BURMA GETS SHAVED
A young boy in Myanmar. Photo Credit: DMG
February 2, 2026
By Nicholas Kong
Five Years After the Coup — Fake Elections, Foreign Failures, the Resistance Test, and Urgent Strategic Solutions
Five years after Myanmar’s February 1, 2021, coup, the country—once sprouting toward democracy and prosperity—stands not at the edge of recovery but at the institutionalization of collapse. What began as a military seizure of power followed by brutal crackdowns on peaceful demonstrations has evolved into an economic, regional security, and humanitarian catastrophe marked by nationwide civil war. The junta’s latest maneuver—a staged election—does not signal a return to civilian rule, but the formalization of military supremacy under a civilian disguise.3
Myanmar’s tragedy today is not only domestic. It is the cumulative outcome of international hesitation, geopolitical rivalry, and resistance fragmentation intersecting with a military determined to survive at any cost.
The Five-Year Descent
Since the coup, Myanmar has lost more than lives—it has lost infrastructure, intellectual capital, and generational potential. Nearly 4 million people are internally displaced4, while education and healthcare systems have collapsed. The economy has shrunk, informalized, and criminalized. According to international development assessments, Myanmar’s GDP remains over 30 percent below pre-coup levels, with inflation repeatedly exceeding 20 percent annually5.
Cyber-scams, narcotics, illegal mining, and human trafficking have replaced legitimate commerce. The junta now stages selective raids not to dismantle crime, but to deflect international pressure and erase evidence linking top generals to illicit networks.
The junta governs not through administration, but coercion: aerial bombardment, village burning, forced conscription, and economic extortion. State institutions function primarily as revenue extractors for the military.
Meanwhile, resistance forces—PDFs and ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs)—have transformed large portions of Myanmar into contested or liberated zones, contracting junta control largely to urban centers and airspace dominance. Operation 1027 in late 2023shattered the myth of military invincibility, stripping the regime of manpower, morale, and territory. Yet battlefield success has not translated into political consolidation, especially after China’s intervention forced operational pauses.
The Fake Election: Manufacturing Legitimacy
The junta’s election is neither democratic nor about Myanmar’s future—it is a calculated survival strategy conceived at the beginning of the coup and bolstered by Beijing.
It is structurally fraudulent. Its objective is recognition, not governance. By repackaging Min Aung Hlaing from general into “president,” the military seeks to transform dictatorship into a quasi-civilian regime, offering procedural cover for China, Russia, and hesitant ASEAN states to re-engage without confronting legitimacy. It mirrors the old roadmap of military dictators.6
It is absurd that an acting President Min Aung Hlaing grants martial law authority to Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing himself. By assembling a rubber-stamp parliament through the USDP, monopolized by loyal generals, and positioning himself for the presidency while retaining military control—likely through a Central Military Commission modeled on the CCP—Min Aung Hlaing seeks permanent authoritarian continuity under civilian camouflage.
The International Community: Morality Without Muscle
The international response condemned the coup, imposed sanctions, delivered aid, and rejected the fake election. Symbolically important, yes—but structurally ineffective.
There was no unified diplomatic strategy converting pressure into transition. Sanctions were not regionally enforced. Myanmar slipped from global attention under Ukraine, Gaza, Iran, Venezuela, and other crises. Aviation fuel and arms pipelines remained porous. Humanitarian aid was often delayed, diluted, or diverted by the military. Families of junta elites continued to shelter assets abroad.
China remains Myanmar’s most consequential external actor. After Operation 1027 threatened collapse, Beijing reversed course—pressuring EROs into ceasefires while propping the junta with financing and weapons. China turned Myanmar into a managed instability zone: stable enough for Belt and Road connectivity and pipelines, unstable enough to remain dependent.
The United States remained principled but constrained—ethical in language, thin in consequence. It sanctioned military-link conglomerates: MEC, MEHL, and generals but lacked ASEAN, Indian, and Japanese enforcement. Humanitarian corridors were promised but rarely operationalized. Myanmar became a strategic blind spot overshadowed by U.S.–China rivalry.
Russia monetized chaos, turning repression into a client relationship. India, the world’s largest democracy, disappointed deeply—viewing Myanmar narrowly through border security, Kaladan access, and China containment while remaining silent on fake elections.
The EU endorsed CRPH and NUG as legitimate representatives but lacked geographic leverage. ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus became a monument to inaction, trapped by non-interference and internal division, allowing dictatorship to normalize.
Resistance Forces: Victory Through Unity
Myanmar’s Spring Revolution transitioned from peaceful protest into armed resistance through PDFs supported by EROs and coordinated under the NUG. It challenged one of Asia’s most entrenched militaries—but stalled politically.
The resistance failed to convert battlefield gains into diplomatic capital. Lack of unified command enabled military regrouping and external manipulation. Diplomacy is as decisive as combat. A protracted war costs not only lives but generational futures.
Myanmar’s history teaches a painful truth: disunity has always been the nation’s downfall. Ethnic fragmentation, exploited by dictators, remains the revolution’s greatest vulnerability. Without unified federal leadership, international confidence erodes and adversaries trade Myanmar’s fate for their interests.
Economically, early boycotts and innovations like NUG-Pay and Spring Development Bank weakened junta revenue. But China’s financial rescue eclipsed these gains. Meanwhile, promised Western assistance including U.S. congressional allocations—such as the $121 million under NDAA—were rarely operationalized in full scale due to logistics and coordination failures, but ironically culminated with false impression of Western control of the resistance.
The junta wages propaganda warfare globally, while some international media amplify resistance missteps7. Transparency, discipline, and administrative credibility are no longer optional; they are strategic weapons.
Policy Recommendations: From Condemnation to Conversion
If Myanmar’s collapse is to be reversed, policy must move beyond moral statements toward coordinated leverage.
1. Enforceable Regional Sanctions Architecture
Sanctions without regional enforcement are symbolic. Myanmar’s economy remains deeply penetrated by military-linked conglomerates and affiliated cronies using regional intermediaries.
The U.S., EU, Japan, India, and ASEAN partners should create a joint sanctions enforcement mechanism targeting:Aviation fuel supply chains,
Dual-use technologies,
Shipping insurance and re-export hubs,
Overseas assets of generals and cronies.
Without Thai, Indian, Singaporean, and Malaysian compliance, pressure remains porous.
2. Recognize De-Facto Governance in Liberated Areas
Nearly 60–70 percent of Myanmar’s territory is contested or outside full junta control.
Instead of treating the conflict as binary, donors should:Channel aid through NUG and ERO administrations,
Support civil registries, taxation pilots, and service delivery,
Provide satellite communications and early-warning systems against airstrikes.
With nearly 4 million displaced people and millions of children out of school, governance support converts resistance into administration.
3. Strategic Bargaining with China, Not Moral Appeals
China’s interests are structural: Indian Ocean access, border stability, and CMEC/ BRI protection.
The resistance and partners should pursue strategic bargaining:Guarantee infrastructure protection under federal transition,
Coordinate joint anti–cyber scam operations,
Demonstrate that prolonged junta survival increases transnational crime.
Cyber-scam compounds generate multi-billion-dollar illicit flows annually, harming regional victims and Chinese citizens alike.
4. Convert U.S. Policy from Moral Ethics to National Security Interests
Myanmar now intersects U.S. security through:Cyber fraud targeting Americans,
Narcotics trafficking routes,
China’s Indian Ocean access corridor.
Funding must be operationalized via:Cross-border logistics with India and Thailand,
Secure financial corridors for NUG institutions,
Intelligence cooperation on transnational crime.8
This shifts Myanmar from humanitarian case to strategic node.
5. ASEAN: From Non-Interference to Conditional Legitimacy
ASEAN should adopt conditional legitimacy:No recognition without inclusive participation,
No seats for fake-election regimes,
A permanent implementation unit, not rotating envoys.
Without accountability, ASEAN becomes a shelter for normalization.
6. Resistance Reform: From Revolution to Statecraft
To win sustained support, the NUG and EROs must demonstrate:Unified federal command,
Transparent finance,
Consistent assertive diplomacy,
Civilian protection doctrine,
Negotiation coherence.
Confidence grows not from heroism, but administrative credibility.
The Strategic Lesson
Myanmar’s war is not merely internal—it is geopolitical. Every actor prioritized stability, rivalry, or risk avoidance over democratic transformation. The junta weaponized elections and monetized chaos.
Liberation will not come from elections staged by generals nor sympathy abroad. It will come when Myanmar’s resistance becomes not only morally legitimate but strategically indispensable—through unity at home, bargaining power abroad, and governance on the ground.
Five years after the coup, the military has already failed Myanmar. The unresolved question is whether Myanmar’s people and resistance can finally outgrow it—and whether the international community is willing to move from observing collapse to converting leverage into change.
References:
https://apnews.com/article/217ba470970142b3599bb62e1292aabc?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Nicholas Kong is a Myanmar democracy activist.
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