Soft Power And Strategic Ports: China’s Expanding Media Presence In Panama – Analysis




August 1, 2026
Diálogo Américas
By Paolo Manzo

Key Takeaways:

China pairs economic investments in ports, telecom, energy, and logistics with coordinated media and digital campaigns that portray it as a reliable development partner and reduce scrutiny of strategic dependencies.

In Panama, after the country left the Belt and Road Initiative and a court struck down Chinese-linked port concessions, Beijing’s messaging shifted from cooperative to confrontational, framing the decisions as U.S. pressure rather than independent national choices.

Similar influence efforts appear across Central America and the Caribbean, integrating infrastructure projects with narratives that can normalize dependencies; analysts recommend stronger independent media, fact-checking, and transparency to counter them.

In recent years, China has paired its economic expansion with growing media and digital influence efforts, using strategic communications to strengthen its presence in key sectors such as ports, telecommunications, energy, and logistics. Through state media, embassies, social media platforms, and local partners, Beijing promotes narratives that portray China as a reliable partner and a driver of development.

These campaigns are not solely intended to improve China’s image. They also seek to shape the political and social environment in which projects involving strategic infrastructure are debated. The goal is to build support for Chinese investments while reducing public scrutiny of potential risks related to economic dependencies, control of critical infrastructure, and security concerns.


“Beijing has progressively shaped public debate and policy orientations in ways that discourage critical examination of strategic dependencies, governance risks, and security concerns associated with major Chinese investments,” Martin Vladimirov, program director at the Europe-based Center for the Study of Democracy, told Diálogo.

Panama offers a particularly revealing example of how this strategy has evolved. For years, China’s presence at the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal was accompanied by narratives emphasizing cooperation, modernization, and economic growth. But after Panama withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Supreme Court declared the Panama Ports Company concessions unconstitutional, Chinese messaging became noticeably more confrontational, raising questions about how Beijing may respond when its strategic interests are challenged in the region.
The battle over the ports narrative

The dispute surrounding the ports of Balboa and Cristóbal marked a turning point in China’s communications strategy in Panama. Following the country’s withdrawal from the BRI, the strengthening of ties with Washington, and the January 2026 ruling against Panama Ports Company, controlled by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison, messages from Chinese state media and diplomatic channels adopted a much more confrontational tone.


According to Beijing’s narrative, Panama’s decisions were not the result of an independent national choice but rather the product of pressure exerted by the United States. At the same time, CK Hutchison was portrayed as the victim of an injustice and a violation of the rule of law, while Chinese authorities emphasized the need to protect the company’s “legitimate rights and interests.”

As Vladimirov noted, “In Panama, Beijing has portrayed criticism of Chinese involvement in strategic infrastructure as politically motivated or driven by geopolitical competition.”

This approach represents an evolution of the model identified in a 2025 report by Expediente Abierto. The study identified three pillars of Chinese messaging in Panama: China as a historic partner through the presence of the Chinese-Panamanian community for more than 170 years; China as a driver of economic and infrastructure development; and China as an alternative to U.S. influence.

Through a network that includes Xinhua, CGTN Español, the Chinese Embassy, and a range of local amplifiers, port and logistics investments were presented as tools for growth and modernization. While the port concessions dispute has not altered the fundamental objectives of China’s communications strategy, it has changed the tone. Themes of national sovereignty and historic U.S. interference, already present in earlier messaging, have become central to the debate.


Vladimirov believes this phase may be temporary. “Over time, I expect China to rely instead on economic incentives, trade partnerships, and diplomatic engagement to preserve its position,” he said. Panama remains too important as a logistics and commercial hub for China.

The Panama case is particularly significant because it combines critical logistics infrastructure, global maritime connectivity, and a geographic position of strategic importance to international trade. In this context, debates over ports, concessions, and investments extend beyond economics and become closely linked to sovereignty, institutional resilience, and the protection of strategic infrastructure.
A strategy that extends beyond Panama

Panama’s experience is not unique. Across Central America and the Caribbean, China’s economic expansion has been accompanied by communications efforts designed to strengthen its political and social legitimacy.

In El Salvador, for example, construction of the new National Stadium and the La Libertad tourist pier has been presented as tangible evidence of China’s contribution to the country’s development. Chinese official messaging has also highlighted cooperation with the Salvadoran government in the areas of security, technology, and education.

In Costa Rica, meanwhile, the strategy has focused on cultural diplomacy, academic exchanges, and telecommunications. The controversy surrounding Huawei and other Chinese providers’ exclusion from the country’s 5G network has often been portrayed by media outlets and voices aligned with Beijing as an example of geopolitical pressure. Costa Rican authorities, however, have argued that the restrictions stem from cybersecurity regulations requiring suppliers of critical telecommunications infrastructure to originate from countries that are parties to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, a criterion that China does not meet.

Cuba offers another important example. On the island, China’s presence extends to telecommunications through companies such as Huawei and ZTE, as well as to port and airport infrastructure and the energy sector, where Beijing has invested in power grid modernization and new solar energy projects. This has been accompanied by close media cooperation between Cuban and Chinese state media organizations, including content-sharing agreements, co-productions, and converging narratives.
Infrastructure and information

According to analysts, one of the most significant aspects of China’s strategy is its ability to integrate economic and informational influence. Investments and narratives advance in parallel.


Alongside its commercial expansion, Beijing has built a network that includes embassies, state media outlets, cultural institutes, universities, research centers, and local interlocutors. Together, these actors help disseminate favorable messaging about Chinese investments and reinforce the image of the People’s Republic of China as a reliable and indispensable development partner.

According to Vladimirov, Chinese influence is typically exercised through a mutually reinforcing network of actors. “State media and embassies partner with local political figures and commercial stakeholders to amplify narratives that promote Chinese investments and portray China as a reliable development partner,” he said.

Experts warn that the primary concern is that these narratives may normalize strategic dependencies and limit public debate about the geopolitical, economic, and security costs associated with control of critical infrastructure. As Vladimirov noted, “These dependencies can eventually become economic and political levers that are difficult to remove.”

To counter propaganda and influence campaigns, Vladimirov argues that it is essential to strengthen independent media and promote fact-checking mechanisms capable of identifying coordinated or misleading narratives. Increasing transparency regarding who funds and disseminates certain content, as well as developing institutional capabilities to monitor foreign influence operations, is equally important.

This article was published by Diálogo Américas

About Diálogo Américas
Diálogo Américas is a professional magazine published by U.S. Southern Command as an international forum for security issues in Latin America.
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Number of people living in each city - OWID

Most of the world’s fastest-growing megacities will soon be in Africa. / OWIDFacebook

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By Esteban Ortiz-Ospina for Our World in Data July 31, 2026

Most of the world’s fastest-growing megacities will soon be in Africa. Many cities across East Asia and Latin America have grown quickly over the last few decades. Since 1950, São Paulo’s population has grown sixfold. Shanghai’s nearly tenfold, Our World in Data  (OWID)  reports.

This rapid growth is now ending. São Paulo is near its population peak, and Shanghai is projected to peak around 2050.

The fastest-growing megacities are now emerging elsewhere. In the chart, you can see various examples: Karachi in South Asia, and Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, and Luanda in Africa.

Luanda, the capital of Angola, is an interesting case. It gets much less attention than well-established megacities, but as the chart shows, it's on track to overtake São Paulo in about 20 years and Shanghai in about 60.

In this dataset from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, only 24 of today’s 100 largest cities are projected to still be growing by 2100; of those, 12 are in Africa, and 5 are in South Asia.

Of course, these rely on projections — often many decades ahead — and those come with a lot of uncertainty. Nonetheless, they provide a useful perspective on what the future of cities across the world might look like.

Explore the full data for other cities in our interactive chart

TACO

Trump flip-flops on Patriot license for Ukraine promise

During their meeting in Ankara US President Donald Trump promised Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy a license to make Patriot interceptor missiles in Ukraine, but a week later he appears to have cooled on the idea. / IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 2, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has asked Washington for an emergency package of 300 Patriot missiles before winter, warning that Ukraine’s reserves are running dangerously low and that the country cannot reliably defend itself against Russian ballistic missiles without them.

During a heavy bombardment of Kyiv at the weekend that killed nine people, Ukraine was only able to bring down one of the 50-odd missiles Russia fired, in a testament to how low its stock of air defence ammo is.

But Zelenskiy’s request has landed at a bad time for the White House as America’s stock of the sought after missiles is also running dangerously low after heavy expenditure in the Iran war. Able to only produce about 600 new PAC-3 interceptor missiles a year, the production bottleneck has seen the order book back up for years to come.

Trump added a further layer of uncertainty on July 31 when he said he was “not sure” whether Washington would allow Ukraine to make Patriot interceptors domestically, retreating from a pledge he had made at the Nato summit in Ankara earlier in July.

“It’s a very extraordinary weapon, and we have to be a little bit careful of who we license it to. We don’t really license equipment,” Trump told the Financial Times.

“I’m not looking for missiles. We’re looking for peace,” he added, saying that his priority was ending the war rather than expanding Ukraine’s long-term weapons-production capacity.

While Zelenskiy boasted earlier this year that Ukraine now produces 60% of what it needs domestically, it still has no large scale production capacity for the most sophisticated missiles and counter measures. Currently, the PAC-3 is the only munition Ukraine has that can reliably bring down Russian ballistic missiles, and Russia has been pouring resources into expanding its missile production capacity.

Kyiv has turned to European production as the only durable solution to its dependence on intermittent US supplies, but the clock is ticking. Ukraine has launched dozens of joint ventures with European defence companies under the so-called Danish model, but these facilities will not start coming on line until 2027 at the earliest and Ukraine’s need for more air defence measures is immediate and urgent.

Zelenskiy raised the licensing issue directly with Trump during their meeting in Washington on July 28. Zelenskiy described the talks as “good”, while Trump said afterwards: “I would like him to end the war. It’s very simple.”

Yet even if Trump were to give formal approval, Ukraine would still face a more fundamental obstacle: Boeing’s reported refusal to licence production of the seeker head used in the PAC-3 interceptor is a potential deal-killer.

The seeker bottleneck

The PAC-3 MSE is the best Patriot interceptor for Ukraine, and its seeker uses Ka-band active electronically scanned array technology, among the most advanced systems of its kind, developed by Boeing.

In reality, even if the Patriot license is granted, Ukraine won’t actually make these missiles, but will be forced to import the components from US producers as it will remain beyond Kyiv’s ability to build the production to make many of the components. The US production bottleneck will remain in effect to begin with as these components are in as high demand as the completed missiles themselves.

That makes Boeing’s seeker a critical bottleneck in any attempt to establish production outside the US.

According to reports, Boeing is not prepared to share the relevant technology with third countries. Without access to the seeker design and manufacturing process, Ukraine cannot build a genuinely domestic PAC-3 supply chain, even if other parts of the missile could be produced locally.

The problem is not limited to intellectual property. Building a complete production network would require licences, specialist factories, qualified suppliers and several years of work.

Even Boeing’s own expansion plans are slow. The company is estimated to need roughly seven years to triple production of the relevant components.

Factories built inside Ukraine would also obviously become priority targets for Russian missile and drone attacks. During this weekend’s missile barrage on Kyiv, the residential damage was widely reported, but less well reported was the strikes on a military industrial complex in Bucha on the outskirts of the capital. As the tit-for-tat missile war continues to escalate, both sides are specifically targeting defence sector factories. That has prompted more discussion of placing at least some production capacity in Western Europe, where it would be less vulnerable but still accessible to Kyiv.

Competing with the US stockpile

Ukraine is seeking 300 missiles, but Washington has used roughly one-third of its pre-war Patriot inventory and around half of its THAAD interceptors since the Iran conflict began.

That would leave the US with an estimated 759-827 Patriot interceptors and 234-278 THAAD interceptors, compared with approximately 2,330 Patriots and 452 THAAD interceptors before the war, the FT reports.

On those estimates, granting Kyiv 300 Patriot missiles would consume a very large share of the remaining American inventory. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has already cancelled arms deliveries for Ukraine, arguing that the remaining stockpiles have already fallen to below the strategic minimum requirements.

Washington is already trying to reverse the shortage. On March 6 — six days into Operation Epic Fury, the joint US-Israeli campaign against Iran — Trump summoned the chief executives of the seven largest US defence contractors to the White House: Lockheed Martin, RTX (Raytheon's parent), Boeing, Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, L3Harris and Honeywell Aerospace.

The meeting came as the Pentagon admitted the first four days of strikes had burned through more long-range munitions than four years of fighting in Ukraine, and lawmakers were openly asking whether US missile stockpiles could sustain a prolonged campaign.

Trump characterised the outcome as a win, posting on Truth Social: "We just concluded a very good meeting with the largest US Defence Manufacturing Companies where we discussed Production and Production Schedules. They have agreed to quadruple Production of the 'Exquisite Class' Weaponry in that we want to reach, as rapidly as possible, the highest levels of quantity."

Lockheed Martin's statement struck a similar note, "We are moving with urgency, and we will deliver", as did Northrop Grumman's.

But then they admitted to how long it would take to achieve: a multiyear framework based on agreements with the Pentagon already in place since January. In other words, nothing changed. The production of systems like the Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD interceptors runs at roughly 600-650 units a year, with replenishment timelines industry executives themselves described as measured in years, not weeks or months.

Last week the US Army awarded Lockheed Martin a new contract worth up to $58.6bn to produce PAC-3 MSE interceptors through fiscal year 2032. The agreement expands an earlier one-year, $4.7bn contract into a seven-year procurement programme. Lockheed Martin says it will use the money to triple PAC-3 MSE production capacity by the end of 2030.

That is far too late for Bankova. The start of what is expected to be an intense Russian missile barrage this winter, targeting what is left of Ukraine’s generation capacity is expected to start in a few months; Ukraine started the war with Russia with just under 60GW of installed power capacity but only has 14GW left, according to various estimates. Russia has reportedly already started stockpiling missiles for the campaign.

Finding more air defence ammo has become a problem with no solution. As IntelliNews reported, Europe’s reluctance to sign the defence sector procurement contracts in the early stages of the war has turned into a strategic blunder that will likely cost Ukraine the war. Germany also has a patriot license from the US to make the less-good PAC-2 interceptors, but the first missile is not expected to roll off the conveyer belt of the new factory in Bavaria until 2027.

The most realistic route may be a hybrid arrangement: final assembly or component production in Europe, continued US control over the seeker and other sensitive systems, and long-term purchasing commitments from Ukraine and its allies. But even this model leaves Kyiv dependent on US export approval and American industrial capacity.

 

The Russia, Ukraine drone war shifts to crippling ports

The escalating drone war between Russia and Ukraine has shifted to crippling ports and as the missile gap between the two adversiries narrows, both sides are feeling the pain. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 1, 2026

Ukraine's long-range drone campaign has entered a new phase, shifting from attacks on Russia's military infrastructure to systematic strikes on the commercial ports, grain terminals and oil export facilities that underpin both Moscow's wartime economy and Kazakhstan's energy exports.

Russia has countered by targeting Ukraine’s six commercial ports of which Odesa is the key transport asset that accounts for two thirds of Ukraine’s seaborne exports by volume and half by value.

Both Ukraine’s and Russia’s ports have already been brought to standstills that will hurt export revenues and has already caused Ferrexpo, a leading Ukrainian metallurgical plant, to shut down production as its warehouses are full to bursting. Russian exports of oil are likely to be impacted as well, although it has several alternative export channels to ease the pressure.

Attacks are escalating as part of the unfolding brutal tit-for-tat missile war and have simultaneously disrupted Russia's two most important Black Sea export businesses: agricultural exports and crude oil shipments.

On July 30, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) again suspended tanker loadings at its marine terminal near Novorossiysk after Ukrainian drones struck two oil tankers waiting to load crude. Hours earlier, Ukrainian analyst Kyrylo Shevchenko reported that Russian attacks on Ukrainian ports and Ukraine's own strikes on Russian grain terminals had left both sides' Black Sea trade under increasing pressure.

Kyiv is widening its economic warfare strategy beyond refineries to target the logistics network that moves Russia's most valuable exports. As IntelliNews reported, Ukraine's strategy of attacking Russia’s oil refineries has settled into a routine of damage, repair and restart that make for spectacular headlines, but after having reduced the throughput by an estimated 45%, according to the Financial Times, has seen the fuel crisis abate in the last weeks as Russia imports petrol from friendly states such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and India. As oil analyst Sergey Vakulenko put it in a recent paper: Russia oil refinery sector is battered but not broken.

Vakhtang Partsvania argued in a comment for Riddle Russia that Bankova, Ukraine’s presidential administration, has become dissatisfied with its previous strategy of hitting oil refineries is working terminals, such as the week-long attacks on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, which temporarily reduce traffic, but the damage can be quickly repaired and the port soon goes back to work, as tank farms are designed to lose individual tanks rather than whole facilities, and loadings usually resume once pipeline and rail links survive, says Partsvania.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) has refined its strategy, using new and more accurate long-range “sanctions”, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has taken to calling them: Ukraine has been aiming at the more sophisticated and difficult to replace equipment in the refineries that is starting to put them out of action completely. For example, the Moscow refinery was hit in May and will not come back online until the start of next year, Reuters reports.

Economic costs mount

With its limited access to the sea, the Russian counteroffensive is hurting Ukraine more than the pain Ukraine is inflicting on Russia. Every day that Greater Odesa's ports remain idle costs an estimated $70mn in delayed exports, according to Shevchenko. In June alone the three ports handled $2.1bn of exports out of Ukraine's total monthly exports of $3.5bn.

During the first half of 2026, 34mn tonnes of cargo—roughly two-thirds of Ukraine's total exports of 50.7mn tonnes—passed through Greater Odesa, which also handles around 60% of Ukraine's cross-border cargo traffic. Russian attacks have already eliminated roughly one-third of Ukraine's Black Sea grain export capacity. That comes at a time where the Ministry of Finance (MinFin) already says there is a $20bn hole in the budget thanks to inflated defence costs.

Still, the pain to Russia is also significant, at a time when its economy has slowed sharply and the budget deficit is swelling alarmingly. Three of the country's largest Black Sea grain terminals—NZT and KSK in Novorossiysk and ZTKT at Taman, together capable of handling more than 20mn tonnes annually—have restricted truck deliveries following repeated Ukrainian drone attacks. According to Shevchenko, operations at Taman have effectively stopped, while shipping through the Sea of Azov has largely frozen.

The impact is now starting to show up in the export statistics. Russian wheat exports in July fell to just 1.5mn tonnes, their lowest monthly level since 2017 and roughly one-third below the same month last year. The decline threatens between $10bn and $15bn of annual grain trade if disruptions continue. Moscow is exploring alternative export routes through the Baltic and Caspian Seas, but Shevchenko says there is so far little evidence that those corridors are absorbing the lost Black Sea volumes.

CPC in the firing line

The innocent bystander in this slugfest is Kazakhstan which sends 80% of its oil to international markets via the CPC pipeline and the Russian port of Novorossiysk.

The CPC said drones struck the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Nissos Sifnos, which was loading Tengiz crude from the consortium's Single Point Mooring-3 at the weekend. The attack ignited a fire near the vessel's cargo manifolds before being extinguished by the crew with assistance from three CPC support vessels.

A second tanker, the Isle of Man-flagged Marathi, was attacked around six nautical miles from the terminal while approaching to load. CPC said neither vessel suffered casualties or oil spills and both remained afloat, but loading operations were suspended once again while inspections continue.

The consortium made an unusually pointed political statement, noting that the attacks had occurred despite repeated appeals from Astana and other international shareholders—including approaches made through the US State Department—calling for international energy infrastructure not to be targeted.

The terminal occupies a unique position in Eurasian energy markets. Although located on Russia's Black Sea coast, the 1,511km CPC pipeline primarily exports crude from western Kazakhstan. Its shareholders include Transneft, KazMunayGas, and subsidiaries of Chevron (NYSE: CVX), ExxonMobil (NYSE: XOM), Lukoil and a Rosneft-Shell joint venture. Every disruption therefore affects Kazakhstan's export revenues as much as Russia's, highlighting the increasingly international economic consequences of the conflict.

Taken together, the Black Sea has become one of the war's principal economic battlefields on a par with the twin closure of the global chokepoints of Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab at the end of the Red Sea.

For much of the conflict, Ukraine focused on breaking Russia's naval blockade and reopening its own export corridor from Odesa. Russia, meanwhile, repeatedly attacked Ukrainian port infrastructure in an effort to choke Kyiv's agricultural and metal exports and the Ukrainian economy is already beginning to shut down as a result. Ukraine continues to lose export revenue every day its ports are disrupted, while Russia's own grain terminals, oil export infrastructure and shipping are increasingly exposed to Zelenskiy’s long-range “sanctions” after the formal EU and US sanctions have delivered little to pressure Putin into talks.

Despite Russia’s clear advantage in the drones vs missiles arms race and Kyiv’s nearly exhausted supply of PAC-3 interceptor missiles, neither side appears capable of protecting its commercial maritime infrastructure completely. Both now face the same difficult choice: absorb the economic cost of interrupted trade or reroute exports through longer, more expensive overland and alternative maritime corridors.

The result is that the economic war in the Black Sea is becoming increasingly symmetrical. At the same time Ukraine’s missile development programme is also rapidly closing the gap with Russia as new classes of long-range and more powerful missiles appear such as the famed Flamingo cruise missile, which is already in service, and the F-9, Ukraine’s first true cruise missile, that is expected to appear at the end of this year.

What began as an attempt to blockade Ukraine's exports has evolved into a contest in which ports, grain terminals, oil tankers and shipping lanes on both sides of the sea have become legitimate military targets, raising the cost of trade for Moscow and Kyiv alike.

Iran's foreign ministry defends Hormuz blockade, tanker strikes as lawful self-defence

File: Images of a struck ship previously provided by Iran. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By bnm Tehran bureau August 1, 2026

Iran's foreign ministry defended the country's naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and its strikes on tankers as legitimate self-defence against US aggression, in a statement issued on August 1.

The statement sets out Tehran's formal legal case for actions that have choked one of the world's most important oil chokepoints, framing continued US military operations rather than Iran's own conduct as the cause of the disruption.

It came the same day the IRGC said it had struck two more tankers attempting to transit the strait, and hours after Iran's waterway authority said it would issue no transit permits until US military operations ceased.

The ministry said the US had continued to breach the ceasefire understanding that ended the war on June 18 through a maritime siege of Iran's ports and shipping, alongside attacks on various regions, economic pressure and what it called unlawful threats.

It said the continued naval siege met the United Nations definition of aggression under General Assembly resolution 3314 of December 14, 1974, and that Iran reserved the right to use all means for legitimate self-defence.

The ministry said a new round of what it described as US military aggression had begun on the evening of July 8, coinciding with funeral ceremonies for the supreme leader, using as a pretext claims of incidents involving three ships crossing an unsafe and unauthorised route through the strait.

It said countries whose ships were involved had known that management of the strait rested with Iran and that the southern route was unauthorised, yet had attempted to send the three vessels through it.

It said such actions violated a fifth clause of the ceasefire understanding, coming only days after the accord was signed, alongside provocative statements by the Gulf Cooperation Council and intervention by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio dated July 26.

The ministry said that between July 27 and July 8, US forces had repeatedly misused commercial vessels to move military personnel, equipment and materiel, and that vessels using the southern route with transponders switched off were seeking to evade Iranian monitoring. It said that on July 8 a CENTCOM warship had crossed the southern route under cover of a large gas tanker.

The US military has rejected Iran's claim to control the strait, saying its forces remain in the region to ensure freedom of navigation, and has directed hundreds of strikes against Iranian targets in the south. The confrontation has left tankers hit and crews killed in recent weeks, and shipping largely suspended through the waterway, which normally carries about a quarter of the world's seaborne oil.

The ministry said Iran held no hostility towards regional states and sought friendly relations based on mutual respect and good neighbourliness with all countries bordering the southern Persian Gulf.

 

Israeli strikes kill at least two in Gaza, damage hospital medical stores day after Hamas deal

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By bnm Gulf bureau August 1, 2026

Israeli strikes killed at least two Palestinians in Gaza and destroyed medical supply warehouses next to a hospital on August 1, a day after Hamas said it had agreed to the latest stage of a deal to end the war, AFP reported, citing Gaza's civil defence agency and medical sources.

The strikes cast doubt over the durability of the US-brokered agreement, with an Israeli political source saying there would be no withdrawal of Israeli forces without what it called genuine disarmament of Hamas. Israel has repeatedly carried out strikes during the ceasefire that has technically held since October 10, 2025, and Gaza's health ministry says more than 1,200 Palestinians have been killed since it began.

An Israeli drone strike in the Sheikh Radwan neighbourhood of Gaza City killed two people, according to al-Shifa Hospital, where the casualties were taken. A separate strike in Deir al-Balah in central Gaza killed one more, hospital sources said.

The Israeli military said it was aware of a strike in the Gaza City area on what it called a Hamas terrorist, and that it had struck several areas across Gaza and dismantled five Hamas weapons storage facilities. It said one facility was next to the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital and had been used as a hideout.

An overnight strike destroyed medicine warehouses attached to Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir al-Balah. The Palestinian health ministry said the strike had obliterated two of the four medical supply warehouses and severely damaged the other two.

"Vital quantities of medical consumables and supplies intended for the care of patients and the wounded were lost or destroyed," the ministry said.

Gaza's health ministry said seven people were killed and 76 wounded across the territory over the past 48 hours, putting the toll since the ceasefire began at 1,222. Despite the ceasefire that went into effect in Gaza on October 11, Israeli breaches of the agreement have continued, with the death toll in the Gaza Strip rising to 73,349, since the beginning of the Israeli aggression in October 2023. At least 174,162 others have also been injured.

The strikes followed Hamas's announcement on July 31 that it had agreed to a deal championed by US President Donald Trump, including provisions to hand over its weapons to a Palestinian governing committee and a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Mark Pfeifle, a former US deputy national security adviser, told Al Jazeera the strikes signalled that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not prepared to accept the agreement in its current form.

Hamas political bureau member Bassem Naim said the ball was in Israel's court and called on mediators to press it to halt violations of the ceasefire. Restrictions on media and limited access in Gaza prevent independent verification of tolls.

 

Morocco names Tiznit-Dakhla expressway after Trump, confirming US president's claim

Morocco names Tiznit-Dakhla expressway after Trump official news agency confirms. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By bne IntelliNews August 1, 2026

Morocco has named the Tiznit-Dakhla expressway the "President Donald J. Trump Highway", casting the move as a mark of relations with the United States stretching back 250 years, the state news agency MAP reported on August 1.

The naming formalises Rabat's embrace of a gesture Trump had publicised days earlier, and ties the kingdom's most ambitious infrastructure project to his 2020 recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which Spain and Algeria dispute.

The naming of the road also comes 24-hours after more than 60,000 people entered the Spanish exclave of Ceuta which sits at the northern edge of Morocco.

Most of the 1,055 km route runs through the disputed territory, which the United Nations still treats as non-self-governing, giving the naming a diplomatic weight beyond the road itself.

The expressway cost about $1bn and runs along the Atlantic coast from Tiznit in southern Morocco through Guelmim, Tan-Tan, Laayoune and Boujdour to Dakhla.

It became fully operational earlier in 2026 and ranks among the longest roads in Africa.

The route forms the backbone of Morocco's strategy to turn its southern provinces into a logistics and trade gateway linking Europe with West Africa through the Guerguerat border crossing. It is designed to connect with the Dakhla Atlantic port, a flagship project scheduled for completion in 2028.

Trump thanked King Mohammed VI for the naming in a post on his Truth Social platform, describing it as a great honour and saying he looked forward to travelling the length of the highway.

Trump's recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara came as part of the deal under which Morocco normalised relations with Israel. France and Spain later shifted towards backing Moroccan control.

Western Sahara has been disputed between Morocco and the Algeria-backed Polisario Front since Spain withdrew in 1975. Morocco controls most of the territory, while the Polisario seeks a referendum on independence.

 

Spain's African exclave Ceuta calms after mass crossing that killed at least 67

Militarised Spanish police and army patrol Cueta in Africa. / CC: Reform UK imagery.Facebook

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By bne IntelliNews August 1, 2026

The Spanish enclave of Ceuta regained a measure of calm after a mass crossing of thousands of Moroccans that left at least 67 people dead, as arrivals from Morocco slowed to sporadic attempts, El País reported on August 1.

The crisis has exposed Spain to a fresh confrontation over migration policy and its management of the North African enclaves, straining relations with Rabat and igniting a domestic political row weeks after a Supreme Court ruling curbed summary returns.

Up to 60,000 Moroccans reached the enclave over several days, the highest numbers on record, with the peak on July 30 however the majority have been returned in recent hours, according to police authorities.

Migrants have been returning by the same route since July 31 they added, and Moroccan agents completed a closure of the border in the afternoon. Spanish security forces deployed a pneumatic barrier about 500 metres long beside the Tarajal border breakwater to slow further arrivals.

The mass entry left the city on edge, with the army deployed and the Civil Guard organising the flows. Shops, bars and petrol stations that had shut began to reopen cautiously.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez's government blamed the crisis in part on a Supreme Court ruling three weeks ago that barred summary returns of migrants intercepted at sea while trying to swim to the enclaves, and on trafficking networks.

Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska praised cooperation from Rabat, said Morocco was not a threat and said the government had reversed the situation within 24 hours.

Civil Guard maritime officers and divers worked to recover bodies off the Tarajal border, where the death toll continued to rise through the day.

"There are more dead in the sea," a police source said.

Humanitarian organisations warned that extending the barrier out to sea would force those attempting to swim across further into open water, raising the risk of more deaths.

Videos released from July 31 show dozens of men being ushered out in dumper trucks heading towards the Spanish border, leading several to suspect that the mass movement of people was deliberate and organised. Morocco claimed that "criminal gangs" organised the mass movement.