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Saturday, June 13, 2026

Trump's bumbling attempt to rob American taxpayers is backfiring


Former President Donald Trump speaking at a MAGA rally, hosted by Turning Point Action, at the Arizona Federal Theatre in Phoenix, Arizona on July 24, 2021, Gage Skidmore
June 11, 2026 

Whoever designed President Donald Trump's $10 billion lawsuit against the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department must be a fan of the Ocean’s Eleven movie franchise. The multi-act plot lines are strikingly similar: Put together a motley crew of risk takers; pick a seemingly invincible target rich in treasure; infiltrate the target; exploit its weaknesses; and get away with an improbable heist while the guards are asleep, distracted, or otherwise occupied.

Act One of Trump’s story arc began on January 29, when he and his eldest sons and the Trump Organization filed the lawsuit in federal district court in Miami. If only briefly, it seemed like the plan just might work. In 2019, an IRS contractor named Charles Littlejohn leaked multiple years of the Trumps’ confidential tax records, along with those of over 7,000 other wealthy individuals, to The New York Times and ProPublica. The Trumps alleged in their complaint that the IRS and the Treasury Department had willfully failed to safeguard their tax information, and that each viewing of a news article mentioning the data constituted a separate $1,000 violation. The total—accounting for harm from embarrassment and reputational and financial injury—ran into the stratosphere.

There is no doubt that Littlejohn broke the law. In October 2023, he pleaded guilty to the unauthorized disclosures and was later sentenced to five years in prison.


But a few things stood in the way of a courtroom victory for Trump and his family: First and foremost, Trump filed his complaint in his individual capacity, placing himself, as the nation’s chief executive, on both sides of the litigation, with his former personal lawyer and now-acting Attorney General Todd Blanche representing the defense.

Neither Blanche nor Trump has backed away from the addendum to the settlement agreement reached in the Miami case that confers civil and criminal immunity on the president and his sons.


The arrangement came to the attention of various public watchdog groups that quickly filed amicus briefs in the case, decrying the litigation as collusive and riddled with irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Collusive litigation is illegal and, if proven, warrants dismissal and court-ordered sanctions. It could also conceivably lead to a future criminal prosecution for conspiracy to defraud the United States, in addition to other offenses. And, because Trump filed the case in his individual capacity, he would not be protected from future prosecutions by the immunity the Supreme Court accorded him two years ago for actions taken within the scope of his official duties.

Another problem for Trump: The case was assigned to Judge Kathleen Williams, a no-BS jurist appointed by Barack Obama. On April 24, Judge Williams ordered the parties to submit briefs on the collusion issue by May 20. The order specifically mentioned remarks made by Trump in press interviews that indicated he understood the nature of the case and that if the litigation were to be settled, he would be in the unique position of negotiating with himself, an admission that could prove critical in future investigations to establish criminal intent.

The order prompted Blanche, Trump, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to open the second act of their Ocean’s Eleven ploy. Instead of filing the requested briefs, they submitted a request to voluntarily dismiss the case on May 18. Believing she no longer had jurisdiction over the case, Judge Williams granted the request.


Later that same day, Blanche announced that the lawsuit had been resolved with the DOJ entering into a “settlement agreement” that created a $1.776 billion “anti-weaponization” slush fund to be drawn from the Treasury Department’s general “judgment fund,“ created by Congress in 1956 as a permanent appropriation to pay litigation judgments entered against the United States. Under the agreement, Trump’s allies, including the January 6 insurrectionists, would be authorized to file claims for monetary compensation due to the alleged weaponization of President Joe Biden's Justice Department against them. The claims would be adjudicated by a committee, selected by the attorney general, that would operate in secrecy with no public reporting requirements and whose members could be fired at will by the president.

The following day, Blanche tacked on an “addendum” to the settlement that ordered the IRS and the DOJ to permanently end all current and possible future tax audits and investigations into the Trump family that were or could have been pending at the time of the settlement. The actual language of the addendum is so nebulous, according to some analysts, that it could be read to immunize the Trumps from any future investigations, civil or criminal, initiated by any and all federal agencies, including the Securities and Exchange Commission and the FBI.

The settlement prompted immediate and uncommon bipartisan criticism in Congress and outrage in the media. It also sparked additional litigation with new lawsuits aimed at blocking the anti-weaponization fund filed in Virginia and the District of Columbia. On May 29, District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema, sitting in Alexandria, Virginia, issued a temporary restraining order preventing the transfer of any money from the Treasury Department to the fund, and precluding the DOJ from taking any further action on the fund. The judge set a June 12 hearing date for oral arguments on the TRO.


Meanwhile, on May 27 in Miami, a group of 35 former federal judges filed a motion to reopen the case, urging Judge Williams to investigate whether the parties had perpetrated a fraud on the court. The judge responded swiftly with an order requiring Trump and his sons to submit a reply brief by June 12. This highly unusual step was necessary, she explained, in light of the “grievous allegations [raised by the 35 judges] that Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this litigation solely to avoid judicial scrutiny of a lawsuit that ‘was collusive from the start’ and was only filed to provide the imprimatur of legality for an unlawful settlement.”

We are now in Act 3 of the administration’s Ocean’s Eleven drama, the part where Trump and his minions back down and regroup. In a hearing before a House Appropriations subcommittee on June 2, Blanche said that the administration would not go forward with the anti-weaponization fund. On June 5, in filings in both the DC and Virginia cases, the DOJ put Blanche’s pledge in writing in motions requesting that both cases be dismissed as moot.

To date, however, neither Blanche nor Trump has backed away from the addendum to the settlement agreement reached in the Miami case that confers civil and criminal immunity on the president and his sons. That benefit, if implemented, would accord the Trumps even more protection than a presidential pardon. It may also have been the real goal of the litigation from the outset.

But the scheme is unlikely to succeed. Whether Judge Williams or her colleagues in DC and Virginia strike down the addendum, the granting of immunity remains an act of blatant corruption. There is no reason to believe a future Department of Justice in a Democratic administration will honor the grant. It may take a few years for the curtain to fall on the president’s Ocean’s Eleven heist, but in the end, he may emerge as the caper’s biggest loser.
Inside Rubicon: The Structure Of Russia’s Elite Drone Center – Analysis

June 13, 2026 
 Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Rob Lee and Dmytro Putiata

(FPRI) — One of the Russian military’s most important developments in 2024-2025 was the establishment of the Rubicon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies under the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate for Advanced Inter-Service Research and Special Projects. As with many Russian innovations in the war, Rubicon’s genesis was a response to Ukrainian innovation. In part, it was a reaction to Ukraine’s Drone Line initiative and innovative Ukrainian drone units. Rubicon was officially established on August 2, 2024, by the order of Minister of Defense Andrei Belousov a few months after his appointment. This decision was a logical step in improving the procurement and development of unmanned systems in the Russian military. While organizations like the “Judgement Day” project played an important role, their experience and innovations were not shared uniformly across the Russian military and their funding relied on support from volunteers. The Rubicon Center was established to centralize research and development, analysis, procurement, and combat deployment of unmanned systems, including unmanned aerial systems (UAS), ground vehicles (UGV), and surface vessels (USV).

Rubicon has a broad remit. It plays an active role in developing the doctrine for the employment of unmanned systems: developing and spreading new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) across the military, training unmanned systems forces’ units, and improving and modernizing unmanned systems and other technologies. Since its formation, Rubicon has been a high priority for Minister Belousov. It is well funded and able to operate differently than conventional forces with a distinct culture. Its members are paid similarly to specialists from the Special Operations Forces (SSO), a significantly higher compensation than that of conventional forces. At the start of operations, it could also afford to be much more selective about the personnel it recruited, and was authorized to take unmanned systems teams from conventional forces.

In addition to its headquarters, Rubicon consists of combat formations. These units, mostly detachments, played a notable role in priority directions along the front line in 2025. Rubicon detachments were a qualitative improvement over conventional drone units, with substantial quantities of drones available and a much greater capacity for innovation. They also pursued more specific missions, typically targeting UAS teams and logistics targets at greater distances behind the front line. These detachments were tasked with experimenting with new equipment and tactics, which could be shared across the military. As a group of forces-level assets, they played an important role in reducing the time required between locating and striking targets, thus broadly improving the kill chain. In several respects, Rubicon combat detachments would ameliorate systematic issues or problems conventional forces could not fix. This included training UAS and counter-UAS (CUAS) crews from conventional units in the occupied areas on the latest TTPs and lessons learned. To some extent, Rubicon has compensated for the conventional forces’ generally slow adaptation cycle through its own innovations. Unlike other units, Rubicon detachments receive equipment directly from manufacturers and provide direct feedback, which leads to a more rapid drone innovation cycle.

Rubicon Center’s Approximate Structure in 2025

Rubicon includes a total of seven departments or centers, but it is important to emphasize that its structure is constantly evolving. Russia is actively scaling the number and size of its unmanned systems formations, which will likely continue. The main components of its structure include a headquarters, drone development center, instructor training center, analytical center, supply/sustainment unit, and combat formations.




Rubicon has a command group led by the center commander as well as seven deputy commanders responsible for religious support/unit ministry team (chaplain), physical readiness, legal affairs, research and development, combat training (G7), combat operations (G3), and political affairs/FSB counterintelligence officer. Next is the headquarters/staff led by the chief of staff. It consists of an operations section (G3), signal section (G6), intelligence section (G2), command post, personnel/manning section (G1), state secrets protection office/classified control office, UAS service section (cell), electronic warfare section, and communications control post (signal control node).

There is a sustainment and support section that consists of a technical directorate with a deputy commander for armaments, chief of technical inspection point (maintenance control point), and automotive service officer (motor pool). A logistics/sustainment directorate (G4) is led by the deputy commander for logistics with an organizational planning section and materiel and technical support department. The section also consists of a financial management office, human resources department, and specialized services, which typically include a RKhBZ (CBRN) defense officer and an air defense officer. In total, the command group, headquarters/staff, and sustainment section included approximately 100 personnel.

The next section is the operational test and combat employment units, which consist of a heavy FPV UAS test detachment, UAS test and evaluation detachments, an unmanned surface vessel (USV) test detachment, a special unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) test detachment, and an air defense systems test detachment. The Center also has its sustainment/supply units, including a warehouse section, medical aid station (role 1), transportation company/motor transport section, maintenance and repair unit, and security/force protection platoon.

The research and development block consists of six departments: innovation and advanced technology development, capability integration and fielding, analytical, medical technology development, training, and communications, and command and control systems. The innovation and advanced technology development department has a variety of functional groups: multi-rotor UAS, fixed-wing UAS, unmanned ground systems, unmanned surface systems, computer vision, artificial intelligence, software development, electronic warfare systems development, signals intelligence and electronic protection systems, UGV control systems development, field testing and validation, reverse engineering, and a defense industry cooperation cell.


The capability integration and fielding department includes the following groups: FPV systems, medium-range heavy UAS, EW and SIGINT systems integration, unmanned surface vessel integration, UGV systems integration, and technical sustainment. The analytical department includes the UGV employment analysis group, internal systems technical support group, software engineering group, and open-source and media analysis (OSINT) group. The medical technology development unit consists of an operator performance and human factors lab and an interactive training systems lab. The training department includes a command element, six training platoons with 18 personnel each, and a training support platoon. Lastly, the communications, command, and control systems department includes an experimental communications systems test group, fielded communications systems integration group, and technical maintenance group.
Table of Organization for Rubicon Combat Formations


In April 2025, there were eight Rubicon detachments. Six of these detachments were formed subordinate to each of Russia’s six groups of forces. These were the Rubicon-S (North), Rubicon-Z (West), Rubicon-Yu (South), Rubicon-Ts (Center), Rubicon-V (East), and Rubicon-D (Dnepr) detachments. The table of organization for the six detachments was 149 personnel, but their actual numbers ranged between 120-141 personnel, or 85% strength on average in April 2025. Russia also formed the Rubicon-Reserve and Rubicon-DM (Distance Mining) detachments, which were subordinate to the Joint Group of Forces led by General Gerasimov, which commands the war. Since then, Rubicon has scaled considerably with a total of 17 detachments, two unmanned systems battalions (roughly half the size of a detachment), and six companies.

Elements from Rubicon-S, Rubicon-Yu, and Rubicon-D were employed in Kursk oblast and played a key role in Russia’s retaking the salient held by Ukrainian forces around Sudzha. They were redeployed primarily to the Donetsk region in April, and had an immediate effect on the fighting in that direction. The Kursk operation was an immediate demonstration of Rubicon’s effectiveness. Retaking Kursk was a key political goal for Russia, and the new method of reinforcing areas of the front with elite strike UAS units focused on disrupting logistics demonstrated results.

As with Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces’ units, including the regiments and brigades in the Drone Line initiative, Rubicon detachments and teams are sent to reinforce priority directions. Given their capabilities and resources, the deployment of Rubicon detachments is a strong indication of Russia’s priority directions for offensive operations. During much of the summer and fall of 2025, there were several Rubicon detachments operating in support of the Center Group of Forces (GOF), whose area of responsibility includes Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and Dobropilla. In addition to the Rubicon-Ts detachment, which should be operating under the GOF, elements from Rubicon-D (Dnepr), Rubicon-7, Rubicon-8, Rubicon-DM (Distance Mining), and Rubicon-PVO (Air Defense) were all supporting Center GOF during this time. Russia also redeployed its naval infantry brigades and regiment to this direction at the end of the summer, which conducted several company-size mechanized assaults as well as dismounted infiltration. The redeployment occurred after the deep infiltration in mid-August. This was Russia’s main axis of advance during the second half of 2025, with the objective of advancing to Barinkove in Kharkiv oblast where they planned to meet units from the Western Group of Forces advancing from the Lyman direction. If successful, this would have encircled the cities of Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka.


On the other side, they faced many of Ukraine’s most capable UAS units, including elements from Magyar’s Brigade, Lasar’s Group, the Rarog Regiment, and other units. Russia did manage to advance and occupy most of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad during this time, but failed to exploit the deep infiltration that occurred east of Dobropillia in August. The deployment of several assault regiments, special operations forces, UAS units, and the redeployment of the 1st Azov Corps headquarters managed to stabilize and then improve the situation, despite the deployment of so many Rubicon teams. According to brigades in the Kostyantynivka direction, some Russian advances were attributable to Rubicon’s actions. Once they could not resupply their infantry or UAS positions in some areas, they could not sustain their positions and counter Russian infiltration. Rubicon has thus far managed to complicate the situation for Ukrainian brigades holding the front line, but, so far, this not been sufficient to enable a breakthrough.
Table of Organization and Equipment for Rubicon Detachments


Rubicon not only scaled the number of combat formations, but also the size of its detachments. With the increased size and diverse capabilities, detachments can now operate more autonomously and can perform a greater variety of missions. The standard Rubicon detachment increased in table of organization strength from 149 personnel in early 2025 to 474. Out of this total, there are 52 officers, 46 warrant officers, 78 sergeants, and 298 soldiers. The command section has 39 personnel, including the commander, deputy detachment commander, deputy detachment commander for operations (S3), deputy detachment commander for logistics (S4), head of communications service (S6), and deputy detachment commander for armaments/chief of materiel. The command also includes the staff of 22 personnel with the chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, two assistant chiefs of staff, an instructor, reconnaissance/intelligence section with three personnel, and battle command group with 14 personnel.

The detachment’s combat component has 245 personnel. The quadcopter FPV group has 106 personnel and is led by the group commander and deputy group commander for operations. It is composed of four FPV platoons, each led by an officer. Three of these platoons have eight teams with three personnel each and the 4th platoon has six crews with four personnel per team. Each team is led by a sergeant. There is also a fixed-wing FPV group of 72 personnel. This group has two platoons with eight teams each. Each team has four personnel. The reconnaissance-strike group has 69 personnel with four S-350NJ Supercam and four Zala ISR UAS teams. Each of these teams has seven personnel with pilots for both ISR and loitering munition UAS (typically, a Lancet variant). Each of these teams is led by an officer with two warrant officers. The aerial reconnaissance group has 35 personnel with two Orlan-10 UAS teams and six additional ISR UAS teams. The Orlan-10 teams are led by officers and have five personnel, whereas the regular ISR teams have three personnel and are led by sergeants. The detachment has a counter-UAS group of 29 personnel with two radar teams, two electronic warfare teams, and two radio-electronic reconnaissance teams. There is also a communications platoon with 15 personnel, an ordnance group, maintenance group, support platoon, and a medical evacuation group.

Recent Developments

In addition to the broader expansion of the Unmanned Systems Forces branch in 2026, the Russian military continues to scale the size of Rubicon as well as the 50th “Varyag” Unmanned Systems Brigade. Most of this expansion is occurring in its combat formations. At the end of March 2025, Rubicon’s total strength was approximately 1,450 personnel with an authorized strength of 2,500. As of this spring, Rubicon had approximately 5,000 personnel with an authorized strength of 9,000. This includes approximately 175 personnel in the headquarters, 270 personnel across seven departments (including research and development), and 700 involved in training and support functions. The remainder of personnel are in combat units.

While Rubicon remains a critical component of the Russian military’s unmanned systems’ capabilities, its future role is unclear. Interestingly, it appears the 50th “Varyag” Unmanned Systems Brigade may become the critical unit for Unmanned Systems Forces. Both Rubicon and the 50th Brigade are now tasked with countering Ukraine’s increasingly successful middle strike campaign, a key priority for the Russian military. The 50th Brigade will deploy battalions to help defend the airspace in Russian regions neighboring Ukraine, with Rubicon focused on defending occupied areas.

The previous commander of Rubicon was Colonel Sergei Viktorovich Budnikov, who previously served with the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade and 9th Guards Artillery Brigade. However, he was replaced as the commander of Rubicon by Sergei Aleksandrovich Zbukarev and is now the commander of the 50th Brigade. Approximately 600 personnel from Rubicon transferred to the brigade with him. The change in leadership and movement of personnel suggests that Rubicon may eventually lose its central role in the development of unmanned systems. There have been multiple attempts to significantly alter Rubicon, including removing or reducing its research and development center.

The emphasis on rapidly scaling Rubicon’s combat detachments appears to be creating challenges. The center was authorized to poach UAS teams from conventional regiments and brigades. Therefore, the further scaling of its combat formations is, at least partially, coming from conventional forces. This will likely lead to weakening the organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and UAS fire support capabilities for ground units. Notably, the same thing occurred when Ukraine scaled its Drone Line regiments and brigades, which took many of the best pilots and teams from the maneuver brigades, leaving them, at least temporarily, weaker. To increase its size, Rubicon has lowered its standards. As with special operations forces, attempts to increase size too rapidly will result in a drop in quality. While Rubicon’s growth is contributing to more target strikes each month, it is also tasked with greater responsibilities to address the Russian military’s growing challenges in the war. But these challenges need to be addressed in a more systematic fashion by conventional forces.

Rubicon is also competing for talent with the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade, which is attempting to increase its size from 1,300 personnel to 7,000. The Unmanned Systems Forces had approximately 87,000 personnel at the end of 2025, with plans to reach 165,000 by the end of 2026. Russia is currently failing to meet its monthly recruitment quotas. The plan includes recruiting 68,000 contract soldiers and transferring 10,000 servicemen from elsewhere in the military this year, but, if recruitment of civilians is insufficient, more service members will likely be transferred. Russia is also scaling the size of its unmanned systems units at all levels, including elevating newly-formed unmanned systems regiments subordinate to military districts and fleets into brigades. The scarcity of talent, and struggle to recruit Russia’s most capable and technologically savvy young men and women, will remain a key constraint.


The above analysis was originally published on Two Marines, a newsletter on Russia’s war in Ukraine, defense technology, and modern warfare, on June 5, 2026.

About the authors:Rob Lee is a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program and a former Marine infantry officer
Dmytro Putiata is a drone warfare expert who served in several units in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He served in the 36th Marine Brigade and Ummanned Systems Forces’ 20th Separate Unmanned Systems Brigade “K-2”.

Source: This article was published by FPRI

About Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
Founded in 1955, FPRI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests and seeks to add perspective to events by fitting them into the larger historical and cultural context of international politics.
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Friday, June 12, 2026

 India Flags Second Tanker Incident Off Oman Within 24 Hours

India reported on Thursday a new incident with a tanker off the coast of Oman amid escalating U.S.-Iran tensions in the area, following the death of three Indian seafarers in a U.S. hit on another vessel earlier this week.

"We have learnt of an incident involving a vessel off Shinas port of Oman, earlier today," the Indian Embassy in Oman said on social media in the morning local time on Thursday.

"We are closely monitoring the situation and coordinating with the local authorities for further details," said the embassy.

The Muscat Daily news outlet reported that "Authorities are responding to a fire reported on the tanker MT Jalveer near Shinas, Oman."

The daily noted in an X post that the Indian Embassy "is coordinating with local officials to confirm the crew's safety status."

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), a Royal Navy-sponsored organization, said today it had received a report of an incident 21 nautical miles northeast of Sohar, Oman. Local authorities have reported a tanker has experienced a fire in the engine room. As authorities continue to investigate, no environmental impact has been reported, UKMTO said.

The fresh incident with a tanker offshore Oman comes a day after a U.S. precision ammunition strike at a non-compliant vessel trying to breach the U.S. blockade left three Indian sailors missing.

The seafarers on Thursday were confirmed dead by Sarbananda Sonowal, India's Minister of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, who described the hit on the Palau-flagged MT Settebello as a "tragic incident."

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said it had disabled late on Tuesday the Settebello tanker as it transited the Gulf of Oman. A U.S. aircraft fired precision munitions into the ship's engine room after the crew repeatedly failed to comply with directions from American forces, CENTCOM said.

The attack on the tanker drew condemnation from Arsenio Dominguez, Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).

"I strongly condemn any act from any party that endangers the lives of seafarers and the safety of international shipping. This is simply unacceptable," Dominguez said on Wednesday.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com



U.S. Forces Disable Third Tanker This Week Off Oman with Indian Crew

tanker on fire
Picture reported to show the Jalveer on fire (FSUI India)

Published Jun 11, 2026 11:23 AM by The Maritime Executive


U.S. forces reported that they have disabled a third tanker off Oman, accused of violating the blockade of Iran. The attack, which drew further condemnation and assertions of misleading information from CENTCOM on the attack, came as Donald Trump has grown frustrated with the Iranians and increased the threats of future actions.

The attack, which CENTCOM said took place Thursday morning, June 11, in the Gulf of Oman, fired two Hellfire missiles into the engine room of the asphalt/bitumen tanker Jalveer (6,395 dwt). Pictures showed smoke rising from the ship with reports of a fire.  Twenty Indian crewmembers were evacuated without serious injuries.

UKMTO places the vessel approximately 21 nautical miles northeast of Sohar, Oman. It is registered in Guinea-Bissau and managed from India.  Centcom is asserting the vessel violated the blockade by attempting to transport Iranian oil and that the crew repeatedly failed to comply with directions from U.S. forces.

 

 

India’s government reportedly immediately summoned the U.S. chargé d’affaires in New Delhi and filed a strong protest. The Foreign Ministry said, “These attacks must cease and end,” while calling for increased diplomacy.

At the same time, the Shipping Ministry provided additional details on the attack yesterday on the Settebello. It confirmed that three Indian seafarers initially reported as missing are now confirmed as deceased. Their bodies were located, and they have been identified. The Forward Seaman’s Union of India reported it was the chief engineer, an engine fitter, and a deck cadet who were killed.

The union issues a long statement calling the reports coming from CENTCOM a “pretext of violations.” It said the three attacks this week have “created deep anxiety among Indian seafarers.” The union is demanding “immediate strengthening of naval protection and security arrangements for merchant vessels carrying Indian seafarers in high-risk waters.”

A company called ISO Marine – F.Z.E. issued statements it said were on behalf of the managers of the Settebello, “rejecting claims” that the vessel “ignored warning calls, communications, or instructions.” Some reports assert the vessel was at anchor when it was attacked yesterday. They asserted the tanker “holds no affiliation whatsoever with Iran or Iranian oil” and that it was “engaged in legitimate commercial operations.” 

Past tracking data, as well as reports from the NGO UANI (United Against Nuclear Iran), however, have tracked the vessel transporting Iranian oil in the past.  It was also noted that neither the Settebello nor the Jalveer has been sanctioned.

CENTCOM reported a total of nine non-combatant vessels disabled while saying 135 ships had complied and been redirected. It states the blockade is being enforced “impartially against vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas.” It asserts the Marivex, which was struck on Monday, violated the blockade by attempting to sail to an Iranian port, while Settebello, it says, attempted to transport Iranian oil.

Donald Trump yesterday posted a message about the effectiveness of the blockade, asserting that no ships were getting through. Today, he returned to social media, saying that the United States “will be hitting Iran very hard tonight.” Yesterday, he said the Iranians were not negotiating in good faith and kept changing and delaying their responses. Today, Trump wrote on social media, “At some point in the not too distant future, we will be taking Kharg Island, and other oil infrastructure points, and assume total control of their oil and gas markets,” as his latest economic threat against Iran. 

Iran has responded by launching missiles, which it says were aimed at U.S. bases in the Gulf countries. After Trump wrote that the U.S. had been sneaking tankers out of the Persian Gulf at night, Iran declared the Strait of Hormuz is closed to all vessels.

Later in the day, Donald Trump posted a new message on social media saying he had called off the strikes as a peace deal appeared to be at hand. He wrote that discussions and final points had been, in both concept and great detail, approved by all parties involved, and that further details would be announced shortly.

The general strike in Portugal scored points, but the future is uncertain

Thursday 11 June 2026, by Antonio Louçã



The general strike of June 3rd paralysed a significant number of businesses and services. There is a widespread awareness among the working class that the package of dozens of labour laws represents a mortal threat to their future.

The tourism industry was severely affected by the cancellation of numerous flights at Lisbon, Porto and Faro airports; public transport was paralysed in the major cities, with the exception of minimal bus services and some rail connections between the centre and the outskirts of Lisbon; schools were paralysed in the middle of exam season and public hospitals only operated for emergencies. The big news was the significant participation from the private sector, clearly higher than that seen in the general strike in December, with stoppage rates that the CGTP (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses or General Confederation of Portuguese Workers, the largest trade union federation) estimated at 100% for companies like Sovena and Cimpor, 95% for Bosch and 88% for Glavidro. [1]

The working class was not swayed by the siren songs that guaranteed the rejection of the "package" in the parliamentary vote. The previous strike, in December, had been strong enough to force the neo-fascist Chega party to change its voting position and announce its opposition to the approval of the bill promoted by the (minority) conservative right-wing government. But Chega’s about-face was, and remains, one of its many opportunistic manoeuvres, and no one can trust it to stick to its position. The struggle had to continue, and the call for a new general strike, despite all the postponements and vacillations by the CGTP, offered the working class the opportunity to make its position clear. And that opportunity was seized decisively.

In addition to rejecting illusions about the uncertain outcome of the parliamentary vote, the working class resisted the highly demobilising effect of the five-month interval between the general strike in December and this one in June. During that time, employers and the Government negotiated in the forum known as "Social Concertation" with the social democratic trade union federation UGT (União Geral de Trabalhadores or General Union of Workers), excluding the CGTP, in its majority tied to the communist party. Excluded from negotiations, they did not use that time to mobilise within companies, warning about the danger posed by the government project, but instead went around in circles until calling for a new general strike on June 3.

When the Government’s intransigence forced the UGT itself to refuse to agree to the package, the CGTP had a golden opportunity to promote assemblies in the companies that would eventually drag the UGT into joining the strike. In fact, even without that pressure from below, several UGT unions gave their members the green light to join the strike called by the rival union. However, the CGTP preferred to issue a top-down call, emphasising the UGT’s "yellow" nature and avoiding opening the Pandora’s box of a widespread workplace assembly process that could potentially sustain the struggle in the coming weeks and months.

The absence of assemblies resulted in a very uneven distribution of picket lines. In many workplaces, the union bureaucracy left the mornings free for strikers to stay home or go to the beach and simply called for afternoon demonstrations in each city. Thus, workplaces with a long tradition of assemblies and pickets were now deprived of both. The strike’s coincidence—anything but accidental—with a public holiday the following day, and with a Friday that invited long weekends, exponentially worsened the demobilisation. In Lisbon, the afternoon demonstration was less attended than the one in December 2025.

On June 3, 2026, the working class made its mark with a powerful strike. But there is no strategy or leadership that can guarantee the defeat of the labour package. We are still far from defining that strategy and building that leadership.

5 June 2026

Translated by David Fagan for International Viewpoint from Huella del Sur.

Footnotes

[1] Sovena Group is one of the largest Portuguese agribusiness holding companies, with its own farmyards in Portugal and several other countries. Cimpor - Cimentos de Portugal is the largest Portuguese cement group. Glavidro manufactures glass for industrial and construction purposes.

Claudio Katz: ‘The Argentine left must aim to govern with a strategy for power’

Myriam Bregman

First published in Spanish at Argentina Indymedia. Translation by Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

In this interview, Claudio Katz assesses the newfound prominence in Argentine politics of Workers’ Left Front – Unity (FIT-U) MP Myriam Bregman, and outlines some of the debates on the left. Katz also examines Argentina’s political situation, its economic crisis and President Javier Milei’s declining support, within a regional framework marked by events in Cuba, Venezuela and Bolivia.

Is Argentina’s political landscape changing?

Yes. Milei’s discrediting is very obvious, even among sectors that propelled him to power. His low approval rating, various expressions of disapproval with his administration, and the early election campaigning all indicate this.

The causes are obvious: two years of a dramatic fall in consumption and a brutal transfer of income to the wealthiest has caused widespread discontent. Daily life has been dramatically disrupted. A simple trip to work is now a nightmare, with reduced services and fares rising 12 times faster than wages. The healthcare system’s collapse is even more severe. Price hikes of 400% have pushed 740,000 people out of private health care and into already overcrowded public hospitals. Many pensioners are going without medicines to pay for food.

Inequality is shameful. As fuel exports rise, so do domestic energy costs. Each new record harvest comes with more empty tables in homes, cartoneros [a person who collects waste, such as cardboard, to resell]. rummaging through bins and school canteens run short on food supplies.

Milei took his chainsaw to the country, paralysing public works. He also abandoned his last remaining campaign pledge to cut inflation. It is again hovering at about 3% a month, according to a fictitious measurement based on obsolete household costs. The government itself is fuelling inflation by imposing tariff hikes and violating its monetarist ideology, which attributes price rises to money supply. By manipulating the exchange rate, it is artificially containing a further surge.

But this has not caused his economic model to collapse…

In reality, it is creaking and the shock absorbers are wearing out. 140,000 jobs losses were offset by 100,000 new informal gig economy jobs. No economy can function with 930 businesses closing each month and disposable income collapsing, with families asked to compensate for unpayable debts.

As so many times before, the huge trade surplus has evaporated due to capital flight, and another Trump rescue package is unlikely should last year’s critical exchange rate scenario be repeated. Milei's only solution to the crisis he has created is yet more austerity cuts. With tax revenue plummeting in a stagnating economy, Milei has imposed further cuts to sustain the fiction of a fiscal surplus and avoid a debt default. He has created a vicious circle of economic contraction and poverty, with no way out in sight.

Against this critical backdrop, outrage over corruption has resurfaced…

Absolutely. There is enormous anger over embezzlement by Milei’s gang. Their thievery is so brazen that even the tax collection agency head is hiding assets from tax authorities. The Libra cryptocurrency scandal, [general secretary of the presidency] Karina Milei’s 3% kickback revelations, bribery in more than 600 contracts between the national disability agency and a Kovalivker family-owned business, Milei-backed candidate José Luis Espert’s resignation over campaign funds from a high-profile drug trafficker, all expose how a gang of thugs have taken over the state to line their pockets. The scandals around Milei’s former cabinet chief, Manuel Adorni, go beyond anything imaginable and reveal a scandalous network of salary kickbacks and private plunder. They protect each other with codes and complicity like the mafia.

Milei, however, is more furious that no one cheers his outbursts and antics anymore. He does not know how to handle defeat in the culture war. His inner circle are cynically blaming people for their misfortunes, claiming they “got themselves into too much debt”. Others reinforce the ideology of cruelty, mocking destitute pensioners.

But the huge turnout at the March 24 commemorations [of the 1976 military coup] put those stories to rest. Official denialism [of the military junta's crimes] has as little resonance as attempts to revive theories of “the two demons” [morally equating the military junta’s state violence with leftist political subversion] or dictatorship “excesses”. Milei had to shelve plans to pardon the genocide perpetrators, amid widespread demands for “Memory, Truth and Justice”. These causes are a source of pride for a society that views the trials of the junta leaders as a victory embedded in the country’s DNA.

This same pattern was repeated with the mass march for education. Milei was left isolated after provocatively calling for further cuts to the lowest education budget in 35 years. He has failed to comply four times with the law requiring him to transfer owed funds to universities, attacking institutions that embody the ideal of upward mobility in the popular imagination. Attempting to destroy the symbol of qualification, knowledge and culture that public education embodies, he is losing his audience at breakneck speed.

He is not losing the support of everyone though, because the ruling class still backs him…

That is true, but the establishment is waiting for his term to finish in a respectable manner before continuing with “Mileism” without Milei. They are already sounding out potential replacements, such as the chameleon-like [right-wing Peronist1 MP Miguel Ángel] Pichetto, the reborn [former new right president Mauricio] Macri, the enigmatic [talk show host and pastor Dante] Gebel or the ever-changing [right-wing senator Patricia] Bullrich. Some are even considering a de facto replacement, should the president fall before then. In that scenario, they would keep the government afloat with the support of state governors and the Peronist right.

But Milei is uncontrollable and refuses to give up. He seeks to survive with Trump’s blessing. He has spent more time in the United States than in any Argentine town. New concessions to his patron include contentious laboratory patents and help with business disputes with China in several provinces. Milei has assembled a group of like-minded capitalists, who are vying with [multinational conglomerate Techint CEO Paolo] Rocca, [media mogul and Clarín group CEO Héctor] Magnetto and other local capitalists to reap the benefits of privatisations. They are also competing for control over the judiciary, where disputes between them are settled.

But, as always happens in Argentina, the streets will have the final say on the political course…

Exactly. The March 24 demonstrations exceeded all expectations. An estimated more than 1 million people attended, including a broad mix of generations, refuting claims that young people are shifting right. The education marches reaffirmed this resurgence. Trade union protests in various provinces show that the negative situation created by the recently approved labour reform has been reversed, after several months of retreating from street actions. These are significant mobilisations, but they lack the scale and militancy needed to defeat Milei. There is not yet the prospect of a repeat of the 2001 rebellion [that toppled several presidents] or the 2017 electoral victory against Macri.

Another significant shift is the sudden rise of Myriam Bregman…

Yes. Her rise in the polls is significant, as she has a very high net positive image, which is boosting her voting intentions. Many analysts say Myriam’s appeal has expanded beyond the traditional left-wing or progressive electorate. They believe that the angry anti-establishment voters that supported Milei might soon channel their discontent via the left. The atmosphere, to a certain extent, resembles that around [left-wing MP Luis] Zamora in the years before and after 2001. There are plenty of reasons to launch a major campaign in support of Myriam’s presidential candidacy. All the left agrees we need to shore up this prominence in the coming months.

There have been debates, expressed through various open letters and documents, on the strategic significance of this campaign. What is your view?

There is discussion on the need for Bregman to shift her discourse to show a genuine intent to become president. Such a positive tone requires an affirmative message, highlighting how the left can govern. This approach distinguishes between government and power, and calls on the people to take hold of both. The challenge lies in working out a strategy to achieve this objective.

Some participants in the debate have taken a negative view. They believe the Workers’ Left Front – Unity (FIT-U) should not seek to govern, as it has no viable policy to achieve that goal. Such pessimism simply repeats the right’s tired arguments against the left and fails to recognise potential shifts in the battle for power.

Is this pessimism being reconsidered?

We will have to see. The traditional Trotskyist view sees the struggle for government and power as two simultaneous processes, occurring in close succession. This is the 1917 Bolshevik model: revolution, soviets, the storming of the Winter Palace and the immediate launch of a socialist process. Calls to deepen the struggle, with hopes that popular power will emerge from below, are premised on repeating this.

Some documents reformulate this possibility, presenting Myriam’s candidacy as a link in the chain. They propose a positive campaign, presenting her winning the presidency as closely tied to a revolutionary upsurge. This is the reason for proposing “Committees to fight for a workers’ government, with Bregman as president”.

The obvious objection is this view is unrealistic. There are no signs, as yet, this could occur. But this sensible criticism can lead to the wrong conclusion of abandoning any effective campaign for the presidency. Some documents reject running such a campaign, instead arguing that the focus should be simply on recruitment while reaffirming the idea that elections are merely a platform to spread socialist ideas.

More moderate versions of this position argue that now is not the time to win government, because the social support needed to implement a revolutionary program does not exist in the current climate. They say the left should instead prioritise the immediate building of a party to address this weakness. I disagree with these positions, which I think help perpetuate the left’s political marginalisation.

What is your position?

Basically, fight to win the elections and form government as a means to initiate a struggle for power. A victory at the ballot box that is grounded in popular mobilisation and grassroots organisations would allow us to start the struggle to seize economic, judicial, military and media power. This is a clear, forceful strategy and, above all, one understood by the majority of the population. It avoids abstract debates about whether the conditions exist to advance the socialist project, because it situates that objective within an unpredictable course of events.

We do not know whether conditions for the classic revolutionary model to unfold will materialise. It is just as misguided to dismiss that possibility as it is to stake everything on it. Reaching government and contesting power views that path as a stage in the socialist project. The left may soon be in a position where it can and must govern with a strategy for power. But the most realistic approach is to assess contexts, taking into account the recent history of our country and region.

Which is?

In Argentina, the 2001 uprising. This was a revolt involving assemblies, picket lines and widespread grassroots organisations. This in turn led to an electoral process and the subsequent Kirchnerist cycle [of centre-left administrations headed by Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-15)]. It seems to me the left had no strategy then to intervene in elections. We should not repeat that mistake.

In contrast, Evo Morales became president in Bolivia and [Hugo] Chávez was elected in Venezuela. Their paths were similar to Salvador Allende in Chile. This path was greatly debated throughout the 20th century in terms of assessing the concrete meaning of a workers’ government. In my view, this path aligns, converges or complements — but is in no way counterposed to — the revolutionary dynamics in Russia, China, Vietnam or Cuba.

But the obvious objection would be that those attempts failed to combine the electoral path with revolutionary development…

That is not a valid objection, in my opinion. With that abstract yardstick, every left political process failed. All of them faced limits, setbacks and frustrations at some point. Was Leon Trotsky’s path a success? It seems to me there is a bad habit in polemics to attack an opponent’s failures, without considering one’s own shortcomings. It is not enough to say, for example, that Peronism has failed, without providing an example, national or international, that one considers successful.

If Myriam can consolidate her prominence on the political stage, these shortcomings will be overcome, especially if the left sets more ambitious goals in line with the position it could potentially occupy. This is not just a question of electing more MPs, but winning elections at the district, municipality or provincial level in 2027, and from there launching a campaign to win government at the national level and contest for power. Achieving these goals requires alliances and coalitions that go beyond just the left.

If the FIT-U significantly expanded its electoral base, it would have to clarify its positions on a potential run-off between a progressive centre-left and right-wing presidential candidate. This is not an immediate issue, as Myriam’s positive presidential campaign supposes that she will make it into that second round. But it is essential to develop a position for what typically happens in second round run-offs in Latin America. In that scenario, we cannot hesitate in calling for a vote against the right. Refining strategies is unavoidable in a regional context marked by dramatic events.

Are you referring to the threat of an imperialist attack on Cuba?

Yes. Trump has already stated his intention to take the island and do with it as he pleases. His naval fleet has surrounded Cuba and the US has fabricated a charge against Raúl Castro to pave the way for kidnappings, targeted assassinations or even an invasion. The tycoon needs to make up for his defeat in Iran. This means he could intensify the embargo and oil blockade through military action. The island is preparing for resistance. We must step up our solidarity initiatives here.

Marches are planned, supplies are being sent, and solidarity gestures are multiplying. But the FIT–U should demonstrate a more explicit and visible commitment by, for example, having Bregman visit Cuba, just like [Peronist left-wing leader Juan] Grabois did. This would have a major impact and constitute an important gesture regionally, following Nicolás Maduro's kidnapping.

What is your view on the situation in Venezuela?

To call it “worrying” would be an understatement. We all know that the government has a gun to its head after Maduro’s abduction. We assumed that [Acting President] Delcy [Rodríguez] was buying time, gathering strength and preparing to launch a counter-offensive. We interpreted the concessions to Trump as the heavy and unavoidable cost of such a strategy.

But several months on, the evidence is rapidly mounting that a different path has been taken. This includes a suspicious reorganising of the military command, the foreign ministry’s whitewashed statements on the war against Iran, the release of right-wing conspirators from prison, and the much-celebrated meetings with the empire’s emissaries.

While the head of the [US military] Southern Command talks with Delcy, there is total silence about the humiliating image Trump posted of Venezuela as the “51st state”. The final straw was the mock evacuation of the US Embassy, with Pentagon aircraft flying in the skies over Caracas. It is forgotten that the guest carrying out these operations holds Venezuela’s president hostage.

Furthermore, laws have been passed benefiting US companies in terms of appropriating oil profits. Oil profits are funnelled on a large-scale to the US Treasury, while the IMF resumes inspections.

Criticisms of all this mainly come from within Chavismo’s heart. Luis Britto García has called for transparency over Maduro’s abduction and demands explanations for the government’s appeasement of Trump. Former Vice-President Elías Jaua has insisted Venezuela is under occupation, with Washington planning a protectorate. Lastly, the handover of financier Alex Saab to US courts is completely unjustified. He kept foreign trade circuits open amid the empire’s sanctions. If he committed a crime, he should be tried in Caracas, not held in a prison cell near Maduro.

There are too many signs of a regressive shift to ignore. This should be discussed openly. Continuing to discuss whether there was a betrayal leads us nowhere. What matters is how we characterise this in political terms. Perhaps we could look at what happened after Sandinismo’s first electoral defeat as a precedent for Venezuela today.

Fortunately, we have encouraging developments in Bolivia…

Yes. The popular uprising is truly remarkable. Six months into the right-wing government’s term, there is a huge uprising against austerity, which again demonstrates the strong tradition of militancy in the Altiplano [Bolivia’s western highlands].

This rebellion has laid siege to La Paz, through radical methods of struggle such as roadblocks and mass demonstrations. Protesters demand the president resign for failing to fulfil his mandate and are acting with the force needed to bring the oppressors to their knees. The confrontation is ongoing; the government is using the military to crack down on the streets, issuing arrest warrants for leaders and deploying equipment supplied by Milei.

Remember that in recent decades, Bolivia has paved the way for regional cycles of struggle. At the turn of the century, Bolivia kicked off the wave of rebellions that then swept through Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina. A few years ago it spearheaded a second wave, which then saw rebellions in Ecuador, Chile, Colombia and Peru.

Today, Bolivians are once again taking the lead, against a backdrop of important resistance in Chile, just a few months before [far-right incoming president José Antonio] Kast takes office. The rebellion in Bolivia transcends borders, challenges Trump’s agenda and strikes a blow against his far-right henchmen. It is charting a path that the Argentine left has already adopted as its own.

  • 1

    Peronism has been the dominant political force in Argentine politics since the rise to power of President Juan Domingo Perón in 1946. Currently in opposition, it has also been the main ruling party since the end of the military dictatorship in 1983. As a broad political movement, it encompasses a wide spectrum of politicians (from right-wing to centre-left and progressive), including the previous centre-left administrations of Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-15).

The anti-capitalist left surge in Argentina and the letter that sparked a crucial debate

Tuesday 9 June 2026, by Eduardo Lucita, Israel Dutra


Against the backdrop of a Javier Milei government in crisis and Peronism’s [1] decline, polls are showing a surge in support for Myriam Bregman, a Workers’ Left Front – Unity (FIT-U) MP. With between 9–14% support and a strong social media presence, the FIT-U is emerging as an alternative for millions. However, historic difficulties that have plagued Argentina’s radical left have also re-emerged. Despite its combativeness, the radical left remains fragmented and, in some cases, very sectarian.

Israel Dutra interviewed veteran Argentine revolutionary Eduardo Lucita about Argentina’s emerging political landscape. Lucita is a Fourth International member and co-coordinator of Argentina’s Left-Wing Economists (EDI) collective. Lucita, along with other comrades, initiated a debate with an open letter addressed to the parties in the FIT-U, “The Left Faces a Major Challenge”. The letter has been circulating in Argentina for over a month and was recently followed by a second letter, also signed by well-known left-wing activists. [2]


As we believe it is important to raise awareness internationally about what is happening in Argentina, we interviewed Lucita, a signatory to both letters, on May 27. He discussed this process, provided an overview of the international situation and argued the case for building on the successful anti-fascist conference recently held in Porto Alegre in Brazil.

Your open letter addressed to the parties in the FIT-U has had a big impact within left-wing circles and beyond. Its impacts have even been felt here in Brazil. Could you give us an overview of the letter’s purpose and why it was published now?

I will focus on the letters’main points. To start, there is a broader context to bear in mind: the deepening social crisis and young people’s sense of a lack of future; the president’s declining popularity and strong rejection of his government’s actions; the serious difficulties Peronism has resolving its internal crisis; and the rise of the anti-capitalist left, embodied in the figure of Myriam Bregman. This general context seemed to us a turning point in the political situation, as well as both an opportunity and a challenge for the left.

So, the first objective was initiating a debate about this juncture, which I view as exceptional. Judging by the comments, criticisms and suggestions we have received, and that the Socialist Workers’ Party (PTS), Workers’ Socialist Movement (MST) and Socialist Left (IS) [all parties within the FIT-U] published the first letter on their websites, I think this first objective was achieved.

Beyond the analyses and characterisations, the letter also puts forward concrete proposals, such as creating “Committees of Struggle and Support for Myriam Bregman,” and establishing technical working groups to develop the left’s program with greater precision. We believe this would help consolidate its rise.

As for why now, the idea flowing through the text is that, for the first time in more than 40 years, the chance exists to mobilise sections of the masses to support a workers’ government and, within a broader perspective, raise the idea of contesting for real power. As we say, the committees could play an important role in this. It strikes me as an unprecedented situation that we must capitalise on.

Polls show surging support for Bregman, in terms of her image, approval and voting intentions. Did this surprise you?

Well, Bregman’s profile has been rising for several years. She is a left-wing activist with a long track record around human rights, and supporting trade union and social struggles. She is also a very powerful voice in the National Congress.

But I would be lying if I said that the surge in support for her over the past two months did not take me by surprise. She is the only political figure in the country with a positive approval rating and has an average voting intention of 10%. I am pleasantly surprised by all this.

What do you think explains this explosive rise in the polls? Is it her personal qualities, the policies she proposes, or rather the political and social situation being ripe for a figure as disruptive as Milei was in his day?

It is a combination of several factors. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the socio-economic situation carries significant weight. This is reflected in Milei’s falling approval ratings — now at their lowest point since he came to office [in 2023]— and, above all, by the 60% disapproval of his government’s performance.

The shift to the right within Peronism is also important. The party’s leaders have drifted a fair way from its historic base, which is fragmented, leaderless and disoriented. In a recent conversation with colleagues from some outer Buenos Aires suburbs, they said they had observed a shift in voting intentions within Peronism away from traditional figures towards Juan Grabois [who leads a progressive wing of Peronism closely linked to sectors of the Catholic Church], but now, for reasons unknown, Grabois’s rise had stalled and people were looking to vote for Bregman. I do not know if that is exactly the case, but such anecdotes are worth bearing in mind.

I believe her role as an uncompromising opposition figure who has never made deals with any government (just like the other FIT-U MPs) has been decisive. Her personality and charisma also carry weight. She is pleasant to deal with, always smiling, cultured and intelligent. She is also not afraid to speak out in parliamentary debates, to put her body on the line on the streets and to speak with the media, becoming the most sought-after figure these days.

I would also add that she has been a member of a Trotskyist party [the PTS] for 20 long years. You, as a full-time party activist, and I know full well the demands such parties entail. Bregman’s personality stems from her DNA, but I also believe it comes from being shaped and raised within that party.

The first open letter disagreed with statements by Bregman and Christian Castillo [another PTS leader and FIT-U MP] that the conditions do not exist for a left-wing government, nor for contesting power, as there is no powerful social movement or organs of dual power.

In my opinion, those statements were rather unfortunate. It is not that they are entirely wrong, but they failed to account for the context and came across as defensive, whereas we believe — and the letter makes this clear — that the conditions exist for a more active stance, putting forward proposals and seeking to overcome resistance.

Fortunately, our comrades have not repeated those statements. I think there was a process of reflection, and Bregman recently said in an interview: “Of course we want to be in government, of course we want to have the power to transform this situation at its roots.”

You also controversially characterised the current moment, saying that “an electoral breakthrough is more likely than an insurrectionary one”, before proposing “Committees of Struggle and Support for Myriam Bregman”. Is this not a sign of electoralism? How does this fit with the PTS’s proposal for a new workers’ party? And is the open letter not overly optimistic?

Well, in the face of so much resignation and despair that others want to impose on us, we have opted for the optimism of the will. But not in the abstract; rather, an optimism based on the shifting situation.

As for a workers’ party, I cannot answer definitively, as I am not clear what they are proposing. Speaking at the Ferro stadium on May 1, Bregman referred to a workers’ party, then to an instrument of the workers, then a party of the new working class, and finally a new historic movement. I suppose this proposal will be more defined in time and be discussed within the FIT-U, whose coordinating committee I understand is due to meet in the coming days.

As for electoralism, no one doubts that capital, led by Milei, is waging an offensive against working people’s living conditions, environmental protections and women’s rights, the LGBTQ+ community and various minorities in the country involved in multiple resistance movements.

But a common feature of these struggles — which all indications suggest will intensify — is that they are dispersed, fragmented and often influenced by identity politics, which hinders attempts to unify and centralise them. To make matters worse, leaders such as those of the CGT [General Confederation of Labour] favour negotiation over confrontation, or simply look the other way.

No one believes a social uprising is imminent, although the class struggle is obviously unpredictable. Otherwise, we would have all predicted the 2001 uprising [against neoliberal policies that forced the resignation of several presidents]. As I am older, I remember the 1959 conflict at the Lisandro de La Torre meat-processing plant, which culminated in a general strike organised via word of mouth. But it is a fact that the polls show electoral progress is far more likely to occur today than an uprising.

In the second letter, “Some reflections on the tasks ahead”, you place great emphasis on the committees, presented under the slogan “For a workers’ government: Myriam Bregman for president”.

Yes. The proposal for committees — which, it must be acknowledged, Bregman took up in her May 1 speech when she spoke of “organising support” — seeks not only to unite activists from parties in the FIT-U or other organisations and movements, but also intellectuals, artists and, above all, those leading the currently scattered and fragmented struggles. It aims to call for the broadest possible unity so that we can discuss together a minimum program to address the emergency we face and opens possibilities for profound transformations.

In recent days, the PTS launched its public call of “We need you.” We support this as a step forward, which invites people to organise around the idea of a workers’ government. It also raises the idea of a workers’ party and/or a new historic movement, but as I said, this requires more in-depth discussions.

Logically, these committees, convened by and rallying behind Bregman, should also be involved in election campaigning. The reality is that we will most likely enter a lull period now, due to the World Cup. But elections will be happen soon after it finishes. And they will be important, not only because many think things cannot go on as they are, but because within the ruling classes there is a sector already doubting that Milei will be re-elected, or if it is even in their interests if he is. So, there is no shortage of people wanting to drop him to save their project, and are already looking for a replacement.

So, for me, this is not electoralism. It is about seizing an unprecedented opportunity. But looking at the two open letters, you will see that they insist on not abandoning the struggles or the streets. The electoral arena is just another battlefield. As they used to say in the past, we must not ignore the battles on the terrain that the rulers dominate.

You also talk about shifting from defence to offence. I find this interesting, and not just for the Argentine left. Can you explain what this might look like?

It is clear that Bregman’s support and the shift in public sentiment that I have described — and it is not just me talking about this — will not automatically translate into organised support or votes. Achieving this political objective requires a sort of cultural shift on the left, here and around the world. It involves leaving behind a simply self-serving or self-referential politics and prioritising the general interests of the workers’ and popular movement. That is to say, less vanguardism and more mass politics to reach broad sectors hit hard by the crisis, including those who do not identify with anti-capitalism or socialism.

In our case, we need to reach out to the many groups and sectors within Peronism that are now directionless — without a project, program,or clear leadership — and who have repeatedly expressed their intention to vote for Bregman, to ask them to join the committees.

This leads us to the need for left unity, not simply because together we are more, but because it allows us to jointly think and act. This unity cannot simply be declared, it has to put aside fruitless arguments and create independent, democratic and autonomous committees as a common space for uniting the activist energy currently dispersed across multiple, often ineffective, spaces.

Making progress on this front requires a change in attitude among the members of the various parties in the FIT-U. If we manage this, we can leave behind the defensive position we have been stuck in for a long time, and go on the offensive. This would allow us to go beyond just resisting to envisioning ways to transform this intolerable reality, deal with the problem of power and forge the alliances needed to make this possible.

We have an unprecedented window of opportunity that also poses a major challenge for the left. This opportunity is not open-ended. We know politics abhors a vacuum. If the left does not occupy that space, others will. There is no time to lose.

I also have the international situation in mind. In that sense, how do you see what is happening in Argentina, but also in Bolivia, fitting into a world marked by geopolitical tensions, the rise of the right, and a figure like Donald Trump?

Well, Argentina is, to some extent, an exceptional case. We have a president who defines himself as an anarcho-capitalist and is at the ideological vanguard of the right’s global rise. As if that was not enough, he has also subordinated the country’s foreign policy to Trump’s US and Netanyahu’s Israel.

On the other hand, we have an anti-capitalist left, I believe, unlike any other in the world at the moment. It is spearheaded by an electoral alliance (the FIT-U) of four Trotskyist parties, which has existed for 15 years now, something equally unprecedented.

Bolivia is undergoing a severe political crisis fuelled by a workers’, indigenous and peasant uprising that has blocked the country’s main roads and cities. They demand the Rodrigo Paz government, elected just over six months ago, resign. If this happens — and we should not rule out that something similar could happen in my country, given the critical social situation — it would have a tremendous impact internationally.

Even defeating Milei in the 2027 presidential elections would be significant. It would concretely demonstrate that, whether through insurrection or the ballot box, the far right can be defeated. And if the anti-capitalist left plays a decisive role in these movements, it would serve as an example for the left internationally.

As for Trump, it is clear that he heads a decaying empire seeking to take refuge in the “Western bloc” and that, as it declines, has become more aggressive and predatory. This was demonstrated by the military invasion of Venezuela and kidnapping of its president, the threats and strangulation of Cuba, and his remarks about annexing Canada and Greenland.

Trump allowed Israel to drag him into the Middle East war, while letting Israel run rampant in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon. Trump became involved in the war without a clear entry or exit strategy. It is now clear that he will emerge weakened from this self-inflicted chaos. This could have consequences for the US November mid-term elections.

The flip side is the rise of China, now the main reference point on the global chessboard, as a Spanish political scientist put it. In just under a week, China’s president Xi Jinping received Trump and Vladimir Putin on state visits to Beijing and signed various trade and political agreements with both, granting neither anything of significance. He forced Trump to back down on arms sales to Taiwan and made clear to Putin that China is more important to Russia than Russia is to China.

We face a changing world order, and everything indicates that we are heading towards a division of spheres of influence. This may stabilise the situation for a while, but tensions will return, especially considering that global capitalism’s unresolved crisis underlies all this.

Finally, here in Porto Alegre, we held the 1st Anti-Fascist Conference for the Sovereignty of Peoples in March, with a significant delegation from Argentina. What were your thoughts on this event and how do you see it developing in the future?

I do not know if you are aware, but I collaborated with Eric Toussaint in organising the conference. I no longer travel, but from the reports I received and comments from various comrades, the conference was a success in terms of participation and the diversity of topics debated in the various panels and self-organised activities.

There is no doubt that this success stemmed from focusing on the common objective of an international convergence to confront far-right forces across the world, an objective shared by various parties and social movements in Brazil and internationally by organisations such as CADTM [Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt], the Fourth International, Jubilee South and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation.

A large delegation from my country took part, comprising members of anti-capitalist organisations and centre-left and/or progressive movements, as well as some prominent intellectuals.

I believe the conference must be followed up. This was also the view of the International Committee, which decided to organise two events, one in Mexico and another in Argentina. We will see when these can take place. The decision has been made and it is our duty to carry them out.

2 June 2026

Source: A version of this interview was first published in Spanish at Revista Movimento. Translation by Federico Fuentes for LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Footnotes

[1] Peronism has been the dominant political force in Argentine politics since the rise to power of President Juan Domingo Perón in 1946. Currently in opposition, it has also been the main ruling party since the end of the military dictatorship in 1983. As a broad political movement, it encompasses a wide spectrum of politicians (from right-wing to centre-left and progressive), including the previous centre-left administrations of Nestor Kirchner (2003-07) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-15).

[2] Among the signatories of these open letters are also Ariel Petruccelli, a renown intellectual; Juan Pablo Casiello, a well-known teachers’ union leader from Rosario, and Aldo Casas, a lifelong revolutionary socialist.