The Trump-Driven Push For A ‘New Middle East’ – Analysis

March 15, 2026 
Observer Research Foundation
By Vivek Mishra


The war in Iran is escalating to dangerous proportions. Trump’s declaration of a unilateral victory and Iran’s three preconditions for a ceasefire seem worlds apart. Several American planes have been downed, with the latest being a refuelling plane over Iraq, many US bases hit, and its regional allies scrambling for interceptions.

Adding to this, Iran, being a defiant and wayward actor to potentially mine the Strait of Hormuz, has added another layer to an already combustible situation. The lethality and precision strikes carried out by the United States (US) and Israel, which already exceed 6,000 rounds, may have set a new ceiling for kinetic action conducted using air power. However, the achievements for Washington and Tel Aviv on the ground are qualitatively different from what either may have anticipated before the war with Iran began. The evolving trend lines of the conflict suggest that the US may have bitten off more than it can chew.

What compelled the Trump administration to start the Iran war? Two factors appear particularly significant. The first lies in the spiral set in motion after the Trump administration decided to pull out of the JCPOA in 2018. The second was the Trump administration’s decision to double down on its negotiations with the Iranian regime, demanding that Iran completely halt its enrichment capability. The Trump administration’s proposal that Iran’s enrichment facility be located outside the country but in the region for civil purposes was met with equal scorn from Tehran. In the end, the failure of the Geneva negotiations between Iran and the US, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, appears to have pushed the administration to take the ill-advised decision to bomb Iran. In the process, Trump may have boxed himself in, leaving him with limited options since the 12-day war campaign against Iran in June 2025.

At the heart of this historical decision lie the political ambitions of two politicians—Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. Leading up to the decision, the two leaders appeared to converge on the necessity of using kinetic options on Iran for various reasons, albeit with different political ends. For both, Iran appeared to be at its weakest, with its regional proxies debilitated and its economy spiralling downward, pushing the people to the brink. The mass protests in Iran in January 2026 fed the speculation that regime change in Iran is possible with external help. For Israel, the Iranian threat was always existential, but the political moment which started with the October 7 attacks by Hamas bulged to meet with the serendipitous resilience of Netanyahu. He realises that under the Trump administration, Israel may have its last chance to compel Washington’s hand, without appearing to do so.

The Trump administration found itself buoyed by the military success in Venezuela to replicate the seamless operation in Iran. If continued military campaigns against Iran’s proxies—which are largely non-state actors—have proven inconclusive since the October 7 attacks, it was inevitable that America’s military campaign, led by aerial raids, would fall short of enforcing capitulation on Iran. The only outside chance of forcing the Iranian regime to fall would have been the convergence of mass internal uprising with external military assistance. Even then, an effective blow to the Iranian regime would not have come unless the security apparatus inside the country revolted against the Mullah regime, which was perhaps never a concrete reality and in the post-bombing period appears an even distant dream. There is a strong rally-around-the-flag affect which has bound the Iranians loyal to the regime even more tightly than before, attenuating external pulls.

Trump seems increasingly forlorn amidst his decision to enter the war with Iran. The rising cost of the war, coupled with a domestic political scene which is increasingly getting disenchanted with Trump’s decision, is weighing heavily on the administration. Even externally, his allies in the Middle East as well as Europe do not seem aligned with the US’s position. America’s trans-Atlantic allies were still balancing against Washington’s decisions apropos support to Ukraine when the weight of the Iran war began to drag the Europeans into the war, enforcing a reprioritisation in their own internal and external outlook. In the latest, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is struggling to avoid the repercussions of Trump’s decision on Iran in a referendum at home. The United Kingdom initially declined to allow America to use its bases for launching attacks against Iran before eventually granting limited permission.

The ongoing confrontation between the US and Iran suggests that a different Iran will now shape a different Middle East—one where both Tehran’s internal political calculus and its external relationships are fundamentally altered. Iran’s willingness to strike targets across the region has unsettled the security assumptions of Gulf monarchies and introduced a new phase of volatility in its relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council. GCC members , particularly the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have paid the price for their security alignment with the United States and are now far more wary of the costs of being drawn into Washington’s strategic confrontation with Tehran.

For Washington, the lessons are stark: the war underscores the limits of conventional superiority against an adversary that thrives in asymmetric warfare. Iran’s “precise mass” strategy, deploying large numbers of relatively inexpensive drones and missiles, has shifted the cost equation, forcing the US to expend far more expensive defensive systems while highlighting the urgent need to expand munitions production at scale. At the same time, Tehran’s move to close the Strait of Hormuz, a vulnerability studied since the Tanker War of the 1980s, represent one of the most consequential escalatory risks with global economic repercussions. The targeting of Iranian naval assets such as the IRIS Dena and the wider maritime theatre also indicates that the conflict’s strategic geography is edging closer to the Indo-Pacific. For India, this shift places its traditionally balanced geopolitical posture under unprecedented scrutiny, as disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz directly threaten its energy security, maritime trade routes, and broader strategic calculations in the western Indian Ocean.

Trump’s economic bet on the Middle East had four legs: an intra-regional wager in the I2U2 group built on the momentum of the Abraham Accords; the “Board of Peace” proposal aimed at steering reconstruction efforts in Gaza; the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a bridge to connect its energy promise across the Indo-Mediterranean space; and finally, Trump’s technology bet on the region, which was just beginning to take off. All of these now remain fraught as Iran continues to refuse a ceasefire. In the end, this war may well become a test of resolve and of each side’s ability to withstand a prolonged war of attrition. A Trump-size force remains militarily intent on changing the character of the Middle East.

About the author:

 Vivek Mishra is Deputy Director with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

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