Joint Sino-Indian Bid To Get UNESCO Recognition For Buddhist Monk Xuanzang – Analysis

A depiction of the Chinese monk Xuanzang on his journey to India.

 Credit: Wikipedia Commons

June 8, 2026 
By P. K. Balachandran


As early as 2016, the Chinese Consul General in Kolkata had mooted the idea of jointly celebrating the work of Xuanzang, who translated Buddhist scriptures into Chinese and helped Buddhism gain wide acceptance in China.

Thanks to the thaw in relations between India and China, a 10-year old project to jointly secure UNESCO recognition for the work of the 7 th. Century Chinese Buddhist monk, Xuanzang, is set to take off.

China had suggested to India that the two countries jointly bid for UNESCO’s recognition of Xuanzang, who translated Buddhist texts from Sanskrit and Pali to Chinese, and gave Buddhism a firm foundation in China and South East Asia. The goal is to put Xuanzang’s work in UNESCO’s “Intangible Cultural Heritage List.”

The Indian side responded favourably, and internal consultations are underway. An Indian representative is expected to visit China in the coming weeks to hold discussions with his counterparts.

The project aims to identify practices, narratives, and sites associated with Xuanzang. The proposed nomination needs delineation of cultural practices linked to the transmission of Buddhist knowledge, pilgrimage routes traversed by Xuanzang and oral traditions preserved in monasteries and local communities.

Need to Establish It As A Living Heritage

The project must demonstrate that Xuanzang is a “living heritage” in accordance with UNESCO’s criteria. UNESCO’s Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH) framework, under the 2003 Convention, recognises living traditions such as practices, expressions, knowledge systems and rituals that communities “continue to transmit across generations”.

The list excludes physical manifestations like monuments.

The UNESCO list of Intangible Heritages includes material from over 150 countries, with multinational nominations forming a growing share as States collaborate on shared cultural traditions.

India ratified the convention in 2005 and currently has 16 elements inscribed on UNESCO’s Intangible Culture List, including Yoga, the Kumbh Mela and Durga Puja. Inter-State nominations include Nowruz, a transnational cultural practice shared by several countries in West and South Asia.

Inter-State nominations require participating States to agree on documentation, safeguarding measures and community participation. A joint Sino-Indian proposal would require alignment on the narrative and shared ownership of the elements included.

UNESCO nominations are not easy to get. They require extensive documentation, including evidence of community participation, plans for safeguarding, and demonstration of the element’s continued practice.

UNESCO guidelines require that nominations reflect “community consent and participation”. Therefore, local communities will have to be consulted.

Discussions between India and China will focus on mapping existing material on Xuanzang across archives, monasteries and academic institutions. While India will be examining records related to Nalanda and other sites linked to his stay, China will be compiling material from its own historical sources.

Idea Mooted A Decade Ago

Ten years ago, in 2016, the Chinese Consulate General in Kolkata had held a public event to explain the depth of China’s “cooperative relationship” with India over the last 1400 years. A seminar on “Xuan Zang and China-India Friendly Interactions” was held in Kolkata, which traced the monk’s role “in strengthening Indo-China relations.”

The Chinese Consulate was working with the K.P. Jayaswal Institute, a Bihar-based archaeological institution run by the Bihar Government, to study Stupas.

Improved Climate for Sino-Indian Cooperation

The current outreach from China comes at a time when India-China relations have been seeing attempts at a rapprochement after a period of strain following the 2020 standoff along the Line of Actual Control (the de facto border) between the two countries in Ladakh.

Diplomatic and military talks have continued, with both sides maintaining engagement through established mechanisms. India has allowed increased Chinese investments in its industries and the Hindu pilgrimage to Kailash in Tibet has resumed.

Faxian’s Quest

Buddhism travelled from India to China in the “Later Han period” (from 25-220 AD). Initially, the Chinese rejected it as a “foreign” religion. Only later, during a period of turmoil between 220-and 589 AD, Mahayana or “Great Vehicle” Buddhism began winning Chinese adherents.

It was dissatisfaction with existing Chinese translations of Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures that drove the Buddhist monk Faxian (5 th.Century AD) to set out for India at age 65, intent on finding the originals. After studying them for 10 years in India, he brought back to China a great number of copies of Buddhist texts and translated them from Sanskrit into Chinese. Among them, two of the most important were the “Mahaparinirvana-sutra” a text glorifying the eternal, personal, and pure nature of “nirvana”, on which the nirvana school in China then based its doctrines, and the “Vinaya” (rules of discipline for the monks) of the “Mahasanghika” school, which became available for the regulation of the numerous monastic communities in China.

Xuanzang’s Quest

More than two centuries after Faxian came another Chinese Buddhist monk, Xuanzang (602-664 AD ). He set out for India with much the same purpose in mind – to increase his understanding of the Buddha’s teachings by going to the source. He also wanted to get a feel of the places the Buddha trod.

Judson Knight, writing in encyclopedia.com about Xuanzang, says that under the Sui Dynasty (589-618 AD) and the newly founded T’ang Dynasty (618-907 AD ), Xuanzang and other monks faced a hostile environment. Not only did the T’ang dynasty’s first ruler, Kao Tsu (618-626 AD), embrace the rival faith of Taoism, but placed restrictions on travel in the Western parts of China, which was the gateway to Central Asia and India.

Xuanzang’s Search For Theological Clarity

But Xuanzang was determined to go to India. Whereas Faxian was dissatisfied with Chinese translations of the Buddhist scriptures and wanted to see the originals, Xuanzang’s longing arose from his preoccupation with difficult theological questions. He needed to consult the “Yogacarabhumi Sastra” (dated between 4 th., and 5 th., century AD), which could only be found in India. Therefore, he resolved to make the arduous, extremely challenging journey across the mountains.

But the Chinese Emperor had barred travel beyond the Western borders of China. “As I approached China’s extreme outpost at the edge of the Desert of Lop, I was caught by the Chinese army. Not having a travel permit, they wanted to send me to Tun-huang to stay at the monastery there. However, I said ‘If you insist on detaining me I will allow you to take my life, but I will not take a single step backwards in the direction of China.'”

As it turned out, the top-most government official in the region was a devout Buddhist, and he chose to look the other way, allowing Xuanzang to pass the military outposts that separated China from the lands of Central Asia.

Further West, Xuanzang encountered bandits and marauding tribes, as well as admiring rulers and welcoming groups of monks. He visited Tashkent, Samarkand, and Balkh. (The first two are today in Uzbekistan, and the last in Afghanistan). All three were important trading and cultural centres in the premodern era.

Xuanzang reached India in 631 AD and made his way to the monastery at Nalanda, India’s largest Buddhist centre, where the esteemed master, Silabhadra, taught him personally for 15 months. Xuanzang spent five years at Nalanda, during which time he composed three religious treatises in Sanskrit.

He also travelled to various parts of India, including Bengal, the Deccan Plateau in Central India, and both the Coromandel (eastern) and Malabar (western) coasts. In addition, he journeyed through the Indus River Valley.

King Harsha Hosts Xuanzang

However, a king named Kumara invited Xuanzang to visit him in Assam, in northeastern India, an offer he could not refuse. This in turn led King Kumara’s rival King Harsha ( 590-647 AD), India’s greatest ruler of the early medieval era, to make an invitation of his own.

At Harsha’s court in 642 AD, Xuanzang greatly impressed a gathering of several thousand kings and wise men, winning arguments with Hindu and Jain theologians. Pleased, Harsha showered him with gifts, but Xuanzang accepted only a buffalo-skin coat to keep him warm and dry, and an elephant to transport the many books he had brought with him. Finally, in 643 AD, he set off for China.

Given the fact that he had left China illegally, Xuanzang sent a letter to the Emperor, announcing his return. Eight months later, he received a welcoming reply. As it turned out, Emperor Kao Tsu had been ousted by his son T’ai Tsung (626-649 AD ), who was a Buddhist and eager to meet Xuanzang. The latter arrived at his capital in Ch’ang in early in 645, and the crowd that came out to greet him was so large that at first he could not enter the city.

Rousing Reception In China

He met with the Emperor, and briefed him on all the lands he had visited. Emperor T’ai Tsung offered him a position as his personal advisor, but Xuanzang declined. So the Emperor set him up at the nearby Hung-fu Monastery with a fleet of assistants to help him in his translation work. The only stipulation was that Xuanzang should write a record of his travels, “Ta T’ang Hsi-yü-chi”” or “The Great T’ang Record of Travels to the Western Lands,” which he completed in 646 AD.

Xuanzang’s translation work continued under the reign of Emperor Kao Tsung (649-683 AD ). In 19 years, he produced 76 books. When the great monk died in 664 AD, it was said that a million people attended his funeral. In later years he became a legend.

His translations, commentaries, and those of his close followers make up a quarter of Buddhist literature in Chinese. And the contact he had initiated with India led to close ties between the T’ang dynasty and India


About P. K. Balachandran

P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.

View all posts by P. K. Balachandran →

Living Through Polycrisis: Mental Health In Myanmar – Analysis

June 7, 2026 
Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre
By Jeslyn

Myanmar is facing a severe and often hidden mental health crisis, shaped by ongoing conflict and systemic disruption. This article examines the key drivers, impacts, and current responses to mental health challenges within the country’s polycrisis context.
Key Takeawys:Myanmar’s mental health crisis is driven by conflict and systemic limitations, creating both visible and invisible burdens.
Community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible short-term solutions.
Long-term progress depends on political stability and sustained system strengthening.

Political unrest has severe effects on population health, particularly increasing the mental health burden. People living in conflict settings commonly experienceanxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts. Evidence from Afghanistan and Ukraine also shows high levels of PTSD and depression in conflict settings.


In Myanmar, the ongoing conflict has led to a sharp rise in mental health problems. Depression and anxiety increased from 14.3% and 22.2% in mid-2021 to 61.39% and 58.02% by October, and by late 2022, one in four people experienced moderately severe to severe depression. Therefore, mental health remains a severe and often hidden public health crisis.

Mental Health in Myanmar’s Polycrisis Context

Mental health is not regarded as a priority due to competing needs, as families struggle to survive in a context of multiple overlapping crises. In 2021, a military coup overthrew the elected government, triggering widespread anti-coup protests across Myanmar. These peaceful demonstrations were met with violence, human rights violations, and attacks on civilians. Many people were killed, arrested, or displaced, and repression later expanded beyond protesters, with journalists being killed or detained. Women have also faced sexual violence, causing lasting psychological trauma. Forced conscription of adults aged 18 and above into frontline conflict pushed many young people to flee abroad or move to urban areas. At the same time, three in four Myanmar youths are no longer engaged in education or training due to unsafe learning environments, unaffordable educational costs, and limited scholarship opportunities, particularly among low- and middle-income families. As a result, many youths, who are essential to the country’s future resilience and recovery, face growing distress and anxiety over an uncertain future.

Ongoing conflict has displaced thousands of families, leaving them without adequate shelter or basic services, while also causing family separation. At the same time, the targeting of social service providers and the withdrawal of government workers under the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) have significantly weakened essential public services, including healthcare. Many CDM workers face arrests, torture, and threats against their families. Some are forced to move between safe houses for safety. In addition, the military regime has restricted passport issuance for CDM workers and increased questioning and detention at airports to prevent them from leaving the country. Without documentation and under constant risk of arrest or imprisonment, many CDM members continue to live in fear, insecurity, and anxiety.

Since the coup, inflation has risen to 28.58%, while the poverty rate reached 32.10%, leaving nearly one-third of the population in poverty. Agricultural productivity has declined by 16%, and around 15 million people are at risk of food insecurity. Meanwhile, the cost of essential goods and unemployment have both increased significantly. Salaries, however, have remained largely unchanged, making even daily commuting a financial burden. Many can no longer afford basic leisure or personal items. Some are forced to skip meals or reduce spending. Under such conditions, survival takes priority over mental health care, which costs between $7 and $12 per session.

Stigma is another major barrier. Mental health problems are often viewed as a source of shame, linked to evil spirits or karma, reflecting a limited understanding. Seeking professional care remains highly stigmatized, making people reluctant to access services. Many fear burdening others, hospitalization, or discussing their condition. As a result, individuals often endure problems silently and hide their condition, leading to underestimation of mental health needs.


The lack of adequate mental health care further worsens the situation. There is a major imbalance between professionals, facilities, and patients, especially between urban and rural areas. Only 1.4% of government health spending is allocated to mental health, and although the National Mental Health Policy (2021–2025) was approved, its implementation has stalled due to political unrest and limited resources. Consequently, stigma, low awareness, and limited access to care continue to deteriorate mental health outcomes.

At the same time, Myanmar citizens face additional crises such as COVID-19, cyclones, and earthquakes, causing loss of loved ones, livelihoods, and housing, creating compounded trauma. When these crises overlap, their impacts intensify, making recovery extremely difficult. Weak disaster governance and poor preparedness further worsen these impacts.

As a result, many Myanmar people are carrying invisible wounds. Rising priceshave made simple activities unaffordable for many. Rising crime and worsening public transport have increased insecurity. Safety concerns also extend online, as user data has been handed over to the military. Daily life is further disrupted by power cuts, fuel shortages, and strict refuelling limits, while travel restrictionsand detentions limit mobility. Anxiety has become a daily reality, driven by insecurity, forced conscription, limited opportunities, and uncertainty about the future.

The Hidden Costs of Mental Health Crisis

The psychological impact of the Myanmar polycrisis does not end with ceasefire agreements. It may contribute to trans-generational trauma, shaping families and communities. For example, people born in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide have experienced trauma passed down over time. Children are especially vulnerable, as violence and displacement impair development and learning. In some cases, trauma may alter gene expression, increasing the risk of future mental health problems and creating cycles of inherited distress.

Mental health issues not only affect a person’s mind but also their physical health. They can lead to alcohol and substance abuse, as well as other coping behaviors, and in severe cases, suicide. Anxiety and chronic stress can significantly reduce work productivity and income, while also placing emotional and economic burdens on families. High out-of-pocket healthcare costs further strainhouseholds. Over time, it contributes to reduced human capacity and increased pressure on the country’s overall economic and social systems.
Current Responses and Limitations

The institutional infrastructure, regulation, and oversight of mental health services in Myanmar remain limited, with a significant imbalance between care providers and patients. Individuals with severe mental distress require professional support at higher levels of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) care pyramid. Due to system neglect, cultural beliefs, and stigma, many rely on traditional approaches such as support from Buddhist monks, religious practices, or meditation. Online community groups also provide peer support. While useful for daily coping, these methods are not sufficient for severe conditions.

Mobile psychiatric clinics offer free services through periodic community visits, but this may increase workload and burnout among providers. Earlier efforts to integrate mental health into primary healthcare were also not fully implemented. The parallel government, NUG, prioritizes mental health by offering free telemental health services and awareness campaigns. However, the lack of in-person care limits support for frontline and on-ground individuals, especially those who have lost family members or suffered severe injuries, requiring intensive emotional support. For instance, some civilians have survived junta airstrike while losing family members. Such experiences leave survivors with severe trauma while caring for remaining family members with little or no access to mental health support.

NGOs and international organisations, such as UNFPA, also contribute through online platforms and training programs. At the same time, there has been a rise in short-term training courses, many lacking regulation and proper standards. Some individuals with minimal training offer services, raising safety and quality concerns. While approaches like Psychological First Aid are useful, they should be part of a broader system with proper training and supervision. More structured, evidence-based counselling programmes are needed.

Comments and Way Forward

Given the current polycrisis, community-based and digital approaches are the most feasible in the short term. However, long-term improvement requires a coordinated approach that includes policy reform, workforce strengthening, awareness, and integration into primary healthcare. Political stability is also critical due to its direct and indirect impacts on mental health systems and overall well-being. At the primary care level, clear guidelines and better training are required. Community volunteers can provide basic psychosocial support locally. Reducing stigma is critical. Community-based outreach, culturally appropriate education, and engagement with local and religious leaders are essential. Digital campaigns can reach wider populations. Mental health information should also be provided in multiple ethnic languages to reflect Myanmar’s diversity.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s mental health crisis is deeply shaped by the current polycrisis, making it widespread and complex. While existing responses provide some relief, they remain insufficient for long-term needs. Addressing this crisis requires coordinated efforts, along with improved political stability, to strengthen systems, reduce stigma, and expand access to care.

About the author: Dr. Jeslyn is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc). She holds a Master of Public Health and has experience in research analysis, remote healthcare services, and community outreach programs.

Source: This article was published by The Sabai


About Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

The Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is a hybrid think tank (non-partisan) and consultancy firm that advances sustainable governance, policy innovation, and sustainability literacy in Myanmar. Through its Sustainability Lab, SRIc conducts in-depth public policy research and analysis to promote sustainable development and guide Myanmar toward a more resilient, equitable, and environmentally conscious future. SRIc provides strategic policy advocacy, CSR consultation, and the development of sustainability roadmaps grounded in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. These services support public institutions and private sector actors in aligning their operations with the Sustainable Development Goals. By integrating rigorous research with actionable consultancy, SRIc supports responsible business practices, fosters innovative CSR strategies, and designs impactful sustainability pathways. SRIc contributes to local transformation & global sustainability efforts through this dual approach.

View all posts by Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre →

 

South Korea election victory marred by ongoing ballot crisis

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By IntelliNews June 8, 2026

The ruling Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) scored a sweeping victory across local administrations in recent elections, but missed out on the ultimate capital prize, while the conservative opposition salvaged a critical political lifeline. At the same time, an unprecedented administrative failure by election authorities left thousands of voters without ballots, triggering violent street demonstrations and allegations of systematic electoral fraud, The Korea Herald reports.

This dramatic split vote on the southern half of the Korean peninsula points to a highly volatile regional landscape. While the DPK now controls the vast majority of provincial governments nationwide, its absolute failure to breach the capital proves it lacks an uncontested national mandate. More critically, the National Election Commission’s administrative blunders have completely destroyed public confidence in South Korea’s democratic architecture at a moment when hyper-polarisation is running at record levels.

The DPK captured 12 out of 16 mayoral and gubernatorial races across the country, the National Election Commission (NEC) announced on June 4. The main opposition People Power Party (PPP) retained only four jurisdictions, clinging firmly to its core southeastern heartlands of Daegu, North Gyeongsang Province, and South Gyeongsang Province, along with the capital city, Seoul. The outcome reverses the trends of the 2022 local elections when the DPK won a mere five of 17 metropolitan and provincial seats. Despite building a massive national footprint in this cycle, senior liberal officials voiced immediate anger over the loss of Seoul. The defeat in the capital is a serious blow because the DPK went into the mosst recent poll carrying a comfortable double-digit lead across major independent opinion surveys, while President Lee Jae Myung maintained a rock-solid personal approval rating of 60%.

According to The Korea Herald, PPP candidate Oh Se-hoon bypassed DPK challenger Chong Won-o to secure an unprecedented fifth term as Seoul mayor. Chong was personally selected and heavily backed by President Lee. DPK Chair Rep. Jung Chung-rae stated during a press briefing that whilst he felt deep gratitude to the electorate for giving the party a sweeping victory across the country, it was incredibly painful that they failed to reclaim Seoul. Former DPK leader Song Young-gil expressed almost identical levels of frustration during a radio interview with MBC, noting that the party’s central campaign strategy failed to convert the administration’s massive popularity into a victory in the capital.

Logistical failures trigger institutional crisis

According to Chosun Biz, however, electoral politics immediately shifted to raw institutional panic as extensive ballot shortages halted voting. The NEC admitted it had miscalculated voter turnout and under-printed paper ballots for the election. Polling stations in the affluent, conservative-leaning district of Songpa-gu ran out of forms after receiving supplies covering only 50% of registered local voters.The deficit froze voting at 14 stations in Seoul and 17 sites nationwide. The administrative failure forced officials to stretch voting hours until 10:00 pm at disrupted stations, though hundreds of angry citizens walked away without voting.

The failure sparked an instant institutional crisis leading into the weekend as a crowd of 1,200 protesters launched an overnight siege at the central NEC headquarters in Gwacheon, Gyeonggi Province, Chosun Biz reports. Demonstrators blocked the exits, physically trapping employees inside the building and shoved staff who attempted to leave. The political fallout worsened by the hour, with PPP Floor Leader Rep. Song Eon-seog demanding a parliamentary probe and a special counsel investigation. Simultaneously, a conservative activist group filed a formal criminal complaint against NEC Chair Roh Tae-ak and Secretary-General Heo Cheol-hoon for dereliction of duty, and the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency opened a full criminal investigation.

The DPK hit back at the opposition's outrage, when DPK Secretary General Rep. Jo Seoung-lae remarked that the PPP screamed for a total suspension of the vote count and a re-run when it expected a heavy defeat, but completely buried those demands the moment the mayoral numbers turned in its favour. The standoff remains highly volatile in Jamsil-dong, Seoul, on June 8, where furious crowds numbering up to 8,000 physically blocked the transit of two remaining ballot boxes holding 2,000 uncounted votes. While these ballots are not enough to threaten the 53,000-vote lead held by Oh Se-hoon, the city election commission cannot legally certify the mayoral outcome until every single box is processed, leaving the governance of South Korea’s capital up in the air.

ASEAN’s Shifting Views On China And The United States – Analysis

June 8, 2026 
By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

For the second consecutive year, ASEAN stakeholders prefer China over the United States as a strategic partner, driven by China’s dominant economic presence, infrastructure investments, and growing trust. U.S. standing has eroded due to policy unpredictability under the Trump administration, climate withdrawal, and declining reliability as a partner.

For the second time, China has edged out the United States as ASEAN’s preferred partner, a trend that hints at the shifting sands in how Southeast Asian stakeholders view the two great powers. According to the annual State of Southeast Asia Survey Report by Singapore’s Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Yusof Ishak Institute, published on April 7, (52%) of respondents said they would align with Beijing over Washington (48%) if forced to choose. A review of the key risks identified by respondents helps explain this evolving take on the U.S.-China contest for regional influence.From pg. 51 of 80 of 2026 ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute State of Southeast Asia Survey
Leveraging economics to become a favored strategic partner

In this year’s survey, China kept its position as ASEAN’s most influential economic (55.9%) and political-strategic (40%) partner. Beijing also emerged as the partner with greatest strategic relevance (9.1 out of 11), followed by Washington (8.6). In forecasting ties with major powers, more ASEAN respondents had high expectations for improved relations with China over the next three years (55.6%) than with the U.S. (32.8%). The economic part is easy to explain. China has been ASEAN’s largest trade partner for 16 consecutive years since 2009. Since 2019, ASEAN has also become China’s top trade partner, reinforcing economic linkages between the two sides. The upgrading of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement last year to cover digital and green economy and supply chain connectivity is bound to deepen this economic interdependence.

From pg. 42 of 80 of 2026 ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute State of Southeast Asia Survey

ASEAN countries and China are also part of the world’s largest free trade area, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. RCEP, which entered into force in 2022 and will be due for a general review next year, is looking to elevate its standards and expand. Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Chile, and Bangladesh seek membership in the trade bloc. China also applied to join other regional trade pacts in which several ASEAN countries are already members, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam) and the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (Singapore). Survey respondents ranked ASEAN as a leader in championing global free trade (25.5%), followed by China (21.3%). In sharp contrast, the US prefers bilateral trade deals and employs tariffs to pressure trade partners to negotiate. The poll ranked the U.S. a distant fourth (14.8%) after the European Union (19.2%) in promoting trade liberalization.

Furthermore, compared to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which is now in its 13th year and has already delivered concrete projects like the Laos-China railway, Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway, and Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, among others, U.S. alternatives like the Blue Dot Network or the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework have yet to make their presence felt in the region. New Chinese pitches, such as the Global Development Initiative, also received unanimous support from ASEAN, given China’s success in poverty alleviation and in achieving many United Nations Sustainable Development Goals ahead of the 2030 schedule.


China is a major force in deepening regional connectivity through cross-border railways, highways, ports, grid, and digital infrastructure. It supports the transition to green energy and industrial upgrading of its ASEAN neighbors. The Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is one of the financiers of Laos’ Monsoon Wind Farm, Southeast Asia’s largest, which began commercial operations last year and now transmits clean energy to Vietnam. State-owned PowerChina led the construction with wind turbines supplied by Shanghai-based Envision Energy. China plays a big part in the rise of Laos as the region’s battery, exporting renewable energy to its neighbors, and a land link connecting mainland ASEAN to China. It powered Indonesia’s shift from a raw nickel ore exporter to a critical mineral processor. Beijing was also quick to dispatch relief and financial assistance to ASEAN countries visited by calamities from the earthquake in Myanmar to typhoons in the Philippines and Vietnam last year. Chinese carmakers are ramping up production of electric vehicles (EVs) and batteries in Southeast Asia, pushing the region’s shift to modern green transport

Beyond economics, China is also active in mediating conflicts, pursuing sustained shuttle diplomacy to defuse the Cambodia-Thailand border clash last year. Trilateral foreign minister meetings were held in Anning (August 14) and Yuxi (December 29), both in Yunnan province, in 2025. Complementing these official meetings, China Foreign Affairs University hosted the first trilateral Track 2 dialogue on February 10 this year in Beijing.
Policy reversals and unpredictability undermine appeal

ASEAN respondents identify climate change and extreme weather events (60.0%) as the region’s top challenge this year. Economic competition between major powers ranks only second (51.7%). The U.S. exit from the Paris Climate Agreement, introduction of incentives for oil and gas expansion, while terminating subsidies on EVs, dented its role in global climate change conversations. Curtailment of humanitarian and development aid further diminished the U.S.’ profile. Meanwhile, China’s massive new energy capacity, robust portfolio of overseas projects in renewables and EV and battery production, and increasing climate change aid, especially to Global South countries, enhance Beijing’s position.


ASEAN elites also identify US leadership under President Donald Trump (51.9%) as the top geopolitical concern. It scored higher than global scam operations (51.4%) and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea (48.2%). This is a reverse order of 2025, when maritime tensions ranked first. To view the U.S. as a source of geopolitical risk is a turning point. It undermines Washington’s position as a defender of the so-called “rules-based order.” The capture and trial of a sitting leader of a sovereign country, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, and oil blockade of neighboring Cuba generated unease among ASEAN countries. The use of force or threats to use force to effect “regime change” is disturbing, as it may set precedent for rival powers or other countries at odds with their neighbor. The destruction in Gaza and U.S. failure to rein in its ally Israel also fueled resentment in Muslim-majority ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. Designs over the territory (Greenland) of a fellow NATO ally (Denmark) also raised concerns over the U.S. treatment of allies and friends.

Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to have the upper hand over China when it comes to trust. But the ISEAS survey made some interesting insights. First, while ASEAN respondents have more trust in America (44%) than China (39.8%), trust in the latter has increased from last year (36.6%), while the former’s number declined (from 47.2%). Second, distrust of both powers has also become comparable – the U.S. got 35%, while China got 34.5%. Third, for the first time since the survey was conducted in 2019, more respondents have expressed trust (39.8%) than distrust (34.5%) of Beijing. Finally, while the survey cited the same factors to explain trust and distrust of the two competing powers, the differences in the numbers could be telling. ASEAN respondents see China as having more vast economic resources and a strong political will to provide global leadership (47.8%) than the US (32.5%).

That said, respondents also shared greater concern over Beijing’s use of economic and military power to threaten an ASEAN country’s interests and sovereignty (43.8%) than that of Washington (35%). It goes without saying that with greater power comes greater responsibility, restraint, and reassurance. Of the things China should do to improve relations with ASEAN, the resolution of territorial and maritime disputes peacefully in accordance with international law ranks highest (35.1%). This is followed by a desire to see Beijing respect the sovereignty and not constrain the foreign policy choices of its Southeast Asian neighbors (25.5%).

Indeed, parsing the survey results offers clues about Southeast Asia’s thinking, giving powers keen to influence the region a chance to adjust and recalibrate. 

This article was published at China-US Focus

About Lucio Blanco Pitlo III

Lucio Blanco Pitlo III is a Research Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Pathways to Progress Foundation. He was a lecturer at the Chinese Studies Program at the Ateneo de Manila University and the International Studies Department at the De La Salle University and contributing editor (Reviews) for the journal Asian Politics & Policy. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies. He obtained his Master of Laws from Peking University and is presently pursuing his MA International Affairs at American University in Washington D.C.

View all posts by Lucio Blanco Pitlo III →

China’s Economy And The World Order – OpEd

June 7, 2026 

By Simon Hutagalung

China’s economy is a global force. It is a means of projecting power, of insulating against vulnerability, of shaping global norms. It is more than a simple growth model; it is a tool of statecraft that is strengthening China’s national power and changing the international balance of power. It is a manifestation of the political authority of the Communist Party of China, of the country’s system of economic management, and of its growing engagement with the rest of the world.

At its core, China’s economic system is that of a Communist Party at the apex of power. The Party controls the strategic resources and the core sectors of the economy. The National Development and Reform Commission and the Five-Year Plans represent the focal point for economic planning and the promotion of technology, and for the integration of economic management and national security. While since the 1970s the state has been introducing market elements and has allowed foreign capital in order to foster competition, the leeway granted to markets and to foreign elements is always strictly controlled by the state and remains subordinate to the Party.

Domestically, China is operating under a so-called dual-track-structure. The energy sector, telecommunications, finance as well as the defence sector are dominated by state-owned enterprises. But there are also private companies, which drive innovation, employment and consumer spending. Yet growth by the private sector is being restricted by the state. The state-controlled banks allocate the credit within the framework of the priorities set by the government, thus fuelling local debt, property bubbles and shadow banking activities.

A reflection of these contradictions is the Party’s dual circulation strategy launched by Xi Jinping in autumn 2020. The aim is to reduce dependence on foreign markets and to promote foreign technology while at the same time strengthening domestic demand for Chinese products and services and promoting indigenous innovation. However, so far, only a limited rebalancing has taken place. In order to stimulate consumption, the government could introduce a comprehensive social security system, allow the housing market to develop more freely and grant more scope to private enterprises to grow. However, the Party would risk losing control if it were to implement these reforms.


On the international front, China seeks to extend the reach of its economic system by increasing engagement in trade and investment with countries and regions across the globe. It aims to tap into global markets for its goods and services, to attract foreign capital to fuel further growth and to develop a network of infrastructure across Asia, Africa and Europe through its New Silk Road/Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI can be seen as a key component of China’s pursuit of a greater role on the global stage. In addition to the financial advantages that the BRI could bring to countries along the routes, it also promises to open up new markets for Chinese firms, provide a destination for the surplus productive capacity that China’s state-owned enterprises have been unable to absorb within the country, and serve as a platform for China to project its hard and soft power to all corners of the globe. However, as with many countries along the routes, which are struggling with debt sustainability and the effective governance of large-scale BRI projects, resistance is also rising.

The Digital Silk Road will also help to establish China’s position in global telecommunications and information systems, through the spread of affordable and efficient telecommunications networks, as well as of surveillance systems and models of digital governance, which will allow the country to impose its own technology standards and models of political management on other parts of the world. While for developing countries the Digital Silk Road may be an attractive option due to financial benefits, for advanced countries it is perceived as a threat to their data security and as a means to gain strategic control over their key sectors. The rise of China therefore also challenges Western dominance in the sphere of 5G telecommunications and of artificial intelligence.


The global impact of China’s model of economic development is vast. China today is the world’s largest growth market, a leading manufacturer, and a major provider of financing for global infrastructure. Commodity prices are influenced by China’s demand. The country’s rise has created new challenges and sparked growing trade tensions and de-risking in developed countries. Supply chains for semiconductors and critical raw materials are being reorganised around China.

The model, however, also has several constraints. Demographic decline and its impact on productivity and fiscal sustainability will require significant adjustments. Several years of damage to the environment will require even more significant investments to reverse. The property sector has become a systemic vulnerability. Finally, export controls and investment screening measures currently in place in several countries are already restricting access to advanced technology and foreign capital for Chinese firms.

China’s economic system is a deliberate creation, a product of design and of ongoing effort. It is a system in which the state plays a commanding role, but in which markets and in some measure even private enterprise are also allowed to function. At home, the economy is shaped by strategic priorities; abroad, by a global strategy. Can China manage its vulnerabilities and sustain its system as a stabilising force in the world, or will it bring increased global tension instead?

The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.

References

Jain-Chandra, S., Kothari, S., Garcia-Macia, D., & Xu, Y. (2026, February 18). How China’s economy can pivot to consumption-led growth. International Monetary Fund.

Hill, F. (2026, April 3). Peril and possibility: Collapsing old order, emerging disorder, or new order? Brookings.


About Simon Hutagalung

Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.

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Inflation beating pay rises in Europe: Where are workers losing the most?

Copyright Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved

By Servet Yanatma

Published on 08/06/2026 - EURONEWS

As inflation surges across Europe following the recent Middle East conflict, advertised pay growth in the eurozone is failing to keep up, causing workers' real earnings and purchasing power to fall.

Prices are rising again across Europe, but pay is not keeping up.

Inflation in the EU reached 3.2% in April 2026, its highest level since January 2024, and Eurostat's flash estimates suggest prices continued to climb in May.

However, wage growth in salaries advertised in job postings across the eurozone are not keeping pace with inflation, according to Indeed. That means inflation is outpacing posted wage growth across Europe, weighing heavily on workers' purchasing power, with earnings buying less than before.

The latest inflationary pressures come after the EU experienced its biggest price shock in decades. Annual inflation surged to more than 11% in 2022, driven largely by soaring energy costs following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

So, how do inflation and posted wage growth compare across major European economies?

Middle East conflict: Inflation on the rise

It remained below 3% from early 2024 until recently. But a gradual upward trend has emerged since the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran and Tehran's response in late February 2026.

In January 2026, annual inflation in the EU stood at 2%. It rose sharply to 2.8% in March and 3.2% in April.

The post-pandemic inflation eroded workers' purchasing power across major European economies as consumer prices rose faster than wages. As of early 2026, cumulative real posted wages remained below pre-pandemic levels in Europe's five largest economies, according to Indeed.

With inflation rising following the recent conflict in the Middle East, wage growthin the eurozone fell below inflation in March 2026, with the gap widening further in April. This reversed a trend that had held since September 2023, when posted wage growth consistently outpaced inflation in the eurozone.

With annual consumer prices climbing to 3.0% in the eurozone in April, workers’ wages are no longer keeping up with cost-of-living increases, according to Indeed's wage tracker, which shows year-over-year growth in posted wages of just 2.3%.

In January 2026, posted wage growth stood at 2.4%, while annual inflation was just 1.7%, highlighting how quickly the picture has changed.

“Inflationary pressures from the global energy price shock have started to show in the European data, eroding real wage gains,” Aubrey Woessner, associate economist at the Indeed Hiring Lab, said.

Why is the UK bucking the trend?

Inflation and posted wage growth vary across major European economies. The UK stands out with posted wage growth of 4% year-on-year, well above its inflation rate of 2.8%.

“But even so, real wage growth is stalling. The slip in real purchasing power will weigh on demand in the coming months, adding to other headwinds facing the economy,” Woessner noted.

Pawel Adrjan, director of economic research at Indeed, emphasised that the UK still has a real-wage cushion that much of the eurozone has already lost. UK inflation eased in April, helped by government measures to bring down energy bills, even as it rose across the continent.

“But the UK's real wage cushion is thinning fast. Growth in posted wages was 4.0% year on year in April, supported in part by a headline minimum wage rise of 4.1%, but this was the slowest rate in four years,” he told Euronews Business.

“Since hiring remains weak, recent real wage gains will erode quickly if the Iran conflict keeps oil and gas prices high.”

The UK is not alone. As of April 2026, posted wage growth also exceeded inflation in Germany and Ireland, although the margin was much narrower. In Germany, posted wage growth stood at 3.2% compared with inflation of 2.9%. In Ireland, the gap was even tighter, with posted wages growing by 3.7% compared with inflation of 3.6%.

Italy and France: The hardest hit for workers

Italy and France appear to be the hardest hit countries for workers. While posted wage growth in France has remained stable at 1.1% throughout 2026, inflation climbed from 0.4% in January to 2.5% in April.

Workers are also losing ground in Italy. Posted wage growth has been below 0.8% since mid-2025, while inflation has consistently outpaced it over the past year. The gap deepened further this year as inflation reached 2.8% in April.

While monthly trends offer useful insights, cumulative real wage growth over recent years provides a fuller picture.

Bessent Backs 3% Deficit Goal Despite 5% Budget Forecasts

File photo of US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Photo Credit: @SecScottBessent, X


June 7, 2026 
The Center Square
By Brett Rowland

(The Center Square) – U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pledged in two congressional hearings this week to cut the federal deficit to 3% of GDP, a target the government’s own budget projections do not currently support.

Bessent repeated the goal before both the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and Means Committee, telling lawmakers the administration could achieve “something with a three in front of it” by the end of President Donald Trump’s term.

The administration’s fiscal 2027 budget, however, projects deficits above 5% of GDP through 2029.

The Congressional Budget Office projected in February that the federal deficit will reach $1.9 trillion, or 5.8% of GDP, in fiscal year 2026 – and will not fall below 5.6% of GDP at any point over the next decade. Debt held by the public reached 101% of GDP, the highest level since World War II. Bessent told the House committee the deficit had fallen to 5.5% of GDP, a figure that Treasury has not publicly reconciled with CBO’s 5.8% projection for fiscal year 2026. Treasury did not respond to questions about the basis for Bessent’s 5.5% figure.

The federal government is projected to spend more than $1 trillion on interest payments alone in fiscal year 2026, more than all discretionary defense spending. By 2036, CBO projects annual interest costs will reach $2.1 trillion, approaching the total projected cost of all discretionary federal spending that year.

Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, said in a May 6 statement that $2 trillion deficits have become routine.

“Two trillion dollar deficits used to be unheard of, and then they only occurred during major recessions,” MacGuineas said. “It’s beyond scary that $2 trillion deficits are now the norm.”

A $2 trillion deficit, she noted, amounts to more than 6% of GDP – about double the 3% target Bessent has endorsed.

Despite those projections, a bipartisan group of House members has backed H.Res. 981, a nonbinding resolution that would set a congressional goal of reducing the deficit to 3% of GDP by 2030. The resolution has 20 cosponsors, evenly split between Republicans and Democrats, but has remained in committee without action since its introduction in January.

Rep. Lloyd Smucker, R-Pa., one of the resolution’s original cosponsors, raised it directly during Thursday’s House hearing, telling Bessent the measure has bipartisan support. Bessent has publicly endorsed the resolution and told the committee he left a career in finance partly out of concern about the nation’s debt trajectory.

H.Res. 981 was introduced Jan. 7 by Rep. Bill Huizenga, R-Mich., and Rep. Scott Peters, D-Calif., co-chairs of the Bipartisan Fiscal Forum, a House caucus focused on deficit reduction, along with Smucker and Rep. Mike Quigley, D-Ill. The resolution has been referred to three House committees – Budget, Ways and Means, and Rules – without further action.

The federal government has not recorded a budget surplus since 2001, and the deficit has exceeded 3% of GDP every year since 2015, according to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

Adding to the fiscal pressure, the Social Security trust fund that pays retirement and survivors benefits is projected to be exhausted in 2032 – one year earlier than previously projected – at which point benefits would fall by an average of 28% without congressional action, according to the Congressional Budget Office’s February 2026 budget outlook.

Researchers at the Penn Wharton Budget Model have estimated the United States has roughly 20 years to change course before the national debt approaches the outer limits of what financial markets can absorb.

“As soon as capital markets start believing that Congress will never get its act together, things unravel immediately,” Kent Smetters, faculty director of the Penn Wharton Budget Model, told The Center Square.

About The Center Square

The Center Square was launched in May 2019 to fulfill the need for high-quality statehouse and statewide news across the United States. The focus of their work is state- and local-level government and economic reporting.

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Imperial War Comes Home: Iran, Fuel Prices, And The Crisis Inside The U.S. Core – OpEd

June 7, 2026 
By Michael Harrison


The United States has long treated war as something that happens elsewhere. Bombs fall in West Asia, sanctions starve economies in the Global South, fleets patrol distant waters, and Washington calls it “security.” But imperialism never remains external forever. It returns to the imperial core in distorted forms: inflation, public debt, militarized politics, decaying infrastructure, and the slow erosion of everyday life for ordinary people.

The war with Iran is revealing this contradiction with unusual clarity. It is not only a military confrontation. It is not only a geopolitical struggle over West Asia. It is also a domestic economic crisis for the United States, expressed most visibly through fuel prices.

The gas pump has become one of the most honest political instruments in America. It shows what official language tries to hide: imperial war is not cost-free. It is paid for by workers, commuters, small businesses, truck drivers, farmers, and families whose lives are already organized around precarity.

The material link is obvious. The U.S. Energy Information Administration describes the Strait of Hormuz as one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints. Before the current crisis, roughly one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption passed through this narrow corridor. When military conflict disrupts this route, the effect does not remain confined to the Gulf. It moves through tanker insurance, shipping delays, crude benchmarks, refinery margins, diesel markets, freight contracts, and finally into the price of food, transport, and basic goods.

This is the material geography of empire. Washington may speak in the language of freedom, deterrence, and order, but the world economy speaks in supply chains, chokepoints, commodities, and class power. The U.S. can dominate sea lanes militarily, but it cannot abolish the dependence of its own economy on the very global system it has built and policed.

That contradiction is now being felt inside the United States. According to the EIA’s Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, regular gasoline reached $4.475 per gallon in the week of May 25, 2026, while on-highway diesel stood at $5.523. Gasoline attacks household budgets directly. Diesel attacks them indirectly by raising the cost of moving nearly everything: food, construction materials, retail goods, farm products, medical supplies, and industrial inputs.

This is how imperial war becomes inflation.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the Consumer Price Index rose 3.8 percent over the twelve months ending in April 2026. Energy prices rose 17.9 percent over the year, while gasoline rose 28.4 percent. These figures are not simply “market data.” They are class data. They show the transfer of war costs downward onto those least able to absorb them.

For the wealthy, higher fuel prices are an inconvenience. For workers, they are discipline. They discipline movement by making commuting more expensive. They discipline consumption by forcing families to cut back elsewhere. They discipline labor by making people more dependent on jobs that may not pay enough to keep up with rising costs. A worker cannot negotiate with the gas pump. A parent cannot ask the landlord to reduce rent because imperial strategy made diesel more expensive.

This is why the official separation between “foreign policy” and “domestic economics” is false. A war in Iran becomes a grocery bill in Ohio. A naval confrontation in the Persian Gulf becomes a delivery surcharge in Arizona. A decision made in Washington becomes a missed medical appointment, a delayed car repair, or another balance carried on a credit card.

Economists describe this process through pass-through effects. Research from the Dallas Fed shows that unexpected oil price shocks move quickly into gasoline prices and then into broader inflation. The Federal Reserve has also warned that oil shocks can create second-round effects, spreading beyond energy into food, services, wages, expectations, and price-setting behavior.

But behind the technical language is a simple reality: imperialism raises the cost of life.

The U.S. ruling class presents military escalation as a way of securing order. In practice, it destabilizes both the targeted region and the society that pays for the intervention. The empire exports destruction, then imports inflation. It produces insecurity abroad and austerity at home.

Even a ceasefire would not immediately end the damage. Oil markets do not return to normal because politicians announce a pause. Tanker routes must reopen. Insurance premiums must fall. Inventories must be rebuilt. Refining capacity must recover. Traders must believe the next escalation is not imminent. Until then, the war premium remains embedded in fuel prices.


The EIA’s Short-Term Energy Outlook has already warned that global oil inventories are falling sharply and that Brent prices are expected to remain elevated in the near term. The International Energy Agency has similarly noted the strain on inventories and refining margins caused by disruptions to Gulf energy flows. This means that even if the shooting slows, the economic consequences will continue.

Here the deeper problem appears. The United States is not simply suffering from an accidental energy shock. It is suffering from the contradictions of the imperial mode of living itself. The American economy depends on cheap energy, global logistics, military dominance, and unequal access to the resources and labor of the world system. Yet the military machinery used to preserve that arrangement increasingly destabilizes the conditions that make it possible.

This is not a temporary policy mistake. It is structural. Imperialism creates a world economy in which the core depends on the controlled vulnerability of the periphery. But when the periphery resists, when strategic regions become ungovernable, when sanctions, blockades, and wars disrupt the flow of commodities, the core discovers that its own comfort was never independent. It was always built on coercion.

The war with Iran exposes this dependency. Washington may imagine itself as the manager of global energy security, but its own population is now paying for the insecurity its policies produced. The same empire that claims to protect oil routes has helped make fuel unaffordable for many of its own people.

This does not mean the American working class is the primary victim of U.S. imperialism. It is not. The greatest violence is still inflicted on the peoples of West Asia and the Global South, who endure sanctions, military threats, assassinations, occupation, and economic strangulation. But the domestic consequences matter because they reveal that imperialism does not even provide real security to the population in whose name it acts. It offers only a declining bargain: tolerate war abroad, accept higher costs at home, and call it national interest.

That bargain is collapsing.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that in April 2026, disposable personal income fell while personal consumption expenditures rose, and the personal saving rate dropped to 2.6 percent. This is not strength. It is exhaustion. People are still spending because survival requires spending, but they are doing so with fewer reserves and more debt.

This is the domestic face of imperial crisis: a population told it lives at the center of the world, while its daily life becomes more fragile, more expensive, and more insecure.

The anti-imperialist lesson is clear. The fight against war cannot be separated from the fight against the political economy that produces war. The fuel shock is not merely a consumer problem. It is a symptom of a system that organizes the world around extraction, military domination, and unequal exchange, then demands that ordinary people pay when that system breaks down.

Diplomacy and de-escalation are not acts of weakness. They are the minimum conditions for preventing further social damage. But a deeper answer requires more than a ceasefire. It requires confronting the imperial structure that turns entire regions into battlefields and then turns the consequences into household expenses.

The war with Iran has come home to America. Not as victory. Not as security. Not as order.

It has come home as inflation, fuel shock, declining savings, and a higher price for ordinary life. And in that return, it has exposed the truth Washington fears most: empire is not stability. Empire is crisis, moving through the world until it reaches its own center.


About Michael Harrison

Michael Harrison is an independent writer focusing on politics, history, and global affairs. His work offers a critical perspective that goes beyond headlines, exploring the deeper forces shaping international events and public discourse. He can be reached on X at @M_Harrison93

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