Schrödinger’s Pipeline: Why The Ukraine-Hungary Standoff Is No Quantum Mystery – Analysis



March 22, 2026 
EurActiv
By Thomas Moller-Nielsen

(EurActiv) — Quantum mechanics, popular science books often assure us, implies that a cat trapped inside a closed box can be simultaneously dead and alive. At best, this is half-true: a process known as decoherence means that large physical objects – including Erwin Schrödinger’s unfortunate kitty – are astronomically unlikely to exhibit any quantum weirdness.

The current dispute between Kyiv and Budapest over the Druzhba oil pipeline, a Soviet-era conduit that transports Russian crude to Hungary via Ukraine, occasionally feels just as confused – and confusing – as pseudoscientific explanations of modern physics.

On the one hand, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán claims that the pipeline is not damaged, but that Ukraine is intentionally blocking oil deliveries to bolster support for opposition leader Péter Magyar ahead of parliamentary elections on 12 April. The spat has also led the Moscow-friendly leader to veto a €90 billion EU loan to Kyiv that he had previously greenlit last year.

On the other hand, Kyiv argues that the pipeline was damaged by a Russian attack in late January. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also claimed this week that his engineers are “undertaking all possible efforts” to repair it: a process he said will last until late April or early May.


So, who’s right?

We don’t know for certain. This is because Ukraine has refused for weeks to allow EU officials to assess the alleged damage. Even though EU inspectors finally arrived in Ukraine this week, it remains unclear whether they’ll actually be allowed to visit the pipeline.

Ukraine’s blocking of EU inspections – combined with Zelenskyy’s explicit reluctance to fix the pipeline and the fact that the alleged repairs will only conclude after the Hungarian elections – suggest that Orbán probably has a point. You don’t need to open the box to know the cat’s dead, especially if something smells putrid.

This view is privately conceded by many European officials. One EU diplomat noted that Kyiv’s refusal to permit inspections has been “anything but reassuring”, even if the Ukrainians “give good explanations” about why the pipeline is difficult to repair.

“If I am very, very honest, I went back and forth several times” about whether Orbán is right, the diplomat said.

In other words, the pipeline might not be in a superposition. But EU officials’ views of it are.
Hungary for trouble

None of this, of course, is to defend Orbán’s decision to veto the €90 billion loan he previously agreed to, which has – understandably – enraged European and Ukrainian officials.

Nor is it even to criticise Zelenskyy’s reluctance to repair the pipeline. On the contrary, there’s arguably something morally perverse about demanding that the leader of a war-torn country help sell the oil produced by the very nation that is attacking it.

Putting ethical assessments to one side, however, Ukraine’s behaviour also raises an economicpuzzle.

As we’ve previously reported, Ukraine is set to run out of money in late April. So if Kyiv is attempting to influence Hungary’s 12 April election – and Zelenskyy has also strongly hinted that this is indeed his goal – why is Ukraine not more worried about its financial predicament? Shouldn’t fears of an imminent financial collapse cause Kyiv to panic, or capitulate?

The obvious explanation – that Ukraine is pinning its hopes on Magyar unblocking the loan on 13 April – doesn’t hold water.

Even if Orbán loses (and recent polls suggest that he might), there is no guarantee that an opposition government will quickly be formed. Orbán himself took seven weeks to form the current government despite winning a landslide victory in 2022.

A potentially more plausible reason is that, regardless of who wins, Ukraine will be able to restart oil deliveries almost immediately after the election. Unfortunately, there’s no cast-iron guarantee that Orbán will unblock the loan post-election even if the crude begins to flow. Nor is there any certainty that Magyar would do the same, despite EU officials’ hopes that he will.
Dismal science fiction

The most important reason, though, is that – much like a simultaneously dead-and-alive cat – the notion of a suddenly cash-strapped Ukraine bears little resemblance to actual reality. Rather, it is one borne of popular-science-style journalism – including, I’m afraid to say, my own.


As analysts at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute point out, the emergence of a fiscal “pressure point” by sometime around late April is “broadly plausible”. However, the specific ways in which this pressure would manifest itself “would depend on the timing of inflows, domestic borrowing conditions, and the government’s ability to manage expenditures”.

Crucially, the analysts note that Ukraine is “unlikely” to default on its debt to foreign creditors even if the €90 billion loan fails to arrive in a timely manner. This, they explained, is because Ukraine is mostly externally indebted through economically favourable, long-maturity loans that are “fully manageable even amid significant financing shortfalls”.

In the event of a severe financing shortfall, Ukraine would likely issue more domestic debt to stay afloat, they added.

Their assessment was broadly shared by Maksym Samoiliuk, an economist at the Centre for Economic Strategy, a Kyiv-based think tank. Cuts to military expenditure are “out of the question” and the “political and practical costs” of slashing social spending are likely “too high”, he said. But Ukraine could issue bonds to state-owned banks to remain afloat, he added.

Samoiliuk also noted that, in a worst-case scenario, Ukraine’s central bank could simply print money as it did following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 – which would likely cause inflation to soar but would, technically, cover any potential funding shortfalls.

“The key point is that Ukraine is not facing an immediate fiscal cliff today, but the margin for manoeuvre would narrow rapidly without fresh disbursements,” the Kyiv School analysts told me. “The longer the delay, the more difficult and costly the adjustment would become.”

In other words: Ukraine has significant funding needs, but it doesn’t face any immediate fiscal crunch. Its financial predicament is urgent – but not critical.

Much like with quantum theory, Ukraine’s political and financial predicament is arguably stranger than fiction. And, crucially, there’s nothing decoherent about it.