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Showing posts sorted by date for query KENYA. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Saturday, September 05, 2026



Tell DHL to stop union-busting



Workers in the Philippines need our solidarity today.


After DHL workers organised a union, management announced it was closing the warehouse, claiming its supermarket-chain contract had not been renewed.

Workers saw this as union busting, especially since DHL had announced in December that it had secured a three-year contract.

With negotiations blocked and their jobs at risk, the workers went on strike on 17 August, demanding that DHL sign a collective bargaining agreement and guarantee their jobs if the warehouse reopens.

They've requested an international online campaign and we've created one.

Please click here to learn more and to send off your message of protest and solidarity.


Unions and the climate crisis


Sean Sweeney is the founder and coordinator of Trade Unions for Energy Democracy (TUED), a global network of trade unionists who are trying change the way we deal with the global climate crisis. Instead of failed neo-liberal solutions, TUED is pushing for 'public pathways' to confront the climate emergency.

Yesterday, I interviewed him for the LabourStart podcast. Listen to it here.

In November, Sean will be in Turkey for COP 31, the People's Climate Summit and TUED's own Inter-Regional Meeting. (In the interview, he explains that these terms mean, as many of you may not know about COP 31).

LabourStart will be there as well, proud to be part of TUED's great initiative.



Organising workers in Kenya - where paying bribes to the police is just part of the job

This week I also interviewed Joseph Ndiritu Karobia, General Secretary of the Public Transport Operators Union (PUTON) in Kenya.

Joe's union has managed to win a couple of legal battles ensuring that drivers working in Kenya's informal sector have rights. But employers are resisting and the struggle is not yet won. Joe tells us about some of the challenges that his members face including 16 hour work days -- and regular bribes to the police.

Listen to this fascinating interview here.


 NIGERIA

Dangote says refinery IPO to open within days


The initial public offering of Nigeria’s Dangote refinery, the largest on the continent, will open in the next 10 to 12 days, owner Aliko Dangote said on Thursday.

“So our dream is that we want to make sure we double the capacity of the refinery … which will take us to 1.4 million barrels per day. The IPO will open in the next 10 to 12 days,” Dangote told investors and analysts in Botswana, while visiting the Southern African country.

The refinery, owned by Africa’s richest man, is expected to seek to raise about $5 billion in what could become the continent’s largest IPO.

Dangote does not disclose refinery margins, but the refining industry has benefited from stronger profits as turmoil in the Middle East boosted demand for alternative fuel supplies.

The 650,000-barrel-per-day refinery reached full nameplate capacity in February and has already tested output at 700,000 barrels per day.

The businessman also said the secondary listing of Dangote Cement (NGX: DANGCEM), another flagship company in his industrial empire, on the London Stock Exchange would most likely be in October, a move that could broaden its access to international investors and capital.

Dangote is also planning to build a new refinery on Kenya’s coast in partnership with East African governments. The project, which is expected to take up to three years to complete, would supply refined petroleum products to Kenya and neighbouring countries, helping reduce East Africa’s reliance on imported fuels.

It would mark Dangote Group’s biggest refining investment outside Nigeria. “We are launching it on September 30,” he said.

(Reporting by Sfundo Parakozov and Chijioke Ohuocha; Editing by David Gregorio)

Friday, September 04, 2026

Solar Power Is Booming in Emerging Markets


  • Romania's solar installations jumped 45 percent in 2025 while the rest of Europe barely grew, thanks to early investment in battery storage.

  • Pakistan is adding rooftop solar and batteries faster than any other market on Earth as residents bypass a failing national grid.

  • Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Morocco, Kenya and Namibia have all overtaken the United States in their clean energy transitions.

Solar energy is going gangbusters. The world is adding photovoltaic solar panels at a blistering rate, shattering its own records year after year, buoyed by a flood of ever-cheaper solar panels out of China. “We have a plentiful and cheap source of electricity that can be built quickly, almost anywhere in the world,” NewScientist wrote in an article published late last year. “Is it fanciful to imagine that solar could one day power everything?”

But the growth of solar power is uneven around the globe, with some regions seeing a rapid transformation while others see their numbers plateauing. Interestingly, it is some of the world’s poorest countries that are now leading the solar revolution, while some of the richest and most avid champions of the clean energy transition are lagging behind.

“Europe likes to think of itself as a champion of renewable energy, the Economist wrote in an August report, when in reality, solar additions in 2025 barely topped those of 2024, and in 2026 “new deployments are set to fall in every big EU country except Italy.”

Europe’s solar slowdown is in large part thanks to the constraints of the continent’s energy grid. During peak production hours, the grid is overly congested and lacks sufficient energy storage, leading to energy wastage, negative energy prices, and even the threat of grid failure and catastrophic blackouts, such as the one that took almost all of Spain and Portugal offline in 2025. European leaders are racing to add storage capacity to the grid in order to address these mounting issues and avoid yet another energy crisis, but in the meantime, adding even more solar to the overloaded grid will only serve to intensify these issues.

But one dark horse country managed to stay ahead of the curve when it comes to energy storage development, and is therefore now emerging as a surprise solar frontrunner in 2026. “Unlike many western European countries, Romania is deploying storage relatively early in its solar build-out, rather than trying to catch up after large amounts of solar capacity have already been installed,” Antonio Arruebo, an analyst at SolarPower Europe, told the Economist. Much of this growth comes in the form of small-scale and residential solar-plus-battery systems. As a result of the steady growth of these much smaller capacity additions, Romania managed to see a 45 percent increase in solar installations in 2025, while the rest of Europe barely eked out any growth at all.

“At the start of Europe’s solar revolution, the impulse was to get panels deployed by all means. As the industry matures, countries need to strike a balance between generating capacity and storage,” the Economist writes. “Romania looks like a model.”

But Romania is not alone in this approach – nor in its success. Around the globe, some of the world’s poorest countries are seeing unprecedented gains in solar energy capacity growth thanks to solar-plus-battery systems. In recent years, emerging economies including Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Morocco, Kenya, and Namibia have all overtaken the United States – the world’s largest economy – in their clean energy transitions.

“Some countries are pulling off stunningly fast energy transitions, adding solar so rapidly, it’s become a major source of electricity over the course of years — not decades,” reports CNN. Pakistan has become the surprise poster child of this movement over the past couple of years as residents install rooftop solar and batteries faster than any other market on Earth. Pakistanis are rapidly adopting these systems to provide electricity more cheaply and reliably than the country’s beleaguered energy infrastructure.

Globally, solar power adoption is no longer a matter of climate policy – it’s going gangbusters thanks to its essential and growing contribution to energy security and simple economics. Solar is now the cheapest form of energy on Earth, while also representing the clearest pathway forward to energy autonomy and resilience, especially for smaller and growing economies that need to shield themselves from the whipsaw geopolitical climate in which they have vanishingly little leverage.

By Haley Zaremba for Oilprice.com

Wednesday, September 02, 2026

 

When Foreign Investment Connects: Africa, Asia And The Geography Of Global Production – Analysis

africa Network Social Globe Worldwide Social Network Logo

Key Takeaways:

  • The issue for Africa is not only how much FDI arrives but how deeply MNEs embed: local suppliers, domestic value added, and regional production chains versus export enclaves.
  • ADB’s 2026 comparison shows foreign firms can bulk large in exports without matching GVA; East/Southeast Asia linked affiliates into component trade, Latin America sits in between, Africa is more uneven—Morocco autos/aerospace, Ethiopia apparel, Kenya agribusiness as pockets, extractives as the common weak-link case.
  • Fragmented markets and thin intermediate-input systems limit spillover; the next frontier is turning isolated plants into continental production networks, not just more capital.

The debate on foreign investment in Africa tends often to focus on how much capital the continent attracts. Yet the volume of investment says little about its developmental impact. Firms invest abroad for different reasons and through different models, but multinational enterprises (MNEs) are particularly important because of their capacity to organise production across borders, connect suppliers to international markets and transfer technology and know-how. The critical question, therefore, is not simply whether foreign firms invest in Africa, but how deeply that investment becomes embedded in the economies where it operates. Does it generate local suppliers, domestic value added and regional production linkages, or does it remain relatively disconnected from the wider productive economy?

The Asian Development Policy Report 2026 provides a useful comparative lens because it examines the contribution of foreign MNEs to gross value added and exports. The comparison points to important differences between Africa and the economies of Asia and the Pacific, while also revealing substantial variation within the Asian region. The report suggests that Africa’s challenge is not only quantitative (in terms of the volume of foreign capital it attracts), but also qualitative: the extent to which that investment becomes embedded in domestic and regional productive networks.

This is, however, not a uniform story. The continent contains markedly different patterns of MNE integration. Morocco, for example, has become an important production base for European automotive and aerospace companies, with foreign firms increasingly connected to local suppliers and export markets. Ethiopia and Kenya have also developed pockets of integration into apparel, agribusiness and other value chains. These cases demonstrate that African economies can become platforms for internationally connected production. The broader problem is that such integration remains relatively concentrated and uneven across countries and sectors, and less extensive than the dense production networks that characterize much of East and Southeast Asia.

The regional comparison provides a useful way of putting this unevenness into perspective.  The graphic below, extracted from the Asian Development Policy Report 2026, compares the contribution of MNEs to domestic production and exports across regions. The comparison reveals an important distinction: the foreign-MNE footprint in exports does not necessarily translate into a commensurate contribution to domestic gross value added (GVA). This is particularly relevant for Africa, where foreign firms can account for a significant share of exports while their contribution to economy-wide value added remains comparatively more limited. The gap points to a deeper question about the nature of foreign investment: how far is it connected to the wider productive economy through domestic suppliers, value creation and regional production networks, rather than operating primarily through relatively self-contained export-oriented activities? The figure does not by itself answer this question, but it provides a useful starting point for examining the extent to which foreign investment becomes embedded in the economies in which it operates.

Figure 1: Share of Foreign MNEs in Gross Value Added and Exports (% GDP)

The experience of the more deeply integrated Asian economies (indicated in the graphic with the acronym AAP) helps explain why this distinction matters. In many Asian economies, foreign MNEs became central actors in export-oriented production systems. They did not merely establish factories; they connected economies through trade in components, intermediate inputs and services. Foreign affiliates became embedded in supplier networks and regional production chains, linking domestic firms to international markets. The result was a close relationship between MNE presence, exports and domestic productive transformation.

The question of embeddedness is ultimately inseparable from the broader question of how regional production systems develop. In “Emerging States and Economies”, Sugihara argues that Asian industrialization was associated with a mutually reinforcing relationship between intra-regional trade and industrialization, a dynamic that developed much less extensively in Africa and Latin America. Accordingly, the significance of the Asian experience lies not simply in its ability to attract foreign firms, but in its ability to embed those firms within dense regional production networks, where capital, technology, intermediate goods and production stages move across borders.

Latin America presents a different configuration. Foreign MNEs play a substantial role in production and exports, and several economies have developed sophisticated export industries. Yet the region has generally developed denser regional production networks than Africa, but less extensive ones than those found in East and Southeast Asia. Foreign investment has therefore been important without generating the same degree of cross-border fragmentation of production found in many Asian value chains. The relevant divide, therefore, is not between regions that attract MNEs and those that do not, but between different degrees and forms of productive integration.

Africa’s internal diversity makes this distinction particularly important. Morocco’s automotive industry, Ethiopia’s apparel sector, and Kenyan agro-processing and horticultural exports demonstrate that African economies can become effectively integrated into international value chains. Yet these successes coexist with a much larger group of economies where foreign investment remains concentrated in extractive industries or other activities with relatively limited linkages to domestic suppliers and regional production. The result is an uneven landscape, with pockets of deep integration alongside large areas of relatively weak productive embeddedness.

The distinction is crucial. An MNE that sources locally, transfers technology, develops suppliers and exports through regional production networks can generate effects that extend well beyond its own balance sheet. An investment operating largely as an enclave generates far fewer such linkages. The issue, therefore, is not whether foreign companies are present in Africa. They clearly are. The question is whether their presence helps create broader production ecosystems.

This is where Africa’s structural disadvantage becomes apparent. Many economies still lack the dense combination of domestic firms, intermediate-input markets, infrastructure, finance and regional connectivity that allows foreign investment to generate cumulative productive effects. Fragmented national markets reinforce the problem. Even where an individual African country has successfully attracted an MNE, the absence of efficient regional trade can limit the scope for developing cross-border supplier networks and production specialization.

The comparative lesson from Asia, Latin America and Africa is not that foreign investment is inherently transformative, but that its impact depends on what it connects to. Where foreign firms become embedded in dense networks of domestic suppliers, regional trade and cross-border production, investment can become a powerful engine of structural transformation. Africa already offers examples of this model. The challenge is to turn these pockets of integration into a much broader continental pattern. 

After decades of attracting foreign capital, the next frontier for Africa is therefore not simply more investment, but investment that builds lasting links between firms, suppliers, skills and production across African economies, turning individual projects into building blocks of an integrated African production system.


About Danilo Desiderio

Danilo Desiderio is a trade policy specialist focusing on customs systems, trade facilitation, and regional integration, with particular emphasis on trade and logistics dynamics in Africa. He is the Founder and CEO of Desiderio Consultants, a Nairobi-based advisory firm in Kenya. His research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, combining institutional economics, trade theory, and behavioural analysis to examine the operational and systemic dimensions of trade governance, contributing both to practitioner-oriented reforms and to emerging conceptual frameworks in trade analysis. He is also a trade policy expert and Senior Associate at the Horn Economic and Social Policy Institute (HESPI).

View all posts by Danilo Desiderio →

Tuesday, September 01, 2026

Experts Gather in Tunis To Improve Safeguards Against The Diversion Of Hazardous Materials


Attendees at the Africa Shield 2026 Regional Counterproliferation Workshop in Tunis discuss keeping hazardous materials from falling into the hands of terror groups and nonstate actors. ANDREA CHANEY/DTRA

August 30, 2026

By Africa Defense Forum


Key Takeaways:

Africa Shield 2026 in Tunis brought more than 100 African military, police, and policy officials together, with DTRA, EU, and U.N. support, to tighten control of dual-use industrial and medical materials that militants might steal or divert.

Sessions covered borders and supply chains, intelligence and incident response, export controls, and CBRN investigations and financing, tied to implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540.

Follow-on work includes a Nigeria Police CWMD train-the-trainer workshop and Kenya’s CBRN National Action Plan plus Justified Accord drills; analysts say the goal is oversight that does not block lawful industry.


Industrial development is booming across much of Africa, and with it comes the use of hazardous chemicals and other sensitive material.

Terrorist groups covet many of these “dual-use” items for use in attacks. Chlorine gas, for example, is commonly used in water treatment but can be weaponized to deadly effect. Medical research uses radiological and biological materials that can be dangerous in the wrong hands.

“The same materials that strengthen healthcare, scientific research, mining and industry can also become security risks if poorly managed,” Mubarak Aliyu, a Nigeria-based political and security risk analyst, told Al Jazeera.


To combat this threat, more than 100 professionals from across the continent gathered in Tunis for Africa Shield 2026, a regional counterproliferation workshop. Participants represented the military, law enforcement, policymakers and international oversight bodies.

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), with help from the European Union and United Nations agencies, funded and organized the three-day conference. Participants discussed a range of topics, including:

Border management and supply chain security: Countries are working to tighten controls at border crossings and are sharing best practices to stop nonstate actors smuggling sensitive materials.

Intelligence flow and incident response management: Information sharing and coordination will improve responses to potentially dangerous incidents.

Export controls and dual-use technologies: Strengthening regulations and enforcement helps prevent the illicit transfer of sensitive materials.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) crime investigation and counter-proliferation financing:Security professionals are updating investigative skills and collecting information needed to disrupt financial networks that enable proliferation.


The meeting also emphasized the implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, which calls for information sharing, interagency coordination, border management and regional cooperation to combat the threat.

Attendees said events like Africa Shield are key to strengthening the network of professionals that stops hazardous items from being diverted or stolen.

“This initiative has enabled African countries to clearly demonstrate their ownership of the counterproliferation problem set,” said Maj. Brittany Brown of DTRA’s Africa counter-weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) program. “The networks and collaboration created and endorsed at Africa Shield are unmatched, allowing our foreign partners to effectively fight against adversarial networks.”

Countries across Africa are also working to strengthen domestic safeguards. After Africa Shield, the Nigeria Police Force held a CWMD curriculum development workshop in Abuja. The event, held in partnership with DTRA, was part of a train-the-trainer initiative to heighten awareness and strengthen the ability of police across the country to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive threats.

“The evolving nature of weapons of mass destruction demands proactive policing, continuous operational training and deeper inter-agency and international collaboration,” Nigeria’s Deputy Inspector-General of Police in charge of Operations Umar Shehu Nadada said at the beginning of the event.

In Kenya, the military, police and civilians have held a number of training events. The country formally unveiled its first comprehensive CBRN National Action Plan last year. During the annual Exercise Justified Accord in Nairobi, U.S. Soldiers trained alongside members of Kenya’s Disaster Response Battalion to prepare for CBRN threat scenarios.

Experts believe CBRN safeguards and awareness need to be part of a whole-of-government approach that prepares for threats without impeding lawful economic activity.

“The challenge is not to restrict development, but to ensure that innovation is matched by effective oversight, secure handling practices and robust regulatory systems that prevent diversion or misuse without slowing economic progress,” Aliyu told Al Jazeera.


About Africa Defense Forum
The Africa Defense Forum (ADF) magazine is a security affairs journal that focuses on all issues affecting peace, stability, and good governance in Africa. ADF is published by the U.S. Africa Command.
View all posts by Africa Defense Forum →

Sunday, August 30, 2026

Uganda and Burundi military officials visit Israel to discuss Gaza troop deployment

TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) — A Board of Peace official told The Associated Press that Ugandan officials joined a Burundian military delegation, and that Uganda is finalizing details of its participation after its parliament approved the troop contribution this month.

TEL AVIV, Israel (AP) — Military officials from Uganda and Burundi visited Israel last week to discuss deploying troops to Gaza as part of an international security force envisioned by U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace for the fragile ceasefire, according to officials.

A Board of Peace official told The Associated Press that Ugandan officials joined a Burundian military delegation, and that Uganda is finalizing details of its participation after its parliament approved the troop contribution this month.

Nothing has been finalized with Burundi, but the official said they look forward to starting the process.

“We shared significant knowledge with one another, and the Burundi representatives expressed interest in our mission,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to discuss talks with potential troop-contributing countries ahead of any agreement.

A Burundian military official told the AP that three other senior military officers led the delegation to Israel and that Burundi appeared intent on joining. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to the media.

It was not clear what Uganda or Burundi might be offering or what they might receive in return. Spokespersons for their militaries did not respond to requests for comment.

Progress on the international force has been slow

If Burundi moves ahead, the African nations would be the latest to join the international force for Gaza after Morocco, Kosovo, Kazakhstan and Albania made commitments. Uganda has committed around 1,200 personnel, and Morocco has committed up to 500. Kosovo, Kazakhstan and Albania in total have committed around 80.

Indonesia earlier said it was preparing to send 8,000 troops — by far the largest commitment — but put that on hold after the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran.

The 20,000-strong force would be led by U.S. Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers. Troops committed remain far short of that goal.

Last month, Trump announced a deal for Hamas to disarm and for Israel to withdraw its forces from Gaza. According to the deal, the International Stabilization Force would be deployed to areas of the Palestinian territory administered by an incoming technocratic committee, and Israeli forces would withdraw.

The force would help monitor the ceasefire, train Palestinian police and secure the delivery of aid, among other tasks.

The ceasefire that took effect in Gaza last October has stalled due to disagreements regarding Israel’s withdrawal from the strip and Hamas’ disarmament. A U.S. delegation met for hours earlier this month with the Hamas leader and then with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to press them forward. Hamas has agreed to the new U.S. deal.

Netanyahu has rejected it, saying Israel will not withdraw from any of the roughly 60% of the territory it controls in Gaza until Hamas has been completely disarmed. Even after Netanyahu’s meeting with the U.S. team, which included negotiator Jared Kushner, officials offered no concrete commitment by Israel.

Uganda and Burundi have peacekeeping experience from Somalia

Paul D. Williams, director of the security policy studies program at The George Washington University, said Uganda and Burundi have gained considerable peacekeeping experience through long-term deployments in Somalia as part of an African Union force resisting the al-Qaida-linked al-Shabab extremist group.

Their countries’ leaderships have “shown they are willing to tolerate high numbers of casualties without withdrawing,” he said.

Williams added that, with the mission in Somalia winding down, both countries will be searching for ways to accrue financial and material support for their militaries: “Deploying to Gaza with U.S. support is one way to do that.”

A Ugandan military officer with knowledge of the upcoming deployment said troops were being selected to go to Gaza. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak to the press.

___

Falzetta reported from Nairobi, Kenya.

Presidential Entitlement to Kill: The 1998 Bombing of Sudan


 August 28, 2026

Bill Clinton on the phone in the Oval Office. Photo: White House.

Last week was the 28th anniversary of the U.S. government bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. Scott Horton, director of the Libertarian Institute, observed last week that that wanton assault by the Clinton administration “helped make a folk hero out of bin Laden, drove up recruitment for Al Qaeda and made it more difficult for the Taliban to give him up.” Operation Infinite Reach was a farce of the first order – and may have helped pave the way to the September 11 attacks.

That carnage resulted in a federal court ruling that practically gave presidents a license to kill any time that they claimed to have good intentions.

On August 7, 1998, two trucks loaded with explosives detonated nearly simultaneously, wrecking U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans, and wounding more than 4,000.

The U.S. government quickly concluded that the embassy attacks had been an al-Qaeda operation. Twelve days later the Clinton administration launched Operation Infinite Reach. In a failed attempt to kill Osama bin Laden, scores of Tomahawk cruise missiles struck al-Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Thirteen cruise missiles launched from U.S. ships in the Red Sea destroyed the El Shifa factory in Khartoum, Sudan.

President Clinton announced that “our goal was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network is associated.” Clinton declared that the attack on the “chemical weapons-related facility” was an “exercise of our inherent right of self-defense … to prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist threat” and that the “terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan” were hit “because of the imminent threat they presented to our national security.”

In Washington press conferences on the day of the attack, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger continually referred to the “so-called pharmaceutical plant.” When a “senior intelligence official” speaking at a Pentagon briefing was asked, “What is this pharmaceutical facility supposed to make?” he replied, “We have no evidence – or have seen no products, commercial products that are sold out of this facility. The facility also has a secured perimeter and it’s patrolled by the Sudanese military.”

But the plant was actually wide open to visitors and had been visited by U.S. government officials, World Health Organization officials, and foreign diplomats in the months before the U.S. attack. There was no Sudanese military presence near the plant.

Earlier in 1998, El Shifa had been awarded (with U.S. government approval) a UN contract to ship a hundred thousand cartons of a veterinary antibiotic medicine to Iraq under a special exemption to the UN embargo on that country. In the days after the attack, journalists reported that the factory grounds were littered with “melted packets of pain relievers and bottles of antibiotics.” Before the smoke had ceased rising from the rubble, it was undeniable that El Shifa was the largest pharmaceutical producer in the Sudan.

The factory was destroyed in part because, when CIA whiz kids searched the Internet for information on it, the El Shifa website did not contain a list of drugs the factory manufactured. This supposedly proved the factory was a chemical-weapons site that must be destroyed.

Defense Secretary William Cohen announced, “We do know that [bin Laden] has had some financial interests in contributing to the – this particular facility.” Salah Idris, a Saudi Arabian banker and industrialist, bought the plant five months before the United States destroyed it, but the U.S. government was unaware that the factory had changed hands. After Idris approached the U.S. government to seek to correct its mistaken assumptions about bin Laden’s ownership, the U.S. government responded by notifying the Bank of America to freeze $24 million in Idris’s bank accounts in the United Kingdom under a U.S. regulation covering “pending investigations of interests of Specially Designated Terrorists.” U.S. government officials claimed to possess secret evidence linking Idris to bin Laden. Yet, though the freeze was based on suspicions that Idris was a terrorist financier, the U.S. government never bothered to officially list him as such.

Cohen announced that “the facility that was targeted in Khartoum produced the precursor chemicals that would allow the production of a type of VX nerve agent.” Administration officials stressed that the “only known use [of the precursor chemical discovered] is as a precursor ingredient in the nerve gas VX.” In reality, the precursor ingredient – known as EMPTA – is also used in pesticides.

El Shifa factory in Khartoum, Sudan. Photo: Wikimedia, Bertramz. CC BY-SA 3.0.

The Clinton administration’s smoking gun was little more than a cupful of dirt that a “CIA operative” had scooped up in December 1997 across the street from the factory – 60 feet from the factory entrance and on someone else’s property. The CIA did not bother to test the soil sample until July 1998. Former CIA official Milt Bearden later observed, “Never before has a single soil sample prompted an act of war against a sovereign state.”

The Clinton administration possessed a much stronger case for attacking the terrorist training camps in Afghanistan than the factory in the Sudan. But, especially with a name like “Operation Infinite Reach,” hitting only one country simply would not do. National Security Council official Richard Clarke later explained that since bin Laden showed his “global reach” by bombing U.S. embassies in two countries, President Clinton “obviously decided to attack in more than one place.”

In his August 20 announcement, Clinton declared, “Afghanistan and Sudan have been warned for years to stop harboring and supporting these terrorist groups. But countries that persistently host terrorists have no right to be safe havens.”

Two weeks after the bombing, the Sudanese ambassador to the United States, Mahdi Ibrahim Mahammad, declared that in May 1998 he had “delivered a formal letter of invitation to a senior official in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, offering to establish a joint effort between our two countries to see the possibilities, to explore them, of working together against international terrorism.” The United States scorned the Sudanese offer. Mahammad was angry that the U.S. government blocked a Sudanese request for a UN investigation of the bombing.

When State Department Undersecretary Thomas Pickering was asked why the U.S. government opposed a Sudanese request for an independent investigation headed by former President Jimmy Carter, Pickering replied, “I’ve just presented the evidence very clearly, I think, on why this was a target. I don’t believe that an international investigative committee needs to have an additional role. The evidence, in our view, is clear and persuasive.’

But the primary evidence presented was the assertion by a government official that the U.S. government possessed secret evidence – which, of course, it could not reveal.

The cruise missile attack came three days after President Clinton, in a deposition with Independent Counsel Ken Starr’s legal team, finally admitted he had had an “inappropriate” relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky. Clinton gave a brief television address on August 17 during which he seemed nearly out of control with rage. Lewinsky was returning to the grand jury for additional testimony on the day that Clinton bombed Afghanistan and Sudan – giving rise to the nickname “Monica’s Missiles” for the attacks.

In a speech eight days after the attack, Clinton bragged to an audience about how he had sacrificed himself to protect innocent Sudanese:

“The night before we took action against the terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Sudan, I was here on this island [Martha’s Vineyard], up until 2:30 in the morning, trying to make absolutely sure that at that chemical plant there was no night shift…. I didn’t want some person, who was a nobody to me but who may have a family to feed and a life to live and probably had no earthly idea what else was going on there, to die needlessly.”

One factory watchman was killed and ten other people were injured in the attack.

Clinton did not have a second thought about destroying the largest pharmaceutical factory in one of the poorest nations on Earth. The Sudanese, like many others in the Third World, cannot afford the more-expensive drugs produced in Western countries. El Shifa was the largest producer of malaria tablets in Africa. In the months after the attack, Sudanese government officials blamed the U.S. attack for a severe malaria epidemic.

Twelve days after the bombing, Defense Secretary Cohen “insisted that the incomplete intelligence was irrelevant to President Clinton’s decision to destroy” the factory, the New York Times reported. Cohen told reporters that the U.S. government “did not learn until at least three days after the attack on the plant that it made medicine.” This raises questions about government officials’ reading speeds, considering that the news was splashed all over the world’s media within hours of the attack.

Idris, the factory owner, hired one of the most respected law firms in Washington to file suit to have his assets unfrozen. On the day before the U.S. government was obliged to respond to his claims in federal court, it threw in the towel and permitted Idris to reclaim his $24 million. When Idris filed a second lawsuit to receive compensation for the destruction of his factory, the U.S. government effectively invoked sovereign immunity, refusing its permission to the lawsuit and thereby eliminating any chance for recompense.

The U.S. attack on the Sudanese factory exemplified a fatal mixture of bad intelligence and crass politics. When the operation turned out to be a fiasco, there was a total evasion of responsibility. Instead, the Clinton administration preferred to repeat banalities about the evil of terrorists. Clinton portrayed the destruction of the factory as a triumph of American idealism:

“Terrorists must have no doubt that in the face of their threats, America will protect its citizens and will continue to lead the world’s fight for peace, freedom, and security…. America is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because … we act to advance peace, democracy, and basic human values; because we’re the most open society on Earth.”

Despite the lofty rhetoric, Clinton’s action, at best, did nothing more than protect Americans from Sudanese horse pills.

That Clinton shot at and missed bin Laden in the wake of the 1998 embassy bombings may have been the best thing that ever happened to bin Laden. At the time of the embassy bombings the Taliban were on the verge of expelling him from Afghanistan; they considered him to be a rude, trouble-making, publicity-hungry guest. But as a Wall Street Journal analysis concluded, the U.S. retaliation “turned Mr. bin Laden into a cult figure among Islamic radicals, made Afghanistan a rallying point for defiance of America and shut off Taliban discussion of expelling the militants. It also helped convince Mr. bin Laden that goading America to anger could help his cause, not hurt it.”

The New York Times concurred, noting that the failed U.S. counterstrike converted bin Laden into a “hero” and a “revered figure” among many Muslims.

Though the bombing policy was outrageous, it took a federal appeals court to convert one atrocity into a perpetual presidential license to kill. This doctrine provides a “get out of jail free” card for any president who itches to bomb foreign nations. The owners of the El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries plant—the largest pharmaceutical factory in East Africa—sued for compensation after Clinton’s attack demolished their facility. Eleven years later, a federal appeals court dismissed the case: “President Clinton, in his capacity as commander in chief, fired missiles at a target of his choosing to pursue a military objective he had determined was in the national interest. Under the Constitution, this decision is immune from judicial review.” Determinations based on secret (often false) information legally absolved presidents of any killings or calamities abroad.

As long as the president or his spokesmen claim benevolent motives, any killings they authorize are legally sacrosanct. This legal doctrine provided the shield for President Obama’s assassination program that claimed a right to kill Americans without a trial, without notice, and without any chance for targets to legally object.  The only legal liability for that program was limited to former NSA contractor Daniel Hale, who was convicted and imprisoned for disclosing that the Obama administration had no idea who it was killing with its drones and missile attacks abroad.

Unfortunately, few Americans realize that the U.S. government’s pattern of reckless bombing began long before George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Likewise, President Donald Trump’s bombing campaigns and invasions have thus far been impossible to thwart on the homefront.

** An earlier version of this piece was published by the Libertarian Institute.

James Bovard is the author of Attention Deficit Democracy, The Bush Betrayal, and Terrorism and Tyranny. His latest book is Last Rights: the Death of American Liberty. Bovard is on the USA Today Board of Contributors. He is on Twitter at @jimbovard. His website is at www.jimbovard.com