Iraq's Energy Sector Faces Its Most Important Test in Decades

By Cyril Widdershoven - Jun 11, 2026

• Iraq is trying to reassert federal control over its fragmented energy sector, using the Hormuz crisis as a catalyst to centralize exports, revenues, and infrastructure.
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• Renewed cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has revived exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.
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• The biggest obstacle remains politics, not geology: Iranian influence, militia activity, security risks, and unresolved Baghdad-Erbil tensions continue to deter investment despite Iraq's vast potential to boost oil and gas production.

Iraq’s oil sector has been discussed over the last few years primarily through the lens of production figures, OPEC quotas and reserve estimates. The latter, however, is no longer sufficient or even appropriate, as today’s story is no longer only oil. The current focus should be on a struggle over sovereignty, state authority, regional geopolitics and economic survival.

The coming months will prove decisive for the future of Iraq’s hydrocarbon sector. The government in Baghdad is currently attempting to rebuild and centralize an energy industry that has been fragmented for decades by war, corruption, militia influence, regional rivalries and institutional weakness. Iraq, at the same time, will need to get out of the ongoing conflict between an assertive Iran, increasingly independent Kurdish ambitions, and mounting pressure from international energy markets.

The irony is striking. The Middle East giant still holds some of the world's largest oil and gas reserves, but its energy future will be determined not by geology but by politics.

Iraq’s Ministry of Oil has become the centerpiece of Baghdad’s broader state-building project. Since early 2026, federal authorities have accelerated efforts to centralize control over exports, revenues and infrastructure. After the elections, a new leadership has been appointed. The increasing role of SOMO and federal institutions already indicates a clear objective: to reduce fragmentation and restore Baghdad's authority over the entire hydrocarbon sector. The new Iraqi leadership has become aware that continued political fragmentation translates directly into lost revenues and reduced strategic influence

The Hormuz crisis has only amplified the urgency of these reforms, as the country is among the hardest hit by disruptions to Gulf energy exports. Before the regional conflict, Baghdad exported around 93 million barrels per month through the Strait of Hormuz. By April 2026, however, these exports through the Strait had declined to around 10 million barrels. Again, even if some don’t want to see it, this has exposed the extraordinary vulnerability of Iraq’s export system. Insurance costs, security concerns, and tanker shortages created an economic shock that Baghdad could not ignore.

For the first time in years, Baghdad’s policymakers are forced to confront a reality that energy analysts have highlighted for decades. The country cannot continue relying almost exclusively on southern export terminals connected to a single geopolitical chokepoint.

This new realization, or maybe even the first-time realism back in town, is the main factor behind the resumption of exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline has become so strategically important. The March 2026 agreement between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was not simply an export deal. Without a doubt, Iraq's energy security depends on cooperation between Erbil and Baghdad, which the Iraqi government now acknowledges. Exports through Ceyhan have resumed at around 200,000-250,000 bpd, with ambitions to increase substantially in the coming months. Joint committees have been established, revenues are again flowing into federal structures, and both sides recognize the strategic necessity of keeping northern export routes operational.

Still, there should not be real optimism yet, as this would be a major mistake; it is only a tactical cooperation, not yet a strategic reconciliation.

The relationship between Baghdad and Erbil remains fundamentally fragile. The KRG continues to demand guarantees on budget transfers, salary payments, trade restrictions and investor protections. All Kurdish leaders have repeatedly argued that security threats from militia groups operating near energy infrastructure will have to be addressed and fully removed before long-term confidence can return. Iraqi authorities, however, still insist that all hydrocarbon revenues ultimately belong to the Iraqi state.

Despite these tensions, there are reasons for cautious optimism.

The Hormuz crisis has created a rare alignment of interests: Baghdad needs northern export routes, while the KRG needs revenue. International oil companies need predictability. Turkey wants transit volumes restored. Washington supports closer federal-KRG cooperation. For perhaps the first time in years, all major stakeholders benefit from a functioning export framework. This also applies to natural gas projects.

For decades, Iraq has been one of the world's great paradoxes: a major energy producer that continues to import gas and electricity. Associated gas flaring remains enormous, while domestic demand continues to rise. Due to the changing geopolitical and security situation in the region, Baghdad now sees gas development as both an economic necessity and a geopolitical imperative. Clearly, every cubic meter of domestically produced gas will reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iranian imports and strengthen the country’s energy security.

This is where the Kurdish region may become a critical part of Iraq's future.

The KRG possesses significant untapped gas resources capable of supporting domestic Iraqi demand, industrial development, and, potentially, future exports to Turkey and Europe. European and other Western policymakers are increasingly viewing Kurdish gas development as a means of reducing Iraqi dependence on Iran. At the same time, it will also support Europe’s move to quit its dependence on Russian and other external suppliers. The strategic importance of Kurdish gas has therefore risen substantially over the last two years.

While all of this is clear, it still does not separate it from the Iranian factor.

Iran remains the single most important external influence on Iraq's political and energy landscape. The Iranian Iraqi relationship is deeply embedded through trade, electricity imports, religious networks, political parties and security structures. The last sanctions on Iraqi officials and allegations involving Iranian-linked oil networks have again highlighted how difficult it remains to separate Iraqi energy policy from broader regional geopolitics. Baghdad’s main challenge is not simply Iranian influence; it is the role of Iran-linked militias operating inside the country.

The new Iraqi leadership has pledged to strengthen state authority and bring weapons under government control. Some militia groups have signaled a willingness to cooperate with reform efforts, while others remain deeply entrenched inside political, security and economic structures. Emerging optimism about signs that certain factions explore separation from formal militia frameworks should be tempered, as institutional influence built over two decades cannot be dismantled overnight.

For international investors, Western but also others, this situation or critical position remains the single greatest concern.

International oil companies can manage geological risks or price volatility. IOCs and NOCs can even manage regulatory uncertainty. The main issue they are unable to deal with is the risk of missile attacks, militia interference, political intimidation and infrastructure disruption. For Iraq, the coming weeks (or months) will represent a critical test.

If Baghdad succeeds in gradually strengthening state authority while avoiding confrontation with militia actors, investor confidence can improve. If tensions between Washington and Tehran escalate again, as they seem to be doing at present, Iraq is clearly expected once more to be one of the preferred arenas for proxy competition. Under such circumstances, pipelines, oil fields, export terminals and foreign-operated facilities would inevitably become targets.

At the same time, the broader regional environment adds another layer of complexity. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has changed Iraqi strategic thinking. Even as regional tensions ease, policymakers now understand that the old model is no longer viable. Baghdad is and will need to actively explore alternative export routes, pipeline expansions, and new agreements with Turkey. Discussions involving international energy companies, including major American firms, demonstrate Iraq's ambition to increase production capacity toward 5 million bpd while simultaneously expanding gas development.

Again, however, strategies and political wishful thinking will be confronted by a list of obstacles that must be addressed. The existing Iraq-Turkey pipeline framework faces uncertainty as long-standing agreements approach expiration. At the same time, infrastructure investment needs will be massive, totaling several billion dollars. Security concerns remain significant for a longer period. Yet the direction of travel is increasingly clear: Iraq is seeking diversification, redundancy and greater strategic autonomy.

This is where the story could become more optimistic than many observers assume.

For years, Iraq's energy narrative has been dominated by crises. ISIS. Budget disputes. Oil price collapses. Iranian influence. Militia violence. Pipeline shutdowns and political paralysis. At present, however, maybe for the first time in a decade, there are signs that structural incentives are aligning in favor of reform.

Baghdad recognizes the necessity of stronger institutions, including a functioning security system. At the same time, the KRG recognizes the necessity of cooperation. International investors recognize the scale of the opportunity. Turkey recognizes the value of Iraqi exports. Even regional actors increasingly understand that a stable Iraqi energy sector benefits everyone. The potential prize is enormous.

Even with the Middle East's vast potential, Iraq remains one of the few countries capable of materially increasing global oil production over the next decade. The country’s gas reserves are still underdeveloped, while its petrochemical sector offers substantial growth opportunities. Geography here also plays a significant role, as its location serves as a bridge among the Gulf, Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

For the Kurdish region, the outlook is equally promising if political agreements can be sustained. The combination of oil exports, gas development, proximity to Turkey and growing international interest in energy diversification could transform the KRG from a perpetual political problem into one of Iraq's most important economic assets.

Optimism could be right, but reality is still hard to deal with. Iranian influence, even if the current regime in Tehran is weakened, will remain. Iraqi Shia militias will not disappear overnight, while the Baghdad-Erbil disputes are not solved yet. Regional instability will periodically return, even in case of a US-Iran deal or a change of regime in Tehran

Yet the most important development is that Iraq's leadership is finally beginning to address the structural weaknesses that have constrained the sector for decades. The next crisis in Tehran, Washington or Erbil will not determine the future of Iraq’s oil and gas industry. When addressed rightly, it will be determined by whether Iraq can build institutions stronger than the political forces that have historically divided it.

By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com

Iraq At The Crossroads: Strategic Ties With Iran, Turkey, And The Arab World – Analysis

Map and location of Iraq. Credit: VOA

June 9, 2026 

The Congressional Research Service (CRS)
By Christopher M. Blanchard

The Republic of Iraq sits at a crossroad in the Middle East region, with ties to Iran, Turkey, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula that shape Iraqi interests, create constraints and opportunities, and attract intervention. In May 2026, Shia Arab businessman Ali Al Zaydi was sworn in as Prime Minister after Iraq’s parliament approved his government program and 14 of 23 cabinet nominees. A newcomer to government, Al Zaydi was the nominee of the Coordination Framework, a Shia coalition whose members won the most seats in Iraq’s November 2025 election.

After a post-election government formation process complicated by regional tensions and the spillover of the U.S./Israel-Iran conflict, Al Zaydi’s government faces questions about its strategic orientation, commitment to asserting state control over armed groups, and plans for averting conflict-amplified fiscal and energy crises. Under U.S.-Iraqi agreements, U.S. military forces have mostly withdrawn from central Iraq and consolidated in Iraq’s Kurdistan region. U.S.-Iraq security cooperation continues, including on efforts to secure more than 5,700 Islamic State (IS/ISIS) prisoners transferred to Iraq from Syria in 2026.

Since February 2026, Iran-backed Shia Iraqi armed groups have carried out hundreds of attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and on civilian targets in the Kurdistan region and neighboring countries, drawing counterstrikes and intensifying pressure on Iraq to rein in Iran-backed militias. Al Zaydi’s ability to do so may be limited and contingent; the CF coalition that nominated him includes parties with ties to Iran-backed armed groups. Like his predecessors, Al Zaydi may be challenged in asserting Iraqi sovereignty while maintaining Iraq’s internal cohesion and balanced relations with competing neighbors and the United States.

Since 2014, Congress has appropriated more than $8.4 billion for counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraqis. The 119th Congress may consider developments in Iraq and Iraq’s relationships with its neighbors as Members review the Trump Administration’s FY2027 requests for security assistance, as well as proposals related to foreign aid, security, and Iraqi religious and ethnic minorities.

Background

Iraqis have persevered through intermittent wars, internal conflicts, sanctions, displacements, terrorism, and political unrest since the 1980s. The legacies of the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq continue to shape U.S.-Iraq relations: the invasion ended the decades-long, dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party but ushered in a long period of chaos, violence, and political transition. U.S. forces withdrew in 2011, but conflict in neighboring Syria and divisive sectarianism in Iraq enabled IS insurgents to seize and exploit much of northwestern Iraq from 2014 to 2018. U.S. military forces and coalition partners returned to Iraq in 2014 at the government of Iraq’s invitation to help defeat the Islamic State group. Iran’s influence in Iraq also grew during this period as several Iran-backed Shia militia groups mobilized. Some of these militias were later legally consolidated into Iraq’s security sector under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state force with an estimated 238,000 personnel and a 2024 budget of about $3.4 billion.

Compared to earlier decades marred by conflict, relative stability and prosperity prevailed in Iraq from 2022 through 2025 under then-prime minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani. Joint U.S.-Iraqi operations targeted IS remnants in remote areas, and IS threats diminished. As conflict inside Iraq receded, new economic opportunities emerged, but regional conflict and unresolved domestic issues threatened to undermine Iraq’s gains. The Sudani government rested on an uneasy partnership between most Shia Arab parties and major Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that enacted expansive public spending laws. Political rivalry and national officials’ disputes with Kurdish leaders over security, energy, and revenue sharing limited government effectiveness. Intra-Kurdish divides have enabled national government efforts to re-centralize decisions and processes.

Sudani’s challenges now fall to Ali Al Zaydi. Unilateral foreign military operations in Iraq and Iraqi airspace by Israel, Iran, Turkey, and the United States have prompted nationalist demands to assert Iraq’s sovereignty. Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups’ attacks contravene Iraqi law, invite retaliation, and jeopardize Iraq’s stated desire to cooperate with foreign partners. Iraq’s young, growing population creates economic promise and employment pressure. Fiscal dependence on oil export revenue persists and public sector hiring has grown, while regional conflict and domestic disputes have limited trade and energy output.

 
U.S.-Iran Conflict and U.S.-Iraq Ties

Conflicts involving Iran since 2023 have shaken Iraq’s security and have placed a spotlight on the future of Iran-backed armed groups in Iraq. Some of these groups have been integrated into the PMF, whose origins lie in the 2014-2018 war against the Islamic State. Others have remained outside the PMF, working alongside some PMF-integrated forces to oppose the continued presence in Iraq of U.S. and coalition forces and to occasionally or repeatedly attack U.S. forces in Iraq, national and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces, and Iraq’s neighbors.


Following armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes during the 2023-2024 Israel-Hamas war, U.S. officials and the Sudani government agreed to end the presence in Iraq of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS during 2026, while U.S. forces relocated within and outside Iraq and refocused toward a bilateral security cooperation mission. While these plans were underway, the onset of Operation Epic Fury against Iran in February 2026 and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Syria prompted an “accelerated transition and force realignment” by U.S. forces in Iraq and a sharp uptick in armed group attacks and U.S. counterstrikes, including some U.S. strikes that killed Iraqi security personnel. Clandestine military operations in Iraq’s deserts attributed to Israel and Iranian attacks on Iraq-based Iranian Kurdish groups both contribute to Iraqi sovereignty concerns.

The United States has demanded that Iraq take action to dismantle Iraqi armed groups that have attacked U.S. targets and civilian targets and infrastructure in Iraq and neighboring countries. Iraqi officials and legislators may consider proposals to alter the status of the PMF and its personnel or address PMF ties to specific armed groups. Prime Minister Al Zaydi may face political and diplomatic dilemmas, as the coalition that nominated him includes parties that have been tied to the PMF and armed groups and as Iraq’s security sector has sought continued U.S. support. Al Zaydi has welcomed decisions by some groups to disengage from the PMF and/or accede to state control of all arms. According to U.S. defense officials, U.S. plans for long term security cooperation with Iraq envision “counterterrorism-focused training, intelligence sharing, and episodic presence without permanent basing.” U.S. forces in Iraq now operate at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and from the Kurdistan region.

Views from the Kurdistan Region

Iraqi Kurdish self-government developed after the 1991 Gulf War. In 1992, Iraqi Kurds established a joint administration between two main political movements—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in areas under their control. Iraq’s constitution recognizes KRG federal authority in areas that were under Kurdish control as of March 2003. After a 2017 KRG referendum favoring independence, national forces reasserted control of some disputed territories.

The Erbil-based KDP and the Suleimaniyah-based PUK won the most seats in the October 2024 KRG regional election and are the largest Kurdish parties in Iraq’s parliament. Historic KDP-PUK tensions have resurged, delaying formation of a new KRG cabinet since the 2024 regional election. KDP leader and former KRG president Masoud Barzani remains influential; his nephew, Nechirvan, is KRG president, and his son, Masrour, is KRG prime minister. The KDP and PUK retain separate aligned militia and security units, despite U.S. efforts to help unify and depoliticize the KRG security sector.

The United States has cooperated with the KRG and has supported the resolution of long-standing KRG-Baghdad disputes over oil production, the budget, territory, and security. In September 2025, a KRG-Baghdad agreement conditionally resolved disputes that had delayed transfers of funds and contributed to serious KRG fiscal strains. Since 2022, Iraqi court rulings have reduced KRG autonomy, including rulings that have found the KRG oil and gas sector law unconstitutional, invalidated KRG electoral arrangements, and required the transfer of KRG revenue to national authorities for payment of KRG employees.

Iraq opposes Turkey’s unilateral military presence and operations in the Kurdistan region, where Turkish forces have targeted the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. The PKK’s 2025 decision to disarm and steps taken to implement this decision could prompt future changes in Turkey’s posture.

U.S. Partnership and the 119th Congress

The U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and U.S. Consulate in Erbil have been attacked in 2026, but remain open. The U.S. Consulate in Basra closed in 2018. The position of U.S. Ambassador to Iraq is vacant, and Joshua Harris has served as chargé d’affaires A.I. since September 2025. On May 31, 2026, President Donald Trump named U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack as Special Presidential Envoy to Iraq.

Congress has authorized counter-IS train and equip programs for Iraq through 2026, and has appropriated related funds available through September 2027. The requestfor 2027 seeks nearly $119 million for Iraq’s military and Counter Terrorism Service, but does not seek funds for the KRG Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs (MoPA).

The Trump Administration’s 2025 foreign aid review ended some U.S. aid programs in Iraq and preserved others. The Trump Administration has not requested a specific amount of Foreign Military Financing foreign assistance for Iraq in FY2027, but seeks $900,000 to continue International Military Education and Training.

Members may conduct oversight and shape implementation of U.S. policy toward Iraq, including through consideration of the FY2027 defense authorization (H.R. 8800) and appropriations bills and other measures. The House Armed Services Committee-passed version of H.R. 8800 would limit most U.S. defense aid for Iraq until the Administration certifies that Iraq’s government has reduced the capacity of Iran-aligned armed groups and improved internal controls.About the author: Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

About CRS
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.
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UN verifies rapes of Palestinians, but still cites no Israeli victims

Ali Abunimah

The Electronic Intifada 

3 June 2026

Pramila Patten, the UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict, amplified Israel’s 7 October mass rape claims despite the absence of verified victims. (Inter-Parliamentary Union/Flickr, CC BY-NC 2.0)

This article contains explicit descriptions of sexual violence.

UN investigators have verified multiple rapes of Palestinian detainees by Israeli forces, but have still not verified a single claim of sexual violence against Israelis on or after 7 October 2023.

In his latest annual report to the Security Council on sexual violence in armed conflict, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warns that the verified crimes against Palestinians should be seen as “indicative of incidents and patterns” more broadly.

For the first time, Guterres added Israel’s military and security forces to the UN list of entities credibly suspected of responsibility for patterns of rape or other forms of sexual violence.

The full extent of those crimes is difficult to document because Israel continues to deny UN investigators access to detention sites and to Gaza, while reporting is further obstructed by “explicit threats” from Israeli forces “coercing detainees not to report abuse,” according to the report.
Rapes and gang rapes

The UN verified sexual violence, including rape and sexual violence used as torture, by Israeli forces against 31 Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank: 14 men, seven women, nine boys and one girl.

Thirteen of these cases occurred in 2025, and 18 in 2023 and 2024. The violations included rape, rape with objects, gang rape, attempted rape, forced nudity, threats of rape, unwanted touching of breasts and genitals, genital violence, targeted shooting of the genitals, and strip and cavity searches “without apparent security justification.”

Rape and gang rape, sometimes repeated, were verified against nine victims, most of them from Gaza.

The UN identified the perpetrators as Israeli military and security forces, including the Israeli army, the Israel Prison Service, its Keter special forces, and Yamam, the police “counterterrorism” unit.

The abuses took place mainly during detention and interrogation, including in prisons and detention camps at Sde Teiman, Etzion, Majnunah, Megiddo, Ofer, Ramla, Hasharon, Shatta, Nafha, Damon and Gush Etzion police station. Others occurred at checkpoints and during Israeli military operations.

The victims included journalists and human rights defenders. Some violations were filmed or photographed, including one of the rapes.

Women detainees were subjected mainly to threats of rape, forced nudity, unwanted touching and “humiliating or degrading strip searches without justification.”

Men and boys were subjected to rape, attempted rape and genital violence, leaving five male victims with severe rectal bleeding or swelling for days or weeks, in some cases without medical treatment.

The report adds that released detainees returned to catastrophic conditions in Gaza.

The UN report says Israel’s longstanding failure to hold its forces accountable has created a climate of impunity for violations against Palestinians.

It cites the case of five Israeli reserve soldiers indicted in February 2025 for severely assaulting a Palestinian detainee at Sde Teiman in July 2024.

Despite video and medical evidence – and allegations that the assault included inserting an object into the victim’s anus, causing severe rectal injuries – the indictment did not include charges of rape or sexual violence.

In March 2026, all charges were dropped and the alleged perpetrators have been widely celebrated in Israel as heroes.

These findings are consistent with other independent investigations into systematic Israeli sexual violence against Palestinians.
No verified Israeli victims

Meanwhile, the new UN report contains no new evidence backing up Israel’s claims of mass rapes and systematic sexual violence by Palestinians on 7 October 2023. In fact, it appears to further undermine those claims.

In his report to the Security Council last year, Guterres listed Hamas – though not Israel – as a party responsible for patterns of sexual violence and rape.

In last year’s report, Guterres stated that a mission to Israel in early 2024 led by Pramila Patten, the secretary-general’s special representative on sexual violence, “found clear and convincing information that some hostages taken to Gaza were subjected to various forms of conflict-related sexual violence during their time in captivity.”

Guterres also wrote that Patten’s mission “found reasonable grounds to believe that sexual violence occurred during the attacks of 7 October 2023 in multiple locations, including rape and gang rape.”

Patten’s claims, contained in a separate special report published in March 2024, were widely reported at the time as corroborating Israel’s narrative.

However, last year’s report by Guterres specifically states that evidence Patten cited was “circumstantial” and Guterres did not state that any case of sexual violence including rape had been verified.

Guterres’ 2026 report still makes no reference to verified Israeli victims of alleged sexual violence by Palestinians, including rapes.

It states that after two ceasefire deals in 2025 led to the release of more than 50 captives held by Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, six Israeli former captives publicly alleged sexual violence.

They included one female captive released in January 2025, two women released in 2023 who spoke publicly in March 2025 and three male captives released in October 2025.

Guterres states that “the United Nations was not able to verify any of these reports, given the continued denial of access by the Government of Israel to competent United Nations bodies to carry out investigations.”

The secretary-general’s report is totally silent about any new evidence, let alone victims, that could corroborate Patten’s sweeping 2024 claims regarding sexual violence on 7 October.

Guterres also notes that the UN “has not as yet received information on indictments by the authorities in Israel for charges of sexual violence against detained Palestinians accused of involvement in the attacks.”

Despite the sensational headlines generated by Patten’s March 2024 report, its detailed findings actually undermined more than they supported Israel’s propaganda narrative: For instance, Patten’s team was unable to find a single photo or video documenting any rapes on 7 October or containing “tangible indications of rape.”

What is clear from this year’s annual report is that the UN has not obtained any new evidence since then.

That is consistent with earlier findings.

In June 2024, the UN Human Rights Council’s independent commission of inquiry into the events and aftermath of 7 October 2023, stated that it had reviewed reports of Israelis being raped “but has not been able to independently verify such allegations.”

The commission also said it was “unable to verify reports of sexualized torture and genital mutilation” of Israeli victims.

In January 2025, an Israeli prosecutor admitted that authorities had zero complainants in alleged cases of 7 October rapes.

And last month, a 300-page Israeli report attempted to revive the mass rape narrative, but also failed to document a single credible case of rape more than two and a half years later.
Rush to judgment

In a press conference last week launching the secretary-general’s new report, Patten confirmed that she “did not meet with any survivor” of supposed 7 October sexual attacks during her 2024 visit.

She said that early last year, she received an invitation from the Israeli government to return to the country, but protracted negotiations over the terms of the visit broke down over Israel’s refusal to provide any evidence that it was implementing measures to stop sexual crimes against detained Palestinians and to provide UN access to detention facilities.

At the press conference, Patten faced a direct challenge over her 2024 visit.

France 24 correspondent Jessica Le Masurier noted the concrete evidence of Israeli sexual crimes against Palestinians cited in this year’s report from the secretary-general, including videos and photos of abuses.

She contrasted that with the absence of evidence backing Israel’s claims about 7 October.

“I remember when you had your visit to Israel, you told me that you were not able to seek any evidence,” Le Masurier said to Patten. She then asked Patten whether “with hindsight, you regret that trip, seeing as it caused so many issues regarding actually being able to draw clear conclusions based on evidence.”

Patten replied that her 2024 visit to Israel “was of an exceptional nature, because of lack of access to relevant UN human rights monitors.” She argued that if she had not gone, “that would have meant that there would have been nothing in the secretary-general’s report on the 7 October attacks.”

One way of interpreting Patten’s response is that in the absence of credible evidence of sexual violence on 7 October, she and her boss António Guterres preferred to recycle and amplify unverified Israeli claims and atrocity propaganda rather than to wait for credible evidence – evidence that nearly three years later is still nowhere to be found.

In doing so, Guterres and Patten – deliberately or not – aided and abetted Israeli atrocity propaganda used to mobilize support for an ongoing genocide that the UN secretary-general still refuses to name.

Israel’s 7 October rape hoax gets a 300-page reboot


Ali Abunimah 

The Electronic Intifada 

14 May 2026

Major media outlets are promoting a new report alleging 7 October rapes without scrutinizing its reliance on discredited stories and sources.

This article contains graphic descriptions of sexual violence

Major media outlets are promoting a new report as an evidentiary breakthrough on alleged mass rapes of Israelis by Hamas on 7 October 2023.

It is nothing of the kind. Weighing in at almost 300 pages, “Silenced no more,” published by a supposedly independent “Civil Commission,” is largely a repackaged compilation of old claims, anonymous allegations and speculation.

This includes numerous claims from figures whose accounts have already been exposed as contradictory, unreliable or fabricated.

But you wouldn’t know this from how the media are covering it.

Britain’s Daily Mail claimed that the report revealed “for the first time” the “full depravity” of the “unimaginable” sexual horrors committed by Hamas “which some on the Left STILL cast doubt on.”

CNN called the new report a “landmark” and invited its principal author for an interview.

The BBC termed it “the most comprehensive” report documenting “rapes, sexual assault and sexual torture” against Israelis.

None of these outlets offered any skepticism or cautious scrutiny – certainly not of the kind they apply when it comes to almost any account of Israeli violence against Palestinians.

Le Monde, in an otherwise sympathetic article, offered a rare hint of criticism, acknowledging that the report may be challenged for combining alleged incidents “of different natures” including acts “for which the sexual dimension is not clear.”

According to The Globe and Mail, the report purports to uncover patterns of “rape, gang rape, other forms of sexual assault, sexual torture – including burning and mutilation,” as well as claims of postmortem sexual abuse, humiliation and desecration of bodies.

Horrifying material, if true. But tellingly, the Canadian newspaper acknowledges that the report asserts that “sexual violence was both widespread and systemic, though it does not provide the number of victims.”
Discredited “Civil Commission”

Indeed, the Civil Commission – an initiative launched by Israeli legal scholar Cochav Elkayam-Levy soon after 7 October – was already severely discredited by Israeli media more than two years ago.

Elkayam-Levy came under fire for her shoddy research methods– which managed to embarrass even some in the Israeli government.

“People disconnected from her because her investigation is not accurate,” an Israeli government source told Ynet, the online outlet affiliated with Israel’s mass circulation newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth.

The government source cited how Elkayam-Levy disseminated a story about Palestinian fighters “slicing the belly of a pregnant woman – a story proven to be untrue, and she spread it in the international media.”

“It’s no joke. Little by little, professionals have begun to distance themselves from her because she is unreliable,” the source added, citing the damage such false accounts do to Israel’s already battered credibility.

It had previously been exposed that Elkayam-Levy also tried to pass off an old photo of a deceased Kurdish female fighter in another country as a victim of the 7 October violence.

Elkayam-Levy also came under fire for financial opportunism.

“She took donations from loads of people and she began asking for money for lectures,” the government source told Ynet.

But these warnings did not scare off a slew of Israel lobby funders including Combined Jewish Philanthropies, Jewish Federations of North America, the Jewish Federation of Los Angeles, the Jewish Federation of Greater Philadelphia, the Jewish United Fund of Metropolitan Chicago, the New Israel Fund and the Wilf Family Foundation.

The report’s funders include the German government, through its Tel Aviv embassy, which is significant since German leaders have openly promoted false claims about 7 October sexual violence, including the fabrication that Hamas fighters filmed themselves raping Israeli women on 7 October.

No such video exists.

On its website, the Civil Commission separately lists “our valued partners” including Microsoft and the government of Canada.

Cochav Elkayam-Levy, pictured with the Spanish and Belgian prime ministers in Jerusalem in November 2023, founded the so-called Civil Commission whose new 7 October sexual violence report relies on debunked witnesses and discredited sources. Nicolas MaeterlinckBelga/Sipa USA/Newscom

The report’s first dozen or so pages are dominated by endorsements from such ardently pro-Israel celebrities and politicians as Hillary Clinton, Sheryl Sandberg and Rahm Emanuel.

Canadian politician Irwin Cotler is identified as a “principal contributor” and wrote a foreword. Cotler is a long-time Israel lobby stalwart and widely regarded as an apologist for Israel’s crimes against Palestinians.

Cotler is also an honorary board member of “Doctors Against Racism and Anti-Semitism,” a pro-Israel group that urged the University of Toronto to treat accusations of Israeli apartheid or genocide as anti-Semitic.

In 2024, an investigation by Canadian publication The Maple found that key claims Cotler has made for years about his relationship with Nelson Mandela and the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa were unsupported or contradicted by South African sources.
The missing rape victims

Does the report offer anything new?

The authors claim they conducted more than 430 “formal and informal interviews, testimonies and meetings” and relied on media interviews, investigative reports, documentaries, podcasts, parliamentary hearings and an index of public reporting related to alleged sexual violence.

The key problem with Israel’s 7 October mass rapes narrative has never been merely the failure to name victims publicly. Privacy concerns could justify anonymizing survivors and withholding identifying details.

Yet to this day, Israel has not provided even the most basic anonymized accounting one would expect in a serious investigation: How many people have complained that they were raped on 7 October, how many deceased persons have been positively identified as rape victims, how many families have been informed that their relatives were assessed to have been raped, and how many alleged cases rest only on witness inferences, hearsay or speculation based on the condition of bodies observed by lay persons?

The Civil Commission report does not fill that gap. It offers no clear victim count and no transparent case list, only a mixture of old public claims, confidential archive references, secondhand accounts and generalized pattern assertions.

In January 2025, an Israeli prosecutor admitted there were still zero complainants in alleged 7 October rape cases.

This remains the basic hole in the entire narrative and the Civil Commission does its best to obscure it.

It claims that confidential information has been withheld and that findings are sometimes presented only in “generalized terms” to avoid identifying victims, including in cases where families of murdered victims may not know sexual crimes were allegedly committed against relatives.

That means some of the report’s most horrifying claims are, by design, insulated from meaningful public scrutiny.

Protecting privacy is of course a legitimate and overriding concern, but that cannot explain the glaring absence of firsthand rape victim testimonies.

There is no reason why the authors could not include anonymized first-person testimonies from rape survivors using pseudonyms and omitting details that could identify them – standard practice in human rights reporting.

The same problem appears in the kibbutzim section: The report itself states that there are “no known survivors of [sexual and gender-based violence] from any of the kibbutzim attacks on October 7th,” other than those taken into captivity.

Publishing anonymized first-person testimonies is precisely the approach researchers took when publishing the explicit and detailed firsthand accounts of Palestinian survivors of rape and sexual torture in Israeli military detention.

Indeed the Civil Commission report includes a number of anonymized testimonies of alleged acts of sexual violence other than rape. But there are no firsthand victim testimonies of rape – except for one, a male identified as “D,” an Israeli intelligence veteran who claims he was the victim of a gang rape.

D’s claims were previously reported in Israeli media in July 2024 – where he was identified by the Hebrew letter “Dalet” – after he filed a lawsuit demanding roughly $137 million from the Israeli government.

The Civil Commission claims that D’s account is “supported by” medical records.

But Amnesty International also previously interviewed D and reviewed his medical records. Its account suggests there is much less substance than the Civil Commission would like people to think.

According to Amnesty: “The reports show that he visited the doctor twice, in March and May 2024, that he reported during both visits anxiety and fears from having been at the Nova festival when it was attacked and that he reported, during the second visit, having been subjected to sexual assault at the Nova festival site.”

Such records may be evidence that D told a doctor in May 2024 that he had been raped the previous October. But from Amnesty’s careful description there does not appear to be any medical evidence of the attack itself.
No firsthand accounts of rape in captivity

The Civil Commission report asserts that Israeli men and women who returned from captivity in Gaza have “testified to experiencing rape, sexual torture and other forms of sexual abuse during their abductions and/or in captivity, as well as to witnessing sexual acts inflicted upon other hostages, including family members.”

However the captivity section does not appear to include a direct, first-person account from a returned hostage stating that she or he was raped in captivity.

The only specific public source the report cites for rape of captives appears to be a June 2024 Washington Post interview with former captive Moran Stella Yanai who explicitly states of her captors, “They didn’t rape me, they didn’t touch me.”

But the Post adds: “What haunts her most are the firsthand accounts of rape from other female hostages, whispered to her in captivity. She holds their secrets, not divulging names to protect their privacy, and to not further endanger their lives.”

It is notable that many of the former captives’ testimonies describe fear of rape, threats, humiliation, forced nudity or other alleged sexual abuse, but none provides a direct, firsthand victim account of rape.

The report does contain a few new allegations of sexual assault against former captives, including a claim that two minors “who were family members, reported that they were forced to perform ‘sexual acts on one another’ ” while in captivity in Gaza. Little additional information is provided.

Such accounts, said to have been given directly to the Civil Commission, cannot be independently assessed from the report’s public text, and come from an organization with a track record of dishonesty and of relying on discredited sources.

But even if they are true, they do not support the main pillar of Israel’s narrative of mass rapes and gang rapes on 7 October.
Thousands of photos and videos, but none of any rapes

Just as striking is the commission’s evasiveness about the visual evidence it claims to have reviewed.

“Across all sites of the attacks reviewed by the Commission, perpetrators were observed celebrating the massacres, chanting religious slogans, and filming scenes of violence and humiliation,” the report claims.

The report also asserts that on 7 October, Israelis “were hunted, executed, tortured, burned alive, mutilated, sexually violated and taken hostage in acts of extreme brutality.”

The Palestinians who allegedly carried out these acts, the report claims, “filmed and broadcast them in real time, transforming their violence into spectacle and human suffering into an instrument of terror.”

And in an age where almost everyone is carrying a camera, thousands of Israeli witnesses would have had the opportunity to take photos and videos as well.

Indeed, the authors boast of analyzing more than 10,000 photographs and video segments, totaling more than 1,800 hours, but the report never says that any of those materials depict an actual rape or gang rape in progress.

The only detailed description of body camera footage allegedly filmed by a Palestinian fighter on 7 October and seen by the Civil Commission appears to be of the killing of several female Israeli soldiers at a military base. The Civil Commission does not describe this video as depicting rape or any other sexual violence.

The absence of visual evidence of even a single rape is glaring considering the scope of the Civil Commission’s claims.

But it is consistent with the March 2024 report by UN special representative Pramila Patten.

The UN team headed by Patten also reviewed thousands of photos and videos provided by the Israeli government and concluded that “in the medicolegal assessment of available photos and videos, no tangible indications of rape could be identified.”

Despite extensive searches, “no digital evidence specifically depicting acts of sexual violence was found in open sources,” the UN report added.

Moreover, in April 2024, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that “the intelligence material collected by the police and the intelligence bodies, including footage from terrorists’ body cameras, does not contain visual documentation of any acts of rape themselves.”

Nothing in the Civil Commission report challenges these findings, but to disguise the stark lack of visual evidence to support the rape narrative, the report invokes the authority of thousands of photos and videos while carefully avoiding any assertion that any image or video actually shows such an attack taking place.
Recycled and discredited accounts

The report’s individual 7 October alleged cases are almost entirely familiar. It leans again on a cluster of “eyewitnesses” – not firsthand victims – whose accounts lack credibility or corroboration, have changed over time or have been debunked outright.

This includes a woman called “Sapir” – who supposedly witnessed women being gang-raped and mutilated, and also claimed to have seen Palestinian fighters carrying severed heads.

This fantastical account, for which no corresponding victims, bodies or forensic evidence have ever been publicly produced or independently verified, was featured in the notorious and discredited December 2023 New York Times article “Screams without words.”

As the Times claimed, Sapir saw Hamas fighters raping several women and then she witnessed “terrorists carrying the severed heads of three more women.”

Sapir’s story was also featured in Screams Before Silence, billionaire former Facebook executive Sheryl Sandberg’s 2024 film pushing the mass-rapes hoax – debunked in detail by The Electronic Intifada after its release – but in the film there is no mention of the severed heads Sapir supposedly saw.

The Civil Commission report includes Sapir’s testimony while omitting the even more sensational claim about beheaded women that had appeared in the Times account.

While leaving out this shocking element from Sapir’s testimony, the Civil Commission report nonetheless repeatedly cites the discredited New York Times article bylined by Jeffrey Gettleman, Anat Schwartz and Adam Sella as if it were a credible source.

About a hundred pages later, separately from Sapir’s firsthand testimony, the report asserts that witnesses claimed to see “perpetrators carrying the severed heads of women.” A footnote attributes this claim to Sapir. If the Civil Commission considers it credible – despite the lack of corroboration – why omit it from Sapir’s own testimony?

The report also includes other dubious “eyewitnesses” such as Raz Cohen and Tali Biner.

Cohen – whose story has changed repeatedly – is featured in the Gettleman article and both he and Biner appear in the Sandberg film.
Fabulists, liars and grifters

These are not even the most egregious examples.

The Civil Commission report cites a number of other individuals whose credibility has collapsed, including Rami Davidian, prominently featured in the Sandberg film claiming to have single-handedly rescued hundreds of Israelis from the clutches of Palestinian fighters on 7 October.

He also claimed to have seen dozens of dead victims of alleged rapes on that day, some with objects inserted into their genitals, but told Sandberg that he altered the positions of the bodies so that – conveniently enough – no one else would ever see what he saw.

In May 2024, The Electronic Intifada pointed to the glaring inconsistencies and impossibilities in Davidian’s claims.

A year later, an investigation by Israel’s Channel 13 found that Davidian had indeed fabricated his tales of superhero-like heroism and used his fame to enrich himself with huge speaking fees and donations.

“These are not slight exaggerations, mildly inflating the number of those rescued, absolutely not,” Channel 13 journalist Raviv Drucker stated. “These are stories made up from beginning to end. Hair-raising stories that never, ever occurred.”

And yet Davidian is cited extensively as a source in the Civil Commission report.

Similarly, the report relies extensively on claims from members of ZAKA, the Israeli “rescue” organization responsible for notorious 7 October lies such as the false claims of dozens of beheaded babies and burned children.

The group played a prominent role in lending “first responder” credibility to such atrocity propaganda, helping generate public consent for Israel’s genocide in Gaza after 7 October.

ZAKA was founded by Yehuda Meshi-Zahav, who died by suicide after being exposed in Israel as a serial sexual predator accused of violent sex crimes against Jewish men, women and children over decades.

After Meshi-Zahav’s victims spoke out, ZAKA’s Chaim Otmazgin publicly defended him, claiming the extensive evidence against him had been acquired via extortion.

ZAKA and Otmazgin are cited repeatedly as credible sources in the Civil Commission report.

Otmazgin and ZAKA colleague Simcha Greinman also appeared in the Sandberg film making lurid and inconsistent claims about seeing nails and other objects in genital areas.

The crossover is no coincidence. The Civil Commission report explicitly thanks Kastina Communications, the producer of Screams Before Silence, for allowing it to use “materials and testimonies” collected for the film.
Painting a lurid picture

The report acknowledges in a footnote that Israeli authorities “largely did not collect relevant forensic evidence from the attack sites or the recovered bodies.”

The lack of forensic evidence is therefore another major narrative problem the Civil Commission has to contend with in addition to the lack of rape victims.

The report attempts to explain away this absence with the well-worn assertion that “Hamas operatives and collaborators methodically destroyed important evidence by setting fire to bodies, property and houses.”

Basic forensic science makes clear that destroying forensic and DNA evidence, even by fire, is not necessarily straightforward at a single crime scene.

The claim becomes far less plausible when applied to an alleged pattern of mass rapes supposedly carried out across a vast geography amid the chaos of 7 October.

The report does not address evidence that significant numbers of Israelis were killed, and many bodies incinerated, by Israeli fire during the widescale application of the Hannibal Directive, a protocol that allows the Israeli military to use overwhelming force to stop Israelis being taken captive even if that means killing them along with their captors.

But the Civil Commission – similar to the Sandberg film – does rely on multiple eyewitness accounts of bodies, for example with their legs spread or injuries to the groin area, to suggest that these persons were victims of rapes and other forms of sexual violence.

This phenomenon was already addressed in the UN’s March 2024 Patten report, which pointed to “erroneous interpretations of the state of bodies by some volunteer first responders without relevant qualifications and expertise.”

This included “mistaking ‘postmortem pugilistic posturing’ (a ‘boxer-like’ body posture with flexed elbows, clenched fists, spread legs, and flexed knees) due to burn damage as indicative of sexual violence; misinterpreting anal dilatation due to postmortem changes as indicative of anal penetration; and mischaracterizing grazing gunshot wounds to genitalia as targeted genital mutilation using knives.”

The Civil Commission report relies repeatedly on claims about the condition of bodies from first responders who were not forensic experts, including Shari Mendes, an Israeli military reservist who was at the Shura military base as it was being used as a makeshift morgue on 7 October.

Mendes appears in the 2024 Sandberg film recounting her horrifying claims about bloody underwear, naked bodies and systematic sexual mutilation.

Her claims are contradicted not only by the Patten report but also by the findings of Israeli pathologists.

As Haaretz reported in April 2024: “At Shura Base, to which most of the bodies were taken for purposes of identification, there were five forensic pathologists at work. In that capacity, they also examined bodies that arrived completely or partially naked in order to examine the possibility of rape. According to a source knowledgeable about the details, there were no signs on any of those bodies attesting to sexual relations having taken place or of mutilation of genitalia.”

The bottom line is that the Civil Commission report is the latest attempt to revive Israel’s mass-rapes hoax at a moment when Israel is despised and isolated around the world for its genocide in Gaza. The narrative invokes well-worn racist and colonial tropes of native savages raping white settler women.

But a “comprehensive” report that recycles discredited sources, cites debunked media coverage as evidence, fails to quantify the number of victims and still cannot confirm the existence of any specific rape victim, living or dead, does not rescue Israel’s mass-rape hoax. It confirms its bankruptcy.

Ali Abunimah is executive director of The Electronic Intifada.

Opinion

The strategic value of Kurdish gas for Europe’s energy security


The Kawergosk Refinery is a major oil processing facility in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. [Photo by Reza/Getty Images]

by Dr Kamran Yeganegi
June 7, 2026
Middle East Monitor


Europe’s Energy Challenge is Far From Over

Europe has made significant progress in reducing its dependence on Russian natural gas since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Through increased liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, expanded purchases from Norway, and greater reliance on the Southern Gas Corridor, European governments have managed to mitigate some of the vulnerabilities that once defined the continent’s energy landscape.

Yet the notion that Europe’s energy security challenge has been resolved is misleading. Diversification is not a one-time achievement but a continuous strategic process. As geopolitical tensions continue to reshape global energy markets, Europe must identify new sources of supply capable of strengthening resilience and reducing dependence on a limited number of producers and transit routes.

In this context, one potential contributor remains largely overlooked in European energy debates: the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

Located at the intersection of the Middle East, Turkiye, and European energy markets, the Kurdistan Region possesses substantial natural gas resources that could play an important role in Europe’s long-term energy strategy.


While political disputes and security concerns continue to present obstacles, the strategic significance of Kurdish gas is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore.

Why Kurdish Gas Matters

The Kurdistan Region possesses some of the most promising undeveloped gas reserves in the Middle East. Fields such as Khor Mor and Chemchemal already contribute to regional energy production, while additional projects including Miran and Topkhana-Kurdamir have the potential to significantly increase output in the coming years.

Unlike many energy producers in the Gulf, whose exports depend heavily on maritime routes vulnerable to regional instability, the Kurdistan Region enjoys a unique geographic advantage. Its proximity to Turkiye creates the possibility of direct pipeline connections to existing energy infrastructure serving European markets.

Geography has always shaped energy politics. In an era when supply security has become as important as supply volume, the location of Kurdish gas may prove just as valuable as the resources themselves.

For Europe, the importance of Kurdish gas extends beyond additional supply volumes. Every new source of energy reduces strategic dependence on existing suppliers and enhances the flexibility of the broader energy system. The lessons of the Ukraine crisis demonstrated that excessive reliance on a single supplier can quickly evolve from an economic issue into a geopolitical vulnerability.

Kurdish gas offers Europe an opportunity to strengthen diversification before another crisis emerges.

Turkiye’s Ambition and the Emerging Energy Corridor

No discussion of Kurdish gas can be separated from Turkiye’s growing role in regional energy geopolitics.

For more than a decade, Ankara has pursued an ambitious strategy aimed at transforming the country into a major energy hub linking Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

Existing infrastructure already connects Caspian resources to European consumers through Turkiye, while new initiatives continue to expand the country’s importance within regional energy networks.

The Southern Gas Corridor has become one of the European Union’s most significant non-Russian energy routes. Carrying natural gas from Azerbaijan through Turkiye into European markets, the corridor has demonstrated both technical feasibility and geopolitical relevance.

However, its future effectiveness depends on diversification within the corridor itself.

Adding Kurdish gas would strengthen the resilience of this network by increasing available supply and reducing dependence on a limited number of sources. Rather than competing with Azerbaijani exports, Kurdish production could complement them, creating a more robust energy architecture stretching from the Middle East to Europe.

For Turkiye, the benefits are equally clear. Kurdish gas could contribute to domestic energy security, reinforce Ankara’s role as a transit hub, and deepen economic interdependence with northern Iraq.

This convergence of interests creates a rare alignment between economic incentives and geopolitical objectives.

The Political Obstacle: Baghdad and Erbil

Despite its strategic potential, the future of Kurdish gas exports ultimately depends on politics.

The long-standing dispute between Baghdad and Erbil over hydrocarbon governance remains one of the most significant barriers to large-scale energy development. Successive Iraqi governments have maintained that energy contracts must be managed through federal institutions, while the Kurdistan Regional Government has consistently defended its authority to conclude agreements independently.

The result has been years of legal uncertainty.

For international investors, uncertainty is often more damaging than risk itself. Energy companies are prepared to operate in challenging environments, but they require predictable legal frameworks before committing billions of dollars to long-term projects.

Without a durable political settlement between Baghdad and Erbil, many of the region’s most promising gas projects may struggle to attract the investment necessary for large-scale development and export infrastructure.

The challenge extends beyond domestic Iraqi politics. European policymakers seeking diversified energy supplies and Turkish officials pursuing regional energy connectivity cannot replace the need for an internal Iraqi consensus. Sustainable energy cooperation requires a governance framework accepted by both federal and regional authorities.

Security and Infrastructure Challenges

Political disagreements are not the only concern.

Recent attacks targeting energy facilities in northern Iraq have highlighted the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Incidents affecting gas production facilities have demonstrated how security disruptions can influence both energy supply and investor confidence.

Energy corridors require long-term stability. Pipelines are not short-term projects; they are strategic investments expected to operate for decades. As a result, international investors evaluate not only resource availability but also political stability, infrastructure security, and institutional reliability.

These concerns should not be underestimated. However, they should also be viewed in perspective.

Many of today’s successful energy corridors emerged despite significant geopolitical challenges. The Southern Gas Corridor itself was once regarded as an ambitious project facing considerable political and technical obstacles. Yet sustained political commitment transformed that vision into reality.

The same could be true for Kurdish gas if regional stakeholders demonstrate sufficient strategic determination.

Report: Mossad supplied Kurdish forces with weapons seized from Hamas and Hezbollah

A Strategic Opportunity for Europe

European energy policy often focuses on immediate challenges. Yet strategic planning requires a longer horizon.

The Kurdistan Region is unlikely to become a major supplier to Europe overnight. Infrastructure development, political agreements, and investment decisions require time. However, the essential foundations already exist: substantial gas reserves, geographic proximity to Turkiye, established energy cooperation, and growing European interest in diversified supply chains.The question facing European policymakers is not whether Kurdish gas can replace existing suppliers. It cannot.

The more relevant question is whether Europe can afford to ignore a resource capable of strengthening long-term energy resilience.The post-Ukraine energy order remains under construction. While Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian gas, the search for secure and diversified supplies continues. Strategic foresight requires identifying tomorrow’s opportunities before they become urgent necessities.In that regard, the Kurdistan Region deserves far greater attention than it currently receives.

Conclusion

The future of European energy security will depend not only on reducing dependence but also on expanding strategic options.The Kurdistan Region of Iraq offers one such option. Its considerable gas reserves, advantageous geography, and proximity to existing transit infrastructure provide a foundation for a potentially significant energy corridor connecting the Middle East with European markets.

The obstacles are undeniable. Political disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil, security concerns, infrastructure requirements, and investment challenges all remain substantial barriers.Yet history demonstrates that major energy corridors are rarely created under ideal circumstances. They emerge when political leaders recognize long-term strategic interests and act before opportunities are lost.

For Europe, Kurdish gas should not be viewed merely as a regional resource. It should be understood as a potential strategic asset in an increasingly uncertain energy landscape. The real question is whether Europe, Turkiye, Baghdad, and Erbil possess the political vision necessary to transform that potential into reality.

OPINION: The geopolitics of energy algorithms: Who will control oil markets in the age of Artificial Intelligence?

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Turkey probes billionaire businessman, 95 over Kurdish woman joke

AFP

June 6, 2026 

Rahmi Koc, pictured second on the left in 2004, a year after he stepped down as chairman of Koc Holdings – Copyright AFP/File FARJANA K. GODHULY

Prosecutors on Saturday opened a probe into a 95-year-old billionaire and honorary head of Koc Holdings, Turkey’s biggest conglomerate, over a joke about a Kurdish woman widely denounced as sexist and racist. 

The blunder was made by Rahmi Koc at the opening of a hospital in the western resort city of Izmir late Friday, but when the footage started circulating online it caused a backlash. 

The joke, which revolved around a misunderstanding between a Kurdish woman and a doctor, also drew the ire of the pro-Kurdish opposition DEM party which said it had filed a complaint against him. 

The probe was announced by Justice Minister Akin Gurlek on X who said it was over “expressions deemed to target women and citizens of a specific ethnic identity” although he did not publicly name Koc. 

“Uttering such words under the guise of a ‘joke’ or humour does not mitigate this discourtesy displayed toward our women and a specific segment of our society,” he wrote. 

Also on X, DEM said it had filed a criminal complaint against Koc “for making sexist remarks about Kurdish women, on the grounds of ‘public incitement to hatred and hostility’, ‘insult’ and ‘hate and discrimination’.”

In response to the backlash, Koc issued a brief apology published by Koc Holding on X, saying his remarks “were not intended to target any particular group”. 

“I would like to sincerely express my regret,” he wrote.

Koc stepped down as chairman of Koc Holding in 2003, handing the reins to his eldest son, Mustafa Koc who died suddenly of a heart attack in 2016. He was 55. 

Koc Holding is a family-run conglomerate set up in the 1920s whose main sectors are energy, automotive, durable consumer goods and finance, although it is also involved in technology, food, retail, tourism, agriculture and shipbuilding. 

Family-run conglomerates are the mainstays of Turkey’s economy with interests in every sector, with Koc Holding accounting for approximately seven percent of Turkey’s GDP and around eight percent of Turkish exports, it says on its website. 

Forbes magazine this year estimated that Rahmi Koc has a fortune of $2.4 billion.