Climate Change And The Future Of Central Asia-South Asia Connectivity – Analysis

The Middle Corridor -- or the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route -- is a network of roads, railroads, and ports that connect China to Europe. It offers an alternative to a northern route which largely passes through Russia, and to maritime routes. Credit: RFE/RL

June 12, 2026 
By Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza

At the 64th session of the U.N. climate framework (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies (SB64) in Bonn, Germany, which is running June 8-18, India – alongside a host of international groupings spanning the ideological spectrum – has called for direct action on a widening gap in climate-relevant funding. Whether any concrete outcomes will emerge from the ongoing meeting is so far unclear. Nevertheless, thousands of kilometers to the east, in Central as well as South Asia, the consequences of inaction are significant, not just for climate mitigation and adaptation goals of the regions’ countries, but also for the ambitious regional connectivity projects between the two.

The Hindu Kush Himalaya region, which stretches across Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal, and Pakistan, is arguably the epicenter of the climate emergency confronting both Central and South Asia. According to estimates, glaciers across the 3,500-kilometer arc, also known as the Third Pole, are retreating 65 percent faster than in the previous decade. Ten major river basins originate from the region. The glacier melt can potentially threaten the water supply for nearly 2 billion people across all eight countries. The region has already recorded a 23-year low in snow persistence for the third consecutive year. In 2025, for instance, the Indus river basin ran 16 percent below normal and some eastern river basins are facing deficits of up to 50 percent.

In Central Asia, there is a different crisis, involving a dearth of water. Over the past 70 years, the region has already warmed by 1.2 degrees C, which has led to a 20 percent decline in snow depth. Projected temperature rise of 2-6 degrees C by century’s end threatens to intensify droughts and land degradation. Already, 2024 saw the region’s worst flooding in over 70 years, even as the Western Himalayas, eastern Iran, and parts of Afghanistan experienced below-normal precipitation. This pattern of extremes can become more frequent.

Against this backdrop, I participated in the second Termez Dialogue, held on June 4-6 in Uzbekistan. The primary theme of the event was connectivity between Central and South Asia, with an additional focus on climate change and environmental resilience related to the ambitious regional connectivity projects. The dialogue also highlighted a growing recognition that connectivity and climate adaptation must be seen as intertwined agendas. The discussion emphasized that Afghanistan plays a crucial role as a strategic link between Central and South Asia. Therefore, it is essential to integrate Afghanistan into regional climate adaptation frameworks and conversations to ensure both environmental security and physical connectivity.


The dialogue is part of Uzbekistan’s urgent exploration of the possibilities for implementing several major infrastructure projects linking Central and South Asia, most of which run through Afghanistan. Apart from the bottlenecks posed by regional rivalries, there is also a realization that projects such as CASA-1000, the INSTC, and the TAPI pipeline, all still in their incipient stages of implementation despite being under discussion for decades, were conceptualized on environmental assumptions that climate change seems on the verge of now to be undermining.

Take, for instance, the curious case of the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) project, originally conceptualized as far back as 2008. The logic of this $1.2 billion power transmission effort, designed to carry surplus hydroelectricity from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, rests on the existence of surplus glacial and snowmelt-fed hydropower in the summer months. If projections of continuing glacial retreat, as well as consequent peaking river flows followed by declines after 2050, hold, those surpluses could disappear entirely. Unless climate resilience is inbuilt into the project, as the World Bank clearly underlines, hydropower generation can undergo significant disruption, driving the project into a no-show. Therefore, hydropower projections for the project need to be stress-tested against climate scenarios, not just current hydrology.

While one can argue that the involved countries will still derive benefit from the project for more than two decades, Afghanistan’s incapacity to generate finances for its share of the project has introduced a roadblock. There seems to be no way around this, unless the Taliban generate revenue or convince international donors to unfreeze financing. Both seem to be a herculean task but a necessary condition to break the current impasse.


The $10 billion Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project, the initial concept for which dates to the 1990s, is set to traverse some of the most climate-vulnerable and politically fragile terrain in the world. A desertifying and drought-prone Afghanistan is not the most ideal terrain to build and operate the infrastructure needed for the project. Therefore, the pipeline routes for the project need to account for changing precipitation and temperature profiles across Afghanistan and Pakistan, in addition to managing the acrimonious relationships between these two countries and the associated funding challenges.

In contrast, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200-kilometer multi-modal network connecting India, Iran, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Central Asia, which originated in 2002, is somewhat less directly exposed to glacial dynamics. The project is of immense importance to India. Still, extreme weather events along its overland and maritime routes face scenarios of shifting precipitation patterns, which have cast a shadow over the integration of road and rail networks. The INSTC, without significant climate resilience modifications, may not prove viable in the long run. It needs to factor in the increased frequency of extreme weather events that will test road, rail, and port infrastructure over their operational lifetimes.

Uzbekistan’s climate adaptation funding deficit is estimated at $7.2 billion through 2030. The country is actively seeking international climate finance to close the gap, experimenting with green investments and agricultural water-saving technologies, and attempting to shift from state-led fossil fuel dependence toward renewable energy and climate resilience.

As could perhaps be expected, the countries most exposed to these climate risks are also among those least equipped to manage them without external assistance. Climate negotiations in the past years have become all about forceful articulation of positions and a bit of grand bargaining. U.S. President Donald Trump’s exit from the global climate treaty puts enormous pressure even on the wealthy and willing countries to provide finances for the adaptation and mitigation funds. It is for this reason that India has been insisting that climate financing is at the core of adaptation. But the gnawing gap between the ambitions being expressed in Bonn and the institutional architecture available to channel resources toward projects such as CASA-1000 or TAPI remains wide.

The climate crisis unfolding across the Hindu Kush Himalaya and Central Asia can reshape the viability of these ambitious connectivity projects. While these were conceived in a different climatic reality, and did not include deliberate climate-proofing, they now risk becoming stranded investments. Forums such as the Termez Dialogue signal a growing awareness and interest in binding connectivity and climate resilience together. An institutional bridge between climate finance negotiations and on-the-ground infrastructure planning in South and Central Asia could be the next target for these two regions if they intend to implement these much-delayed projects and derive economic benefits along with environmental safety for the region.

This article was published at The Diplomat


About Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza
Dr. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza is President & Founder of Mantraya; Consultant/ Security and Political Analyst; Expert and Contributor to the Middle East-Asia Project (MAP) at the Middle East Institute, Washington DC; Senior Analyst, South Asia desk, Wikistrat Analytic Community, New York; Associate Editor, Journal of Asian Security & International Affairs, Sage Publications; Strategic Studies Network (SSN) Fellow, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC; Advisor, Independent Conflict Research & Analysis (ICRA), London. Shanthie has previously been Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS).
View all posts by Dr. Shanthie Mariet D Souza →

The Collapse Of Government In Nepal 2025: An Inclusive Analysis

Protest in Nepal. Photo Credit: हिमाल सुवेदी, Wikipedia Commons

June 12, 2026 
By Abdul Wasi Popalzay and Yugdeep Airi

LONG READ

On 4 September 2025, the government of Nepal, under Prime Minister Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, announced a sweeping prohibition on twenty-six social media platforms, including WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok, citing the Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2025 as its legal basis (CNN, 2025). While formally justified as a regulatory measure, the ban quickly came to symbolize authoritarian overreach for Nepal’s digitally native Generation Z, a cohort aged roughly 13 to 28, who interpreted the move as a calculated attempt to silence mounting dissent against corruption, nepotism, and elite impunity (Britannica, 2025; AP News, 2025).

What began as digital indignation swiftly evolved into offline mobilization. Leaderless collectives such as “Hami Nepal” repurposed alternative platforms like Discord to coordinate demonstrations that spread across Kathmandu and other urban centers, escalating into direct confrontations with police and military forces (Gurkhatech, 2025; The Conversation, 2025). Within days, state repression intensified.

On 8 September, security forces deployed tear gas, water cannons, and live ammunition, leaving nineteen people dead; by 14 September, at least seventy-two fatalities and more than 1,300 injuries had been recorded, while demonstrators torched more than three hundred government buildings, including Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the Prime Minister’s residence,causing an estimated $21 billion in damages (BBC, 2025; New York Times, 2025; Al Jazeera, 2025a; Al Jazeera, 2025b).

The crisis culminated in Oli’s resignation on 9 September, paving the way for an interim administration led by former Chief Justice Sushila Karki, which was tasked with stabilizing governance and preparing elections scheduled for March 2026 (BBC, 2025b; Al Jazeera, 2025d). At face value, the social media ban appears to have been the proximate trigger for regime collapse. Yet a growing body of evidence and scholarly commentary suggests that the eruption of unrest was not simply the outcome of a single tactical misstep but rather the culmination of deeper and long-standing structural failures embedded in Nepal’s political and economic order.


For more than a decade, Nepal’s governance architecture has been characterized by elite capture, weak federal decentralization, and Kathmandu-centric power consolidation, undermining accountability and provincial autonomy (Longdom Publishing, 2025; Political Geography, 2022/2025 update). Simultaneously, the socio-economic plight of Nepal’s youth has intensified: unemployment among those aged 15–24 reached 20.82 percent in 2025, remittances accounted for 33.1 percent of GDP, and an estimated 2,000 young Nepalis emigrated daily in search of low-wage employment abroad (World Bank, 2025a; World Bank, 2025b; IMF, 2025). The NGO Federation of Nepal’s 2025 Country Inequality Report concluded that such structural inequalities are “deeply systemic,” leaving fertile ground for unrest (NGO Federation of Nepal, 2025).

Against this backdrop, Oli’s decision to impose a social media ban, compounded by lethal state violence, functioned less as an isolated cause than as a catalytic spark that illuminated these entrenched vulnerabilities. The central puzzle for analysis, therefore, is causal: to what extent was the government’s collapse directly attributable to the social media ban, and to what extent did the ban merely expose a fragile system already primed for implosion?


The significance of addressing this puzzle is twofold. Empirically, Nepal’s case provides a rare and vivid instance of a hybrid regime collapsing with remarkable speed in response to digitally mediated mobilization. It offers an opportunity to dissect the interplay between structural decay and catalytic repression in ways that enrich our understanding of state fragility. Theoretically, the case advances debates within political science by bridging two literatures that are often examined separately: studies of hybrid regimes, which emphasize elite strategies of resilience and institutional hollowing, and studies of digital social movements, which focus on the capacity of leaderless, networked actors to circumvent traditional barriers to coordination (Staniland, 2025; The Conversation, 2025).

By situating Nepal’s crisis within this intersection, the paper contributes to a more nuanced conceptualization of regime vulnerability in the digital age. Furthermore, the events echo recent precedents in South Asia, notably Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic protests and Bangladesh’s 2024 student revolts, that similarly witnessed digitally empowered youth movements destabilizing governments under conditions of economic duress and institutional malaise (Eurasia Review, 2025; Divya Gandotra Tandon, 2025).


Nepal thus constitutes not an isolated anomaly but part of a broader regional syndrome, underscoring the urgency of comparative inquiry. This study is guided by a central question: to what extent was the fall of the Oli government in September 2025 the direct result of the social media ban, versus the culmination of long-standing structural failures within Nepal’s political and economic system?

Four secondary questions flow from this puzzle. First, how did specific socio-economic conditions, such as youth unemployment, remittance dependency, and mass emigration, create fertile ground for Gen Z-led mobilization? Second, in what ways did the government’s repressive strategies, including the ban and the use of lethal force, transform a digital rights issue into a nationwide movement for systemic change? Third, how does the leaderless, digitally networked morphology of the Gen Z movement compare to earlier mobilizations in Nepal, and what does this reveal about the future of political organization? Fourth, what regional patterns of youth-led uprisings across South Asia are illuminated by Nepal’s case, and what broader drivers of hybrid-regime instability can be identified?

The architecture of decline: pre-existing conditions for Nepal’s political unraveling

Nepal’s political landscape since the abolition of the monarchy in 2008 has been characterized by profound instability, with 14 governments failing to complete a full term, a cycle widely attributed to elite capture and chronically weak institutions that prioritize coalitional bargaining over public accountability (Paudel, 2025).

This environment of perpetual flux has fostered a culture of impunity, where corruption thrives unchecked. Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), released in 2025, ranks Nepal 107th out of 180 countries with a score of 34 out of 100, indicating a stagnation in anti-corruption efforts and reinforcing public perception of a political class insulated from consequences (Transparency International, 2025a).


Democratic backsliding further exacerbated this decay. Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s two dissolutions of parliament, in December 2020 and May 2021, both subsequently reinstated by the Supreme Court, are emblematic of executive overreach that systematically weakened judicial independence and eroded constitutional checks and balances (Kurlantzick, 2025). This pattern of instability is not merely numerical; as analyzed in peer-reviewed studies, the frequent collapse of coalitions between 2022 and 2024, often due to petty power-sharing disputes rather than ideological differences, mirrors a broader regional trend of fragile governance seen in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh (Adhikari, 2025).

The phenomenon of “Nepo Kids”, the privileged offspring of political elites flaunting their wealth and influence, became a potent symbol of this systemic rot, crystallizing popular anger over a system perceived to protect and enrich a select few. As one anonymous youth activist starkly put it in an interview, “Nepo Kids symbolize how corruption protects the elite while we suffer” (FES Asia, 2025). This sentiment underscores a generational rift and a profound loss of faith in the political establishment. Defenders of the status quo, however, often deflected blame externally.

Former Prime Minister Oli himself, whose fourth term ended in resignation on September 9, 2025, claimed just days prior that the instability was due to “opportunistic elements infiltrating genuine demands” (Eurasia Review, 2025), a narrative that sought to attribute the crisis to exogenous factors rather than internal failings. Some pro-regime scholars have extended this argument, suggesting in publications like GIS Reports that geopolitical competition between India and China is the primary driver of Nepal’s instability, thereby downplaying domestic accountability (GIS Reports, 2025).


This deflection is robustly countered by empirical analysis. As rebuttals in Eurasia Review (2025) contend, external pressures may exacerbate Nepal’s situation, but they cannot explain the persistent internal culture of impunity evidenced by 14 failed governments and stagnant CPI scores. The IMF’s 2025 Staff Report provides a more nuanced institutional analysis, positing that Oli’s actions exemplify hybrid regime tactics that undermine judicial independence and foster an environment where corruption scandals, particularly in public tenders, flourish and amplify public distrust (IMF, 2025a).

This assessment is echoed by opposition figures like Sher Bahadur Deuba, President of the Nepali Congress and a five-time former PM, who criticized the interim government’s moves as further backsliding, stating that “the dissolution of parliament violates constitutional norms” (UN News, 2025). The academic conclusion, as detailed in 2025 peer-reviewed works, is that Nepal’s political rot represents a failed democratic transition, necessitating substantive constitutional amendments to ensure coalition durability and prevent the recurrence of such crises (Adhikari, 2025; Kurlantzick, 2025).


This profound political failure is inextricably linked to a parallel economic collapse, which together severed the social contract between the state and its citizens. Nepal’s economy has become a “tinderbox of despair,” characterized by a toxic combination of high youth unemployment, crippling dependence on remittances, and mass emigration (Paudel, 2025). The World Bank’s 2025 Nepal Development Update places youth unemployment (ages 15-24) at 20.82% for FY2024/25, while remittances constitute 24.25% of GDP, a figure projected to rise, and approximately 2,000 young people emigrate daily in search of work (World Bank, 2025c; IMF, 2025b).

This exodus, particularly the surge in migrant outflows to the Middle East documented in the IOM’s 2025 Migration Governance Indicators, is driven by powerful economic push factors, mirroring patterns in Bangladesh and reflecting a domestic economy incapable of creating meaningful opportunities for its educated youth (IOM, 2025). The human cost of this failure is starkly illustrated in the words of a migrant worker who stated, “I left for Malaysia because no jobs at home match my education” (Migration Data Portal, 2025). This individual despair aggregates into a national crisis. While some IMF analyses project a modest 4.0% growth rate for 2025 and suggest remittances provide a crucial economic buffer, implying an adaptive rather than broken social contract (IMF, 2025c), this optimistic view is heavily rebutted.

More critical analyses, including World Bank updates, argue that such figures dangerously overlook the depth of youth despair, noting that 33.7% of Nepali youth are classified as NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), a statistic indicative of a systemic breakdown rather than resilience (World Bank, 2025f). Dilip Ratha, Lead Economist on Migration at the World Bank, warns in the 2025 Remittances Report that “Nepal’s 24% GDP from remittances risks hollowing out the workforce,” creating a long-term dependency that undermines sustainable development (World Bank, 2025e). This economic reality fueled the political unrest. As opposition leader Gagan Thapa, Nepali Congress General Secretary, argued, “economic despair fuels unrest, with youth leaving because the state fails them” (UN, 2025).


Former Finance Minister Ram Sharan Mahat acknowledged this policy failure in a World Bank briefing, noting that “remittances bolster resilience but cannot substitute for domestic job creation” (World Bank, 2025d). Academic expert Suman Sharma synthesizes this in a 2025 paper, analyzing that the mass emigration peak of 2,000 people per day evidences a broken social contract stemming from post-COVID recovery failures and necessitates urgent inclusive policies (Sharma, 2025).

As has been demonstrated, Nepal’s economic despair is not a separate issue but the direct result of a ruptured social contract, requiring urgent, targeted investments in vocational training and small-to-medium enterprises to stem the hemorrhage of human capital and begin the arduous task of rebuilding public trust.
The catalyst and the conflagration: a strategic miscalculation

The Nepali government’s decision on September 4, 2025, to ban 26 social media platforms was ostensibly framed as a necessary measure to combat misinformation and enforce regulatory compliance under the Information Technology and Cyber Security Bill 2025. A statement from the Ministry of Communications, reported by UN News on September 5, justified the action as essential “to combat misinformation and ensure platform accountability,” aiming to safeguard national security amid escalating online dissent (UN News, 2025a).


However, in a society deeply integrated with digital tools, this regulatory move was immediately perceived as a profound authoritarian overreach. Academic analyses, such as that by Acharya & Acharya (2025), frame the ban as a critical misjudgment that ignored the socio-economic role of these platforms. In a nation where remittances, heavily reliant on affordable digital communication, constitute 24.25% of GDP (World Bank, 2025) and approximately 29 million Nepalis live abroad, platforms like WhatsApp serve as indispensable lifelines for maintaining family connections and facilitating financial transactions.

As one Nepalese migrant worker starkly expressed in an IOM interview on September 10, “Without WhatsApp, I can’t afford to call home, it’s an attack on our families” (IOM, 2025). This sentiment was echoed by opposition leader Gagan Thapa, General Secretary of the Nepali Congress, who argued on September 6 that the ban “silences the voices of our youth and migrants, who depend on these tools for survival” (Human Rights Watch, 2025a). The government’s action, rather than quelling dissent, inadvertently framed the state as antagonistic to fundamental communicative and economic needs, thereby igniting immediate protests.


Expert analysis, such as Gurung’s (2025) ResearchGate study, posits that the ban’s logic fundamentally underestimated the adaptability of digital natives, who swiftly migrated to alternative platforms like Discord, thereby amplifying rather than containing dissent. While government-aligned scholars countered that the ban was a proactive measure against foreign-influenced misinformation aimed at protecting national sovereignty (Paudel, 2025), rebuttals in outlets like The Conversation (2025) noted the historical shortsightedness of such shutdowns, which consistently increase radicalization, as evidenced by Nepal’s rapid protest escalation. The academic conclusion, supported by global reports, is that the ban functioned not as a mere regulatory misstep but as a pivotal trigger that exposed deep communication fractures in a remittance-dependent economy, highlighting the urgent need for more inclusive digital policies (World Bank, 2025; Amnesty International, 2025a).

The state’s response to the burgeoning protests marked a severe and fatal escalation. Beginning with the digital shutdown on September 4, the government rapidly progressed to employing lethal force by September 8, a transition that human rights organizations unequivocally condemned as disproportionate and in violation of international standards. Major claims from Amnesty International (2025b) and Human Rights Watch (2025b) assert that this securitized response radicalized initially peaceful protesters.


Statistics compiled by the UN and Amnesty detail a grim toll: by September 14, at least 72 deaths (including 60 protesters, 9 prisoners, and 3 police officers) and 2,113 injuries had been recorded, alongside economic damages estimated at $21 billion (UN News, 2025b; Reuters, 2025). A Nepalese police official, in a statement cited by the OHCHR on September 9, defended these actions as “necessary to maintain order against infiltrators,” attempting to justify the force as a response to chaos (OHCHR, 2025).

However, this narrative was starkly contested. Opposition leader Ram Chandra Paudel of the Nepali Congress declared on September 10 that “lethal force against unarmed youth is a crime that erodes all legitimacy” (Human Rights Watch, 2025c), a sentiment echoed by protesters themselves. One demonstrator, quoted in Amnesty reports on September 8, stated, “They shot us for speaking out, now we fight for everything” (Amnesty International, 2025b), illustrating the profound radicalization catalyzed by state violence. A

cademic experts like Bishnu Upreti et al. (2025) analyze this pattern as characteristic of hybrid regimes, where initial digital repression escalates into physical violence, thereby confirming state impunity in the public eye and irrevocably eroding legitimacy. While state defenders, such as those publishing in GIS Reports (2025), argued that force was a reactive measure to protester violence including arson, rebuttals from Amnesty International (2025c) cited evidence of unprovoked shootings, deemed excessive under international law.


The academic conclusion, as per 2025 analyses, is that this escalation critically undermined state authority, transforming grievances into a widespread demand for systemic accountability and underscoring the imperative for rights-based policing reforms (OHCHR, 2025; Upreti et al., 2025). This sequence of actions constituted a profound strategic miscalculation by the state. The ban and subsequent violent repression fundamentally misread the resilience and motivations of the populace, particularly the youth. What began as a discrete protest against a specific policy was rapidly transformed into a nationwide uprising demanding comprehensive anti-corruption reforms and elite accountability (The Diplomat, 2025).

Academic arguments, such as those advanced by Sharma (2025), contend that this miscalculation reflects a deeper ontological insecurity among Nepali youth, for whom state repression served as final proof of systemic failure, thereby amplifying calls for structural overhaul. The statistics are telling: protests spread to multiple cities, resulting in over 300 government buildings torched and a collapse of the stock market (IMF, 2025). This pattern mirrors regional precedents, such as Sri Lanka’s 2022 Aragalaya movement, where similar state missteps led to regime change (New Lines Magazine, 2025).


Even as Prime Minister Oli resigned on September 9, he persisted in deflecting blame, admitting to an “extraordinary situation” but attributing the crisis to “vested groups” (Reuters, 2025), a stance that further highlighted the elite’s disconnect. In contrast, a youth opposition leader declared on September 12 that “Repression united us against the system” (UN News, 2025d), a sentiment captured succinctly by a protester on X (formerly Twitter): “Ban was spark, bullets the fuel, now we demand change” (ChronoverseTick, 2025).

World experts like Joshua Kurlantzick (2025) of the Council on Foreign Relations contextualize Nepal’s error within broader South Asian trends, where digital amplification transforms state repression into a catalyst for systemic demands. While counterarguments posited that external proxies exploited the situation (Eurasia Review, 2025), rebuttals emphasize the overwhelming empirical evidence of domestic grievances driving the change (The Conversation, 2025). The foregoing discussion has shown that, the state’s repressive tactics were a fatal error, igniting a conflagration that could have been avoided. This miscalculation signals a critical lesson for governance in the digital era: in fragile democracies, adaptive and inclusive governance is not merely preferable but essential to survival.
The new agents of change: anatomy of a Gen Z Revolt

The 2025 Nepalese Gen Z protests emerged as a paradigmatic example of a leaderless movement, characterized by a horizontal, decentralized structure that fundamentally bypassed traditional political hierarchies. This digital-native morphology enabled rapid mobilization and resilience in the face of state repression, particularly after the September 4 social media ban.


As academic DB Subedi (2025) argues, this structure reflects a significant shift toward decentralized activism in hybrid regimes, where platforms like Discord and Instagram facilitate anonymous coordination, thereby reducing vulnerability to state crackdowns. Statistics from Amnesty International’s 2025 report quantify this digital mobilization, indicating over 145,000 participants in Discord servers such as “Hami Nepal,” with Instagram stories serving as critical tools for amplifying calls to action and facilitating the protest’s rapid spread across Kathmandu and beyond between September 8 and 10 (Amnesty International, 2025a). This decentralized model was not without its strategic innovations; in a striking example of digital decision-making, Discord polls were used to select former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as an interim leader on September 12, a tactic that mirrored the decentralized processes observed in Bangladesh’s 2024 student protests (Human Rights Watch, 2025a).

The conscious rejection of centralized leadership was a defining feature. As Gen Z protester Diwakar Dangal stated in an interview on September 11, “We are not capable of taking the leadership… This bloodshed is because of you (old leaders)” (ANI, 2025), a sentiment that underscored a strategic aversion to co-optation and infiltration.

Opposition figure Gagan Thapa acknowledged this strength on September 12, noting that “The movement’s digital structure allowed it to thrive without a single leader” (The Kathmandu Post, 2025). However, this very structure drew skepticism from some quarters; counterarguments in Eurasia Review (2025) suggested the leaderless facade potentially masked external orchestration by foreign actors using digital tools to exert influence.

These claims are robustly rebutted by the OHCHR (2025), which emphasizes empirical evidence of an organic, youth-driven decentralization, arguing that such accusations function as an unsubstantiated deflection from legitimate internal grievances. The academic conclusion, as per 2025 peer-reviewed works, is that the movement’s morphology signals a transformative model for youth activism, leveraging digital tools for resilience, yet it inherently risks fragmentation and requires safeguards against co-optation to achieve sustained political impact (Subedi, 2025; Gurung, 2025). The movement’s power derived not only from its structure but from its compelling and unifying narratives. The discourse around “Nepo Kids”, the privileged offspring of political elites, served as a potent viral symbol of systemic corruption and generational disenfranchisement.

As researcher N Gurung (2025) deconstructed, the “Nepo Kids” narrative, which went viral from September 4 in Kathmandu, effectively unified Gen Z by starkly contrasting the luxury of the elite with widespread poverty and economic despair, particularly amid a youth unemployment rate of 20.8% (Human Rights Watch, 2025b). This anti-elitism discourse was amplified digitally, bridging individual grievances into a powerful collective identity focused on systemic inequality (Subedi, 2025).


The narratives were passionately articulated by participants like 19-year-old student protester Binu KC, who stated simply on September 9, “We want to see an end to corruption in Nepal” (Human Rights Watch, 2025a). While former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli dismissively claimed on September 7 that “Gen Z thinks they can demand anything” (Eurasia Review, 2025), opposition leader Sher Bahadur Deuba acknowledged the potency of these narratives on September 14, conceding that “Nepo Kids symbolize systemic rot” (The New Humanitarian, 2025). World officials like Rupert Colville of the OHCHR emphasized the gravity of these disenfranchisement narratives, noting on September 8 that they “demand transparent probes” into state violence (OHCHR, 2025).

While some counterarguments again claimed these narratives were externally amplified to serve geopolitical agendas (Eurasia Review, 2025), rebuttals from Amnesty International (2025b) asserted clear evidence of authentic disenfranchisement, with deep-seated corruption perceptions being the primary driver of unity. The academic conclusion is that these mobilizing narratives were exceptionally effective in unifying the revolt, demonstrating the formidable power of digital discourses in channeling generational anger, though their long-term sustainability is contingent upon tangible institutional reforms addressing the root causes of inequality (Gurung, 2025; Subedi, 2025).

This Gen Z revolt stands in stark contrast to previous waves of political mobilization in Nepal, particularly the 2006 democracy movement. Academics highlight that while the 2006 movement was a party-led, hierarchical campaign primarily focused on ending the monarchy through structured political alliances, the 2025 uprising was a digitally-coordinated, leaderless movement targeting systemic corruption and elite capture within the post-republican political framework (Subedi, 2025; Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2025).

This contrast is evident in the tactics and velocity of the movements; UN reports note that the 2025 protests resulted in 72 deaths within a condensed 48-hour period, a pace of escalation and casualty rate that underscores the accelerated, digital nature of the revolt compared to the more prolonged 2006 campaign (UN News, 2025b). Sudan Gurung, president of Hami Nepal, articulated this distinction on September 12, stating, “Unlike 2006’s party-driven push, this is youth-led without leaders” (The New Humanitarian, 2025).

Veteran politician Ram Chandra Paudel further elaborated on September 14, noting “2006 ended monarchy; 2025 challenges the republic’s elites,” highlighting the evolution of protest goals from establishing a republic to demanding accountability within it (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 2025).

An anonymous protester summarized the tactical shift to Human Rights Watch on September 12, stating, “We use apps, not alliances, that’s our difference from 2006” (Human Rights Watch, 2025a). However, some experts, like Roman Gautam, editor of Himal South Asian, offered a note of caution on September 13, analyzing that “2025’s revolt risks repeating 2006’s cycle without change,” warning of potential backsliding if deep structural reforms are not achieved (TOI Plus, 2025).


Joshua Kurlantzick (2025) of the Council on Foreign Relations compared “2006’s structured tactics in Kathmandu to 2025’s digital decentralization,” noting the uniqueness of the latter in its speed and singular youth focus. While some counterarguments downplay this uniqueness by pointing to potential similarities in external influences (Eurasia Review, 2025), Drawing everything together the 2025 Gen Z revolt’s digital, leaderless structure represents a distinct and evolved model of activism that accelerates political change but concurrently introduces new risks of instability if its energy is not channeled into concrete institutional reforms.
A regional phenomenon: Nepal in the south Asian mirror

The 2025 Gen Z-led uprising in Nepal did not occur in a vacuum; it represents the latest manifestation of a broader regional pattern of youth-driven political upheaval across South Asia. Major claims assert that Nepal’s crisis mirrors the trajectories of Sri Lanka in 2022 and Bangladesh in 2024, forming a distinct syndrome where acute economic crises ignite the rapid collapse of hybrid regimes, a process dramatically accelerated by digital mobilization and met with characteristically repressive state responses (Staniland, 2025).

Academic arguments frame these events as interconnected failures of governance, where entrenched elites’ profound inability to address post-pandemic economic woes and deep-seated corruption exposes a fundamental institutional fragility common to the region (Staniland, 2025; Al Jazeera, 2025a). The latest statistics from the World Bank’s 2025 South Asia Development Update quantify the shared economic vulnerabilities: regional youth unemployment averages 18-22% in FY2024/25, while remittances constitute a critical 24-33% of GDP in Nepal and Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka continues to grapple with a debilitating debt crisis lingering at 110% of GDP (World Bank, 2025a).

This combustible economic mix has repeatedly ignited political conflagrations. Major examples include Sri Lanka’s 2022 Aragalaya protests, which successfully ousted the powerful Rajapaksa regime amid severe fuel shortages; Bangladesh’s 2024 student-led quota reform movement, which escalated to force the exile of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina; and Nepal’s 2025 unrest, triggered by a social media ban and culminating in over 72 deaths and Prime Minister Oli’s resignation (AP News, 2025; Carnegie Endowment, 2025).

Diverse voices highlight both the parallels and nuances of this regional trend. Nepalese interim leader Sushila Karki, the former Chief Justice appointed on September 12, 2025, explicitly linked the crisis to regional dynamics, stating “We must address youth demands for integrity and rule of law,” thereby emphasizing the imperative of economic reforms in the stabilization phase (Human Rights Watch, 2025a). An opposition analyst from Bangladesh’s Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) reinforced this interconnectedness in a September 16, 2025, report, arguing that “Youth uprisings in Nepal and Bangladesh stem from unmet economic expectations” (CPD, 2025).


A retrospective reflection from a Sri Lankan protester, cited in Carnegie reports, drew a direct line to Nepal’s experience: “Economic hardship united us against elite corruption” (Carnegie Endowment, 2025). This pattern of state response, often violent and escalatory, was condemned by global figures. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk noted on September 9, 2025, that “Violence in Nepal echoes Bangladesh’s repression,” and called for immediate investigations (OHCHR, 2025a).

Academic expert Paul Staniland, a professor at the University of Chicago, synthesized these events in a September 2025 analysis, arguing that “Nepal’s rapid fall, like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, shows decentralized youth movements toppling hollow institutions” (Staniland, 2025). Expert analysis from International IDEA’s 2025 Global State of Democracy Report supports this, positing that these uprisings reveal the core weaknesses of hybrid regimes, where economic triggers like regional inflation of 15-20% and the potent role of youth in digital mobilization consistently outpace the state’s capacity to adapt (International IDEA, 2025).

While counterarguments in outlets like Eurasia Review suggest external geopolitical proxies (e.g., from India or the U.S.) exploit these grievances rather than organic economic factors (Eurasia Review, 2025), rebuttals from the UN OHCHR emphasize internal repression and youth agency, citing evidence from 2025 probes that identify state violence as the primary escalator (OHCHR, 2025b).

The academic conclusion, therefore, is that the shared economic and youth dynamics across Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh signal a profound regional shift, necessitating genuine inclusive reforms to break these cycles of unrest (Staniland, 2025; Al Jazeera, 2025a). A systematic comparison of key variables elucidates this common syndrome. The primary economic triggers were severe across all three cases: Nepal (2025) faced youth unemployment of 20.8% and corruption scandals despite remittances constituting 24% of GDP (World Bank, 2025b); Sri Lanka (2022) was crippled by a debt crisis of 110% of GDP and catastrophic fuel and food shortages (Carnegie Endowment, 2025); and Bangladesh (2024) erupted over job quota injustices, high inflation at 15%, and pervasive corruption (CPD, 2025).

The role of youth was pivotal and defining: Nepal saw Gen Z leaderless protests resulting in 72 deaths (OHCHR, 2025a); Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya movement was youth-led and ousted the Rajapaksa regime (AP News, 2025); and Bangladesh’s movement began with student-led quota reforms that escalated into a full regime change (Phys.org, 2025).

The use of digital media was a critical accelerant: In Nepal, the government’s ban on platforms ironically sparked massive mobilization on Discord and Instagram (Staniland, 2025); in Sri Lanka, social media was instrumental in amplifying protests (Indian Express, 2025a); and in Bangladesh, hashtags and online campaigns unified the movement (Daily Star, 2025). Finally, the state response followed a familiar pattern of failed repression: Nepal deployed lethal force and the army, leading to Oli’s resignation (UN News, 2025a); Sri Lanka’s crackdowns failed, resulting in the government’s ouster (Carnegie Endowment, 2025); and Bangladesh responded with repression and abuses, leading to Hasina’s exile (OHCHR, 2025c).


Synthesizing these findings leads to a powerful theory of hybrid regime vulnerability. Major claims theorize that South Asia’s hybrid regimes, which blend democratic facades with authoritarian controls, are acutely prone to collapse under a common syndrome: the confluence of deep-seated economic grievances, sophisticated digital mobilization, and persistent elite intransigence (Staniland, 2025; International IDEA, 2025).

Academic arguments frame this as a regional vulnerability model where weak institutions fundamentally fail to absorb the shocks delivered by youth-led digital uprisings (Nature, 2025; IMF, 2025a). Latest statistics from the V-Dem Institute’s 2025 Democracy Report illustrate the region’s autocratization trends, with hybrid regimes scoring a weak 0.4-0.6 on democracy indices, a situation exacerbated by GDP growth rates of 5-6% that are utterly insufficient to address youth unemployment hovering around 20% (V-Dem, 2025).

This syndrome was vividly displayed in Bangladesh’s 2024 fall due to quota grievances amplified online, Sri Lanka’s 2022 debt-fueled protests, and Nepal’s 2025 crisis ignited by a ban that exposed elite disconnect (Samvada World, 2025; World Bank, 2025c). As a Nepalese official admitted in a moment of crisis on September 8, 2025, “Economic discontent fueled digital unrest” (UN News, 2025b).

Bangladeshi interim adviser Muhammad Yunus reflected in February 2025 that “Repression deepened vulnerabilities” (OHCHR, 2025d), and Sri Lanka’s President Anura Kumara Dissanayake noted that “Youth digital power exposed intransigence” (Carnegie Endowment, 2025). Expert analysis from the IMF’s 2025 regional report extends this theory, positing that elite intransigence in such hybrids systematically amplifies grievances through digital channels, leading to rapid dissent as seen in Nepal’s 48-hour collapse (IMF, 2025b).

Although counterarguments claim external actors drive this vulnerability (Eurasia Review, 2025), rebuttals by V-Dem cite robust data on endogenous autocratization (V-Dem, 2025). In synthesizing the arguments this intertwined syndrome renders hybrid regimes exceptionally vulnerable, urgently necessitating genuine institutional strengthening to mitigate these recurring and destructive cycles of dissent.
Conclusion

The fall of the Nepali government in September 2025 was not a sudden anomaly but the culmination of profound and protracted systemic failures. This research set out to determine the core reasons behind this collapse, moving beyond the immediate trigger of the social media ban to examine the deeper structural decay that made the state so vulnerable. The primary objective was to critically assess the causal weight of long-term political and economic grievances against the short-term catalytic miscalculation, and to situate Nepal’s experience within the broader context of South Asia’s ongoing political upheavals.


The analysis reveals a clear and compelling narrative: Nepal’s political architecture had been hollowed out by years of chronic instability, elite capture, and a culture of impunity, while its economic foundation was crippled by youth unemployment, remittance dependency, and mass emigration. This created a tinderbox of generational despair. The government’s decision to impose a social media ban was a profound strategic error, a classic case of a hybrid regime misreading the power of digital-native citizens. Rather than suppressing dissent, the ban and the subsequent lethal state response acted as a spark, transforming discrete grievances into a unified nationwide demand for systemic change.

The movement’s leaderless, digital-first morphology, powered by potent narratives against corruption and elite privilege, proved uniquely resilient and effective at mobilizing dissent, ultimately overwhelming the state’s capacity to respond with anything but force. Theoretically, Nepal’s case significantly advances our understanding of hybrid regime vulnerability. It demonstrates that the confluence of economic distress, digital mobilization, and elite intransigence creates a predictable syndrome that can lead to rapid political collapse. This challenges frameworks that prioritize either purely institutional or purely economic explanations, arguing instead for an integrated approach that accounts for the agency of digitally empowered generations.

The events in Nepal, following similar patterns in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, suggest a regional shift in how political authority is contested and lost, highlighting the diminishing returns of authoritarian repression in the digital age. In final reflection, the September 2025 uprising stands as a powerful testament to a generation’s refusal to accept a failed status quo. It underscores a harsh truth for elites in fragile democracies: technical governance and periodic elections are insufficient without genuine accountability and inclusive economic opportunity. The interim government’s challenge, and indeed the challenge for the entire region, is to move beyond restoring order to rebuilding a social contract that has been shattered. The legacy of this revolt will be determined not by the fall of a single government, but by whether it finally catalyzes the structural reforms that Nepal’s youth have so decisively demanded.

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About Abdul Wasi Popalzay
Abdul Wasi Popalzay is a doctoral researcher in Political Science and International Relations at the Central University of Punjab, India. His doctoral research examines the changing dynamics of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations in the post-U.S. withdrawal era, with a focus on major power engagement. His research interests include regional security complexes, great power foreign policy behavior, South and Central Asian geopolitics, and post-conflict diplomacy. He previously completed postgraduate research on the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict from a geopolitical perspective. He was recognized as Best Research Scholar (2025) by the Central University of Punjab.
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About Yugdeep Airi
Yugdeep Airi is a political analyst and researcher specializing in international relations, with a focus on South and Central Asia, narrative warfare, media representation of conflicts, and geopolitics. He recently completed his Ph.D. at Central University of Punjab, where his dissertation examined "Narrative Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of Russia-Ukraine War Representation in International Media Outlets" under the supervision of faculty in the Department of South and Central Asian Studies.
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Column: LNG demand in Asia recovers from Iran shock as China buys

Reuters | June 9, 2026 

Stock image.

(The views expressed here are those of the author, Clyde Russell, a columnist for Reuters.)

Liquefied natural gas demand in Asia is quietly recovering from the shock of losing almost 20% of global supply to the Iran conflict as top buyer China shows signs of returning to the ​market.

The biggest-importing region is on track for arrivals of 21.83 million metric tons in June, the most for five months and also up from ‌the 21.55 million tons in the same month last year, according to data compiled by commodity analysts Kpler.

Asia’s LNG imports had dropped to a six-year low of 18.74 million tons in April after the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, following US and Israeli attacks on Iran on February 28, stopped shipments from Qatar, which shipped 80.9 million tons in 2025.

China only just held onto its ​status as the world’s biggest LNG importer in 2025 as imports dropped to 66.48 million tons, slightly ahead of Japan.

For the first five months of 2026 ​it seemed certain that China would drop to second place because its utilities steered away from buying spot cargoes as prices surged ⁠in the wake of the Iran war.

The price of spot LNG for delivery to North Asia jumped to a three-year high of $25.30 per million British thermal units (mmBtu) in the ​week to March 20, up 143% from the $10.40 that prevailed before the Iran conflict.

Prices subsequently eased to $16.05 per mmBtu by mid-April, but have since climbed to end at $18.80 in ​the week to June 5.

Part of the rise in prices stems from China taking more of the super-chilled fuel, with imports forecast by Kpler to rise to reach 4.48 million tons in June, down slightly from the four-month high of 4.74 million in May.

China’s imports in May and June are also well ahead of the 3.78 million tons for March and April’s eight-year low of 3.63 million ​tons.

LNG imports by China, Japan, India

Japan gains

However, China’s increased appetite for LNG has been more than matched by Japan, which is also on track to see imports rise in June, with Kpler estimating arrivals ​of 5.33 million tons, a three-month high and also above the 4.91 million tons from June 2025.

South Korea, the third-biggest LNG importer, is forecast to have arrivals of 3.26 million tons in ‌June, down ⁠slightly from both May’s 3.37 million and 3.48 million in June last year.

The loss of cargoes from Qatar was most felt by South Asian buyers, with India’s LNG imports dropping to a three-year low of 1.67 million tons in March.

However, they are expected to recover to 2.09 million tons in June, just behind the 2.11 million from June last year, as India sources LNG from alternative suppliers such as Angola, Nigeria and the United States.

Pakistan, which used to buy almost exclusively from Qatar, has struggled to find alternatives, with ​June imports expected at just 210,000 tons, ​with one cargo from Oman and one ⁠from Qatar, which has seen a handful of vessels manage to exit the Strait of Hormuz in recent weeks.

Pakistan’s imports in June are about one-third of the 620,000 tons from the same month in 2025, but have recovered somewhat from the 10-year low of ​70,000 tons in April.

On the supply side, the initial surge of US LNG that headed to Asia in the wake ​of the start of the ⁠war against Iran is starting to ease, with exports of 2.73 million tons in June, down from the record high of 4.07 million in May.

However, US shipments to Asia are still running at rates well above the average of 1.15 million tons in the three months leading up to the attack on Iran.

It appears that US LNG is switching back to Europe, ⁠with Kpler ​estimating exports of 4.99 million tons in June, up from 4.53 million in May, which was the ​lowest since October 2024.

(Editing by Sonali Paul)

Malaysia to promise Japan maximum possible LNG and naphtha supplies, Nikkei reports

Reuters | June 9, 2026 | 

Stock image by littlewolf1989.

Malaysia’s Prime Minister will agree to provide Japan with the largest possible supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and naphtha as Tokyo seeks to diversify its sources of energy and petrochemicals, the Nikkei newspaper reported on Wednesday.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, currently visiting Tokyo, are expected to formalize this pledge in a joint statement at a summit later on Wednesday, the report added.

Japan faces a potential LNG supply crunch due to tensions linked to the Iran conflict, as air-conditioning demand in the country rises heading into summer.

Global LNG markets are already under pressure from conflict-linked supply disruptions and constrained flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a key route for about a fifth of global crude oil and LNG shipments.

Japan imports about 15% of its LNG from Malaysia, its second-largest supplier after Australia, according to the newspaper.

Malaysia and Japan will also seek to work together on economic security with China’s export restrictions on rare earth elements in mind, the article said.

Japan and Western governments have been seeking to diversify critical mineral supply chains away from China, the world’s largest rare earths producer.

In May, Japan signed an agreement with Australia to strengthen cooperation on energy and critical minerals, while public broadcaster NHK reported in April that Tokyo and Paris had agreed to bolster rare earth supply chains.

Additionally, the Japanese and Malaysian prime ministers are expected to discuss cooperation in nuclear energy, with Japan sharing its expertise in power plant technology and site selection, the report said.

The summit also includes plans for discussions on AI policy, aimed at joint applications in agriculture, mobility and education, Nikkei added.

(By Nikita Maria Jino and Kumar Tanishk; Editing by Jonathan Ananda)