporate goons, top-elite bureaucrats, have created a scenario where they have manipulated the democratic mandate. WIth a manipulated mandate they are winning elections, manipulating the election commission and putting their political puppets in top positions in many institutions.

They are tearing down our democracy. They are not listening, they are not showing accountability. They are creating a humanitarian crisis.

India is the most populated country in the world and has the highest youth population. The disgusting thing is we have unemployed youth who are starving, malnourished and bound to be living in tents. They live their life without opportunity to work, and often fall into depression, frustration and, being alienated from the society, feel compelled to commit suicide.

This is the overall scenario of the education system against which Gen Z has risen up and decided to resist this government. Gen Z has taken the social media platforms that the Modi government used to pollute the minds of the Indian youth and turned it into a weapon against their propaganda.

From the start the government labelled us as terrorists, anti-nationals, viruses, but the youth of this nation has strongly expressed their solidarity, has stood with us, and all of that propaganda has failed. They participated physically and on social media, and while the language was diverse, the message was the same, that this government has to go down.

This was the victory of the student youth movement in our nation. When people stand up against corruption and authoritarianism, they can win.

The women of this nation have shown, when the BJP was threatening citizenship rights against Muslim people, they stood up in the anti-CAA movement and the Shaheen Bhag Delhi movement, and forced the government to step back.

When the land and agriculture of the country was being destroyed and given to the big corporations, the farmers stood up and forced the government to repeal the three farm laws it had passed. It was a historic, unprecedented moment in parliamentary democracy that in the same parliament a bill was passed, it was taken back. It was the power of the movement and the united struggle.

An authoritarian regime, a monarch-like regime, a person who portrays himself as a Superman-like authority, who controls the resources, the media, the bureaucracy and the military, but had to step back because the people stood up and protested against him.

This is not only a matter of education and employment, but also of democracy. We are facing a humanitarian crisis. It is a drastic contrast we are seeing: on one side we have a $5 trillion economy, but on the other side our students are committing suicide, and are not able to go to schools. Two crore (20 million) of students are not in the education system. We are reaching Mars but our students are not able to go to school. That is the stark reality of our system.

Students are ready to reclaim our socialistic, secular, republican democracy, we are fighting even though we face heavy crackdowns and they are bulldozing our constitution. We want to consolidate this energy and focus on the demands to abolish the NTA, repeal NEP2020 and force the resignation of home minister Amit Shah, who is responsible for the brutality against protesters on July 20.

The government has to take responsibility or it has to go.


Wednesday, August 05, 2026

INDIA


Student Uprising Against Moral Hollowness


Prabhat Patnaik | 






Had the GenZ agitation been led by “leaders”, it would not have gone as far as it did.


A common explanation of the student uprising that has just shaken the country focuses on the anger of the Gen Z at the pervasive unemployment that prevails, and the rampant corruption that leads to question paper leaks, and damages its prospects of getting even such employment as is available. This of course is correct; but it is insufficient. When a 15-year-old girl confesses that she came to Jantar Mantar after telling a lie to her mother, surely what agitates her is not just her own job prospects, but something deeper; likewise, when the Gen Z agitation spreads spontaneously to numerous cities across the country, something deeper is at stake, which the ruling party and government cannot even comprehend.

It is clearly not a political agitation; it clearly has no “leaders”. The Bharatiya Janata Party is adept at dealing with “leaders”, by dividing them, by defaming them, by corrupting them, by buying them up, and by threatening them with the Enforcement Directorate and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act.

Had had this agitation been led by “leaders” it would not have gone as far as it did. All the standard tricks of the ruling party were tried, but they failed miserably, since the movement did not depend on anyone’s “leadership”. Sonam Wangchuk’s breaking his fast made no difference to the agitation. Likewise, the visit by two members of the “Cockroach” Janata Party to Minister J.P. Nadda’s house to negotiate, did not go down well with the students; the fact that their disapproval prevented any further negotiations without prior stipulating of conditions, indicated the unconventional nature of the movement.

It was not like usual movements with “leaders” acting on behalf of “followers”. In fact, the students were united not behind “leaders” but on a set of (three) conditions, on which no compromise was allowed by them.

The fact that this movement aroused such pervasive and spontaneous support in such a short time was because of a deeper reason, namely, a disenchantment among the students and youth about the moral hollowness of the present regime. What united the vast crowds at Jantar Mantar was not just the bleak job prospects or the scourge of paper leaks; it was the fact that there was no accountability in the system, nobody to be held morally responsible for the system’s grotesque failures, which indicated a moral hollowness.

The demand for Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation was not because that resignation would rectify the problem of question paper leaks or fix a broken education system; every person present at Jantar Mantar knew that. The demand for his resignation was nonetheless made non-negotiable, because it was to overcome this moral hollowness, to ensure that someone in the political establishment, not just some bureaucrats or underlings, was made answerable for the exam fiasco; this is also why Modi’s promise of fast-track courts to deal with those responsible for question paper leaks fell so completely flat. It was in short a demand for ethical conduct that united the students and the youth, from the 15 year-old girl who had run away from home, to the intrepid young men and women who faced pellet guns.

Indeed, a moral hollowness is at the core of the present regime, which has infected much of the polity with it. From disenfranchising millions of voters who it believes may vote against it, and that too by using an Election Commission whose formation itself is through a process that is immoral (it is formed essentially by the Prime Minister and one of his nominees), to making election results themselves irrelevant by buying up or threatening elected opposition members to change sides and join the ruling party, it has been playing out a veritable charade in the name of democracy. The students and youth were expressing themselves against this charade.

While much of the ‘godi’ (lapdog) media has been applauding this charade, and vast numbers of people, aware of this charade, have been terrorised into silence over it, the students have shown the gumption to openly oppose it. The lampooning of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cult through posters and cartoons was an obvious expression of this opposition; and it had the effect of freeing lots of people from the paralysing fear that had been gripping them.

In fact, the police brutality, the pellet guns, the nailed lathis, the tear gas, and the apparently senseless insistence on Dharmendra Pradhan’s continuation as Education Minister, were all designed to perpetuate that very fear in people’s minds, to perpetuate the impression that this government does not budge. It aimed once again to atomise people, to break them into monads, so that each person continues to believe in his or her own ineffectiveness and is persuaded that the government enjoys such strong support that it remains invincible.

This moral hollowness is indeed a hallmark of all fascist regimes. The Nazi movement in Germany in the 1930s which began by fulminating against monopoly capital even while being surreptitiously aided by some monopolists, made a deal with it on coming to power. To effect this deal, it even massacred large numbers of its own supporters who were led by Ernst Rohm, in the “Night of Long Knives”. From the moral high ground of being anti-monopoly, it shifted to the moral hollowness associated with an alliance with monopoly capital. The neo-fascists of today make an open deal with monopoly capital, especially with a newer segment of it, even before coming to power; and such a deal which gives a license to loot to the monopolists necessarily gives rise to a moral hollowness.

Goebbelsian propaganda would not be needed by the fascists if such hollowness did not exist. And in India, Bollywood actors would not be pressured (as one of them has admitted) into singing ditties like “Modi hai to mumkin hai” if the regime did not have moral hollowness at its core that had to be covered up in this manner.

Students, in fact, are the one social group that is ideally positioned to contest this moral hollowness. They are innocent, idealistic, informed, thoughtful, and intrepid, with a strong commitment toward and respect for ethical conduct; all these qualities equip them with the capacity to fight against the moral hollowness of regimes that thrive by cynically manipulating people through Goebbelsian propaganda. By the same token, however, their success in imposing a semblance of ethical behaviour in one instance, as at present, does not signify any change in the system, any more than trapping a leopard can be a precursor to changing its spots.

The students’ demands did not incorporate any change in the system or any institutional change; had they done so, it would have led to much discussion and not spread so rapidly or spontaneously across the country. The contrast here with the kisan agitation is quite striking. Since that was a class agitation in defence of the interests of a basic class, as distinct from an agitation to enforce ethical conduct, its demands were necessarily institutional, to roll back the institutional changes being enacted at the behest of imperialism that presides over a neo-liberal order into which Indian monopoly capital is thoroughly integrated.

In the current instance, there has been no question of any institutional changes being effected, which is why the neo-fascist regime, having suffered a setback to its image and to the atmosphere of terror it had so assiduously built up, would work overtime to recover lost ground.

It would do so in the days to come by strengthening religious appeals to the majority community, by creating communal incidents, by provoking international incidents on the border (though this last device becomes more difficult with Donald Trump’s penchant for intervening in South Asian affairs), and by attempting to co-opt, or in other ways diminish, the “leadership” (in term of which alone it can perceive movements) of the student agitation.

The student agitation, however, has played a sterling role in exposing the shenanigans of neo-fascism, above all its cynical use of communalism; in puncturing the myth of the infallibility of the “supreme leader”; and in breaking the atmosphere of terror that had gripped the country for so many years. It has opened the way for a political challenge to neo-fascism that can now be mounted.

A common explanation of the student uprising that has just shaken the country focuses on the anger of the Gen Z at the pervasive unemployment that prevails, and the rampant corruption that leads to question paper leaks, and damages its prospects of getting even such employment as is available. This of course is correct; but it is insufficient. When a 15-year-old girl confesses that she came to Jantar Mantar after telling a lie to her mother, surely what agitates her is not just her own job prospects, but something deeper; likewise, when the Gen Z agitation spreads spontaneously to numerous cities across the country, something deeper is at stake, which the ruling party and government cannot even comprehend.

It is clearly not a political agitation; it clearly has no “leaders”. The Bharatiya Janata Party is adept at dealing with “leaders”, by dividing them, by defaming them, by corrupting them, by buying them up, and by threatening them with the Enforcement Directorate and the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act.

Had  this agitation been led by “leaders”, it would not have gone as far as it did. All the standard tricks of the ruling party were tried, but they failed miserably, since the movement did not depend on anyone’s “leadership”. Sonam Wangchuk’s breaking his fast made no difference to the agitation. Likewise, the visit by two members of the “Cockroach” Janata Party to Minister J.P. Nadda’s house to negotiate, did not go down well with the students; the fact that their disapproval prevented any further negotiations without prior stipulating of conditions, indicated the unconventional nature of the movement.

It was not like usual movements with “leaders” acting on behalf of “followers”. In fact, the students were united not behind “leaders” but on a set of (three) conditions, on which no compromise was allowed by them.

The fact that this movement aroused such pervasive and spontaneous support in such a short time was because of a deeper reason, namely, a disenchantment among the students and youth about the moral hollowness of the present regime. What united the vast crowds at Jantar Mantar was not just the bleak job prospects or the scourge of paper leaks; it was the fact that there was no accountability in the system, nobody to be held morally responsible for the system’s grotesque failures, which indicated a moral hollowness.

The demand for Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation was not because that resignation would rectify the problem of question paper leaks or fix a broken education system; every person present at Jantar Mantar knew that. The demand for his resignation was nonetheless made non-negotiable, because it was to overcome this moral hollowness, to ensure that someone in the political establishment, not just some bureaucrats or underlings, was made answerable for the exam fiasco; this is also why Modi’s promise of fast-track courts to deal with those responsible for question paper leaks fell so completely flat. It was in short a demand for ethical conduct that united the students and the youth, from the 15 year-old girl who had run away from home, to the intrepid young men and women who faced pellet guns.

Indeed, a moral hollowness is at the core of the present regime, which has infected much of the polity with it. From disenfranchising millions of voters who it believes may vote against it, and that too by using an Election Commission whose formation itself is through a process that is immoral (it is formed essentially by the Prime Minister and one of his nominees), to making election results themselves irrelevant by buying up or threatening elected opposition members to change sides and join the ruling party, it has been playing out a veritable charade in the name of democracy. The students and youth were expressing themselves against this charade.

While much of the ‘godi’ (lapdog) media has been applauding this charade, and vast numbers of people, aware of this charade, have been terrorised into silence over it, the students have shown the gumption to openly oppose it. The lampooning of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cult through posters and cartoons was an obvious expression of this opposition; and it had the effect of freeing lots of people from the paralysing fear that had been gripping them.

In fact, the police brutality, the pellet guns, the nailed lathis, the tear gas, and the apparently senseless insistence on Dharmendra Pradhan’s continuation as Education Minister, were all designed to perpetuate that very fear in people’s minds, to perpetuate the impression that this government does not budge. It aimed once again to atomise people, to break them into monads, so that each person continues to believe in his or her own ineffectiveness and is persuaded that the government enjoys such strong support that it remains invincible.

This moral hollowness is indeed a hallmark of all fascist regimes. The Nazi movement in Germany in the 1930s which began by fulminating against monopoly capital even while being surreptitiously aided by some monopolists, made a deal with it on coming to power. To effect this deal, it even massacred large numbers of its own supporters who were led by Ernst Rohm, in the “Night of Long Knives”. From the moral high ground of being anti-monopoly, it shifted to the moral hollowness associated with an alliance with monopoly capital. The neo-fascists of today make an open deal with monopoly capital, especially with a newer segment of it, even before coming to power; and such a deal which gives a license to loot to the monopolists necessarily gives rise to a moral hollowness.

Goebbelsian propaganda would not be needed by the fascists if such hollowness did not exist. And in India, Bollywood actors would not be pressured (as one of them has admitted) into singing ditties like “Modi hai to mumkin hai” if the regime did not have moral hollowness at its core that had to be covered up in this manner.

Students, in fact, are the one social group that is ideally positioned to contest this moral hollowness. They are innocent, idealistic, informed, thoughtful, and intrepid, with a strong commitment toward and respect for ethical conduct; all these qualities equip them with the capacity to fight against the moral hollowness of regimes that thrive by cynically manipulating people through Goebbelsian propaganda. By the same token, however, their success in imposing a semblance of ethical behaviour in one instance, as at present, does not signify any change in the system, any more than trapping a leopard can be a precursor to changing its spots.

The students’ demands did not incorporate any change in the system or any institutional change; had they done so, it would have led to much discussion and not spread so rapidly or spontaneously across the country. The contrast here with the kisan agitation is quite striking. Since that was a class agitation in defence of the interests of a basic class, as distinct from an agitation to enforce ethical conduct, its demands were necessarily institutional, to roll back the institutional changes being enacted at the behest of imperialism that presides over a neo-liberal order into which Indian monopoly capital is thoroughly integrated.

In the current instance, there has been no question of any institutional changes being effected, which is why the neo-fascist regime, having suffered a setback to its image and to the atmosphere of terror it had so assiduously built up, would work overtime to recover lost ground.

It would do so in the days to come by strengthening religious appeals to the majority community, by creating communal incidents, by provoking international incidents on the border (though this last device becomes more difficult with Donald Trump’s penchant for intervening in South Asian affairs), and by attempting to co-opt, or in other ways diminish, the “leadership” (in term of which alone it can perceive movements) of the student agitation.

The student agitation, however, has played a sterling role in exposing the shenanigans of neo-fascism, above all its cynical use of communalism; in puncturing the myth of the infallibility of the “supreme leader”; and in breaking the atmosphere of terror that had gripped the country for so many years. It has opened the way for a political challenge to neo-fascism that can now be mounted.

The writer is Professor Emeritus, Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views are personal.        



 INDIA

T. Mohandas -- The True Face of RSS Ideology



Ram Puniyani |




While RSS has disowned his statement, he represents the Hindu nationalist ideology that sees democratic norms and women’s equality as undesirable and contemptuous.



After the government agreed to the demands of the Jantar Mantar student protestors, the matters are not over yet. The arrests continue, those arrested have not been released in various places. There is also an observation that among those arrested for these protests, Muslims number more than others. The case of Junaid bhai is very disturbing. He organised a team to provide water and food to the protesters. Cockroach Janata Party founder Abhijeet Dipke touched his feet as a matter of gratitude. However, police were prompt and overactive in harassing Junaid and his family members.

Where did Junaid get the money to organise the supply of food? He had begun with just distributing water and later, with the help of a few relatives, started supplying food. Later, he started getting many supplies from various donors and his outfit became a sort of centre for providing this basic necessity at the protest site.

The welcome thing was that the protestors shouted slogans against the communal politics of the Central government. It is good that the youth are vigilant about the failure of the government to keep the promises given in the signed agreement. All over the country, the movement has left an immense positive impact in that the people who felt stifled are now able to breathe and partly express themselves. The protest is midway, with kudos to the spirit of the youth. They deserve all the praise for loosening the tight grip of the repressive system.

The question is, will it last? The question is to channelise the mass discontent piling up over the past few years. The question is whether broader political coalitions will pick it up and ensure that the democratic values are revoked to some extent.

In the aftermath of this protest, there are many like Hindi film actor Kangana Ranaut, the Bharatiya Janata Party MP who said India got “freedom in 2014”, calling GenZ as the “gutter generation”. Shame on such people who can’t see the positive and creative culture that was on display at Jantar Mantar.

And then there are the likes of T. Mohandas, an ex-chief of BJP’s Intellectual Cell, one who has shouldered many responsibilities for Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-BJP, who showed their political ideology in its true colours. He said, “The protesters at Jantar Mantar would have been shot and killed if he was in control.” He also said the women who were part of the protest “like to be raped and would not even complain if it happens.”

While for tactical purposes, his statement has been disowned, the fact remains that RSS is adept in disowning its members when they do or say ghastly things. The unforgettable case of RSS denying that Nathuram Godse had anything to do with them. This despite the fact that Nathuram Godse’s brother, Gopal Godse, in his book, May it Please Your Honour” says that all the brothers, including Nathuram, were groomed in RSS shakhas.

Mohandas, representing the Hindu nationalist ideology, makes both aspects of democratic norms and women’s equality as undesirable, and has contempt for them. He describes the chronology of controlling the protest at Jantar Mantar. First, he would have imposed a curfew in that area, then he would have given a warning to disperse, failing which firing would have been ordered and those killed and injured would have been sent to hospitals.

The democratic norms for which Mohandas is showing contempt have already been clear during the past 12-13 years, since the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance has been in power.

Global indices showing India’s ranking in democratic norms is falling year after year to the extent that now it is labelled as an “electoral autocracy.” Even the BJP ‘Marg Darshak Mandal’ is disturbed by the path this government is taking. First, Lal Krishna Advani declared that it was an “undeclared emergency.” Now Murli Manohar Joshi is critical of the way police handled the protests.

As per Freedom House (Freedom in the World Index): India is placed at 62 out of 100, designating the country as "Partly Free" due to pressures on political rights and civil liberties. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU Democracy Index) categorises India as a "Flawed Democracy". V-Dem Institute (Democracy Reports) classifies India's governance structure closer to an "Electoral Autocracy", citing a heavy reduction in civic space and judicial independence.  Reporters Without Borders (World Press Freedom Index) ranks India 157th out of 180 countries, pointing to growing constraints on media independence and journalist safety.

Mohandas’s comments about girls and women participating in the Jantar Mantar dharna are straight from the inventory of misogynist abuses and comments. The RSS, to which Mohandas belongs, is deeply rooted in feudal and patriarchal values in which women, as a matter of principle, are regarded as the property of man. The politics of communalism is played on the bodies of women. While RSS is an exclusively male organisation with swayamsevaks, its subordinate women’s organisation is Rashtra Sevika Samiti. Here women can only be sevikas (servants).

In Savvy magazine (April 1994), Mridula Sinha of BJP, did accept that taking and giving dowry was OK, wife-beating was OK and women should not work outside unless there is dire economic crisis. This is quite in line with Hitler’s diktat for women, that their lives should revolve around the Kitchen, Children and Church.

Hindutva’s major ideologue, VD Savarkar, reprimands the noble king Shivaji for returning the daughter- in-law of Bassein’ king, who was brought as a gift for him by Shivaji’s army. As per him, the atrocities on Muslim women were needed as revenge.

The RSS does try to hide its real ideology by deceptive language but the truth pops up times and time again. The previous anti-corruption protest that was led by Anna Hazare and Arvind Kejriwal were cleverly propped up by RSS to defame the Congress. This time, we need to exercise caution. In due course, the democratic forces have to put their act together, shoulder to shoulder, and try to ensure that the likes of T. Mohandas and their ideological parents do not manipulate this protest into their lap and strengthen the divisive politics of Hindu nationalism.

Sure, most in this country are fed up with the present dispensation and if elections are held honestly (a big if) they would have no place in a secular democracy. Mohandas’s statement is the polar opposite of the politics of another Mohandas, whom following Netaji Subhash Bose, we term as the ‘Father of the Nation’.

The writer is a human rights activist, who taught at IIT Bombay. The views are personal.


Manufacture of a Usable Past: NCERT & Hindutva Rewriting of Indian History



Archit |





Education has become a live political fault line in India right now.

The past few weeks of encampment at Jantar Mantar by the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) along with various Left organisations like SFI, AISA AND AISF, and nationwide protests, have shaken the power corridors of New Delhi and resulted in an unprecedented resignation of a cabinet minister for the first time since the victory of the Bhartiya Janata Party in 2014.

Education has become a live political fault line in India right now. While paper leaks and mismanagement have been the central taking point of the movement, Left groups have consistently pointed out the deeper embedded rot in the education system, where curriculum seems to have transformed into a frontier for the regime to establish its legitimacy and political-cultural world-view.

Nationalist projects also need a past, one which is comfortable for them to live with. However, the past on offer is very often inconvenient, ambiguous, or simply too complicated to serve present politics, a challenge that serves as catalyst for projects of remaking the past. Historian Eric Hobsbawm called this the invention of tradition, wherein there is a deliberate construction of a lineage or a set of origins along with a moral order and universe which is argued to be as ancient, pristine and beyond critical scrutiny given its sacred and unbroken continuity; even though much of it is in fact actually freshly assembled information arranged to the end of answering contemporary, modern needs.

Italian communist thinker Antonio Gramsci gave another name for the end product of such undertakings: common sense, the layer of belief which is so deeply absorbed and accepted that it ceases to be an argument at all, and instead it is the only way things obviously are. School textbooks are an important site where this common sense takes shape. The textbooks reach a child before she has the tools to question them, and they do it under the authority of the state and the discipline of history itself, which is precisely why regimes carry a relentless and compulsive drive to remake a nation's self-understanding.

The Hindutva movement has pursued revision of history for a long time. Its account of the past rests on a few load-bearing claims: that Hindus are the original and continuous inhabitants of the subcontinent, stretching back to the first urbanisation and Harappan period; that the arrival of Islam had interrupted an otherwise harmonious civilisation and inflicted several centuries of unrelieved suffering on it; and the caste system, whatever its faults, is a secondary and largely colonial-era distortion rather than something woven into the fabric of the sub-continent’s religious and social life.

All these claims collapse against evidence, and cannot survive in the form the movement needs them to. Genetic and linguistic research supports migration into the subcontinent rather than an unbroken line running from Harappa to the Vedic age.

The five centuries of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal empire were, like every other period of subcontinental history, a mix of conquest, patronage, syncretism, and violence and cannot be categorised under a singular category of Dark Era. Caste hierarchies, far from being introduced by colonialism, have textual and social roots that predate colonialism by well over a thousand years, as generations of scholarship from Ambedkar onward have shown.

This is the gap that the revised NCERT textbooks, rolled out at every level from class six through class twelve, exist to close. For roughly a decade after the BJP’s rise to power in 2014, the NCERT curriculum had proven surprisingly resistant to wholesale rewriting. That resistance has now given way. What has replaced it is not a coherent alternative history so much as a patchwork of insertions, omissions, and reframing, each aimed at a different pressure point in the discipline, and each traceable back to one or another of Hindutva's foundational claims.

Reading the textbooks, chapter by chapter makes it apparent that it is not merely ideologically motivated revision which is visible, but rather a kind of muddle: contradictions within a single chapter, contradictions between chapters written for different classes, and a persistent unwillingness to follow any argument to a place the writers do not want it to go. This essay works through four of those pressure points, and then asks what it means for a country to raise a generation of students on a history built this way.

Remarkable Continuity, Invented On The Page

The clearest instance of this confusion is also the most consequential, because it touches Hindutva's founding myth of civilisational continuity. The class six textbook Exploring Society: India and Beyond opens its chapter on the Harappan civilisation by listing its various names - Indus, Harappan, Indus-Sarasvati, Sindhu-Sarasvati - and announcing that the book will use all of them. It then does nothing of the sort. The term "Harappan civilisation" never appears again in the chapter, even as the people themselves are still called Harappans throughout. "Indus-Sarasvati" recurs at least five times; "Sindhu-Sarasvati" twice. The term Sindhu-Sarasvati re-appears, briefly but more prominently, as the only term used for the civilisation in the textbook on social sciences for class nine. The class twelve textbook, by contrast, sticks to "Harappan civilisation" from beginning to end and never uses the Sarasvati formulation at all.

This is not a stylistic inconsistency. It is the seam where an argument the writers want to make meets an argument they cannot quite bring themselves to complete. Archaeology names cultures after the site where they were first identified, which is why "Harappan" remains the term of choice among working archaeologists. Today, well over a thousand sites are  known, spread from Alamgirpur in western Uttar Pradesh to Sutkagen-dor on the Makran coast, from Manda in Jammu and Kashmir down to Malvan in Surat district, with an isolated site as far off as Shortughai in North Afghanistan.

An archaeological culture distributed across that much territory, along multiple river systems, is poorly served by a name tied to any single one of them, whether that name is Indus or Sarasvati. The identification of a string of sites along the dried bed of the Ghaggar-Hakra with the Rigvedic Sarasvati is a live and interesting hypothesis, one that even Romila Thapar's older NCERT text treated as worth entertaining, but it remains a hypothesis, not a settled finding, and the objection to river-based naming applies to the Sarasvati formulation exactly as much as it applies to “Indus Valley Civilisation."

What the Sarasvati formulation buys, when a textbook insists on it anyway, is continuity: a direct line from the Harappan cities to the age of Rigveda, and from there onward to a Hindu civilisation that has occupied the subcontinent since the beginning, needing no migration story to explain how the Vedic-speaking peoples got there. This is precisely the ground on which the Class 12 NCERT rejects the Aryan migration hypothesis outright, notwithstanding the weight of genetic and linguistic evidence behind it. But the chapter that would need to do the actual work of establishing that continuity, the class twelve chapter on Harappa itself, declines to touch the Sarasvati terminology at all, presumably because making the case at the level of specialised, university-track history invites exactly the scrutiny the term cannot survive. It is at the Class 6 and 8 level, where most students will encounter their last formal history lessons, that the claim gets planted and left uncontested. Very few of those students will go on to study history in college. Fewer still will ever read the counter-argument.

Turning The Past Into The Present's Mirror[1] 

A second, subtler technique is anachronism: describing the past in the vocabulary of the present, so that old events come pre-loaded with contemporary political meaning. Historical method treats this as close to a cardinal sin, because it erases the very thing that makes a period worth studying on its own terms, the fact that people in the past operated within categories, loyalties, and constraints that were not ours.

The Class 6 textbook's account of Shivaji's night raid on Shaista Khan's camp offers a textbook case, in more than one sense. After describing the raid, in which Shaista Khan escaped having lost several fingers and abandoned Maharashtra, the text adds that "this daring raid resembles the modern-day surgical strike." A 17th-century Maratha ruler's assault on a Mughal governor is folded into the vocabulary that has, over the past decade, become central to Indian political rhetoric around cross-border military action against Pakistan.

The effect is to make Shivaji legible to a child not as a figure of his own century but as a proto-nationalist forerunner of today's state, and to make today's state, by the same gesture, an inheritor of an eternal Hindu tradition of righteous retaliation against a Muslim adversary. When put to test with the historical method such conflation is bound to be extremely untenable. Raiding for tribute is about as far from the self-image of a modern professional army as a historical practice gets, yet this is what the textbooks attempts at establishing.

The Maratha state, if studied on its own terms, reveals much more nuanced histories of statecraft and polity, of raiding, wars, alliances and conciliations, including those with muslim polities of the same period. It also reveals the friction between new polities like that of the Marathas and the existing Brahmanical order, histories   which are conveniently ignored. Shivaji[2]  has long been a central icon for the Hindutva movement's account of Hindu resistance to Muslim rule; a comparison this anachronistic does not happen by accident in a textbook that otherwise polices its language quite carefully[3] .

The historian David Ludden identifies this manoeuvre as a repeating ingredient in most nationalist history projects. This is territorial anachronism, or the projection of a present-day map backward onto a past that never organised itself along those lines, so that the boundary appears ancient rather than freshly drawn. Ludden's point is that a national map carries the emotional freight of belonging, prerogative , and exclusion. This freight , rather than geography, decides who counts as inside the nation and who counts as an intruder in it, legitimising present day structures of power and authority. Civilisational formulations throughout the textbook seem to project this very kind of demarcation, as which polities are constituents of the ancient and righteous civilisational lineage and which ones are aberrations to it. 

Building a dark age out of a colonial habit

The most audacious revision sits at the opening of the history section in the class eight textbook, under a heading titled "A Note on History's Darker Periods." It concedes, reasonably enough in the abstract, that history often dwells on war and cruelty, and counsels that such periods be approached with detachment. What follows makes clear which centuries the framing is meant to cover: roughly six hundred years, from the establishment of the Mamluk dynasty in Delhi in 1206 through the decline of the Mughals after Aurangzeb. The textbook's own justification is that this era saw "war, abuse, fanaticism, bloodshed" descend suddenly upon an otherwise era of peaceful social order.

The claim does not withstand a moment's scrutiny, since the subcontinent before 1206 was no stranger to war, conquest, or bloodshed of its own. But its purpose is not really historical; it is to reintroduce, under a new vocabulary, the periodisation that the British colonial historian James Mill imposed on Indian history two centuries ago, dividing it into Hindu, Muslim, and British ages. That scheme was always a political instrument rather than a neutral chronology, useful to a colonial administration that wanted to present British rule as a rescue from Muslim tyranny. Hindutva has recycled it for a domestic audience, where it does a double duty: it supplies a centuries-long narrative of Hindu victimhood, which is the emotional fuel of majoritarian politics, and it erases everything about the period that complicates the picture, above all the Bhakti movements, whose critique of caste and Brahmanical authority makes them an uncomfortable fit for a history organised around Hindu suffering at Muslim hands rather than internal Brahmanical hierarchy[4] . Attention to the latter would also have brought light to structural caste violence, institutionalised as the varna-jaati system, which is a major constituent in any serious reconstruction of ancient and medieval Indian history, and thus, discredit any framing of pre-sultanate landscape as harmonious and

The textbook's treatment of the Delhi Sultans compounds this. It notes, accurately, that the Sultans “lived in luxury funded by plunder, taxation, and the slave trade” — a description equally true of essentially every medieval court anywhere in the world, and offered here without that comparison, so that ordinary medieval statecraft reads as evidence of a uniquely foreign and barbaric rule.

The section on temple destruction follows the same pattern. It states that the period saw attacks on Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu religious images, motivated not primarily by plunder but by iconoclasm, which it later defines as unique to Islamic polities. Most serious historians situate temple desecration in the wider subcontinental practice of desecrating a defeated rival's patronised deity and temple, a practice that long predates the arrival of Turkic rule.

Richard Eaton's extensive research on temple desecration lays out the pattern clearly: in 642, the Pallava king Narasimhavarman I looted the image of Ganesha from the Chalukyan capital at Vatapi; in the eighth century, Bengali troops destroyed what they believed was the state deity of the Kashmiri king Lalitaditya; in the early tenth century, the Rashtrakuta ruler Indra III not only destroyed a Pratihara temple at Kalapriya but took evident pride in recording it. Temples of state deities were understood across the subcontinent as targets in war precisely because they embodied a rival king's authority. None of this excuses the destruction that did occur under Turkic and Mughal rule; it simply means that treating that destruction as the unique signature of Muslim conquest, rather than a regional political practice that Muslim rulers also participated in, is bad history in service of a predetermined conclusion.

In the same textbook for class 8, It is noted that Aurangzeb issued a blanket ban on all non-muslim institutions of education. This seems to be based off a de-contextualised reading of a court Farman dated 1669. It quotes the order as instructing provincial governors "to demolish schools and temples of the infidels and put down their teachings and religious practices," presenting it as a blanket order for religious persecution. The fuller record, found in the Ma'athir-i 'Alamgiri, situates the order as a response to a specific report reaching the court that April: that certain teachers in Thatta, Multan, and Benares were spreading what the court called "false books" and drawing students of both Hindu and Muslim background from great distances. Whatever the court's actual objection to this teaching was, the order reads as a response to a targeted complaint about a specific mode of instruction at certain specific locations, not a general campaign against the worship and practices of non-muslim groups, and it sits awkwardly beside the extensive documentary record of land grants and patronage that Aurangzeb extended to various sects, communities, temples and religious institutions throughout his reign, what Richard  Eaton and Satish Chandra, along with others have well highlighted in their work on Aurangzeb. This misreading of the Aurangzeb record is not new; Hindu nationalist historians going back to Sita Ram Goel have leaned on selectively quoted Persian court sources for decades, by reading Persian hyperbole at its face value. Mainstream historiography corrected the record long ago. The reappearance of this long rejected extrapolation here is clearly a politically motivated choice[5] .

The Caste Violence That Disappears

The fourth pressure point is caste, and here the method is not distortion so much as removal. The previous class eight social science textbook carried a dedicated chapter on women, caste, and reform. The revised edition drops it, and caste as a subject barely surfaces anywhere else in the new curriculum. Where the class six social science text does address the varna-jati system, it offers the following account: that “the system was more flexible in earlier periods and became rigid over time, in particular during the British rule in India," and that varna-jati, while significant, is only one of several mechanisms shaping Indian society.

Both halves of that sentence do real ideological work. The first pushes the hardening of caste hierarchy onto the colonial period, letting pre-colonial Hindu society off the hook for a rigidity that, as the historical and textual record shows, long predates British rule. The second minimises caste's centrality to Indian social life by placing it on a list alongside unspecified other factors, treating a structuring institution as one variable among many. Both moves protect the same thing: a vision of a harmonious, undivided "Hindu society" that Hindutva politics needs in order to mobilise Hindus as a single vote bank across caste lines, something the movement's own internal history, from its Brahmanical leadership to its uneasy relationship with Dalit assertion, makes considerably harder to sustain than the textbook suggests. A curriculum genuinely interested in restoring suppressed history would have expanded its treatment of caste and gender not deleted it. That it has done the opposite, in a project explicitly framed as correcting historical injustice, is the clearest evidence that the aim is at producing a rather communitarian history, where hinduism becomes an homogenised category rather than the diverse and stratified social reality it that is swept under the rug.

Continuity For The Victors, Catastrophe On Loan

There is an older vocabulary for what these four moves add up to, and it comes from Walter Benjamin in his Philosophy of History, written in 1940. Here he argues that the historian who identifies with the past as an unbroken inheritance is, whether he admits it or not, identifying with whoever currently holds power, because that inheritance, the "cultural heritage" passed down as a triumphal procession, belongs to "the heirs of all those who have ever been victorious." Continuity thus is what gets constructed for the people who won. Set against this is what Benjamin calls the tradition of the oppressed, for whom the state of emergency is not an interruption of history but its rule: not a chain of events but a single unbroken catastrophe piling wreckage at its own feet. The attempt at establishing continuity from Harappan culture to the Vedic age seeks to manufacture an unbroken civilisational line running from the Harappan urban centres,  through the Vedas to the present, so that whoever stands at the end of that line inherits it as birthright. That is what continuity is for.

But framing of the period of muslim polities, as an “Dark Age”, does something Benjamin's schema does not anticipate. It assigns the vocabulary of rupture, emergency, centuries of unrelieved catastrophe, to the same party that is supposedly the uncontested heir to the so called eternal and essentially Hindu civilisation. Hindutva historiography wants continuity and catastrophe at once, applied to the eternal Hindu civilisation which is perpetually at the risk of imminent catastrophe and subjugation. A textbook that wants its readers to feel both at the same time is not describing a historical position so much as borrowing an emotional register it has no structural claim to, which is catastrophe without the risk of actually occupying any losing side of history.

What a common sense costs

None of these four revisions reads, on its own, as overtly dramatic falsification. That is what makes the method effective. A confused nomenclature here, an unearned comparison there, a selectively quoted order, a deleted chapter: each is small enough to defend individually, and cumulatively decisive enough to rebuild a child's sense of who did what to whom over two thousand years of subcontinental history. Gramsci's point about hegemony was never that a ruling narrative announces itself as ideology. It is that it stops looking like an argument at all, and becomes simply what everyone already knows, absorbed before the tools to interrogate it exist. That is what a Class 6 or Class 8 textbook does better than almost any other instrument a political movement could design, because most of the students reading it will never take another history course.

What is at stake, then, is not a dispute between two versions of the past that reasonable people might weigh against each other. It is whether the discipline of history, with its ordinary and unglamorous obligations to evidence, context, and the refusal to read the present back into the past, survives as something Indian children are actually taught, or whether it is replaced by a story whose only real test is whether it flatters the politics of the government that commissioned it. Historians can and do argue about the Aryan migration, about the balance of plunder and patronage under the Delhi Sultanate, about how rigid caste hierarchy really was in any given century. What they cannot do, and what these textbooks do throughout, is settle those arguments in advance and then wish away every piece of evidence that points the other way.

A country's history curriculum is usually the last place its citizens will encounter organised, evidence-based arguments about their own past before they either forget the subject or make their peace with whatever version of it they were handed at the age of 13 years. It is difficult to imagine a more consequential place to get this wrong.

The writer is an activist with the Students' Federation of India and currently a Master's student in the Department of History, University of Delhi. The views are personal.


LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Hinduism Is Fascism