Showing posts sorted by date for query PAKISTAN. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query PAKISTAN. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, August 14, 2026

Pakistan's emerging DJ scene: The women behind the turntables

Cover image: Focus © France 24
Issued on: 11/08/2026 
05:25 min

Pakistan, a country known for its conservative values, rarely makes waves in the music and entertainment industry. Yet in major cities like Karachi and Lahore, a quiet but thriving DJ scene is beginning to make itself heard, with emerging talents and artists transforming the music industry. At the heart of this evolution, more and more women are asserting themselves in a field largely dominated by men.

Yet this culture remains largely limited to an urban elite, while the Pakistani electronic scene is still very informal – made up of one-off events, temporary collectives and underground raves, in a climate where the authorities seek to crack down on so-called immoral cultural productions.

FRANCE 24's Shahzaib Wahlah and Ondine de Gaulle report.


China’s Belt And Road Initiative: Key Economic Issues – Analysis



China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China in Red, the members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in orange. Credit: Lommes, Wikipedia Commons

August 14, 2026
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
By Karen M. Sutter and Michael D. Sutherland


Key Takeaways

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (originally One Belt, One Road), launched in 2013 and later elevated in Party documents, seeks to build PRC-centered global infrastructure, trade, technology and production networks through land, maritime, digital, green and polar corridors.

Financing and project delivery are dominated by state banks, funds and national-champion firms using often opaque, collateralized loans and integrated packages that expand Chinese standards, secure resources and create long-term economic and strategic dependencies, raising concerns about debt sustainability, lack of reciprocity and potential dual-use applications.

The United States and partners have responded with alternative financing tools (such as the DFC and EXIM programs), quality-infrastructure initiatives and greater scrutiny of Chinese deals, while Congress continues to debate further measures to monitor and counter BRI’s economic and geopolitical effects.


The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) in 2013 launched an ambitious and multifaceted foreign economic policy initiative—One Belt, One Road—to expand China’s global economic reach and influence. In 2015, China’s leaders changed the English name to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (while keeping the Chinese name),possibly to deflect attention from the initiative’s focus on developing China-controlled and -centered global ties in a hub-and-spoke format. The Communist Party of China (CPC) incorporated the initiative into its Charter in 2017. It reaffirmed the efforts’ significance at its 20th Party Congress in 2022 and in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic Development (2026-2030). Some in Congress assess that One Belt, One Road projects advance PRC economic and geopolitical goals while undercutting U.S. global influence and interests. In response, some Members have sought to develop alternative U.S. and multilateral financing programs.

Scope and Objectives

One Belt, One Road has evolved into a global effort that aims to develop PRC-centered and -controlled global production, trade, infrastructure, and transportation networks. It includes a land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” Sub-initiatives include a “Polar Silk Road” focused on Arctic shipping routes and a “Digital Silk Road” to promote PRC information and communications technology (ICT) exports and satellite networks. A “Green Silk Road” promotes PRC renewable energy products and services. Other efforts seek to promote health and science and technology (S&T) ties and the use of PRC technical standards among partner countries. The effort emphasizes policy coordination, trade and investment, dispute settlement, tourism, and student/personnel exchanges.


One Belt, One Road projects in energy, ICT, manufacturing, and transportation infrastructure look to vertically integrate PRC production supply chains, technology infrastructure, and transportation networks. The effort involves technology and financial integration that expands the use of China’s digital platforms and currency. It seeks to expand PRC firms’ presence overseas, create markets for China’s goods and services, and secure access to foreign sources of agriculture, energy, and strategic commodities, such as critical minerals. Projects also aim to develop China’s interior regions, employ PRC workers, and offload PRC excess industrial capacity.

At the One Belt, One Road forum in 2023, PRC leader Xi Jinping prioritized “high quality development”; intermodal and green infrastructure; digital trade zones; S&T cooperation; a “compliance evaluation system” to address corruption; and cooperation in energy, tax, finance, think tanks, media, and culture. In 2021, Xi presented at the United Nations (UN) a Global Development Initiative to complement One Belt, One Road with projects for poverty alleviation and food security and in areas to advance PRC firms globally in infrastructure, manufacturing, and digital technologies. See CRS In Focus IF13099, China Primer: China’s Global Development Initiative.

China’s Investment and Financing

China’s use of onshore financing and special-purpose vehicles for foreign investment complicates analysts’ ability to track PRC global economic activity. One Belt, One Road is an umbrella initiative, and projects may be specifically or loosely tied to the effort. As a result, many groups track PRC cross-border financing, investment, and overseas projects generally. China’s stock of global outward foreign direct investment (ODI)—investment made into a business or real asset in another country—stood at $3.6 trillion (7.8% of world total) in 2025, up from $34.7 billion (0.5% of world total) in 2001. In comparison, the United States accounted for $6.6 trillion, or 14.4%, of global ODI stock in 2025 (down from 32% in 2001), according to official country data compiled by the UN. PRC ODI flows have picked up since 2021 and were $174 billion in 2025, accounting for about 9% of global ODI flows. (U.S. ODI flows were $263 billion, or about 14% of global ODI flows in 2025.) Additionally, PRC cross-border contracts—a corporate structure used for overseas construction and infrastructure projects—have been stable and reached an all-time high of $289 billion in 2025. The PRC also operates cross-border projects in agriculture, energy, minerals, finance, technology, and shipping (Figure 1).

AidData, a research lab at the College of William & Mary, estimates that, as of 2023, China’s overseas lending portfolio was $2.1 trillion. (In comparison, the World Bank’s portfolio in 2025 was about $400 billion.) It assessed that even as One Belt, One Road focused on developing countries, since 2000, PRC lending has been shifting toward high-income countries (e.g., the United States) and financing for technology deals and the purchase of foreign firms in strategic sectors. AidData reports that, as of 2023, 24% of PRC lending was for low- and lower-middle-income countries, and that infrastructure accounted for about 20% of China’s overseas lending portfolio.

Figure 1. China’s ODI Flows and Overseas Contracts. Source: CRS, with data from China’s Ministry of Commerce.

PRC state banks (e.g., CHEXIM and CDB), firms, and funds (e.g., Silk Road Fund) undertake a large share of PRC overseas lending and investment. The PRC government often pays firms in China for projects they implement, while host governments pay the PRC government for the projects. Projects are neither assistance—PRC loans are typically not interest-free and issued at market terms—nor truly commercial, because repayments are often backed by collateral commitments (e.g., lease rights, minerals, or commodities) made to the PRC government, which in turn absorbs much of the commercial risk for PRC firms. Recipients of collateral may include state firms not party to the original transaction that are designated by the PRC government.

Role of China’s State Firms


PRC strategic investments are typically state-sponsored and aim to advance national economic and foreign policy goals. A handful of state firms operate most projects. These firms are funded by and report directly to the central government, and include China Harbor, CRRC, State Grid, China Three Gorges, and COSCO. China’s projects strategically position national champions—such as Huawei, ZTE, and Alibaba—by creating technology infrastructure and systems built to PRC standards. Alibaba’s internet project in Malaysia, for example, provides a foundation for PRC data/cloud, e-commerce, and financial services. Projects may offer the PRC visibility and touchpoints into sensitive infrastructure and services via interconnection and interoperability in communications, energy, and transportation. Projects in critical minerals support PRC industrial policies.
U.S. Concerns

Some observers note the economic benefits of China’s investments in developing countries while others argue that China is introducing unsustainable debt obligations and opportunities to gain economic concessions and influence. China tends to extend the duration of its loans, rather than forgive debt repayment, which can create long-term financial dependencies. For example, in 2017, when the Sri Lankan government was unable to repay PRC loans, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd. acquired a majority stake in the firm that operates Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port and the right to operate the port for 99 years. Credit and loan terms are generally opaque and China tends to settle agreements bilaterally. China’s opacity in lending came to a head in 2019 when U.S. officials questioned whether International Monetary Fund relief for Pakistan might also be used to repay Pakistan’s debts to China.


The PRC government insists that most PRC state banks and state firms are not subject to sovereign lending terms adopted by the United States and other major creditors in the Paris Club. PRC loans often forbid multilateral debt restructuring (e.g., under Paris Club auspices). China joined two G20 debt relief initiatives that accept Paris Club disciplines, but these apply only to CHEXIM and the China International Development Cooperation Agency. The PRC claims it has provided more deferments under G20 schemes than Paris Club members, but many countries indebted to China do not appear to qualify or have not applied—likely due to PRC pressure—for G20 debt relief. Some experts say One Belt, One Road undermines the role and principles of multilateral financial institutions, which work with China on projects, and argue China should not have a leadership role in these institutions. Such collaboration may set better terms for host countries while also advancing PRC goals.

PRC entities are expanding overseas in sectors that the PRC restricts to foreign investors in China (e.g., construction, transportation, finance, and communications). The PRC does not offer reciprocal market access for the rights it secures in other countries, challenging a core trade tenet and advantaging PRC firms over their competitors. It has opened foreign markets with “deal-ready” financing and integrated project delivery.

PRC investments in strategic sectors and infrastructure have prompted some governments to increase scrutiny of these deals. Some analysts assess that certain PRC projects have military uses. Under its military-civil fusion program and China Standards 2035 initiative, China is developing standards that promote civilian-military interoperability, including in various technologies and infrastructure (e.g., ports). Commercial land deals may facilitate a military presence. China Merchants Bank, for example, signed the lease for property in Djibouti on which China developed a military base. Sam Enterprise Group, a firm reportedly tied to China’s military, bought land in Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. PRC projects offer alternatives to U.S.-led networks and standards. PRC-built BeiDou satellite and rail networks offer substitutes to U.S.-controlled GPS navigation technology and sea lanes where the U.S. military operates. PRC digital platforms support use of the PRC’s digital currency.

U.S. Government Response

PRC overseas financing practices are prompting the United States with its allies and partners to adjust approaches to global financing to compete with China. Congress enacted the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act; P.L. 115-254) to create the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and increase support for quality market-oriented and financially sustainable projects with environmental and social safeguards. The DFC has sought to compete with PRC consortia on projects and in markets in which the PRC has a major presence. In 2019, Congress created a China and Transformational Exports Program at the Export-Import Bank of the United States with new financing tools and flexibilities to counter PRC financing. The G-7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and Blue Dot Network seek to promote quality infrastructure financing. In 2020, the U.S. government sanctioned PRC state firms that built One Belt, One Road military infrastructure in the South China Sea.


The 119th Congress is debating the effects of dismantling the U.S. Agency for International Development on competition with the PRC. S. 1011 would require the State Department to monitor and counter PRC projects. H.R. 9093 would require a report on the PRC’s use of One Belt, One Road to undermine the U.S.-led global order, and a strategy to counter it. Congress may examinethe PRC government’s role in directing and financing investments in the United States and acquisition of U.S. firms in strategic sectors, and U.S. policy on such investments;

PRC entities’ presence in U.S. production, energy, transportation, and communications networks and investments in the Western Hemisphere; and
whether to allow U.S. development or export financing for global projects that use PRC components or services.

About the authors:
Karen M. Sutter, Specialist in Asian Trade and Finance
Michael D. Sutherland, Analyst in International Trade and Finance

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).


About CRS
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
View all posts by CRS →
A New Axis In Middle East: Reading The New Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Defence Pact – Analysis


Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meet during the signing of the trilateral defense agreement in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 7. MURAT CETINMUHURDAR/TURKEY'S PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE




Key Takeaways

On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, establishing that an attack on any one signatory would be treated as an attack on all and committing the three countries to deeper defence cooperation, interoperability and collective responses decided by consensus.

For Pakistan the pact extends its earlier bilateral mutual-defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia, reinforces long-standing military ties with both Riyadh and Ankara, and elevates Islamabad’s role as a security partner and
 mediator amid doubts about the reliability of the U.S. security umbrella in West Asia.

The agreement is presented as defensive and open to potential new members, yet it reflects a broader regional search for alternative security frameworks; India is watching closely given its strained relations with Türkiye and concerns over Pakistan’s growing integration into West Asian security architectures.

On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye signed the ‘Mecca Joint Defense Agreement’, also referred to as the Mecca Defence Accord, at the Makkah Al-Mukarrama summit in Saudi Arabia. The pact aims to build collective deterrence and enhance regional stability, while further consolidating defence cooperation among the three countries. Coming against the backdrop of the war between the United States and Iran and its regional fallout, the timing of the signing is widely read as a response by these states to the faltering US security umbrella in West Asia — even as all three signatories have stressed that talks on the pact had been under way for some time.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, described the agreement as an ‘extension’ of the ‘Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement’ signed with Saudi Arabia on 17 September 2025, which also included a collective security clause. The agreement’s significance for Pakistan is thus twofold: it positions the country as a beneficiary of the shifting regional order, embedding Islamabad further within the West Asian security architecture, while also giving it room to elevate its external standing.

The Contours of the Agreement

The agreement lays out two specific objectives. First, in what is seen as an echo of NATO’s Article 5 clause, the trilateral agreement calls for an attack on any one of the three signatories to be treated as an attack on all of them, inviting a collective response in line with the principles of collective deterrence set out in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The important aspect here is not the clause for collective security — which was also a key element of the 2025 pact between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan — but the subsequent response, based on discussion and consensus among all the signatories. The type of support offered would thus vary depending on the needs of the aggrieved partner, as the pact provides for general commitments rather than fixed obligations. This support could take the form of a military response, logistical support, intelligence sharing, or the provision of arms and ammunition.

Second is the pursuit of increased defence cooperation among the three countries, building on the long-standing defence partnership among them. The defence pact with Saudi Arabia has already solidified Islamabad’s partnership with the kingdom. Pakistan’s deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia, and its training of Saudi troops and personnel, has continued since the 1980s. In April, it deployed close to 8,000 troops, fighter jets and air defence systems to the Abdulaziz Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has also been a major source of aid and assistance to Pakistan: in April 2026, it rolled over a US$3 billion deposit to the country, and in July 2026, it extended a separate US$5 billion facility for another three years.


Pakistan also enjoys a strong defence partnership with Ankara, which was Islamabad’s third-largest arms supplier between 2020 and 2024, providing Bayraktar TB-2 drones and aircraft electro-optical sensors, while also looking to expand the relationship through joint production of Turkey’s fifth-generation KAAN fighter jet programme. Pakistan also used Turkish drones during hostilities with India last year.

The agreement is also seen as creating new opportunities to improve integration between the armed forces of the three countries, with a focus on military interoperability, joint training, threat assessment, and the synergising of weapons and communications systems.

Following the signing, all three countries issued additional statements clarifying the pact’s terms and scope, with the emphasis falling on its defensive nature and the assurance that no country was being targeted. Saudi Arabia further clarified that the pact had no nuclear dimension, nor was it aimed at starting an arms race in the region. This addressed lingering echoes of the controversy that had followed the earlier defence pact with Riyadh, when a statement by Pakistan’s Defence Minister, Khawaja Asif, on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being made available to the kingdom, prompted Saudi officials to clarify that the agreement was purely a comprehensive military one. Pakistan’s status as a nuclear-armed state, however, continues to invite such assumptions. While Pakistan describes the new pact as an extension of the Saudi agreement, all three countries have stressed that it does not override any pre-existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements they hold with each other or with others.

Membership, too, was framed as flexible: Türkiye signalled the possible inclusion of Egypt, while Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ishaq Dar, clarified that any country aligning with the pact’s ‘fundamental principles’ could join. Though this leaves the actual criteria for admitting new members vague, it serves a clear purpose — to counter concerns that the pact might replace the US security umbrella with an alternative, or that the grouping is a closed one with no room for others.

While the modalities of how the pact would take shape have remained out of public view, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan highlighted that its institutionalisation will be through the establishment of a political and military committee, which would include representation from the foreign and defence ministries of all signatories as well as their chiefs of staff.


Pakistan’s Balancing Act

Consistent with the fanfare that typically accompanies Pakistan’s signing of international agreements, both the symbolism of this pact and the context in which it took shape are seen to have given fresh momentum to Pakistan’s external standing. During the visit, Prime Minister Sharif was accompanied by Chief of Defence Forces Field Marshal Asim Munir, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Defence Minister Khawaja Asif. In its statement celebrating the agreement, the civilian government credited the CDF’s role in bringing it to fruition, alongside the coordinated decision-making that led to its signing. Islamabad’s inclusion was also seen as a testament to its defence capabilities, with FM Dar reiterating that it aligns with the country’s foreign policy.

This foreign policy has played out in myriad ways over the past year. Following the crisis with India, and the military’s consolidation of control over the civilian government, Pakistan has leaned on the post-crisis victory narrative — raising its expectations of how it wants to be perceived in the world. Even as the country continues to grapple internally with acute security and economic challenges, with political stability also under scrutiny, both the warm reception given by US President Donald Trump to Munir and the subsequent thaw in bilateral ties appear aimed at seeking legitimacy.

Since 28 February, when the war between Iran and the United States broke out, Pakistan has assumed the role of mediator, positioning itself as a stabiliser and security provider. Its inclusion in the Trump administration’s Board of Peace (BoP) for Gaza in January 2026, and its subsequent hosting of talks in April between Tehran and Washington, are both seen as examples of its growing mediatory role. It is also one of thirteen countries that are part of the Saudi-proposed multinational maritime defence coalition to protect shipping and energy routes in the Red Sea. While the US-Pakistan relationship has seen its regular ups and downs since Pakistan’s founding, it was the signing of the defence pact with Saudi Arabia that reignited conversations about Pakistan’s strategic importance to the region.

The Gulf countries’ growing exasperation with Washington’s inability to protect their interests in the region, coupled with the closely coordinated US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, has dented their confidence in American security guarantees. While this is also the gradual culmination of grievances accumulated over the last few decades, the most recent crises to have upended the region have made the search for alternative safety valves far more urgent. It is in this context that Pakistan’s importance to the region’s countries comes into sharper focus.

If the Saudi-Pakistan pact offers any insight into how this new agreement will pan out, it has more to do with institutionalising what already existed and signalling intent, rather than creating something entirely new. The coming together of these countries reflects a reshaping of the region’s security architecture, with countries exploring ways to supplement US security support with alternative frameworks that give them greater agency over outcomes. While officials downplayed the pact as a response to the US-Iran war, the fallout of the war — particularly its toll on the interests and assets of Washington’s Gulf partners — nonetheless accelerated its signing.

New Delhi is closely watching these developments, mindful of its national interests. While ties between New Delhi and Riyadh remain strong, its bilateral relationship with Ankara has deteriorated. The latest round of hostilities between India and Pakistan in May 2025, coupled with the Pakistani military’s increasing hold over the country’s security and foreign policy, shows that India will need to stay attentive to developments in its western neighbourhood. In that context, Pakistan’s growing inclusion in West Asia’s regional architectures will be a cause for concern for India.

About the author: Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


About Observer Research Foundation
ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.
View all posts by Observer Research Foundation →

Thursday, August 13, 2026

 

Traumatic brain injury in Pakistan linked to poor long-term survival





Weill Cornell Medicine
Dr. Junaid Razzak 

image: 

Dr. Junaid Razzak

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Credit: Weill Cornell Medicine






Traumatic brain injury (TBI) in Pakistan is associated with a high risk of death and disability long after the initial injury, even in mild to moderate cases, according to two new studies in JAMA Network Open led by Weill Cornell Medicine researchers. While most TBIs occur in low- and middle-income countries due to road traffic accidents, long-term patient outcomes remain poorly understood.

To shed light on this critical issue, the researchers analyzed data from a trauma registry of all injured patients from two care centers in Karachi, Pakistan, from December 2021 to May 2024. The studies followed patients for a year after injury, providing one of the most detailed pictures to date of what happens after TBI in a resource-limited setting.

The first study, published Aug. 11, focused on patients with severe to moderate TBI. A second paper, published Aug. 13, looked at outcomes of mild traumatic brain injuries. Together, the studies found that the consequences of brain injury depend on more than severity at admission and many patients remain vulnerable after leaving the hospital.

“We found that TBIs are responsible for a high number of trauma-related deaths in Pakistan, even with more mild to moderate injuries, which we were not expecting,” said senior author Dr. Junaid Razzak, professor of emergency medicine at Weill Cornell and an emergency medicine physician at NewYork-Presbyterian/Weill Cornell Medical Center. “Patients are falling through gaps in the trauma care system before, during and especially after hospitalization.”

The study suggests that many deaths and disabilities could potentially be prevented in Pakistan and similar low- and middle-income countries with stronger trauma systems, including faster access to appropriate care, structured post-discharge monitoring and expanded rehabilitation services.

Focusing on the First Month After Discharge

Clinicians use the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), a 15-point measure of eye, verbal and motor responses to gauge how alert patients are after a head injury. Severe TBI, a score of 3 to 8, means people cannot follow commands or respond to pain and may have trouble with their airway. Moderate TBI, a score of 9 to 12, means patients may be confused but can still respond to simple commands.

The first study focused on 819 registry patients diagnosed with moderate (45%) to severe (55%) TBI based on the GCS. As expected, patients with severe injuries faced the greatest risk of death and disability. However, researchers were surprised by the poor outcomes among patients with moderate injuries, who would typically be expected to have a better chance of recovery.

Many deaths occurred during the first month after discharge, suggesting that patients remain vulnerable during the transition from hospital care to life at home. At 12 months, mortality reached nearly 60% in patients with moderate TBI and almost 88% among those with severe injury. In comparison, a previous study in high-income countries found respective mortality rates of 9% and 30%.

For both studies, the researchers found that older age, no surgical intervention and greater injury severity were associated with a higher risk of death.

Telehealth and regular remote follow-up may be a practical way to monitor recovery and identify complications early, proposed the authors.

Reconsidering How "Mild" TBI Is Defined

The second study assessed 602 registry patients with mild TBI, defined as a GCS of 13 to 15. These patients tend to be awake and can follow commands but may experience brief confusion or memory loss.

The researchers found that not all mild TBIs had the same prognosis. Some patients at the lower end of the GCS mild range experienced substantially worse outcomes, including higher mortality and poorer quality of life during recovery, than those who scored 15. Potentially, some injuries classified and treated as mild may have actually been more serious, said the authors. In addition, premature hospital discharge may have contributed to this finding, as patients stayed approximately two days.

Overall, the 12-month mortality rate was 14% for all groups in the second study, which is relatively high, compared to higher-income countries in the published literature.

“My hunch is that even people with mild disabilities, who are already living at the edge of poverty, fall below the poverty line when they can't work or perform basic tasks,” Dr. Razzak said. “Then their access to basic healthcare and ability to take care of themselves drops significantly.”

Future Research

“A broken 'chain of survival’ exists, in which bystanders don't know how to respond to an accident, ambulance drivers don't know which hospitals have open beds and emergency room healthcare providers race against the clock,” Dr. Razzak said. “Treatment in the first 48 hours is critical for better outcomes.”

Dr. Razzak plans to research how trauma care systems can be designed and better equipped to get patients to the right facilities. “By making this issue more visible to the government, we hope these gaps can be fixed, saving a significant number of lives," he said.

 

This research was funded by the Fogarty International Centre of the National 3 Institutes of Health under award No. D43TW007292—The Aga Khan University Trauma and 4 Injury Research Training Program; this funding solely supported data collection.

 

IMO and Pakistan Denounce Deadly Attack as Houthis Threaten Saudi Assets

cargo ship on fire
Cargo ship on fire after the attach with at least two missiles (Colonel Waddah Al-Dobish)

Published Aug 12, 2026 1:32 PM by The Maritime Executive



A political controversy is swirling after the attack on a small deck cargo ship that killed at least six people and injured as many as 10 others from the crew and the Yemen Coast Guard. The IMO, the government of Yemen, and Pakistan each issued statements condemning the attack while the Houthis took credit and said they would continue to strike assets linked to Saudi Arabia.

In the latest incident in the long-running civil war, both sides traded accusations and threats after the attack. The Houthis said their armed forces “will continue their operations targeting all Saudi mobilizations.” At the same time, Colonel Waddah Al-Dobish, the spokesperson for the Yemeni Joint Forces, lashed out, saying the government forces could target two ferries the Houthis operate between the mainland port of Salif and the near-shore island of Kamaran. He said they were refraining despite the use of transporting military supplies to the island, because the vessels also are involved in the movement of citizens and their daily needs.

 

(Houthi propaganda video posted on social media)

 

The reported circumstances of Monday’s attack vary between the two sides. The Houthis claim the vessel was used to transport Saudi military equipment and was in the Bab al-Mandab when it was struck. The government says the vessel was at anchor in the port of Mocha for engine repairs and maintenance. The pictures show the vessel at a dock with no signs of any military equipment onboard.

“The ferry Tihama is a civilian ferry affiliated with a private company, officially licensed to operate maritime transport, and is used to ferry passengers and civilians between Aden, Djibouti, Somalia, and Socotra on round-trip routes,” wrote Al-Dobish on social media. “It has previously participated in rescue operations and the transport of civilian supplies, including provisioning Socotra Island with gas. One of the Arab news channels had previously filmed it and covered its entry into Socotra.”

 

Damage pictures posted by Colonel Waddah Al-Dobish

 

He asserts the vessel was struck by a missile that started a fire, which the photos show destroyed the bridge and small deckhouse. There was a crew of 11 aboard. Three, two from Pakistan and one from Indonesia, died in the initial attack. The Yemen Coast Guard went to the vessel’s aid, and then it was struck by a second missile. A third crewmember was killed, and two from the Coast Guard were also killed. At least seven others were injured during the evacuation, with two hospitalized and the other five reporting minor injuries.

The Coast Guard says it later intercepted an explosive-laden drone that approached the vessel about three hours after the initial attack.

The Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), Arsenio Dominguez, issued a statement calling the incident “particularly troublesome” as it was yet another one in the Red Sea / Gulf of Aden area.

“These continued attacks on shipping only serve to escalate tensions and threaten global supply chains on which everyone depends,” said Dominguez. “I reiterate my call for shipowners and ship operators to?thoroughly?assess risks?before?transiting this and other regions and follow appropriate best management practices.?Seafarers?deserve to be protected and allowed to do their jobs in safety and security.”

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister also condemned the Houthi attack, saying such attacks “constitute a violation of international law.” So far, there has been no comment from the Saudi or Indonesian governments. The ship was registered in Tanzania, and reports say it is owned by a company in Egypt.

The Houthis announced their blockade against Saudi Arabia on July 20 as possible negotiations in Yemen have dragged on. Saudi Arabia backs the current legally recognized government. In addition to claiming attacks on several Saudi tankers in the Red Sea, the Houthis on Sunday and Monday launched a series of attacks on the port of Mocha. They also claimed to have attacked a Saudi encampment and a regional Saudi airport just over the border with Yemen.

Saudi Arabia reported that it would be convening a second planning session today, August 12, for its new multinational coalition to protect shipping interests. The reports said the two-day meeting would finalize the institutional framework of the new 14-nation effort, and the Saudis expect other nations to join their new Gulf of Aden security initiative.

Wednesday, August 12, 2026

 

How women-led businesses manage to survive and thrive in Afghanistan

12.08.2026, DPA

Photo: Fardina Akbari/dpa

Women's rights have been suppressed in Afghanistan ever since the Taliban seized power five years ago. But a few women-led enterprises are flourishing, offering some hope in an otherwise bleak economic climate.

By Mathis Richtmann, dpa

Ruqia Rezai slowly peels reddish bars of soap from a silicone mould and stacks them on top of one another.

Her little workshop in western Afghanistan is in full swing, filling the air with the scent of fresh herbs, saffron and turmeric.

Rezai, 21, set up her small business four years ago, one year after the Taliban managed to seize power again, plunging the impoverished country into a spiralling humanitarian crisis.

Women's lives and freedom of movement are extremly restricted under the new Islamist regime, but many refuse to give up hope - and some are managing to make their own living, against all odds.

Rezai was forced to finish her schooling as quickly as possible when the Taliban took over on August 15, 2021. Their clampdown on women's rights meant she had no chance of attending university.

Then her father lost his business, leaving the family fighting for survival.

Today, Rezai's workshop in Herat employs eight people, sometimes more when orders are up.

The work is helping Rezai and also her sisters, who are involved too, to overcome difficult times, she says.

"Overall, this work has improved the mental health of our whole family."

Education severely restricted for girls

The humanitarian situation in Afghanistan has worsened considerably since the Taliban took over five years ago.

The economy collapsed and the country was excluded from the international financial system, while foreign aid payments have been cut.

That has led to hunger and despair. At least 3.7 million young children in Afghanistan are considered to be acutely malnourished. And almost 40% of the population may be acutely affected by food insecurity in the coming winter months.

Meanwhile 2.4 million girls are currently excluded from secondary schooling as a result of a Taliban ban, UNESCO said recently.

Under the Taliban, access to education - and public life in general - has been severely restricted for women and girls. They are not allowed to attend secondary school or university, and have been largely excluded from the workforce.

The Taliban takeover triggered a major exodus, but some 3.9 million people have since returned to Afghanistan from neighbouring Iran and Pakistan. Many were forced to, according to the UN refugee agency.

In a development update published in May, the World Bank noted that such return migration is putting further pressure on the Afghan economy.

"While returnees support demand and economic activity, their numbers are growing faster than the economy's capacity to absorb them. This
places pressure on jobs, public services, and prices, reinforcing poverty and fragility," the World Bank says.

While the economy grew last year, "rapid population growth has
outpaced economic expansion, leading to falling incomes per person."

Ongoing conflict with Pakistan is also hampering economic development. Following mutual attacks, Islamabad closed border crossings to the movement of goods, leaving Afghan farmers unable to export melons and nuts, while imports via Pakistan are also no longer possible.

Life under the Taliban

The situation is worst of all for Afghan women, who are no longer allowed to work in offices, need a male relative to accompany them in public and are forced to submit to strict Islamic dress codes.

Those rules are not enforced equally across all provinces, as Ghuncha Gul Karimi has seen for herself.

The 39-year-old beekeeper has been dressing up as a man every day since the Taliban takeover to ride 15 kilometres on her motorbike to attend to her beehives on the outskirts of Herat.

Once, the Taliban detained her due to her disguise. During the interrogation, she was asked whether she wasn't afraid of the new government.

"Instead of selling my body, I've decided to wear men's clothes, ride my motorbike, go to work, earn an honest living and put food on the table for my family," Karimi replied. She was released.

Karimi started beekeeping 18 years ago. Today, she runs 120 hives and trains both men and women in the craft.

This doesn't only allow her to cover all her family's expenses, but she was even able to pay for an eye operation her son needed.

"Today, I'm proud to say that by selling honey, I can help my children achieve their dreams," Karimi says.

Latif Nazari, deputy economy minister, told dpa that his ministry was supportive of female-led businesses as long as they stick to Islamic norms.

Women are employed in small and medium-sized enterprises and, "where necessary," in places such as airports, banks or the security sector, he says.

Afghanistan aims to achieve sustainable economic growth, and women are contributing to this while respecting national values, Nazari adds.

In reality, however, experts have noted that women are rarely granted work permits for employment.

Female-led businesses outperforming male counterparts

The private sector is currently driving the nation's fragile economic growth, according to the World Bank analysis.

"Notably, women-managed firms outperformed their male-managed
counterparts on several key indicators, despite operating under considerably tighter social and economic constraints," the World Bank says.

The bank found that female-led businesses saw significantly higher real annual sales growth, while they also recorded better employment expansion.

"Future private sector growth will depend critically on policies that
remove the financing, mobility, and regulatory barriers that prevent women-managed firms from translating demonstrated dynamism into sustained, scalable expansion."

But for some, it is not just the many restrictions that weigh on business, but a lack of capital.

Rezai would love to expand her soap workshop, she says. Business is going well thanks to marketing on social media.

Last year, she received a large order from Tajikistan, marking the first request to export abroad. But Rezai was forced to turn it down, unable to expand production capacity beyond the 12-square kitchen fast enough.

Restrictions have been tightened even further by the Taliban since this year, Rezai says. But she refuses to back down.

"People shouldn’t wait for someone to come and rescue them. They won’t come. People can only save themselves."

CPEC And Balochistan: A Corridor Of Opportunity Or Missed Promises? – OpEd


Approximate routes for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This map is for illustrative purposes only. Credit: RFE/RL


Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest and most resource-rich province, with critical strategic value as the centrepiece of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) via Gwadar, yet it remains one of the country’s least developed regions with deep local grievances over representation, resource benefits, employment and infrastructure.

Nearly a decade after CPEC’s launch, the corridor has largely failed to deliver the promised transformation: industrialisation and job creation lag far behind projections, infrastructure often bypasses local communities, and security threats—including attacks on Chinese personnel—continue to undermine progress.

Long-term success requires shifting from an infrastructure- and security-first model to people-centred development that generates tangible local benefits, addresses legitimate political grievances through constitutional channels while confronting militancy, and ensures Balochistan becomes a principal beneficiary rather than merely a transit corridor.


Balochistan occupies a paradoxical position in Pakistan. It is the country’s largest province by area, possesses enormous reserves of natural gas, copper, gold, coal and other minerals, and commands a coastline of extraordinary strategic importance. Yet it remains one of Pakistan’s least developed regions, with persistent grievances over political representation, resource distribution, employment, infrastructure and the benefits accruing to local communities.

The province also lies at the heart of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Pakistan. The $62bn CPEC, formally launched in 2015 was to be a “Game Changer” for Pakistan’s economy. Conceived as a transformational economic corridor, CPEC was expected to connect China’s Xinjiang region with Gwadar on the Arabian Sea through roads, railways, energy infrastructure and industrial development. For Pakistan, it was projected as an opportunity to transform connectivity, energy supply, employment and industrial growth. For China, it offered a shorter overland connection to the Arabian Sea and an important strategic and commercial link with South Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia.

Almost a decade after its formal launch, however, the central question remains: Has CPEC delivered the transformation promised to Balochistan and Pakistan?

Balochistan: A Province at the Centre of a Grand Strategy

Gwadar is the geographical and strategic centrepiece of CPEC. Its location gives Pakistan an important Arabian Sea port and gives China the possibility of developing an alternative route for trade and energy supplies. The overland connection between western China and Gwadar was envisaged as a means of reducing the distance involved in transporting energy supplies from the Gulf and, strategically, of mitigating China’s long-standing concerns over its dependence on vulnerable maritime routes such as the Malacca Strait.

But the strategic importance of Gwadar has not automatically translated into prosperity for the people living around it.For many residents, the most striking feature of CPEC has been the gap between the scale of the promises and the realities of everyday life. Roads, ports, power projects and security installations may demonstrate state activity, but development is ultimately measured by whether ordinary citizens have better schools, functioning hospitals, reliable water and electricity, employment, business opportunities and meaningful participation in the economic activity taking place around them.

CPEC Complicated

The original vision included Special Economic Zones intended to attract investment, establish industries and generate employment. Yet the industrialisation promised under the first phase has progressed far more slowly than initially anticipated. Employment creation has also fallen substantially short of the extraordinarily high projections made at the beginning of the programme. For Balochistan, this matters enormously.

A province sitting on mineral wealth and strategic infrastructure can reasonably ask why large-scale investment in its territory does not produce proportionate opportunities for its population.


Gwadar: A Symbol of Disappointment?

Gwadar was supposed to become a major commercial centre. Instead, the city continues to face fundamental developmental challenges. The criticism frequently heard from local residents and observers is not necessarily that infrastructure should not be built, but that development should not occur around the population while bypassing it.

A port cannot become an economic engine simply because ships can dock there. It requires an ecosystem of businesses, logistics, manufacturing, services, skilled workers, entrepreneurs and local supply chains. If local traders, fishermen, small businesses and young people do not see tangible opportunities, the perception that development is being imposed rather than shared inevitably grows.


This is particularly important in Balochistan, where historical mistrust of Islamabad is already deep. CPEC therefore faces a problem that cannot be solved merely by building more roads or deploying more security personnel.The economic corridor must also become a corridor of opportunity for the people whose province hosts it.


Security and Economics

The security environment has further complicated the CPEC equation. Chinese citizens and companies working on infrastructure projects have repeatedly been targeted by militant organisations in Pakistan. Baloch separatist groups have specifically attacked Chinese personnel and projects, arguing that Chinese investment represents exploitation of Balochistan’s resources and insufficient benefit to its inhabitants.

The large-scale attacks in Balochistan in August 2024 demonstrated the continuing capacity of militant groups to strike security installations, transport infrastructure and civilian targets. Such violence inevitably reinforces Beijing’s concerns about the security of its citizens and investments.

Balochistan’s legitimate Political Grievances

At the same time, Balochistan’s legitimate political grievances should be distinguished from militant violence.Democratic political actors must have space to articulate concerns over land, employment, resource distribution, missing persons, provincial autonomy and development. At the same time, armed attacks on civilians, security personnel, infrastructure or foreign workers cannot be legitimised as political expression.

A mature policy must be capable of doing both things simultaneously: confronting terrorism while addressing legitimate grievances through political and constitutional means.


Rich in Resources, Poor in Returns

Perhaps the central contradiction of Balochistan is that its natural wealth has not translated into comparable human development. The province possesses major mineral and energy resources, yet many communities continue to struggle with basic services.This creates an uncomfortable question for Pakistan:

If Balochistan is so strategically and economically valuable, why has its population not experienced a corresponding transformation in living standards?


The answer cannot simply be that the province is remote or insecure. Those difficulties are real, but they also underline the need for a development model specifically designed around local participation.

Resource extraction without local value addition can deepen resentment. Large projects that employ outside labour while leaving local workers on the margins can create perceptions of exclusion. Infrastructure that connects mines and ports but does not adequately connect communities to markets, schools and hospitals can appear to serve the project rather than the people.CPEC therefore has to move beyond the concept of infrastructure first towards people-centred development.


China’s Patience and Pakistan’s Responsibility

Beijing also has legitimate concerns. China has invested heavily in Pakistan, but Chinese companies require security, predictable regulations, commercially viable projects and continuity of policy. Repeated attacks on Chinese personnel naturally increase the cost and risk of investment.

China’s reassessment of overseas infrastructure investment should therefore not automatically be interpreted as China abandoning Pakistan. Rather, it reflects a broader reality: major investments must eventually produce economic returns. Pakistan cannot expect China to finance projects indefinitely simply because the two countries describe themselves as “All-weather Friends,higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel.”

The responsibility ultimately lies with Pakistan to create conditions in which Chinese investment—and investment from any other country—can succeed.That means improving governance, reducing bureaucratic bottlenecks, ensuring policy continuity, strengthening provincial participation, protecting investors and workers, and creating transparent mechanisms through which local communities can see how they benefit from projects undertaken in their region.


CPEC as a Corridor of Success

The original promise of CPEC was much larger than a collection of roads, power plants and a port. It was supposed to become an economic ecosystem linking Pakistan with China and, eventually, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its second phase envisages industrial cooperation, agriculture, technology, connectivity and other forms of economic integration.

But for this vision to succeed, Balochistan cannot remain merely the geographical location of the corridor. It must become one of its principal beneficiaries.

The success of CPEC should therefore not be measured merely by kilometres of highways constructed, megawatts of electricity generated or billions of dollars committed but should generate local recruitment, vocational education, scholarships, healthcare, water supply, fisheries development, support for local traders, opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises, and greater participation of provincial institutions in planning and implementing projects.


Mining and mineral development should similarly create local processing, skilled employment and downstream industries rather than simply extracting resources and transporting them elsewhere.

If CPEC generates economic activity but Balochistan remains poor, the project will struggle to convince its most important local audience of its value.

Pakistan’s Prism of Terrorism

Balochistan should not be viewed solely through the prism of terrorism. Nor should its legitimate developmental and political grievances be dismissed because militant groups exploit them. Both realities can exist simultaneously.

There is a security problem in Balochistan. There is also a governance and development problem. There are militant organisations seeking to exploit instability, but there are also ordinary citizens seeking education, employment, dignity and a greater stake in their province’s future.

Pakistan must therefore pursue both security and development. It must confront violent networks while strengthening democratic institutions, improving governance and ensuring that the province’s natural wealth generates visible benefits for its people.

China, too, has an interest in this outcome. A secure Gwadar cannot be created by security checkpoints alone. A successful CPEC cannot be sustained by infrastructure alone. And long-term Chinese investment cannot flourish without the confidence of the communities in which those investments operate.

Balochistan is too important to Pakistan as a transit route, its resources, coastline and strategic location give it enormous potential.

Potential but No Development

Balochistan’s story is therefore not simply one of terrorism. It is also a story of communities seeking peace, political actors working through constitutional institutions, security agencies confronting violent networks, and development initiatives attempting to create greater opportunity.

The recent appeal by Mir Yar Baloch to the international community for recognition of Balochistan as an independent country, accompanied by his assertion that the movement had entered a new phase focused on diplomatic and political recognition, illustrates that the political dimension of the Balochistan question remains very much alive. Supporters marked August 11, as “Balochistan Independence Day”.


CPEC visioned to reshape Pakistan’s economy with its extensive network of roadways linking rural and urban areas. Appears that CPEC after a decade of promised opportunities has “Not taken off to fulfill the role of a “Game-Changer” in the regional development as dreamt for the local Balochipopulace.




About Patial RC
Patial RC is a retired Infantry officer of the Indian Army and possesses unique experience of serving in active CI Ops across the country and in Sri Lanka. Patial RC is a regular writer on military and travel matters in military professional journals. The veteran is a keen mountaineer and a trekker.
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Another Blow Against Pax Americana – OpEd


President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump join King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, and the President of Egypt, Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, Sunday, May 21, 2017, to participate in the inaugural opening of the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)
Key Takeaways

Trump’s preference for autocrats over liberal democracies, first signaled by the 2017 Riyadh “orb” photo with the Saudi king and Egypt’s Sisi, continues through close ties with leaders such as Putin, Netanyahu and Erdogan, even as many of those same figures grow wary of his unpredictability.

The newly announced Turkey–Pakistan–Saudi mutual security pact (the “Mecca Defense Pact”) shows U.S. military allies hedging against unreliable American security guarantees and preparing to rely more on one another.

While Trump advances selective multilateral projects of his own (Board of Peace, Pax Silica, Abraham Accords, Quad), allies from the Middle East to Asia and Europe are quietly making contingency plans, underscoring the fading of the liberal international order and Pax Americana.


Remember that photo from Donald Trump’s first overseas trip as a president back in 2017?

The new president was in Riyadh. Instead of going to Europe or Japan or Canada, Trump was making his first presidential trip to Saudi Arabia. And there he was, at the opening of a new World Center for Countering Extremist Thought, flashing his trademark smirk as he put his hands on a glowing orb that represented the globe. Next to him, their hands also on the magic ball, were the Saudi king and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

The three leaders looked like they were in a film, playing an evil trio plotting to take over the world. Twitter lit up with comparisons to the three witches from Macbeth. It was a terrifying irony that Trump and company were inaugurating a center for “countering extremist thought” since they all three, in their own way, represented the promotion of extremist thought.


This appearance in Saudi Arabia was effectively Trump’s announcement that the liberal international order was over. The new president didn’t want to associate with European liberals or Japanese democrats or Canadian moderates. He preferred the company of a military strongman from Egypt and a religious autocrat from Saudi Arabia. Their hands on the globe symbolized their desire to spin the world in a different direction.

A decade later, Trump can still be judged by the company he keeps. He’s buddies with war criminals like Russian leader Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He’s tight with autocrats like Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, and Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman.

But, increasingly, even the autocrats are leery of Trump. Sure, no one wants to piss off Trump since, after all, he controls both nukes and tariffs. But the U.S. president is unpredictable and, frankly, erratic. Richard Nixon pretended, more or less, to be a madman in the 1970s so that the North Vietnamese would not be able to predict his next move in the war. Trump is probably not pretending. Other leaders are playing it safe by quietly treating him like a lunatic.


In 2017, the autocrats couldn’t wait to visit Trump at Mar-a-Lago and then return the favor by inviting him to join their clubs, like the absurdly titled World Center for Countering Extremist Thought. But now, a decade later, some authoritarian countries like India and Russia haven’t even joined Trump’s Board of Peace.

More concerning, at least from the point of view of an American exceptionalist, are the clubs that have been set up to exclude the United States. And that’s where the new Mecca Defense Pact comes in.
It’s Our Party

Last week, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual security pact in which they pledged to come to each other’s defense in the event of an attack. The new alliance is built on a bilateral agreement signed last year between Islamabad and Riyadh.

Two things are significant about this announcement. The first is that three U.S. military allies have decided that they shouldn’t rely overmuch on Washington for their security. Instead, they will increasingly rely on each other.

Second, this new pact won’t stop at three. The next member will likely be Egypt, which already consults with the other three countries in an arrangement called R4. Also likely to join at a certain point will be Gulf countries like Qatar and Kuwait.

This “Mecca Defense Pact” amounts to a strategic convergence of Sunni-majority countries. It also brings together three largely authoritarian countries, with Turkey subject to the whims of its leader, Pakistan dominated by its military, and Saudi Arabia functioning as a religious monarchy.


The current tripartite alliance is not targeting any particular adversary. But it’s not difficult to guess who they’re thinking about: the three Is of India, Israel, and Iran. These adversaries are a mixed bunch—one majority Hindu, another majority Jewish, a third majority Shia—with no likelihood of responding with their own military pact. They don’t constitute a unified threat even if you add the Houthis of Yemen to the mix. And none of these potential adversaries has identified the new pact as adversarial. It’s tempting, then, to dismiss the Mecca pact as just a Sunni friendship alliance, more declarative than substantive.

But if that were the case, the three countries wouldn’t be so eager to include an Article 5-like provision in their pact and, in so doing, challenge certain geopolitical realities. Turkey is a member of NATO, so now it will be committing to fight in wars on several continents? Pakistan is currently trying to mediate in the war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, so will it now commit to intervene against Tehran the next time Iranian missiles fall on Saudi Arabia? Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has strong economic and military relations with India, so is it now willing to cede all of that to Israel?

All of these complications point to one conclusion. The three countries are willing to make some sacrifices to align against their adversaries, but the real aim is to protect themselves from their ally, the United States. Ever since his first term, Donald Trump has threatened not to uphold U.S. security commitments if countries don’t spend more on their own militaries (NATO), if countries don’t spend more on their alliance commitments (Japan, South Korea), or if countries look at the U.S. president the wrong way (Canada and much of the rest of the world).

Instead of just complaining about U.S. fickleness, the leadership of Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have decided to do something about it.
Trump’s Version of Globalism

For a guy who has trashed internationalists and globalists, Trump seems to be spending a lot of foreign policy energy on creating new multilateral security arrangements. His Board of Peace, with its 27 members willing to pay the $1 billion entrance fee, is a rather anemic version of the United Nations, but it’s also clear evidence that Trump doesn’t want to go it alone. He wants other countries to follow behind him like ducklings in a row.

Then there are the purpose-built associations. Trump has created a Pax Silica to secure mineral access in friendly countries. This grouping only has 24 members, but they’re powerhouses, including the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India. The U.S. president continues to push forward with his Abrahamic Accords to integrate and elevate Israel in the Middle East. The Quad—India, Australia, Japan, and the United States—is designed to contain the ambitions of China in the Indo-Pacific region.


At the same time, Trump has pushed back against other multilateral efforts. He has pulled the United States out of a plethora of UN institutions, including UNESCO and the World Health Organization. He has threatened the BRICS with economic devastation if they have the temerity to issue a currency to compete with the dollar. He pulled the U.S. delegation out of the last G20 meeting in South Africa and ignored the last Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in South Korea.

The message is clear: it’s my multilateralism or no multilateralism.

So far, the Trump administration seems to view the Mecca Defense Pact as a friendly grouping that can implement the burden-sharing that the president has pressed on U.S. allies. It’s the same kind of tacit approval that the administration has shown the greater coordination between Japan and South Korea or the moves to expand the European Defense Fund.

As with so many things, the Trump administration is failing to read the room. U.S. allies are not openly defying the Trump administration, but they are also not following orders. The actions of these allies, from Europe to Asia to the Middle East, are more akin to family members telling a violent, dangerous, and unhinged father that they’re taking him to a lovely vacation spot when they’re really shipping him off to a lunatic asylum. Papa, still powerful in his dotage, needs his ego stroked and his suspicions allayed before he can be nudged off the stage.

In the global version of Succession that is currently taking place, everyone is making contingency plans. The Mecca pact is just the latest indication that the liberal international order is dying, Pax Americana is on its last legs, and the rough outlines of what comes next is just becoming visible.



About John Feffer
John Feffer is an author and columnist and the director of Foreign Policy In Focus.
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