France orders internet providers to block access to Polymarket prediction site


France's ​main ​gambling sector regulator said ⁠on Friday it had ‌instructed the ‌country's ​internet service providers to ​block access ​to ​the Polymarket ​website, one of a number of online prediction markets that allow people to bet on the outcome of future events. The move aims to enforce an existing ban on financial transactions to the site.


Issued on: 17/07/2026 
By: FRANCE 24

The blocked access to Polymarket's website comes after visits increased despite a ban on bets from France. © Martin Lelièvre, AFP file photo

France said Friday it was blocking access to the online prediction market Polymarket, as punters continued to make bets despite a ban already in place.

The national gaming authority ANJ said Friday that Polymarket's webpage would be blocked on French territory, which adds to a November 2024 ban on financial transactions to the site.

Polymarket is one of a number of online prediction markets which allow people to bet on the outcome of future events.

The ANJ said the site's continued availability – where betting odds on different events are updated in real time – constituted advertising.

"Advertising, by any means whatsoever, in favour of an unauthorised betting or gambling site is a criminal offence," the ANJ said, and noted the fines could reach €100,000 ($114,000).

The regulator said that despite the ban on transactions from French accounts, visits from French internet addresses to Polymarket's site have been rising, hitting 578,751 last month.

The betting markets have caused a number of problems.

Cover image: © France 24
02:21

France's weather agency Meteo-France filed a complaint in April after one of its weather probes was hacked in order to fix bets on Polymarket.

A US soldier is facing federal charges for using classified information to bet on online prediction markets related to the US operation in January to capture former Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro. He allegedly made more than $400,000.

READ MORE'Information leakage to our adversaries': When prediction markets spiral out of control

The White House said Thursday a teleprompter operator had been suspended over allegations he placed bets with a prediction market on the content of US President Donald Trump's speeches.

France is one of a number of European countries that restrict or block access to online prediction markets such as Germany, Italy and Spain, according to the ANJ.

France allows online sports betting.

Trump tightens US visa rules, limits stay for foreign students and journalists


President Donald Trump's administration on Thursday finalized rules imposing stricter limits on how long foreign students and journalists may stay in the United States, tightening legal immigration. Student visas would be capped at four years, while journalists would be limited to 240-day stays. Chinese journalists would face 90-day limits.


Issued on: 17/07/2026 
By: FRANCE 24

The seal of US Department of Homeland Security, Washington, May 21,2025. © Jose Luis Magana, AP

President Donald Trump's administration finalised rules Thursday that impose stricter limits on how long foreign students and journalists can stay in the United States, the latest bid to tighten legal immigration in the country.

Under a change that could be implemented as soon as September, foreigners on student visas would be admitted for the length of their academic program up to a maximum of four years.

Foreign journalists would be limited to stays of just 240 days, or around eight months, but could apply for extensions of similar duration. Chinese nationals would get just 90 days, with extensions of 90 days.

The move forms part of a broader immigration crackdown that Trump has made a centerpiece of his presidency, spanning aggressive enforcement operations in major cities as well as new restrictions on legal pathways to citizenship.

Media rights groups assailed the new rules, with Reporters Without Borders (RSF) telling AFP on Thursday it was "outraged" over the limitations.

"This change destroys international journalists' ability to report from the US and makes it extremely difficult for international outlets to operate here at all," warned RSF North America advocacy manager Ben Grazda.

The group urged the US Congress to act to ensure foreign journalists may work freely in the country.

The Committee to Protect Journalists called the move "the behaviour of a backsliding democracy", and the latest in "a pattern of deeply concerning press freedom violations from this administration".

The Department of Homeland Security received close to 22,000 public comments after proposing the student and journalist rules in August 2025, but finalised it largely unchanged.

When it proposed the rule, DHS alleged that non-Americans were indefinitely extending their studies so they could remain in the country as "forever students".

The department said the open-ended system, in place for students since the late 1970s, had undermined its ability to monitor visa holders.

The United States welcomed more than 1.1 million international students in the 2023-24 academic year, more than any other country, contributing more than $50 billion to the US economy in 2023, according to official data.

Higher education groups had denounced the proposal as a needless bureaucratic hurdle that would deter talented students, with the Presidents' Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration warning it "weakens the ability of US colleges and universities to attract top talent".

Universities have already reported lower international enrollments after earlier Trump administration actions, including the revocation of thousands of student visas and suspension of billions of dollars in federal research funding.

Media organizations and international stakeholders, including the Embassy of Japan, urged DHS to allow admission periods of two to five years for correspondents posted to US bureaus.

The department rejected the proposals, along with requests for expedited processing and capped fees for journalists.

Trump proposed similar limits at the end of his first term, but his successor Joe Biden scrapped the idea.

The rule is subject to review by the Republican-led Congress.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

Washington is ready to 'upend the rules-based world order', HRW chief says

Cover image: TÊTE À TÊTE © FRANCE 24
Issued on: 16/07/2026 

In an interview with FRANCE 24, Human Rights Watch executive director Philippe Bolopion says the Trump administration has "launched an all-out assault on human rights" at home and abroad. He calls the Fort Bliss ICE detention centre a "human rights catastrophe" and warns Washington is ready to "upend the rules-based world order".

Speaking from New York, Philippe Bolopion says the Trump administration has "launched an all-out assault on human rights domestically in the US, but, sadly, also on the global level". He points to Fort Bliss in Texas – the largest ICE detention centre – where migrants are "beaten up by masked agents for no reason" and held in "completely degrading circumstances". One detainee died under "very suspicious circumstances", he reports, adding that Human Rights Watch wants the site "closed down and investigated".

'Dictators around the world are taking note'

Beyond US borders, Bolopion cites sanctions on the International Criminal Court and says Marco Rubio has made dismantling the court "a goal of US foreign policy". Coupled with "defunding of the UN" and its exit from the Human Rights Council, he argues that the US is ready to "upend the rules-based world order". He also warns that "would-be dictators or actual dictators around the world are taking note".


OUR GUEST

Philippe BOLOPION

Executive Director of Human Rights Watch

BY:

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Play (12:03 min)From the show

Ukraine: Caught Between NATO And Trump – OpEd

July 20, 2026 
By Lim Teck Ghee

Key Takeaways:

Trump’s efforts to broker peace in Ukraine have stalled, as he underestimated NATO’s deep strategic commitment to prolonging the conflict and securing a Ukrainian victory rather than accepting any settlement favorable to Russia.

NATO is invested in long-term support for Ukraine through massive multi-year aid (€70 billion in 2026), shifting to a “NATO 3.0” model with European-led financing, domestic Ukrainian production of advanced weapons, and integration into the alliance’s defense industrial base.

The article argues that NATO’s Cold War origins and eastward expansion (viewed by Russia as existential provocation) have shaped its current stance, making compromise difficult and leaving Ukraine to bear the human and economic cost of the unresolved conflict.

In what some media touted as a historic encounter, U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a face-to-face meeting in Rome following the funeral of Pope Francis on April 26, 2025 in which both sides characterized the un-aided, one-on-one discussion on the Ukraine war as productive. At that time, the two leaders discussed key issues on the war, including a potential ceasefire, strategies for achieving peace, and competing proposals for ending the conflict.

The end to Europe’s bloodiest war since the end of the 2nd World War appeared then to be in sight.

One year on, President Trump, after repeatedly stating his optimism that a peace agreement is attainable and just around the corner, appears to have given up on his efforts.

Trump’s error appears to have fundamentally underestimated NATO’s role in the war and to overestimate America’s position as a global hegemon in being the key player in European geopolitics.

This approach contrasts sharply with NATO’s own strategic calculus, which points to a deep-seated investment in supporting Ukraine for the long haul, not only to prolong the war, but to ensure a Ukrainian victory and prevent what appears a Russian one.

Why NATO Is Invested In Ukraine War Continuation

That NATO is invested in the continuation of the war can be deduced from the following evidence :

· A Long-Term Strategy for Ukrainian Victory: NATO is moving from “sporadic support for Kyiv towards a more industrialized, prolonged war strategy”. The goal is to ensure Russia does not win, reflecting a view that a Russian victory could embolden further aggression.

· Massive, Multi-Year Financial Commitment: At the 2026 Ankara summit, NATO pledged €70 billion ($82.1 billion) in military aid for Ukraine in 2026, with a commitment to sustain at least equivalent levels in 2027. This long-term planning signals a commitment to outlast Russia.

· Shift to “NATO 3.0”: NATO is shifting toward a model where “European allies and Canada are now financing the majority of bilateral and multilateral security assistance”, aiming to reduce reliance on the U.S. and build a sustainable European defense industrial base.

· Deep Integration of Ukraine: By allowing Ukraine to produce Patriot missile systems domestically, NATO is integrating Ukraine into its defense industrial complex, making support more self-sustaining and less susceptible to political shifts.

This investment is driven by the belief that supporting Ukraine is in NATO’s “direct interest” and that the war is not a temporary crisis but a “long-term project with multi-year budget planning”.

NATO’s Cold War Origins

Just as if not more important in understanding NATO’s perspective of the war, and why it will continue to oppose Trump’s effort to end it, is discernible by burrowing into the origins of the organization and its past history. This backdrop, missing from most media commentaries and analysis, helps explain why the supposedly defensive alliance is opposed to any peace settlement with Putin’s Russia, except on its own terms.

NATO was established in 1949 with three core goals: deterring Soviet expansionism, preventing the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe, and encouraging European political integration.

To counter the Soviet Union, Article 5, a collective defense clause declaring that an attack against one member is an attack against all, has been in place. This anti-Soviet positioning in European geopolitics was shaped through a series of specific historical developments and doctrines that go back 80 years. It may have mutated beyond its initial objectives but is still a cardinal principle.

In 1946, U.S. diplomat George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” argued that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionist but could be contained through firm, long-term strategic resistance. This formed the ideological basis for NATO’s defensive perimeter. The 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin convinced Western European nations and the United States that a unified military alliance was necessary to prevent the USSR from dominating the continent.

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was agreed to by 12 founding nations, and formalized a security umbrella backed by the United States. This effectively linked North American military power to Western European defense, deterring conventional Soviet superiority.

In response, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European ally states formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955 solidifying the Cold War division of Europe which continued until the breakup of the Soviet Union.

NATO Expansion and the Ukraine Red Line

Instead of dissolving after the Cold War, NATO has continued to expand its membership and mission. Tensions escalated as NATO moved into former Soviet states and intervened in the Balkans. Russia’s failed attempts to join NATO in the early 1990s suggested that the alliance was, in some views, intended to exclude Russia.

The 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO declared Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members, is frequently cited as the point where the die was cast. Another Russian allegation – not refuted by official channels – is that Western leaders gave informal assurances to Soviet President Gorbachev that NATO would not expand “one inch eastward” after German reunification. From Moscow’s view, NATO’s subsequent enlargements (to 32 members by 2024) broke this promise and acted as a direct provocation. Russians have seen this as an “existential threat” rather than an act of self-defense.

President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly asserted that Ukraine is a “red line,” a loss that would fundamentally shift the strategic balance of power and one that would be an obstacle rather than a positive to creating a new, inclusive European security order. It is a view that Trump appears to endorse

Ukraine Victory At Whose Cost

Whichever external forces and factors will be instrumental in helping bring an end to the war, even the staunchest of NATO’s proponents cannot dispute the war as the tragic conclusion of a decades-long process where a triumphant NATO failed to build a pan-European security system, instead expanding to the point where Russia felt compelled to act.

Unfortunately it is Ukraine that has, and will continue, to pay the price for the failure to end the war.



About Lim Teck Ghee

Lim Teck Ghee PhD is a Malaysian economic historian, policy analyst and public intellectual whose career has straddled academia, civil society organisations and international development agencies. He has a regular column, Another Take, in The Sun, a Malaysian daily; and is author of Challenging the Status Quo in Malaysia.
View all posts by Lim Teck Ghee →

Kyiv hit with deadly strikes after attack on Russian e-commerce giant

Kyiv (Ukraine) (AFP) – Russian strikes killed one person and wounded 13 others in Ukraine's capital on Sunday after Kyiv launched a deadly wave of drones that struck e-commerce warehouses in Russia.


Issued on: 19/07/2026 - FRANCE24

Smoke hangs in the air following Russian missile strikes on Kyiv on July 19, 2026 © Serhii Okunev / AFP


The latest bombardment highlights a dual challenge for Ukraine in its fifth year of war, facing almost daily Russian attacks alongside rare domestic political instability triggered by a sudden wartime shakeup of its military leadership.

AFP journalists in Kyiv heard explosions moments after the Ukrainian air force warned residents via Telegram of incoming ballistic missiles.

One of the explosions was so powerful it set off alarms of cars parked in the city centre, an AFP journalist said.

Ukraine's state emergency services said on Telegram that one person was killed and 13 others wounded in the attack that police said had targeted six districts.


According to Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko and local authorities, an apartment building in the Solomianskyi district was hit and a fire broke out at a supermarket, while a house was ablaze in the Sviatoshynsky district.

Strikes were also reported at a shopping and entertainment centre in the Dniprovsky district, an apartment building in the Shevchenkivsky district and a non-residential building.

In Dnipropetrovsk, the central region that borders the frontline, Russian drone strikes killed one person, regional official Oleksandr Ganzha said on Telegram.

On the Russian side, a Ukrainian strike killed one person in the Kursk region, which is near the frontline, regional governor Alexander Khinshtein said on Telegram.

Russia has been firing drones and missiles at Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities almost daily since it launched its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Attacks inside Russia

On Saturday, Ukraine sent attack drones to destroy e-commerce warehouses in the Moscow and Tambov regions, killing eight people and causing major fires.

In Ukraine, Russian strikes killed five people and wounded almost 20 others in regions stretching the country's southeast Saturday.

"In response to Russian strikes on our civilian infrastructure and on our cities and communities, two major logistics facilities were hit -- in the Moscow and Tambov regions," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had said on X.

He alleged the centres were used "to supply sanctioned components for drone production and navigation equipment".

© Sergei SUPINSKY / AFP

Kyiv has in recent months intensified its strikes on Russian territory, disrupting the lives of ordinary Russians -- strikes it calls retribution for more than four years of bombardments against its territory.

The campaign, which Kyiv calls "long-range sanctions", has mostly targeted Russia's oil infrastructure triggering a full-blown fuel crisis in one of the world's biggest oil-producing countries.

More than 370 drones were launched toward the Moscow region overnight, said the mayor of the Russian capital, Sergei Sobyanin.

Between July 11 and 18, almost 1,892 Ukrainian drones heading towards Moscow were intercepted, he added.

Rare wartime protests

But even as the war raged, in big cities across Ukraine, thousands gathered for a third day in a row to protest on Saturday the removal of popular defence minister Mykhailo Fedorov.

The tech-savvy minister was ousted by Zelensky in a surprise government reshuffle just as Ukraine appeared to be gaining momentum on the battlefield, triggering a rare public backlash.

The demonstrations came as the president held two days of meetings with top military commanders, fuelling media speculation he could be looking for a replacement for army chief Oleksandr Syrsky.

During his barely six months in office, Fedorov had repeatedly argued with Syrsky, 60, in his efforts to digitise and modernise an army strained by four and a half years of fighting.

 

Ukraine accelerates privatisation drive with sale of strategic industrial assets

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By bne IntelliNews July 19, 2026

Ukraine is pressing ahead with one of its most ambitious privatisation programmes since the war began in 2022, seeking to attract private capital into strategically important industrial enterprises while generating revenue for post-war reconstruction and reducing the state's role in the economy, reported Ukraine Business News.

The government has approved the terms for the sale of the state-owned Odesa Port Plant, two industrial assets confiscated under sanctions legislation and, separately, has set a new auction date for chemical producer Sumykhimprom, signalling renewed momentum in efforts to revive large-scale privatisation despite the continuing war.

The largest transaction in the current privatisation wave is expected to be the sale of the state's stake in the Odesa Port Plant, one of Ukraine's best-known chemical enterprises and a long-standing but repeatedly delayed privatisation target.

The asset will be offered through an open electronic auction with a starting price of more than UAH4.3bn ($96mn). To ensure the enterprise continues operating after the sale, the government has attached investment conditions requiring the successful bidder to spend at least UAH500mn on modernisation and energy-efficiency improvements while maintaining the plant's core production activities.

The inclusion of mandatory investment obligations reflects a shift in Ukraine's privatisation policy from simply raising budget revenue towards attracting strategic investors capable of restoring production and improving industrial competitiveness.

The government has also approved the sale conditions for two assets transferred to state ownership under Ukraine's sanctions legislation.

Demuryn Mining and Processing Plant will be auctioned with a starting price of UAH1.82bn, while Motordetal-Konotop, an engineering enterprise, will enter the market with a starting price of UAH415.5mn.

Unlike traditional privatisation proceeds, revenue from these sales will be channelled directly into the Fund for the Elimination of the Consequences of Armed Aggression, which finances Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery efforts following damage caused by Russia's invasion.

Separately, the State Property Fund has announced that an electronic auction for the state's 99.9952% stake in chemical producer Sumykhimprom will take place on Oct. 13, 2026.

The auction will mark the government's third attempt to privatise the company after previous efforts failed to attract a buyer. Officials have lowered the starting price to UAH1.005bn, around UAH83mn below the previous valuation, in an apparent effort to improve investor interest.

 

Russian disinformation campaign fails to fan flames of Ukrainian Defence Minister Fedorov sacking

Analysis of 6,947 publications suggests street protests shifted blame for defence minister’s dismissal towards army chief Oleksandr Syrskyi / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin July 20, 2026

Russian state media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels failed to turn Ukrainian public opinion against the sacked former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov before his dismissal, according to an analysis of almost 7,000 publications that tracked the competing narratives surrounding his removal.

The study by PoshukAI, a Ukrainian artificial intelligence-based media-monitoring service, examined 6,947 publications from 1,340 sources over nine days, identifying 18 separate narratives. The service monitors material appearing on Telegram, TikTok, Threads and the wider web. Its methodology and classifications have not been independently audited.

The findings suggest that attempts to blame Fedorov for abuses by Ukraine’s Territorial Recruitment Centres, or TCKs, initially dominated the information space but quickly lost momentum.

On July 9, a day after about 200 people clashed with recruitment officers and police in Lviv and overturned a military vehicle, the narrative that “Fedorov is to blame for the lawlessness of the TCK” accounted for 58.2% of the discussion monitored by PoshukAI. Ukrainian authorities opened criminal investigations into the violence and the alleged use of force by recruitment personnel.

The study said MPs from President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s Servant of the People party helped launch the criticism. Danylo Hetmantsev began discussing the issue at 07:14, followed by Roman Kaptielov at 11:28. Zelenskiy entered the debate at 18:23, about 11 hours after the first intervention.

But by July 13, the TCK narrative had fallen to just 2.5% of monitored coverage. “It simply didn’t take root,” the researchers concluded. By the time Fedorov was dismissed on July 15, public discussion had moved to a different explanation: his increasingly acrimonious dispute with General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces.

Fedorov, a 35-year-old former digital transformation minister, left the defence ministry after only six months. He had developed a reputation as a technological moderniser, expanding Ukraine’s use of drones and data-driven warfare while attempting to overhaul military procurement. Zelenskiy acknowledged that Fedorov and Syrskyi had been unable to work together effectively.

The second-largest hostile narrative described Fedorov as “An incompetent PR minister without military experience.” It peaked on July 14 and argued that he lacked the experience to plan military operations and had merely repackaged projects developed by others.

One message repeated across the network said: “Part of the generals believes that the minister lacks military experience, and his initiatives are called repackaging of existing projects.”

PoshukAI described this as the most “Russian” of the narratives that also circulated inside Ukraine. Russian-language Telegram channels generated 57% of the material, although the use of Russian does not by itself establish that a source was controlled from Russia.

Another line of attack claimed that “Fedorov himself is corrupt.” According to the study, Russian-language outlets and what it described as tabloid-style non-governmental organisations accounted for 47% of publications carrying that accusation.

The clearest Russian disinformation narrative was that “Fedorov is a Western project, and the protests are staged.” Variations included the claim that a “Soros crew is gathering a Maidan”, that Fedorov was being promoted by oligarch Viktor Pinchuk’s financial-industrial group and that demonstrators had been paid to take part.

Russian sources produced 94% of publications advancing that theory, compared with 6% from Ukrainian sources. The principal carriers included Life.ru, Vesti.ru and Komsomolskaya Pravda, according to the analysis.

PoshukAI said Russian state media displayed exceptional hostility towards Fedorov. “When Moscow works against a specific defence minister with such intensity — this is probably the best indicator of his effectiveness,” the analysis said.

That assessment was echoed indirectly by some pro-Kremlin commentators celebrating his departure. One Russian military blogger described Fedorov as “too smart and effective for an enemy”, while other commentators portrayed his public disagreement with Zelenskiy as a political rebellion.

The dismissal nevertheless triggered rare wartime demonstrations. More than 1,000 people gathered outside the presidential office in Kyiv on July 16, while protests were held in several other cities. Demonstrations continued in the capital for at least three consecutive days, with participants demanding Fedorov’s reinstatement and Syrskyi’s dismissal.

The protests substantially changed the balance of online discussion. The narrative “Accusations against Fedorov because of the TCK” fell from 8.8% to 2.8%, while calls to retain him rose from 14% to 27.6%.

At the same time, the narrative that “responsibility is placed on Syrskyi” surged from 2.4% to 18.2%.

“The protest did not lift the accusations. It redirected them to a different address,” the study said.

The volume of coverage accelerated as the dispute unfolded. On the penultimate day of monitoring, PoshukAI recorded 1,939 publications. Before the following day had ended, the total had already reached 3,246. Fedorov’s farewell message generated 566 follow-up publications across 412 sources, making it the most widely reproduced single message in the dataset.

Overall, 48.4% of the publications were classified as supportive of Fedorov, compared with 13.9% that were hostile and 37.6% that were neutral.

The figures suggest that the Kremlin-linked media ecosystem succeeded in injecting hostile narratives into the debate but failed to make them dominant. Instead, the public backlash transformed Fedorov’s dismissal from an internal government reshuffle into a broader argument over military leadership, technological reform and responsibility for Ukraine’s mobilisation crisis.

Graham's "hellish" Russian sanctions bill moving forward

The “hellish” package of sanctions proposed by the late Lindsey Graham is making progress through the House after being watered down somewhat. / bne IntelliNews


By Ben Aris in Berlin July 18, 2026


A US sanctions bill originally promoted by the late Senator Lindsey Graham and Democrat Richard Blumenthal has moved close to passage after being stalled in Congress for more than a year. The latest compromise has the support of the White House, Republicans and a significant number of Democrats, The Bell reported on July 18.

The bill has been substantially softened from the original proposal for “hellish sanctions”, which included mandatory tariffs of at least 500% on goods from any country continuing to buy Russian oil, gas, petroleum products or uranium.

Under the revised Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, tariffs of up to 100% could be imposed on imports from countries that remain among the five largest buyers of Russian oil or gas.

The bill would also allow tariffs of up to 500% on goods imported directly from Russia into the US, although this would have limited economic impact because bilateral trade is already very small.

The White House and senators agreed the compromise text on July 10, and the administration formally confirmed its support three days later.

The bill would require the president to introduce almost the entire sanctions package within 30 days of enactment, regardless of whether Moscow is participating in peace negotiations.

However, Section 115 would give the president very broad authority to suspend virtually any sanction or tariff by notifying Congress in writing that the suspension serves US national interests. Congress would have no power to veto such a temporary suspension.

Sanctions could be terminated permanently only after the president certified that Russia had signed a peace agreement accepted by a “free and independent government of Ukraine”, ended military operations and stopped attempting to overthrow the Ukrainian government.

Congress would then have 30 days to consider the termination and could theoretically oppose it through a joint resolution, although overriding a presidential veto would be difficult.

According to The Bell, the bill gained momentum following Graham’s sudden death on July 11, reportedly from an aortic dissection at the age of 71. By July 16, the new version had more than 60 co-sponsors.

The legislation has also become more attractive to Donald Trump following a February 20 Supreme Court ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not permit presidents to impose tariffs unilaterally. The bill would provide explicit congressional authority to impose tariffs on countries buying Russian energy.

The Bell says Trump’s language towards Vladimir Putin has hardened. Trump reportedly complained that “a lot of lies” were coming from Putin and that “he is always very nice, but it means nothing”.

Energy and uranium

The bill would prohibit new US investment in Russia’s energy sector and impose sanctions on managers and major shareholders connected to the Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG projects, affecting Novatek and its foreign partners.

It would enforce the existing US prohibition on Russian uranium imports, including Rosatom products, after transitional exemptions expire at the end of 2027.

Foreign companies supplying goods, services or technology that support sanctioned Russian uranium production could also face US sanctions.

The US prohibition would not directly prevent countries such as Hungary, Slovakia or Turkey from using Russian nuclear fuel. Hungary’s Paks nuclear plant reportedly purchases about €70mn of Russian fuel annually.

Oil-price cap and the shadow fleet

The bill would effectively return the US to the Western oil-price-cap coalition alongside Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand and the UK.

Ships, insurers, captains and ports violating the coalition’s price cap could be sanctioned.

Inclusion of a vessel on sanctions lists maintained by the UK, EU, G7 or Five Eyes intelligence alliance could become sufficient grounds for corresponding US sanctions.

This would narrow the gaps between different sanctions jurisdictions that Russia’s “shadow fleet” has used to continue transporting oil.

Frozen Russian assets

The bill would support using income generated by frozen Russian assets to finance loans to Ukraine, rather than confiscating the underlying assets directly.

About €210bn of Russian assets are frozen in the EU, mainly at Belgium’s Euroclear.

A proposed European “reparations loan” was blocked by Belgium inDecember 2025 because it wanted other EU members to share the legal risks of possible Russian lawsuits.

Personal sanctions and oligarchs

The legislation would place existing sanctions against senior Russian officials — including the president, prime minister, foreign minister, defence minister and security chiefs — into statute.

This would make the sanctions more difficult for a future president to remove unilaterally.

It would also allow sanctions against Russian oligarchs who had not demonstrated opposition to the war or who continued to benefit from links to the authorities.

Financial system

The Bank of Russia would face at least two measures from a list of possible sanctions, rather than necessarily being subjected to complete asset blocking.

Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank and other state-owned or state-affiliated Russian banks would face a broader package including asset freezes, restrictions under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and prohibitions on US correspondent accounts.

Foreign banks conducting “significant transactions” with those Russian banks could face secondary sanctions, potentially affecting Chinese, Indian and Turkish institutions involved in Russian energy sales and parallel imports.

The administration would be required to review such foreign banks every 180 days.

The bill would also target operators of international financial-messaging systems that knowingly facilitated sanctions evasion, although it would not require Russian banks to be disconnected completely from systems such as SWIFT.

What is genuinely new

The Bell identifies two principal new instruments.

The first is pressure on buyers rather than sellers: countries buying large amounts of Russian oil or gas could put their entire export trade with the US at risk through tariffs of up to 100%.

The second is broader use of secondary sanctions against foreign banks handling transactions with Russian state banks, threatening the yuan- and rupee-based payment channels Moscow has built to bypass the dollar system.

If China and India reduced purchases, Russia could be forced to offer larger discounts on Urals crude relative to Brent, reducing federal oil and gas revenues.

Buyers might have to obtain more oil from the Middle East, Africa or the US, which could provide some support for global oil prices.

Main limitation

The bill’s practical impact would depend heavily on whether Trump actually used the powers against major countries such as China and India.

Almost all the measures could be suspended by the president on national-interest grounds.

The sanctions might therefore be used selectively as leverage in unrelated trade negotiations rather than consistently to reduce Russia’s war revenues.

The legislation’s central importance is that it would make economic pressure the default background to negotiations. Moscow could no longer delay sanctions merely by agreeing to talks.

It would also distinguish between a temporary “deal with Trump” and a permanent peace settlement accepted by Ukraine: only the latter would allow sanctions to be removed completely.

Putin Excluding Individuals And Groups From Common Legal Sphere Much As Nazis Did – OpEd

July 20, 2026 

By Paul Goble

Key Takeaways:

Russia under Putin has created a monopoly on exclusion, using labels such as “foreign agent,” “undesirable organization,” or “extremist” to systematically strip individuals and groups of rights, turning law into a tool for exclusion rather than protection.

This system targets political agency while permitting limited cultural expression, particularly affecting ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples; nearly 100 indigenous initiatives have been labeled terrorist or extremist.

The author warns that the return of hundreds of thousands of veterans from the Ukraine war could intensify this trend, potentially leading to new proto-state actors and further erosion of legal protections for dissent.

“Max Weber described the state as a structure possessing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force” but Putin’s Russia like in Nazi Germany, “the authorities have gone further: they are constructing a monopoly on the power to exclude individuals and groups from public life” and its legal protections, Ilya Shumanov says.

The founder of the Arktida project, which defends the numerically small peoples of the Russian north, says Moscow has “established an extensive nomenclature of labels” – such as “undesirable organization” or “foreign agent” – stripping those assigned to these categories of access to the rights of others (sapere.online/ot-monopolii-na-nasilie-k-monopolii-na-isklyuchenie/).

According to Shumanov, “the goal of these designations is not merely to punish, but to create a system of exclusion: once a person steps onto this ladder, they are gradually stripped of their rights until their continued presence in society becomes impossible.” And “each step up this ladder of escalation and exclusion strips away specific rights.”


“A “foreign agent” is barred from teaching, running for office, monitoring elections, placing advertisements, writing books, or posting on social media without a mandatory disclaimer,” he says. Moreover, “for every status, there are protocols, corresponding registries, and rules governing both the maintenance of these lists and removal from them.

Shumanov continues: “Everything is strictly formalized to create an appearance of legality, even though there is very little actual legality in the actions of the Russian authorities. The law is inverted: instead of protecting human rights, it becomes a switch that turns off human or civil rights.”

A similar system existed in Nazi Germany. It was promoted by Carl Schmitt who argued that “the sovereign is the one who decided on ‘the state of exception’ – that is, the one with the power to create exceptions to the rules. The same logic is now evident in the Russian context where the state established this set of exceptions.”

This is very much the case with the ways in which Moscow deals with ethnic minorities, the activist says. “The state encourages their cultural diversity, viewing them as a kind of ethnographic subject; but when anyone talks about genuine political rights — such as rights to land, self-determination, or environmental protection – these are denied.

In short, Shumanov says, “culture is permitted but political agency is not.”

According to him, “approximately 100 indigenous initiatives in Russia have been designated as terrorist or extremist” by the Russian state; and the state is increasingly “delegating the functions of state-sanctioned violence to proto-state or non-state actors,” like the Wagner PMC and the Russian Community.

“these groups serve as a buffer for the Russian state, ensuring that the fallout from acts of violence does not attach to the state itself or further undermine trust in institutions of power that are already compromised,” Shumanov suggests, as “the state can easily label a grassroots initiative ‘radical and disavow it as necessary.”

When hundreds of thousands of veterans return from Putin’s war in Ukraine, this trend will almost certainly increase and even lead to the possible creation of a veterans party that will aid the Kremlin in putting even more individuals and groups beyond the protection of the law.

About Paul Goble

Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia blog and can be contacted directly at paul.goble@gmail.com .

Serbian Interior Ministry Accuses Military Analyst Over ‘Sound Cannon’ Claim

 July 20, 2026

EurActiv

By Katarina Baletic

Key Takeaways:

• Serbia’s Interior Ministry filed a criminal complaint against military analyst Aleksandar Radic for allegedly claiming a sonic weapon (“sound cannon”) was used against protesters at a massive March 15, 2025 rally in Belgrade, charging him with preparing an offence against constitutional order and disclosing classified information.

• The prosecution cites Radic’s media statements and communications with journalists, opposition figures, students, and others as evidence, following raids on his home and office; Radic has left the country and faces a detention request and arrest warrant.

• The case has drawn criticism from journalists’ groups and NGOs, who see it as intimidation and political persecution linked to the huge student-led protest over the Novi Sad railway station tragedy, with authorities denying any use of sonic devices.

A criminal complaint against military analyst Aleksandar Radic was filed on Friday by Serbia’s Interior Ministry on the request of the Higher Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade over his claims that a sonic weapon was probably used against protesters at a huge rally on March 15 last year.

Radic is suspected of two crimes: preparing an offence against the constitutional order and security of Serbia, and disclosure of classified information.

He is suspected specifically of presenting “false claims regarding the alleged use of a ‘sound cannon’ by state authorities” during a major anti-government protest on March 15, 2025.

A prosecution statement added that it is also suspected that, by “exploiting his contacts with unidentified persons employed by state authorities, [he] collected information classified at various levels of secrecy”.

After his apartment and office were raided in June, Radic left the country. The prosecution now requests an order for his detention and the issue of an arrest warrant.

The prosecution statement quoted Radic’s communication with journalists from N1 television, the state broadcaster RTS, Beta news agency, and the weekly Nedeljnik, in which he was asked about his opinion of the incident at the protest that day.

“Subsequently … the N1 news portal published an article … containing A.R.’s statement alleging the use of a ‘sound cannon’. According to the prosecution, this was the first media claim that a sound cannon had been used during the March 15, 2025 protest in Belgrade,” it stated.

It noted that Radic’s mobile phone and other electronic devices underwent forensic examination, after which “it was determined that there are grounds for suspicion that the suspect committed the aforementioned criminal offences”.

The prosecution statement also cited Radic’s communication with Zdravko Ponos, the head of the opposition Serbia Centre party, SRCE,who was questioned on July 1 over his claims that a sound cannon was used.

It added that Radic chatted with Russian citizen, named as V.O., and with a Serbian Army lieutenant colonel and pilot, named as D.B., about the same topic.

The prosecution statement noted also that Radic also communicated with students of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts who were interested in what kind of weapon was used. The prosecution statement contains direct quotes from students who spoke with Radic.

The Journalists’ Association of Serbia, UNS, condemned the prosecution’s statement because it revealed the identities of all the journalists who “in the course of their professional work, had legitimately contacted a source of information [Radic]”. UNS said that it considers this “an act of intimidation”.

The rally on March 15, 2025 was the biggest protest ever held in Serbia, attracting around 300,000 people, according to the NGO Archive of Public Gatherings. It was organised by students calling for accountability over the deaths of 16 people after a concrete canopy collapsed at Novi Sad railway station several months earlier. 

During a silent vigil for the dead, the crowd suddenly dispersed in a brief stampede. Some of them later told BIRN that, just before the stampede started, they heard a noise that they variously described as “unnatural”, “like from a movie”, or like a jet plane. Others described a “kind of low howling sound”.

The Serbian authorities denied that any kind of sonic weapon was used at the protest. Interior Minister Ivica Dacic first denied that police even have any such acoustic device, but later admitted they have two Long-Range Acoustic Devices, but that they hadn’t been used.

The Higher Public Prosecutor’s Office then launched an investigation on the suspicion that “simulation of the use of a ‘sound cannon’ was planned and carried out at the end of the protest” in order to pin the blame on state authorities.

A group of 14 prominent Serbian NGOs responded that the  judiciary “succumbed to political pressure and transformed the investigation into the political persecution of victims and those who supported them”.

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