Showing posts sorted by date for query Municipal socialism. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query Municipal socialism. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, July 31, 2026

Congress Can Reverse America’s Growing Wealth Disparity


 July 31, 2026

Photograph by Nathaniel St. Clair

Everyone expects there to be differences in wealth and income among Americans, as is true of citizens of other developed countries. Many of us do not expect to be among the richest. Even so, what happens when wealth accumulates to the point that the richest 1% of Americans hold nearly one-third of the nation’s total net worth? That is what we have in 2025.

Sarah Anderson, who directs the Global Economy Project and co-edits Inequality.org at the Institute for Policy Studies, wrote, “Something has gone wrong here in the U.S. We now have a wider wealth gap between rich and poor than in any other major developed nation.”

However, when measured across all households, U.S. income inequality is comparable to that of other developed countries before taxes and transfers. Nevertheless, after taxes are paid and benefits are provided to lower-income families and business owners, such as tax write-offs, the U.S. becomes one of the highest in income inequality. In other words, the rich receive far more benefits than the poor on welfare; essentially, higher-income households in other developed countries transfer more wealth to their lower-income households.

Analysts and consumers have noticed that since President Ronald Reagan’s two administrations, income and wealth disparity has been growing. It may not be coincidental, since his kitchen cabinet consisted of 16 millionaires who recommended appointees to his cabinet. That was a time when millionaires had the financial and political clout that billionaires have today.

An Economist/YouGov poll from January 2026 found that half of Americans (52%) say the gap between rich and poor is a very big problem. The conservative American Enterprise Institute reviewed Gallup polling from Reagan’s last term onward and found that 60% have consistently agreed that money and wealth should be more evenly distributed.

Since there is an extreme disparity in wealth, how does it impact our lives?

The gap between the richest and average citizens is the same as it was right before the Great Depression began a hundred years ago. That calamity was tied to the stock market’s collapse. There are currently more protections in place to prevent that phenomenon from recurring, and we have a sturdier social safety net.

Nevertheless, the significant income gap between the average citizen and the wealthiest during the 1920s was due in part to rapid productivity and corporate profits growth, while employees saw their wages decline in purchasing power. Consequently, our economy increasingly depended on wage earners taking on greater debt rather than on having more income to meet their basic needs. This is the pattern we see today in America.

Overall, the bottom half of households hold nearly zero net wealth, and many carry debt that exceeds the value of their assets just to afford a decent standard of living. It’s hardest for the poor. In 2016, the bottom 20% of the population had an average income of $15,600; the top 20% earned $280,300. Income disparity also extends into the highest income bracket, with the top 1% earning $1.8 million per year and owning 32% of all US wealth.

This huge gap in income and wealth between half of our citizens and the wealthiest undermines the stability of our consumer-dependent economy. As of the second quarter of 2025, the top 10% of income earners accounted for nearly half of all U.S. consumer spending, according to Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics. Since consumer spending drives about 70% of U.S. GDP, if one-tenth of households suddenly and significantly reduce their spending, the average citizen will suffer the most, as jobs disappear if a recession sets in.

In the US, the top 10% own roughly 90% of all publicly traded stocks, which make up about 45% of these households’ personal asset portfolios and are closely tied to the AI-driven stock rally. A big chunk of the “growth” in the economy, as measured and publicly cited as a sign that the economy is booming, is really a wealth effect from the portfolios of the wealthiest, not the paychecks of working Americans. If the AI stock rally stalls or dives, AI shareholders may well dump the stock and cause a ripple effect throughout the economy if there is fear of a shrinking economy.

Lower take-home pay is already underway, as evidenced by the fact that consumer spending among middle-income households (40th–60th percentile) has leveled off over the past two years, while consumer prices are up roughly 25% since 2020. As a result, most households are losing ground. While aggregate GDP and retail sales numbers can look healthy, most people experience stagnation or decline in their incomes and wealth.

What do voters want of Congress? 

Constitutionally, Congress has the authority to levy and collect taxes. This is the linchpin for maintaining a stable economic system that a democracy must have to sustain its operations. And just as importantly, it helps bolster cultural acceptance of democratic governance as the preferred form of government.

Congress, being elected more often than a president, represents an ongoing regional mix of citizens’ concerns. But unlike a president, it is subject to multiple points of view in reaching a final decision. This is an internal negotiation that occurs among Congressional members.

In the Congressional debates that unfold, it is expected that popular beliefs and needs will rise to the top of Congress’s agenda for action. This has not been what has been happening with regard to the widespread concern about the concentration of wealth in fewer hands.

In the past 40 years, poll after poll shows that the majority of Americans support taxing the rich. As recently as January 2026, 59% said the federal government should reduce the wealth gap, while only 21% said it shouldn’t. Although Democrats and Republicans are deeply divided, 57% of independent voters said the government should. However, as the AEI noted, despite consistent popular support, that support becomes fragmented when specific policy mechanisms are proposed, such as wealth taxes, redistribution, and regulation.

Lost in Congressional debates is an effort to overhaul an unfair tax system that continues to widen wealth and income disparities. Over the last 35 years, Congress, under both parties, has gradually lowered marginal tax rates, resulting in the top 1 percent seeing their incomes reach new heights. Meanwhile, Congress has pushed for the importation of cheaper goods, greater automation, and restrictions on organized labor that would hinder these trends.

One can understand why public approval of Congress has averaged around 30% on Gallup during that time. Under both President Joe Biden’s term and Trump’s current term, hope for what Congress could accomplish peaked in each president’s first quarter, reaching Congressional approval of 36% under Biden and 31% under Trump. Congress’s rating plummeted under both administrations after the first quarter, reaching 12% for Biden in his last quarter and 10% this past April for Trump.

The numbers will continue to fluctuate for Trump, but the pattern is clear: the public doesn’t approve of Congress, and they expect the President to work with it to make America more affordable.

Congress has not used its power to close the disparity gap in wealth.

Gabriela Sandoval, the Executive Director of the Excessive Wealth Disorder Institute (EWDI), provides a report on six taxes that Congress could enact to stem the steady shift of wealth from the top 10% of citizens and redirect it to the other 90%. Taxes are the most direct approach, though not all are equally effective or popular.

Among the six explored (the billionaire tax, wealth tax, raising the top marginal tax rate, millionaire surtax, capital gains taxes, and the estate tax and related dynasty trust reform), the billionaire tax is the easiest to explain and the most acceptable to the public. Consequently, it will be reviewed here, since discussions of the others require more detailed descriptions. An Inequality.org meta-analysis of more than 55 polls found that a billionaire income tax averaged 67% support, including 84% of Democrats, 64% of independents, and 51% of Republicans — the highest cross-partisan support among any wealth-tax variant they tracked.

President Joe Biden’s Billionaire Minimum Income Tax proposal (BMIT) is the model that was introduced into Congress. It would have required those who own at least $100 million (approximately the richest 0.01% or about 20,000 households) to pay an effective tax rate of at least 20%. In comparison, the median US wage worker pays an effective total federal tax rate of approximately 16% on their gross income. However, billionaires earn income from investments, not from hours in the office or shop as wage workers do; in addition, they have more spendable income to cover not only their basic needs but also any other needs they desire.

With such broad support, why did the BMIT legislation never receive a vote in Congress? Biden and Congressional Democrats either lacked a strategy to pass it or didn’t make a serious effort. Although Democrats controlled both the Senate and the House for the first two years of Biden’s administration, the BMIT was not introduced until the last two years, when they no longer controlled the House.

It’s typical for the President’s party to do poorly in the midterm elections. Democrats were proud to have kept the Republicans to a slim majority. Still, they lost control of the House, leaving no chance of passing any BMIT legislation with the Republicans in control. The Democrats should have pushed for BMIT while they had a majority in both houses. Instead, they pushed for the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which, although it had received between 55% and 70% public support, not a single Republican voted for it. The IRA did pass, and BMIT could have as well by the same count.

Any progressive tax legislation, such as the BMIT or the other five tax options, will not pass Congress as long as Republicans control one of the chambers. Despite half of Republican voters supporting generic progressive tax legislation, taxing billionaires will not pass for two reasons.

First, Republican legislators receive roughly 80% of billionaires’ political spending, which supports GOP candidates in the midterm elections, according to an analysis of Federal Election Commission filings cited by Fortune. Second, the Democrats need to connect the dots between billionaires and the public policies they promote, which make life harder for more than half of Americans.

For Democrats, this is not about pushing socialism as a solution; it’s about pushing for a democratic government that is not another commodity to be purchased. It’s about doing grassroots organizing in rural, as well as urban, communities that are being hurt by policies that benefit only the few, but not them or their neighbors.

Voters must deliver a message to Congress that they are obligated to protect all citizens’ interests above those of just the wealthiest.

Nick Licata is author of Becoming A Citizen Activist, and has served 5 terms on the Seattle City Council, named progressive municipal official of the year by The Nation, and is founding board chair of Local Progress, a national network of 1,000 progressive municipal officials.

Cuba: Who will govern the market?

Cuban market

First published at La Joven Cuba. Translation by LINKS International Journal of Socialist Renewal.

Despite consensus on Cuba’s economy needing reform, the measures announced on June 25 have raised more questions than answers. They come amid a crisis combining a drop in production, a collapsing energy sector and a migration exodus, worsened by the tightening US blockade. Under these circumstances, it is impossible not to ask who will be able to accumulate wealth, what will happen to workers in the least profitable sectors, how bureaucratic privileges will be stopped from mutating into oligarchic forms, and what role the market will play.

Can this package of reforms be viewed as a simple technical adjustment to get out of this distressing crisis?

To contribute to the debate, Ariel Dacal Díaz spoke with Cuban researcher Wilder Pérez Varona, a PhD in philosophy, writer and researcher, who has analysed the reshaping of the political imagination in Cuba, particularly within the digital ecosystem. He is a postdoctoral researcher at Argentina’s National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET) from the National University of Quilmes.

Wilder examines how the reform will redefine power relations, the social structure starting to take shape behind the rhetoric of “perfecting socialism”, and whether this can be sustained without transforming the political system.

Cuba is facing the most comprehensive package of reforms in the past 30 years. Are these merely technical or economic measures?

The approved package of 176 measures contains highly technical provisions — exchange rates, joint-stock companies, bankruptcy procedures — but its nature is decidedly political. These measures will not merely change the economy, but who controls the country’s wealth for decades to come.

It is true they stem from an emergency. Cuba is facing an almost unprecedented productive, energy and demographic crisis, which has been worsened by the tightening US blockade. Today, Washington restricts trade, tries to block access to loans, discourages foreign investment and hinders fuel supply — it is a deliberate strategy to close off any scope for economic recovery.

But recognising the blockade’s impact does not mean assuming that the reforms are politically neutral. Any economic reform redistributes power. The problem is not merely how to produce more, but deciding who benefits from that wealth.

The most significant change is not more market, but the redefined relationship between ownership and power. A company can still call itself socialist while workers and citizens no longer have a real say in its affairs, thereby rendering social ownership a legal fiction.

GAESA [a Cuban conglomerate owned by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces] is the clearest example. Beyond recent news regarding the release of assets, under these reforms it could retain its management forms and convert companies it already runs into shareholdings. On paper, ownership will remain with the people; in practice it will be the same people making decisions as before the reform.

There is consensus that the bureaucratic statist model has run its course. Cuba needs more dynamic companies, greater managerial autonomy and new scope for economic initiative. But autonomy for whom and under what controls?

The measures seek to strengthen enterprises and new economic actors, but say little about democratising decisions regarding the wealth they generate. We are decentralising enterprises, but not necessarily power.

This also alters the socialist project’s logic. For decades, despite many contradictions, equality was the model’s starting point. As [Cuban president Miguel] Díaz-Canel stated, this sequence is apparently being reversed: first accumulate, then redistribute. Growth is no longer subordinate to social justice; social justice now depends on growth.

This represents a shift in economic philosophy. The market can be a useful tool for developing a socialist economy, but it cannot substitute for politics. If new opportunities for accumulation are not accompanied by transparency, democratic regulation and social control, we risk replacing an inefficient bureaucracy with a new economic elite closely linked to state power. The National Asset Valuation Program, without an independent judiciary or transparency regarding who is buying what, could turn managers and military officials into legal shareholders of the very companies they currently manage on the state’s behalf. This is, albeit with some nuances, largely what happened in the post-Soviet transition.

That is why the debate should not be reduced to a choice between the state and market. The fundamental question is whether these reforms will further socialise economic power or pave the way for a new structure of privileges.

What impacts can we anticipate on the socio-class structure that has taken shape in recent years?

These reforms, if implemented, will transform society as a whole. Above all, they will alter class relations.

For decades, Cuban socialism built a society that was far more egalitarian than what existed before 1959. That relative equality began to erode from the 1990s onwards, with remittances, tourism and an expanding private sector. Now, that social differentiation has ceased to be a consequence of the crisis and is instead becoming a stable component of the model.

There will be more entrepreneurs, larger companies and greater wealth concentration. Of course, every economy needs actors capable of investing, innovating and taking risks. The question is who these entrepreneurs will be: will they emerge as a result of productive labour and innovation, or from converting bureaucratic privileges into private property? The risk is that the line between managing public resources and appropriating opportunities generated by the reform may become increasingly blurred. The removal of the 100-worker cap for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (mipyes) and the possibility for individuals to own several companies lay the foundations for capital accumulation. The conversion of state-owned enterprises into joint-stock companies, with private individuals buying shares, is the specific mechanism driving this concentration. We do not know yet whether these shares will be bought by entrepreneurs willing to risk their own capital or by managers already running the company.

At the same time, the world of labour will also change. State employees, which until a few years ago were relatively homogeneous, will be replaced by a workforce with vastly different conditions depending on the sector, access to foreign currency, remittances or links to private and foreign companies. The so-called “muro de la divisa” (foreign currency wall) may become entrenched as the main faultline in Cuban society, this time by design.

Inequality will also be defined by race, region and family background, because those with start-up capital, relatives abroad or better economic networks will have clear advantages over those depending exclusively on a salary paid in pesos. This is seen most starkly at the regional level, as decentralisation to municipalities lacking an industrial base or tourist appeal will mainly redistribute deficits rather than autonomy. Social differences will be reproduced from generation to generation if the state does not intervene to address them.

An equally important change is the often-announced shift from universal policies to targeted subsidies, altering the relationship between citizens and the state. A proposed new framework classifies people as “vulnerable” in order to decide who receives support. Workers in profitable companies will somehow be integrated into the new economic circuits; those in so-called “zombie” companies will be left exposed to bankruptcy or liquidation. Equality is no longer understood as a right, and “vulnerability” – that is, poverty – will be treated as a permanent reality. The risk is that the state will stop preventing inequality and instead confine itself to managing its consequences.

The problem is not merely growing inequality, but the kind of power this will generate. As is well known, when wealth becomes concentrated, the ability to influence public decisions also tends to become concentrated.

So, it is not enough to ask whether a new capitalist class will consolidate itself. The crucial question is whether Cuba will have sufficiently democratic institutions to prevent economic power from ultimately capturing political power. The reforms redistribute much more than just income; they redistribute power. This new distribution of power, rather than the economic measures themselves, will ultimately define Cuba’s future.

Why do you say that the proposed model presupposes inequality as a permanent condition of its functioning?

It is not because the government has decided inequality is an objective, but because the new model ultimately makes it a prerequisite for boosting the economy.

This is probably the most profound change these reforms introduce, which, whatever anyone says, departs from previously approved guiding documents.

We can trace, measure by measure, how the logic of organised production according to principles of egalitarian distribution is being reversed in the technical design. The setting of wages has now been decentralised and is subject to each company’s “economic and financial capacity”. This will condemn workers in less profitable sectors to precariousness while allowing for unregulated wages in the dynamic sector. Bankruptcy procedures, with severance pay of barely three to six months’ wages, will turn job insecurity into yet another mechanism of market discipline, even within the state sector. Partial dollarisation creates a stratified system of consumption, even for previously free services; those who can afford it are charged, while there is only a precarious level of protection for the rest. These mechanisms are parts of a single design that requires inequality to function, because inequality generates the market incentive that the state can no longer generate alone.

The risk that wealth may stem from privileged access to information, political connections or control over public resources exists because the reform expands opportunities for accumulation without proposing mechanisms for transparency and social control. This opening up may consolidate an oligarchy born from the state itself. Once that risk becomes real, it is very hard to return as this new capitalist class consolidates its assets — through the National Asset Valuation Program or share purchases. Reversing this concentration would entail a political cost that no actor with veto power will be willing to bear. Inequality, to put it another way, does not dissipate with growth; but tends to become entrenched.

That is why I am worried the debate is reduced to how much GDP grows or how much investment flows into the country. An economy can grow while also losing social cohesion. It can increase productivity while reducing society’s ability to exercise democratic control over the wealth produced.

The crucial question is not how much market an economy can accommodate, but who governs that market. If concentrating wealth ends up also concentrating political power, the problem will no longer be merely inequality, but the formation of a new dominant bloc.

If, in 10 years’ time, Cuba is a more prosperous country but also more oligarchic, we will have changed the economic model without resolving the historical problem of our ailing socialism.

Will these economic reforms be viable without adjustments to the political system?

I have serious doubts. Not because every economic reform automatically requires changing the political system, but because no transformation of this magnitude can be sustained without democratising power. By democratisation, I mean who controls the fundamental economic decisions and the institutions through which society oversees them.

The reform transfers enormous power to companies, banks, investors and new private actors. That may be needed to revive the economy. What is difficult to grasp is why this decentralisation is not accompanied by a corresponding expansion of public oversight.

We are creating more autonomous enterprises, but not necessarily more democratic ones.

This has, precisely, been one of Cuban socialism’s major problems. For too long, we have confused state ownership with social ownership. But a company does not truly belong to society simply because a document says so. It belongs to society when those who produce its wealth and those who depend on it understand how it operates, participate in its decision making and hold its managers accountable.

Economic democratisation is not a luxury reserved for better times, but a prerequisite to remain socialist. This means more than just making enterprises efficient; it needs transparency over the use of public resources, accountability, institutions capable of preventing conflicts of interest, and genuine forums where workers and citizens can have a say in major economic decisions. Otherwise, company autonomy may simply mean autonomy from society.

There is another equally important aspect. If the reform creates new entrepreneurs, new labour relations and new forms of ownership, they must strengthen workers’ organising capacity. A country that profoundly transforms its economy without expanding labour’s participation risks further unbalancing the relationship between capital and society.

All this is even more important given the exceptional conditions imposed by the US blockade. Precisely because Cuba faces extraordinary external pressure, it needs to strengthen internal cohesion. Sherritt [a major Canadian mining and energy company], after more than three decades operating in Moa, withdrew due to sanctions that threatened to block its access to the international banking system. It ended up carrying out a forced sale, under liquidation terms, to a fund linked to a former Trump administration adviser. It is worth remembering that, while Cuba needs foreign currency for the private banking sector and the foreign exchange market to function, whoever controls that flow of capital makes any relief conditional on a political transformation that the government has declared off the table. The market can only be decoupled from the system in a rhetorical sense.

But that internal cohesion, which used to rest on the historical legitimacy of our social project, needs to be built on new forms of participation, transparency and public trust. The margin for error has become very narrow. If, when universal subsidies are phased out, there is no Social Protection Fund already operating, the gap between austerity and direct aid could fuel the same social unrest that erupted in July 2021.

The reform will only bring stability if the majority feels that they not only share in their benefits, but also in making the decisions.

Once again, the challenge lies in preventing the economy’s modernisation from leading to a renewed concentration of power, this time under market-based forms. If socialism remains the long-term goal — despite being virtually absent from the measures announced — then political and economic democratisation cannot come after the reform. They must be part of the reform from day one.

What models, formulas or concepts do you think should have been considered?

The debate has been framed incorrectly from the start. We have been led to believe that there are only two paths: either preserve a failed bureaucratic statism or move to an economy increasingly governed by the market. But the problem has never been a choice between the state and market; it is a question of deciding who exercises power over the economy.

If the Cuban experience has demonstrated anything, it is that state ownership, in itself, does not guarantee socialism. A company can be formally state-owned yet operate with its back turned to society. Similarly, allowing for markets does not necessarily mean abandoning a socialist vision. What matters is whether wealth is subject to democratic control or ends up becoming the property of a minority, whether bureaucratic or private.

For example, if state-owned enterprises are granted autonomy, they should also secure worker participation and effective mechanisms for accountability. If the private sector grows, the state must prevent economic success from turning into political power through progressive taxation, anti-monopoly regulations and strict rules against conflicts of interest. If foreign investment plays a greater role, society has the right to know which national priorities that investment intends to serve.

In other words, without democratic checks and balances, the market ceases to be a tool for the country’s development and becomes a mechanism for concentrating wealth and influence.

I would also have placed far greater emphasis on genuinely social forms of ownership, such as cooperatives, worker-managed enterprises, local development initiatives and spaces where communities have a say over the wealth they generate. I am thinking, specifically, of networks of cooperative banks and locally managed municipal development funds, capable of channeling remittances and reinvesting them in the community, rather than channeling them towards private wealth accumulated by a handful of actors. Not because these initiatives replace the state or market, but because they distribute power. Ultimately, that is what socialism is all about: stopping economic power being concentrated in a few hands.

There is also a lesson that Cuba should not lose sight of. All economic transitions give rise to new social classes. While this may be unavoidable, steps should be taken to prevent a new economic elite gradually taking over the state. That risk is even greater in a country where a significant part of the economy has historically been managed by highly concentrated state and corporate structures. Transparency, oversight of government institutions at all levels, a free media and citizen participation are mechanisms for safeguarding the public nature of the nation’s wealth.

Of course, none of these discussions can take place while ignoring the US blockade. Cuba needs to grow under extraordinarily adverse conditions and has the right to seek the economic tools it needs to survive. But precisely because it faces this external pressure, it is even more important to preserve what historically distinguishes the socialist project: the idea that development should serve the majority and not a new privileged minority.

Ultimately, I believe that the real debate is not whether Cuba should resemble China, Vietnam or any other model. The task at hand is how to build an economy capable of generating wealth without abandoning the democratisation of power.

The future of Cuban socialism will not depend solely on how much the economy grows. It will depend on whether those who produce wealth also have a say in decisions about its use. If reforms merely modernise mechanisms of accumulation, but leave existing power relations intact or even reinforce them, they will have changed the economy without transforming what, from a socialist perspective, really matters: who governs the collective wealth and on whose behalf.




Sunday, July 19, 2026

 

Contemporary challenges for the Malaysian left


Malaysia left graphic

[Editor’s note: Socialist Party of Malaysia activist Kirisna Veni Singham will be speaking at Ecosocialism 2026, September 11-13, Magan-djin/Brisbane, Australia. For more information on the conference visit ecosocialism.org.au.]

First published at Tricontinental.

To understand the current situation in Malaysia we need a brief overview of the history and political and economic development of the country. The Portuguese first came to Southeast Asia in the early 16th century. They, and the Dutch who came about 130 years later, had mercantile interests — they wanted to control the trade routes so that they could acquire the commodities that were in demand in the European market. Hence, they wanted control of the shipping routes and main ports, but were not interested in controlling the hinterland.

The industrial revolution in Europe created a hunger for raw materials such as tin, coffee, sugar, and rubber. The colonial powers needed control over the land in South East Asia to be able to mine, and to open plantations. They also needed cheap labour for the production of these commodities. The local population was not too inclined to slave in difficult conditions for low wages.1 Also, the British thought it best to not disrupt the indigenous Malay population, but instead relied on labour from India and China to develop the colonial economy. This led to a massive influx of Indians and Chinese to the Malayan peninsula starting in the mid-19th century.

Malaya, being colonised by the most ‘virile’ industrial power of that time, experienced the fastest development of mines, plantations, roads, railways, and ports, compared to Indonesia, Indochina, and the Philippines. This resulted in massive demographic changes — at Independence in 1957, the immigrant population of Chinese and Indians was actually slightly more than half the total population of Malaya. The class character of Malayan society had changed dramatically in the colonial period. Prior to 1800, the vast majority of the population were peasants and fishermen engaged in a subsistence economy. The colonial economy generated a large working class in the plantations, tin mines and the railways, and this in turn sparked off a network of supporting economic activities — market gardening, import of food and other basic necessities, retail trade, local production of some consumer products, transport, etc.2

In the meantime, the native Malay population was shielded from the colonial economy, and their lifestyle and economic activities did not change much. The British were outwardly ‘respectful’ of the Sultans of the various States and provided handsomely for them, as this helped sustain the myth that the British were benevolent ‘advisors’ to the native rulers. Land was plentiful in Malaya, so the British had no cause to deprive the Malay peasants of their land. But they enacted a law that forbade the Malay farmers from converting their rice fields to plantations of rubber or other commodities for export.3 Rice was the staple grain for the Malays as well as the immigrant Chinese and Indians. The British needed a sufficient supply of inexpensive rice for immigrant labour.

The only strata within the indigenous community which resented British rule were the Malay chieftains and lesser royalties whose sources of income — levies on the produce of the peasants, contributions for the use of rivers, etc. — were compromised when the British took over the administration of land in Malaya. There were, therefore, a series of revolts by these chieftains in the late 19th century, but they were not able to get the support of the peasants (whose way of life had not been much affected by the colonial economy) or the Sultans who were well looked after by the British.4

The Malayan Communist Party and the independence struggle

The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was founded in 1930 in Singapore. The MCP retreated into the jungle in early 1942 and resisted the Japanese occupation of Malaya as the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The MPAJA was largely ethnic Chinese as the Japanese had a pronounced anti-Chinese bias. The MCP was recognised by the British post-World War II, with its leader Chin Peng receiving the Order of the British Empire in London. The MCP opened offices in several towns in post-World War II Malaya and continued organising the population.

Independence was in the air in Asia, spurred by vibrant independence movements in China, India and in Indonesia by the end of World War II. Though many of the Malay and Indian nationalists had been on the opposite side during the Japanese occupation, the MCP managed to set up a broad-based coalition called the All Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA).5 It comprised the trade union movement, the MPAJA, the Malayan Democratic Union (a party set up by urban English educated Malayans), the Malayan Indian Congress, some Chinese business interests, and others. The AMCJA formed a pact with PUTERA, a coalition of Malay nationalists comprising the Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya, Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API), and the Angkatan Wanita Sedar (AWAS).

The AMCJA-PUTERA coalition had a series of discussions that resulted in the ‘Peoples Constitution’ detailing how the nation would be governed post-Independence. However, the British rebuffed the efforts of this coalition to initiate negotiations for independence. The AMCJA-PUTERA coalition called for a Hartal that was carried out on 20 October 1947. All activity in Malaya was stopped for a day — a nationwide strike where even businesses did not open.

The British struck back. API was banned in July 1947 and several of its leaders including the charismatic Ahmad Boestamam was detained and imprisoned. The British then passed legislation to control the militant trade union movement. Unions had to limit themselves to specific sectors of the economy. The then-existing General Labour Unions had to reorganise themselves into smaller sector-based unions and register with the Registrar of Trade Union (RTU). The RTU however refused to recognise many of the re-organised unions. When they attempted to continue to organise the workers, these unions were deemed illegal criminal organisations and their leaders detained. Strikes were met with brutal repression with instances of workers being killed by the authorities.

On 17 June 1948, a unit of the MCP assassinated three British planters in Sg Siput Perak. The British declared the Emergency, arrested thousands of activists and outlawed the MCP, which took to the jungles. In the initial period, MCP units were able to prevail, over-running small rural police stations and even briefly taking over the administration of a rural town, Gua Musang. The British High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney of Malaya was assassinated on 6 October 1951.

The British countered with the Brigg’s Plan in 1950 to deny food supplies to the communist forces. All the Chinese farmers scattered in the peri-urban regions were forced to move into 540 security camps, with barbed wire fencing all around, and a single-entry point guarded by the military or police. The farmers were allowed to tend to their crops during the day but were under curfew from dusk to dawn. Plantation workers were not permitted to buy rice. The management of estates gave each family a daily ration of cooked rice depending on the size of the family. The indigenous community, the Orang Asli, too was similarly confined in security camps.

The communist insurgency, deprived of food, was not able to sustain larger units. A decision was taken in 1952 to retreat to the Malayan-Thai border.6 The British also had a propaganda blitz where they painted the MCP as Chinese dominated and injurious to the long-term welfare of the Malay population.

Meanwhile the British set up Legislative Councils with representatives from the elites of Malayan society — the Malay aristocracy and non-Malay business leaders. They recognised United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) that was set up by Malay aristocrats and elites in colonial civil service. A national election was called in 1955 in which the Alliance Party, a coalition led by UMNO, won 51 out of the 52 seats contested. It had campaigned on the pledges of Amnesty for the MCP and Independence within two years. The leader of UMNO, Tunku Abdul Rahman was designated as the Chief Minister of Malaya.

The MCP responded to the 1955 election pledges by indicating that it was interested in Amnesty. The MCP could see by then that winning the armed struggle would be near impossible. They wanted access to the people and the electoral space. A talk was held between Alliance leaders and the MCP in Baling, Kedah in December 1955. The MCP were prepared to lay down arms and even dissolve the MCP. They wanted the right to return to Malaya and participate in the political process.6 The Tunku insisted on surrender, detention, and rehabilitation. An agreement could not be reached. The MCP leaders felt that Tunku had to take a strong stand to impress the British so as to win independence. They hoped that negotiations would resume after independence, but the MCP had to wait 30 long years for that. In August 1957, the British granted independence to Malaya helmed by the Alliance government.

The economic development of post-independence Malaysia

Malaya was primarily a producer of primary commodities during independence (1957). Rubber was its biggest export, and tin was the second largest. The plantation companies have since diversified to oil palm — now 5.6 million ha out of the 8.4 million hectares of agricultural land in Malaysia is dedicated to oil palm cultivation, while rubber is grown on 1 million ha of mainly smallholder farms. In the 1980s, the government managed to acquire a majority of shares in the plantation companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and currently more than 60% of plantation land is held by government-linked companies.

In the 1970s, the Chief Minister of Penang then, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, pioneered special economic zones catering for multinational electronic companies looking for lower costs of production. Many multinational corporations opened factories in Penang and a network of supporting factories have evolved over the years. Electronic components are now the largest export commodity of Malaysia, dwarfing oil palm. Employment in the manufacturing sector now accounts for about 18% of total employment, but wages are at about the minimum wage level, and around 30% of all workers in manufacturing are foreign workers. Much of our manufacturing is linked to global chains.

Post-independence, large petroleum deposits were discovered in Malaysia. The government enacted the Petroleum Development Act in 1974 which vested ownership of all petroleum discovered in Malaysia in Petronas, a company fully owned by the Ministry of Finance. Any foreign oil company which discovers petroleum in Malaysia has to negotiate an income sharing agreement with Petronas. Petronas has been contributing between 20 to 40% of the federal revenue for the past 30 years.

On the social front, the following significant steps have been taken:

  • Rice farmers (around 200,000) and traditional fishermen (80,000), predominantly ethnic Malay, receive subsidies of various sorts. But they still constitute one of the poorest sectors of Malaysian society.
  • 110,000 rural families have been allocated ten acres of land each under the Federal Land Development Authority land schemes. Slightly less than a half a million ha of land has been utilised for this scheme. Oil palm is the main crop.
  • The Employment Provident Fund (EPF), that was set up in the late colonial period has now grown to cover about twelve million members (out of a labour force of sixteen million) and has total assets of RM 1.2 trillion (Malaysia’s GDP in 2025 is RM 1.875 trillion).
  • The Social Security Organisation (SOCSO) was set up in 1971 pursuant to a 1969 Act of Parliament and currently covers about nine million workers. It compensates workers for workplace injuries, and provides a life-long pension if a worker becomes disabled for any reason. SOCSO recently initiated schemes to cover gig riders and housewives.
  • The government has set up a network of hospitals and clinics such that 95% of the population is within three km of a health care facility. Childhood immunisation is at 99% of the eligible population. Life expectancy increased from 66.5 years at independence to 75 years currently. Mortality under five is now 7.8 per 1000 live births.
  • Schooling is free up to the secondary level — thirteen years in total.

Malaysia’s GDP has increased 24-fold, in real terms, between 1970 and 2020. The population’s access to modern conveniences — refrigerators, cars, washing machines, gas cookers, televisions, handphones, etc. — has increased tremendously. However:

  • Wages are about 1/8th of the wages in Europe for work of a similar nature.
  • Household debt is about 200% of total household income. The ratio is higher for the lower decile of the population.
  • Many working people work more than 48 hours per week to try and make ends meet.
  • 21% of children under-five in Malaysia are stunted.7
  • House prices are exorbitant, and housing loans are a major component of household debt.
  • Old age poverty is a sad reality in Malaysia. 75% of the retirees aged 65 and above do not have any savings to draw upon.
  • While highly subsidised health care is available for all, the public health care system is underfunded, receiving only 2.4% of the GDP. Waiting lists are long, and so, many families take out private insurance so that they can go to private hospitals if there are delays in the public health care system.
  • 50% of the rice consumed in Malaysia is currently imported. As wheat cannot be grown in Malaysia, we are totally dependent on wheat imports. Malaysia is a highly food insecure country!

In addition, since the 1990s, Malaysia has entered a number of Free Trade Agreements which threaten the economic sovereignty of the country and seriously impair the ability of the Malaysian government to manage the national economy. For example:

  • The ASEAN Free Trade Agreement has tied us to a zero-tariff policy for over 98% of goods vis-à-vis ASEAN countries. This constrains us from raising our minimum wage by a larger quantum as then, cheaper manufactured goods from ASEAN would devastate our manufacturing sector. And our food producers are subject to dumping of excess produce from the neighbouring ASEAN countries.
  • The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and other agreements grant foreign investors numerous rights including the right to enter any economic sector that is open to local businesses, freedom from any requirements to enhance local technical capacity or use local inputs, and freedom from any form of capital controls.
  • The Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions exist in several of these FTAs.8

Malaysians are living better in material terms, but are under severe economic stress as incomes are generally low, and the cost of living is high. There is a high level of insecurity and uncertainty and therefore stress. This needn’t be so. Our analysis (Table 1) shows that too large a portion of national income accrues to the owners of capital!

Table 1: The share of national income accrued to various social groups in Malaysia.

Social Strata

Share of National Income

16 Million Working People

29%

Government

16%

Owners of Capital & Top Managers (0.3 million individuals)

55%

The parliamentary left

The radical Malay nationalists who were detained in 1947 were released in 1955 before the national elections. Some among them, including Boestaman, set up the Parti Rakyat (Peoples Party) while others entered the Parti Buruh (Labour Party). These two parties contested the general elections of 1959 as the Socialist Front and won eight seats in the 104-member parliament. They also did well in the Municipal elections winning a majority of seats in the Penang City Council and the position of Mayor.

The Alliance government abolished Local Council Elections and used the Internal Security Act (ISA) to detain more than a thousand Socialist Front leaders and activists in the 1960s, seriously impeding the expansion of the Front.9 Issues involving language and the nature of Malaysia also divided the Chinese and the Malay members of the Socialist Front. The Chinese members, largely in the Parti Buruh, wanted equality for all nationalities in Malaysia, with three official languages. The Malays, largely in the Parti Rakyat, wanted Malaysia to be recognised as part of the Nusantara Melayu (the Malay homeland); while the languages and religions of the immigrant communities would be respected, Malay language and culture should be the bedrock upon which the Malaysian nation should be based. These issues led to the break-up of the Socialist Front in 1966.

The Parti Buruh, weakened by the detention of many of their leaders and disillusioned with the electoral process, decided not to contest the 1969 elections. A significant number of them went underground and linked up with the MCP. The Parti Buruh was then de-registered. The Parti Rakyat won two state assembly seats in Pahang in 1969, but the two elected members spent their terms under detention under the ISA. These were the last election victories of the Parti Rakyat.

Ethnic imbalances in Malaysia

For reasons that have been elucidated in the section on the colonial period, the Malay community was economically disadvantaged during independence. As they had remained outside the modern economy, the academic achievement of Malays and their representation in the professions was far below their population ratio.

This was recognised by the Malaysian leaders at that time, and a special provision (Article 153) was included in the Federal Constitution empowering the Constitutional Monarch to grant special quotas for Malays in educational institutions and permits for businesses. Many special residential schools and junior colleges were set up to enable the Malay population to catch up academically. Many scholarships and business permits have been awarded. Intake into government jobs such as clerical staff, teachers, and nurses have witnessed a very high proportion of Malays resulting in our 1.6 million civil service now being more than 85% bumiputera.10

This affirmative action premised on ethnicity — termed the New Economic Policy (NEP) — has seen the creation of a large Malay middle class and has stabilised Malaysian society considerably. But, as the Table 2 shows, there is still a significant imbalance — the Malay community hasn’t reached their population ratio in some key professions.

Table 2: Bumiputera participation in selected professions

Profession

1973

2014

2023

Engineer

13.5%

32%

 

Medical doctor

7.6%

46%

 

Veterinary doctor

30.8%

42%

 

Dentist

8.4%

 

52.8%

Accountant

17.9%

 

32.3%

Lawyer

20.3%

 

38.9%

The Malay community constitutes about 60% of the population of Malaysia. The indigenous populations of Sabah and Sarawak make up another about 10% of the population. They are collectively termed bumiputera (sons of the soil) in some government documents. The Chinese community makes up 23% of the Malaysian population while the Indians constitute 7%, and the Orang Asli are around 200 thousand strong. The figures in the Table 2 attest to the fact that even 60 years post-independence, the bumiputera are lagging behind in several occupations.

The bumiputera communities are still over-represented in agriculture which is a low-income sector. Even in the formal sector, the available data indicates that they are earning much less than non-Malay workers as their median EPF savings were significantly lower than the non-Malay population (as Table 3 shows). Also, they did not have other financial assets to rely on during the Covid-19 lockdown and had to withdraw a large portion of their already meagre retirement funds.

Table 3: Median EPF savings (in Malaysian Ringgit) before and after the Covid-19 lockdowns, by ethnic group.

Race

Savings (April 2020)

Savings (December 2022)

Decline

Bumiputera

15,541

4,937

-10,604

Malay

16,938

5,529

-11,409

Othe Bumiputera

10,591

3,302

-7,289

Chinese

45,756

45,162

-594

Indian

25,724

14,929

-10,795

Class differentiation of the Malay community and the Reformasi movement

Malay society has undergone a massive change in the past 65 years. Now, the majority of them are wage-earners in urban areas. The feudal ties that bonded them to their rural villages have been weakened. They are part of the urban working class and are struggling financially because of low wages and high cost of living.

UMNO, the party that led the nation to independence and that oversaw the implementation of the ethnic based affirmative action favouring the Malays has also transformed from a grassroots-based party of school teachers, journalists, and religious leaders into a party of businessmen, contractors, and corporate bosses. Much of the financial allocations meant for the Malay poor is now captured by this stratum of Malay business people.

The financial crisis of 1997-1998 led to a severe crisis within the UMNO elite. There were too many crony capitalists who needed funds, and there was disagreement on who to save, whether to accept IMF loans, etc. The then Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, sacked his deputy Anwar Ibrahim citing sexual impropriety. This sparked the Reformasi movement. Ibrahim campaigned on the issue of governance, corruption, and the fattened Malay elite who had hijacked funds meant for uplifting the Malay poor. He utilised his Islamic credentials to strengthen his criticism. A significant part of the Malay urban population joined the movement.

Ibrahim was imprisoned in 1999.11 Mohamad stepped down as Prime Minister in 2003. In 2009, Najib Bin Razak became the Prime Minister. Then, the 1MDB scandal erupted in 2016. This reignited the Reformasi movement. The corruption associated with the UMNO elite had become common knowledge by then. The mighty UMNO party began losing ground and the Pakatan Harapan, Ibrahim’s coalition, formed the government in 2018.12

The current status of the Malaysian left

The Parti Sosialis Malaysia (Socialist Party of Malaysia or PSM) is currently the most visible and active left party in Malaysia. However, because of our origins as student activist groups working among plantation workers (largely Indian), currently about 60% of PSM members are Indian. The PSM began working with non-Indian ethnic groups in the late 1990s and our Chinese and Malay membership is increasing gradually. We need many more cadres of all ethnic groups.

Apart from the PSM, there are several other left parties in Malaysia:

  1. The veterans of the MCP and the Parti Buruh. These veterans outnumber the PSM. The former members of the MCP who were allowed back into Malaysia after the Haatyai Peace Accord of 1989 have formed the Kawan Karib (Close Friends) and the 21st Century associations. They have regular dinners and social gatherings. But they are not politically active apart from publishing several memoirs and biographies that detail their role in the struggle for independence. Some among them support our fund-raising dinners.
  2. The Parti Rakyat. It is a shadow of its former self. It still puts up a few candidates at each general election, but does little in the intervening periods except for the occasional press statements. The PSM is trying to persuade them to join us in forming a progressive third force coalition.
  3. The Socialist Alternative. The Socialist Alternative is a small group that is affiliated with the Committee for a Workers’ International. They come out with periodic analyses of the current situation. Their analyses are good, but lacking in concrete ideas of how to move forward given the current reality. They still practice ‘entryism’ which makes it difficult to include them in joint activities. In any case, they believe that the PSM is leading the working class astray with our reformist policies and participation in elections.
  4. Left-leaning individuals in media, NGOs, academia, and civil society. There are quite a large number of such individuals. They are supportive of our campaigns and other activities. The PSM is keen to get them onboard as there is a lot of work to do.

Challenges facing the left in Malaysia

The left in Malaya/Malaysia has been beaten down twice in the past 80 years. The British managed to neutralise the armed insurrection of 1948. By 1952, the MCP was effectively excluded from Malayan society. The Alliance government used the ISA to detain hundreds of Socialist Front leaders and union activists in the 1960s, and crippled the parliamentary left. History, they say, is written by the victor. The left has been vilified by official propaganda for the past 80 years, both in the print media as well as in the text books.

As a result, the public perception of the left is rather negative. Many Malaysians feel that the left is innately authoritarian, anti-democratic, and violent. The armed insurgency of the MCP, the authoritarianism of the Soviet Union from 1930 onwards, the genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge, and Western propaganda have all contributed to this fairly entrenched view.

Religion has a great influence over the Malaysian population. About 80% of Malays surveyed a few years ago said that Islam was the most important component of their identity, only then ethnicity, and nationality. Some Malays fear that joining the PSM would make them too ‘secular’ and impair their ‘Aqidah’. Conservative religiosity isn’t confined to Muslims. In the recent by-elections for the state seat of Ayer Kuning (on 26 April 2025), our candidate Bawani was attacked by opponents for being an atheist.13

The PSM has responded to these two perceptions and fears by arguing that:

  1. We believe in democratizing society — at the workplace through unionisation, at community level through the formation of community level councils, and by re-instituting local government elections.
  2. We contest elections, we organise campaigns as permitted by the laws of the country.14
  3. We have been involved in so many community struggles for the past 30 years. There hasn’t been an instance where we initiated any violence.

As for the perception that the left is against religion and faith, we state that we are not anti-religion. There is no requirement to renounce religion in order to become a PSM member. The PSM believes that religion is a personal matter and there should be no compulsion on anyone to follow or leave any particular religion. There are people of all faiths in the PSM. There are also atheists and agnostics. It is their right to not believe. We also point out that socialism, which is based on solidarity with all, including the poor and the marginalized, is much more in line with the principles of religions than capitalism.

There are quite a number of people who believe the left does not have the capacity to manage a modern economy. Unfortunately, there is some truth in the general perception that parties left of the social-democrats are idealistic and out of touch with current reality. Too many in the left have not given sufficient thought about our programme for the first five years after taking power should be. We need to move from critiquing capitalism and imperialism to explain, in layman terms, how we will transform the current reality into something that is better for all the citizens. We need a realistic transitional programme that the ordinary person can understand, and identify with. It cannot be just an article of faith!

In the Malaysian context we need to have positions on the following issues (among others):

  • Our stance on foreign capital already invested in Malaysia? At present our economy is export oriented and we need market access. The value of Malaysia’s exports is equal to 75% of GDP. Disengaging too abruptly from the global system would result in high unemployment rates and economic misery.
  • Are we thinking of working towards a planned economy like there was in the USSR, or of a well-regulated market economy that allocates resources through a system of prices set by supply/demand mechanics (as has developed in China)?
  • What is the role of small and medium sized firms in the economy we are envisaging? Many of them are owned by Malaysian Chinese. Would we want to develop a strategic partnership with them to enhance Malaysia’s industrial and technological self-reliance?
  • How would we reduce the tendency of the leaders of our movement being over-influenced or even bought over by business interests?
  • Would we want to put up tariffs to protect domestic manufacturing industries which are obliged to implement the higher wages we would legislate? If so, how would we disentangle ourselves from international trade and investment agreements that Malaysia has signed on to? These agreements tie us to a low or zero-tariff regime.
  • Or would we keep wages relatively low, so that our industries remain competitive, but increase the social wage (subsidised health care, public transport, free tertiary education, residences for rent, etc.)? Or would we implement a negative income tax that would level up the income of all working Malaysians to a basic minimum?
  • How would we handle the fiscal deficit and the RM 1.2 trillion debt that the government has accumulated?15 Debt repayment is now RM 56 billion or 17% of total government revenue. Would we increase corporate taxes unilaterally or would we try to do this in conjunction with ASEAN and other countries?
  • Could we use the modality of debt financing? If so, to what extent?

These are some of the issues that we need a clear understanding of if the left intends to take over the management of a modern economy that is closely integrated into the global capitalist economy. The PSM is working on several of these issues in our Policy Research Bureau, but there are many issues that we still do not know enough about.

There is thus a basis for the comment, ‘you people are good activists who speak up for the marginalized. Stay as an NGO and continue the good work’. In other words, they do not trust us to manage the economy and fear that we would crash it by causing capital flight, unemployment, and social unrest. We need to address these fears by clarifying our own understanding of these issues, and achieving a consensus about the pace of progress towards socialism.

Apart from all the negative perceptions of the left in the Malaysian public, the left faces a very ethnically polarised society. After the demolition of the left at the end of the 1960s, all the main political parties — both in government and opposition — were ethnic or religious based. Fifty years of ethnicised politicking has created a highly polarised society. The Malay population (60% of total population) are still the poorer compared to the Chinese (23% of the total). The Malays are anxious that the affirmative action they have enjoyed would be withdrawn. They fear becoming ‘second class citizens’ in their own country.

The Chinese business class’s grouse is that they are creating wealth for the nation, but are being unfairly treated. Communities of Chinese farmers who have been tilling state land since before independence keep getting evicted with scant compensation whenever nearby urban centres need houses or industrial sites. The Chinese fear that their vernacular schools will be closed, and that Islamic dress codes and other restrictions will be enforced on them.

The indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak — the Kadazan, Murut, Sulu, Bajau, Iban, Bidayu, Kenyah, Kayan, Penan, and several others (10% of the total Malaysian population) — feel that they are being neglected by the government, and that their land rights are being trampled upon. The Indians (7% of total population), are resentful that they are left out of most affirmative action programmes and denied government jobs, though there are many Indians who are in need. They also are afraid that some of the 500+ Tamil primary schools in the country will be closed down. Hindu Temple demolitions are another sore point.

The PSM is trying to impress on the people that:

  1. The grievances and fears of all the communities are valid and have to be dealt with in a spirit of solidarity. The Malaysian Constitution presents well-balanced formulae for handling most of the outstanding issues. However, certain issues are exaggerated and played up by politicians vying for power.
  2. The working people of all ethnicities need to be united to demand a fairer share of the economy.
  3. The main political parties which play up and exaggerate ethnic conflicts are actually traitors to the working people, for they divert attention from the crucial issue — 55% of the wealth created by our collective effort is going to 3% of the population leaving 97% of the population with only 29% of the wealth.

Apart from the above challenges, repression by the authorities is a persistent danger. This was consistently used to cripple left movements in the past.16 The likelihood of this being used against us is high if we succeed in rallying more people to our side and appear as a threat to the status quo.

Undoubtedly, the Left in Malaysia faces several tough challenges. However, the PSM believes that we have the ideas that can take this nation forward. And we are working hard to build a movement that will bring a progressive coalition of political parties and people movements to power.

Jeyakumar Devaraj is Chairperson of Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM)

  • 1

    The annual mortality rates for immigrant labour in some estates were as high as 10% for certain years due to malnutrition, malaria, other infections, and snake bites.

  • 2

    Kevin Henison and Jim Glassman, ‘Class in Southeast Asia’, in Class, Economy and Politics in South East Asia (University of Philippines and Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2024).

  • 3

    Rice Land Enactment (1917).

  • 4

    Dato Maharaja Lela assassinated James W. W. Birch, the British Resident of Perak in November 1875, launching the Perak War against the British. He was executed by the British in 1877. There are several other noblemen e.g. Mat Kilau and Dato Bahaman, who also rebelled and resisted British colonial rule.

  • 5

    The Japanese encouraged Indian nationalists to set up the Indian National Army under Subash Chandra Bose. This army fought alongside the Japanese in the Burmese – Indian border.

  • 6

    Chin Peng, Alias Ching Peng: My Side of History (Media Masters Pte, 2003).

  • 7

    UNICEF.

  • 8

    ISDS provisions provide for foreign investors to by-pass national courts and refer disputes with the host government to a private Tribunal in Hong Kong, Europe or in the US.

  • 9

    The ISA empowered the Minister of Home Affairs to detain persons suspected of being a threat to the security of the Nation for a period of two years, without the requirement to charge the persons in Court. The period of detention could be extended for another two years if the Minister deemed it necessary. Individuals have been held for up to 20 years under this Act. This Act was repealed in 2013.

  • 10

    Bumiputera means ‘son of the soil’. It refers to ethnic Malays who make up about 60% of the population of Malaysia and indigenous Sabahan and Sarawakians who make up another 10% of the population of the country.

  • 11

    On sodomy charges. These were reversed in 2004 and Ibrahim was released.

  • 12

    Results of the General Elections in Malaysia. The Barisan Nasional is the coalition led by UMNO. Should be noted that some coalition members left after 2018 and others left in 2022. The total number of seats in the Malaysian Lower House is 222.

    Year   Seats won by the Barisan Nasional

    2004                198

    2008                140

    2013                132

    2018                79

    2022                30

  • 13

    We only obtained 6.3% of the votes cast, as we had anticipated. But we achieved our targets – exposure in the mainstream media as well as several dozen videos about our analyses and work in social media.

  • 14

    The PSM organises campaigns highlighting major issues affecting the people. Our last campaign was for universal old age pension to address old age poverty. An 18-month long campaign. We are just beginning a campaign to defend and improve the public health care system which is chronically underfunded and under assault.

  • 15

    Malaysian GDP was RM 1875 billion at the end of 2024.

  • 16

    Six senior members of the PSM were arrested under the Emergency Ordinance in 2011 and investigated for ‘attempting to rekindle the armed struggle’. The Emergency Ordinance allows detention without trial for an indeterminate period, just like the ISA. The PSM conducted a vigorous campaign and managed to release us after a month.