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Showing posts sorted by date for query Kurdish. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Monday, March 09, 2026

Kurdish rebels say ready to resist Iran, await uprising

Penjwen (Iraq) (AFP) – From their hideouts in the Iraqi mountains near Iran, leftist Kurdish rebels say they are ready to fight the Islamic republic, but hope for an uprising before they intervene, with or without US support.

Issued on: 09/03/2026 - RFI

Roken Nereda, 39, a commander in the Iranian Kurdish armed faction Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) at a site near the Iraqi border with Iran in Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan region © - / AFP

After saying that he would be "all for" a Kurdish offensive on Iran, US President Donald Trump appeared to backtrack Saturday, saying he did not want such an attack.

Senior commander Roken Nerada of the Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK) told AFP: "If there is an attack on the Kurdish people... then with every means... we are ready to resist as we always have."

"I think we can achieve our rights without the help of the US or any other country," said Nerada, 39, who joined the rebels 17 years ago.

Like other Iranian Kurdish rebel groups, PJAK has bases in the mountains of Iraq's northern autonomous Kurdistan region, but it also maintains hideouts in majority-Kurdish areas inside Iran.

Iran has designated Kurdish rebels groups as terrorist organisations, and many have previously fought its security forces in Kurdish-majority areas along the border.

But in recent years, under political pressure mostly from their Iraqi hosts, they have largely refrained from armed activity -- raising questions about their current capacity to lead an armed offensive against Iran.

AFP journalists met 30 PJAK fighters in a bunker adorned with photos of fallen comrades, with a television inside showing war coverage with smoke rising from Tehran and Beirut.

Since the Middle East war began late last month with a wave of US-Israeli strikes on Iran, Tehran has repeatedly struck Kurdish militants' positions in Iraq, accusing them of serving Western or Israeli interests.

Ground attack, not yet

Just before the war, and after anti-government protests in Iran, PJAK joined a coalition of Kurdish rebel parties seeking to overthrow the Islamic republic and secure self determination.

Kurdish figthers say they are ready to resist Iran if there is a popular uprising there © - / AFP


"We are ready to fight, especially after what they did 50 days ago," PJAK fighter Shwan said, referring to the crackdown on the protests in Iran that left thousands dead.

Amid reports that rebels might collaborate with the US, Tehran threatened to target "all facilities" in Iraq's Kurdistan if Kurdish militants cross the border.

But on Saturday, Trump said "we're not looking to the Kurds going in".

"We don't want to make the war any more complex than it already is," he added.

Amir Karimi, another commander in PJAK, told AFP last week that the "Americans are already in the area, and we have had a dialogue".

It was "a political exchange... to get to know each other," Karimi said, adding that "a ground attack is not on the table at this stage".

"From a strategic and tactical point of view, we believe it wouldn't be a good idea," he added, warning that Iranian forces have reinforced the borders.

"The most important thing is that the population itself becomes a driving force. There must be a popular uprising" in Iran, Karimi said.

"We are not waiting for Iran or the United States to give us the green light. But the population needs support from the outside," he added.

The Kurds will need guarantees to secure a democratic Iran, he said.

"Who can say that, tomorrow, they won't support another dictator and bring him to power," Karimi said, referring to the US.

Commander Nerada said: "What is important... is to change this current darkness into a democratic Iran."

© 2026 AFP





‘Intentional Chemical Warfare’: Toxic Black Rain in Tehran After US-Israel Bomb Oil Facilities

“The consequences of this environmental and humanitarian catastrophe will not be confined within Iran’s borders. These strikes constitute war crimes,” said a spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry.



A dark smoke cloud engulfs destroyed vehicles near an ongoing fire following an overnight airstrike on the Shahran oil refinery in northwestern Tehran on March 8, 2026.
(Photo by AFP via Getty Images)



Jon Queally
Mar 08, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

In the wake of infernos unleashed across portions of Tehran the night before, the people of Iran’s capital woke up Sunday to the hideous sight of ominous gray clouds above, choking-levels of smoke, and black raindrops full of toxic oil falling across the city.

Critics described “scenes of Armageddon” and characterized the bombings and the destruction they triggered as the latest crimes committed by the US and Israel since they launched their unprovoked and illegal assault on the Middle East nation last week.



Iranian officials urged residents to stay in doors to avoid the health impacts of the air quality following Israel’s intentional bombing of several oil storage and processing facilities in the city on Saturday.

“On top of everything else, Israel and the US have unleashed an environmental disaster in Tehran,” said Assal Rad, a fellow at the Arab Center in Washington, DC. “How many ways can they show you they have no regard for human life?”



Iran’s Red Crescent Society warned that the toxic rainfall in Tehran, home to approximately 10 million people, could be “highly dangerous and acidic” and issued exposure guidelines for residents.

Esmaeil Baqaei, a spokesperson for the Iranian Foriegn Ministry, condemned the attacks and resulting damage in stark terms.

“The US-Israeli criminal war against the Iranian nation has entered a dangerous new phase with deliberate strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure,” said Bagaei in an online statement. “These attacks on fuel storage facilities amount to nothing less than intentional chemical warfare against the Iranian citizens.”

“By targeting fuel depots, the aggressors are releasing hazardous materials and toxic substances into the air, poisoning civilians, devastating the environment, and endangering lives on a massive scale,” he continued. “The consequences of this environmental and humanitarian catastrophe will not be confined within Iran’s borders. These strikes constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—all at once.”

In a Sunday morning video, CNN correspondent Frederik Pleitgen showed the view from central Tehran, including the black water gathering on every surface:



Pleitgen also traveled to the Shahran oil depot, among the facilities bombed Saturday, where dark gray smoke continued to billow into the air and he described the amount of damage as “immense”:



“Though it is day, the sun cannot be seen in Tehran today because of all the smoke following the US and Israel bombing Tehran’s oil refineries,” said Trita Parsi, executive vice president for the Quincy Institute, a US-based foreign policy think tank. “People on the ground describe it as armageddon.”



Parsi, who is of Iranian descent, also took aim at members of the Iranian diaspora who for weeks and months have pushed for the US and Israeli governments to attack their own country.

“History,” he said, “will not forgive Reza Pahlavi, Masih Alinejad, Nazanin Boniadi, and all other ‘leaders’ who tricked Iranians into thinking this war would set them free.”

Black Rain Pours Over Tehran As Israel Strikes Oil Facilities On Ninth Day Of Conflict – OpEd



March 9, 2026 
By Sadegh Pashm-Foroush


March 8, 2026 marked the ninth day of the escalating military conflict between the Iranian regime, Israel, and the United States. On the eighth day of the war, 80 Israeli fighter jets carried out massive overnight bombardments targeting military sites across Tehran.

While the regime’s President Masoud Pezeshkian issued an apology to neighboring countries regarding missile strikes originating from Iran, other regime entities and officials quickly contradicted his statements. US President Donald Trump warned of “complete destruction” if the regime did not alter its behavior. Concurrently, the regime has been grappling with a severe internal power vacuum following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, prompting emergency meetings of the Assembly of Experts.

Roundup of today’s key events

New regime leader reportedly selected: Members of the Assembly of Experts claim a successor to Ali Khamenei has been chosen, though the regime’s foreign minister publicly contradicted this, stating no one knows the successor yet.
Oil facilities bombarded: Israeli airstrikes hit multiple fuel storage and distribution sites in Tehran and Alborz provinces, causing blackened skies, “oil rain,” and leaving four dead.
Gulf nations targeted: The regime launched fresh drone and missile attacks on Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE, resulting in structural damage and civilian casualties, including the first reported deaths in Saudi Arabia.
US warns Iranian civilians: US Central Command urged civilians to stay away from military launch sites in densely populated cities like Dezful, Isfahan, and Shiraz, which the regime is using as human shields.
Trump dismisses regime threats: US President Donald Trump brushed off threats from the Iranian regime, signaling that strikes will intensify.

Massive strikes on oil infrastructure and ‘black rain’ in Tehran


Over the weekend, Israel launched a fresh wave of attacks specifically targeting the Iranian regime’s energy resources. According to Vis Karami, the managing director of the National Iranian Oil Products Distribution Company, all distribution and transfer facilities in the Tehran and Alborz provinces were targeted and damaged, including sites in Shahran, Aghdasieh, and Fardis, Karaj. The state-run Student News Network (SNN) reported that four people were killed during the bombardment of the refineries and oil depots in Tehran and Alborz.

The heavy bombardment resulted in massive plumes of smoke visible from miles away, completely darkening the skies over the capital on Sunday morning, March 8. CNN correspondents in Tehran reported the phenomenon of “oil rain,” as blackened rainwater covered the city in soot.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright clarified that the United States has “no plans” to target the regime’s oil or natural gas industries, noting that the strikes on local fuel depots were conducted solely by Israel.



Internal crisis and contradictory claims over leadership succession

Following the death of supreme leader Ali Khamenei, the regime’s internal factions are showing deep fragmentation over his succession. Ahmad Alamolhoda, the regime’s Friday prayer leader in Mashhad, stated that the election for the leadership has been completed and the new leader has been determined, adding that Hosseini Bushehri is responsible for making the public announcement. Heidari, another member of the Assembly of Experts, echoed this, telling state-run Khabar Online that the “most qualified option” has been chosen and that “the enemy has mentioned his name.”

However, the regime’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi contradicted these statements on Sunday. Speaking on NBC’s “Meet The Press,” Araghchi claimed “nobody knows” who the next supreme leader will be and dismissed the claims as rumors, stating the 88-member Assembly of Experts must still convene to vote. Araghchi also responded to US President Donald Trump, rejecting any interference or demands for unconditional surrender, claiming the regime will continue to act in “self-defense.”

Regime’s strikes on Gulf nations cause casualties and destruction


Despite Pezeshkian’s recent apologies, the Iranian regime continues to terrorize neighboring countries in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that 234 missiles and 422 drones have been detected since the outbreak of the conflict last week. Drone strikes caused fires at a government tower and Kuwait International Airport over the past 24 hours. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Interior reported casualties including a young girl, two military personnel, and two border guards.

Saudi Arabia reported its first deaths since the war began after a military projectile hit a residential compound in the Al-Kharj governorate, killing an Indian and a Bangladeshi national, and injuring 12 others.

Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates asserted its right to self-defense against “brutal and unjustified Iranian aggression.” The UAE’s Ministry of Defense reported intercepting a massive barrage over the past week, including 1,422 drones, 8 cruise missiles, and 238 ballistic missiles from Iran. In Bahrain, a drone attack damaged a desalination plant, and previous reports indicated a worker was killed by falling debris.

US military warns civilians as regime uses populated areas for attacks

As the war rages, US Central Command (CENTCOM) issued an urgent warning to the Iranian people, urging them to stay home and away from military installations. The US military accused the Iranian regime of knowingly putting its citizens at risk by using heavily populated civilian areas—specifically naming Dezful, Isfahan, and Shiraz—to launch attack drones and ballistic missiles.

CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper stated, “Iran’s terrorist regime is blatantly disregarding civilian lives.” US officials stressed that locations used for military purposes lose their protected status under international law and become legitimate military targets.
Regional fallout and regime’s defiant rhetoric

Regime President Masoud Pezeshkian claimed on Sunday, “We stand with power against those who attack our country, and we will respond with power,” adding that the enemy has “naive” misconceptions.

Internationally, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, calling for de-escalation “at any cost” to prevent further disruption to global trade and to restore a ceasefire. The human cost across the region continues to climb; the Lebanese Health Ministry reported today that nearly 400 people have been killed in Israeli strikes targeting Hezbollah since the campaign began.


Sadegh Pashm-Foroush writes for PMOI/MEK



One week into Iran war, the dangers for the US and Trump multiply

One week into the US-Israeli war against Iran that has plunged the Middle East into turmoil, President Donald Trump faces a growing list of risks and challenges that raise questions about whether he will be able to translate military successes into a clear geopolitical win.



Issued on: 08/03/2026 - RFI

US President Donald Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio attend a roundtable discussion in the East Room of the White House on 6 March, 2026, in Washington DC, USA. Getty Images via AFP - ANNA MONEYMAKER

Even after the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and devastating blows against Iranian forces on land, at sea and in the air, the crisis has quickly widened into a regional conflict that threatens a more prolonged US military engagement with fallout beyond Trump’s control.

That is a scenario that Trump had avoided in his two terms in the White House, preferring swift, limited operations like the January 3 lightning raid in Venezuela and June’s one-off strike on Iran’s nuclear sites.

“Iran is a messy and potentially protracted military campaign,” said Laura Blumenfeld of the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies in Washington. “Trump is risking the global economy, regional stability and his own Republican Party's performance in the US midterm elections.”

Trump, who came to office promising to keep the US out of "stupid” military interventions, is now pursuing what many experts see as an open-ended war of choice unprompted by any imminent threat to the US from Iran, despite claims to the contrary by the president and his aides.

In doing so, analysts say he has struggled to articulate a detailed set of objectives or a clear endgame for Operation Epic Fury, the biggest US military operation since the 2003 Iraq invasion, offering shifting rationales for the war and definitions of what would constitute victory.

White House spokesperson Anna Kelly rejected that assessment, saying Trump has clearly outlined his goals to "destroy Iran’s ballistic missiles and production capacity, demolish their navy, end their ability to arm proxies, and prevent them from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon.”

However, if the war drags on, American casualties mount and the economic costs of interrupted Gulf oil flows multiply, Trump’s biggest foreign policy gamble could also hurt his Republican Party politically.

IAEA finds no evidence of hits on Iran nuclear facilities, urges restraint

MAGA support holding, for now

Despite criticism from some Trump supporters opposed to military interventions, members of his Make America Great Again movement have largely backed him on Iran so far.

But any softening of their support could imperil Republicans’ control of Congress in the November midterm elections, given opinion polls showing opposition to the war among the broader electorate, including a crucial bloc of independent voters.

“The American people are not interested in repeating the mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan,” said Brian Darling, a Republican strategist. “The MAGA base is split between those who relied on no-new-war promises and ones who are loyal to Trump’s judgment.”

High on the list of analysts’ concerns is the mixed messaging from Trump and his aides on whether he is seeking “regime change” in Tehran.

At the outset of the conflict, he suggested that overthrowing Iran’s rulers was a goal, at least by fomenting internal rebellion. Two days later, he stopped short of mentioning that as a priority.

But then on Thursday, Trump told Reuters he would play a role in picking Iran’s next leader and encouraged Iranian Kurdish rebels to launch attacks. That was followed by his demand in a social media post on Friday for Iran’s "unconditional surrender."

Across the region, the dangers have escalated with Iran's retaliatory strikes on Israel and other neighbors as it seeks to sow chaos and raise the costs for Israel, the US and its allies.

Showing that Iran may still be able to activate proxy groups, Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia has renewed hostilities with Israel, expanding the war to another country.

American casualties have been low so far, with six service members killed, and Trump has largely shrugged off the prospects for more to come while declining to completely rule out deployment of US ground troops.

Asked whether Americans should worry about Iran-inspired attacks at home, Trump said in a Time magazine interview published on Friday: “I guess … Like I said, some people will die.”

But Jonathan Panikoff, a former deputy US national intelligence officer for the Middle East, said: “Nothing is likely to hasten an early end to the war more than American casualties … That’s what Iran is counting on.”

US President Donald Trump speaks at a press briefing at the White House, in Washington, DC, USA, on 20 February, 2026. REUTERS - Jonathan Ernst

Venezuela miscalculation?

Many analysts believe Trump, who has shown an increasing appetite for military action in his second term, miscalculated that the Iran campaign would unfold like the Venezuela operation earlier this year.

US special forces captured Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, opening the way for Trump to coerce more compliant former loyalists into giving him considerable sway over the country’s vast oil reserves – without any extended US military action needed.

By contrast, Iran has proved a much tougher, better-armed foe with an entrenched clerical and security establishment.

Even the joint US-Israeli "decapitation" strike that killed Khamenei and some other senior leaders has failed so far to prevent Iran from mounting a military response and has raised questions whether they could be replaced by even more hardline figures.

Looming over the conflict, however, is whether Iran could slide into chaos and break apart if its current rulers fall, further destabilizing the Middle East.

Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a nonprofit research institute considered hawkish on Iran, praised Trump’s overall war strategy but said the president needs to make clear publicly that he does not want to see the country disintegrate.

Oil chokepoint

For now, however, one of the most pressing concerns is Iran’s threat to the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow chokepoint through which a fifth of the world's ​oil passes. Tanker traffic has halted, which could have grave economic consequences if it lasts.

Though Trump has publicly dismissed any concern about already-rising US gas prices, he and his aides have scrambled for ways to mitigate the war’s impact on energy supplies as voters tell pollsters that the cost of living is their top concern.

“It's an economic pain point on the US economy that it seems was not fully anticipated," said Josh Lipsky at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington.

One former US military official close to the US administration said the widening of the war's economic impact had caught Trump’s team by surprise in part because those with knowledge of oil markets were not consulted ahead of the attack on Iran.

The White House's Kelly said, “The Iranian regime is being absolutely crushed" but did not specifically address concerns about preparations for a war.

Trump made his decision to press ahead with the strikes despite warnings from some senior aides that the escalation could be difficult to contain, according to two White House officials and a Republican close to the administration.

Some traditional US allies were caught off guard. "It's a decision-making circle of one," said one Western diplomat.

The war’s duration is a major unknown likely to determine the extent of its repercussions. With the price tag of the Iran campaign mounting by the day, Trump has said that the operation could last four or five weeks or “whatever it takes” but has offered little explanation of what he envisions will follow.

Retired US Army Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and formerly commanded the US Army in Europe, commended the US military for its tactics in Iran. But he told Reuters: "From a political, strategic and diplomatic standpoint, it seems not to have been thought all the way through.”

Trump also has a lot riding on helping oil-producing Gulf Arab states weather the Iran crisis given they have long hosted US bases and have made pledges of massive new US investments to him.

While Gulf allies appear to have fallen in line to support the campaign, especially after Tehran targeted them with missile and drone strikes, not everyone in the region is onboard with Trump’s war.

In an open letter to Trump published on Thursday, UAE billionaire Khalaf Al Habtor, a frequent visitor to Trump's Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida, asked: "Who gave you the right to turn our region into a battlefield?"

(Reuters)
Balkanizing Iran? US Strategy Risks Protracted Ethnic Conflict – Analysis



File photo of Iran's IRGC. Photo Credit: Tasnim News Agency


March 9, 2026 0 Comments
Geopolitical Monitor
By Jack Roush


While the ongoing campaign by the United States and Israel has relied primarily on aerial strikes to degrade the Islamic Republic’s leadership, infrastructure, and military capabilities, recent reporting suggests the White House is also searching for partners on the ground. This would be a necessary step if Washington ultimately hopes to produce a political transition in Iran. However, if the US chooses to support insurgencies among Iran’s minority populations as part of that strategy, it risks fueling ethnic conflict with potentially serious regional consequences.

Need for Local Partners

Though the Trump administration has been criticized for its unclear strategic aims in Iran, US and Israeli decapitation strikes appear to indicate that political transition is a preferred outcome. If the Islamic Republic fails to produce a leader amenable to US interests during its succession process, a more complete overthrow of the regime may be required – something that may be impossible through an aerial campaign alone. Though the administration has expressed openness to placing boots on the ground in support of its aims, factors such as Trump’s promises of peace during the presidential campaign and the immediate unpopularity of the conflict during a midterm year likely limit its willingness to launch a direct regime change operation.

Therefore, an approach in which the US cooperates with local allies to topple the regime or pressure reform within the Islamic Republic may appear logical. Reportedly, efforts have already been made to promote defections from within Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and conventional armed forces (Artesh) or encourage a popular uprising. However, both of these approaches are relatively uncertain and have proven difficult to orchestrate during previous crises in Iran.

In the absence of widespread defections or the formation of a cohesive, national opposition, policymakers may instead look toward armed groups operating along Iran’s periphery as potential partners. These include capable militant organizations from among the country’s minority communities, particularly the Baluchis and Kurds – both of which are predominantly Sunni. Organizations from both of these communities have waged low-grade insurgencies against the Islamic Republic for decades, with varied success. Cooperating with such groups would parallel previous US assistance to the Kurds during the Syrian Civil War or support for Berber rebel groups during the Libyan Civil War.


The situation is rapidly evolving, but the strategy of instrumentalizing local partners already appears to be taking shape. According to reports, US officials including Trump are in direct contact with Kurdish militias in western Iran, and have discussed mounting a coordinated offensive. US and Israeli strikes have also been concentrated in Kurdish-majority provinces, degrading IRGC and other Iranian security infrastructure and facilitating cross-border contact with Kurdish militants in Iraq. The picture is less clear in Baluchistan, where militant groups recently formedan umbrella organization to coordinate operations. While Washington has not moved to overtly coordinate with Baluchi insurgents, the US has been long accused of supplying arms and other support to these groups. As conditions on the ground change, this could evolve into a more significant partnership, as some analysts have speculated.


Unintended Consequences in Iran


Providing air support, intelligence, and arms to Baluchi and Kurdish militant organizations would likely support US aims in the short run, by undermining the Islamic Republic’s control of Iran’s periphery and further degrading its security infrastructure. In a best-case scenario for the Trump administration, this could potentially hasten the regime’s capitulation or outright collapse.

However, this strategy brings several risks for Iran’s long-term stability. These insurgencies do not have the military capability or political will to march on Tehran, and both the Kurdish and Baluchi minority communities comprise comparatively small fractions of the overall population. As a result, they are apt to primarily focus on consolidating control over their local regions. With US support and a weakening central authority, this could harden into protracted tension and conflict with Iran’s Persian-majority core, potentially worse than has been seen in recent Iranian history. Rather than producing a cohesive political transition, the result would resemble the fragmented political geography seen in parts of the Middle East. One example of this is Syria, where confrontations with minority enclaves continue even after the fall of the Assad regime.

Such an outcome could leave Iran divided between rival authorities, localized militias, and competing political movements. In this environment, clashes between national forces and Baluchi and Kurdish insurgents could persist even after the Islamic Republic reforms or falls. What begins as a strategy to pressure the regime could therefore evolve into a prolonged struggle over territorial control and ethnic interests along Iran’s eastern and western borders. Unclear or open-ended commitments by Washington to support partners on the ground could drag the US into this struggle for an indeterminate period.

An overlapping risk worth considering is what happens if the overarching conflict ends in a negotiated settlement that enables the regime to reassert its hold over Iran. If it reaches an acceptable arrangement with the Islamic Republic, the Trump administration could suddenly abandon its enhanced support for minority insurgencies, as has occurred in other conflicts. Should this occur, ethnically-targeted reprisals against Kurds and Baluchis would likely be significant, with the US shouldering much of the blame. Iranian officials have long accused Sunni minorities of collaborating with the US and Israel, especially amid protests, international conflicts, or other crises. After the previous round of US strikes, thousands of Kurds and Baluchis were arrested for alleged espionage. During the protests in recent months, Sunni minorities were accused of fomenting unrest and committing acts of violence by the regime. If an overt US partnership were to end unsuccessfully, it would not be difficult to see these accusations descend into mass violence.

Creating conditions for ethnic conflict in Iran would also undermine US credibility among Iran’s mainstream opposition. Most prominent opponents of the Islamic Republic oppose ethnic separatism and policies that could fracture Iran’s long-term stability and territorial integrity. Moreover, the most prominent Baluchi militant groups – like Jaish-al-Adl and its predecessor, Jundallah – have waged fearsome campaigns of terror over the last two decades. While most attacks have targeted security personnel, the groups’ use of tactics such as mass-casualty suicide bombings and hostage taking have been greatly unpopular with most Iranians. Therefore, tying Washington’s interests to those of such organizations may damage US influence both in Iran and among the influential Iranian diaspora.


New Regional Hazards

Aside from bringing risks for US policy toward Iran, intensified and protracted ethnic conflicts also create new threats to regional stability. This could undermine the strategic benefits perceived by the Trump administration to collapsing the Islamic Republic and its network of proxies and partners.

Both the Baluchi and Kurdish insurgencies in Iran are transnational in nature. Kurdish groups operate between Iran and the semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq – with links to Kurdish communities throughout the region. Meanwhile, Baluchi separatists have long maneuvered across the Iran-Pakistan border. These activities have aided militant organizations in securing funding, arms, and refuge, but they have raised the ire of other regional actors. The mobilization of Kurdish groups could provoke intervention by Turkey, as has occurred recently in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, Pakistan has proven willing to conduct operations on Iranian soil countering Baluchi insurgents during periods of comparative strength for the Islamic Republic. All this indicates that ethnic fragmentation in Iran could escalate into a wider conflict. Furthermore, Turkey and Pakistan are both close US regional partners and would likely be incensed by more overt US support for Kurdish and Baluchi militancy in Iran.

Aside from conflicting with the interests of Turkey and Pakistan, potential US support for these groups presents additional security threats. Jaish-al-Adl, which has emerged as the preeminent militant organization in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province, espouses radical Salafi and Deobandi doctrine, and is reportedly affiliated with Al-Qaeda. This could become a regional concern, as Iranian Baluchi insurgents have already attempted to operate in the Gulf states and Central Asia. Additionally, both Kurdish and Baluchi militants have targeted regional energy infrastructure in the recent past, including attacks on critical oil and gas pipelines. Inadvertently facilitating such actions would prove counterproductive for the Trump administration, as it seeks to manage international economic fallout from its confrontation with Iran.

Implications for US Strategy


While Iran’s Kurdish and Baluchi communities have demonstrated the ability to wage insurgencies and pressure the Islamic Republic, the Trump administration faces serious risks in seeking to use such minority groups as its primary partners on the ground. If Washington wishes to avoid these risks, it must clearly define the extent and purpose of its cooperation with local partners. Its apparent coordination with Kurdish groups may prove tactically advantageous in degrading Iranian security infrastructure, but such engagement should remain tightly bounded and focused on specific objectives. At the same time, Washington should make clear that it will not cooperate with Baluchi militant organizations, particularly those espousing extremist ideologies. Drawing such distinctions would reassure regional partners, especially Turkey and Pakistan, that US actions are not intended to widen or perpetuate its conflict with Iran. Ultimately, the success of US policy will depend on demonstrating the strategic clarity necessary to maintain credibility and prevent a dangerous cycle of fragmentation and ethnic violence.



This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com

Geopolitical Monitor

Geopoliticalmonitor.com is an open-source intelligence collection and forecasting service, providing research, analysis and up to date coverage on situations and events that have a substantive impact on political, military and economic affairs.
The Question Of The Alevi Minority In Turkey And Their Religious Identity – Analysis


Alevi women partaking in Semah ritual in Turkey. 
Photo Credit: SERDAR AYDIN 1, Wikipedia Commons


March 9, 2026 
By Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Introduction

Despite occasional suggestions from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—including floated referendums on EU talks in the mid-2010s—the path to Turkish EU membership remains blocked, fueling debates over whether accession would strengthen European security against radicalism or exacerbate cultural and historical divides.

A current EU political concern is reflected in many controversial issues, and one of those the most important is about whether or not to accept Turkey as a full member state (being a candidate state since 1999). Turkey is, on one hand, governed as a secular democracy by moderate Islamic political leaders, seeking to play the role of a bridge between the Middle East and Europe. However, Turkey is, on the other hand, an almost 100% Muslim country with a rising tide of Islamic radicalism (especially since the 2023 Israeli aggression on Gaza and ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian Gazans), surrounded by neighbors with a similar problem.

There are two fundamental arguments by all of those who are opposing Turkish admission to the EU: 1) Muslim Turkish citizens (70 million) will never be properly integrated into the European environment that is predominantly Christian; and 2) In the case of Turkish accession, historical clashes between the (Ottoman) Turks and European Christians are going to be revived. Here we will refer only to one statement against Turkish accession: it “would mean the end of Europe” (former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing) – a statement which clearly reflects the opinion by 80% of Europeans polled in 2009 that Turkey’s admission to the EU would not be a good thing. At the same time, there are only 32% of Turkish citizens who had a favorable opinion of the EU, and, therefore, the admission process, for which formal and strict negotiations began already in 2005, is very likely to be finally abortive.

Islamic fundamentalism and Turkey’s admission to the EU

The question of Turkish admission to the EU is, by the majority of Europeans, seen through the glass of Islamic fundamentalism as one of the most serious challenges to European stability and, above all, identity that is primarily based on Christian values and tradition. Islamic fundamentalism is understood as an attempt to undermine existing state practices for the very reason that militant Muslims (like ISIS/ISIL/DAESH) are fighting to re-establish the medieval Islamic Caliphate and the establishment of theocratic authority over the global Islamic community – the Umma. Nevertheless, religious fundamentalism first came to the attention of the Western part of the international community in 1979 when a pro-American absolute monarchy was replaced with a Shia (Shiia) Muslim anti-American semi-theocracy in Iran. In other words, Iranian Shia Muslim clerics, who were all the time the spiritual leaders of the Iranians, became their political leaders too. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 prompted possibilities of similar uprisings in other Muslim societies, followed by pre-emptive actions against them by other governments.

What can be the most dangerous scenario for Turkey from the European perspective if the accession negotiations fail is, probably, Turkish turn towards the Muslim world, followed by rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism, which can be properly controlled by the EU if Turkey were to become a member state of the club? That is, probably, the most important “security” factor to note regarding the EU-Turkish relations and accession negotiations. Namely, following the 9/11 terror attacks (on Washington and New York), it was becoming more and more clear that it was better to have (Islamic) Turkey inside the EU rather than as a part of an anti-Western bloc of Muslim states.

In general, for Western governments and especially for the US and Israeli administrations, Shia Muslims became seen after the 1979 Iranian Islamic (Shia) revolution as the most potential Islamic fundamentalists and the religious terrorists. Therefore, the oppression of Shia minorities by the Sunni majorities in several Muslim countries is deliberately not recorded and criticized by Western governments. The case of the Alevi people in Turkey is one of the best examples of such a policy. However, at the same time, the EU administration is paying full attention to the Kurdish question in Turkey, even requiring the recognition of the Kurds by the Turkish government as an ethnocultural minority (as different from the ethnic Turks). Why are the Alevi people discriminated against in this respect by the EU’s minority policy in Turkey? The answer is because the Kurds are Sunni Muslims, but Alevis are considered a Turkish faction of the (militant) Shia Muslim community within the Islamic world.

In the next paragraphs, I would like to shed more light on the question of who the Alevi people are and what Alevism is as a religious identity, taking into account the fact that religion, undoubtedly, has become increasingly important in both the studies and practice of international relations and global politics. We also have to keep in mind that religious identity was predominant in comparison to national or ethnic identities for several centuries, being the crucial cause of political conflicts in many cases.

What is Alevism?

The Alevi people are those Muslims who believe in Alevism, that is, in fact, a sect or form of Islam. Especially in Turkey, Alevism is a second common sect of Islam. The number of Alevi people is between 10 and 15 million. The name of the sect comes from the term Alevi, which means “the follower of Ali”. Some experts in Islamic studies claim that Alevism is a branch of Shi’ism (Shia Islam), but, as a matter of fact, the Alevi Umma is not homogeneous, and Alevism cannot be understood without another Islamic sect – Bektashism. Nevertheless, Alevi culture produced many poets and folk songs, alongside the fact that Alevi people are experiencing many everyday life problems in living according to their beliefs in Islam.

The Alevis (Turkish: Aleviler or Alevilik; Kurdish: Elewî) are a religious, sub-ethnic, and cultural community in Turkey representing at the same time the biggest sect of Islam in Turkey. Alevism is a way of Islamic mysticism or Sufism that believes in one God by accepting Muhammad as a Prophet, and the Holy Qur’ān. Alevi people love Ehlibeyt – the family of Prophet Muhammad-, unifying prayer and supplication, prayer in their language, to prefer a free person instead of Umma (Muslim community), to prefer to love God instead of God’s fear, to overcome Sharia reaching to the real world, believing in the Holy Qur’ān’s genuine instead of shave. Alevism has found its cure in human love; they believe that people are immortal because a person is manifested by God. Women and men are praying together, in their language, with their music that is played via bağlama, with semah. Alevism is an entirety of beliefs that depends on Islam’s rules, which are based on the Holy Qur’ān, according to Muhammad’s commands; by interpreting Islam with a universal dimension, it opens new doors to the earth. The Alevi system of belief is Islamic with a triplet composed of Allah, Muhammad, and Ali.

There are many strong arguments about the relationship between Alevism and Shi’ism. Some researchers say that Alevism is a form of Shi’ism, but some of them say that Alevism is sectarian. We have to keep in mind that Shi’ism is the second most common type of Islam in the world after Sunnism. This is a branch of Islam which is called the Party of Ali for the reason that it recognizes Ali’s claim to succeed his cousin and father-in-law, the Prophet Muhammad, as the spiritual leader of Islam during the first civil war in the Islamic world (656−661). In most of the Islamic countries, the Sunnis are in the majority, but the Shi’ites comprise some 80 million believers, or, in other words, around 13% out of all the world’s Muslims. The Shi’ites are predominant in three countries: Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates. However, Alevism cannot be understood as identical to Sufism, which is the mystical aspect of Islam that arose as a reaction to strict religious orthodoxy. Sufis seek personal union with God, and their Christian Orthodox counterparts in the Middle Ages were the Bogumils.

Undoubtedly, Alevism has some similar issues with Shi’ism; at the same time, there are a lot of differences concerning the general practice of Islam. However, in some Western literature, Alevism is presented as a branch of Shi’ism, or more specifically, as a Turk or Ottoman way of Shi’ism.

Split within Muslims

We have to keep in mind that in this place, the Islamic expansion in the 7th and 8th centuries was accompanied by political conflicts which followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and the question of who is entitled to succeed him is still splitting up the Muslim world today. In other words, when the Prophet died, a caliph (successor) was chosen to rule all Muslims. However, as the caliph lacked prophetic authority, he enjoyed secular power but not authority in religious doctrine. The first caliph was Abu Bakr, who is considered, together with his three successors, as the “rightly guided” (or orthodox) caliphs. They ruled according to the Quran and the practices of the Prophet, but, thereafter, Islam became split into two antagonistic branches: Sunni and Shia.

The Sunni-Shia division basically started when Ali ibn Abi Talib (599−661), Muhammad’s son-in-law and heir, assumed the Caliphate after the murder of his predecessor, Uthman (574−656). The civil war ended with the defeat of Ali and the victory of Uthman’s cousin and governor of Damascus, Mu’awiya Umayyad (602−680), after the Battle of Suffin. However, those Muslims (like the Alevi people, for instance) who claimed that Ali was the rightful caliph took the name of Shiat Ali – the “Partisans of Ali”. They believe that Ali was the last legitimate caliph and, therefore, the Caliphate should pass down only to those who are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter, Fatima, and Ali, her husband. Ali’s son, Hussein (626−680), claimed the Caliphate, but the Umayyads killed him together with his followers at the Battle of Karbala in 680. This city, today in contemporary Iraq, is the holiest of all sites for Shia Muslims (Shi’ism). Even though the Prophet Muhammad’s family line ended in 873, the Shia Muslims believe that the last descendant did not die, as he is rather “hidden” and will return. Those basic Shia interpretations of the history of Islam are followed by the Alevi people, and, therefore, many researchers are simply considering Alevism as a faction of Shi’ism.

The dominant branch of Islam is Sunni. The Sunni Muslims, unlike their Shia opponents, are not demanding that the caliph has to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. They are also accepting the Arabic tribal customs in the government. According to their point of view, political leadership is in the hands of the Muslim community as such. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the religious and political power in Islam was never again united into a political community after the death of the fourth caliph.

Alevism in Islam

Alevi people believe in one God, Allah, and, therefore, Alevism, as a form of Islam, is a monotheistic religion. Like all other Muslims, the Alevis understand that God is in everything around them in nature. It is important to notice that there are those Alevis who believe in good and bad spirits (and kind of angels), and, therefore, they often practice superstition to benefit from good ones and to avoid harm from bad ones. For that reason, for many Muslims, Alevism is not a real Islam as it is more a form of paganism imbued with Christianity. However, a majority of Alevis do not believe in these supernatural beings, saying that it is an expression of Satanism.

The essence of Alevism is in the fact that Alevis believe that according to the original text of the Quran, Ali, Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was to be the Prophet’s successor as God’s vice-regent on earth or caliph. However, they claim that the parts of the original Quran related to Ali were taken out by his rivals. According to Alevis, the Quran, as a fundamental holy book for all Muslims, should be interpreted esoterically. For them, there are much deeper spiritual truths in the Quran than the strict rules and regulations that appear on the surface. However, most Alevi writers will quote individual Quranic verses as an appeal for authority to support their view on a given topic or to justify a certain Alevi religious tradition. The Alevis generally promote the reading of the Quran in the Turkish language rather than in Arabic, stressing that it is of fundamental importance for a person to understand exactly what he or she is reading, which is not possible if the Quran is read in Arabic. However, many Alevis do not read the Quran or other holy books, nor base their daily beliefs and practices on them, as they consider these ancient books to be irrelevant today.

The Alevis are reading three different books. If, according to their opinion, there is no proper information in the Quran, as the Sunnis corrupted the authentic words of Muhammad, it is necessary to reveal the original Prophet’s messages by alternative readings. Therefore, Alevi believers are looking to (1) the Nahjul Balagha, the traditions and sayings of Ali; (2) the Buyruks, the collections of doctrine and practices of several of the 12 imams, especially Cafer; and (3) the Vilayetnameler or the Menakıbnameler, books that describe events in the lives of great Alevis such as Haji Bektash. Except for these basic books, there are some special sources to participate in the creation of Alevi theology, like poet-musicians Yunus Emre (13−14th century), Kaygusuz Abdal (15th century), and Pir Sultan Abdal (16th century).

The foundation of Alevism is in the love of the Prophet and Ehlibeyt. Twelve Imams are godlike, glorified by the Alevis. Waiting for the last Imam’s (Muslim religious leader) reappearance, the Shia Muslims established a special council composed of 12 religious scholars (Ulema) that elect a supreme Imam. For instance, Ayatollah (“Holy Man”) Ruhollah Khomeini (1900−1989) enjoyed that status in Iran. Most Alevis believe that the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, grew up in secret to be saved from those who wanted to exterminate the family of Ali. Many Alevis believe Mehdi is still alive and/or that he will come back to earth one day. According to Alevis, Ali was Muhammad’s intended successor, and therefore the first caliph, but competitors stole this right from him. Muhammed intended for the leadership of all Muslims to perpetually stem from his family line (Ehli Beyt) by beginning with Ali, Fatima, and their two sons, Hasan and Hüseyin. Ali, Hasan, and Hüseyin are considered the first three Imams, and the other nine of the 12 Imams came from Hüseyin’s line. Just to remind ourselves, the names and approximate dates of the birth and death of the 12 Imams are:

İmam Ali (599-661)
İmam Hasan (624-670)
İmam Hüseyin (625-680)
İmam Zeynel Abidin (659-713)
İmam Muhammed Bakır (676-734)
İmam Cafer-i Sadık (699-766)
İmam Musa Kâzım (745-799)
İmam Ali Rıza (765-818)
İmam Muhammed Taki (810-835)
İmam Ali Naki (827-868)
İmam Hasan Askeri (846-874)
İmam Muhammed Mehdi (869-941).


For the Alevis, to be a really good person is an inalienable part of their life philosophy. It is important to notice that the Alevis are not turned to the Black Stone (Kaaba), which is in Mecca in the Sunni Saudi Arabia, and, as it is known, the Muslim community’s member is supposed to visit it for Hajj at least once in their lives. Alevis’ first fasting is not in Ramadan, it is in Muharram, and it takes 12 days, not 30 days. The second fast for them is after the Feast of Sacrifice for 20 days, and another one is the Hizir fast. In Islam, there is a rule that if a person has enough money, he/she should give a specific amount to a poor person, but the Alevis prefer to donate money to Alevi organizations, not to individuals. As they don’t go to Mecca for Hajj, they visit some mausoleums, like that of Haji Bektaş (in Kırşehir), Abdal Musa (in Tekke Village, Elmalı, Antalya), Şahkulu Sultan (in Merdivenköy, İstanbul), Karacaahmet Sultan (in Üsküdar, İstanbul), or Seyit Gazi (in Eskişehir).

Bektashism

Haji Bektash (Bektaş) Wali was a Turkmen who was born in Iran. After graduating, he moved to Anatolia. He educated a lot of students, and he and his students served a lot of religious, economic, social, and martial services in Ahi Teşkilatı. Haji Bektash started to be popular among the Ottoman elite military detachment, the Janissaries. Nevertheless, he was not of the Alevi origin, but he adopted the rules of the Alevi believers into his personal life. That sect, or a form of Islam, was founded in the name of Haji Bektash Wali, whose members depend on the love of Ali and the twelve imams. Bektashism was popular in Anatolia and the Balkans (especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania), and it is still alive today.

Over the course of time, Bektashism was improved by taking some features of the old beliefs of Anatolia and Turkish culture. However, Bektashism is the most important part of Alevism, as many rules of Bektashism are incorporated into Alevism. For the Alevi believers, the mausoleum of Haji Bektash Wali in Nevşehir in Anatolia is an important point of the pilgrimage. Finally, in Turkey, Bektashism and Alevism, in fact, cannot be treated as different concepts of Islamic theology.

Problems and difficulties of Alevis in Ottoman history and Turkey

When the Ottoman state was established at the end of the 13th century and at the beginning of the 14th century, it did not have sectarian frictions within Islam. At that time, Alevis occupied a lot of chairs in state institutions. The Janissaries (originally the Sultan’s bodyguard) were members of Bektashism, which means that even the Sultan tolerated in full such a way of the interpretation of the Quran and the early history of Islam. However, as the Ottoman state was involved in the process of imperialistic transformation by annexing surrounding provinces and states, Sunnism was getting more and more important because the Sunni Muslims were becoming a clear majority of the Ottoman Sultanate and, therefore, Sunnism was much more useful for the state administration and the system of governing. The Ottoman state became involved in the chain of conflicts with the Safavid Empire (Persia, today Iran, 1502−1722) – a country with a clear majority of those Muslims who expressed Shi’ism that is a form of Islam very similar to Alevism. The Alevi group, who complained about being more Sunni in the Ottoman Sultanate, became sympathizing Safavid Shah İsmail I (1501−1524) and his state, as it was based on Alevism. The animosity between the Ottoman Alevis and Ottoman authorities became more obvious in 1514 when the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (1512−1520) executed some 40.000 Alevis together with the Kurdish people while going to have a decisive Battle of Chaldiran (August 23rd) in Iran against Shah Ismail I. Till the end of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1923, Alevis have been oppressed by the authorities as the sectarian believers who were not fitting to the official Sunni theology of Islam.

After the end of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, Alevis were glad in the first years of the new Republic of Turkey, which declaratively proclaimed a segregation of the religion from the state, which practically meant that there was no official state religion in the country. The Alevi population of Turkey supported most of the reforms with great hope that their social status would be improved. However, after the first years of the new state, they started to experience some difficulties as, de facto, a religious minority. The 1960s were very important for Turkish society for at least three reasons: (1) The immigration had started from the rural area to the urban area following a new process of industrialization; (2) The immigration abroad, mostly to West Germany, according to the German-Turkish so-called Gastarbeiter Agreement; and (3) A further democratization of political life. As a consequence, in 1966, Alevis established their own political party – Birlik Partisi (Unity Party). In 1969, Alevism, as a minority group, sent eight members to the Parliament according to the results of the parliamentary elections. However, in 1973, the party had sent just one member to the Parliament, and finally, in 1977, the party had lost its efficiency. In 1978, in Maraş, and in 1980, in Çorum, hundreds of Alevi Muslims were killed as a consequence of the conflict with the majority Sunni population, but the most notorious Alevi massacre happened in 1993 on July 2nd in Sivas, when 35 Alevi intellectuals were killed in Madimak Hotel by a group of religious fundamentalists.

Undoubtedly, the Alevi believers still face many problems in Turkey today in connection with freedom of religious expression and the recognition as a separate cultural group. For example, the religious curriculum does not have any information about Alevism, but rather only about Sunnism, which means that Alevism is not studied on a regular basis in Turkey. Alevism is deeply ignored by Turkey’s administration, for instance, by the Presidency of Religious Affairs (est. 1924), which is an institution dealing with the religious questions and problems, but in practice, it is working according to the rules of Sunni Islam. However, on the other hand, there are some improvements in Alevi cultural life, as, for instance, many foundations and other civic public institutions are opened to support it. Nevertheless, Alevis, like Kurds, are not recognized as a separate ethnocultural or religious group in Turkey due to the Turkish understanding of a nation (millet) that is inherited from the Ottoman Sultanate, according to which all Muslims in Turkey are treated as ethnolinguistic Turks. The situation can be changed as Turkey is seeking the EU’s membership and, therefore, certain EU requirements have to be accepted, among others, and granting minority rights for Alevis and Kurds.

Conclusions

Alevism is a sect of Islam, and it shows many common points with Shi’ism. However, we can not say that it is a part of Shi’ism as a whole. Alevi culture has a rich heritage in poems and music because of its worship style. In Anatolia, Bektashism is usually connected with Alevism.

The Alevi people were living in the Ottoman Sultanate and its successor, the Republic of Turkey, usually with troubles, as they, with their religion, did not fit the official (Sunni) expression of Islam.

Today, Alevis in Turkey are fighting to be respected as a separate religious-cultural group that can freely demonstrate their peculiar way of life. As a matter of fact, the Alevi people could not express themselves freely for centuries, including in present-day Turkey, which should learn to practice both minority rights and democracy.

Finally, if Turkey wants to join the EU, surely, it has to provide a maximum of the required standards of protection of all kinds of minorities, including religious and religious-cultural ones. That can be a chance for the Alevi people in Turkey to improve their status within society.


Personal disclaimer: The author writes for this publication in a private capacity, which is unrepresentative of anyone or any organization except for his own personal views. Nothing written by the author should ever be conflated with the editorial views or official positions of any other media outlet or institution. The author of the text does not have any moral, political, scientific, material, or legal responsibility for the views expressed in the article.
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Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic

Dr. Vladislav B. Sotirovic is an ex-university professor and a Research Fellow at the Center for Geostrategic Studies in Belgrade, Serbia.



Sunday, March 08, 2026

Iran's Azeris fear ethnic strife, sucking Turkey and Azerbaijan into the war


With ethnic brethren in northern Iran and a US outreach to Iran’s Kurds following the launch of Operation Epic Fury, Turkey and Azerbaijan are at risk of being drawn into the war. For Iran’s Azeris, the largest minority group in a multi-ethnic country, it could mean trouble as ethnic fault lines threaten to rip apart the South Caucasus region.


Issued on: 06/03/2026 
FRANCE24
By: Leela JACINTO

FIle photo of the Armenian Monastery of Saint Stepanos in Jolfa, northern Iran near the Azerbaijani border taken on September 18, 2025. © Atta Kenare, AFP

Over the past few months, Ehsan Hosseinzadeh, like many Iranians in the diaspora, had come to believe a foreign military intervention was necessary to help his people oust an Islamic regime that was oppressing and massacring innocent civilians. But a week after Israel and the US launched a war in his home country, the 38-year-old refugee in France is worried about the conflict dragging in regional powers – to the detriment of Iran and its citizens.

Hosseinzadeh has every reason to fear a conflagration erupting along ethnic, religious and civilizational fault lines that could rip open the wounds of history in an ancient land.

Born in Urmia – a city in the northwestern extremity of Iran that shares borders with Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Iraq – Hosseinzadeh understands a thing or two about the explosive mix of identity and grievance.

An ethnic Azeri (also called Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani-Turkish in Iran) Hosseinzadeh belongs to the largest minority community, constituting around 24% of Iran’s 93 million population. His birthplace is also home to a significant Kurdish population, as well as Armenians and other minorities that have lived in lands where the borders of empires and republics have shifted with the times. The tangle of history can sometimes make the region a diplomatic tripwire for political leaders.

So, on Thursday, when Azerbaijan accused Iran of a drone attack on its territory that injured four civilians and vowed to retaliate, Hosseinzadeh was on high alert. The drone hit an airport building in Nakhchivan, a landlocked exclave of ⁠Azerbaijan bordering Iran, Turkey and Armenia. It was an ominous development.

READ MOREAzerbaijan's Aliyev vows retaliation after 'terrorist' drone strike blamed on Iran

“You can see the tension is increasing. And there’s also the ethnicity factor. I’m not sure, but I can predict that if an ethnic conflict arises in that region between Turkish people and Kurdish people, both Baku and Ankara will have a tendency to intervene, to play their cards there,” he said, referring to the Azeris, a Turkic people, as “Turkish people” in a telling sign of the complex linguistic-identity mix in the region.

Turkey – which shares a nearly 500-kilometre border with Iran that was drawn in 1639, making it the oldest continuously managed frontier in the Middle East – is at high risk in a regional conflagration. A shared border, an ethnic group straddling a frontier, infrastructure and business interests on either side – all could see Turkey facing refugee and economic crises.

On Wednesday, a ballistic missile launched from Iran and heading towards Turkish airspace was destroyed by NATO air defence systems. Turkey, NATO’s only Muslim-majority member, is home to the Incirlik base, which is believed to have US nuclear weapons. The next day, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a televised speech, warned that the Iran war had taken tensions in the region to a "terrifying level".
‘Ankara's nightmare scenario’

Turkey and Iran have a long history of rivalry, competition and have at times supported opposing proxies, especially in Syria and Iraq. But bilateral relations between Ankara and Tehran have held firm, based on mutual economic interests and domestic imperatives to contain the Kurds. Like Turkey, Iran also has an oppressed Kurdish minority comprising around 10 to 17% of the population living in areas also inhabited by Azeris.

But after Operation Epic Fury exposed the Trump administration’s epic failure to calculate the fallout of the war, Washington made a high-profile outreach to Iranian Kurdish armed groups based in the Iraqi semi-autonomous zone. The Kurds, who have a long experience of being “hung out to dry” by Washington, have so far not bitten the US bait. But they are aware that President Donald Trump has provided them a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in their historic resistance to regimes in Tehran.

If that opportunity is seized, it could draw Turkey into the Iran war, experts warn. “Turkey is in a bind,” explained Guney Yildiz, senior adviser on geopolitics and strategic insights at the Anthesis-Wallbrook Group. “It just resolved its own 40-year Kurdish war,” he explained, referring to the decision last year by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disband, disarm and engage in a peace process. “And now a CIA-backed Kurdish uprising is emerging on its eastern border involving the PJAK [Kurdistan Free Life Party], which is linked to the PKK network. That's Ankara's nightmare scenario.”

In the weeks before the launch of the Iran war, as Trump’s US military “armada” was deploying to the region, Turkey engaged in a frantic diplomatic effort to avert a conflict. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reached out to the US, Iran, Oman and other Gulf countries, as well as Turkey’s other Western allies, in a bid to explain the high-stakes fallout of a conflict for Ankara. The effort failed.

The US making an outreach to the Kurds, Ankara has been put on alert, explained Shukriya Bradost, a Middle East security expert and doctoral researcher at Virginia Tech's School of Public and International Affairs. “Erdogan is going to be watching this closely. He obviously does not want a Kurdistan in Iran,” similar to the Kurdish semi-autonomous zone in Iraq, Bradost explained. “He could obviously reach out to the [Iranian] Azeris and he's very close to Baku as well,” she added.


Transit corridors, pipelines, competition and cooperation

Turkey and Azerbaijan share close ties rooted in common linguistic and cultural foundations that have deepened with economic and military cooperation.

During the 2020 Azerbaijan-Armenia war over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, Turkish drones and military advisers were critical in handing Baku a victory. Iran, a country that has cordial relations and an open border with Armenia, has traditionally used its relations with Yerevan to contain Azerbaijani-Turkish ambitions in the South Caucasus region. But with Armenia defeat, Tehran emerged from the conflict diplomatically weakened.

Meanwhile, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been patching up ties after the 2020 war. A recent agreement between the two countries for a transit corridor linking Azerbaijan to the Nakhchivan exclave – called the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” – has further sidelined Iran in the region.

The economic stakes in Iran’s northwestern region are also high for Turkey, which receives more than 15% of its natural gas from Iran through the Tabriz-Ankara pipeline.

But the US-Israeli war on Iran threatens to rattle the intricate web of interests and critical economic corridors that maintain stability in the South Caucasus region.

If Azerbaijan, emboldened by its ally Turkey, attempts to mobilise Iranian Azeris, it could touch a particularly sensitive ethnic fault line in northwestern Iran, experts warn. “The risk is that Iran's western provinces become a proxy space where Turkey backs Azeris and the US backs Kurds, which fragments the Iranian opposition further at exactly the moment it needs cohesion,” said Yildiz.

Hopes fading – but not completely

Iran’s West Azerbaijan province – of which Urmia is the capital – has long been home to a mixed population of mainly Shiite Azeris and Sunni Kurds.

The Azeris, the Turkic group that produced the Safavid and Qajar dynasties before the Pahlavi dynasty came to power, were an influential group that was integrated with Iran’s majority Persians. Their fortunes dipped with the Pahlavis, a regime reviled by ethnic minorities as Persian supremacists.

With the 1979 revolution and takeover of the Islamic regime, the Azeris were back in the national mainstream. Under the Shiite Islamic regime in Tehran, the Azeris are a highly integrated ethnic group in Iranian society. The late supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was Azeri, and the community is regarded as the Shiite brethren of Iran’s majority ethnic Persians, who make up more than 50% of the population. “They have international support from neighbouring Turkey and Azerbaijan, and inside Iran, they’re powerful too, because they've been part of the system – the political, economic and security structures,” explained Bradost.

The Kurds, in comparison, have fared poorly under the Shiite authorities. But they are the most mobilized ethnic group in Iran, with many Kurdish parties having armed groups based in neighbouring Iraq.

A collapse of central authority could ignite an ethnic tinderbox between the two communities who have historic territorial disputes.

For Hosseinzadeh, who has family in the region, it’s a nightmare scenario. “I'm very worried about a very big ethnic conflict there, because there is, as I understand it, little or no dialogue between the two ethnic groups. And there are very extreme people on both sides. In the Kurdish camp, there are people who say the whole Azerbaijan [region of Iran] is our territory and this is part of Kurdistan. And there are also people in Azerbaijani [or Iranian Azeri] camp saying that we have to join Azerbaijan or Turkey,” explained Hosseinzadeh.

For nearly half-a-century, the Islamic regime in Tehran maintained that it was the only guarantor of stability in the country. Hosseinzadeh, an Iranian lawyer and fervent defender of democratic rights, is at pains to note that he is not echoing Islamic regime propaganda. “The regime warns people of chaos. They say if the regime falls, we will fall. I'm not repeating that perspective,” he stressed. “The Islamist regime has to go. We’ve had 47 years of it, that’s enough. But there are very big and serious concerns in Iran and we have to be careful of those rising conflicts.”

After years of championing human rights and hoping for foreign help to make his vision for Iran come true, Hosseinzadeh today sounds anxious after sleepless days trying to reach his loved ones back home and following the news. “My wish was, and is...but it's getting a bit pale,” he trails with worry and exhaustion before starting again. “My wish was bringing democracy, a federal democratic government based on human rights for all the people of Iran – not for the supremacy of the Persian people, for all ethnicities,” he emphasises. “And now we’re getting far from that, with the danger with bombardment, ethnic conflict, foreign actors…it's pity and it's worrying. But let's see what will happen in the future.”

This Is Netanyahu’s War, Stupid – OpEd

By 

A national daily commented editorially yesterday that apropos of the United States’ war on Iran, the Modi government should “take a more emphatic stand against the war and work with other powers to de-escalate the conflict. India should also strongly oppose U.S. attempts to bring the war to its  backyard.” 

Such counselling is overdue. Signs are multiplying that New Delhi is a captive of the narrative of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the Jewish lobby who control US President Donald Trump. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s untimely visit to Israel ten days ago has brought about a manifestly pro-Israeli tilt in India’s regional policy in West Asia. This is hugely consequential.

Trump and Netanyahu are aiming at a total destruction of Iran to make it a submissive vassal state. Trump insists that he will have a say about choosing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s successor, implying that the decapitation strategy will continue until a pliable figure appears in Tehran. Such a strategy fits into Netanyahu’s longstanding agenda to remove Iran from the geopolitical chessboard as the main obstacle to his Zionist agenda of Greater Israel. Trump is vulnerable to Israeli blackmail over the Epstein file. But how are these to be conflated with India”s interests? 

Alas, Delhi has a tunnel vision. Shashi Tharoor, the chairman of the parliament’s standing committee of on foreign affairs, tailors his vision to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The BJP president of the state unit in Kerala Rajeev Chandrasekhar is indignant about the opposition parties’ “shameless politics” of pandering to political Islam by “condemning only US-Israel for attacking Iran…” 

However, the ground beneath the feet of the ruling elites in Delhi is shaky. Bloomberg reported on February 27 (before the war began) that Indonesian lawmakers, provoked by Modi’s patently pro-Israeli remarks while in Israel, sought to put on hold an order for 105,000 trucks with two of India’s top manufacturers — per a disclosure by Minister Ferry Juliantono in an interview with a local TV station. 

The spectre of disruption of oil supplies haunts the Indian government. Brent has crossed $83 bpd and may cross the $100 bpd mark. Trump no longer cares about high oil prices. 

But Trump continues to navigate India’s energy security. This is also the message from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s social media announcement of a 30-day waiver that allows India to return to Russia to buy oil. But there’s a flip side to it. The strategic implications are that the US can also put the waiver on hold. It is unclear whether Delhi sought such a waiver — or, got the Jewish lobby in DC to intervene — but either way, the whole situation is humiliating. 

Meanwhile, sensitive questions have been raised about the Moudge-class Iranian frigate that was returning from Visakhapatnam after participation in a multilateral naval event by a US nuclear-powered attack submarine lurking nearby. Did the Americans take advantage of the intelligence sharing bilaterally between the Indian and American sides? 87 Iranian sailors lost their lives. 

India is cast in a false position as the very next day, Sri Lanka showed exemplary moral courage and asserted its strategic autonomy to respond to a distress call from a second Iranian ship with over 200 sailors on board, and allowed it to dock at Trincomalee Harbour. The optics are not good.

However, the mother of all mysteries is why the government  lapsed into such a deafening silence over the heinous assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on February 28 in a pre-meditated, meticulously planned Israeli air strike. Simply put, Delhi didn’t want to publicly condemn Israel. 

In a reluctant course correction subsequently, full six days later, the government deputed the Foreign Secretary to sign the condolence book at the Iranian embassy. But the damage has been done. The big question is, what has Tehran done to earn the wrath of the BJP government?

On the other hand, Modi rushed to commiserate with certain Gulf countries by personally telephoning his counterparts to condemn Iran for retaliatory strikes, which had caused some human casualties and physical damage. Perhaps, it was a diplomatic ploy designed to draw Arabs into the orbit of the US-Israeli axis. On the contrary, mum is the word over the killing of over 150 Iranian girl students in a US air strike, which the UN called “a grave violation of humanitarian law”.

All these aberrations taken together, a perception has grown that Modi government has been completely brainwashed by Netanyahu.

In reality, though, the US could be facing the most humiliating military defeat  in its modern history. Khorramshahr-4 hit sensitive installations in Tel Aviv on the sixth day of the war. The entire US ecosystem built over decades at the bases in the Gulf region, especially UAE, costing trillions of dollars have been decimated, dealing a mortal blow to the US Central Command’s war capability. The naval base in Bahrain, home to US Naval Forces Central Command, has been destroyed.

This war may effectively mark the end of the US’ sprawling military presence in West Asia that gave the US the wherewithal to pursue interventionist wars and conflicts. In yet another insightful Substack piece titled Iran Blinds US With Unprecedented Campaign of Strikes on Region’s Strategic Radars , Simplicius assesses that “an avalanche of new satellite intel has revealed shocking region-wide damage that Iran has done to US’s most priceless assets, which—it would seem—could only have come by way of major Chinese and Russian help.”  

When asked by the NBC Nightly News anchor Tom Llamas in a video interview yesterday about the prospect of a US ground invasion, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said bluntly, “No, we are waiting for them, we are confident that we can confront them, and that would be a big disaster for them.” Araghchi closed the door on diplomacy with the Trump administration. 

Trump suffered a setback when he called the top Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq, Bafel Talabani and Masoud Barzani, and personally offered “extensive US air cover” and other forms of support if only for Kurdish groups attacked Iran. He pleaded, per a Washington Post report, “Kurds must choose a side in this battle — either with America and Israel or with Iran.” Barzani later reportedly called Araghchi to assure him Kurds wouldn’t intervene!

WaPo commented: “Iranian and Iraqi Kurds are in a difficult situation. The US has backed Kurds in Iraq and Syria, but… Iraq’s Kurds have reached an uneasy modus vivendi with Iran, based on the sides not backing attacks on the other… There were premature reports in Israeli and American media about the start of an Iranian Kurdish offensive last night [Sunday] that were later taken down.”

In the final analysis, the national mood in America will determine the timeline of the war. There are rumblings within Republican Party that Trump’s focus ought to be on the economy with an eye on mid- terms  in November. The majority of Americans oppose the war. The Democrats are bullish and  quietly spreading word  that Trump is manoeuvring to distract attention away from Epstein scandal. They have nicknamed it as “Netanyahu’s war”.

All is not lost for Modi government to beat a retreat. Netanyahu was instrumental to navigate Haifa Port deal; he is probably controlling the strings of Epstein scandal; or, he is fixated on the geopolitical construct that control of Iran will uproot Chinese influence regionally. But none of it is good enough to conflate Israeli/ Jewish interests with Netanyahu’s or his own personal interests with India’s.

Of course, ultimately, the fault lies not even with Netanyahu but almost entirely with the BJP in its quest to establish ideological affinity on the international plane for Hindutva pivoting on ethnocentrism. The paradox is, this was also what drew Savarkar once to the Nazi ideology.

Delhi should return to a priori history and the knowledge that comes from  the power of reasoning based on self-evident truths to work with like-minded countries to try to de-escalate this senseless war. At any rate, India should applaud Sri Lanka’s pushback against the US attempts to widen the war to the South Asian region. Certainly, this is Netanyahu’s war, stupid – not ours.

M.K. Bhadrakumar

M.K. Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.