June 3, 2026
By Paul Goble
As with any authoritarian leader, Russian President Vladimir Putin will claim any outcome he gets in his war against Ukraine as a victory. He will deploy his propaganda machine to ensure that most Russians accept that. It is increasingly obvious to all—ranging from war-weary Russians who want the war to end to supporters of the war who want him to fight on— that Putin is not going to achieve his long-insisted goals (see EDM, April 23, 27 [1], [2], May 6, 13). As a result, the Kremlin is currently trying to figure out how to present something that will be less than a triumph as exactly that. Moscow needs to do so in ways that will not spark a challenge to Putin’s rule.
An obvious example of that effort and how fraught with problems it is likely to be came last week when the Kremlin allowed an article to appear in a major Moscow newspaper—even if only for a short time—suggesting that military triumphs are overrated and even that Russia has benefited at home when it has suffered what others have described as a defeat abroad. Such a proposition, when presented so baldly and already associated with the Russian opposition in emigration, was too much. The Kremlin ordered it taken down, although the text remains available and is certain to be widely discussed by both those who favor peace now and those who want the war to continue.
On May 24, Moskovsky Komsomolets, one of the most widely read of the pro-Kremlin newspapers in the Russian Federation, published a 1,200-word article entitled “Amazing Defeats: When Geopolitical Losses Can Be More Useful than Brilliant Victories,” by Dmitry Krasnov, a lawyer and member of Moscow’s Public Chamber. The article focused on the distant past rather than current events, but it rapidly attracted attention from commentators as Aesopian language about Russia’s present situation abroad and at home (Telegram/@astrapress, May 27; Glavnoe in UA, May 28; Altyn-Orda, May 29).
Unsurprisingly, those reactions and their implications for Putin sparked alarm, and four days later, the article was removed, with those using its original URL being informed that the article did not exist (Moskovsky Komsomolets, May 24;Tema.Glavnoe, May 29). The article has remained available on the paper’s website and elsewhere, including in the PDF version of the entire issue of the paper for May 25 (Moskovsky Komsomolets, May 25; see an archived version here).
Krasnov begins his article with the proposition that Russians, like most peoples, are far more inclined “not to remember defeats.” He writes, “In Russia, it is precisely lost wars and humiliating truces that have regularly paved the way for new surges of progress, reforms, and—astonishingly enough—new victories.” He gives a series of examples of this phenomenon. The Mongol Yoke weakened the power of regional princes, united Russia, and opened the way for the ouster of that foreign power. Initial defeats by the Swedes allowed Russia to weather the Time of Troubles and then return to defeat the Swedes and open “a window on Europe.” The loss in the Crimean War led to the end of serfdom and to political reforms that opened the way for national integration and dramatic economic growth in the decades leading up to World War I. From these examples, he concludes that any military defeat, or “humiliating peace” in Russian history, led to reform that included “a stripping down of the elites and greater freedom for the people” and resulted in a “defeated nation would begin to rapidly regain its strength.”
Many Russian historians would agree with his analysis, at least as long as its lessons could be safely confined to the past. Krasnov, however, then discusses the issue in ways that make it clear he believes it remains relevant, even though he does not directly address Moscow’s current war against Ukraine. He argues, “The mechanism of the Russian historical trajectory—which transforms defeat into victory—lies in the insatiable drive of anyone who has acquired even a shred of power or wealth to expand their position.” This leads to the search for methods for combating greed and the lust for power. He explains, “In Russia, a cycle has emerged: the loosening of restrictions and the activation of social mobility—the formation of new elites—the halting of social mobility—the ossification of the elites—the stagnation of progress—defeat—and the launch of a new cycle.”
If other countries have developed various means to limit the power of elites without war, Russia has often had to rely on military defeat, he suggests. In Russia, those with power increasingly use force against their own people to continue to enrich themselves despite the costs that Russians and Russia itself have to pay. Krasnov points out, however, that “tightening the screws to the absolute limit invariably strips the threads, and the country is guaranteed to lose … to its own elites, who are ready to surrender both their Fatherland and their people just to prolong their own festivities.” He explains that once the country has gotten into a war and suffers a defeat, it could face “total disintegration, dangerous revanchism, or assimilation into a foreign culture as a dominion or colony.” He adds, “Fortunately, time and again—ever since the era of the Mongol yoke—Russia has chosen the path of salvation: reining in its unruly elites and granting greater freedom to the people.”
Krasnov continues, Peter I earned the title “the Great” because “he managed to make the right decision following a defeat in a single battle rather than waiting for the loss of an entire war.” As a result, he broke “the habitual Russian cycle by making reforms an immediate response to the very first setback.” He adds, “It is no easy feat for a nation’s leadership to decide to break this vicious cycle before defeat strikes.”
It is no surprise that the Kremlin took down this article. On May 28, Krasnov gave an even more critical interview to a Ukrainian outlet (Ukraina.ru, May 28). His statements are virtually a call to arms for Russia’s elites and masses to take action before it is too late. It is also an appeal to Putin himself. If Putin wants to be known as “the great” like his tsarist predecessor, he needs to recognize how Russian history works and change direction, however improbable that would be for a man who celebrates Russia’s past as largely an unbroken series of triumphs.
This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation
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