May 16, 2026
Observer Research Foundation
By Kartik Bommakanti
The possibility of the United States (US) limiting India’s response to a Pakistani-sponsored terrorist attack on Indian soil or a conventional attack against Indian forces is now a source of consternation within the Indian strategic community. American officials have reportedly conveyed to India that it won’t automatically extend support to India in the face of Pakistani aggression. Washington will pursue its national interests as it deems fit, and thus, will not feel obliged to support India because of shared democratic values or morality. Recently, a former American envoy to India, Kenneth Juster, stated that improved US-Pakistan ties may compel New Delhi to exercise caution in retaliating against Pakistan-backed terrorism. Pakistan believes that its current rapprochement with Washington and its current role in the US-Iran negotiations will insulate it from Indian retaliation in the event of a conflict.
The possibility of the US withholding unconditional support for India in the face of Pakistani terrorism or aggression is not new. Since 1947, India’s response to Pakistani aggression conventionally and unconventional, has been conditioned by how much external and internal pressure the Indian governments have felt to retaliate against Pakistani aggression. Historically, Washington never extended automatic support to New Delhi following a Pakistani attack, regardless of whether the administration was Democrat or Republican.
In the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the US suspended military supplies to both countries, even though Rawalpindi precipitated that conflict. India was not deterred from retaliating against Pakistani aggression, irrespective of American military supplies to Pakistan preceding the war. Pakistan procured military hardware to align itself with Washington against the Communist Soviet Union and, through its membership in various treaties such as the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Washington, under the Johnson administration, took a neutral position in this war and did not construe Pakistan’s treaty membership as a license to attack India. If anything, Washington’s neutrality helped India, because Pakistan was more dependent on American military hardware.
During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the US “tilted” in favour of Pakistan, a favour for Rawalpindi’s role in enabling the rapprochement between the US and China. The US even dispatched the USS Enterprise as part of the United States Navy’s (USN) Seventh Fleet to signal deterrence against any Indian attempt to expand military operations into West Pakistan. India’s military action on its western border was primarily defensive. As Henry Kissinger told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in October 1971: “It is our judgment that the Indians see in this situation no longer a legal problem of East Pakistan but an opportunity to settle the whole problem of Pakistan [including West] which they have never accepted.” Yet American intervention on behalf of Pakistan in this case was irrelevant to the outcome of the conflict.
In the 1970s, Pakistan embarked on an “orographic offensive,” coupled with “cartographic confusion,” claiming that the entirety of the Saltoro Ridge, which includes the Siachen Glacier, was part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Pakistan dispatched mountaineering expeditions across the glacier, and American maps from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon showed the Saltoro Ridge to be a part of Pakistan. Washington, in this instance, tacitly accepted Rawalpindi’s cartographic warfare. In any case, Washington’s support was also a quid pro quo for Pakistan’s involvement in training and arming the Mujahideen, who were fighting against the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan beginning in 1979. Concerned by these developments, the Indian Army (IA) launched “Operation Meghdoot” under orders from the Indira Gandhi government. India was able to secure the most tactically advantageous positions on the Saltoro Ridge, which it continues to hold today.
Similarly, following the outbreak of the 1999 Kargil war, the Clinton administration did not extend automatic support to India. While Washington recognised Pakistan’s responsibility for initiating the conflict, it was concerned about India’s decision to escalate vertically to reverse Pakistan’s territorial seizure, as it was about the origins of the conflict. Washington’s position evolved as the conflict progressed, with the Americans reluctantly aligning with India because the latter threatened to escalate the conflict.
The 2001-2002 crisis led to a massive military mobilisation by India against Pakistan following the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)—a Pakistani terror outfit’s attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The aim was to coerce and compel Pakistan to shut down its terror training camps, which Rawalpindi promised to do. This crisis, however, eventually led India to back down from attacking Pakistan due to American pressure. Further, India chose to exercise restraint despite opportunities to strike across the Line of Control (LoC) and the International Border (IB) with Pakistan in early 2002; however, delays in kinetic action, shifting demands, and poor civil-military alignment on New Delhi’s part compounded its problems as the crisis progressed. Washington, which was by now in the middle of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as a result of the 9/11 terror attacks, would not countenance an Indian attack on Pakistan.
Pakistan was roped in as a frontline non-NATO ally to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and India’s military mobilisation was threatening American objectives in Afghanistan. Consequently, Pakistani military resources that were needed against Al Qaeda terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan were diverted to defend against India. Once the US saw its interests directly jeopardised, New Delhi had no choice but to demobilise. If anything, the US brought compelling pressure to bear against New Delhi, including a travel advisory warning Americans not to travel to the subcontinent. This was only the second occasion, after the 1971 war, that Indian and American interests were opposed to each other. Otherwise, for the US, South Asia has been a tertiary or secondary theatre to its larger geopolitical goals.
In the aftermath of the 26/11 attacks, Washington again pressured India not to retaliate against Pakistan. The Indian government obliged under American duress not to respond militarily, although, internally, too, there was resistance against a military response, which was likely the primary reason for Indian restraint.
It is after the 2019 Pulwama attack that India retaliated with airstrikes against the JeM terror camp in Balakot in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. On this occasion, India, for the first time since the 1971 war, struck targets inside Pakistan. Yet Washington was not outrightly opposed to an Indian response. Indeed, President Trump even went to the extent of saying in the run-up to the Indian Air Force (IAF)’ Balakot strikes that India was considering action that was “….very strong…So I can understand that also.”
Six years later, the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025 compelled India to launch air strikes inside Pakistan. These strikes were the most extensive since the 1971 war, as Pakistani terrorist training camps in Muridke and Bahawalpur were struck by the IAF. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance said about the fighting between India and Pakistan in May 2025, it was “none of our business”, and the only thing the US was pursuing was back-channel diplomacy to defuse hostilities. Yet, it was Pakistan, after suffering heavy losses, that sought a ceasefire on May 10, 2025, which India accepted. Pakistan, however, declared that President Trump deserved all the credit, which he readily accepted and continues to claim.
Implications for India
It is evident that US policy following the outbreak of an India-Pakistan conflict has varied considerably over the last 80 years: neutrality between the belligerents; outright opposition to India; tacit accommodation of, and gradual alignment with, Pakistan; reluctant alignment with India; sympathy and empathy for India; and, finally, helplessness in defusing hostilities. In each instance, Washington’s mixed positions on India-Pakistan conflicts have reflected its interests. Despite playing the role of a conduit between Iran and the US today, Pakistan must not construe this as a quid pro quo that permits it to overplay its hand against India. This is why New Delhi has to remind both Rawalpindi and Washington that it will not hesitate to retaliate to any provocations.
About the author: Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.
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