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Friday, October 02, 2026

Kushner, Key Trump Negotiator on Gaza, Owns Firm With Major Stake in Israeli Military

Kushner’s private equity company is the biggest shareholder in a Tel Aviv firm that invests heavily in arms makers.
October 1, 2026

Jared Kushner speaks during a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and U.S. President's Special Envoy Steve Witkoff in Kyiv, Ukraine, on September 6, 2026.Maxym Marusenko / NurPhoto via Getty Images

Jared Kushner’s private equity company reportedly has major stakes in companies that provide weapons to the Israeli military, as new reporting reveals the latest conflict of interest concerns with regard to Kushner’s role as a top Middle East negotiator for President Donald Trump, including on the Gaza genocide.

A CNN investigation published Thursday finds that Kushner’s company, Affinity Partners, holds the largest stake in a Tel Aviv-based firm called Phoenix Financial. The report, which analyzed just a fraction of Phoenix’s holdings, shows that the firm holds over $450 million across nine companies that provide weapons or equipment to the Israeli military.

The firm’s largest investment related to the Israeli military is in Elbit Systems, which is Israel’s largest weapons manufacturer, with $265 million in holdings. Its next three biggest holdings in this realm are $68 million in Next Vision, which sells cameras for attack drones; $56 million in Bet Shemesh Engines, which makes engines for military aircraft; and $40 million in Reshef Technologies, which makes electronic fuzes for artillery shells that have been used in Gaza.

Its other investments include roughly millions of dollars in Boeing, which makes bombs and bomb kits used by Israel in Gaza, and Caterpillar, whose bulldozers are used by the Israeli military to raze civilian infrastructure in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

“All nine companies identified by CNN saw their stock value climb last year, with many stating the war in Gaza had driven demand for their businesses,” the report found.

Affinity, which Kushner is the sole owner of, bought a 5 percent stake in Phoenix in 2024, as Israel’s genocide was reaching a high point. It then doubled its stake in the firm just before Trump was sworn into office in 2025, becoming Phoenix’s biggest shareholder.

“Investing in Phoenix in July 2024 was a decision rooted in my belief in Israel’s resiliency and the fundamentals of Phoenix’s business,” Kushner told Bloomberg at the time.

The report raises concerns about Kushner’s true motivations and conflicts of interest in his work conducting negotiations on Gaza and beyond. As a lead negotiator on Gaza, executive board member of Trump’s “Board of Peace,” and Trump’s son-in-law, Kushner has enormous influence over Israel’s genocidal campaign in Gaza, as well as the financial future of the enclave.

In January, Kushner unveiled his plan for “New Gaza” that contains a dystopic vision of a technocapitalist future for the area at the World Economic Forum. His presentation mentioned very little about life for Palestinians in Gaza, while touting the supposed opportunities for real estate investment and tourist development. The plan, as well as the Board of Peace’s latest plan unveiled on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly last week, is contingent on the demilitarization of the Gaza Strip — which could leave room for Israel to seize permanent security control over Gaza, as Israeli leaders have worked toward.



Kushner has brushed off the idea that conflicts of interest are a problem at all.

“What people call conflicts of interests, Steve and I call experience and trusted relationships,” he told “60 Minutes” in October 2025.

At the same time, Kushner has openly said that the political future of Gaza and Israel’s military — over which he has enormous influence — impacts his firm’s financial decisions. In September 2025, CNN notes, Kushner told the podcast “No Priors” that he believes that Arabs and Israelis “forget about everything else” when he guides them into talking about business opportunities.

“My investors from the Middle East are now looking at Israel, and they’re saying, ‘Wait a minute, maybe there’s a benefit to having these wars done,’” he said.

Kushner went on to discuss his interest in Phoenix in particular. “At the time we made the decision, we had very intense discussions in our investment committee because they said, ‘Look there’s about to be a war in the country,’ which is what we kind of thought was going to happen, and said, ‘How do we explain this to the investors if it goes wrong?’ And I said, ‘Well number one, it’s not a bad thing to have them more vested in the economy of Israel now.’”

Kushner is already facing congressional inquiries related to his financial entanglements in the Middle East as he conducts negotiations across the region. Affinity’s biggest clients are the sovereign wealth funds run by the Gulf states — the very governments that he negotiates with in his role for the White House.

The New York Times reported in March that Kushner spoke to government figures about raising $5 billion or more for Affinity Partners while he was conducting negotiations with Middle East leaders amid the early stages of the U.S.’s war on Iran.

“The degree of shamelessness is unprecedented,” Jeff Hauser, founder and executive director for Revolving Door Project, told Truthout earlier this year. “The degree of unity among elected Republicans to not speak about the Trump progeny, and their corruption, is the worst conspiracy of silence in American political history.”

Ex-Trump official flags disturbing aspect of Jared Kushner's 'volunteer' status

Bennito L. Kelty
October 1, 2026 
RAW STORY


Former Trump White House press secretary Stephanie Grisham flagged Jared Kushner's 'volunteer' status (CNN/Screenshot)

A former Trump White House press secretary says Jared Kushner's "volunteer" role with the current administration lets him avoid disclosing how much money he makes.

During a Thursday interview with CNN anchor Erin Burnett, Stephanie Grisham made the claim following a CNN investigation into Kushner's financial ties to an Israeli company with stakes in firms that have seen business grow from the war in Gaza. According to CNN, Kushner's investment firm, Affinity Partners, is the largest shareholder in Phoenix Financial, which holds stakes worth more than $456 million in Israeli defense companies.

"None of this surprises me," Grisham said. "I recall back in our Trump administration, he had his hands in everything."

She also recalled how Kushner talked about Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

"I remember he used to bring Bibi up as if it was just like an old guy he plays basketball with. He would drop his name so casually," she said. "Jared had a way of, you know, making it seem like he was this mover and shaker, and don't worry, he'll fix everything."

Grisham then pointed to Affinity's growth since Kushner left the White House.

"After the first Trump administration, as you guys probably know, Affinity Partners was committed $2 billion from Saudi Arabia. And now I believe its assets are around $6 billion," she said. "Meanwhile, he's calling himself a volunteer. I mean, that's great volunteer work if you can get it, I guess."

She added, "I don't mean to be glib, but the reason he's a volunteer is because you don't have to then claim and show a lot of the money that you make during the time as a temporary public worker."

Asked whether the arrangement fit Kushner's past claim that "what people call conflicts of interest, I call experience and trusted relationships," Grisham said it didn't.


 




‘Taxpayers Deserve Answers’: US Senate Urged to Support Bill to Spotlight Israeli Abuses in West Bank

“Demanding transparency and enforcing US laws governing military aid should be the bare minimum for any senator.”



Palestinians survey the damage after Israeli settlers raided the West Bank village of Al-Mughayyir, setting Palestinian-owned vehicles on fire and spraying racist slogans in Hebrew on September 29, 2026.
(Photo by Issam Rimawi/Anadolu via Getty Images)


Jake Johnson
Sep 29, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

The US Senate is expected to vote as soon as Tuesday evening on a resolution that would require the Trump administration to produce an official report on Israel’s human rights practices in the illegally occupied West Bank, where the US-backed Israeli government is engaging in large-scale land confiscations, displacing Palestinians en masse, and enabling deadly settler violence.

The Senate measure, known as S.Res.852, cites Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to formally request “an unclassified statement” from the US State Department “regarding Israel’s human rights practices.” The filibuster-proof resolution, led by Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), notes that at least nine Palestinian Americans have been killed by Israeli settlers or security forces in the West Bank since 2022, and that “Israeli military authorities have detained, interrogated, prosecuted, and imprisoned approximately 13,000 Palestinian children” since 2000.

If passed by the Senate, Van Hollen’s resolution would require the State Department to produce a report within 30 days on the Israeli government’s human rights conduct in the West Bank. Some US military assistance to Israel would be frozen if the State Department failed to issue the mandated report by the deadline.

Following release of the potential State Department’s report, “the Congress may at any time thereafter adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for such country,” according to the Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits US military aid to any country that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”

Cavan Kharrazian, senior policy adviser with the advocacy group Demand Progress, urged senators to back Van Hollen’s resolution, saying that “US taxpayers deserve answers about what happened and what our government is doing to prevent its military aid from fueling human rights violations and ethnic cleansing in the West Bank.”

“We know that Americans have been killed by Israeli forces and settlers and that Palestinian children face detention and abuse in Israeli military custody,” said Kharrazian. “Demanding transparency and enforcing US laws governing military aid should be the bare minimum for any senator. This resolution is a long-overdue first step. Every senator should support it, then follow through by supporting resolutions to block any new arms sales to Israel.”

Amnesty International USA also expressed support for the resolution, saying in a Monday statement that it “provides an important opportunity to press the Trump administration on its policies and the lack of accountability for the Israeli government’s human rights abuses and violations of international law.”

“This vote comes at a critical juncture in the occupied Palestinian territory as Israel continues its ethnic cleansing campaign against Palestinians in the West Bank,” said Elizabeth Rghebi, the group’s advocacy director for the Middle East and North Africa. “This campaign must also be understood as occurring within a broader context of Israel’s ongoing genocide against Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip, illegal occupation, and an apartheid system over all Palestinians.”

Last year, the Trump State Department—led by Marco Rubio—issued a sparse report on Israel’s human rights practices that said nothing about Israel’s annexation efforts, home demolitions, aiding of settler violence, and other abuses in the occupied West Bank.

Far from working to mitigate Israeli atrocities in the occupied Palestinian territories, the Trump administration is actively fueling them. Earlier this month, The Washington Post reported that the administration is planning to send Israel tens of thousands of additional 2,000-pound bombs in what the newspaper described as “the largest single sale of the controversial munition in recent years.”

“For years, the US has failed to get justice for Americans—those killed in the West Bank and detained by the Israeli government—or accountability for Palestinians who are being brutalized with the government’s complicity,” Van Hollen wrote in a social media post on Monday. “This week I will force a vote on this resolution to get answers.”

Despite Historic Support, Fetterman Joins GOP in Blocking Effort to Expose Israeli Abuses in West Bank

“Tonight, 47 senators supported my resolution to get accountability for the nine Americans killed on the West Bank and for Palestinians who face injustices daily,” said Sen. Chris Van Hollen.


Israeli army soldiers stand behind a masked man hurling stones at Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, on October 10, 2025.
(Photo by Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP via Getty Images)

Jake Johnson
Sep 30, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

Democratic US Sen. John Fetterman joined nearly every Republican senator on Tuesday in voting against a resolution that would have required the Trump administration to produce an unclassified report on Israeli abuses in the illegally occupied West Bank, including the imprisonment and killing of Palestinian Americans.

The resolution, led by Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), narrowly failed 47-51, with Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) joining every Democrat except Fetterman in supporting the measure. Van Hollen and other supporters of the resolution lamented the failed vote but celebrated the historic support it received as public opposition to Israeli atrocities—and US funding of Israel’s military—continues to grow.

“Tonight, 47 senators supported my resolution to get accountability for the nine Americans killed on the West Bank and for Palestinians who face injustices daily,” Van Hollen wrote in a social media post. “That’s more support than we’ve ever had in this fight. Republicans blocked us, but we won’t stop until we get justice.”

In 2024, just 11 senators—all members of the Democratic caucus except Paul—backed a similar resolution led by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.).

“Listen to the American people: NO MORE MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL,” Sanders wrote in response to Tuesday’s vote.

If passed, Van Hollen’s resolution would have required the US State Department to issue a report within 30 days on Israeli human rights practices in the West Bank, where Palestinians have faced a historic level of violence by Israeli settlers and soldiers this year.

The resolution, which invoked Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, specifically called on the Trump administration to provide “all credible information of which the Department of State is aware concerning the alleged killing of United States citizens by the Israel Defense Forces, other Israeli security forces, or Israeli settlers since January 1, 2022,” as well as “an assessment on any United States citizens currently held in Israeli prisons.”

Under the Foreign Assistance Act, a failure to produce the required report would have resulted in a freeze on some US military assistance to Israel.

Josh Ruebner, policy director at the IMEU Policy Project, said that while the resolution “narrowly failed” due to near-unanimous Republican opposition, “make no mistake: this is historic.”



The resolution’s text highlights the case of Sama Safi, a 20-year-old Palestinian American student with a chronic health condition who was abducted by Israeli forces during a West Bank raid in June and has reportedly been detained without charge for months.

On Tuesday morning, Zeteo highlighted the case of Abdalkareem Issa Ahmed Safi, “an American teenager with Texas roots” whom Israeli forces snatched “from his family’s West Bank home in the middle of the night” in late June. Zeteo noted that he is the third young American known to be “languishing in Israeli prison.”

“Only one Republican voted to even somewhat hold Israel accountable for acts like this,” Zeteo’s Prem Thakker wrote late Tuesday.



Violent Riot by Israeli Settlers Prevents Return of Displaced Palestinian Family

“Israeli officials are now condemning settler terror, but the state itself is backing this violence.”



A Palestinian boy looks at a burnt vehicle following an attack by Israeli settlers in the Jalud village of the illegally occupied West Bank on March 22, 2026.
(Photo by Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP via Getty Images)


Jake Johnson
Sep 29, 2026
COMMON DREAMS


More than 100 Israeli settlers in the illegally occupied West Bank rioted in the early hours of Tuesday morning to prevent the return of a Palestinian family that was driven from its home in the village of Jalud.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF), which was forced by a court ruling to facilitate the Tubasi family’s return, said in a statement that rioting settlers “blocked roads,” “set fires” to structures and vehicles, and hurled rocks at security forces as they tried to escort the Tubasis. Haaretz reported that after IDF forces failed to prevent rampaging Israeli settlers from storming the family’s homes, “they put the family members into an armored military vehicle and evacuated them from the scene.”

One family member told Haaretz that “half an hour later, smoke began to rise from the homes.” The IDF said that three Israelis were detained for taking part in the riots.



Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose government has been accused of “actively enabling” mass violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, issued a statement early Tuesday condemning the attacks while downplaying them as the work of a “handful of rioters.”

The Jerusalem Post reported that the Tubasi family’s return “had been coordinated after they were previously forced to evacuate following attacks by extremist settlers.”

“The attempted return followed a September 6 High Court of Justice order requiring Israeli authorities to arrange within 14 days for three Palestinian petitioners and their families to return to their homes in Jalud,” the outlet added. “The court ordered the IDF and police to protect the families during the return and allow them to bring in supplies needed to repair the homes and restore water and electricity.”

Tuesday’s riots were just the latest eruption of violence in the West Bank, where Israeli settlers are committing attacks on Palestinians at an unprecedented rate, according to data from the United Nations.

“Israeli officials are now condemning settler terror, but the state itself is backing this violence,” said Breaking the Silence, an Israeli advocacy organization. “The Tubasi family had been expelled because the IDF backed terrorists who besieged their house for weeks. They allowed terrorists to roam free while barring journalists and solidarity activists from accessing them.”

“Even after committing a pogrom, the vast majority of them, if not all, will never be held accountable and will continue to terrorize Palestinians,” the group added. “Why? Because the state backs it.”

The settler attack came days after the leading Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem published a report characterizing the Israeli government’s actions in the West Bank, including large-scale land seizures, as “an elimination project,” noting that Israel has “sharply escalated longstanding policies of control, violence, and dispossession, implementing them more openly, more violently, and at a faster pace.”

“What Palestinians are living through in the West Bank is not a series of separate incidents,” said Yuli Novak, B’Tselem’s executive director. “It is a single political project that reaches into every part of life. Communities are being expelled, the economy is being pushed toward collapse, and millions are living in constant fear of Israeli military or settler violence.”

“These mechanisms work together to dismantle Palestinian collective life while entrenching a permanent system of Jewish supremacy across the West Bank,” Novak added. “The world is watching and still failing to respond with anything close to the urgency this demands.”



Battle Over Illegal E1 Settlement in Occupied West Bank Escalates a Month Before Israeli Election

Critics around the world continue to call the proposed settlement “a plan to progress the forced displacement and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.”



Palestinian Bedouin children walk in the community of Khan al-Ahmar, near land Israel plans to use for its controversial E1 settlement, in the occupied West Bank.
(Photo by Ilia Yefimovich/AFP via Getty Images)


Jessica Corbett
Sep 27, 2026
COMMON DREAMS

Israel’s far-right finance minister and other settlers living in the illegally occupied West Bank fumed on Sunday after their country’s attorney general pushed a key deadline for the widely condemned E1 project until after the Israeli Knesset election.

Although the International Court of Justice, plus governments and human rights groups around the world, have concluded that all Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory violate international law, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has charged ahead with expansion plans, granting final approval for the building of 3,401 housing units in the E1 area last year.

Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich had celebrated that decision, declaring that the project “buries the idea of a Palestinian state,” as it would split the West Bank in two by connecting Jerusalem and the settlement Ma’ale Adumim. While signing a related agreement a year ago, Netanyahu similarly said that “there will be no Palestinian state.”

Despite an ongoing legal challenge to the E1 plan from Bedouin Palestinians who live in the area and Israeli peace groups, Israel’s Ministry of Construction and Housing last month issued a tender to build seven residential compounds with 1,234 units, giving contractors until October 19—a week before the October 27 election—to submit bids.

“This is a last-minute maneuver that is part of the scorched-earth policy the government is pursuing at the end of its term to secure long years of conflict and bloodshed for Israel,” the Israeli watchdog Peace Now said at the time. “The government is trying to sign contracts with contractors before the elections so that it will be much harder for the next government to cancel the construction.”

The office of Israeli Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara this week ordered a monthlong postponement of the deadline for bids, “so that it will fall after Election Day, thereby reducing the concern that the tender could be used for prohibited election propaganda.”

Smotrich on Sunday accused her of “trying to stop the construction in E1” and “interfering in the election campaign” to help Gadi Eisenkot, the Yashar party leader who could lead a coalition government that ousts Likud’s Netanyahu, depending on the results.

The finance minister called on Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg, who chairs the Central Elections Committee (CEC), to intervene to “ensure that the attorney general and her people do not turn into active players in the election campaign in an attempt to back up the left, prevent the right from forming a government, and to enable the establishment of a Palestinian state that would endanger the existence of the state of Israel.”



Ma’ale Adumim also challenged the attorney general’s move on Sunday, with a petition to the High Court of Justice. Mayor Guy Yifrach said that “if the claim is that continuing the tender is political, I say exactly the opposite: Stopping it now is an intervention with political implications.”

“The E1 plan is already facing heavy international pressure, and developers and contractors need certainty,” Yifrach added. “Is it not enough that outside Israel they are trying to deter them from the project, now we are adding uncertainty from within our home as well?”

Earlier this month, the United Kingdom, France, and Canada jointly announced bans on imports from illegal Israeli settlements, and partnered with nine other nations—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden—for a statement that describes the situation in the West Bank as “rapidly deteriorating amid unprecedented levels of settler violence and settlement expansion, including the unacceptable decision to publish tenders for the E1 settlement project.”

Then, 19 US Senate Democrats on Wednesday introduced a bill to sanction people or companies that facilitate the construction for Israeli settlers in the E1 area, with Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), one of the lead co-sponsors, condemning the project as “a move towards de facto annexation of the West Bank.”

Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.), another lead sponsor and longtime supporter of Israel, said on social media Friday that “the Netanyahu campaign to extinguish the possibility of a future Palestinian state by building Israeli settlements in the E1 area of the West Bank must end. I’m leading a new effort to sanction those involved in its development and preserve a future pathway for peace.”



In addition to pushing for the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, since the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, Netanyahu has overseen a genocidal war against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Despite a ceasefire agreement reached nearly a year ago, Israeli attacks continue, and the official death toll keeps rising, topping 74,000 on Sunday.

The bleak milestone came two days after The New York Times corroborated Haaretz’s recent reporting that in September 2023, United Arab Emirates President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan warned Netanyahu about now-deceased Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar’s plans “for a major event” targeting Israel. The Israeli leader has denied those reports, and even threatened to sue Haaretz.

However, in a signal that Netanyahu and his allies are worried about the upcoming election, the CEC this week voted to disqualify all Arab-majority political parties from the election, while declining to take similar action against Smotrich’s Religious Zionism, far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit, and Zehut, founded by Moshe Feiglin, a former Likud member. The Supreme Court is set to review the disqualifications this week.

Meanwhile, Eisenkot suggested this weekend that the barred parties would not be part of any government he leads. As Haaretz summarized, he said that “all coalition partners would have to recognize Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, uphold the values of the Declaration of Independence, support mandatory military service, and recognize Hamas as a terrorist organization that must be destroyed.”

Yoav Segalovich from the United Arab List’s Knesset slate responded that anyone seeking to lead the country must “show leadership and not fold in the face of the Likud’s scare campaign,” adding: “Israel needs deep change and genuine partnership, through courageous leadership. Eisenkot will not have a government without the United Arab List.”


Wednesday, September 16, 2026

BRICS Summit Takes Aim at U.S. Influence Over the Global Economy



  • BRICS demanded greater developing-country influence at the IMF, World Bank and WTO but avoided directly naming the United States in its criticism.

  • The declaration urged “maximum restraint” in the Middle East and made no mention of Ukraine, illustrating the compromises required to maintain consensus.

  • Kazakhstan used the summit to balance BRICS ties with Washington, while Uzbekistan’s president traveled to South Korea and sent a deputy prime minister to represent the country in New Delhi.

Like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, the global grouping of emerging markets and developing countries, is intent on diminishing Western influence over the world economy. And just like the SCO summit earlier in September, the latest conclave of BRICS leaders fell short of presenting a united front against the West, the United States in particular.

Both the SCO and BRICS include China, India, Iran and Russia as permanent members. Among the four, India, the host nation for this edition of the BRICS annual summit, has acted as a brake on efforts to de-dollarize the global economy. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are both BRICS partner countries.

BRICS members adopted a 140-point joint statement September 12 that featured calls for major reforms of Western-dominated financial institutions, including the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, to give developing countries a greater say in policymaking and practices. 

Some joint statement provisions took oblique swipes at the Trump administration. For example, in comments on the WTO, the statement noted a “proliferation of trade-restrictive actions that are inconsistent with WTO rules, whether in the form of indiscriminate raising of tariffs and non-tariff measures, or protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives.”

But the statement does not mention the United States or Trump by name, and it soft-pedals the group’s stance on the Gulf war currently embroiling the US, Israel and Iran, calling for “maximum restraint” of all sides, instead of adopting a clear position more favorable to Tehran. 

Iran came away with a symbolic victory of sorts, however, underscored by a one-on-one between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed, a meeting designed to counter the image that the United States is succeeding in economically isolating Tehran. 

A statement issued by Abu Dhabi officials was non-committal about future bilateral ties, however. The two “discussed a number of regional and international issues of mutual interest,” while emphasizing a need to promote “de-escalation and strengthen regional stability.”

Beyond the Gulf war, the BRICS statement makes no mention of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a clear win for the Kremlin.

Underscoring a lack of unity within the broader BRICS framework, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev passed over the summit in New Delhi, instead making a state visit to South Korea, where he promoted stronger economic ties with the East Asian Tiger.

South Korea will host a gathering of leaders from all five Central Asian states in Seoul under a C5+1 format on September 16.

Meanwhile, in an expanded session of the BRICS gathering, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev adopted a middle-of-the-road stance that, consistent with the country’s multi-vector foreign policy, sought to balance the interests of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union.

“The erosion of the international security architecture and protracted conflicts are increasing the risk of a new arms race and strategic miscalculations and practical wrongdoings,” Tokayev said. “Therefore, high-level dialogue among nuclear powers is needed to reduce nuclear risks, including those linked to new technologies.”

The comments could be seen as referring to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But they can also be interpreted as a call for the US and China to de-escalate their deepening rivalry for dominance in the development of artificial intelligence. Central Asia is emerging as a central battleground in the brewing race for AI leadership.

Tokayev went on to characterize BRICS as “an open platform for practical cooperation that complements the UN-centered multilateral system and connects peoples, regions and markets.”

On the sidelines of the BRICS gathering, Tokayev met with Sergio Gor, the US ambassador to India, who is also the Trump administration’s special representative to Central Asian states. Tokayev told Gor that he is looking forward to participating in the G20 meeting to be held in Miami in December. But he also delivered an unusually blunt message, indicating that he expects faster progress on deal-making between the United States and Kazakhstan and the repeal of the Central Asian nation’s Jackson-Vanik trade status.

The Miami gathering will provide “a good opportunity to discuss bilateral issues,” a Kazakh readout of the conversation quoted Tokayev as saying. “We prefer concrete actions and practical steps to advance our mutual cooperation, rather than just words.”

By Eurasianet

Wednesday, September 02, 2026

Military Alliances And The Reshaping Of The International Order: From Collective Defense To Strategic Network Alliances – Analysis


Senegalese naval forces participate in the Obangame Express 2025 maritime security exercise. CHIEF PETTY OFFICER JOHN PEARL/ UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES EUROPE-AFRICA/U.S. SXTH FLEET

LONG READ


September 2, 2026

By Dr. Mohammed Issam Laaroussi and Dr. EL Abess El Ouardi

Key Takeaways:

The article argues alliances are shifting from Cold War treaty clubs to hybrid “strategic networks”: NATO still matters after Ukraine, but AUKUS, the Quad, and Middle East coalitions add mission-specific, multi-domain layers (cyber, AI, industry, intel, maritime) that classical realism/liberalism/constructivism only partly explain.

It proposes the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM): seven pillars—integrated deterrence, tech superiority, intelligence fusion, defense-industrial cooperation, economic resilience, flexible coalitions, political cohesion—effectiveness measured by adaptability and interoperability, not Article 5 permanence alone.

Cases: NATO’s 2022 Concept and Nordic enlargement; Indo-Pacific tech-maritime partnerships without a NATO clone; a more plural Middle East (U.S.–Israel core, Abraham Accords, GCC industry, China/Russia options). Future research should test SNAM with interoperability and network metrics rather than force size.

Abstract

The evolving international security environment has fundamentally transformed the nature and strategic functions of military alliances. While traditional alliance theory has primarily interpreted military alliances as treaty-based mechanisms for collective defense and balance-of-power politics, contemporary security challenges—including renewed great-power competition, the Russia–Ukraine war, the Indo-Pacific strategic rivalry, and the emergence of multi-domain threats—have accelerated the evolution of military cooperation beyond conventional institutional arrangements.

This article examines how military alliances are adapting to these transformations and assesses their role in reshaping the emerging international order. Employing a qualitative comparative research design based on strategic analysis, document analysis, and comparative case studies, the study examines three principal theatres of contemporary security competition: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. It argues that the current international security architecture is undergoing a structural transition from predominantly treaty-based military alliances toward a hybrid system in which permanent alliances coexist with flexible, mission-oriented strategic coalitions.

To explain this transformation, the article proposes the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), an original conceptual framework that integrates formal alliances, regional partnerships, operational coalitions, intelligence cooperation, technological innovation, cyber resilience, maritime security, and defense-industrial collaboration within a multi-domain security architecture. The comparative analysis demonstrates that developments surrounding the Russia–Ukraine war, AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and emerging Middle Eastern coalition structures illustrate a broader global trend toward networked security governance. The article concludes that the future effectiveness of military cooperation will depend increasingly on strategic adaptability, technological interoperability, multi-domain deterrence, and political cohesion rather than on the permanence of institutional structures alone. The proposed framework contributes to contemporary alliance theory by offering a comprehensive analytical model for understanding the evolution of military cooperation in an era of strategic competition and geopolitical transformation.

Introduction

The international security environment is undergoing one of its most profound transformations since the end of the Cold War. Renewed strategic competition among major powers, the return of large-scale interstate warfare following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the accelerating militarization of emerging technologies, and intensifying geopolitical rivalries across the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East have fundamentally altered the character of contemporary international security. Rather than diminishing the strategic relevance of military alliances, these developments have reinforced their central role in managing geopolitical competition, deterring aggression, and shaping the emerging international order.

While military alliances have traditionally been understood as treaty-based arrangements designed to provide collective defense and maintain the balance of power, their strategic functions have expanded considerably over the past two decades. Contemporary alliances increasingly incorporate cooperation in cyber security, artificial intelligence, space operations, intelligence sharing, defense-industrial integration, critical infrastructure protection, and technological innovation. Military alliances are therefore evolving beyond conventional defense organizations into multi-domain strategic networks capable of integrating military, technological, economic, political, and informational instruments of power.


Although this transformation is widely acknowledged, much of the existing literature continues to analyze alliances through theoretical frameworks developed during the Cold War. Classical approaches—including Structural Realism, the Balance of Threat theory, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism—remain indispensable for explaining why alliances emerge and persist. However, they offer only a partial explanation of how alliances are adapting to an international environment characterized by technological disruption, hybrid warfare, economic statecraft, cyber competition, and increasingly flexible security partnerships. Consequently, an important theoretical gap remains regarding the evolution of military alliances within the contemporary international system.

This article argues that military alliances are undergoing a structural transformation from predominantly treaty-based collective defense organizations into multi-domain strategic security networks. To conceptualize this evolution, the article introduces the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), an analytical framework that explains how formal alliances, strategic partnerships, mission-oriented coalitions, technological cooperation, intelligence integration, cyber resilience, defense-industrial collaboration, and economic security increasingly operate as interconnected components of a broader security architecture. Rather than replacing existing alliance theories, SNAM extends them by providing a framework better suited to explaining alliance behavior under conditions of strategic competition and geopolitical fragmentation.

Methodologically, the study employs qualitative comparative analysis combining international relations theory, strategic studies, official policy documents, and comparative case studies from three principal theatres of contemporary geopolitical competition: Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East. These cases demonstrate that NATO, AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), and emerging coalition structures in the Middle East collectively illustrate the evolution of military cooperation toward networked security governance.


The article makes three principal contributions to the literature. First, it provides an updated theoretical interpretation of alliance transformation in the twenty-first century. Second, it develops the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) as an original analytical framework for understanding multi-domain military cooperation. Third, it demonstrates that the evolution of military alliances constitutes one of the defining characteristics of the emerging international order, where strategic adaptability, technological interoperability, political cohesion, and networked deterrence increasingly determine the effectiveness of international security cooperation.
Military Alliances in International Relations Theory

Military alliances have long occupied a central place in the study of international relations because they constitute one of the principal mechanisms through which states seek to enhance their security, deter external aggression, and influence the distribution of power within the international system. (1) Traditionally, alliance theory has focused on explaining why states establish formal security arrangements under conditions of international anarchy. However, the strategic environment of the twenty-first century has expanded the functions of military alliances far beyond collective defense. Contemporary alliances increasingly encompass cyber security, intelligence cooperation, artificial intelligence, defense-industrial integration, maritime security, technological innovation, and economic resilience. These developments suggest that alliance theory requires conceptual refinement to account for the emergence of multi-domain strategic security networks.


Structural Realism provides the classical explanation for alliance formation. Waltz argues that the absence of a central authority compels states to rely upon self-help strategies, making alliances a rational response to systemic pressures rather than expressions of ideological affinity.(2) Within this perspective, alliances serve primarily to preserve the balance of power and prevent the emergence of regional or global hegemony.

Stephen Walt subsequently refined this approach through his Balance of Threat Theory, arguing that states balance against perceived threats rather than material capabilities alone. (3) Threat perception is influenced by aggregate power, geographical proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions. Walt’s framework remains highly relevant in explaining contemporary responses to Russian military expansion and China’s growing strategic influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Glenn Snyder further advanced alliance theory by examining the internal dynamics of alliance management. His concepts of abandonment and entrapment continue to explain many of the strategic dilemmas confronting modern alliances, particularly NATO, where member states seek simultaneously to preserve national autonomy while maintaining credible collective commitments. (4)

Although Realist theories continue to explain the origins of alliance formation, they offer a less satisfactory explanation of the expanding political, technological, and economic dimensions of contemporary security cooperation.


Liberal Institutionalism complements the Realist perspective by emphasizing the capacity of institutions to facilitate long-term cooperation under conditions of anarchy. Keohane argues that institutions reduce uncertainty, establish common rules, and lower the transaction costs associated with interstate cooperation. (5) Contemporary alliances illustrate this logic through institutionalized military planning, standardized operational procedures, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and collaborative technological development.

Constructivist scholarship adds a further dimension by emphasizing the importance of shared identities, common norms, and strategic cultures. Wendt argues that the behavior of states is shaped not only by material capabilities but also by socially constructed identities and collective expectations. (6) NATO’s continued cohesion after the collapse of the Soviet Union illustrates that shared democratic values and institutional identity have become significant sources of alliance resilience.

Recent strategic developments nevertheless demonstrate that none of these theoretical traditions fully captures the multi-domain character of contemporary alliance cooperation. The accelerating importance of cyber operations, artificial intelligence, defense-industrial collaboration, supply-chain security, space capabilities, and technological competition indicates that military alliances increasingly function as integrated strategic ecosystems rather than purely collective-defense organizations. (7)


It is precisely this theoretical limitation that motivates the development of the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) advanced in this article. Rather than replacing Realism, Liberal Institutionalism, or Constructivism, SNAM synthesizes their principal insights while extending alliance theory to explain how military alliances now integrate military, technological, economic, informational, and political instruments of power within flexible strategic networks. In this sense, contemporary alliances should be understood not simply as treaty organizations but as adaptive multi-domain security architectures designed to compete in an increasingly complex international order.

The Strategic Evolution of Military Alliances: From Collective Defense to Multi-Domain Strategic Networks

From Collective Defense to Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation

Military alliances have historically been established to deter external aggression, preserve strategic stability, and maintain the balance of power within an anarchic international system. During the Cold War, alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact were primarily designed around collective defense, territorial protection, and nuclear deterrence. Their strategic effectiveness depended largely on formal treaty obligations, military interoperability, and the credibility of collective retaliation against conventional or nuclear aggression. (8)


The end of the Cold War did not eliminate the need for military alliances; rather, it fundamentally transformed their strategic purpose. The proliferation of non-traditional security threats—including terrorism, cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, disinformation, economic coercion, maritime insecurity, and the militarization of outer space—has significantly expanded the operational responsibilities of contemporary alliances. Security cooperation today increasingly extends beyond the battlefield into the technological, economic, informational, and industrial domains. (9)

Consequently, military alliances should no longer be understood solely as institutions for collective defense. They have progressively evolved into multi-domain strategic organizations that integrate military planning with cyber resilience, intelligence sharing, defense-industrial cooperation, technological innovation, supply-chain security, and strategic communications. The effectiveness of an alliance is therefore measured not only by the size of its armed forces but also by its capacity to coordinate multiple instruments of national power across interconnected strategic domains. (10)

This transformation reflects a broader evolution in the concept of deterrence itself. Classical deterrence theory, developed during the nuclear age, emphasized the prevention of war through the credible threat of military retaliation. (11) Contemporary deterrence, however, increasingly depends upon resilience, technological superiority, intelligence integration, cyber defense, economic security, and the protection of critical infrastructure. Deterrence has therefore become multidimensional, requiring alliances to coordinate military and non-military capabilities simultaneously in order to preserve strategic credibility.


The evolution of military alliances should therefore be understood not as institutional adaptation alone but as a structural transformation in the organization of international security. Contemporary alliances increasingly resemble interconnected strategic ecosystems capable of integrating defense policy, technological innovation, industrial production, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and economic resilience within a unified strategic framework. This development represents one of the defining characteristics of twenty-first-century international security governance.

Technological Competition and Alliance Transformation


Technological innovation has become the principal catalyst of alliance transformation. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, space technologies, advanced missile defense, and data-driven military decision-making are reshaping both the character of warfare and the strategic requirements of international cooperation. (12)

Consequently, technological superiority has become inseparable from alliance credibility. Modern alliances increasingly invest in joint research programs, defense-industrial integration, innovation ecosystems, and collaborative technological development. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly identifies emerging and disruptive technologies, cyber security, and resilience as central pillars of collective defense. (13) Likewise, AUKUS illustrates how contemporary security partnerships increasingly priorities advanced technological cooperation over traditional force structures.


These developments indicate that future alliance effectiveness will depend less upon numerical military superiority than upon the ability to integrate technological innovation with operational interoperability. Defense industries, research institutions, private technology firms, and intelligence agencies have consequently become integral components of contemporary alliance architecture, demonstrating that military power can no longer be separated from scientific and technological capacity.
The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM): A New Analytical Framework for Alliance Theory

The transformations examined throughout this study suggest that contemporary military alliances can no longer be adequately explained through analytical models developed during the Cold War. Although Structural Realism, Balance of Threat Theory, Liberal Institutionalism, and Constructivism continue to provide indispensable explanations for alliance formation, cohesion, and persistence, they offer only a partial understanding of the multi-domain character of contemporary security cooperation. None of these theoretical traditions fully captures the growing integration of technological innovation, cyber resilience, defense-industrial collaboration, intelligence fusion, economic security, and flexible coalition-building within modern alliance structures. (14)

To address this analytical limitation, this article proposes the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) as a new conceptual framework for understanding the evolution of military alliances in the twenty-first century. SNAM argues that contemporary alliances are no longer defined solely by formal treaty commitments or collective-defense obligations. Instead, they function as interconnected strategic networks that integrate military, political, technological, economic, intelligence, industrial, and diplomatic capabilities into a multi-domain security architecture.


Unlike traditional alliance models that focus primarily on balancing military threats, SNAM conceptualizes alliances as dynamic governance systems designed to generate collective strategic advantages across multiple domains simultaneously. Military interoperability remains an essential component, but it now operates alongside cyber cooperation, technological innovation, artificial intelligence, defense-industrial integration, intelligence sharing, maritime security, supply-chain resilience, strategic communications, and economic coordination.

Within this framework, alliance effectiveness depends less upon institutional permanence than upon strategic adaptability. Contemporary security organizations increasingly succeed because they can rapidly establish operational coalitions, integrate new technologies, coordinate intelligence, strengthen industrial resilience, and respond collectively to multidimensional threats that transcend conventional military confrontation.

Accordingly, SNAM identifies seven mutually reinforcing pillars of contemporary alliance effectiveness:Collective Defense and Integrated Deterrence—maintaining credible military capabilities capable of deterring conventional and hybrid aggression.
Technological Superiority—joint development of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, quantum technologies, and advanced defence innovation.
Intelligence Integration—continuous intelligence sharing, strategic assessment, early-warning mechanisms, and multidomain situational awareness.
Defence-Industrial Cooperation—collaborative production, supply-chain resilience, defence procurement, and innovation ecosystems linking governments, armed forces, universities, and private industry.
Economic and Strategic Resilience—coordination in sanctions policy, protection of critical infrastructure, energy security, and technological supply chains.
Flexible Coalition Architecture—the ability to establish mission-oriented partnerships rapidly according to specific operational requirements rather than relying exclusively on permanent treaty commitments.
Political Cohesion and Strategic Governance—shared political objectives, institutional legitimacy, democratic consultation, and strategic decision-making capable of maintaining long-term alliance cohesion.


Taken together, these pillars demonstrate that military alliances have evolved into multi-domain strategic governance systems rather than remaining exclusively collective-defence organizations. This transformation reflects broader changes in the international security environment, where military power increasingly interacts with technological competition, economic statecraft, cyber conflict, and geopolitical rivalry.

Rather than replacing existing alliance theories, SNAM should therefore be understood as an integrative theoretical framework. Structural Realism continues to explain why alliances emerge under conditions of anarchy; Balance of Threat Theory explains patterns of strategic alignment; Liberal Institutionalism clarifies the institutional mechanisms that facilitate cooperation; and Constructivism illuminates the importance of shared identities and norms. SNAM builds upon these traditions by explaining how alliances adapt operationally to an increasingly interconnected and technologically driven strategic environment. It therefore provides a complementary analytical perspective capable of bridging classical alliance theory with the realities of twenty-first-century international security.

From a broader theoretical perspective, SNAM also contributes to the study of international security governance. Whereas traditional alliance theory primarily examined relations among sovereign states, the proposed framework recognizes that contemporary security increasingly depends upon networks linking governments, international organizations, intelligence agencies, defense industries, research institutions, technology companies, and regional coalitions. Security governance has therefore become progressively decentralized, multi-domain, and networked.

The Strategic Network Alliance Model consequently offers an analytical framework not only for explaining the transformation of NATO, AUKUS, the QUAD, and emerging Middle Eastern security partnerships, but also for understanding the future evolution of international security cooperation under conditions of accelerating technological change and intensifying geopolitical competition.


The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) is proposed as a mid-range theoretical framework. It does not seek to replace general theories of international relations but rather to explain the evolving organizational logic of military alliances under conditions of multi-domain strategic competition.





The Russia–Ukraine War and the Reconfiguration of the International Security Architecture


The Return of Interstate Warfare and the Revival of Collective Defense


The outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine war in February 2022 marked a major turning point in the evolution of the contemporary international security environment. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, Europe witnessed a large-scale interstate conventional conflict involving one of the world’s principal military powers. Beyond its regional consequences, the war challenged many assumptions that had shaped post-1991 security thinking, particularly the expectation that economic interdependence and globalization would gradually reduce the likelihood of major interstate warfare. (15)


Instead, the conflict reaffirmed the enduring importance of military power as a central instrument of statecraft. Strategic competition among major powers rapidly displaced the liberal optimism that had characterized much of the post-Cold War era. As a result, military alliances once again became essential mechanisms for deterrence, defense planning, military modernization, intelligence cooperation, and geopolitical coordination.

From a theoretical perspective, the conflict revived several classical realist propositions concerning anarchy, the security dilemma, and the continuing relevance of military capabilities. At the same time, it demonstrated that contemporary deterrence extends well beyond conventional armed forces to include economic sanctions, cyber operations, intelligence sharing, strategic communications, and technological coordination. (16)
NATO’s Strategic Adaptation after 2022

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Russia–Ukraine war has been the strategic revitalization of NATO. Prior to 2022, the Alliance faced persistent debates regarding burden-sharing, political cohesion, and long-term relevance. Russia’s invasion fundamentally altered these debates by restoring collective defense to the center of NATO’s mission while simultaneously expanding its responsibilities across multiple strategic domains.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept identifies Russia as “the most significant and direct threat” to Allied security while recognizing China as a long-term systemic challenge affecting Euro-Atlantic stability. (17) This dual assessment represents a significant departure from earlier strategic doctrines by acknowledging that future security challenges originate simultaneously from conventional military threats, emerging technologies, cyber operations, and geopolitical competition.


The Alliance has responded through reinforcement of its eastern flank, expansion of multinational battlegroups, increased defense spending, enhanced readiness forces, and greater investment in advanced military technologies. The accession of Finland and Sweden has further strengthened NATO’s strategic position in Northern Europe, significantly altering the military geography of the Baltic region and extending the Alliance’s capacity for collective deterrence.

Rather than simply returning to its Cold War posture, NATO has evolved into a multi-domain security organization capable of integrating conventional military power with cyber defense, intelligence cooperation, resilience planning, space security, and technological innovation. This adaptation illustrates the broader transformation of military alliances from static defense organizations into dynamic strategic networks.
The Indo-Pacific and the Emergence of New Alliance Architecture

While the Russia–Ukraine war has reinforced NATO’s centrality within Europe, it has also accelerated strategic realignments beyond the Euro-Atlantic theatre. The United States increasingly regards the Indo-Pacific as the principal arena of long-term geopolitical competition, with China’s expanding military capabilities representing its foremost strategic concern.

This strategic shift has stimulated new forms of security cooperation that differ substantially from traditional treaty-based alliances. Initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) emphasize technological collaboration, maritime security, defense-industrial integration, intelligence sharing, and regional deterrence rather than formal collective-defense obligations comparable to NATO’s Article 5.

These arrangements illustrate an important evolution in alliance politics. Contemporary partnerships increasingly prioritize interoperability, technological innovation, and strategic flexibility over rigid institutional structures. Alliance effectiveness is therefore measured less by formal treaty commitments than by the capacity to coordinate across multiple strategic domains in response to rapidly evolving security challenges.

Economic Statecraft and the Expansion of Alliance Functions


One of the defining characteristics of contemporary alliance politics is the growing integration of military strategy with economic statecraft. The Russia–Ukraine war demonstrated that sanctions, export controls, financial restrictions, and technological embargoes have become essential instruments of strategic competition.

Western governments coordinated unprecedented economic measures against Russia while simultaneously seeking to strengthen energy security, diversify supply chains, and reduce dependence on strategically vulnerable technologies. These developments illustrate that economic resilience has become inseparable from national security.


Similarly, competition over artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies, cyber capabilities, and critical minerals increasingly shapes alliance cooperation. Military alliances therefore function not only as defense organizations but also as platforms for technological governance and industrial coordination.
Implications for the Emerging International Order

The strategic consequences of the Russia–Ukraine war extend far beyond the immediate military confrontation. More fundamentally, the conflict has accelerated the transition toward an increasingly fragmented and competitive international system characterized by multiple centers of power, overlapping security architectures, and intensifying geopolitical rivalry.

The evidence presented in this study suggests that military alliances should no longer be analysed solely through the traditional concepts of collective defense or balance-of-power politics. Instead, they increasingly operate as multidimensional strategic ecosystems integrating military capabilities with technological innovation, economic resilience, intelligence cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and industrial capacity.


The Transformation of Global Security Governance: Why Flexible Coalitions Are Replacing Traditional Collective Security?


The Crisis of Collective Security in the Contemporary International System


The post-Cold War international order was founded on the expectation that multilateral institutions would play an increasingly effective role in maintaining international peace and security. Built upon the principles of collective security enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the liberal international order sought to reduce interstate conflict through international law, multilateral diplomacy, and institutional cooperation. However, the resurgence of geopolitical rivalry during the past decade has exposed significant limitations in the ability of universal institutions to respond effectively to major international crises. (18)

The growing strategic competition among the United States, China, and Russia has increasingly constrained multilateral decision-making, particularly within the United Nations Security Council. The repeated use of the veto by permanent members has reflected the return of power politics to the center of international relations, reducing the Council’s capacity to produce timely and effective collective responses to armed conflicts. Consequently, the international system has witnessed an increasing reliance on alternative security arrangements capable of responding more rapidly and flexibly to emerging threats. (19)


Rather than signaling the disappearance of multilateralism, these developments indicate a redistribution of security responsibilities. Universal institutions continue to provide political legitimacy and normative frameworks, while operational responses to crises are increasingly undertaken by regional organizations, strategic alliances, and mission-oriented military coalitions.

From Universal Collective Security to Flexible Coalition-Based Security


One of the defining characteristics of contemporary international security is the growing preference for flexible coalition-building over universal collective action. Unlike traditional collective security arrangements, which require broad international consensus before military action can be authorized, contemporary coalitions are typically established among groups of states sharing common strategic interests and threat perceptions.

This transformation reflects the changing nature of security threats. Cyber warfare, hybrid operations, terrorism, maritime insecurity, disinformation campaigns, and the protection of critical infrastructure require rapid operational coordination that often exceeds the decision-making capacity of traditional multilateral organizations. Flexible coalitions therefore offer greater strategic agility by enabling participating states to coordinate military capabilities, intelligence assets, technological resources, and diplomatic efforts without the institutional constraints associated with universal organizations. (21)

The emergence of coalition-based security does not necessarily undermine international institutions; rather, it represents an adaptive response to an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment. States continue to value the legitimacy provided by multilateral institutions while simultaneously recognizing that immediate security challenges frequently require operational mechanisms capable of acting with greater speed and flexibility.

Strategic Competition and the Rise of Mission-Oriented Coalitions

The renewed era of great-power competition has accelerated the evolution of military cooperation from permanent alliance structures toward mission-specific strategic coalitions. Unlike traditional treaty-based alliances, contemporary coalitions are generally organized around clearly defined operational objectives, limited geographical theatres, and specific security challenges.

Examples include multinational maritime operations (22) protecting critical sea lines of communication, coordinated missile-defense initiatives, intelligence-sharing arrangements, cyber-defense partnerships, and technological cooperation in areas such as artificial intelligence and space security. These initiatives demonstrate that contemporary security cooperation increasingly emphasizes operational effectiveness rather than institutional permanence. (23)


The evolution of these arrangements also reflects a broader transformation in deterrence theory. Classical deterrence relied primarily upon military retaliation against conventional aggression. Contemporary deterrence, however, increasingly depends upon multi-domain integration encompassing cyber resilience, technological superiority, intelligence fusion, economic security, strategic communications, and industrial capacity. Consequently, successful security cooperation now requires integrated networks capable of coordinating multiple instruments of national power simultaneously. (24)

Flexible Coalitions as an Emerging Pillar of International Security

Recent international crises provide compelling evidence that flexible military coalitions have become indispensable components of contemporary security governance. The international response to maritime insecurity in the Red Sea (25), multinational efforts to strengthen cyber resilience, and coordinated missile-defense cooperation among regional partners all demonstrate that coalition-based security has become an increasingly prominent feature of the evolving international order.

These developments suggest that security governance is gradually shifting toward a hybrid architecture (26) in which traditional military alliances coexist with flexible operational coalitions. Permanent alliances continue to provide long-term strategic stability, interoperability, and institutional continuity, whereas mission-oriented coalitions offer the adaptability required to confront rapidly evolving threats.

This coexistence represents neither the replacement of alliances nor the abandonment of collective security. Instead, it reflects an ongoing process of strategic adaptation through which states combine institutionalized security commitments with more flexible mechanisms capable of addressing multidimensional security challenges.


Implications for the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM)

The transformation of global security governance provides further support for the central argument advanced in this article. Contemporary international security is no longer organized exclusively around permanent treaty-based alliances. Rather, it increasingly consists of interconnected strategic networks combining formal alliances, regional partnerships, ad hoc military coalitions, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, technological cooperation, and defense-industrial collaboration.

Within the proposed Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), these arrangements should be understood as complementary rather than competing forms of security cooperation. (27) Traditional alliances continue to provide the institutional backbone of international security, while flexible coalitions expand operational capacity by enabling rapid responses to specific strategic contingencies.

Accordingly, the emerging international order is characterized by a multilayered security architecture (28) in which alliances and coalitions jointly contribute to deterrence, crisis management, technological innovation, maritime security, cyber defense, and geopolitical stability. This evolution illustrates that the future of international security will depend less upon the expansion of formal alliances than upon the ability of states to construct resilient strategic networks capable of integrating military, technological, economic, and political capabilities across multiple domains.


The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) in Practice: The Evolution of the U.S.–Israel Security Network and the Changing Middle Eastern Security Order


The contemporary Middle East provides one of the most illustrative examples of how the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) operates in practice. Unlike the bipolar alliance structures of the Cold War, regional security is increasingly shaped by overlapping networks of military cooperation, technological partnerships, intelligence sharing, economic interdependence, and diplomatic coordination. Within this evolving architecture, the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel represents one of the most institutionalized and technologically integrated security networks in the international system. Rather than functioning solely as a bilateral military alliance, it has developed into a multidimensional strategic partnership encompassing advanced defense technologies, missile defense systems, intelligence cooperation, cyber security, defense-industrial collaboration, and regional diplomatic initiatives. (29)

The evolution of this strategic network reflects broader transformations in alliance politics. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has progressively shifted from maintaining large permanent military deployments toward constructing regional security architectures based on interoperability, burden-sharing, technological integration, and partnerships with regional actors. The Abraham Accords, expanding missile-defense cooperation among regional partners, and increasing intelligence coordination demonstrate how contemporary alliances increasingly function through interconnected strategic networks rather than isolated bilateral commitments. (30)

However, the Middle Eastern security environment is simultaneously undergoing profound structural changes. The diffusion of military technologies, the proliferation of precision-guided weapons, the expansion of indigenous defense industries, the growing use of unmanned systems, and the emergence of non-state military actors have altered the regional balance of power. Several Arab states have substantially modernized their armed forces while simultaneously pursuing strategic diversification through defense partnerships extending beyond traditional Western suppliers. China and Russia have also expanded their diplomatic, economic, and military engagement across the region, contributing to an increasingly multipolar security environment. (31)


From an Arab strategic perspective, these developments are frequently interpreted as reflecting the gradual transition from a predominantly unipolar regional order toward a more diversified security architecture. Rather than relying exclusively on external security guarantees, many regional states increasingly emphasize strategic autonomy, defense-industrial development, technological modernization, and diversified international partnerships. This trend does not necessarily imply the decline of the United States’ regional influence; rather, it suggests that regional security is becoming more pluralistic, with multiple centers of influence operating simultaneously. (32)

Similarly, scholars from the Global South often argue that contemporary international security is experiencing a broader redistribution of political and military capabilities. Emerging powers seek greater participation in shaping international security governance while questioning institutional arrangements established during the post-Second World War period. Within this perspective, alliances are increasingly evaluated not only according to their military effectiveness but also according to their capacity to accommodate changing geopolitical realities and evolving distributions of power. (33)

The ongoing conflicts in Gaza, the Red Sea, and the broader regional tensions involving Iran and its network of partners further demonstrate both the strengths and limitations of highly integrated alliance networks. The U.S.–Israel strategic partnership continues to provide substantial military interoperability, intelligence coordination, and technological advantages. Nevertheless, these conflicts also illustrate that military superiority alone cannot resolve complex political crises rooted in questions of legitimacy, governance, state fragility, and regional rivalries. Contemporary security increasingly depends upon the interaction between military capabilities, diplomatic engagement, economic resilience, and political legitimacy. (34)

The Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) provides a comprehensive framework for analyzing these dynamics. Rather than viewing military alliances as static treaty organizations, SNAM conceptualizes them as adaptive strategic networks operating across multiple domains of power. The Middle East demonstrates that successful security cooperation increasingly depends upon the integration of military capabilities with technological innovation, intelligence cooperation, economic resilience, diplomatic engagement, and institutional flexibility.

Consequently, the future of military alliances should not be understood in terms of their expansion or contraction alone, but in terms of their capacity to evolve within an increasingly multipolar international system. The principal challenge facing alliances during the coming decades will be their ability to remain strategically cohesive while accommodating the redistribution of global political influence, the diffusion of military technologies, and the emergence of new regional centers of power. In this evolving environment, resilience, adaptability, and network integration are likely to become more decisive than numerical military superiority alone.

Strategic Networks and the Future Balance of Power in the Middle East


The Middle East has emerged as one of the most dynamic theatres for observing the transformation of military alliances in the twenty-first century. The region no longer reflects the relatively stable alliance structures that characterized the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War era. Instead, it has evolved into a complex security environment in which traditional alliances coexist with flexible coalitions, strategic partnerships, intelligence networks, defense-industrial cooperation, and technological integration. This multidimensional security landscape provides a particularly valuable empirical context for evaluating the explanatory capacity of the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM). Rather than understanding regional security through binary alliance rivalries, SNAM conceptualizes the Middle East as an interconnected system of overlapping strategic networks operating simultaneously across military, technological, political, economic, and informational domains. (35)

The Evolution of Regional Military Networks

The United States has remained the principal external security actor in the Middle East for more than five decades, with its strategic partnership with Israel representing one of the most institutionalized military relationships in contemporary international politics. Extensive intelligence cooperation, joint military exercises, integrated missile-defense systems, cyber-security collaboration, and defense-industrial partnerships have produced a highly resilient security network capable of responding to a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional threats. (36)

Nevertheless, the regional security architecture has undergone significant diversification. The Abraham Accords have facilitated unprecedented cooperation between Israel and several Arab states in areas including intelligence exchange, air and missile defense, maritime security, and technological innovation. Simultaneously, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have invested heavily in indigenous defense industries, military modernization, artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and cyber capabilities. These developments suggest that regional security is increasingly characterized by networked cooperation rather than isolated bilateral alliances. (37)

The Redistribution of Regional Military and Political Power

While the United States continues to possess unmatched military capabilities and maintains an extensive regional presence, the strategic environment has become progressively more pluralistic. Regional actors have expanded their political autonomy by diversifying diplomatic partnerships and reducing dependence on a single external security provider. This evolution reflects not the disappearance of American influence but rather the emergence of a more distributed balance of power in which regional and extra-regional actors exercise increasing strategic agency. (38)

Arab states have progressively invested in military modernization programs designed to strengthen national deterrence capabilities and reduce long-term dependence on foreign military support. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Egypt have expanded defense procurement, developed domestic defense-industrial capacities, and invested in emerging technologies including autonomous systems, cyber defense, and space capabilities. Although considerable differences remain in operational effectiveness, these initiatives indicate a broader regional trend toward strategic self-reliance. (39)

At the same time, Turkey has pursued an increasingly autonomous defense strategy, combining NATO membership with an expanding indigenous defense industry and an active regional security policy. Iran, by contrast, has relied primarily on asymmetric deterrence, ballistic missile development, unmanned aerial systems, and partnerships with non-state armed groups to compensate for conventional military limitations. These contrasting approaches demonstrate that regional power is increasingly exercised through diverse strategic networks rather than through conventional force structures alone.(40) ⁶

External Powers and the Emerging Multipolar Middle East


The redistribution of regional power has also been influenced by the growing involvement of external actors beyond the traditional Western alliance system. China has significantly expanded its economic presence through infrastructure investment, technological cooperation, energy partnerships, and diplomatic engagement. While Beijing has thus far avoided establishing a comprehensive military alliance structure comparable to that of the United States, its growing political and economic influence contributes to an increasingly multipolar regional environment. (41)

Russia likewise continues to play an important strategic role, particularly through its military engagement in Syria, defense exports, energy diplomacy, and political mediation efforts. Although the war in Ukraine has affected Moscow’s capacity to project power, Russia remains an influential regional actor whose policies contribute to the diversification of Middle Eastern security relationships. (42)

For many states in the region, the objective is not to replace one strategic partner with another but to diversify external relationships in ways that maximize strategic autonomy. This approach reflects a broader trend in Global South diplomacy, where states increasingly pursue multidirectional foreign policies that seek cooperation with multiple major powers while avoiding exclusive alignment with any single geopolitical bloc. (43)

Drivers of the Emerging Regional Security Architecture.

The gradual transition toward a more networked and pluralistic security architecture in the Middle East is driven by several interrelated structural developments that collectively reshape alliance behavior and regional strategic calculations.

First, the sustained increase in regional military expenditure reflects the growing determination of Middle Eastern states to strengthen national defense capabilities while reducing excessive dependence on external security guarantees. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Middle East remains one of the world’s highest military-spending regions relative to GDP. Saudi Arabia consistently ranks among the world’s largest defense spenders, while Israel maintains one of the highest defense expenditures as a percentage of national output among advanced economies. The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey have likewise invested substantially in military modernization, including advanced air defense systems, precision-guided munitions, cyber capabilities, space assets, and indigenous defense industries. (44)

Second, the proliferation of indigenous defense-industrial capabilities has fundamentally altered the regional balance of military dependence. Rather than relying exclusively on imported weapon systems, several regional powers have adopted long-term strategies aimed at developing domestic production capacities. Turkey has emerged as a leading producer of unmanned aerial vehicles, naval platforms, and armored vehicles. Israel continues to lead in missile defense, cyber technologies, and advanced defense innovation, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have incorporated defense-industrial development into broader national transformation programs such as Saudi Vision 2030 and the UAE’s industrial strategy. These developments strengthen national strategic autonomy and diversify the technological foundations of regional security. (45)


Third, the diversification of strategic partnerships reflects a significant evolution in regional foreign policy. While the United States remains the principal external military partner for many Middle Eastern states, regional governments increasingly pursue simultaneous political, economic, and security cooperation with China, Russia, European partners, India, and other emerging powers. This multidirectional diplomacy does not necessarily represent a rejection of existing alliances; rather, it reflects an effort to reduce strategic vulnerability by avoiding excessive dependence on any single external actor. Such diversification is consistent with broader patterns observed across the Global South, where states seek greater flexibility in an increasingly multipolar international system. (46)

Fourth, the changing nature of regional threats has encouraged states to prioritize national resilience over broad collective-security arrangements. Contemporary security challenges—including cyber-attacks, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems, maritime insecurity, terrorism, energy infrastructure protection, and transnational criminal networks—often require rapid, specialized responses. As a result, governments increasingly establish issue-specific partnerships based on immediate operational requirements rather than comprehensive collective-defense commitments. Intelligence-sharing arrangements, integrated air and missile defense initiatives, maritime task forces, and cyber-security cooperation illustrate this functional approach to security governance. (47)

Finally, regional political priorities have become increasingly differentiated, making comprehensive collective-security frameworks more difficult to sustain. Middle Eastern governments often face distinct strategic environments, domestic political pressures, economic development agendas, and perceptions of external threats. Consequently, alliance behavior is increasingly driven by national interests and regime-specific security calculations rather than by a unified regional conception of collective security. This does not imply the disappearance of cooperation; instead, cooperation has become more selective, pragmatic, and mission-oriented. States increasingly participate in overlapping security arrangements according to specific strategic objectives rather than permanent bloc politics. (48)

Viewed collectively, these developments suggest that the Middle East is not witnessing the collapse of traditional alliances but rather their transformation. The regional security order is evolving toward a multilayered architecture in which permanent alliances coexist with flexible coalitions, bilateral strategic partnerships, technological cooperation, intelligence networks, and defense-industrial collaboration. From the perspective of the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM), this transformation demonstrates that alliance effectiveness increasingly depends on the capacity to integrate diverse forms of strategic cooperation across multiple domains rather than on formal treaty commitments alone. In this respect, the Middle East represents one of the clearest contemporary illustrations of the transition from alliance-based security toward network-based security governance.

SNAM and the Future Security Architecture of the Middle East

The evolving balance of power in the Middle East provides strong empirical support for the Strategic Network Alliance Model. Rather than replacing traditional alliances, emerging security arrangements increasingly complement them through flexible coalitions capable of addressing specific operational challenges. Permanent alliances continue to provide strategic continuity, institutional experience, and military interoperability, while ad hoc coalitions contribute operational flexibility, technological specialization, and rapid crisis response.

From this perspective, the future regional security architecture is likely to consist of interconnected strategic networks integrating formal alliances, regional organizations, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, defense-industrial partnerships, cyber-security cooperation, maritime security initiatives, and technological collaboration. Military effectiveness will therefore depend increasingly upon the ability of states to coordinate these multiple dimensions of power rather than upon conventional force size alone. (49)

This transformation also carries important implications for the future of regional stability. Military superiority remains an important component of deterrence; however, durable security increasingly requires political legitimacy, economic resilience, technological innovation, institutional adaptability, and effective diplomacy. Alliances that successfully integrate these complementary dimensions will be better positioned to respond to the increasingly complex security challenges of the twenty-first century.

From both Arab and Global South perspectives, this evolution reflects neither the inevitable decline of established powers nor the emergence of a completely new regional order. Instead, it illustrates a gradual redistribution of influence within an increasingly interconnected international system in which multiple actors simultaneously contribute to regional security governance. In this context, SNAM offers a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding how strategic networks—not merely formal alliances—are becoming the principal mechanism through which military and political power is organized in the contemporary Middle East. (50)

Conclusion

The transformation of the international security environment has fundamentally challenged the traditional understanding of military alliances. The resurgence of great-power competition, the proliferation of hybrid and multi-domain threats, rapid technological innovation, and the redistribution of political and military capabilities have exposed the limitations of classical alliance theories that primarily interpret alliances as treaty-based mechanisms for collective defense against common adversaries. While these theoretical traditions continue to provide valuable insights into alliance formation and deterrence, they are less capable of explaining the increasingly complex patterns of cooperation that characterize contemporary international security.

To explain this transformation, the article proposed the Strategic Network Alliance Model (SNAM) as a new analytical framework for understanding the evolution of alliance politics in the twenty-first century. Unlike traditional alliance theories, which focus principally on balancing behavior, deterrence, or institutional commitments, SNAM conceptualizes alliances as dynamic strategic networks composed of five mutually reinforcing pillars: collective defense, technological innovation, intelligence integration, flexible governance, and multi-domain strategic cooperation. This framework expands existing alliance theory by incorporating the growing importance of technological interdependence, defense-industrial cooperation, institutional adaptability, and networked security governance.


The empirical examination of contemporary security developments further demonstrates the explanatory value of the model. NATO’s institutional adaptation after the Cold War, the increasing reliance on flexible coalition-based security arrangements, and the evolution of strategic partnerships in the Middle East collectively illustrate that contemporary security governance increasingly operates through overlapping and interconnected security networks rather than through isolated alliance structures. The analysis of the United States–Israel strategic partnership, together with the broader evolution of regional security relationships, shows that permanent alliances now coexist with mission-oriented coalitions, intelligence-sharing mechanisms, technological partnerships, maritime security initiatives, and defense-industrial cooperation.

The Middle East represents one of the clearest illustrations of this transformation. Rising defense expenditures, the expansion of indigenous defense industries, the diffusion of advanced military technologies, and the diversification of external strategic partnerships have contributed to a progressively more networked and pluralistic regional security architecture. At the same time, regional governments increasingly interpret security through the prism of national strategic priorities, leading to more selective, issue-specific, and flexible forms of cooperation rather than comprehensive regional collective-security arrangements. These developments do not signify the disappearance of traditional alliances but rather their adaptation to a more complex and multipolar international environment.

The findings of this study also have broader implications for international security governance. As global power becomes increasingly dispersed, security cooperation is likely to depend less on rigid bloc politics and more on the ability of states to construct interoperable strategic networks capable of integrating military, technological, political, economic, and informational resources. In this evolving environment, resilience, adaptability, and multi-domain coordination are becoming central determinants of strategic effectiveness. Alliance success will increasingly be measured by the capacity to connect institutions, technologies, and partners across multiple levels of security governance rather than by the size of military forces alone.

Although the Strategic Network Alliance Model offers a comprehensive conceptual framework for analyzing these transformations, it should be regarded as an evolving analytical model rather than a definitive theory. Future research should subject SNAM to systematic empirical testing across different regional security complexes and alliance systems, including NATO, AUKUS, the Quad, the U.S.–Israel strategic partnership, African regional security arrangements, and emerging Indo-Pacific coalitions. Comparative case studies, network analysis, and quantitative indicators of interoperability, technological integration, intelligence cooperation, and institutional resilience would further refine the model and assess its explanatory power under varying geopolitical conditions.

Ultimately, this article contends that the future of military alliances lies not in the replacement of traditional alliance structures, but in their transformation into increasingly interconnected strategic networks capable of responding to the multidimensional challenges of contemporary international security. By offering a framework that bridges classical alliance theory with emerging patterns of networked security governance, the Strategic Network Alliance Model contributes to a deeper understanding of how military cooperation is evolving in an era defined by strategic competition, technological disruption, and an increasingly multipolar international order.


Endnotes: 

George H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4–10.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 118–128.
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 21–37.
Snyder, Alliance Politics, 165–202.
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 67–109.
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 246–312.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 593–621.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 35–52; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 117–125.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 592–620.
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–34.
Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Future of Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 113–150
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022), 7–12.
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 601–623; Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022), 211–236.
John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (2014): 77–89; Lawrence Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (London: Allen Lane, 2023), 412–438.
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 1–34; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 102–128
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2022), 3–12.
G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020); Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); David Malone, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004).
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (2009): 34–39.
Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023); Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid, 2022); U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 2022).
Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022).
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
U.S. Department of Defense, “Operation Prosperity Guardian,” December 2023; NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept.
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Patricia A. Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (1997); NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid, 2022).
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
Michael Eisenstadt, The Abraham Accords: The Gulf States, Israel, and the New Middle East (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021); U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 2022).
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf (London: Routledge, 2013); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025)
Fawaz A. Gerges, The New Middle East: Protest and Revolution in the Arab World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2025.
. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambrid ge University Press, 2003); Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
Steven A. Cook, The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2024); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019).
Michael Eisenstadt, The Abraham Accords: The Gulf States, Israel, and the New Middle East (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021); NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid: NATO, 2022).
Fawaz A. Gerges, The Great Betrayal: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023); G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020).
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025); Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand.
Henri J. Barkey, Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: DavutoÄŸlu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order (London: Routledge, 2023); Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Dynamics of Change in the Persian Gulf (London: Routledge, 2013).
Jonathan Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies (London: Routledge, 2022); Jonathan Fulton, “China’s Changing Role in the Middle East,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief (2023).
Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia Up to in the Middle East? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 2025.
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Yearbook 2025: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025); Nan Tian et al., “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2025.
Kenneth M. Pollack, Armies of Sand: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025 (London: Routledge for the IISS, 2025).
Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018); Jonathan Fulton, China’s Relations with the Gulf Monarchies (London: Routledge, 2022).
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (Madrid: NATO, 2022).
Louise Fawcett, ed., International Relations of the Middle East, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Hal Brands, The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us About Great-Power Rivalry Today (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022); Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers.


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About Dr. Mohammed Issam Laaroussi

Dr. Mohammed Issam Laaroussi is a Professor of International Relations at The international American University of Theism and International Relations Academy in Istanbul, ex Director of Research and Studies at TRENDS Research and Advisory Center in Abu Dhabi. Dr. Laaroussi is experienced in the analyses of the evolving multi-dimensional aspects of strategic and security issues, with over 20 years of expertise. His main areas of expertise are International Law, Criminal Law, Management of International Organizations, National Security Approaches, and Foreign Policy Analysis, Crisis Management, and Geo-strategic studies, Terrorism Affairs, Leadership and Governance, with a focus on the MENA and Europe regions. Dr. Issam is a consultant and expert accredited by different media outlets (Abu Dhabi TV-Sky News Arabia-Al Hora channel-CCTV, INDUS TV), as well as some other international bodies.
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About Dr. EL Abess El Ouardi

Dr. EL Abess El Ouardi is Professor of Public Law and Political Science at Mohammed V University in Rabat, Morocco, and an expert in public policy, governance, and political analysis. He serves as Director General of the African Journal of Public Policies at Mohammed V University. His research and professional expertise encompass public governance, institutional reform, public policy analysis, political and strategic affairs, and contemporary international issues. He has published and contributed to academic and policy-oriented debates on governance, political institutions, and public affairs.
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