Critical Minerals In The Global Economy: Demand Drivers And Uzbekistan’s Position In The Supply Chain – Analysis

July 8, 2026 
By Dr. Ikboljon Kasimov and Ikhtiyorkhon Jabborov

Key Takeaways

Rising Global Demand — Critical minerals like copper, rare earths, gallium, and germanium are essential for EVs, renewable energy, and AI, driving structural demand growth and supply security concerns amid China’s dominance in processing.

Uzbekistan’s Export Growth — Critical mineral exports rose ~33% from $6.85B in 2020 to $9.13B in 2024, led by gold and copper, positioning Uzbekistan as an emerging supplier amid global diversification efforts.

Need for Value Addition — Most exports remain raw or low-processed materials; expanding domestic refining (e.g., Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex model) and securing technology transfers are key to capturing higher value in global chains.

Introduction

Critical and strategic minerals, including copper, rare earth elements, gallium, germanium, tungsten, nickel, and other technology-related metals, have assumed a position in industrial policy comparable to that once occupied by oil and gold. This shift reflects the convergence of three major transformations: transport electrification, renewable energy expansion, and the rapid growth of artificial intelligence, all of which depend on a relatively narrow range of mineral inputs (Bloomberg, 2026). As demand continues to accelerate, concerns regarding supply security and processing concentration have intensified, increasing the strategic importance of countries that control extraction and refining capacity. This article examines the principal drivers of global demand for critical and strategic minerals and evaluates Uzbekistan’s export performance, its role in international supply chains, and opportunities to increase domestic value addition.

Structural Demand Drivers

A mineral is generally classified as critical when it is both economically essential and vulnerable to supply disruption. Such vulnerability typically arises when extraction or refining activities are concentrated in a limited number of countries and commercially viable substitutes are unavailable. The addition of copper to the United States critical-minerals list in 2025 demonstrates how rapidly strategic assessments are evolving in response to technological and industrial change. Electric vehicles and renewable energy technologies are currently the most established drivers of mineral demand. According to Elements (2022), an electric vehicle requires approximately six times more mineral inputs than a conventional internal-combustion vehicle, while an onshore wind turbine requires roughly nine times more mineral resources than a comparable gas-fired power facility. These technologies depend heavily on copper, rare earth elements, nickel, and other strategic minerals that support electrification and energy storage systems.

Artificial intelligence has emerged as an additional and rapidly expanding source of demand. The construction of hyperscale data centers requires significant quantities of copper for power transmission, cooling systems, and digital infrastructure. Advanced semiconductors further depend on materials such as gallium and germanium. According to S&P Global (2026), global copper demand is projected to increase from approximately 28 million metric tons in 2025 to more than 42 million metric tons by 2040, with digital infrastructure and AI-related investments becoming increasingly important contributors. At the same time, global supply remains highly concentrated. China dominates the processing of rare earth elements and maintains a leading position in the production and refining of several strategic minerals. Recent export restrictions have highlighted the geopolitical risks associated with concentrated supply chains and have encouraged major economies to pursue diversification strategies. As a result, countries with commercially viable mineral reserves and stable investment environments are becoming increasingly important participants in global supply networks.


These developments create significant opportunities for resource-rich economies such as Uzbekistan. Growing demand, combined with international efforts to diversify sourcing arrangements, provides favorable conditions for expanding mineral exports and increasing participation in higher-value segments of global supply chains.

Uzbekistan’s Export Profile and Contribution to Global Supply Chains

Uzbekistan possesses an established mining sector. The Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex, founded in 1949, remains the country’s sole copper producer, while the state-owned Navoi Mining and Metallurgical Complex ranks among the largest gold producers globally. Uzbekistan’s copper reserves rank eleventh worldwide, and the government has identified thirty-two critical minerals with commercial potential.

Figure 1. Uzbekistan’s critical mineral export value, 2020–2024 (USD million). Source: Developed by the author based on data from Stat.uz

Export data indicate that Uzbekistan’s critical and strategic mineral exports increased from approximately USD 6.85 billion in 2020 to USD 9.13 billion in 2024, representing growth of roughly 33 percent over the five-year period (Figure 1). Export revenues fluctuated moderately during 2021 and 2022 before increasing sharply in 2023, when total exports reached nearly USD 9.63 billion. Although export earnings declined slightly in 2024, they remained substantially above earlier levels, underscoring the growing importance of mineral commodities in Uzbekistan’s export structure. The export profile is highly concentrated in a small number of mineral categories. Gold consistently accounts for the largest share of export revenues, followed by copper. Aluminum, zinc, and nickel contribute comparatively smaller shares but remain strategically relevant for industrial diversification and participation in emerging technology-related value chains.

Category	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Five-Year Change
Gold	$ 5 950,20	$ 4 526,67	$ 4 312,44	$ 8 334,56	$ 7 751,59	30%
Copper	$ 729,08	$ 1 170,86	$ 1 107,78	$ 1 106,24	$ 1 194,04	64%
Nickel	$ 1,55	$ 1,38	$ 0,63	$ 1,21	$ 1,59	2%
Aluminum	$ 21,90	$ 53,32	$ 54,47	$ 44,77	$ 66,93	206%
Zinc	$ 149,11	$ 198,64	$ 239,73	$ 147,20	$ 115,37	-23%

Table 1. Uzbekistan’s exports by mineral category, five-year change, in millions. Source: Stat.uz

The composition of mineral exports reveals differing growth trajectories across commodity groups. Gold exports increased by approximately 30 percent between 2020 and 2024, reaching USD 7.75 billion and maintaining their position as the dominant source of mineral-export earnings (Table 1). Although export revenues fluctuated throughout the period, gold continues to play a central role in supporting foreign-exchange earnings and macroeconomic stability.

Copper exports increased by approximately 64 percent over the same period, rising from USD 729 million to nearly USD 1.2 billion. Given copper’s importance in renewable energy systems, electric vehicles, electricity networks, and artificial intelligence infrastructure, this trend positions Uzbekistan well to benefit from long-term structural demand growth. Among the remaining categories, aluminum demonstrated the strongest growth, expanding by more than 200 percent between 2020 and 2024. Although its overall contribution remains modest compared with gold and copper, this performance suggests increasing opportunities in industrial and technology-oriented supply chains. Nickel exports remained relatively stable, while zinc exports declined by approximately 23 percent, making zinc the only major category in the sample to record a sustained contraction during the review period.

Overall, Uzbekistan’s contribution to global mineral supply chains remains modest compared with leading producers such as Chile, Australia, and China. Nevertheless, growing international efforts to diversify supply sources have increased the strategic importance of emerging producers. Uzbekistan’s geological diversity, geographic position, and expanding international partnerships provide a strong foundation for strengthening its role within global critical and strategic mineral markets.

Increasing Value-Added Output

A significant proportion of Uzbekistan’s current exports consists of raw ore, concentrate, or unrefined bullion rather than the refined or battery-grade materials that capture the greatest value within these supply chains. The 2024 establishment of the Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex, intended to build a complete processing chain from raw material to finished product for tungsten and molybdenum, represents a substantive step toward addressing this gap. Extending this model to copper, alongside planned production of selenium, tellurium, and rhenium, constitutes a logical next phase. Investment in battery- and semiconductor-grade refining, rather than extraction capacity alone, is likely to yield the greatest increase in captured value, as this stage of the chain generates the highest margins.

Uzbekistan’s engagement with multiple partners, including a February 2026 critical minerals memorandum with the United States, participation in the FORGE (Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement) initiative, and interest from Azerbaijan’s AzerGold, provides leverage to negotiate technology transfer alongside capital (CFR 2026; Times of Central Asia 2026). Concurrent investment in domestic technical capacity, including metallurgical training and planned research infrastructure in Chirchik, is a necessary complement, as extraction rights alone do not confer the capacity to process materials domestically.

Constraints merit acknowledgment: refining infrastructure requires substantial capital and extended timelines; water and environmental considerations are significant given existing scarcity; and managing simultaneous interest from the United States, the European Union, and China will require policy discipline.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

Global demand for critical minerals is being driven by transport electrification, renewable energy deployment, and the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure, alongside a pronounced effort by major economies to reduce dependence on concentrated sources of supply. This combination presents a favorable environment for a mineral-rich, geologically diverse producer such as Uzbekistan to secure advantageous terms for capital and technology. The data examined indicate measurable growth, though concentrated in a limited number of commodities and weighted toward unprocessed materials. Whether Uzbekistan converts current agreements into refining capacity and higher-value finished products will determine whether it secures a durable position within global supply chains, rather than remaining a supplier of raw material.

Based on the analysis above, refining capacity should take priority over further extraction expansion, since export value remains concentrated in raw ore, concentrate, and bullion rather than higher-margin processed materials. The Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex’s concentrate-to-finished-product model, already applied to tungsten and molybdenum, should be extended to copper and to the planned selenium, tellurium, and rhenium lines. Lithium and platinum group metals warrant targeted investment, as both declined in export value over 2020–2024 despite being the categories global buyers most want diversified. Technology transfer should be negotiated across the existing U.S. memorandum, the FORGE initiative, and AzerGold engagement, while also evaluating technical cooperation with Chinese refiners on commercial merit, given China’s processing expertise. This requires parallel investment in metallurgical training and the Chirchik research infrastructure, without which extraction rights alone will not build domestic processing capacity. Water-resource and environmental planning should be built into project design from the outset, given Uzbekistan’s existing scarcity constraints, to avoid delays as agreements move to construction

References

Bloomberg (2026). Critical Minerals: The Core of the Modern Economy. Available at: https://sponsored.bloomberg.com/immersive/globalx/charting-disruption/critical-minerals

China Briefing. (2025). China’s Rare Earth Elements Dominance in Global Supply Chains. Available at: https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinas-rare-earth-elements-dominance-in-global-supply-chains/

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2026). U.S. Allies Aim to Break China’s Critical Minerals Dominance. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/articles/u-s-allies-aim-to-break-chinas-critical-minerals-dominance

Elements. (2022). EVs vs. Gas Vehicles: What Are Cars Made Out Of? Available at: https://elements.visualcapitalist.com/evs-vs-gas-vehicles-what-are-cars-made-out-of/

Grand View Research. (2025). Electric Vehicle Battery Market Size, Share & Trends Analysis. Available at: https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/global-electric-vehicle-battery-market

McKinsey & Company. (2025). Amped-Up Battery Demand. Available at: https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/week-in-charts/amped-up-battery-demand

S&P Global. (2026). Copper in the Age of AI. Available at: https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/special-reports/copper-in-the-age-of-ai

Statistical Agency under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Stat.uz). (2025).

 Foreign Trade Statistics and Mineral Export Data. Available at: https://stat.uz

Times of Central Asia. (2026). Azerbaijan Moves into Uzbekistan’s Gold and Critical Minerals Sector. Available at: https://timesca.com/azerbaijan-moves-into-uzbekistans-gold-and-critical-minerals-sector/

U.S. International Trade Administration (ITA). (2026). Uzbekistan Mining and Quarrying Sectors. Available at: https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/uzbekistan-mining-and-quarrying-sectors

World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). (2026). Uzbekistan Trade Profile. Available at: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/UZB

About the authors:

Dr. Ikboljon Kasimov – Assoc. Professor of Business and Economics at the Graduate School of Business and Entrepreneurship

Mr. Ikhtiyorkhon Jabborov – Chief Specialist, Research and Grants Department at the Graduate School of Business and Entrepreneurship

About Dr. Ikboljon Kasimov

Dr. Ikboljon Kasimov is an economist specializing in foreign trade and investment, structural transformation, business and entrepreneurship, and sustainable development in developing countries, with a particular focus on transition economies. He has led and contributed to research on the impact of FDI on economic growth and energy intensity, export diversification, and the search for new prospective markets for Uzbekistan’s goods and services. Dr. Kasimov actively engages with policymakers, providing evidence-based input on trade, investment, and sustainable development strategies
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About Ikhtiyorkhon Jabborov

Ikhtiyorkhon Jabborov – Chief Specialist, Research and Grants Department at the Graduate School of Business and Entrepreneurship
View all posts by Ikhtiyorkhon Jabborov →

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan And The End Of Europe’s Industrial Illusion: Why Germany Is The Ultimate Test Case – OpEd

July 8, 2026 
By Najmidin Qarluq

Key Takeaways

Strategic Shift in China’s Approach — Beijing’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) is not just an economic blueprint but a deliberate strategy to create permanent dependencies, lock Europe into negative trade balances, and outpace the EU’s de-risking efforts through supply-chain dominance.

Germany as the Critical Test Case — As Europe’s industrial heart, Germany’s reluctance to confront China on human rights (especially Uyghur forced labor) and its heavy economic exposure make Berlin’s policy a litmus test for whether the EU can implement meaningful de-risking or remain strategically vulnerable.

Urgent Actions Needed — Europe must move beyond rhetoric by setting measurable de-risking benchmarks, addressing forced labor in supply chains, scrutinizing outbound investment, and coordinating security policy (including with NATO) before China’s plan solidifies its advantages.

For years, the European debate on China has been framed mainly in economic terms: market access, export opportunities, industrial policy, and supply-chain resilience. These remain important, but they no longer capture the full nature of the challenge. The imminent rollout of China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) demands a fundamental shift in how Europe understands its relationship with Beijing. This new plan is not merely an ambitious economic roadmap; it is an asymmetric trap designed to outpace Europe’s fragile de-risking strategy before it can even be fully implemented.

Currently, much of the European response treats the 15th Five-Year Plan as a green technology challenge or a competitive blueprint. This is a profound miscalculation. The plan is a comprehensive strategy for structural coercion. By relentlessly consolidating its dominance in critical supply chains, Beijing aims to build a sanction-proof industrial ecosystem. It seeks to permanently lock European supply chains into an authoritarian dependency and an irreversible negative trade balance.

To understand the gravity of this impending reality, one need only look at Germany. Germany’s China policy is no longer only a German question. Because Germany remains Europe’s industrial core, its approach to China will help determine whether the European Union’s de-risking agenda becomes a serious strategy or remains a diplomatic formula.

In reality, Berlin has largely set aside its foundational values for the sake of sheer commercial interests in China. While smaller European nations with historical memory, such as the Czech Republic and Lithuania (and earlier, parliaments like Belgium and the UK), have had the courage to formally recognize China’s policies against the Uyghurs as genocide or crimes against humanity, Berlin remains terrified of even bringing the issue to the negotiating table. Symbolically speaking, Germany’s approach has effectively been to “continue making money among the dead.” The scale of this relationship explains Germany’s caution—but it also exposes why hesitation in Berlin is a strategic liability for Europe.

The Industrial Paradox

German industry now faces a paradox. For decades, China was treated as a source of growth for German manufacturers. Today, it has become a source of direct, state-backed competition. In sectors such as electric vehicles, chemicals, and advanced machinery, Chinese firms are no longer only customers or suppliers. They are increasingly rivals, empowered by the very industrial policies the 15th Five-Year Plan seeks to perfect.


The automotive sector illustrates this shift. China remains central to the strategy of German carmakers, but the market is no longer the relatively predictable source of growth it once appeared to be. Volkswagen, for example, has been forced to lower its 2030 China sales targets and reduce its expected operating margins amid aggressive competition from Chinese domestic champions. What began as access to a large market has increasingly become exposure to a state-supported competitor.

Human Rights as Strategic Exposure

The Uyghur issue makes the political nature of this challenge impossible to ignore. Extensive evidence has documented mass detention, coercive birth control, forced labour, and pervasive surveillance in Xinjiang. Democratic parliaments worldwide have rightly identified these actions as constituting genocide and severe crimes against humanity.

Germany’s caution is often explained in economic terms: fear of retaliation and the exposure of large industrial groups to the Chinese market. But this is no longer only a moral question. It is becoming a regulatory and strategic question for the European Union. The EU Forced Labour Regulation will ban products made with forced labour from the EU market starting December 14, 2027. Forced labour concerns cannot be treated as separate from economic strategy; they are foundational to Europe’s legal, commercial, and security framework.

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan relies heavily on the continuous exploitation of the Uyghur region—not only for natural resources but as a testing ground for digital surveillance and forced industrial labour. If Germany treats Uyghur forced labour as a reputational issue rather than a structural risk, it will fall perilously behind the direction in which EU policy is already moving.

A Systemic Challenge and the Closing Window

The deeper issue is systemic. China’s model combines industrial policy, digital surveillance, party control, and economic coercion in ways that differ fundamentally from Europe’s liberal-democratic order. To move from hesitation to coherence, Europe—led by a strategic shift in Germany—must take immediate, irreversible action in three areas:

First, it must make de-risking measurable. Supply-chain diversification should not remain a slogan. Europe must identify critical dependencies in sectors such as batteries, pharmaceuticals, advanced manufacturing, and publish clear, legally binding benchmarks for reducing exposure.

Second, it must systematically dismantle monopoly policies. Europe must rigorously examine the hidden clauses within China’s 15th Five-Year Plan that directly impact the EU-China trade balance, particularly the monopolistic practices embedded in Beijing’s rare earth (and critical minerals) policies, and take necessary defensive countermeasures.

Third, it must synchronise its security strategy. Outbound investment screening should focus aggressively on areas where European capital could strengthen Beijing’s surveillance technologies or military-civil fusion. This economic security posture must be closely coordinated within the NATO framework.

The EU must achieve greater unity and address the systemic sluggishness and vulnerability in its policy-making. It must close every loophole exploited by a Chinese state apparatus that has internalized the “Thirty-Six Stratagems” as the inseparable foundation of its strategic culture. If Berlin and Brussels can translate de-risking into credible industrial, financial, and human rights policy before the 15th Five-Year Plan solidifies Beijing’s systemic advantages, the EU will remain strong. If they cannot, Europe’s China strategy will remain fragmented, and its most powerful economies will become its most serious strategic weak points. The window for independent action is closing fast.


About Najmidin Qarluq
Najmidin Qarluq is a Brussels-based writer, policy analyst, and Principal Analyst at the EU Risk Analysis Institute. Drawing from his background as a former political prisoner, he specializes in EU-China relations, geopolitical risk, and the defense of open societies and Enlightenment values.
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Robert Reich: Stop Private Equity From Profiting While Our Communities Burn – OpEd

July 8, 2026 
By Robert Reich

Key Takeaways

Private Equity is Inflating Costs for Fire Departments — Firms are buying up essential suppliers like emergency software, radios, fire truck engines, and flame retardants, then sharply raising prices.Volunteer Fire Departments are Hit Hardest — Making up 85% of U.S. fire departments and operating on tight budgets, many face massive price hikes — such as software costs jumping from $795 to $5,000 per year.

Public Safety Must Come Before Private Equity Profits — States should block private equity ownership of critical services, and Congress should close the carried interest tax loophole that benefits these firms.

Private equity firms are buying up all sorts of things that fire departments rely on — and jacking up their prices.

This is particularly harmful to volunteer fire departments, which make up about 85 percent of fire departments in the country and operate on shoestring budgets.

Even modest price increases on software can limit a fire department’s ability to protect the public. One Connecticut volunteer fire department reported that after a private equity firm bought the software platform it used to track emergencies, the yearly price skyrocketed from $795 to $5,000.


Private equity is also buying up companies that produce emergency radios, fire truck engines, and flame retardant chemicals.

By now we should all know that when private equity gets involved, prices go up and quality goes down — whether it’s housing or healthcare or even local newspapers.

Private equity managers get rich as they plunder vital industries and then take advantage of the carried interest loophole, which lets them pay a lower tax rate by classifying their incomes as investments.

Fire departments all over America are now facing higher costs, which makes it harder for them to replace aging equipment, train firefighters, and provide emergency services. Some firefighters even report going out on calls in fire engines with faulty brakes.

Can you imagine?

And even if they can afford new equipment, they have to wait longer for it. Sometimes years for a fire truck.

Let me ask you, honestly: Are private equity profits really more important than public safety?

States can and should prohibit private equity firms from sinking their teeth into vital public goods and services.

Oregon, for example, just passed the nation’s strictest law blocking private equity firms from controlling healthcare practices.

And Congress must follow through on eliminating the carried interest tax loophole that lets private equity managers get away with paying less in taxes.

We must not let private equity firms cash in while our communities burn.

This article was published at Robert Reich’s Substack


About Robert Reich
Robert B. Reichis Chancellor's Professor of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley and Senior Fellow at the Blum Center for Developing Economies, and writes atrobertreich.substack.com. Reich served as Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, for which Time Magazine named him one of the ten most effective cabinet secretaries of the twentieth century. He has written fifteen books, including the best sellers "Aftershock", "The Work of Nations," and"Beyond Outrage," and, his most recent, "The Common Good," which is available in bookstores now. He is also a founding editor of the American Prospect magazine, chairman of Common Cause, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and co-creator of the award-winning documentary, "Inequality For All." He's co-creator of the Netflix original documentary "Saving Capitalism," which is streaming now.
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Demagogue Stunt: Nigel Farage’s By-Election Gambit – OpEd

July 8, 2026 
By Binoy Kampmark

Key Takeaways

Farage’s Anti-Establishment Image is Cracking — Revelations about undeclared funding from a convicted criminal aide and a billionaire donor expose the gap between his populist rhetoric and personal dealings.

Undeclared Gifts Raise Serious Standards Questions — Farage faces parliamentary scrutiny for failing to register large donations for security and expenses, despite rules requiring transparency for gifts over £300.

By-Election Becomes a Vanity Project — Farage calls on Clacton voters to judge him and stick two fingers up at the establishment, while other parties dismiss it as a gimmick and plan to stand aside.

Nigel Farage is not a picture of happiness. As Britain’s version of Trumpism (only a version, never a facsimile), the leader of Reform UK had been flying high in the polls. But his themes are starting to tire: the anti-establishment figure who so happens to be profiting from it; the martyr who always falls just short of the sword; the erratic, even cranky bully who aims volcanic fury at media reports he doesn’t like.

A report from The Sunday Times was certainly one such example he did not take a shine to. According to the paper, George Cottrell, a long-time aristocratic aide and convicted criminal, provided funding to Reform UK covering various expenses, including private security, staffing for social media boosting and plush accommodation. These were not declared to parliamentary authorities. Cottrell’s copybook was somewhat blotted by an eight-month stretch in a US prison on wire fraud charges, not that it made much of a difference to Reform operators. (It could have been worse, given his agreement to launder drug money in an undercover FBI sting operation.) As Rob Lownie quipped in Unherd, “In a party with little fondness for strictures, Reform UK insiders maintain that there is one rule: ‘Don’t ask what Posh George does.’”

The Cottrell connection says much about Farage as populist manqué, one who heaps bile upon the powers that be only to cavort and revel with them. Posh George, suggests the political editor of The Independent, David Maddox, has the potential of cursing the Reform leader’s bid for prime ministerial honours. Maddox overeggs the pudding, but he offers that stern Pauline warning that people are judged by the company they keep. Think of Labour’s Keir Starmer and his insensible decision to allow Peter Mandelson (another creature of the “fix-it” school), friend of the late convicted paedophile Jeffrey Epstein, to become UK ambassador to Washington. Or the Conservative Boris Johnson’s dotty promotion of the insufferable Chris Pincher (“Pincher by name, pincher by nature”) to deputy chief whip.


To this can be added an April 2024 gift of £5 million from the cryptocurrency investor and billionaire donor Christopher Harborne, that great exemplar of Britishness who prefers to express his flagged patriotism from the distant climes of Thailand. Harborne’s generosity did not go unnoticed. Since May, Farage has been under investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards for failing to declare Harborne’s gift.

According to the parliamentary rule book, members, subject to various qualifications, must register “any gifts, benefits or hospitality with a value of over £300 which they receive from a UK source.” Multiple benefits from the same source over the value of £300 in a calendar year must also be registered. An exemption does exist for those gifts and benefits deemed “purely personal”. On becoming an MP, Farage registered a trip to Belgium donated by Cottrell to the value of £9,253, and a subsequent £15,276 donation for a US domestic flight in December 2024. After that, nothing appears. Farage further argues that the gift from Harborne was “unconditional” and would go to costs incurred for personal security. The argument here is that it was also given in a personal capacity, thereby exempting it from declaration.

What, then, does a hassled demagogue do in such a situation? For the MP for Clacton, the choice was simple, largely because it was made for him. (The outcome inquiry by Daniel Greenberg, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, could well have forced the issue.) The “people of Clacton,” Farage suggested in a live video statement, “should be the judges of my actions”. Here was a chance to “stick two fingers up at the entire establishment”. Public money had not been misused; no law had been broken.

Such gestures, to be invested with meaning, need fellow participants. And the other parties of British politics have made noises that they will not be fielding candidates in Farage’s forced by-election. The Liberal Democrat leader Ed Davey has suggested that all parties “stand aside” rather than involve themselves in “Farage’s vanity project”. The Tory leader, Kemi Badenoch, thought the exercise a “gimmick” designed to “distract people from what is happening”.


In such a situation, only suitable levels of disgust and disapproval will prevent Farage’s re-election. Reform voters have become fairly used to seeing their man of the long moment derided and mocked for not abiding by the rules. The party’s economic spokesperson, Robert Jenrick, gives some sense to this by claiming that the link with Cottrell was a “very old story that has been dredged up”. Besides, as Donald Trump’s electoral fortunes demonstrate, the iconoclastic rulebreaker who so happens to accuse everybody else for not following the rules is the very sort of record that can get you elected. That said, it is hard to shake off the feeling that being an elected MP is simply not something Farage is particularly fond of. He has always preferred to do things from outside the tent of representation, repeatedly failing to win a seat in the House of Commons, yet consistently present in British politics. Returning him to Westminster, and continuing investigations, may be exactly the sort of punishment he deserves.


About Binoy Kampmark
Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com
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East Shield: Poland’s Role In Defending NATO’s Eastern Border – Analysis

July 8, 2026 
 Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute
By Jakub Romaniuk

Key Takeaways

Poland’s Major Defense Investment — Poland is leading European security efforts with the East Shield project — a multi-billion PLN initiative (2024–2028) to fortify its border with Russia and Belarus through barriers, shelters, logistics centers, and advanced anti-drone systems.

Broad International Cooperation — The project involves close collaboration with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, the UK, and especially Germany (Bundeswehr engineers), and is integrated into EU defense plans (SAFE program) and NATO’s eastern flank strategy.

Strong US Role — The United States supports the project through technology (e.g., Ultimate Building Machines for rapid infrastructure and contributions to the SAN anti-drone system) and high-level visits, while discussions advance toward a permanent US military base in Poland.

Analysis

(FPRI) — Back in February 2025, when US Vice President JD Vance announced at the Munich Security Conference that US assistance would be scaled back and called on Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security, many European leaders reacted with consternation and outrage. The shock was short-lived, and Europe immediately took action. As early as March of that same year, the European Commission unveiled a massive plan called “ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030,” which was intended to serve as the foundation for further joint European efforts aimed at improving the Old Continent’s defense capabilities and boosting Europe’s competitiveness in the defense industry. At the same time, an informal race began for the role of Europe’s new security leader and a valuable partner for the United States. Poland was among the countries that, from the very first days following the Munich Conference, demonstrated initiative in advancing further European security discussions and increased investment in its own defense capabilities. Such action was inevitable for a country bordering Ukraine—which had been attacked by Russia—and which was a potential next target of President Vladimir Putin’s aggression.

That is why Poland has risen to the top of the ranking of countries allocating the largest share of their budget to defense—in line with the 5 percent of GDP targeted by President Donald Trump, Poland reached 4.3 percent as early as 2025 (though the target was 4.7 percent), and in 2026, it currently stands at 4.8 percent. In fact, the proposal adopted at the NATO Summit in The Hague in 2025—committing member states to allocate 5 percent of GDP to defense by 2035—originated in Poland. This approach has not gone unnoticed by the US administration, which today points to Poland as one of its key and reliable partners in the field of defense. Allocating such a large portion of the budget to defense has led to an increase in the size of the army, its modernization, and the launch of several projects crucial not only to Poland’s security but also to the entire eastern flank of NATO—such as East Shield, SAN, PIAST (construction of a satellite constellation), and the Wisła Program (the procurement and integration of the Patriot systems). The implementation of the East Shield program—a flagship initiative for Polish security—entered its decisive phase in 2026. The project, valued at 10 billion PLN ($2.7 billion), is also intended to be one of the key elements of NATO’s eastern border defense. What are the project’s objectives, will it also help other countries in the region, and what is the role of the United States?

About the East Shield

On May 18, 2024, during the celebrations in Kraków marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Battle of Monte Cassino, Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced investments in fortifications and an air defense system known as the National Security Plan East Shield to strengthen the border with Russia and Belarus, and a satellite component—financed by the European Investment Bank. East Shield is a program planned for 2024–2028 aimed at strengthening Poland’s resilience to attacks and hybrid warfare; it is a key investment in Polish and European security. Importantly, this is not a project intended to supplement the existing barrier on the border with Belarus, which is designed to combat illegal migration—the East Shield will serve solely to deter potential aggressors, limit their mobility, and protect soldiers and civilians in the event of an attack. It is also an innovative component—implemented on an unprecedented scale—of the broad transformation currently underway within the Polish Armed Forces. As part of the program, fortifications will be built and natural terrain barriers (e.g., swamps, slopes, and forests) will be utilized and reinforced. In addition, plans call for the construction of shelters, logistics centers, material warehouses, fortification elements, and a drone detection and tracking system that will operate using thermal imaging, radar, and electronic surveillance. The project involves not only fortifying the border zone but also preparing areas in the border region and supporting facilities up to 50 km from the border.

The Armed Forces are primarily responsible for the development and construction of the project, with a particular focus on the engineering corps; however, due to its complexity, this is an inter-ministerial project that also involves local governments, the Government Agency for Strategic Reserves, and other entities. The East Shield is being built primarily on land owned by the state and local governments. The plan calls for program components to be procured from Polish manufacturers, which is intended to further strengthen the domestic market, and some of the new infrastructure—such as roads and bridges—is designed to be dual-use and serve residents in peacetime. However, this is not only a national project; it also has international significance, as it will contribute to the joint defense of the eastern flank of the European Union and NATO. Poland is consulting with Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland on sharing experiences and combining efforts to protect the borders.


Construction of the first elements of the East Shield began in late October 2024. By the end of 2025, 60 km of the border had been secured (including 10 km of physical barriers), though most of the work to date has been devoted to completing all necessary formalities and preparing for further processes. In addition, 17 border crossings have been secured. 2026 is a pivotal year for the project, during which another 200 km (including 20 km of physical barriers) of the border is to be secured and the anti-drone system is to be expanded.

European Defense

Poland has submitted 26 (out of a total of over 100) projects related to the East Shield, with a total value of €10 billion, under the European SAFE program, which is part of the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan. Poland was the first EU country to sign an agreement on the SAFE program. The first 15 percent advance payment of €6.5 billion—out of approximately €43.7 billion allocated to Poland (for comparison, Poland’s defense budget for 2026 is approximately €47 billion)—has already been disbursed to Polish defense contractors. The results are already visible. At the end of May, the first contracts worth over 1.4 billion PLN (€330 million) were signed. SAFE will be used to finance, among other things, the Jarzębina-S guided munitions systems—a key component of the East Shield—as well as TM anti-tank mines and ISM cassettes for Baobab-K mine-laying vehicles. Advanced Protection Systems (APS), a private company specializing in anti-drone systems, also has reason to be satisfied, as it will serve as a key subcontractor for the air defense system under the major SAN anti-drone contract, which includes supplies for the implementation of the East Shield program. The SAN system, Europe’s largest and most advanced anti-drone solution, is part of the East Shield and an important addition to the country’s multi-layered, integrated air and missile defense system. It is partially funded by EU SAFE funds. The total value of the program is estimated at approximately 15 billion PLN (€3.5 billion).


The project also involves close international cooperation. In addition to Poland’s already committed neighbors—Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland—discussions are underway with the United Kingdom and Germany, which are also expected to assist in the implementation of the East Shield. A sister project to the Polish one is the joint intergovernmental project of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—the Baltic Defence Line. An agreement on its implementation was signed by the defense ministers of these three Baltic countries in Riga in 2024. Its goal is to strengthen the eastern flank, including protection against incursions by troops from Russia and Belarus. The Baltic Defence Line is to be linked in the future with Poland’s East Shield. Since 2025, both programs have been formally incorporated into the European Union’s defense strategy and treated as a single, cohesive system.

The United Kingdom’s contribution consists primarily of technological support and advice from military engineers and sappers. Cooperation with Poland’s western neighbors, however, is becoming much closer. Since April this year, several dozen Bundeswehr soldiers have been stationed in Poland to assist in the construction of the East Shield. Their mission will consist mainly of engineering tasks, including the construction of anti-tank barriers, and the German soldiers will remain in Poland until the end of 2027. The signing of a new agreement on defense cooperation on the 35th anniversary of the Good-Neighborliness Treaty also confirms the growing rapprochement between Warsaw and Berlin on security issues. On June 17 in Warsaw, the Polish and German defense ministers, Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz and Boris Pistorius, signed a new agreement replacing the previous one from 2011. Although Germany was even prepared to enter into a broader agreement providing for security guarantees, Poland opted for a less ambitious solution to avoid a political dispute at home. As Kosiniak-Kamysz said, “The agreement paves the way for new areas of cooperation: in the fields of cybersecurity, shared responsibility, joint command in the Baltic Sea, new technologies—particularly space operations (…), military mobility, and the development of infrastructure to support this mobility between our countries.”

The Role of the United States

In a project so crucial to the security of NATO’s eastern flank, US involvement naturally could not be overlooked. More specifically, this refers to the Ultimate Building Machine (UBM) system for the rapid construction of infrastructure facilities, which can produce shelters, warehouses, and hangars in a very short time. In mid-January 2025, an agreement was signed with the American company M.I.C. Industries for the purchase of UBM machines, which are to be part of the East Shield. Another key element of Polish-American cooperation on this project is the US involvement in the creation of Europe’s largest anti-drone system (the SAN system), as part of which Poland will install up to 700 modern radars along its borders with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine.

This May, a special visit was paid by a US delegation led by Thomas G. DiNanno, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, during which he and Deputy Minister Cezary Tomczyk inspected and monitored progress on one of the sections of the East Shield. “The East Shield, together with the Baltic Defence Line, is becoming the foundation of security for Poland, the European Union, and NATO as a whole,” emphasized Tomczyk. DiNanno highlighted the importance of trans-Atlantic cooperation and joint efforts to ensure border security: “The work being done here is an example of the kind of partnership we want to continue developing in the future.” An agreement on a permanent US military presence in Poland is also drawing closer—following a positive response from US authorities, the government in Warsaw adopted a resolution on June 16 launching the formal process of establishing a permanent US military base in Poland. This is an important issue for Poland because, aside from strengthening its security, it is possibly the only topic that could reconcile the president’s administration and the government, which are currently at odds (even if, on this issue as well, there is an ongoing competition over which side deserves more credit).

About the author: Jakub Romaniuk is a Non-Resident Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and Programme Director at the Foundation Institute for Eastern Studies.

Source: This article was published by FPRI


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The Constitutional Test Of Montenegro’s European Future – Analysis

July 8, 2026 
By IFIMES

Key Takeaways

Constitutional Amendments Are a Critical Test — The upcoming vote (requiring a two-thirds majority) on judicial and rule-of-law reforms is the final hurdle to close Chapter 23 and a major litmus test for Montenegro’s EU accession path.

European Integration Legitimises the Government — Prime Minister Spajić’s administration stakes its credibility on being the frontrunner for EU membership, with Montenegro close to closing 19 of 33 chapters and receiving a €3.2 billion post-accession package.

Success Depends on Cross-Party Consensus — Failure to secure opposition support risks stalling reforms, undermining EU progress, and deepening political divisions ahead of the 2027 elections. Broad agreement is essential to demonstrate democratic maturity.

Analysis

Montenegro is entering one of the most politically sensitive phases since it restored independence in 2006. The forthcoming vote on constitutional amendments, which requires a two-thirds majority in Parliament, goes beyond the technical scope of reform and has become a critical test of political actors’ capacity to keep the country on its European course.

The planned amendments seek to strengthen and more precisely define the judicial system, including the composition and election of the Judicial Council, the functioning of the Constitutional Court and the election of its judges, the status of the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office and the procedure for electing the Supreme State Prosecutor, as well as the alignment of the constitutional framework with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

These reforms are the final condition for closing Chapter 23 (Judiciary and fundamental rights), one of the central and most demanding areas of Montenegro’s accession negotiations with the European Union. The outcome of the vote will therefore carry significance beyond domestic politics and will be scrutinised closely in Brussels and other European capitals. Parliamentary deliberation on constitutional amendments and the accompanying rule-of-law reforms can thus be viewed as a political litmus test of Montenegro’s European prospects, as it will directly determine the pace of the final stage of the accession process.

European integration as the cornerstone of the government’s political legitimacy

Prime Minister Milojko Spajić’s government (Europe Now Movement, PES) derives much of its political legitimacy from the claim that Montenegro has emerged as the most successful candidate for EU membership, with the potential to become the next member state as early as 2028.

This strategy means that European integration is not merely a foreign policy goal, but also the main means by which the government legitimises its authority domestically. Should the proposed constitutional amendments fail to pass, that narrative could be seriously undermined.

At the same time, the European Union is increasingly signalling that it regards Montenegro as the most likely candidate for the next round of enlargement. The Council of the European Union’s Working Party on Enlargement has considered draft common positions for the provisional closure of three additional negotiating chapters – Chapter 8 (Competition policy), Chapter 14 (Transport policy) and Chapter 29 (Customs union). If confirmed at the next Intergovernmental Conference, Montenegro would have provisionally closed 19 out of 33 negotiating chapters, further consolidating its status as the front-runner among EU candidate countries. This indicates that Brussels recognises the reform progress made, but also that the completion of the process now depends primarily on political decisions taken in Podgorica.

The opposition caught between principle and political risk

On the other hand, the opposition, led by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), the European Alliance and Civic Movement URA, is seeking to frame the constitutional amendments within the broader context of strengthening democratic institutions and restoring political dialogue after months of institutional crisis. This approach is intended to underline that European integration cannot be separated from the functioning of the political system, but depends directly on its stability and capacity for compromise.

Public perceptions of the opposition’s role in this process could carry serious political repercussions, especially if it is seen as having contributed to a potential reform blockage. Meanwhile, European partners have consistently insisted on consensus as the essential prerequisite for reform in the judiciary, the rule of law and constitutional order, with the capacity to reach political agreement viewed as a crucial indicator of democratic maturity.

The experience of countries that have successfully completed accession negotiations, such as Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria, shows that sustainable progress was possible only when supported by a broad political consensus that rose above party divisions and short-term interests. This pattern suggests that crucial reform decisions in the European integration process required a high degree of political coordination and shared responsibility.


Should a two-thirds majority fail to materialise, the opposition may further entrench its position that major decisions cannot be taken without its involvement. Any slowdown in the European process would nevertheless remain a shared responsibility of all political actors, since in the final stage of negotiations the success of integration depends upon the collective capacity of the political elite to reach a durable agreement.
Time constraints and European pressure as a political challenge

Managing the European integration process effectively requires long-term planning, timely consultations and ongoing communication among all relevant political actors. Postponing crucial reforms until the final deadlines increases the risk of institutional deadlock and points to a lack of coordination within the reform framework.

Against this backdrop, the inter-party meeting in Montenegro, facilitated by the EU Delegation in Podgorica, can be seen as an attempt to revive political dialogue between the government and the opposition amid an accelerated European agenda and the need for decisions requiring a qualified majority. The agreement reached suggests that political actors are aware that constitutional amendments, security sector reforms and key judicial appointments are all inextricably linked components of institutional stability and the continuity of the EU accession process.

The announced changes to the legislative framework governing internal affairs and national security, particularly those relating to security vetting and stronger judicial oversight of the National Security Agency (ANB), mark a step towards greater transparency and more robust civilian oversight, in line with the standards of Chapters 23 and 24.

The creation of a dedicated parliamentary committee to monitor the implementation of legislation further reinforces institutional control mechanisms and could help reduce political tensions through structured dialogue between the government and the opposition. The announced urgent election of Constitutional Court judges and an inclusive approach to pivotal parliamentary appointments also point to an effort to establish a minimum common framework for judicial reform, one of the central issues in European integration.

Securing an agreement between the government and the opposition confirms the political maturity required for Montenegro’s successful European path. However, the European Union measures progress not by the agreement itself, but by its translation into tangible reforms implemented primarily for the benefit of Montenegrin citizens. If the entire Parliament remains committed to European integration, there is every reason to expect success.

The EU has earmarked an exceptionally favourable financial package of 3.2 billion euros for Montenegro, exceeding the amount initially planned and providing a strong incentive to continue reforms. Nevertheless, preserving political consensus after a prolonged period of polarisation remains a challenge. It will be crucial to transform this willingness to engage in dialogue into a stable decision-making mechanism, particularly for matters requiring a two-thirds majority. Parliament Speaker Andrija Mandić (New Serb Democracy, NSD) has a notable role in this process: within his remit, he should encourage dialogue and help build consensus on key reforms. Its success will determine whether Montenegro can capitalise on the current political momentum in the final phase of its EU accession.


From the perspective of IFIMES, the agreement reached is an important, albeit initial, step towards building a sustainable political consensus on the European agenda. Its real value will depend on the willingness of political actors to preserve the continuity of dialogue and prevent new institutional deadlocks that could hinder the accession process.

The long-term stability of institutions can be built only through inclusive dialogue, mutual respect and shared responsibility for achieving Montenegro’s strategic goal: full membership of the European Union.

The regional significance of Montenegro’s accession process

Montenegro’s progress transcends its national borders, serving as a benchmark for all Western Balkan states within the European integration process. In this context, the recent EU–Western Balkans Summit in Tivat carries additional political weight, as it can be read as recognition of Montenegro’s role and of the diplomatic efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Ervin Ibrahimović (Bosniak Party, BS). At a time when enlargement policy once again ranks high on the European Union’s list of priorities, developments in Podgorica are becoming an important signal for the wider regional context.

At present, Montenegro stands out as the most likely candidate to take the next step towards European Union membership. The European Commission’s indicative financial package, valued at 3.2 billion euros for the post-accession period, further underscores the strategic commitment to planning for future membership, even though the final outcome remains contingent on the full fulfilment of reform criteria. This approach is further supported by public statements from senior European officials, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos, who have identified Montenegro as the most advanced candidate at this stage of the process.

In these circumstances, any stalling in reforms would have consequences extending far beyond domestic politics; it would inevitably impact the credibility of the European Union’s broader enlargement policy, particularly with regard to the Western Balkans.
Constitutional amendments as a test of political maturity and European consensus in Montenegro

The forthcoming vote on constitutional amendments goes beyond a mere technical adjustment to the country’s highest legal act and has become a political litmus test of Montenegro’s commitment to its strategic direction. Its outcome will show whether European integration is regarded as a shared national interest or as an arena for partisan rivalry.


A broad cross-party agreement on reforms would be a clear sign of the institutional and political maturity needed to enter the final stage of the accession process with the European Union. By contrast, a failure to reach consensus would risk slowing integration, deepening political divisions and triggering a new period of institutional instability, at a time when European momentum is stronger than at any point since accession negotiations began in 2012.

The International Institute IFIMES assesses that the capacity to reach compromise and cross-party agreement will be one of the defining indicators of Montenegro’s democratic maturity and its readiness to assume the obligations of European Union membership. European integration cannot be the project of a single political bloc; it requires broad consensus, institutional responsibility and a well-developed culture of dialogue. The European Union has made clear that the door to membership remains open, but that the key to completing the process lies in the hands of domestic actors. This is why the vote represents a test of the political system’s overall capacity to act in accordance with Montenegro’s long-term national and European interests.

Such a scenario could weaken the opposition’s political influence to some extent, despite its efforts to position itself as an indispensable actor in the strategic decision-making process. This could lead to a recalibration of the balance of power and a potential restructuring of political alliances in the run-up to the 2027 elections.

Meanwhile, all relevant political actors are already positioning themselves for the next round of elections at all levels, scheduled for June 2027, with every major decision increasingly seen through an electoral lens.

Political dynamics are thus already unfolding in the shadow of those elections, while whoever holds power afterwards will have a place in the “photograph for the history books” as Montenegro moves towards its possible, and increasingly likely, formal accession to the European Union as a full member.


About IFIMES

IFIMES – International Institute for Middle-East and Balkan studies, based in Ljubljana, Slovenia, has special consultative status with the Economic and Social Council ECOSOC/UN since 2018. IFIMES is also the publisher of the biannual international scientific journal European Perspectives. IFIMES gathers and selects various information and sources on key conflict areas in the world. The Institute analyses mutual relations among parties with an aim to promote the importance of reconciliation, early prevention/preventive diplomacy and disarmament/ confidence building measures in the regional or global conflict resolution of the existing conflicts and the role of preventive actions against new global disputes.
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