Location of the Batanes archipelago. Credit: Benar News
June 9, 2026
By Simon Hutagalung
The area in which Japan’s maritime claims around Okinotori and the northern EEZ projection from Batanes of the Philippines overlap is strategically located on the edge of a very important corridor close to Taiwan and the Bashi Channel. The area is therefore more than a simple border dispute, as it will test the ability of maritime law to control the rivalry of actors in one of the most contested areas of the Indo-Pacific. The fact that under UNCLOS, an island generates maritime zones, but a rock that is unable to sustain human presence or economic life activity does not generate an EEZ or a continental shelf, is the root of the problem with Okinotori.
Japan claims that Okinotori has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and a Continental Shelf (CS) of 350,000 square miles, which overlaps with the Philippines’ northern projection of 220,000 square miles from the EEZ and CS from Batanes. In fact, the EEZ and CS generated by rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life on the rock itself have no maritime zone. In reality, Okinotori is best described as a rock that cannot generate any maritime entitlements. Japan claims that it is an island and therefore generates 200 nautical miles of EEZ and 350 nautical miles of CS. Japan and the Philippines have recently begun formal talks on delimiting their boundaries for the EEZ and CS. The Chinese have already begun to send coast guard ships to the waters east of Taiwan and have described the Japan/Philippines talks as ‘illegal’.
The greatest political challenge to an arrangement is that it is outside of waters around Taiwan and therefore does not include Taiwan. Even if such an arrangement is styled as being purely bilateral and is explicitly stated to be non-binding on third states, there are huge problems of inclusion. An agreement about contested waters is hard enough to get to be agreed and to be to gain to be to have credibility when it does not include a party who is currently exercising maritime governance in the very same waters and whose interests in the region are huge, is to create a huge credibility gap. That is to say, such an agreement will not be seen to be to be as to have as much value as it would if all parties who have a huge stake in the region’s waters were included.
The strategic significance of the overlapping maritime claims between Japan’s Okinotori and the Philippines’ northern EEZ projection from Batanes in the Luzon island group cannot be emphasised enough. The area is located at the edge of a very strategically located corridor of sea lanes between Taiwan and the Bashi Channel, a strait linking the South China Sea to the western Pacific. If not managed properly, the boundary dispute between Japan and the Philippines could become a matter of a wider US-China rivalry for control of sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific region. Recent U.S. military exercises conducted in the northern Philippines were reported by Reuters in late 2025 to be part of a larger plan to prevent Chinese warships from entering the Pacific Ocean in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Viewed from this perspective, the issue of the maritime boundary between Japan and the Philippines could become a war-gaming ground for a wider conflict between the two major powers in the region.
The implications of this small patch of the world’s surface are in fact far-reaching. The maritime boundary dispute between Japan and the Philippines is a test case for whether the laws of the sea can or cannot restrain the growing rivalry between two of the world’s greatest powers. It is a small area, but it is a test case of whether the laws of the sea, designed to govern the use of the world’s oceans in times of peace, can or cannot be changed in times of war. If Japan extends the legal status of Okinotori too far, Japan will lose credibility as a champion of the rules-based order of the world’s oceans. If the Philippines treats this issue purely as a matter of sovereignty, then it will turn a legal issue into a security competition with China. The Philippines should instead treat this as an issue of delimitation to be worked out in consultation with all affected parties, and at the same time, as an opportunity to work out several confidence-building measures with Japan, such as coast guard communication, joint management of resources, and rules for dealing with incidents at sea. Multilateral dialogue is key, because legal clarity is not enough; political inclusion is also required.
There is no gain in continuing to claim the maximum in terms of maritime space. Rather, the claims should be based on the narrowest defensible interpretation of the provisions of UNCLOS, i.e. those related to islands capable of sustaining human life and economic activities. For the Philippines, it is also important that the dispute does not get drawn into a competition of deterrence with China. Each new patrol by either side could be used as a sovereignty performance, which would only invite counterpressure from China. In the meantime, the U.S. and other regional actors can support transparency, promote rapid communication between relevant parties, and encourage rules of the road for all encounters at sea in the region. In the end, all of these steps may not resolve the current overlap of claims in the waters around Okinotori overnight, but by taking them, the parties can reduce the likelihood that a seemingly innocuous legal dispute turns into a strategic incident in a region where mistrust already runs high.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
ReferencesBlanchard, B. (2026, June 8). Taiwan says China Coast Guard patrols to its east are a “provocative act”. Reuters.
Corrales, N. (2026, May 6). Japan fires missile in joint drill with US and allies in northern Philippines, facing South China Sea. Reuters
About Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.
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