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Friday, March 27, 2026

Op-Ed: Wikipedia bans AI content — Might also solve the slop problem for everyone


By Paul Wallis
SENIOR EDITOR
DIGITAL JOURNAL
PublishedMarch 27, 2026


Wikipedia image: — © AFP Can EROK

Wikipedia has announced that it’s banning AI-generated content. It’s not obvious, but this is very good, if unexpected, news for content creators and publishers.

This is also a very practical move for such a baseline reference point. AI’s droning repetitive garbage isn’t information. It’s not even really content, more a sort of filler material. It’s certainly no use at all when you’re trying to get facts. It’s substandard dreck of the worst sort.

Wikipedia has a lot of skin in this game. It’s a global factor in information. It’s a baseline reference for just about everything and everyone.

Wikipedia gets a lot of flak, some justified, some not, for content quality. Most people don’t know, and most critics don’t mention the discussion tabs on each and every page. Wikipedia content is often contested. Sometimes the contests are pretty savage, too. To the point of being genuinely ferocious.

The critiques are a rough equivalent of peer review. Doesn’t mean the critics are necessarily right, but at least there are points made.

There’s something to argue with.

This isn’t the same thing as the usual unquestioning, unchecked and indefensibly stupid, incorrect pablum put out by some very lazy news media, for instance. Maybe it’s because Wikipedia knows its role?

AI has become a huge global error factory in just about all sectors in a few years. That’s not a sustainable or tolerable situation. It’s appropriate that a general information site like Wikipedia has found at least the start of a fix.

Some points for consideration here:

Wikipedia generates huge amounts of content.

To control AI content on Wikipedia, you need a working system that can operate on that scale.

You also need the critique process in place as an added safeguard.

If you have any level of expertise in your user base, this is about survival, not just cosmetic quality control.

Seems simple, doesn’t it?

Now apply these principles to academia, business reporting, news media, and anyone who doesn’t want to endure more AI slop in their lives.

Banning AI content is really just a coarse first-line filter. You might miss some things. There’s another factor at work here, and Wikipedia may have just found AI’s Achilles heel.

AI has a serious, perhaps fatal weakness that can be easily managed by the critique process.

AI is terrible at continuity.

It often lacks focus and drivels on endlessly.

That’s where the really turgid slop comes from. Everyone notices the repetition. Nobody seems to notice the truly godawful hash it can make out of any subject simply because of the volume of content. The most useless garbage will mindlessly continue its illogical babble indefinitely.

None of this rubbish could survive a critique from a 2-year-old child. The sheer lack of focus and off-topic drift is easily identifiable. One lousy prompt can do that, but it seems to be a default for all AI content generation. It’s worse than a writer paid solely on a word count. That can be pretty gruesome.

Again, oversight is the key, but this time it’s strategic, doctrinal oversight, geared to product standards. It’s backed up by peer-level reviews. It’s a key component of core business.

Wikipedia may have just found the way out of this black hole of utter AI crap.

__________________________________________________________

Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this Op-Ed are those of the author. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the Digital Journal or its members.

 

South Africa’s morass of unemployment: Causes, consequences and the need for communes

Abahlali baseMjondolo

South Africa faces a staggering unemployment crisis, far exceeding the levels of joblessness during the Great Depression in the United States and even in Weimar Germany. The consequences of this have been catastrophic for the working class — its members are mired in poverty, social cohesion is breaking down, and despair has become widespread.

Despite campaigns by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the state has proved unwilling to address the crisis, beyond offering some temporary and below minimum wage work in its Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP). Meanwhile capitalists in South Africa have generated unemployment, and arguably benefit from it. Indeed, capitalists — along with the state, which has played a central role — have shaped the economy in a way that has led to high unemployment and placed downward pressure on wages. Financialisation has only further exacerbated the situation.

In the face of all this, some community-based movements are experimenting with projects such as communes, to address dire poverty due to unemployment. It is here that hope lies for greater organising and working class communities building mutual aid, communalism and movements that can alleviate the symptoms of unemployment while building a base to confront capital and the state.

The scale of South Africa's unemployment crisis can be gleaned from the latest official jobless figures, which indicate that 31.4% of working age people are without work. This figure, though, does not tell the full story. If people who have given up seeking work due to despair are included, the rate rises to 42.1%, giving a more accurate picture.

Within this sea of unemployment, it is Black working class women and youth that are disproportionately impacted. For instance, the expanded definition rate of unemployment among youth in 2024 was 60.2%.

Genesis and development of South African capitalism

The manner capitalism developed in South Africa, and subsequently evolved, has led to a propensity towards high unemployment.

Capitalism had its origins in South Africa with the discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape province in 1867 and gold in the Gauteng area in 1886.

Gold mining in particular shaped the economy. Shortly after its genesis, large corporations, with strong links to finance, came to dominate the industry. This was due to the vast amounts of capital required — along with the extremely cheap labour of Black workers — to make deep level mining (the dominant form of gold mining in South Africa) profitable.

The key mining sector was therefore highly monopolised, centralised and capital intensive, barring the possibility of smaller competitors arising and suppressing labour levels. From the start, capitalism in South Africa had an in-built trend towards high unemployment levels.

To create a large pool of cheap workers, colonial and apartheid states seized the bulk of the land from the Black population and imposed hut and poll taxes to force people into wage labour. Small-scale farming that could sustain families became unviable for the majority of the Black population, who were forced to sell their labour to the mines, factories and farms owned by white capitalists. Cheap labour — with high unemployment and racial oppression driving down wages — defined capitalism in South Africa.

Between 1940 and the 1970s, unemployment rates dropped. Much of the decline was related to some diversification of the economy, fuelled by a global economic boom in the two decades after World War II. Between 1945 and the late 1960s, the unemployment rate fell, while wages for Black workers, although still extremely low, began to climb.

Nonetheless, much of the diversification and development of an industrial base remained tied to mining. Energy, chemical, oil and explosive sectors emerged — driven by the state and private capital — but these largely remained geared to meeting the needs of the expanding mining sector.

Beyond light manufacturing, robust steel, arms and automotive industries, a large heavy industrial base did not fully emerge. The economy remained largely tethered to the model of exporting raw materials and importing machinery and manufactured industrial goods. It remained vulnerable to high unemployment when raw material prices declined or key mineral reserves became exhausted.

Gold production expanded with the development of new reefs up until the late 1960s, but by the 1970s the global economy began to experience a crisis largely due to over-accumulation. This was exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis and 1979 Volcker shock. By the 1980s gold reserves in South Africa began to decline.

The consequences for the economy were devastating. Profit levels dropped along with investment in productive sectors of the economy, including industry. Unemployment rose rapidly as corporations cut their workforces to raise profits under crisis conditions and shied away from new investments.

Although unemployment figures for the 1960s and ’70s may not be accurate (unemployment in the Bantustans was high), the expanded unemployment rate rose from an estimated 6.7% in 1960 to 10.6% in 1983.

The declining economic situation was compounded by the political situation in the country. As pressure mounted in the 1980s against apartheid, several multinational companies, such as British Leyland, Barclays Bank and General Motors, withdrew from South Africa. The apartheid state, which worked closely with South African capital, came to an understanding that leading local corporations would purchase these multinationals’ South African entities.

Feeding into this was the reality that it was extremely difficult for South African corporations to expand internationally due to sanctions. Large corporations were therefore already inclined to expand into other sectors of the economy.

The 1980s was defined by the largest corporations snapping up the assets of multinationals exiting South Africa and becoming conglomerates with holding interests in the finance, food processing, industrial, mining, services, property and agricultural sectors.

By the end of the 1980s, six conglomerates — Anglo-American, Sanlam, SA Mutual, Rembrandt, Liberty Life and AngloVaal — owned 84% of the shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). Anglo-American alone controlled 52.5% of all shares listed on the JSE at its peak.

This extreme monopolisation meant any potential new competitor in any sector of the economy was either crowded out or taken over by one of the conglomerates. Consequently, the conglomerates embarked on a spree of mergers and acquisitions of smaller entities, as opposed to greenfield investments in the 1980s. Job creation was anemic and the expanded unemployment rate grew to an estimated 23% by 1991.

Compounding the situation, conglomerates also increasingly, and often illegally, whisked money into tax havens or sat on cash in the run up to the 1994 elections, fearing nationalisation might occur under an African National Congress (ANC) government. (Currently, non-financial South African corporations may be sitting on up to R 1,8 trillion in cash rather than re-investing in the productive sector)

Financialisation and unemployment

From the mid-1990s onwards, the South African economy experienced even more profound changes that not only did not alleviate high unemployment rates, but entrenched them even further.

While elements of trade and financial liberalisation were experimented with by the apartheid government, full trade and investment liberalisation was only implemented post-1994, in particular with the neoliberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program of the ANC-led state in 1996.

Trade liberalisation had a negative impact on light industry, such as the footwear and textile sectors, resulting in huge job losses. In the textile industry alone, more than 38,000 jobs were lost between 1995–2001. With import tariffs being halved over this period, local manufacturers simply could not compete with cheap imports. Many closed their doors and retrenched their entire workforces.

The biggest changes, nonetheless, occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the conglomerates relisted in Britain or Australia, unbundled and financialised. By the late 1990s, Anglo-American had shifted its primary listing to the London Stock Exchange, while Gencor purchased Billiton and shifted its listing to Australia. In the process vast amounts of capital were withdrawn from South Africa by these corporations rather than being reinvested in production, thereby adding to unemployment.

Simultaneously, these conglomerates unbundled. Part of this saw these corporations focusing on sectors they saw as core to their business and selling or simply closing subsidiaries in sectors they identified as non-core.

Anglo-American sold its subsidiaries in the retail, industrial, financial, agricultural, food processing and service sectors to focus on the mining sector. Coupled with this, it transformed its London head office into a holding company and broke its mining operations into specific companies, such as Anglo-Gold, Anglo-Platinum and Anglo-Coal.

This was aimed at increasing shareholder value — as a conglomerate the assets of Anglo-American were larger than its share value up until 2000; unbundling the conglomerate was intended to reverse this situation to the benefit of shareholders. Financial institutions and hedge funds increasingly became the dominant shareholders from the late 1990s onwards.

By the mid-2000s, most conglomerates in South Africa had unbundled and used the funds to focus on core sectors, including importantly on expanding globally. Sectors including gold mining, platinum mining, chemicals, explosives and banking remained highly centralised and monopolised, centred around the new companies created from unbundling.

Linked to the process, high share prices and regular, large dividend payouts became the key goals of restructured companies. To assist in achieving this, barriers to foreign speculators purchasing shares on the JSE were eased. Foreign ownership of shares rose dramatically, from almost zero in the late 1980s to more than 38% by 1999 and a high of 52% in the years before the COVID-19 pandemic (this has now declined to about 32%).

This influx of foreign shareholding was of a short-term and speculative nature. Linked to boosting share prices, since 2000 all companies listed on the JSE have undertaken frequent bouts of share buybacks to inflate the prices, which is at the heart of financialisation.

Increasingly financialised companies have spent vast sums of capital on buying their own shares to inflate prices, at the expense of investing in production or greenfield projects. This has contributed to weak job creation and high unemployment.

Adding to the process of financialisation has been the deregulation of insurance companies, pension fund companies and mutual societies since the 2000s. Up until this point, a portion of the investments of these corporations, such as Sanlam, Old Mutual and Liberty Life, had to be made in productive sectors and greenfield projects. This helped to ensure at least some new employment.

However, after requirements were dropped, these companies almost solely focused on speculating on financial instruments, such shares, bonds and derivatives, or at best property. This reduction in investments in productive sectors contributed to high unemployment.

Another feature of financialisation is the changes to the way management is remunerated. Prior to financialisation, managers in most corporations were paid mainly via cash; few owned shares in the companies they managed. Today, in financialised companies, a significant portion of managers’ remuneration is paid via share options to incentivise management to focus on high share-prices and regular dividend payouts.

One way to ensure high share prices is to hire as few workers as possible: in a financialised economy, company share prices tend to rise when they retrench workers. Lean workforces are a feature of financialised companies, even in the manufacturing sector. Via payment through share options, managers are incentivised to maintain lean workforces.

For example, in 1999 the largest explosives and chemicals company in South Africa, AECI, had a workforce of 9850. After financialisation, the number of workers employed dropped to 7186 in 2024.

The legacy of land dispossession, an extremely centralised and monopolised economy, along with financialisation and slow or stagnant growth, has marked the liberalisation of the economy, which led to an expanded unemployment rate of 42.1%.

Impact of unemployment on working-class communities

High levels of unemployment have had devastating consequences for sections of the working class, especially youth, Blacks and women. Due to huge unemployment, South Africa continues to be among the most unequal countries: while the wealthiest 10% own an estimated 85% of the wealth, more than 55% of the population lives in poverty (using the upper-bound poverty line) and 17.6% live in extreme poverty.

More than 2 million households do not have formal housing and are either homeless or live in shacks. It is also estimated that the poorest 40% spends at least half their income on food and non-alcoholic beverages, and cannot afford even the most basic basket of foodstuffs.

We are now in a situation where more than 50% of all South Africans experience hunger or are at risk of going hungry. There is no greater confirmation of a country in crisis than when a majority do not have enough to eat.

The fact that such a large portion of people are unemployed and live in desperate and deprived circumstances poses dangers and leads to fragmentation in society. Under intense pressure to survive in a neoliberal system that values a person according to their wealth and blames unemployment on the individual, many communities, including in rural areas, are increasingly suffering from mental health issues.

Other problems such as alcohol and drug abuse, especially among youth seeking some escape from the dire reality, have become increasing problems in communities. Many youth are becoming involved in gangsterism, which is one of the few routes that offers instant wealth.

Along with substance abuse, gender-based violence has become prevalent: South Africa now has one of the highest rates of violence against women, rivaling some war zones.

The rise of xenophobia and ethno-nationalism

While individuals are blamed as lazy or unskilled for being unemployed, there is a growing number of politicians and local capitalists attempting to attract the support of unemployed people by using xenophobia and tribalism to scapegoat “others” for the unemployment crisis.

Politicians are trying to use national and ethno-nationalism/tribalism — which was central to the apartheid system — to gain support for reactionary and divisive agendas. Politicians and business people avoid discussions about the real cause of unemployment (government policies, the centralisation of the economy and financialisation) by blaming people they identify as foreign or from other ethnic groups for taking jobs or receiving benefits from the state at other’s expense.

One of the saddest ironies is that, in a country where the majority of people fought apartheid and received support from neighbouring countries, working people seeking employment from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Lesotho are loathed as “others” by a significant section of the population, while they see South African capitalists as kindred.

Such scapegoating is a local form of the extreme right wing that has emerged internationally, with movements such as Make America Great Again, and poses a real danger that could lead to violence and the balkanisation of the country.

Understanding, addressing and organising to alleviate the worst material, emotional and mental impacts of unemployment on working class youth and women is key. It is also vital to stem growing xenophobia and tribalism, through which “others” are blamed for the unemployment crisis.

Communes address unemployment and more

While several NGOs and social movements have lobbied the state and protested against unemployment, the state has not taken decisive measures to address unemployment, beyond employing people in work such as cleaning streets, cutting grass on road verges and picking up litter at below minimum wage and on three-month contracts.

The state has instead implemented austerity for the working class (while assisting capitalists), which has exacerbated aspects of the unemployment crisis.

While not letting the state and capital off the hook for the high levels of unemployment, some community-based organisations, such as Abahlali baseMjondolo, have formed communes to address the poverty associated with unemployment and grow and sustain their organisation.

Without addressing the material conditions people face, including hunger and unemployment, it is very difficult for movements to retain and expand membership. Unless you can show that people can improve their lives by being a member, it is extremely difficult to keep members.

The experiments that Abahlali baseMjondolo have conducted in establishing and building communes in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal have seen community members in settlements coming together to establish food gardens, community centres, libraries and even communal kitchens. These are democratically run, and while they cannot in and of themselves end hunger and totally end unemployment, they can and do alleviate it.

Linked to the political education that is run in the community centres, they also help to build communal living and provide a sense of community that directly addresses working class fragmentation. They provide a sense of belonging to something bigger than oneself that is progressive and offers hope.

This can be used to concretely combat xenophobia and tribalism, and the unemployment and hopelessness that is feeding it. Throughout its history, Abahlali baseMjondolo has been successful in addressing xenophobia and tribalism in the settlements it organises. Its members deeply identify with their movement, creating a sense of unity.

Abahlali baseMjondolo’s communes offer an example for other community organisations. While demands must be made for the state and capital to address unemployment, organisations need to materially address poverty if they are to grow. Communes can do this.

Communes can also provide a progressive sense of belonging and hope, and generate resources to help sustain organisations in a context of high unemployment.

Communes also show that a communal life based on solidarity is possible. They show — even if in a limited way — that the working class is capable of self-governing and producing with a focus on need. In this, they offer a glimpse of what building blocks of working-class self-governance could look like beyond capitalism and the state.

As such, they can be used as springboards to extend working class self-governance against the state, and hopefully one day be part of the structures that the working class use to take over and co-ordinate the means of production — and put a permanent end to unemployment.

To paraphrase the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), by organising through communes we can alleviate poverty, build unity and combat nationalism, but we can also form the structures of the new society within the shell of the old.

Saturday, March 21, 2026

Renewables Aren’t the Problem—Market Design Is

  • Renewables can be cheaper than old fossil plants when fuel costs are factored in, but new fossil and nuclear plants may still compete depending on future fuel prices.

  • Current electricity markets set prices based on the last (usually gas) unit needed to meet demand, meaning high gas prices inflate costs for all electricity users, even if renewables produce cheaper power.

  • The grid infrastructure and market rules were not designed for high renewable penetration or increased demand, leading to inefficiencies and affordability crises, particularly in gas-reliant countries like the UK and the U.S.

Donald Trump and crew view renewable energy as an expensive fraud. British industrialists claim that the UK’s green goals make the country too expensive. New York politicians see green energy fueling an affordability crisis. We have argued, on the other hand, that proponents of renewables should push them not because they are greener but rather because they are more economical and less risky than the alternatives. Not everywhere every time, but enough of the time. So, who is right? When customers do not see the benefits, is that failure due to renewable costs or to poor market design and muddled government policy? Don’t buy the bullet points handed out by lazy politicians who are looking for a quick fix.

Now, let’s define the issues. First question: Are new renewable projects cheaper providers of electricity than 30-40 year old fossil plants? That’s like comparing the monthly charges on a new car to those on a 20-year-old jalopy with no monthly finance charges (all paid off) and low collision insurance (car has no resale value).  Absolutely cheaper to keep the old car until it falls apart. But fuel constitutes at least half the cost of those fossil-fueled units, and some renewable power is cheaper than the fuel costs. So, the answer is “sometimes”.

Next, we’re not getting into quasi-religious disputes about the need to reach a 100% green power goal in order to save the world. Shooting for 100% rankles traditionalists, generates opposition and may reduce grid flexibility and raise costs. So why make it an issue? If renewables are as good as their proponents say, they will eventually drive out most of the fossil units, anyway. Patience is a virtue

Unfortunately, the jalopy analogy becomes less and less relevant because the electricity industry has to build new power plants to meet increasing demand, so the next question is: are new renewable plants more economical to own and operate than nuclear or fossil-fueled units? Let’s look at the estimates from two standard sources.

The Energy Information Administration (EIA) produced its latest projections in 2025 and published them under the aegis of the Trump administration, so either the Trump people did not notice or they represent a cautious view of the prospects for renewables.  The EIA predicts “levelized cost”, meaning the average cost per MWH generated (operating, fuel, and capital costs) over the lives of the plants. Here are the base case projections for selected means of generation coming into service in the next few years:

EIA PROJECTIONS

Source: EIA, Levelized Cost of New Generation Resources in the Annual Energy Outlook 2025.

Now, you might rightly be skeptical, considering the uncertainty of long-term projections, but consider that much of the equipment for plants that go into operation over the next few years has been ordered, so we should have a reasonable idea about capital costs, which do not change over the life of the plant. But we have a shaky handle on fuel costs over a 30-year lifetime. If gas costs rose 50% over the estimate, that gas-fired generator would produce electricity as expensive as the nuclear plant. If gas costs fell to half of the estimate, the gas generator would be barely competitive with photovoltaic solar with storage and still way above photovoltaic solar and onshore wind.

The legendary banking house, Lazard, makes a detailed annual analysis, too. In its 2025 report, it unambiguously stated, “On an unsubsidized … basis, renewable energy remains the most cost-competitive form of generation.” Lazard produces estimate ranges and its methodology differs from the EIA,  so pay more attention to the order of ranking than the absolute numbers when comparing to EIA numbers. We show the average estimate and the low end of the range, which we suspect reflects projects most likely to succeed to completion.

Source: Lazard, Levelized Cost of Energy June 2025.

Either way, except for offshore wind, renewables are competitive in cost. The competitiveness of gas units depends on the price of gas. Nuclear is so expensive it’s out of the ballpark altogether. Interestingly, Lazard also calculates the cost of community/industrial solar (local solar on rooftops), which at the low end of its range comes surprisingly close to being competitive with utility-scale power. That should scare the legacy utilities.

Now for the problem, neither the grid nor its managers have prepared for the new age. Place- specific renewables require a transmission link to consumers. What have the transmission owners and operators been preparing for over the past decades?  For more competitive markets and allocation of capacity via financial instruments? Certainly not for an avalanche of renewables and burgeoning demand.

As for price to users, the principal markets in the UK and the USA employ an auction that sets the market price based on the price required to bring online the last unit required to fill the demand quota. That unit is, invariably, fueled by natural gas. Meaning that the price of gas sets the price offered to all generators, even if gas generation makes up only a small part of the total. Under those circumstances, the renewable (or nuclear) generators can pocket a big profit thanks to the high price paid to the last gas generator, and the customer gets no benefit from lower renewable costs. Gas sets the price of renewable energy. That market mechanism was designed before renewables amounted to anything. In the UK, where gas fuels much of the generation, the country has put off construction of sufficient gas storage facilities, so gas price and supply are at risk from foreign events, such as a war in the Persian Gulf.

In short, don’t fix the affordability problem by getting rid of the cheapest generation options. Focus on market structure and the grid, instead. And, no, we don’t know why Bill Gates plans to build a nuclear power plant in Wyoming. Maybe he has money to spare.

By Leonard Hyman and William Tilles for Oilprice.com

Tuesday, March 17, 2026


Why Labour MPs should be worried


MARCH 17, 2026

Mike Phipps reviews The British General Election of 2024, by Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings  and Paula Surridge, published by Palgrave Macmillan.

Some features of the 2024 general election were apparent in the immediate aftermath: a Labour landslide on the smallest share of the vote in modern times, on an almost unprecedentedly low turnout. For less obvious aspects, we have had to wait over eighteen months for political scientists to crunch the numbers. Has the wait been worth it?

“Brilliant,” “written by the wisest heads in academia,” “masterpiece,” “vital,” “definitive,” “perfection,” “must-read” – the advance plaudits for this account of the 2024 general election perhaps raise expectations too high. In reality, I found much of the analysis proffered by this book to be run-of-the-mill, second-hand and lacking rigour, particularly in the build-up to the big event.

Problematic pre-election coverage

A central weakness is its acceptance of the Keir Starmer / Morgan McSweeney version of how the Labour Party was ‘transformed’ into an election-winning machine in the run-up to 2024. Keir Starmer may still be convinced that the now sacked McSweeney is one of the greatest strategists in the entire world, but that lack of judgment may tell us more about Starmer’s own current predicament.

This book went to press before McSweeney’s demise, but it should not have been relying on this lazy narrative in the first place. Its one-sided approach is particularly evident in the coverage of the sacking of Rebecca Long-Bailey and the suspension from the Parliamentary Labour Party of Jeremy Corbyn.

In places, the book’s acceptance of the Labour leadership’s version of events stands reality on its head. “McSweeney inherited a mess,” we are told. “Labour’s grassroots campaigners and managers had been neglected by the Corbyn leadership.” Anyone who took part in the mass canvassing sessions organised in the Corbyn years would without any doubt question this. Worse, it overlooks the fact that Keir Starmer actually disbanded Labour’s Community Organising Unit and oversaw the suspension of a number of local CLPs and activists, demoralising members and undermining grassroots efforts.

For something that is being promoted as the definitive account of the 2024 general election, there are some curious omissions, particularly on the full significance of the Labour apparatus’s factional eve-of-campaign removal of popular candidates and other self-inflicted wounds during the campaign. The sense conveyed here is that because Labour won the election by a landslide, therefore the people who masterminded its strategy must have their insights promoted uncritically.

“This isn’t factional. We just aren’t insulting voters with piss poor candidates anymore,” a Labour insider is quoted, unchallenged, regarding Labour’s ‘tightened’ selection process. But it clearly was factional, as in the removal of Brighton MP Lloyd Russell-Moyle. Meanwhile, unsuitable candidates continued to be nodded through on an entirely factional basis, sometimes with disastrous consequences, as in the Rochdale by-election earlier in 2024. The failure of this “definitive” account to delve further into these issues looks sloppy, to say the least, and worse, over-reliant on self-interested leadership sources.

Positives

So what will you find in this book that is new and interesting? First, the account of the digital campaign, particularly the dominance of TikTok. This is surprising, as the platform did not significantly feature in 2019, does not allow political advertising and has a young demographic in an election where most parties were focused on older voters. But significantly, material that appeared on TikTok resurfaced as newsworthy in more mainstream media outlets. Digital, the chapter concludes, is now  “a pivotal component for those seeking electoral success.”

Newspaper circulation, by contrast, has plummeted since the 2019 general election. Sky News political editor Beth Rigby remarked that “this will be the first time in the general election, probably, that nobody really cares whether they’re endorsed by the editorial of a particular newspaper or not because it doesn’t matter anymore.” On the day, the Sun was the only title to switch allegiance from the Conservatives to Labour, but it was a “tepid, qualified editorial endorsement.” More significantly, many newspapers were instrumental in establishing Reform UK as the main alternative to the big two parties early in the campaign.

The breakdown of the new House of Commons is also worth noting. While a narrow majority of Conservative MPs attended state schools for the third Parliament in a row, the share of privately educated Tories actually rose in 2024. “Three out of the five Reform UK MPs were privately educated, making the populist right-wingers fond of railing against an out-of-touch establishment the only party with a majority of privately educated MPs.”

The gender gap among MPs narrowed and their current ethnic diversity – up from 65 ethnic minority MPs to 90 – for the first time corresponds to that of the voting public. But in other respects, MPs are drawn from an increasingly narrow background and constitute a distinct political class: well over half of all MPs in this Parliament were already working in political professions immediately prior to their election. Furthermore, over half of Britain’s MPs are new to the Commons, including 56% of the Labour intake.

Drilling down into the Labour vote

How people voted constitutes the heart of this book. Age and educational polarisation were again key features of the 2024 election; and while the Tories lost votes across all their strongest demographics, mainly to Reform, there was no “rising tide” for Keir Starmer’s Party: Labour’s largest gains were much smaller than the Tories’ largest losses. In short, “instead of the pendulum swinging directly from government to opposition, the government suffered a record collapse, but the main opposition barely rose as voting fragmented like never before… the 2024 election delivered unprecedented fragmentation.”

Geography was another decisive factor. “Never before in the post-war era has the outcome in seats been so sharply at variance with what would have happened if the rises and falls in party support had been the same throughout the country,” note the authors.

Brexit continued to exercise an influence. The seats which had voted most heavily for Leave in the 2016 referendum were also those where Reform did best in 2024. Additionally, the Tories lost support more heavily in seats where the party was previously strongest – particularly to Reform.

Labour’s vote also merits close examination. Remember: Keir Starmer’s Labour won fewer votes overall in 2024 than in their 2019 defeat under Jeremy Corbyn, and far fewer than Corbyn won in the narrower defeat of 2017.

In England, the Party’s overall share of the vote increased by just half a percentage point on what the Party had achieved in 2019 – so much for the great Starmer transformation.  In contrast, in Scotland, Labour enjoyed a spectacular revival with a +16.7-point increase in its support.

In Wales, Labour’s share of the vote fell by −4.0 points, which the authors attribute to having to defend their record in devolved government. But the retirement of the popular Mark Drakeford as Welsh First Minister with a brand image clearly distinct from Keir Starmer’s and his replacement by the scandal-hit Vaughan Gething should also be mentioned as a central factor in Welsh Labour’s falling popularity.

Writing on this site about the general election in Llanelli, Welsh Senedd member Mike Hedges noted: “Having campaigned for decades, I expected areas of council estates and older terraced housing to do well for Labour but in newer private estates and larger detached houses Labour to do poorly. The opposite was true at this election.”

This anecdotal evidence was confirmed by the authors of this book across Wales and England too: as with the Conservatives, Labour recorded their worst performances in seats where they had previously been strongest. “Labour’s share of the vote typically fell back in constituencies where the party had won more than 45% of the vote in 2019 and did so heavily, by nearly 15 points.”

The defection of the Muslim vote was one factor, a consequence of the Labour leadership’s support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza and the strong showing of independent candidates who highlighted this. Independents on average won 14.8% of the vote in seats where more than 20% of voters identify as Muslim. Another factor was that Labour support fell back in seats with a relatively young population, this time losing votes primarily to the Greens.

Labour’s higher vote in areas where they had previously been weak can be explained by anti-Conservative tactical voting. For similar reasons, they were also the main beneficiaries of the decline of the SNP vote in Scotland.

But Labour’s  efforts to reconnect with the working-class Leave voters who had seemingly cost the Party vital support in the traditionally Labour ‘red wall’ constituencies captured by the Conservatives in 2019 came to nothing. “Of this,” the authors say baldly, “there is no sign.”

Labour’s ‘Jenga tower’

“‘Change’ was Labour’s slogan in 2024, and change is what voters delivered in an election which sent records tumbling,” conclude the authors. If Labour’s recent by-election results show the Party having its worst ever quarter, it’s because Labour in office have not provided the change they promised and that voters so desperately want.

Labour MPs are worried: the outmoded electoral system, combined with clever targeting, has given the Party a big majority, but with insecure foundations, like an electoral ‘Jenga tower’. Flimsy majorities that will disappear on a small voter swing mean the next election will be fought on a map with more competitive marginals than any recent contest. Will this make backbenchers more rebellious? The next few months may prove decisive.

Mike Phipps’ book Don’t Stop Thinking About Tomorrow: The Labour Party after Jeremy Corbyn (OR Books, 2022) can be ordered here.


 

“The only way to save the Party”


MARCH 17, 2026

Highlights from Monday’s Restore Labour Democracy rally.

The clampdown on Labour democracy has gone hand in hand with a range of unpopular and out of touch decision from the government, said Richard Burgon MP, opening Monday’s Restore Labour Democracy  online rally. That’s why a coalition of trade union leaders, including Sharon Graham of Unite and Andrea Egan of Unison have joined MPs in launching a statement calling for the restoration of Party democracy, which members can sign here.

Over four hundred people, from Cornwall to Fife, attended for the rally, which was addressed by Unison General Secretary Andrea Egan. She explained that attacks on Party democracy had serious consequences for the country: political mistakes and moral failure, from the fiasco over winter fuel payments to attacking the rights of migrants and aiding the genocide in Gaza. She said a “deeply toxic, rotten culture was pushing Labour towards the cliff edge” and attacked the decision to bar Andy Burnham from running in the recent Gorton and Denton byelection, with the result that Labour lost the seat. Members should choose their candidates and have a say in the policy process, she said, and MPs like Richard Burgon and John McDonnell should be able to speak out without the threat of being suspended.

Fire Brigades Union General Secretary Steve Wright pointed out that the disastrous appointment of Peter Mandelson was a factionally motivated decision that has cost the Party and country dear. He called on union members to start making demands on their leaderships to put pressure on the government to deliver much-needed change for working people: more public ownership, stronger workers’ rights, an end to wealth inequality and an international agenda based on peace.

Alex Charilaou of Momentum said that if Labour wanted voters to trust it again, the Party had to start by trusting its own members. He pointed out the role Peter Mandelson played in overseeing the longlisting of candidates for Party selections and encouraged socialist members of the Party to stand as Conference delegates and support important rule changes: reducing the threshold of nominations needed for candidates to run for the Party leadership and restoring the power of longlisting parliamentary candidates to local CLPs.

Paul Holden, author of The Fraud, spoke of his nearly four-year investigation into the shadowy Labour Together faction, headed by the now dismissed Morgan McSweeney, which propelled Keir Starmer to power and organised the accompanying war on Jeremy Corbyn supporters. “There was a pretty profound relationship between Morgan McSweeney and Peter Mandelson,” he said. McSweeney and his allies effectively took over the Labour bureaucracy and used this to clamp down on internal democracy. He explained how a small cabal of Party bureaucrats were effectively able to choose around a couple of hundred Labour MPs, many of whom had undeclared donations funnelled into their election campaigns. This takeover has had profound repercussions, in terms of the adoption of unpopular policies, the consequences of which the Party was now reaping in byelection defeats.

Campaign for Labour Party Democracy Chair Rachel Garnham, gave an overview of the battles for Party democracy waged by the campaign over its fifty-year existence. She recalled Nye Bevan’s observation that “the right wing of the Labour party would rather see it fall into perpetual decline than abide by its democratic decisions.” She outlined how the current leadership has sidelined the work of ethnic minority activists, run down the role of Women’s Conference and refused to implement structures for disabled members. She stressed the need for good candidates to be elected to Party bodies at all levels, in particular Gemma Bolton, Yasmine Dar and Minesh Parekh for the National Executive Committee this year.

Brian Leishman MP, newly elected in 2024, talked about the high levels of inequality in Scotland, particularly in life expectancy and what he described as “bordering on Dickensian levels of poverty.” Public services had been hollowed out, with private capital in charge of vital infrastructure, exploiting it for shareholder gain. So why can’t Scottish Labour make any political headway? Brian blamed the refusal of the dominant faction, backed up by the UK leadership, to focus on the central class issues that could win popular support and solve the problems facing Scottish people.

Bell Ribeiro-Addy MP urged members to stay and fight for socialist policies and Party democracy. “People didn’t vote for managed decline,” she said, “they wanted change.” If we listen to our members and restore internal democracy, she argued, we have a much better chance of winning back the lost support.

NEC member Gemma Bolton said the campaign to restore Party democracy was essential to restoring fairness and inclusivity. She highlighted how the Party was now re-running the elections for Young Labour positions having discovered ‘irregularities’ after some socialist candidates made gains.

Former Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell MP underlined the importance of the issue, because the political moment was so dangerous and the current Labour Party was not in a position to be able to defend us from the rise of the far right. The policies he and Jeremy Corbyn MP developed to transfer wealth and power to working people were blocked by the establishment and one of its channels for doing so was funding a project within the Party that would bury such ideas. Instead, the leadership adopted policies that are “just not Labour” and in doing so have created a level of disillusionment that he had not seen in fifty years of Party activity. He pointed out that not only MP candidates were blocked by McSweeney and Mandelson, but also council candidates, leading to byelection losses, with much worse to come in May. The only way to save the Party was to restore its democracy at all levels.

Dr Rathi Guhadasan, Chair of the Socialist Health Association, highlighted the role of huge donations, such as those received by Health Secretary Wes Streeting MP, in influencing policy in a direction that was not in the interests of NHS workers and users.

Ian Byrne MP closed the rally, with a call for an independent investigation into the role of Labour Together and the damage it had wrought in Labour’s heartlands.  

The Fraud: The Paul Holden Interview

In the latest Labour Left Podcast, introduced here by Bryn Griffiths, Paul Holden, the author of The Fraud: Keir Starmer, Morgan McSweeney, and the Crisis of British Democracy, explains what the shadowy Labour Together group did to the Labour Party and how they inflicted their big fraud on the Labour membership.

Ten Pledges

In 2020 Keir Starmer stood for the Labour Party leadership and made ten excellent democratic socialist pledges to the Party membership and the thousands of trades unionists who had enthusiastically voted for him. On 4th April 2020 Starmer was elected Labour Leader.  But all was not as it seemed. Starmer had committed a fraud. In the podcast Paul Holden reveals exactly what Morgan McSweeney’s Labour Together had planned for the Labour membership and it certainly wasn’t the democratic socialism they’d voted for!

Keir Starmer’s ten broken pledges to the Labour membership

Starmer’s socialist supporters

Back in 2023, Labour Together included prominent soft left figures such as Lucy Powell, Jon Cruddas and Lisa Nandy.  Former Labour Left Podcast guest Neil Lawson of Mainstream was assiduously courted by Labour Together. Starmer even employed old Corbyn staffer Simon Fletcher, and Momentum’s former National Coordinator, Laura Parker, was persuaded to back the Starmer Leadership bid.

In the podcast we discuss what was really going on.  Did Labour Together and the Starmer Project have a split personality or where the erstwhile socialist Starmerites subject to a big con?

Antisemitism allegations

Even before the book was published Steve Reed, Labour’s Housing Secretary, suggested in Politico that the book “would whitewash” the antisemitism crisis that happened under Jeremy Corbyn.  In the podcast Paul Holden give’s his response to Reed’s horrible allegation.

“This is the Machine that now rules us”

In the second half of the podcast, Paul Holden explores the suggestion that Labour Together’s internal authoritarianism is spilling over into Government.  Could Labour Together’s factionalism have created the conditions that explain the removal of Sue Gray, the Downing Street Chief of Staff? The appointment of Peter Mandelson as the US Ambassador? The proscription of Palestine Action? The attacks on refugee status?  and, even the undermining of jury trials?

Labour Together’s Response to The Fraud

Every Labour supporter needs to know the story of what Labour Together did when they learnt Paul was to publish The Fraud.  Paul tells us a chilling story of GCHQ involvement, spy allegations, Russian scare stories and ministerial resignations.

How do we fightback?

Some Labour Left  Podcast listeners and watchers have left the Labour Party and I get that. But, if like me, you’re committed to fighting on we need to do something about what Paul has spelt out to us so clearly in this podcast.

Here, as suggested in the podcast are the actions you can take and the links to find out more: Firstly, we need to restore democracy to our party so please join Sharon Graham and Andrea Egan, the Leaders of Britain’s biggest unions, in signing the Restore Labour Democracy Statement.

To sign up to the Restore Labour Democracy statement click here

Secondly, we have some important internal Labour elections this year.  If we’re going to begin to change things we need people committed to democracy in key places, so please this year vote for the Centre Left Grass Roots Alliance (CLGA) in the National Executive, National Constitutional Committee, National Policy Forum and National Women’s Committee Elections.

Here are the details of how to support the Centre Left Grass Roots Alliance internal elections campaign: click here for campaign details.

The CLGA candidates for Labour’s National Executive Committee constituency section.

This year the stakes are so high we need to work together with others in the party who want to see democracy. So, when you’ve voted for the CLGA candidates I urge you to use any remaining votes you’ve got to support Mainstream, the new soft left group.  

‘Labour to Lose’.

In 2026 we will be up against the ludicrously titled Labour to Win slate who will include the supporters of Labour Together and clearly represent continuity at the top. I think, given their performance recently, they’d be better called Labour to Lose.  But whatever we call them, if we want to save the Labour Party we’ve got to stop them.

Watch more Labour Left Podcasts

You can watch the podcast on YouTube, Apple Podcasts here, Audible here, Substack here and listen to it on Spotify here.  You can even ask Alexa to play the Labour Left Podcast. If your favourite podcast site isn’t listed, just search for the Labour Left Podcast

If you subscribe you can catch up on all our 20-plus episodes back catalogue.  The top episode of 2025 was the former Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell MP. Other big hits have included Andrew Fisher, the man behind the 2017 manifesto For the Many and not the Few, and Rachel Shabi, the author of The Truth Behind Antisemitism. To reflect more on Starmer’s leadership, check out the episode where Mark Perryman discusses his excellent book The Starmer Symptom.

You can buy The Fraud here.

Bryn Griffiths is an activist in Colchester Labour Party and North Essex World Transformed. He is the Vice-Chair of Momentum and sits on the Campaign for Labour Party Democracy’s Executive. 

Bryn hosts Labour Hub’s spin off – the Labour Left Podcast.  You can find all the episodes of the podcast here  or if you prefer audio platforms (for example Amazon, Audible Spotify, Apple etc,) go to your favourite podcast provider and just search for the Labour Left Podcast.