Thursday, March 12, 2026

Spain: PM Sánchez Evokes Iraq With ‘No To War’ Slogan

March 12, 2026 
EurActiv
By Inés Fernández-Pontes

(EurActiv) — Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez is using the US-Israel war in Iran to revive one of Spain’s most divisive political memories, and to force the conservative opposition into an uncomfortable debate about its past.

In a televised address last week, the prime minister made his position clear: “No to war”. The message has raised his international profile, casting him as Europe’s most outspoken critic of Donald Trump over the conflict.

Madrid has repeatedly argued that the war breaches international law. It has also blocked the USfrom using its joint military bases for the operation, prompting Trump to threaten sweeping trade retaliation against the country.

But Sánchez’s message is also primed for his electorate. “Twenty-three years ago, another decision dragged us into war in the Middle East,” he said in his address, arguing the 2003 invasion of Iraq made the world “more unstable and unsafe”.

At the time, Spain’s conservative government under prime minister José María Aznar strongly backed US President George W. Bush and joined the US-led coalition, eventually deploying more than 2,600 troops to the region.

Spain’s participation in the war proved deeply controversial at home, with around 90% of Spaniards opposed to the war. According to Ignacio Molina, a senior expert at the Elcano Royal Institute, the intervention triggered a fierce debate about its legitimacy as millions took to the streets in protest.

Spain had traditionally followed a similar diplomatic line to France and Germany. Both countries objected to the US intervention, deeming it “unjustified” and contrary to international law.

But Aznar’s strong alliance with Washington on Iraq turned into a political liability in the run-up to the 2004 election, when the centre-right was widely expected to secure a third consecutive term in power.

Despite the PP holding an absolute majority and leading in the polls, the socialist opposition led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero built his campaign around popular opposition to José María Aznar’s support for the war. “No to war” was a refrain at Zapatero rallies – one that Sánchez has taken up today.
The attack

On 11 March 2004, just three days before the vote, coordinated jihadist attacks attributed to Al-Qaeda struck Madrid’s rail network, killing nearly 200 people.

The public largely blamed the attacks on Aznar’s alliance with the US, though prominent expertsdispute a direct causal link. Zapatero was propelled to victory and immediately withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq.

The episode scarred the PP and “gave birth to the idea that supporting the US in interventionist adventures to change regimes… would not lead to anything good,” says Molina.

To this day, Aznar claims that Spanish forces were only deployed for humanitarian purposes, not combat. Yet opposition parties contest this assertion, highlighting that Spanish soldiers participated in high-risk operations, which led to the death of 11 personnel.
Old wounds

This episode has led PP leader Alberto Núñez Feijóo to be more cautious in commenting on the ongoing Iran war.


“The Iranian regime oppresses its own citizens, pursues nuclear weapons, finances terrorism and destabilises the region. No democrat can deny this reality… the fewer tyrants in the world, the better,” he said last week.

Feijóo stressed Spain “cannot stand alone” and must “preserve” its relations with the US, despite “disagreements” with Trump. “We all want to stop the war, and we all want peace,” he said, while at the same time affirming that international law must be respected.

Still, socialists continue to link Feijóo to Aznar and Spain’s support for the Iraq war.

With Spain entering a regional election cycle, the political gains from this confrontation are clear. Sánchez has already taken the “no to war” message to a rally in Castilla y León, which votes on Sunday, accusing the right of hypocrisy for backing the Iran strikes.

“Those who dragged us into a war in 2003… against Spanish public opinion, are once again supporting the war in Iran, proving that they have learned nothing,” he said.

Juan Miguel Becerra, a political analyst who has worked for the socialist party on election campaigns, says that “Sánchez’s defence of international law mobilises the left while winning over centrist voters with an anti-interventionist, anti-military stance.”

Spain’s next general election is not due until 2027. But Sánchez’s recent regional defeats, a fragile parliamentary majority, and corruption probes involving figures close to his government underline the limits of his domestic position, despite his rising international support.

Europe’s Quiet Break With Trump’s War – OpEd

March 12, 2026 
By Alice Johnson


Europe is not openly rebelling against Washington over the war with Iran. There has been no dramatic summit walkout, no grand declaration of transatlantic rupture, no sweeping speech announcing a new European doctrine. But that is precisely what makes the moment worth noticing. The distance is there all the same—subtle, careful, and unmistakable. What Europe seems to be doing is not confronting Trump head-on. It is something quieter and, in its own way, more consequential: refusing to fully inherit another American war in the Middle East.

That distinction matters. In Washington, wars are often framed as tests of resolve, credibility, and strength. In Europe, they are more often experienced as instability with a delayed fuse. What begins as an American military decision rarely stays confined to the battlefield. It arrives in Europe as economic pressuredisrupted transport, higher energy anxiety, domestic political tension, and renewed dependence on decisions made elsewhere. For many European governments, the issue is no longer just whether a war can be justified in theory. It is whether they are once again being asked to absorb the consequences of a conflict they did not choose.

This is where the political mood in Europe has begun to shift. Even governments that are hardly hostile to Trump seem increasingly uneasy with the idea that escalation should automatically be treated as strategy. The old assumption—that American force creates order and that allies should eventually fall in line—looks less persuasive than it once did. Europe has heard this language before. It has heard that intervention is necessary, that pressure will restore deterrence, that military action will produce stability. It has also watched those promises collapse into longer crises, deeper fragmentation, and new waves of insecurity.

The European response has therefore been notable less for its drama than for its restraint. The language coming from European capitals has not been triumphant or ideological. It has been cautious, legalistic, and wary. Critics may dismiss that tone as weak or indecisive. But it may reflect something more serious: a recognition that widening war in the Middle East does not serve Europe’s interests, and that political maturity sometimes means resisting the emotional pull of escalation.

There is also a practical side to this unease. Europe cannot treat the region as a distant theater. The economic aftershocks are too immediate. Air travel, shipping, insurance, fuel costs, and market confidenceall react far more quickly than speeches do. Every major Middle Eastern conflict reminds Europe of a basic reality that Washington often seems able to postpone: geography still matters. The chaos does not remain over there. It travels through supply chains, financial systems, migration routes, and public opinion. It enters domestic life.


That is one reason Europe’s discomfort should not be mistaken for passivity. What some in Washington would call hesitation may actually be a more sober reading of power. European leaders know they are unlikely to stop an American war by openly denouncing it. But they can refuse to romanticize it. They can decline to sanctify escalation as wisdom. They can signal, however quietly, that not every act of American force deserves automatic political endorsement from its allies.

This matters not only because of Iran, but because of the broader question it raises about the future of the Western alliance. Trump has long presented himself as a man of peace through strength, a leader who disdains the old foreign policy establishment even while reproducing some of its most dangerous instincts. Europe has reason to notice that contradiction. If Washington increasingly treats war as a demonstration of will, allies will eventually begin to ask whether reliance on the United States also means exposure to American impulsiveness. A security guarantee is one thing. Strategic dependency is another.

Europe’s emerging distance from this war may therefore signal something larger than a disagreement over one conflict. It may point to a slow change in how European governments understand their place in an era of renewed American unilateralism. They may not be ready to fully break with Washington. They may not even want to. But they do appear less willing than before to confuse alliance with obedience.


That is the quiet break now taking shape. It is not loud enough to satisfy activists, nor sharp enough to alter the war overnight. But it reflects a deeper instinct that has been growing in Europe for years: the belief that not every war launched in the name of order produces order, and that not every crisis demands submission to Washington’s logic.

For Europe, that is not betrayal. It is overdue realism.


Alice Johnson

Alice Johnson is a policy analyst and writer focused on global affairs, peacebuilding, and social impact. She explores the intersection of diplomacy, human rights, and civic movements, aiming to highlight stories that bridge understanding across nations. Contact: Itsjohnsonoriginal[at]gmail.com | Twitter: @ImAliceJohnson


Several Cardinals Show Grave Concern About Iran War; McElroy Says It’s Not A Just War
Residents in Tehran, Iran on the fourth day of US-Israeli air strikes, 3 March 2026. Photo Credit: Avash Media, Wikipedia Commons

March 12, 2026 
 EWTN News
By Tyler Arnold


Several members of the Catholic hierarchy are expressing grave concerns about the American and Israeli military conflict with Iran, and at least one cardinal said the U.S. decision to launch the initial attacks fails to meet the criteria of a “just war” based on Catholic criteria.

President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered joint strikes on Iran on Feb. 28 amid inconclusive U.S.-Iranian negotiations related to uranium enrichment. In response, Iran launched strikes on U.S. bases and forces, Israel, and the Gulf states.

“At this present moment, the U.S. decision to go to war against Iran fails to meet the just war threshold for a morally legitimate war in at least three requirements,” Cardinal Robert McElroy, archbishop of Washington, D.C., said in an interview with the archdiocesan Catholic Standard.

McElroy noted that the Church recognizes six conditions for a war to be just. The war must be waged by a proper authority, it must have a just cause, it must have the right intention, it must have a reasonable chance of success, it must be a last resort, and the damage caused by the war must not be more harmful than the evil it is meant to destroy.


“The criterion of just cause is not met because our country was not responding to an existing or imminent and objectively verifiable attack by Iran,” McElroy said.

McElroy said the “right intention” criterion is also not met: “One of the most worrying elements of these first days of the war in Iran is that our goals and intentions are absolutely unclear, ranging from the destruction of Iran’s conventional and nuclear weapons potential to the overthrow of its regime to the establishment of a democratic government to unconditional surrender.”

At times, Trump has said he would potentially work with new Iranian leaders but has also urged the Iranian people to overthrow the government at other times. The previous supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, was killed in a strike and has been replaced by his son, Mojtaba Khamenei. Iran has not shown any interest in returning to negotiations or making more concessions since the war began.

McElroy also said “it is far from clear that the benefits of this war will outweigh the harm which will be done.” He called the Middle East “the most unstable region in the world, and the most unpredictable.”

“Already the war has had unintended consequences,” McElroy said. “Iran’s morally despicable decision to target its neighbors in the region has spread the expanse of destruction. Lebanon may fall into civil war. The world’s oil supply is under great strain. The potential disintegration of Iran could well produce new and dangerous realities. And the possibility of immense casualties on all sides is immense.”
More cardinals echo concerns

Other cardinals have also publicly conveyed their concerns about the conflict, including Vatican Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin.

Parolin told Vatican News that “this erosion of international law is truly worrying: justice has given way to force; the force of law has been replaced by the law of force.”

He said people in the Middle East, including Christians, have been “plunged into the horror of war, which brutally shatters human lives, brings destruction, and drags entire nations into spirals of violence with uncertain outcomes.”

“The Holy See prefers to recall the need to use all the instruments offered by diplomacy in order to resolve disputes among states,” Parolin said. “History has already taught us that only politics — through the hard work of negotiation and attention to balancing interests — can increase trust among peoples, promote development, and preserve peace.”

Cardinal Blase Cupich, archbishop of Chicago, criticized the administration’s characterization of the war, especially an X post from the White House that showed videos of American strikes with the caption “JUSTICE THE AMERICAN WAY” in all capitalized letters.

In a statement, Cupich said “more than 1,000 Iranian men, women and children lay dead after days of bombardment,” and added: “A real war with real death and real suffering being treated like it’s a video game — it’s sickening.”

“Hundreds of people are dead, mothers and fathers, daughters and sons, including scores of children who made the fatal mistake of going to school that day,” he added. “Six U.S. soldiers have been killed. They are also dishonored by that social media post. Hundreds of thousands displaced, and many millions more are terrified across the Middle East.”


Following the publication of the statement, a seventh member of the U.S. armed forces was confirmed dead.

Cupich accused the government of “treating the suffering of the Iranian people as a backdrop for our own entertainment, as if it’s just another piece of content to be swiped through while we’re waiting in line at the grocery store.” He warned that “in the end, we lose our humanity when we are thrilled by the destructive power of our military.”

Cardinal Pablo Virgilio David, vice president of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (FABC), raised similar concerns as Cupich, and commented on how technology changes how war is conducted.

“From distant command centers, military operators stare at screens where maps, radar signals, and algorithm-generated targets move like icons in a computer game,” he told Vatican News. “A cursor moves. A coordinate is selected. A click is made. And a missile is launched.”

When asked about who benefits from the war and who does not, David said “industries that manufacture weapons” benefit financially from the conflict.

“Certainly not the families who bury their dead,” David said. “Certainly not the workers who suddenly find themselves trapped in a war zone far from home. Certainly not the poor nations that will absorb the economic shock.”

Cardinal Domenico Battaglia, archbishop of Naples, wrote a critique of the war in poetic form in Italian, addressed to the “merchants of death.”

“I write to you from this trembling land,” he wrote. “It trembles under the footsteps of the poor, under the crying of children, under the silence of the innocent, under the fierce noise of the weapons you have built, sold, blessed by your cynicism.”

Battaglia asked those perpetuating the war to “stop,” to “convert,” and to listen to the words of Jesus Christ, as expressed in the Beatitudes.


“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God,” Christ said in Matthew 5:9.

EWTN News

EWTN News is the rebranding of the Catholic News Agency (CNA), following the decision by EWTN — which was launched as a Catholic television network in 1981 by Mother Angelica, PCPA — that brings CNA and its affiliated ACI international outlets under a single, unified identity. Previous CNA articles may be found by clicking here.



War in Iran and Afghanistan Threatens Central Asia’s Gateway to Global Markets

  • Fighting between the Taliban government and Pakistan threatens major infrastructure projects such as the Trans-Afghan Railway, TAPI pipeline, and CASA-1000 electricity corridor.

  • U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran are disrupting shipping, airspace, and logistics networks that underpin Central Asia’s southern trade routes through the Persian Gulf.

  • As instability spreads, Central Asian states may shift trade toward the Caspian “Middle Corridor” or China-linked routes instead of corridors through Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iran.

The U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran and the Afghanistan–Pakistan conflict threaten Central Asia’s plans to establish southbound trade routes to markets in Asia and Africa.

Military escalation between Afghanistan’s Taliban-led government and Pakistan threatens several emerging trade, transport, and energy corridors linking Central Asia to South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and global markets. Risks are both direct (insecurity along routes) and indirect (border closures, investor withdrawal, and partner-state reluctance).

Pakistan previously moved goods through Afghanistan to Central Asian markets, accounting for significant export volumes (bilateral trade was USD2.4 billion in 2025). That corridor is effectively closed, with border crossings, supply chains, and customs operations stalled. The loss of reliable land access undermines Afghanistan’s (food, fuel, industrial inputs) and Central Asian access southward toward Pakistan’s seaports.


Several high-profile connectivity initiatives depend on peace and stable transit through Afghanistan; heightened conflict raises the risk of delay or failure.

The 760-kilometer Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway is intended to link Central Asia directly to the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The USD6 billion project will cut transit time by five days and reduce transport costs by 40%, but the current conflict makes construction and future operations insecure. International financiers, including the Asian Development Bank and Persian Gulf investors, are likely to hesitate if Pakistan–Afghan relations remain adversarial. Uzbekistan cannot guarantee safe transit if Pakistan views Taliban-linked militant groups as a threat.

CASA-1000, a $1.2 billion cross-border electricity transmission project exporting surplus hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, also becomes vulnerable if conflict escalates.

Construction of the long-delayed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline is underway, but has made limited progress. TAPI is a 1,814-km pipeline running from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, with a capacity of 33 billion cubic meters (bcm)/year. Construction started in 2015, and the Turkmenistan portion was completed by the end of 2024; the Afghanistan section to Herat is projected for completion by the end of 2026.

Taliban–Pakistan hostility undermines Taliban security guarantees, Pakistan may freeze cooperation on construction segments, and India will not commit to off-take agreements in a conflict zone.

Existing road corridors within Pakistan and Afghanistan are at risk. In Pakistan, the Khyber Pass Road corridor, the Peshawar–Torkham Expressway, and trucking routes carrying Central Asian exports to Karachi and Gwadar are high-risk, raising insurance and transport costs, making Pakistani ports less competitive for Central Asian exporters.

In Afghanistan, the Kabul–Jalalabad highway, the Kabul–Kandahar highway, and routes linking Mazar-i-Sharif to Pakistan are vulnerable, and traffic will slow during security operations.

Pakistan may suspend provisions of the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) to pressure the Taliban, leading to retaliation by the Afghan side. Goods from Central Asia transiting Afghanistan will be vulnerable to sudden policy reversals that may strand the cargo, vehicles, and drivers.

The Central Asia–South Asia Economic Corridor (CASAEC) is a regional framework that includes road, rail, and energy integration between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The fighting could stall corridor planning as Afghanistan–Pakistan coordination collapses, Persian Gulf and Chinese investors pause financing, and Central Asian states may shift focus to westward or eastward routes.

The conflict will increase instability along transit corridors, border closures and freight disruption, higher shipping and insurance costs, reduced investor confidence, and a shift away from Pakistan routes toward Iran or the Caspian Sea. The Trans-Afghan Railway, the TAPI natural gas pipeline and the CASA-1000 electricity project can only succeed if there is peace between Kabul and Islamabad.

Politically, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan lose strategic depth as southward access to the Arabian Sea becomes blocked. Iran becomes more critical as Central Asian states may reroute trade through Iran, but this is risky amid the U.S./Israel–Iran conflict. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) planning is disrupted, and China’s efforts to develop north–south corridors through Afghanistan and Pakistan face setbacks if neither side can guarantee stability. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan border Afghanistan and will be concerned about spillover violence and refugee flows from adjacent areas of Afghanistan.

In summary, Central Asia loses a key Southward trade gateway through which goods and transit benefits were expected to expand.

U.S.–Israel attacks on Iran are disrupting regional routes and supply chains. The conflict - particularly around the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf airspace - has significant implications for Central Asia.

The crisis has disrupted tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, an energy corridor that hosts the movement of more than 20 percent of global oil and liquefied natural gas exports. Oil price volatility and rerouting add cost and uncertainty for Central Asian energy imports and transit.

Air and freight logistics have also been affected. Thousands of flights have been canceled or rerouted due to airspace closures, making Asia–Europe routes longer and more expensive. The spill-over includes concerns about airspace over South and Central Asia if instability spreads.

Projects that rely on stable Iran, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor, a 7,200-km multimodal network of sea, rail, and road routes for moving freight between India, Iran, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, Europe, and Russia., will face elevated risk if Iran’s logistics infrastructure (the seaports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas) is targeted or trade sanctions tighten.

Central Asia depends on Iran for access to sea links and alternative routes outside of Russia and China; the current conflict weakens that option. Although partly complete in sections such as the Azerbaijan–Iran Western Route, Russia–Azerbaijan links, and the Mumbai–Bandar Abbas maritime leg, full efficiency depends on stable operations through Iranian territory.

The Five Nations Railway Corridor is a rail link to connect China, through Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, to Iran and ultimately to Persian Gulf ports. The corridor is meant to deepen Central Asia’s link to global markets via Iran and help the participants avoid maritime chokepoints. A major escalation in or around Iran threatens construction, cross-border coordination, and raises security costs and deters financing and investment, particularly in sections involving Iranian infrastructure. The corridor is making slow progress with limited freight operations between Iran and Afghanistan.

The Southern Corridor through Iran is a broader set of Iranian rail expansions intended to bolster East-West connectivity between Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Iran has been upgrading tracks and electrifying main corridors that link Central Asian freight to the Persian Gulf and European markets. Projects include the Marand–Cheshmeh-Soraya railway and expansion of the Turkmenistan–Iran rail link toward Turkey and beyond.

Nargiza Umarova of the Institute for Advanced International Studies in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, notes the Southern Corridor is “critical for Central Asia,” but active conflict could cause delays, rerouting of freight, and suspension of services as neighboring countries close borders or airspace. Shuttle services that rely on Iranian rail infrastructure may find it difficult to operate safely under US and Israeli attacks.

The Central Asia–Persian Gulf Multimodal Corridor, under the Ashgabat Agreement, links Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Oman, and is designed for combined rail, road, and maritime transport. Iran represents a critical section of this corridor, enabling overland freight to reach the Persian Gulf, and conflict-related disruption could curtail services that depend on Iranian logistics capacity, customs cooperation, and security guarantees. The corridor is not yet fully operational, and attacks on Iran will slow work.

The Dauletabad–Sarakhs–Khangiran natural gas pipeline links Central Asian energy exports to Iranian networks. Its continued operation supports regional energy trade and complements transport infrastructure by enhancing the incentives for broader integration. Escalation around Iran could threaten energy infrastructure, encourage sanctions, or lower regional investment in pipeline expansions. The pipeline is operational and moves 12 bcm of gas annually.

South-North land corridors through Afghanistan and Pakistan were emerging as strategic links for Central Asia to South Asia and Indian Ocean transits. These include Trans-Afghan rail and road routes and the partly operational Lapis Lazuli Corridor linking Afghanistan with Turkmenistan and beyond, and Central Asian plans to diversify away from Russia–China routes toward Pakistan and Iran. These land routes are now under severe strain as conflict blocks key junctions and raises security costs, discourages investment, and delays infrastructure completion.

Iran or neighboring states (e.g., Pakistan, Turkey) may close borders or airspace, effectively severing key overland corridors that run through or around Iran. This has already happened in parts of the region during heightened conflict.

Possible alternatives are the Middle Corridor that links Central Asia through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and onward to Europe — seen as a safer alternative; and the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway, another BRI overland route that increases Central Asian connectivity to China and Europe without relying on Iran links.

With Iran unstable and Pakistan embroiled in conflict, Central Asia’s access to ports becomes more constrained. Alternative maritime access—especially via Iranian ports—becomes riskier and more expensive. Central Asian exporters may increasingly rely on northern or east–west corridors (Russia, China) instead of struggling North-South options. And Iran may move to assert more control over Chabahar Port in light of India’s USD 10 billion in defense deals with Israel.

Rail corridors tied to Iran are optimized to complement maritime freight through Persian Gulf ports. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz and shipping routes can cascade back into overland connectivity planning and usage.

Displaced trade flows risk increasing transport costs, delivery times, and logistical uncertainty for Central Asian exporters and importers. Some countries could see trade patterns shift further east toward Chinese markets or Caspian routes. Investment flows into connectivity infrastructure are likely to slow unless security stabilizes, as investors avoid conflict zones.

Heightened geopolitical risk reduces or slows foreign investment and financing for infrastructure projects, and may prompt Central Asian states to pivot toward alternatives such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) bypassing Iran.

Despite the disruptions, Central Asian states may pursue diversification by pushing more trade via rail and the Trans-Caspian corridor (bypassing conflict zones), deepening ties with China’s BRI and the Middle Corridor through the Caucasus, and strengthening overland routes to Europe that bypass Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

The U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran do not just threaten Iranian territory and infrastructure - they endanger key pieces of the regional connectivity architecture that Central Asia seeks to build for diversifying trade routes, reducing dependence on Russia or maritime chokepoints, and integrating into global markets. Despite Trump’s friendly approach toward Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, he is likely to prioritize cooperation with Israel in the conflict with Iran, leaving regional economic repercussions to be addressed later. Among the effects may be reduced interest by Persian Gulf investors if they turn their attentions to repairing infrastructure damaged by Iranian attacks or increasing military spending.

These combined geopolitical crises are undermining Central Asia’s planned integration into South Asian and Middle Eastern trade networks, prompting nations to pivot toward more secure connectivity options to sustain economic growth and avoid being cut off from global value chains.

By James Durso


US–Israel–Iran War: Second‑Order Coercion And Strategic Fragmentation – OpEd

March 12, 2026 
 Observer Research Foundation
By Kartik Bommakanti


The escalation in hostilities between the United States (US), Israel, and Iran began on 28 February 2026, following a large-scale attack on Iran’s leadership, nuclear facilities, and conventional forces. Two issues merit attention. The first is second-order coercion, which Iran is pursuing against both Israel and the United States. Second, the administrations of US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appear to be leveraging domestic instability and fragmentation as part of their strategy.

At present, nearly all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been targeted by Iran. These operations have ranged from missile strikes to one-way drone missions. The GCC states affected include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Iran’s escalation has compelled these countries to respond, primarily through defensive measures such as intercepting ballistic missiles and shooting down drones using surface and airborne assets. In addition, Qatar has arrestedsleeper agents of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operating on Qatari soil. To date, Oman remains the only GCC country not targeted by Iran, largely because it does not host any American base and remains resolutely neutral. Although reports indicate its oil tankers were struck off the Omani coast by Iran.

Iran’s decision to target the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, despite their limited role in the conflict, warrants closer examination. The simple answer is that Iran believes GCC states suffering material and economic losses are more likely to wield influence in Washington and Tel Aviv than direct Iranian assaults on American bases in the Middle East and Israel.

The Iranians are currently resorting to second-order coercion to compel the Americans and the Israelis to back down and cease their military assault. Fundamentally, second-order coercion involves a coercing state pressuring a third party or secondary target that wields influence over the primary target to yield and comply with the coercer’s demands. Iran has done precisely this by launching missile and drone attacks not only against American military bases in the region and Israel, but also against civilian targets in Arab states in the GCC. Tehran has gambled that military assaults on GCC states will compel them to pressure Washington and Tel Aviv.


However, for the moment, Tehran’s assault appears to be working against itself, with the Americans, Israelis, and their GCC partners rallying to defend themselves. Yet, as the conflict unfolds over the coming days and weeks, the costs for the GCC states could become difficult to sustain, potentially compelling them to pressure Israel and the United States to halt hostilities. For Israel and the United States, it is therefore a race against time. President Donald Trump initially indicated that the military campaign could last at least four to five weeks, although the United States may be facing a more protracted engagement.

For Iran’s clerical regime, the objective is to hold out against the joint US–Israeli air campaign while inflicting sufficient pain on Washington’s GCC partners. If attacks against the GCC states diminish significantly or cease, and the economic pressure on them eases, Iran’s strategy of second‑order coercion may fail to compel a swift end to the hostilities.

Secondly, the American–Israeli military campaign may not be aimed explicitly at regime change, but the degradation or elimination of Iran’s military capabilities—including its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes—is a stated objective. At most, regime change may be an Israeli objective, while the United States remains conflicted over this goal, creating challenges for US–Israeli unity and coordinated military action. Israel may therefore be compelled to act independently. More broadly, the current military campaign appears, at a minimum, aimed at limiting Iran’s ability to project military power beyond its borders. However, a secondary objective—one that remains unstated—may be to stoke internal instability through insurrection and support for disaffected groups such as the Kurds. The latter could potentially be armed and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In such a scenario, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would be compelled to respond to a Kurdish offensive, forcing its forces into the open. This would allow Israel and the US to target IRGC fighters from the air.


Apart from the Kurds—who constitute around 10 percent of Iran’s population and are unlikely to be effective on their own—the Israelis and the Americans would also need to identify and militarily support Iranian dissidents and ethnic groups opposed to the regime. Taken together, these efforts would need to be sustained for several weeks, and potentially months, to produce significant internal chaos and fragmentation within Iran. A former Israeli official familiar with the Netanyahu government’s military strategy conceded: “…this will take time…There is a lot of work to be done. Iran is huge.”

The domestic chaos, fragmentation, or even civil war that Israel may be seeking to trigger could prevent any surviving elements of the regime from reconstituting a credible military and nuclear capability that threatens Israel, the United States, and their regional partners and allies. If Israel and the United States succeed, they could significantly undermine the clerical regime. However, at this stage of the war, it remains far from clear whether the objective of substantially weakening Iran’s revolutionary regime can be achieved.

Further, if Iranian military capabilities are significantly degraded while the regime remains intact, Iran may redouble efforts to rebuild its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, posing a long‑term threat to its neighbours. Preventing this outcome is therefore essential. The US–Israeli military campaign will consequently need to be conducted with considerable discipline and sustained effort. At the same time, Israel and the United States will need to maintain domestic cohesion and public support for what is likely to be a prolonged military campaign unless they capitulate or prematurely terminate hostilities due to rising costs. Iran is mining the Strait of Hormuz and has signalled it will not relent in its attacks, rejecting calls for a ceasefire. The country may also face long‑term consequences with the GCC states, which are unlikely to overlook its strikes and may deepen military cooperation against it.


About the author: 
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


Observer Research Foundation

ORF was established on 5 September 1990 as a private, not for profit, ’think tank’ to influence public policy formulation. The Foundation brought together, for the first time, leading Indian economists and policymakers to present An Agenda for Economic Reforms in India. The idea was to help develop a consensus in favour of economic reforms.


Oil Shocks And Crashes: Where Are We Headed With The 2026 Crisis? – Analysis


360info
By Professor Peter Newman AO and Professor Ray Wills

On March 9, oil prices crossed US$ 100 a barrel for the first time in almost four years as the war in the Middle East between the US and Israel on one side and Iran on the other continued to escalate with no immediate end in sight.

Oil price shocks triggered by conflict in the Middle East have historically reshaped global energy systems. But the latest tensions around the Strait of Hormuz are unlikely to produce a long-term return to high oil prices.

The first oil crisis in 1973 shaped the lives of baby-boomers. The price of oil quadrupled overnight as Arab oil exporters targeted Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. The second oil crisis, in 1979, followed the Iranian Revolution and panic buying set in as the oil price shot up. Then the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war reduced global oil supply even further, so the price rose dramatically right through the 1980s.

The latest outbreak of war in the Middle East has led to oil tankers being trapped in the Straits of Hormuz, and key producers such as Qatar, Iraq and Kuwait cutting production.


Our reading of both the data and history is that this crisis will reinforce the shift away from oil. If the current war blows out and creates a prolonged oil crisis of months rather than weeks, there will be more downward pressure on oil use – and an equal acceleration in China of electric car production at home, with an associated surge in exports.

The first oil shock disrupted daily life across many Western countries. Fuel shortages led to rationing, long queues at petrol stations and emergency conservation measures in several cities in the United States and Europe.

One of us experienced the oil crisis in the USA where San Francisco fell apart as fuel became scarce, 5 km long queues started at gas-stations and people began stealing from neighbours’ cars.

Australia was not targeted. But the ensuing global inflationary spiral began the pressure to look at using less oil. Former prime minister Malcolm Fraser hooked Australia to global oil prices to help us keep more aware of volatility in the market.

Fuel efficiency standards became mainstream and drove public awareness of oil dependence to new heights.

Long term plans to get off oil were dropped in 1990 when oil prices crashed back to the $40 range and business-as-usual returned to car sales and use. But in 2008 it rose to a record $147 as China began its growth spurt and US production declined. The resulting global inflation again triggered a collapse in economies and oil fell to the $30s in a few months.

These crises and crashes were not good for economies and thus the need to get off oil became a major global concern. Market volatility in critical functions like transport is never good for economies and when it was clear that a global climate policy also required oil to be replaced then the logic to get rid of fossil fuels became overwhelming. In 2016 the Paris Agreement accelerated the race to electrify transport through the net zero transition.
Towards a decline for oil?

An article by Professor Hussein Dia in The Conversation suggests we must accelerate the switch for all transport from oil to electricity. Certainly, there are plenty of people now driving big oil-guzzlers that will be very worried about their decision.


Others saw that the situation had changed as demand was now much less than in previous decades and there was indeed ‘a global glut of oil’.

It is possible that the days of sustained triple digit oil prices may be over.

Our approach to the future is to trace fossil fuel use and renewables to see how rapidly the energy transition is happening and to predict the future by taking the trends forward using the inflections to guide the exponential trends rather than taking simple linear predictions. The figure shows these trends.



Fossil and renewables consumption 1990-2025 and projection to 2030. Wills and Newman, 2025.


From our projections, renewable energy is quickly gaining momentum and will become the dominant global fuel source by 2030. The decline in oil as transport systems become electrified and fuelled by renewables, suggests oil is headed for dinosaur status.

As demand erodes, oil prices are likely to trend back towards something like $US 40-60 per barrel in the 2030s, not because the world has become more secure for oil, but because oil simply becomes less and less central to how we move people and freight.

For governments, cities and firms, the strategic response to the latest oil crisis cannot simply be to ride out the spike and hope for another crash. They must double down on electrification of transport, backed by rapidly expanding renewable generation and storage.

The world is choosing to depend on sunshine, batteries and wires rather than on unstable sea lanes and combustible geopolitics. The sooner we complete that choice, the less each new oil shock will matter.

About the authors and editors:

Professor Peter Newman AO is John Curtin Distinguished Professor of Sustainability, Curtin University.

Professor Ray Wills is Adjunct Professor at The University of Western Australia, and Managing Director of Future Smart Strategies.

Samrat Choudhury, Commissioning Editor, 360info

Source: This article was published by 360info

360info

360info provide an independent public information service that helps better explain the world, its challenges, and suggests practical solutions. Their content is sourced entirely from the international university and research community and then edited and curated by professional editors to ensure maximum readability. Editors are responsible for ensuring authors have a current affiliation with a university and are writing in their area of expertise.

US-Israeli War on Iran Sparks ‘Largest Supply Disruption in History of Global Oil Market’: IEA


“The oil market challenges we are facing are unprecedented in scale,” said the executive director of the International Energy Agency.



Fire breaks out at the Shahran oil depot after US and Israeli attacks, leaving numerous fuel tankers and vehicles in the area unusable in Tehran, Iran on March 8, 2026.
(Photo by Hassan Ghaedi/Anadolu via Getty Images)


Jake Johnson
Mar 12, 2026
COMMON DREAMS 

The International Energy Agency said Thursday that the US-Israeli war on Iran and its reverberating impacts across the region have sparked “the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market,” with flows of crude and other fossil fuel products through the Strait of Hormuz plummeting and Gulf nations slashing production as they run out of storage space.

The agency noted in its monthly report on the state of the global oil market that “oil prices have gyrated wildly since the United States and Israel launched joint airstrikes on Iran on 28 February,” pointing to “disruptions to Middle Eastern supplies due to attacks on the region’s oil infrastructure and the cessation of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz,” which have “sent Brent futures soaring, trading within a whisker of $120/bbl.”

The IEA’s report came a day after the agency’s 32 member nations—including the US—agreed unanimously to release a total of 400 million barrels of oil from their emergency reserves to “address disruptions in oil markets stemming from the war in the Middle East.”

“The oil market challenges we are facing are unprecedented in scale, therefore I am very glad that IEA member countries have responded with an emergency collective action of unprecedented size,” said the agency’s executive director, Fatih Birol.

The IEA assessment on Thursday came as oil prices surged again as Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s new supreme leader, vowed to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed. An estimated 20% of the world’s oil passes through the route each year.

Earlier on Thursday, Iraq—which has among the largest confirmed reserves of crude oil in the world—suspended all of its oil terminal operations after two vessels were attacked off the nation’s coast. NPR reported that Iran “took responsibility for attacking one of the tankers, which it said was owned by the US.”

The US and Israel have also bombed Iran’s oil infrastructure, choking Tehran with black smoke and spraying toxic rain that prompted warnings from the World Health Organization (WHO).

“The black rain and the acidic rain coming with it is indeed a danger for the population, respiratory mainly,” WHO spokesperson Christian Lindmeier told reporters in Geneva earlier this week.

Heba Morayef, Amnesty International’s regional director for the Middle East and North Africasaid Wednesay that “the potential for vast, predictable, and devastating civilian harm arising from strikes targeting energy infrastructure, including uncontrolled deadly fires, major disruptions to essential services, environmental damage, and severe long-term health risks for millions, means there is a substantial risk such attacks would violate international humanitarian law and in some cases could amount to war crimes.”

“Regardless of whether a military objective is cited to justify targeting energy infrastructure, under international humanitarian law all parties have a clear obligation to take all feasible precautions to reduce civilian harm and refrain from attacks that cause disproportionate death or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects,” said Morayef. “This includes any foreseeable knock-on, indirect adverse effects on civilians’ life and health, such as exposure to toxic chemicals.”


IEA Approves Record Oil Reserve Release, Keeping a Lid on Prices

Pixabay
Pixabay

Published Mar 11, 2026 8:07 PM by The Maritime Executive

 

On Wednesday, IEA members approved a record-setting coordinated release of 400 million barrels from global reserves, helping to keep an expected increase in Brent crude prices to just five percent. Brent closed at $92 per barrel, well under the $100 benchmark and far short of the $120-per-barrel levels it approached briefly on Monday. 

The continued increase in pricing reflects market expectations that the Strait of Hormuz will remained closed, pending major geopolitical or military developments. The effective shuttering of the waterway has bottled up about 15 million barrels of supply (net) out of a total global oil trade of 100 million barrels a day, creating immediate problems for the region's producers. Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have all throttled back production to match their respective export and storage capabilities; the UAE is expected join next with well shut-ins as early as next week, according to analysts at Societe Generale. 

To reduce its exposure, Saudi Aramco has maximized use of the East-West pipeline, sending an additional four million barrels per day of Saudi crude overland to its Red Sea terminal at Yanbu. More than two dozen tankers have rerouted from the Gulf to Yanbu to meet the supply at the new location - but Yanbu's lower rate of loading at the pier will limit its near-term capability. At present Yanbu is achieving just 2.2 million bpd, compared to the 7 million bpd potential of the East-West pipeline. 

The White House has urged tanker owners to make the run through the strait and resume unescorted operations to and from the Gulf, but several factors continue to deter shipping. The first is the continuing risk to crewmembers: three ships were hit overnight Tuesday, resulting in one major casualty and three missing personnel. The second is the cost of insurance, reported to be running as high as one to two percent of hull value for a Gulf voyage. The third is the absence of naval escorts, which the U.S. Navy has told owners it will not provide because it considers the risk too high. 

The IEA reserve release was intended to reassure the market and keep oil price increases within tolerable limits, but a protracted closure is expected to result in rising costs for energy consumers. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - the most powerful political force within the country - has stated that this is its objective. 

"You [the U.S. government] will not be able to artificially lower the price of oil. Expect oil at $200 per barrel," an IRGC spokesperson said in a statement Wednesday. "The price of oil depends on regional security, and you are the main source of insecurity in the region."

Energy executives and analysts  have predicted severe disruption in the event of a protracted closure, lasting well after the strait reopens. Repositioning tankers, restarting shut-in oil wells and rebooting shuttered refineries will take time, and unwinding the effects of the crisis will not happen overnight. 

Aramco Chief Executive Officer Amin Nasser warned in an earnings call this week that there "would be catastrophic consequences for the world’s oil markets" if the shutdown persists. 

"While we have faced disruptions in the past, this one by far is the biggest crisis the region’s oil and gas industry has faced," Nasser warned. 

Neil Atkinson, the former chief of oil at the International Energy Agency, told CNBC this week that the world faces a "game-changing and unprecedented energy crisis" in the event of a long shutdown in the strait - especially as production gets shut in at an increasing number of oil fields. While he declined to predict future prices in round numbers, he said that "the sky is the limit."