The Tariffs Were a Wake-Up Call; Ottawa Hits Snooze Again

Ottawa wants Canadians to believe that a new era of strategic independence is underway, but the trade measures increasingly look performative, while the surge in military spending risks doing little to reduce Canada’s underlying dependence on the United States.


Prime Minister of Canada and Liberal Party Leader Mark Carney delivers a speech to supporters during a rally on April 23, 2025 in Surrey, Canada.
(Photo by Rich Lam/Getty Images)

Umer Azad
Oct 05, 2026

Common Dreams


There is something almost admirable about the Canadian government’s ability to respond to an American provocation with precisely the right number of carefully selected adjectives. Washington imposes tariffs. Ottawa expresses deep disappointment. Washington threatens Canadian sovereignty. Ottawa says the relationship is changing. Washington escalates again. Ottawa announces that Canada is entering a new era. Then everyone goes home.

The problem is no longer simply that Canada’s foreign policy is too cautious. It increasingly appears to have no direction at all. Ottawa responds to American provocations with carefully worded statements, measured diplomatic language and assurances. But underneath the polished rhetoric there is no clear moral compass, little strategic spine and, most importantly, remarkably little follow-through. Canada continues to drift like seaweed, bending with every current while insisting that it is still steering the boat.

The recent tariffs should have been a wake-up call. They exposed the extraordinary vulnerability of a country whose economic fortunes are so deeply tied to a neighbor that increasingly treats trade as an instrument of coercion. The threats to Canadian sovereignty should have made the lesson even clearer: Economic integration is no guarantee of political goodwill, and decades of unquestioned alignment do not necessarily buy Canada respect or security. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney himself recognized the changing environment when he spoke of a world in which economic integration could be weaponized. Yet, Canada’s answer has been to dress up token diversification as strategic independence while continuing to bend to Washington on matters far beyond trade.

Cheerleading American military interventions and then dressing up Trump’s annihilation rhetoric as merely the language of war is not buying Canada any goodwill in Washington.

Tariff by tariff, Ottawa has responded with declarations of retaliation and resilience. Canada announced trade missions, new partnerships, investment initiatives, and efforts to expand access to markets beyond the United States. These are bombarded as evidence that the country is moving toward a more diversified and resilient economy.

There is some truth to that, yes. The US share of Canadian merchandise exports did fall from 75.9% in 2024 to 71.7% in 2025, and while exports to countries outside the United States rose 17.2%, that headline figure conceals the limits of the transformation. Global Affairs Canada reports that the growth in non-US exports was driven largely by an exceptional increase in gold exports, with gold exports rising by $14.1 billion in 2025. The increase was driven by a 45.2% rise in gold prices, while gold export volumes actually fell 6.3%. In other words, what Ottawa can present as evidence of diversification was substantially boosted by a gold-price windfall, not simply by Canadian businesses dramatically expanding into new international markets. And among Canadian exporters whose US sales declined, most did not significantly expand sales into non-US markets.

That is not exactly the economic equivalent of escaping Washington’s orbit. It is more like rearranging the deck chairs and announcing that the ship has changed direction. Canada can announce trade missions, negotiations, and investment funds. But such announcements are not diversified supply chains. They are not new markets. They are not industrial capacity. After the magnitude of America’s pressure on Canada, the question should not be whether diversification has started. It should be whether Canada has diversified enough to reduce the vulnerability that Ottawa itself says exists. It hasn’t.

The contradiction becomes even harder to ignore when we look at defense. Canada is dramatically increasing military spending while remaining deeply embedded in a security architecture dominated by the United States. Canada plans to acquire 88 F-35 fighter aircraft at an acquisition cost of approximately $27.7 billion, with the initial Canadian aircraft scheduled to be based at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona for training. This is not at all an isolated procurement decision but part of a deeply integrated military relationship. Already, NORAD links the two countries’ air defense systems, making their military architecture deeply intertwined. Canada is consistently embedding its defense posture in a security architecture overwhelmingly shaped by the United States.

So to sum up, Canada has not escaped its dependence, either economically or militarily. It has barely moved the needle. And more importantly, it does not appear intent on doing so. Ottawa wants Canadians to believe that a new era of strategic independence is underway, but the trade measures increasingly look performative, while the surge in military spending risks doing little to reduce Canada’s underlying dependence on the United States. And if the recent United Nations General Assembly is any indication, the Carney-Anand duo has not merely failed to distance itself from Washington’s military adventures. It has doubled down on its political and diplomatic alignment with them.

In his latest speech at the UN, Carney called Iran “one of the greatest threats in the current world” and described it as an “existential threat to Israel and its allies.” When asked about US President Donald Trump’s threats to annihilate or destroy Iran, he simply responded with “Well, there is a war underway, and he’s speaking the language of war.” He might as well have said, “Boys will be boys.” This time, Ottawa did not even seem interested in trying to sound politically correct. Foreign Minister Anita Anand was even more categorical. At the United Nations General Assembly, she declared: “Iran is the principal threat to peace and security in its region… Its threats to navigation rights in the Strait of Hormuz are a direct affront to international law.”

Ever since the United States and Israel launched their illegitimate war on Iran on February 28, which has already killed around 3,500 people and displaced over 3.2 million people and counting, Carney’s government continued to express support. Canada has spent months issuing statements condemning Iran, sanctioning hundreds of individuals and entities, and diplomatically isolating Tehran. Last week, Anita Anand announced sanctions against another five individuals and five entities under Canada’s Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations. This is where Canada’s claim to an independent foreign policy begins to look increasingly hollow. You do not need to go to Georgetown to understand what appeasement looks like. You simply need to watch Ottawa’s foreign policy unfold across Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Cuba, Venezuela, and now Iran. The pattern is remarkably consistent. Every single time the United States goes about their military adventurism, Canada unflinchingly finds diplomatic language to accommodate it. And the performative language of rules-based international order just whimpers out of the vocabulary.

But this time, at the UN General Assembly, Carney and his foreign minister were effectively going above and beyond, doing the public-relations work of explaining away Trump’s language better than any McKinsey consultant could have managed. Canada does not merely follow Washington. Increasingly, it appears to anticipate what Washington wants and adjust its own language accordingly. The result is a foreign policy that is forceful toward countries Washington opposes while remarkably accommodating toward the power whose military, economic, and political leverage constrains Canada’s choices.

And this is where the absurdity of the strategy becomes difficult to ignore. Canada has been hit with tariff after tariff, threatened over its sovereignty, and repeatedly reminded that Washington is willing to weaponize the very economic relationship on which Canada depends. Yet Ottawa continues to cower before Washington while backing its military adventures and accommodating its rhetoric. Stupidity, as the old saying goes, is doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting a different outcome. If decades of deference were supposed to buy Canada security, goodwill, or protection from American coercion, the tariffs should have demonstrated by now that the strategy has failed. Instead, Ottawa appears determined to double down.

Perhaps in a parallel universe, Canada has the courage to stand up to the United States and develop a genuinely independent foreign policy. But this is not that universe. This is Canada in which Mark Carney is prime minister and Anita Anand is foreign minister. Canada was given a wake-up call. The tariffs exposed the danger of economic dependence. The threats to Canadian sovereignty exposed the limits of political complacency. The wars and conflicts surrounding Canada’s foreign policy exposed the limits of strategic independence. Ottawa’s answer has been to diversify a little, spend billions on American-linked defense systems, issue carefully calibrated statements, and continue moving in Washington’s direction.

Perhaps expecting this government to have the conscience to call a genocide a genocide; call for a ceasefire in Iran, Gaza, or Lebanon; or demand an end to the US blockade of Cuba is wishful thinking. But repeated tariffs and threats to Canadian sovereignty should at least force Ottawa to wake up to the obvious: Cheerleading American military interventions and then dressing up Trump’s annihilation rhetoric as merely the language of war is not buying Canada any goodwill in Washington.

Nor is it reflecting the views of the Canadians this government claims to represent and hopes to win over at the next election. A clear majority of Canadians have opposed the US military action against Iran and, with every passing day, Canadians have also become increasingly critical of Israel’s conduct in Gaza, with polls showing substantial support for describing Israel’s actions as genocide. Perhaps, then, after tariff after tariff, Ottawa might finally realize that subservience is not a foreign-policy strategy. So if there is any silver lining to this prolonged humiliation, it may be that Carney might be finally forced to rethink Canada’s relationship with the United States and begin divesting from that dependence. Maybe it is time to stop guessing what Washington wants, stop parroting its justifications, and start listening to the Canadians this government claims to represent.


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Umer Azad
Umer Azad is a software engineer by profession and a volunteer with CODEPINK and the Palestinian Youth Movement (PYM). He previously served as the regional social media expert for Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), where he worked on digital outreach, exposing voter fraud, and documenting human rights violations.
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IMPERIALIST WAR CRIME

Saudi-backed forces run over surrendering Houthis with trucks

Akhtar Makoii
Mon, October 5, 2026


Saudi-backed Yemeni forces ran over surrendering Houthi fighters with armoured vehicles, video showed on Monday, as intense clashes raged over control of a key Red Sea shipping lane.

In one video clip, a group of Houthi fighters can be seen raising their hands to surrender moments before an armoured vehicle drives over them. The driver is heard shouting "Allahu Akbar".

Another video shows an armoured vehicle driving over several wounded fighters who had raised their hands while lying on the ground. A third shows Houthi fighters, wading through shallows, being run over. Some also appeared to be gunned down.

The images emerged as Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi air power, pressed an offensive to drive the Iran-backed Houthis from the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which the rebels seized in a lightning offensive last month.

Both sides have reported heavy casualties in fighting along the coast of the Red Sea, which is vital for global shipping, and around the city of Taiz.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949, which Yemen has ratified, bars violence against combatants who are "hors de combat" – out of the fight – including those who have surrendered or been incapacitated by wounds.

Intense clashes broke out on Monday over one of the world's most important shipping lanes.

Plumes of smoke were seen rising over the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, after Saudi jets struck at least one location in the city.

Yemeni military sources on the ground told The Telegraph that the operation began with waves of Saudi-led air strikes and a ground push by government units towards the strait.

Houthi rebels said they were fighting back, and denied that government forces had advanced.

Were Yemen's forces to wrestle back control of the strait, it could provide a significant security boost for shipping through the narrow oil and gas chokehold.

The Saudi-backed forces said they had seized large parts of the Dhubab district, which overlooks Bab el-Mandeb.

Brig Gen Majid al-Nuzaili, a spokesman for the Saudi-backed forces, said troops had tightened control of the area and that some besieged Houthi fighters had fled by boat.

If the Yemeni government retook the Bab el-Mandeb strait, it could provide a significant security boost for global shipping - Reuters

He described the operation as a "strategic offensive operation" that utilised "modern capabilities". More than 1,000 strikes were said to have been carried out since dawn.

A Yemeni defence minister said that forces had taken "full control of Bab al-Mandeb and Mayun Island".

The assault is part of a broader campaign, called Operation Dawn of Yemen, announced on Sunday by the country's internationally recognised government.

As night fell, Saudi-backed forces said they had captured the strategic coastal city of Mokha and were pushing north towards the Red Sea towns of Yakhtul, Jiran, Maushij and Al-Khaukhah.

Mokha, the historic coffee trading port that gave mocha its name, had been seized by the Houthis last month in their lightning sweep down the coast.

Yemen's pro-government Saba news agency quoted a military source as saying government forces had retaken the city, west of Taiz province, and were securing it.

If confirmed, the capture would be one of the government's most significant gains since the offensive began on Monday morning, handing it a foothold on the coast and paving the way for an advance up the shoreline toward Hodeidah, the Houthis' main Red Sea port, while loosening the fighters' grip on the waters around Bab el-Mandeb.

Rashad al-Alimi, the chairman of the presidential leadership council, ordered forces to retake all Houthi-held territory and vowed to fight "until the country is liberated from the grip of the terrorist militia".

He set the recapture of Sanaa as the ultimate goal to help move Yemen "towards a new dawn of freedom, peace, and stability".

The Saudi-led coalition said more than 320 "high-value targets" had been struck since the operation began, with more than 100 jets taking part on Monday alone.

"We are providing air support to back the Yemeni armed forces on the ground around the clock," Maj Gen Turki al-Maliki, the coalition spokesman, said.

The government army said 1,747 Houthi fighters had been "neutralised" and more than 360 military vehicles destroyed in some 1,100 operations across Saada, al-Jawf and Taiz provinces and the western coast.

The Telegraph could not independently confirm casualty and equipment figures because the situation on the ground was rapidly changing on Monday afternoon local time.

The Houthis have pressed their own advances. A source said the group had driven government forces from the al-Mawasit district of Taiz province, reaching Mr al-Alimi's home area.

The military said the rebels had pushed along strategic hilltops near Taiz and cut the last road linking the besieged city to Aden, the government's interim capital.

The fighting has thrust another global energy artery into jeopardy. Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, has gained importance as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, effectively closed by the Iran war.

The Houthis seized much of the Red Sea coastline last month, and the renewed combat has pushed up global oil prices.

The latest fighting has deepened what the United Nations has described as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

Afrah Al-Zouba, the Yemeni foreign minister, appealed for more international support, saying it was "in the world's interest" for the country to be stable.

"The latest flare-up threatens to be absolutely devastating," said Matthew Hollingworth, a senior World Food Programme official, adding that Yemen imported roughly 90 per cent of its food.

Across Yemen, 18.3 million people face severe food insecurity, including 2.2 million acutely malnourished children under the age of five.

The Houthis seized much of the Red Sea coastline last month - Getty Images/Mohammed Hamoud

More than 149,000 people have been uprooted by the latest fighting, the International Organisation for Migration said, and more than 3,700 have fled across the strait to Djibouti.

Saudi Arabia led an Arab coalition into Yemen in 2015 and fought the Houthis to a bloody stalemate.

US Backs Major Saudi-Led Offensive as Yemen Slides Back Toward All-Out War

The US is providing military advisers and helping the Saudis choose targets in a war that has already displaced nearly 150,000 people and put much of the country on the brink of acute food insecurity.

Flames burn at a facility belonging to Saudi oil giant Aramco south of Riyadh following retaliatory strikes from Yemen’s Houthis on October 3, 2026.
(Photo by AFP via Getty Images)

Stephen Prager
Oct 04, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

Yemen is spiraling back toward full-scale war after its Saudi-backed government launched a major offensive on Sunday to retake territory captured by the Iran-backed group Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis.

President Rashad al-Alimi said the armed forces would seek to retake all Houthi-controlled territory, which is home to about 70% of Yemen’s population, including the capital Sanaa. He said the offensive would continue “until the country is liberated from the grip of the terrorist militia.”

Houthi officials said Saudi forces have launched 50 air and missile attacks in the last 12 hours. As al-Alimi announced the new offensive, the Houthis responded by launching ballistic missiles and drones at Saudi Aramco oil facilities, including one near Riyadh that was engulfed in flames.



Last month, the Houthis captured major strategic areas along the Red Sea coast, giving them unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s busiest shipping routes and adding to the economic stranglehold Iran is asserting by restricting travel through the Strait of Hormuz in response to US-Israeli attacks.

Earlier this month, it was reported that President Donald Trump had rebuffed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s request for the US to launch airstrikes against the Houthis.

However, US officials told Axios on Friday that the military is providing Saudi Arabia with “everything short of direct combat, mainly intelligence and targeting data.”

While the Saudis conduct a new campaign of airstrikes, Yemen’s government could reportedly mobilize as many as 100,000 troops, one of the largest military buildups since the 2022 truce that halted the nation’s brutal eight-year civil war.

That war, in which the US also provided extensive military support to a merciless Saudi air campaign, is estimated by the United Nations Development Program to have caused about 377,000 excess deaths by the end of 2021: 154,000 from the fighting itself and 223,000 from indirect effects such as hunger, disease, and the collapse of healthcare and basic infrastructure. An estimated 259,000 of those deaths were of children under 5.

Even before Sunday’s escalation, renewed fighting was already fueling a major displacement and hunger crisis. More than 149,000 people have been driven from their homes, according to the International Organization for Migration. Meanwhile, the World Food Program says fighting has disrupted food delivery routes, placing 18.3 million Yemenis at risk of acute food insecurity.

The US and Israel have repeatedly bombed the group, yet it still controls much of the country.

On the other side of the Arabian Peninsula, Maj Gen Ali Abdollahi, the chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, warned on Monday that any new war against Iran would spiral out of control and "engulf everyone".

On Monday evening, Turkey and Pakistan vowed to send troops to Saudi Arabia under a newly signed defence pact.

The "rapid deployment" of soldiers was announced in a joint statement by Pakistan's foreign ministry as it praised Riyadh's "vigilance" in countering Houthi attacks.

The Mecca joint defence agreement, modelled on Nato's Article 5, was signed in August by the three majority-Sunni nations and agreed an attack on one was an attack on all.

In the statement, Islamabad and Ankara condemned the "attempted targeting" of Mecca and Medina, two of Islam's holiest sites, by the Iran-backed Shia Houthi.

Turkey's foreign minister added: "We also discussed what could be done to resolve the issue peacefully through dialogue. Saudi Arabia has adopted a very constructive approach to resolving the issue."

Afghanistan And The Terrorism Question Before The United Nations – OpEd

Photo Credit: Zarif Amir, Pexels

October 5, 2026

By Dr. Sahibzada Muhammad Usman


Key Takeaways:

A closed Security Council meeting on Sept. 16, 2026, days before the General Debate, was briefed that terrorist groups in Afghanistan still threaten the region; France pressed the Taliban on security as well as rights, and Afghanistan’s own envoy called terrorism a serious threat.

The piece says the worry is wider than Pakistan’s TTP-sanctuary claims, which Kabul denies, and points to the February Monitoring Team report, the secretary-general’s reporting, and the Sept. 11 counterterrorism session.

The author’s ask is measurable checks on movement, recruitment, finance, and training, plus Pakistani intelligence through U.N. channels, not isolation of Afghans.

At a highly significant diplomatic juncture, Afghanistan is back at the heart of international security issues. The United Nations Security Council held a closed-door meeting on the situation in Afghanistan on 16 September 2026, just days before world leaders will arrive in New York for the 81st United Nations General Assembly’s General Debate. The timing matters. No longer is Afghanistan only talked of as a humanitarian crisis or uneventful political transition. Terrorist groups have become a recurring theme in debates on security in the region and indeed in the international community. The Security Council meeting record shows that the Council was briefed separately on Afghanistan and the UNAMA briefing explicitly stated that Afghanistan remains the victim of the threats of terrorist groups and the situation in the region and international peace and security is at threat.

That is the wording which needs to be watched as it takes the dialogue beyond bilateral Pakistan Afghanistan blame game. Islamabad has also repeatedly alleged the presence of armed groups, especially the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan, in Afghanistan, which it alleges provide them with sanctuaries and/or operational networks. Kabul has denied Pakistan’s charges and said that the Afghan land was not being used to strike other nations. But the worry over the terror activity within Afghanistan is not restricted to Pakistan. There is institutional support for international monitoring of the security situation through the most recent reporting schedule of the SG, the Monitoring Team in August, and the Taliban sanctions monitoring report.
A Concern That Extends Beyond Pakistan

France has added important diplomatic weight to this discussion. During earlier The position can be reviewed in the official Security Council transcript. At the 16 September meeting, France again pressed the Afghan authorities to demonstrate credible action on security concerns, alongside human rights and political commitments. The wider Council discussion therefore illustrates something significant. Concern about terrorism linked with Afghanistan is not merely a Pakistani talking point. It has entered the vocabulary of permanent and elected Security Council members.


This distinction should shape the international discussion. It is built through convergence between national evidence and independent international assessments. The February Monitoring Team report and the earlier Secretary General report on Afghanistan show that the United Nations has continued to track extremist networks and security risks. Even Afghanistan’s representative at the United Nations stated during the September meeting that terrorism remained a serious threat and referred to Monitoring Team findings concerning numerous terrorist organisations. His Security Council statement also argued that counterterrorism concerns must be addressed through accountable governance and respect for international law.

There is also a larger lesson emerging from the Council’s recent counterterrorism discussions. On 11 September, France convened a Security Council meeting marking twenty five years since the attacks of 2001. The Council terrorism debate addressed changing terrorist methods, recruitment, financing and the exploitation of new technologies. The accompanying Council briefing analysis recorded negotiations in which the continued presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan became part of the discussion. This places Afghanistan within a much wider security problem involving cross border networks, digital recruitment, terrorist financing, foreign fighters and increasingly decentralised extremist organisations.

Why UNGA 81 Creates a Diplomatic Opening

The coming General Assembly week gives this issue additional importance. The 81st session formally opened on 8 September and its General Debate begins on 22 September, according to the United Nations UNGA guide. The UNGA high level program confirms that heads of state, governments and senior delegations will converge in New York during the same week. Other international institutions are organising their priorities around this diplomatic gathering, including the World Health Organization program and the European Union UNGA agenda. Afghanistan therefore enters the high level week with its security situation already fresh in diplomats’ minds.

For Pakistan, this creates an opportunity to internationalise the discussion without turning it into a campaign against Afghanistan or the Afghan people. The distinction is essential. Pakistan’s argument should remain focused on specific terrorist organisations, their leadership structures, financing, movement, recruitment and alleged operational facilities rather than treating Afghanistan itself as the adversary. Evidence presented through multilateral institutions carries greater credibility than sweeping political allegations. The Security Council September forecast already identified cross border militancy as an important regional security issue and noted Pakistani allegations regarding TTP activity as well as the Taliban’s rejection of them. The UN Web TV record also provides a public record of the September Afghanistan discussion.
From Diplomatic Attention to Measurable Action

What ultimately matters is verification. The international community should seek measurable indicators showing whether organisations operating within Afghanistan are losing freedom of movement, recruitment capacity, financing, training infrastructure and the ability to plan external attacks. Afghanistan’s authorities, for their part, have an opportunity to demonstrate through verifiable measures that their territory will not be used against neighbouring states. Pakistan should similarly continue sharing actionable intelligence through appropriate international and bilateral mechanisms rather than expecting political statements alone to resolve the problem.


The diplomatic environment is therefore becoming more consequential. France holds the Security Council presidency during September, as reflected in the Council program of work, and its recent interventions have placed terrorism in Afghanistan within a broader international security framework. The Security Council’s monitoring architecture, UNAMA reporting, sanctions mechanisms and the political visibility of UNGA 81 together create a moment when evidence can be translated into sustained diplomatic attention. The purpose should not be isolation for its own sake. It should be accountability and measurable counterterrorism action capable of protecting Afghans, Pakistanis and the wider region.

As the Security Council declared years ago, international terrorism represents a challenge to all states and all humanity. That principle remains highly relevant today.

“Acts of international terrorism constitute a challenge to all States and to all of humanity.”
RecommendationsPakistan should present verifiable intelligence through established United Nations mechanisms consistently.

Regional states should strengthen intelligence sharing and coordinated border security arrangements.

UN monitoring bodies should regularly assess terrorist mobility recruitment and financing.
Afghan authorities should demonstrate measurable action against every designated terrorist organisation.

International engagement should connect diplomatic normalization with verifiable counterterrorism commitments.

About Dr. Sahibzada Muhammad Usman
Dr. Sahibzada Muhammad Usman holds a PhD (Italy) in geopolitics and is currently doing a Postdoctoral Fellowship at Shandong University, China. Dr. Usman is the author of a book titled ‘Different Approaches on Central Asia: Economic, Security, and Energy’, published by Lexington, USA.
View all posts by Dr. Sahibzada Muhammad Usman →

Balochistan: The Female Face Of Insurgency – Analysis




Baluchistan, Pakistan. Credit: VOA


October 3, 2026
SATP

By Ruchika Kakkar

Key Takeaways:

SATP reports that the banned Balochistan Liberation Front claimed its new all-female Karima Armed Assault Division’s first operation on Sept. 22, 2026, an ambush on an Action Task Force convoy near Jusak on the CPEC highway in Kech; no independent casualty figures were released, and the group also posted training footage.

The piece reads KAAD, named for activist Karima Baloch, as a 2025–26 shift after the BLF’s first claimed female suicide attack at Nokundi on Nov. 30, 2025, catching up with the BLA’s Majeed Brigade, which has publicized female attackers since the April 26, 2022 Karachi Confucius Institute bombing.

Claims about a mixed-gender Saddo battalion, a May 22, 2026 BLA women’s wing, and named attackers in Herof operations are group statements, not verified battlefield facts; the author treats the trend as recruitment and branding under pressure, not proof of a wider social mandate.

On 22 September 2026, the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) – a banned Baloch ethno-nationalist separatist group in Pakistan, waging an insurgency in Balochistan, allegedly from bases in Afghanistan – claimed that its newly formed all-female unit, the Karima Armed Assault Division (KAAD), carried out its first armed operation near Jusak in the Turbat tehsil (revenue unit) of Kech District in Balochistan. According to BLF spokesperson ‘major’ Gwahram Baloch, KAAD fighters ambushed a Pakistani military Action Task Force (ATF) convoy on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Highway. The group stated that the attack damaged military vehicles and left several ATF personnel dead or injured, though it did not release specific casualty figures. At the same time, the BLF’s media wing Aashob released training footage showing more than 20 uniformed women handling heavy weapons in mountainous terrain.

In a subsequent statement demarcating KAAD’s objectives, the BLF declared that its female fighters would operate on dual fronts: militarily against the Pakistani Army, intelligence agencies and military infrastructure, and socially against patriarchy, class exploitation and what the organisation terms regressive traditions within Baloch society. The statement positions KAAD as both an operational combat formation and a deliberate ideological project. BLF portrays its female members as predominantly highly educated and politically conscious, leveraging their involvement to frame insurgency as an intellectual and political movement rather than a purely armed or tribal uprising. It further contends that women’s participation bolsters the movement’s legitimacy and helps transcend regional, tribal and sectarian divides. KAAD, named after the prominent Baloch activist Karima Baloch, a former chairperson of the Baloch Students Organisation (BSO-Azad), whose death in suspicious circumstances in Toronto, Canada, in December 2020 became a significant rallying point, is presented by the BLF as an organised unit that combines armed, political, ideological and organisational roles.


The formation of KAAD forms part of a wider strategic and political shift within the BLF in 2025-2026. For years, the group had largely avoided both suicide operations and the systematic recruitment of female fighters. This stood in contrast to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), another Baloch ethnonationalist militant organisation, whose Majeed Brigade had first popularised high-visibility suicide attacks from 2022 onward, as well as the use of female operatives in those missions. The BLF only began employing female suicide operatives later, with its first confirmed case on November 30, 2025, and subsequently formalised this change by creating KAAD as a competitive response to BLA’s tactics. BLA’s methods had generated significant media attention, prompting the BLF leadership under Allah Nazar Baloch to adjust its approach, while also seeking to expand the group’s operational scope.

In 2025, on November 30, Zareena Rafiq, aka Tarang Maho/Trang Mahoo, associated with the BLF-formed Saddo Operational Battalion (SOB), carried out a suicide attack on the Frontier Corps (FC) headquarters in Nokundi, Chagai District of Balochistan. BLF presented this as its first use of a female suicide bomber. The attack resulted in the death of at least one FC trooper and injuries to several others, though casualty figures remain contested. The involvement of a relatively small number of Baloch women in armed and suicide operations has drawn significant attention. SOB is named after Commander Waja Sado aka Saadat Marri / Sado Marri, a veteran Baloch fighter born in 1927 who participated in earlier phases of Baloch resistance during the 1960s, 1970s and later years. He was killed on December 3, 2007, during an attack on an FC post in Kech. BLF messaging describes SOB recruits as highly motivated volunteers selected for discipline and a willingness to undertake high-risk operations. It is labelled as an evolutionary step that moves the BLF beyond traditional guerrilla tactics toward more professional, high-intensity special operations.


Although KAAD and SOB are operational units within BLF, they feature distinctly different structural frameworks and roles. Unlike KAAD, which is an exclusively female unit, SOB is not restricted to women. It includes male members and functions as an elite mixed-gender formation designed for complex, high-intensity missions.

As the South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) noted earlier, the participation of Baloch women in insurgent groups, including as female fidayeen (suicide) attackers, has become increasingly prominent in recent years. Women in Balochistan have been prominent in non-violent political activism over the past decade. Much of this activism has centred on issues of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, reflecting a parallel but distinct form of mobilisation within Baloch society. The first confirmed use of a female suicide bomber by a Baloch insurgent group occurred on April 26, 2022, when BLA attacked the Confucius Institute at the University of Karachi. The bombing killed five people, including three Chinese nationals, their Pakistani driver, and a security guard. In claiming responsibility, the BLA released the image and identity of the attacker, Shaari Hayat Baloch aka Bramsh, a member of the group’s Majeed Brigade suicide squad. She had joined the Majeed Brigade two years earlier.

Significantly, BLA is also actively expanding its women’s wing. On May 22, 2026, BLA publicly announced the creation of its women’s wing and released a video via its media wing, Hakkal, featuring Shaynaz Baloch as its ‘commander’. In the approximately 11-minute video, Shaynaz Baloch appears in combat gear alongside other armed women, states that she joined the organisation about seven years earlier as an ordinary member, and appeals to Baloch women and youth to join the struggle. She frames women’s participation as equal and rooted in historical Baloch tradition.

During Operation Herof 2.0, a large-scale, multi-district offensive launched by BLA across Balochistan in January-February 2026, the group heavily publicised the front-line involvement of its female cadres. In February 2026, Asifa Mengal, a 24-year-old Majeed Brigade operative, carried out a vehicle-borne suicide attack on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters in the Nushki District of Balochistan.


Similarly, in February 2026, Hawa Baloch, a fighter on the Gwadar front in Gwadar District, recorded a final propaganda video against the Pakistani state hours before dying in combat; and Dur Jan Baloch, a militant within BLA’s specialised Fateh squad, featured in BLA media carrying weapons alongside male fighters during attacks in Nushki.

In recent years, BLA has strategically deployed highly educated women for high-impact suicide missions, exemplified by the actions of Summiya Qalandarani and Mahal Baloch. On June 24, 2023, Qalandarani, a 25-year-old Computer Science student and BLA media propagandist, executed a suicide bombing targeting a Pakistani military convoy near Chakar Azam Chowk in Turbat, killing a police constable and prompting the BLA to officially declare the “era of women’s active participation in the armed struggle.”

Building on this tactical shift, law student Mahal Baloch aka Zilan Kurd, participated in BLA’s coordinated “Operation Herof” on August 26, 2024, driving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) directly into the gates of the FC Headquarters at Bela in Lasbela district to breach the military infrastructure.

The emergence of female suicide bombers marks a departure from traditional patterns in the Baloch insurgency. Using women enhances operational effectiveness by exploiting gendered assumptions in security protocols while expanding the recruitment base available to insurgent organisations. Sustained military operations, arrests, and targeted killings often shrink the pool of available male recruits, prompting groups to seek alternative sources of manpower. The present shift combines tactical innovation, ideological rebranding, and gendered symbolism in an effort to reposition the organisation within the increasingly competitive landscape of Baloch militancy.

KAAD is significant primarily because it may signal a tactical shift from the occasional participation of women in Baloch militancy toward a more institutionalised female combat structure. It reflects an organisational strategy shaped by the pressures of prolonged conflict. The growing presence of women in militant violence highlights the capacity of these groups to adapt, innovate, and reshape social norms to ensure their own survival.

Ruchika Kakkar, Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Source: This article was published by SATP

About SATP
SATP, or the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) publishes the South Asia Intelligence Review, and is a product of The Institute for Conflict Management, a non-Profit Society set up in 1997 in New Delhi, and which is committed to the continuous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia. The Institute was set up on the initiative of, and is presently headed by, its President, Mr. K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd).
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‘No Response Yet’: Silence From Pakistan On Grave Human Rights Violations Surrounding Forced Religious Conversions And Child Marriage Of Minority Girls – OpEd

October 5, 2026
By Kashif Nawab


Three UN Special Rapporteurs join UN Human Rights Council side-event to remind Pakistan of its international human rights and domestic law obligations to protect its children against slavery and sexual violence, and uphold human rights.

“We don’t know where they are keeping her […] We have terrible thoughts about what is happening to her,” the mother of Maria Shahbaz pleads in the video playing in the Human Rights Council side-event room Concordia 1; “Help us bring our daughters back,” is the appeal that echoes from the families of girls abducted and forcibly converted by their Muslim neighbours.

Professor Nicolas Levrat, UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues provides the keynote statement. His position is clear, the impunity surrounding forced religious conversions will, “not be solved by new laws or legislation.” He notes that Pakistan has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and that the rights of children are explicitly stated there; the practice of forced religious conversion and child marriage violate Pakistan’s international and domestic law commitments. Prof. Levrat, UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues expresses opposition to legislation banning forced religious conversion noting during the event noting that – internationally – such legislation is always applied discriminatorily by the majority religion against minority religions. Prof. Levrat instead appeals to the Pakistani authorities to ensure better access to justice for minorities, noting the opening testimonies of the families where the father of Maria Shahbaz described how the family went from court to court and “nothing happened.” Professor Levrat calls for training and technical cooperation of law enforcement and legal authorities. He does not disregard legal appeals, but emphasises that there are several hurdles to protecting the rights of the child that need to be tackled in tandem – the law but also education to counter the societal pressure against minorities. “This has to be worked on,” he says, noting there is a widespread bias in favour of the dominant group, “the authorities need to seriously consider the complaints – issue justice,” Prof. Levrat concludes.

Joining online Dr. Katarina Schwarz, an international and comparative legal scholar with extensive experience on contemporary forms of slavery, human trafficking, and related forms of exploitation and the newly appointed Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery and trafficking in persons, raises how child marriage falls under the category of slavery. She clearly describes how slavery does not occur in a vacuum but often foments in an environment of discrimination and often targets women and girls. She adamantly defends the legal position that responsibility to protect the girls rests with the state. She urges Pakistan to work preventatively and implement “Robust and effective protection to fulfil their obligation.”


Joining online as well, the Special rapporteur on violence against women and girls, its causes and consequences, Reem Alsalem, opens her statement with a clear outline of the legal frameworks for the protection of women and girls in Pakistan. She is positive to the passing of the Child Marriage Restraint Bill 2026 which passed in Punjab and came into force in May 2026, setting 18 years as the minimum legal age for marriage for both boys and girls and declaring underage marriage a non-bailable offence. Section 5 of the law also made cohabitation with a child resulting from such a marriage as child abuse, regardless of the child’s consent. The passing of this bill in Punjab is significant, as Punjab is the state where the majority of abductions and forced religious conversions of Christian girls occur, as noted in Jubilee Campaign’s report “Stolen Girls.” She notes with concern the inconsistent application of these laws however, where accountability often was dependent on which court and the level of engagement by the lawyers. She also describes how lack of accountability is exacerbated due to pressure on victims and families to withdraw complaints by the abductors and sometimes even law enforcement.

Christophe Foltzenlogel, advocacy officer with the European Centre for Law and Justice, expounds on the backdrop of discrimination of minorities, particularly against Christian minorities, in Pakistan. He describes the slow justice system, specifically in an anti-blasphemy law case: “Consider Shahzad Masih. He was just 16 years old when [authorities] arrested [him] in 2017 simply for repeating a conversation.” He says that even though the police commissioner testified that Shahzad’s words were not insulting because of immense pressure from fundamentalist groups who pack the courtrooms to intimidate judges, the court refused to try him as a minor and sentenced him to death in November 2022. Shahzad Masih recently told his lawyers: “They should just hang me. I cannot bear this suffering of waiting every single day.”


Christophe Foltzenlogel joins his co-panelists in emphasising that Pakistan has the laws but is not implementing them. He spotlights the mishandling of justice in forced religious conversion cases and woefully notes that there is more care given to intangible objects that have been stolen than the abduction of a human life. In cases of theft the object is sought out and placed under police custody or returned to its owner but even now, 13-year old Maria Shahbaz – abducted by a 30 year old man – remains under the control of her abductor, “the thief.”

Joseph Janssen, Pakistani human rights advocate and advocacy officer with Jubilee Campaign, has met with survivors of forced religious conversion and abductions. He outlines the extent of the problem drawing from Jubilee Campaign’s report “Stolen Girls.” He describes what took place in the court during one of the most recent cases of a minor who was forcibly converted and married off to an older Muslim man, Amber Nadeem. He says, “I personally witnessed lawyers arguing that because she had converted to Islam, she could not return to her Christian parents, as this would constitute apostasy. Her status as a child was being pushed aside.”

This speaks to the societal pressure described by Professor Nicolas Levrat, noting that there are injustices that need to be confronted in tandem with the legislative and other advocacy to secure sustainable protection for minorities today and tomorrow, recognising minorities as equals in dignity and rights.

“Maria Shahbaz’s case has been raised locally and internationally, including at the European Parliament and the United Nations,” Joseph Janssen concludes, “Yet she remains in the custody of her alleged abductor and purported husband. Why has she still not been placed in government protective custody, away from those accused of harming her?”


He echoes the plea of the families: Pakistan needs to rescue the girls from their abductors while they wait for justice and heed the international and domestic calls for implementation of existing laws and not just lip service, Maria Shahbaz and others need to be returned to their parents.

“No response yet,” Prof. Nicolas Levrat says in response to a question about what has happened to the the UN Special Procedures’ communication which raised concern the impunity surrounding forced religious conversions and abductions of women and girls in Pakistan and other countries. The communication was followed up several times with press releases including most recently in April 2026, noting that the scale and persistence of these human rights violations, “point to systemic discrimination against non-Muslim women and girls who are forced or compelled to convert to Islam in order to marry Muslim men.” The Special Procedures in that release called on the government of Pakistan to: “intensify efforts to eradicate forced conversions, to raise the minimum age for marriage to 18 in all provinces and territories, to criminalise forced religious conversion as a distinct offence and to enforce applicable laws pertaining to human trafficking and sexual violence.” The implementation of the recommendations is yet to be seen but the panelists’ hopes are that this side-event will be a reminder to Pakistan to put the plight of Pakistan’s daughters on the top of their agenda, to bring them back to safety and rescue them from the grasp of their rapists and captors.


About Kashif Nawab
Kashif Nawab is a Director with Social Action Transformation of Humanity (SATH) in Pakistan.

Heatwaves, wildfires expose a third of world to extreme ozone pollution

Heatwaves and wildfires helped expose 34 percent of the world’s population to “extremely poor” ozone air quality in the first eight months of 2026, according to a European Union report published Wednesday. Asia recorded the highest exposure, while ozone pollution remained difficult to curb despite decades of progress in reducing other harmful emissions.

Issued on: 30/09/2026 
By: FRANCE 24

(FILE) This year's ozone pollution was fuelled in part by record-breaking heatwaves and wildfires. © Sajjad Hussain, AFP

Heatwaves and wildfires combined with human-caused emissions this year to expose one third of the world's population to extremely high levels of ozone pollution, a European Union report said on Wednesday.

In a new analysis covering the first eight months of 2026, the European Union's Copernicus Climate Atmosphere Monitoring Service (CAMS) highlighted the close relationship between climate change and air pollution.

When heat and sunlight react with airborne emissions from wildfires, vehicles and industry, they create ground-level ozone pollution, which can damage lung tissue, cause breathing problems, trigger asthma attacks and lead to other health issues.

Despite progress in cutting the most harmful air pollutants in recent decades, ozone has proved more difficult to tackle as climate change fuels the conditions that favour its formation.

This year's ozone pollution was driven in part by record-breaking heatwaves and wildfires that seared Europe and North America and sent smoke well beyond their borders.

Indonesia has experienced major wildfires, while the warming El Nino weather pattern, which started in June and is due to peak later this year, could drive more fires in southeast Asia, according to the analysis.

"Air pollution does not stop at borders. It can travel thousands of kilometres, crossing continents and oceans and affecting air quality far from its source," CAMS director Laurence Rouil said in the Atmosphere Watch report.
'Extremely poor' air

CAMS uses satellite data and computer models to track air pollution and wildfires.

The report found that 34 percent of the global population was exposed to "extremely poor" air quality between January 1 and September 15, meaning concentrations of ozone were well above the World Health Organization's exposure guidance.

The WHO's guideline sets 100 micrograms of ozone per cubic metre as the maximum recommended level of exposure, averaged over eight hours.

Another 17 percent of the world breathed "very poor" air, while five percent was exposed to "good" levels of ozone.

Asia has the highest rate of exposure to ozone pollution, with 53 percent of its population breathing "extremely poor" air. Another 22 percent was exposed to "very poor" ozone.

The continent's widespread emissions are driven by industrialisation, economic development and transport, as well as wildfires and the burning of agricultural residue.

New Delhi, Dhaka, Chinese megalopolis Chongqing and Pakistan's Lahore were among cities whose ozone levels were "extremely poor".

Two thirds of the population in North America and 45 percent in Europe were exposed to "poor" or "very poor" air quality.

EU regulation has been effective in reducing emissions from air pollutants, except for ozone, the report said.

Ozone pollution is linked to 60,000 premature deaths per year in Europe, Ian Marnane, an official at the European Environment Agency, told a media briefing.

Ozone levels in North America also remained "relatively unchanged" despite ambitious emissions reduction policies, the report said.

Smoke from forest fires, crop burning and cooking are significant contributors to Africa's air pollution while Saharan dust travels as far as Europe.

Eight percent of Africa's population endured "extremely poor" air quality this year. It was "very poor" or "poor" for 19 percent of the continent.

Ozone levels were very high in the Brazilian city of Sao Paulo and extremely elevated in Rio de Janeiro but the air quality was "good" or "fair" for 81 percent of South America's population.

One bright spot was Oceania, including Australia and New Zealand, where 66 percent of the population enjoyed "good" ozone levels and 34 percent lived under "fair" conditions.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

 

Pakistan Explores Buying or Chartering Boxship Due to Shipping Challenges

Port Trust operates two container terminals but Pakistan does not have a dedicated containership of its own (Port Trust)

Published Oct 1, 2026 9:22 PM by The Maritime Executive

The government of Pakistan has agreed to work with the country’s manufacturers and shippers to explore obtaining a dedicated containership. Like other nations, it cites the growing challenges and rising costs of shipping, while the manufacturers urge that they are at a growing disadvantage due to the problems in shipping.

The Minister of Maritime Affairs hosted a meeting in Islamabad on October 1 to discuss the challenges with the shipping industry. Adidas Pakistan led the discussion along with a local manufacturer, Style Textile, and the Pakistan National Shipping Corporation. Adidas has large manufacturing capabilities in Pakistan and is also a major retailer in the country.

The manufacturers and exporters emphasized the growing challenges, in part due to the disruption from the US-Iran war and the problems in the Red Sea. They highlighted the disruptions to shipping due to the rerouting of vessels away from the Gulf region and diverting around Africa to avoid the dangers from the Houthis in the Red Sea. They also cited changes in the shipping industry and the routing of the large containerships to main routes and relegating smaller ports to more limited feeder services.

They emphasized that the longer shipping distances are making it more difficult to move goods and driving up the cost of shipping. Furthermore, they said it is disadvantaging Pakistani exporters compared to regional competitors who have more direct access to major markets.

The Pakistan National Shipping Corporation told the meeting that it would be willing to charter or purchase a container vessel to facilitate the exporters' needs. However, they said it would have to ensure sufficient cargo volumes to make the operation commercially viable.

The ministry, along with the shipping corporation and the exporters, agreed to form a working group to examine the steps available to improve shipping connectivity and access to international markets.  They are also asking for other measures aimed at reducing transportation costs and improving connectivity.

The manufacturers will also consult other exporters to determine a better understanding of the challenges and the potential demand for a dedicated container vessel.

At the beginning of this year, the Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works began cutting steel for the construction of the country’s first containership. The plan, which was announced in 2022, calls for building a vessel with a capacity of 1,100 TEU. It would be operated by the state-run Pakistan National Shipping Corporation. Reports at the time said it was the first large commercial ship to be built in Pakistan since the 1980s.

The government launched a task force in 2024 to examine the opportunities to expand Pakistan’s maritime economy.

Farmers unite worldwide against what they call ‘chemical colonisation’

Farmers and activists around the world are mobilising on Saturday for an international day of action against pesticides – denouncing products sold by major agrochemical companies that they say are damaging their health and destroying their livelihoods.


Issued on: 02/10/2026 - RFI

"No more cancer. Stop fumigating us," reads the banner of Exaltacion Salud protesters in Argentina demonstrating against the use of pesticdes. © Cortesía Virginia Roldán

By:  Zeenat Hansrod

“Pesticides are manufactured in France and exported to the Global South by companies who know full well that these pesticides contain molecules banned here," said Fleur Breteau, founder of Cancer Colère, one of four French organisations behind Saturday’s campaign.

"They are making money in breach of French regulations and in defiance of human rights laws.”

Farmers and organisations from countries including Pakistan and Argentina have joined the mobilisation, sharing what Breteau describes as the same anger over “chemical colonisation”.

“We, farmers, need to unite because of chemical colonialism by these very powerful agrochemical firms. As a Western person, as a French person, it is a big no because they are making money while breaching French laws,” said Breteau, who is battling breast cancer for a second time.

Illegal spraying of pesticides in Parada La Lata (Exaltación de la Cruz) in 2020, less than 1 km from a house and a rural school. © RFI/Agustín Brun

Health concerns in Argentina

In Argentina, Agustín Brun, an activist with Exaltacion Salud, a group fighting the use of chemical pesticides, also supports the campaign. He lives in Exaltacion de la Cruz in Buenos Aires province, a town closely surrounded by fields heavily sprayed with pesticides.

“The European Union and China, big buyers of our grains, export pesticides – some of which are banned in their own countries – while importing commodities at a cheaper price without having to face the socio-environmental costs and health issues of pesticide contamination at home,” Brun told RFI.

“In other words, those countries are outsourcing their problems.”

Developed countries “extract” products from Argentina that mostly benefit large pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies such as Bayer-Monsanto and Syngenta, Brun said.

“In my town we have found several agrochemicals molecules, including atrazine, in the soil, water and human blood samples. There is a high rate of cancer and other chronic diseases, higher in Exaltación de la Cruz than in nearby cities,” he said.

A landmark study by researchers at the National University of Rosario Faculty of Medical Sciences found that young people living in agricultural villages exposed to pesticide fumigation were 2.5 times more likely to develop and die from cancer than those living in areas unexposed to agrochemicals.

“We can feel it in our own bodies, you know?” Brun said. “Several members of our groups died of cancer.”

We need to unite to fight against chemical colonialism. As a Western person, we say that we refuse that firms produce forbidden pesticides in our country and send them to the global south. It's a big no. It's against the French laws.

01:00

Fleur Breteau from Cancer Colère association in FranceZeenat Hansrod

Scientific evidence has linked atrazine exposure to cancer. Scientists have described atrazine as an endocrine disruptor and said it can have neurotoxic, teratogenic and genotoxic effects, as well as harming the liver and kidneys.

Atrazine was first developed by agrochemical company Syngenta, Brun said. Syngenta is one of four global giants in the seed and pesticide sector, alongside BASF, Bayer and Corteva, and is also one of Argentina’s biggest pesticide suppliers.

Atrazine has been banned in 60 countries, including across the European Union.

In 2019, a small aircraft illegally sprayed pesticides over a school near Brun’s town.

“The children and school staff were poisoned and suffered health damage,” Brun said. “A ban against aerial spraying of pesticides was then introduced throughout our municipality, not the province, but we’ve been campaigning for such a ban since 2012.”
Global mobilisation

Exaltacion Salud is among the organisations taking part in Saturday’s global protest. Actions are also planned in countries including Costa Rica, Pakistan, the United States, Belgium and Indonesia, as well as Hawaii.

“We’ve realised that anger is healthy,” Breteau told RFI. “And it’s led us to come together and unite our forces. There are millions of us and we’re right to be angry. When we bring all this helplessness and distress together, we can become very powerful. And this is what we will demonstrate on Saturday 3 October.”

France’s emergency agriculture bill passed, amid divisions over pesticides

In France, protesters will march outside one of Syngenta’s pesticide manufacturing plants in Saint-Pierre-la-Garenne, about 100 kilometres north-west of Paris, with several actions also planned in a neighbouring field.

Farmers, cancer patients, people affected by pesticide contamination, health workers, cancer researchers and lawyers are expected to join the demonstration.

“Four giants of pesticide and seed manufacturing industry, BASF, Bayer, Corteva and Syngenta, have formed a sort of oligopoly where they wield immense power worldwide,” Breteau said. “They are patenting living organisms and are making farmers dependent on their pesticides, seeds and technology to grow food.”

Syngenta was acquired in 2017 by Chinese state-owned ChemChina, itself a subsidiary of Sinochem Holdings.

“A seed from Syngenta won’t grow if you simply put it in the ground on its own, it needs pesticides to thrive,” Breteau said. “It’s as if you were putting pesticides in a child’s feeding bottle and saying, ‘It will make them grow faster’. It’s madness.”
Syngenta's response

Syngenta told RFI that farmers must be able to rely on a range of solutions and technologies to address the interconnected challenges of agricultural production, climate change and food security.

It said it strives to develop innovative solutions for all farmers and farming models.

“We fully respect the right to assemble and protest,” a Syngenta spokesperson said. “However, organising a protest at the Saint-Pierre-la-Garenne site seems ill-founded given the reality of its current operations: 70 percent of the site’s current output is suitable for use in organic farming.”

In Kenya, Susan Owiti of the Kenyan Peasants League told RFI that most pesticides used in the country are banned in the United Kingdom. She also described their sale in poorer countries as a form of chemical colonisation.

“Whoever feeds you, controls you,” she said. “Food sovereignty is about taking control and ownership. Control over what you are growing. So, by dumping their banned products onto us, the Global South, they want to take control of our food systems.”

The Kenyan Peasants League, a social organisation representing around 5,000 peasant farmers transitioning to agroecology, is taking part in the 3 October mobilisation on social media. It plans a “Twitter storm” and Facebook posts to raise awareness about pesticides and showcase the experiences of its farmers.

Owiti, a small farmer and activist from Migori in western Kenya, said she has farmed all her life.

“Agroecology farming has been a family tradition for as long as I can remember,” she said. “It means that we work closely with nature. I use my own seeds, make my own manure and develop my own pesticides based on knowledge passed on from my grand-mother and our elders.”

“We do not rely on agrochemical companies.”

In Kenya where the majority of farmers are women, they regularly help each other when there is a lot of work. Here in Apuoyo village, female farmers are weeding a maize and beans field, September 2025. © RFI/Kenyan Peasants League

Pesticides sold by major agrochemical companies, some of which may contain banned molecules, are degrading soil, affecting the health of farmers and their families and trapping them in debt, Owiti said.

“Because they need the pesticides for the seeds purchased from these companies, the farmers find themselves borrowing money from banks to pay loans to pesticide companies,” she said.

Owiti said she had seen many women – who make up most farmers in Kenya – suffering from skin and pulmonary diseases because they do not use protective equipment when handling pesticides.

“The government needs to implement the Agroecological strategic plan launched by the ministry of Agriculture in 2024,” she said.

The National Agroecology Strategy for Food System Transformation covers the period from 2024 to 2033.

Sharing the ancestral knowledge of older farmers is another way to “fight the big companies”, Owiti said.

“The older farmers, they are like libraries holding years and years of research,” she said.

She said passing this knowledge between generations and on to younger farmers would help preserve it and allow them to move away from agribusiness practices.

Why France's agriculture law may not help the farmers it claims to defend
Political battle

Breteau also accuses lawmakers of being influenced by major agrochemical companies.

“Today the red line has been crossed and ethics trampled over,” she said. “Lawmakers, mostly from the centre to the far-right, are casting doubts over the scientific evidence between some pesticides and the diseases they cause.

“Laws are being passed that reintroduce pesticides which were previously banned due to their toxicity to human health.”

Breteau became known in July 2025 when she shouted from the public gallery of the French parliament: “You are in league with cancer and we will make sure everyone knows it.”

French MPs were debating the Duplomb Bill, which included lifting restrictions on the use of pesticides, including acetamiprid.

“There’s a political ploy to force even more pesticides upon us, not to make the life easier for farmers or food sovereignty, it is simply matter of profit,” Breteau said.

“Pesticides are designed to boost production and increase yields at the expense of our health, biodiversity, clean water whilst using as few workers as possible.”

The European Parliament will examine the Food and Feed Safety Simplification Omnibus in October. It aims to streamline food and feed legislation, while its proposal for “efficient renewal procedures for pesticides” has come under criticism.

“It will authorise more than 90 percent of the pesticides currently in circulation, even if scientific studies show they are toxic,” Breteau said.

“In other words, once voted we won’t be able to take them off the market, despite their proven toxicity. So, this is very serious because it creates an unrestricted European market for these pesticide manufacturers.

“Any Member of the European Parliament who vote for this Omnibus law, we’ll regard them as criminals.

“How are we all supposed to get better in a world that poisons us a little more every day?”

Afghanistan Reduced Opium Production: What Was The Impact On Drug Trafficking? – Analysis

Cultivating poppies in Afghanistan for opium. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency.


September 28, 2026

By Geopolitical Monitor
By Damián Jacubovich

Key Takeaways:

UNODC figures show Afghan opium poppy area falling from ~232,000 ha (2022) after the Taliban ban to 10,200 ha in 2025 (~296 tonnes potential output; Alcis/EUDA ~414 tonnes). Farm sales income is estimated at $134 million in 2025, down 48% from 2024; drought also played a role.

The author says that does not prove the world heroin market shrank: EUDA cites ~12,000 tonnes of estimated Afghan stocks, Myanmar area up 17% (output ~flat), and ~9,116 ha of poppy reported in Balochistan—hectares are not proven replacement tonnes.

Criminal profits cannot be read off farm losses: revenue, cost, and margins differ by stage; groups may tap stocks, new sources, or other drugs. Relocation is a hypothesis to test, not a finding.

Afghanistan reduced the area devoted to opium poppy cultivation from approximately 232,000 hectares in 2022 to 10,200 in 2025. The scale of this decline raises three related questions that require different answers.

First, can state intervention drastically reduce a major source of drug production? In Afghanistan, the answer is yes. Second, has that reduction produced an effective contraction in the international opium and heroin market? Large accumulated stockpiles and the possible emergence of alternative suppliers make the answer less certain. And third, what consequences has the ban had for criminal organizations’ revenues and profitability, and what can we infer about drug trafficking globally?

Did the ban reduce opium production in Afghanistan?

In April 2022, the Taliban authorities banned opium poppy cultivation. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Afghanistan cultivated approximately 232,000 hectares in 2022 and produced an estimated 6,200 tonnes of opium. Cultivated area fell to 10,800 hectares in 2023, rose to 12,800 in 2024 and declined again to 10,200 in 2025. UNODC estimated potential production at 296 tonnes in 2025. Drought and crop failures also contributed to the latest decline, so not every change can be attributed exclusively to the ban.

The contraction is unmistakable, although estimates differ. The European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA) cites an Alcis estimate of 414 tonnes of Afghan opium production in 2025, compared with UNODC’s 296 tonnes. Comparisons over time should therefore use a consistent statistical series.

The economic consequences are also clear at farm level. UNODC estimates that farmers’ income from opium sales to traders fell from $260 million in 2024 to $134 million in 2025, a decline of 48 percent.


The answer to our first question is clear: following the ban, opium cultivation in Afghanistan fell dramatically. Afghan farmers also suffered a substantial loss of income. Yet their losses do not establish that international intermediaries and distributors experienced an equivalent decline. A smaller harvest does not necessarily mean that less opium is available on the market.
Did the fall in Afghan production contract the international opium and heroin market?

Cultivation is only the first link in a longer commercial chain involving traders, processors, transporters, intermediaries, and distributors. The market impact of lower harvests also depends on accumulated stocks, alternative suppliers, prices, and demand.

Stockpiles create a time lag between production and supply. The European Drug Report 2026 cites an Alcis estimate of approximately 12,000 tonnes of opium stored in Afghanistan in 2025. This is an estimate, not a physical inventory. EUDA reports that stockpiles, processing and adulteration practices, and supply management by trafficking networks have helped sustain heroin availability in Europe despite the decline in Afghan cultivation.

Stocks can sustain sales without equivalent new production, but they may eventually be depleted, become more expensive, or cease to be accessible to particular networks. The evolution of supply as these stocks diminish will be essential to evaluating the ban’s lasting market effects.

Alternative producers present a different question. UNODC reports that Myanmar’s cultivated area increased by 17 percent, from 45,200 hectares in 2024 to 53,100 in 2025. Its estimated opium output, however, rose by only 1 percent because yields fell. Internal conflict, displacement, and economic difficulties also affect cultivation there. These figures establish expansion in another country, not that the Afghan ban caused it or that Myanmar has replaced Afghan supply.


Pakistan offers a different kind of evidence. EUDA cites satellite analysis suggesting approximately 9,116 hectares of poppy cultivation in Balochistan in 2025, potentially rivaling Afghanistan’s 2025 output. This suggests a possible alternative source of supply, but hectares are not tonnes: neither the volume produced nor effective replacement of Afghan supply has been established.

We must distinguish three propositions: simultaneous expansion elsewhere, displacement causally linked to the Afghan ban, and actual replacement of supply. Each requires different evidence. The answer to the second question remains open: the production decline is established, but the extent and duration of its effects on the international opium and heroin market are not. Even if that market contracts, we still need to establish who bears the economic losses—and which activities, if any, take their place.
What happened to criminal organizations’ revenues and profitability—and what does this tell us about global drug trafficking?

This question brings me back to a hypothesis I began developing in 2014 while examining changes in Latin American drug trafficking and its expansion into Argentina. I borrowed a concept from the economics of globalization: relocation.

My hypothesis involved two mechanisms. State pressure—stronger controls, enforcement, and higher operating costs—could encourage certain activities to move to territories with lower risks. Expanding demand could also attract organizations, alter routes and draw previously peripheral territories into new consumer markets. Relocation could therefore reflect both a response to state intervention and the search for new commercial opportunities.

Afghanistan provides a case in which to investigate this hypothesis, but the available evidence does not yet confirm it. The central question is what happens to economic opportunities when a major source of production shrinks. Some may disappear permanently; others may be taken up by new suppliers, organizations, or activities. Relocation is one possible mechanism of that transformation, and its existence and scale must be demonstrated case by case.

Criminal organizations are not interchangeable with the markets in which they operate. An intervention may dismantle a network without eliminating consumer demand or the opportunities that attracted other actors. Some organizations may lose their business; others may draw on stockpiles, find suppliers, or diversify. There is no single global drug-trafficking organization making coordinated decisions.

The economic terms also matter. Revenue is the money received from sales; profit is what remains after costs; profitability relates profit to the resources required. Supply contraction can affect prices, costs, and margins differently at each stage. Prices and traded volumes may help estimate revenue, but profit also requires information on costs, and profitability requires relating profit to the resources employed. Higher heroin prices could increase an intermediary’s revenue without raising profit if procurement and operating costs also rise.

The documented fall in Afghan farmers’ income cannot simply be transferred to international traffickers’ accounts. Nor would a contraction in the heroin market and falling profits among organizations involved in it establish an equivalent decline in global drug-trafficking profits. Different organizations, substances, and markets may experience opposite outcomes; there is no single profitability figure for the entire illicit drug economy.


Testing the broader impact would require establishing which organizations lost income and profit, whether those losses persisted, whether other actors took their place, and whether activities shifted to other markets. Illicit markets do not provide conventional financial statements, but wholesale and retail prices, traded volumes, seizures interpreted alongside other indicators, estimated margins, financial flows, and changes in distribution may offer partial evidence.

Consumer behavior matters too. Reduced heroin availability could lead some people to consume less and others to turn to different substances. EUDA warns that synthetic opioids and stimulants warrant monitoring as possible market shifts; it does not establish that widespread substitution has already occurred because of the Afghan ban. A smaller heroin market could coexist with growth elsewhere, but that possibility remains to be tested.

The ban’s impact on the revenues and profitability of organizations involved in opium and heroin remains uncertain. Establishing its consequences for drug trafficking globally requires an even broader investigation.
Three Questions, Three Different Answers

The first question has a clear answer: state intervention can drastically reduce a major source of drug production. Afghanistan’s cultivation figures demonstrate this.

The second remains open. Stockpiles have cushioned the impact of smaller harvests, while alternative suppliers, prices, and consumption will help determine whether the international opium and heroin market undergoes a lasting contraction.

The third demands a wider inquiry. Even if that market contracts, we must establish which organizations lose revenue and profit, which adapt and whether those losses translate into a reduction in the illicit drug economy as a whole. The outcome could be lasting contraction, partial adaptation, or a transformation of criminal activities. Relocation is one mechanism to investigate, not a conclusion to assume.

Afghanistan has demonstrated that opium production can be drastically reduced. What remains to be demonstrated is whether that reduction also shrinks the market and, beyond it, the economic opportunities and profits of criminal organizations.

This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com


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