Excessive U.S. pressure on Taiwan defense spending plays into CCP's hands
American policy influencers should explain that Taipei needs encouragement, not punishment
Yoshiyuki Ogasawara
August 15, 2024
In recent years, quite a few American politicians and foreign policy experts have vocally demanded that Taiwan increase its defense spending. © Reuters
"Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we're no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn't give us anything," Donald Trump told Bloomberg recently.
These comments came as no surprise, as the Republican presidential candidate and former president repeatedly says that allies of the U.S. should ramp up military spending.
In recent years, quite a few American politicians and foreign policy experts have vocally demanded that Taiwan increase its defense spending. Elbridge Colby, an official in the Trump administration, wrote a piece for the Taipei Times in May in which he argued that Taipei should increase its budget from the current 2.5% of annual gross domestic product to at least 5%. He basically said that Taiwan should not expect U.S. support if it fails to do so.
Such remarks have prompted debate in Taiwan. Former President Ma Ying-jeou (who in April traveled to Beijing to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping) has said that "money-pit bills" for arms purchases would ruin public finances and only benefit the U.S. defense industry.
I agree with Colby that Taiwan needs to make more efforts to strengthen its defense capability. But I feel uneasy about the way some U.S. politicians discuss the security of Taiwan without considering the nature of public opinion in Taiwan. Defense capabilities do not arise just from military expenditures, but also from the stability of the government and the determination of the people.
Taiwan's defense budget reached 3% of gross domestic product in 2008 but then decreased over the eight years of Ma's Kuomintang (KMT) administrations to 2.1% in 2016. Under the following Democratic Progressive Party administrations of President Tsai Ing-wen (2016-2024), it rose to 2.5%. But measured in terms of New Taiwan dollars, the budget increased by 66% over the past eight years from NT$365.8 billion ($11.2 billion) to NT$606.8 billion. So it is not as if Taiwan isn't making an effort.
"Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we're no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn't give us anything," Donald Trump told Bloomberg recently.
These comments came as no surprise, as the Republican presidential candidate and former president repeatedly says that allies of the U.S. should ramp up military spending.
In recent years, quite a few American politicians and foreign policy experts have vocally demanded that Taiwan increase its defense spending. Elbridge Colby, an official in the Trump administration, wrote a piece for the Taipei Times in May in which he argued that Taipei should increase its budget from the current 2.5% of annual gross domestic product to at least 5%. He basically said that Taiwan should not expect U.S. support if it fails to do so.
Such remarks have prompted debate in Taiwan. Former President Ma Ying-jeou (who in April traveled to Beijing to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping) has said that "money-pit bills" for arms purchases would ruin public finances and only benefit the U.S. defense industry.
I agree with Colby that Taiwan needs to make more efforts to strengthen its defense capability. But I feel uneasy about the way some U.S. politicians discuss the security of Taiwan without considering the nature of public opinion in Taiwan. Defense capabilities do not arise just from military expenditures, but also from the stability of the government and the determination of the people.
Taiwan's defense budget reached 3% of gross domestic product in 2008 but then decreased over the eight years of Ma's Kuomintang (KMT) administrations to 2.1% in 2016. Under the following Democratic Progressive Party administrations of President Tsai Ing-wen (2016-2024), it rose to 2.5%. But measured in terms of New Taiwan dollars, the budget increased by 66% over the past eight years from NT$365.8 billion ($11.2 billion) to NT$606.8 billion. So it is not as if Taiwan isn't making an effort.
Taiwan's new Advanced Jet Trainer aircraft fly at an air force base in Taitung, Taiwan, on July 6, 2022. Taipei's defense budget is currently as much as 2.5% of annual gross domestic product. © Reuters
But considering the structure of party politics in Taiwan, it is difficult to increase the defense budget dramatically over a short period. Even though the current administration of President Lai Ching-te intends to boost military spending, opposition parties are likely to block such a move in the Legislative Yuan. A gradual increase seems to be the realistic option.
Taiwanese society has, in general, been resilient in the face of Chinese pressure because a majority of people believe the U.S. would help Taiwan in any emergency. In reality, it is not possible for Taiwan alone to defend itself against an invasion by China. But, still, Taiwan's military would be able to inflict great damage to the People's Liberation Army, and this could make the Chinese leadership think twice about making any such move.
The best way for the Chinese Communist Party to achieve unification is to take Taiwan without waging war. For that purpose, China has been trying to intimidate Taiwan, penetrate its society and intervene in domestic politics. The authoritarian state seeks to undermine the democratic system by poisoning public opinion.
The CCP has been trying to spread skepticism about the U.S. in Taiwan -- the aim of which is to create the perception that Washington is unreliable.
They have various narratives: Taiwan would be abandoned by the U.S. in the end; the reason why the U.S. is so willing to sell weapons to Taiwan is to let the Taiwanese shed blood, while no American soldier would be deployed; the real purpose of the U.S. is to use Taiwan as a pawn to check China's development; and so on.
For people influenced by this spreading of skepticism, spending more on the military has no meaning. They too do not want to be ruled by the CCP, but may be willing to first negotiate to prolong the survival of Taiwan as a self-governed entity for as long as possible. Polls show that around 30% of voters have such views, and thus cannot be ignored.
If the next U.S. administration actually tries to force Taiwan to increase the military budget to 5% of GDP, it could trigger a domestic political uproar, possibly leading to a more Beijing-friendly president after the next election in 2028. A KMT administration would be more susceptible to pressure from China -- disadvantageous to Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy.
People in Taiwan have a strong attachment to America, especially as they think the U.S. is the only country that Taiwan could truly rely on in the event of a military crisis. At the same time, people fear that the U.S. could pull the rug out from under Taiwan.
They have cause to fear this. In 1979, the U.S. abandoned its recognition of the Republic of China (the formal name for Taiwan) as the legitimate representative of all China, in order to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (the formal name for China.) This dismayed many Taiwanese people, even though they became grateful to the U.S. later for giving great support by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, which allows Washington to have unofficial government-to-government contacts with Taiwan.
It is true that the sense of crisis in Taiwanese society is not strong. However, this also has advantages, as Xi's attempts to threaten Taiwan have had little effect on the public. This can be called the "great insensitivity of the Taiwanese people." If the majority of Taiwanese voters were very sensitive to such matters, Taiwan would have been psychologically subjugated by China by now.
On the surface, Taiwan appears to be a small, powerless entity being rocked to and fro by the U.S. and China. But the fact is, Taiwan also influences the strategies of the two superpowers and so should not be treated like a pawn in a great game.
As the U.S. presidential election approaches, stateside discussions on Taiwan will inevitably be conducted with American voters in mind. It is important that some people in influential U.S. positions grasp the nuances and complexity of the Taiwan issue.
If Washington starts pressuring Taipei too much on defense, that could end up pushing it into the CCP's trap. Taiwan needs encouragement, not punishment.
But considering the structure of party politics in Taiwan, it is difficult to increase the defense budget dramatically over a short period. Even though the current administration of President Lai Ching-te intends to boost military spending, opposition parties are likely to block such a move in the Legislative Yuan. A gradual increase seems to be the realistic option.
Taiwanese society has, in general, been resilient in the face of Chinese pressure because a majority of people believe the U.S. would help Taiwan in any emergency. In reality, it is not possible for Taiwan alone to defend itself against an invasion by China. But, still, Taiwan's military would be able to inflict great damage to the People's Liberation Army, and this could make the Chinese leadership think twice about making any such move.
The best way for the Chinese Communist Party to achieve unification is to take Taiwan without waging war. For that purpose, China has been trying to intimidate Taiwan, penetrate its society and intervene in domestic politics. The authoritarian state seeks to undermine the democratic system by poisoning public opinion.
The CCP has been trying to spread skepticism about the U.S. in Taiwan -- the aim of which is to create the perception that Washington is unreliable.
They have various narratives: Taiwan would be abandoned by the U.S. in the end; the reason why the U.S. is so willing to sell weapons to Taiwan is to let the Taiwanese shed blood, while no American soldier would be deployed; the real purpose of the U.S. is to use Taiwan as a pawn to check China's development; and so on.
For people influenced by this spreading of skepticism, spending more on the military has no meaning. They too do not want to be ruled by the CCP, but may be willing to first negotiate to prolong the survival of Taiwan as a self-governed entity for as long as possible. Polls show that around 30% of voters have such views, and thus cannot be ignored.
If the next U.S. administration actually tries to force Taiwan to increase the military budget to 5% of GDP, it could trigger a domestic political uproar, possibly leading to a more Beijing-friendly president after the next election in 2028. A KMT administration would be more susceptible to pressure from China -- disadvantageous to Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy.
People in Taiwan have a strong attachment to America, especially as they think the U.S. is the only country that Taiwan could truly rely on in the event of a military crisis. At the same time, people fear that the U.S. could pull the rug out from under Taiwan.
They have cause to fear this. In 1979, the U.S. abandoned its recognition of the Republic of China (the formal name for Taiwan) as the legitimate representative of all China, in order to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (the formal name for China.) This dismayed many Taiwanese people, even though they became grateful to the U.S. later for giving great support by enacting the Taiwan Relations Act, which allows Washington to have unofficial government-to-government contacts with Taiwan.
It is true that the sense of crisis in Taiwanese society is not strong. However, this also has advantages, as Xi's attempts to threaten Taiwan have had little effect on the public. This can be called the "great insensitivity of the Taiwanese people." If the majority of Taiwanese voters were very sensitive to such matters, Taiwan would have been psychologically subjugated by China by now.
On the surface, Taiwan appears to be a small, powerless entity being rocked to and fro by the U.S. and China. But the fact is, Taiwan also influences the strategies of the two superpowers and so should not be treated like a pawn in a great game.
As the U.S. presidential election approaches, stateside discussions on Taiwan will inevitably be conducted with American voters in mind. It is important that some people in influential U.S. positions grasp the nuances and complexity of the Taiwan issue.
If Washington starts pressuring Taipei too much on defense, that could end up pushing it into the CCP's trap. Taiwan needs encouragement, not punishment.
Yoshiyuki Ogasawara is a professor emeritus at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and visiting professor at National Tsing Hua University (Taiwan). He has been observing the development of Taiwanese politics for the past 30 years.
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