The Strategic Logic Driving Russia’s Taliban Engagement – Analysis

GENDER APARTHEID IS NOT PART OF IT

Taliban Defense Minister Mawlawi Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid shakes hands with Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu during the signing of a military-technical cooperation agreement in Moscow region, May 27, 2026. (Photo: Taliban Defense Ministry)

June 9, 2026 

Observer Research Foundation
By Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash and Shivam Shekhawat

On 21 May, Russia’s Security Council Secretary, Sergey Shoigu, reiterated Moscow’s concerns vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the potential sources of destabilisation in the region. Speaking at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) security meeting, he highlighted the presence of 18,000 to 23,000 militants from more than 20 groups within Afghanistan, the gradual return of militants from Syria to the country, and the production and trade of synthetic drugs in and around Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries. Even as he acknowledged the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate’s efforts in countering these challenges — particularly the presence of militants — he also underscored the limits on the group’s ability to address these threats effectively, necessitating cooperation with the regime.

The Taliban’s removal from Russia’s terrorist list, and its subsequent recognition in July 2025, was an inflexion point for strategic stability in Eurasia, reflecting regional actors’ growing receptiveness to engaging with the Taliban. While there is considerable impetus to progressively strengthen the partnership, Moscow has had to tread cautiously in announcing large-scale infrastructure development projects, owing to the security factors outlined above and the deteriorating relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which could potentially alter the threat calculus in the region.

Drivers of the Taliban-Russia Relationship

Moscow’s Taliban strategy is driven by a framework of pragmatic realism. The Taliban’s arrival in 2021 signalled an American retrenchment from the region, and Russia was quick to capitalise on this vacuum by establishing official contacts with the Taliban. Its embassy in Kabul remained operational, and it was the first country to open a business representative office in Kabul after the Taliban’s return. The Taliban’s swift consolidation of power reflected a new reality that states in the region would inevitably have to reckon with. The risk of proliferation of different terror groups inside Afghanistan — now that the US and its allies’ security umbrella had disappeared — raised the prospect of terror threats percolating into Central Asia and eventually making their way into Russia. The bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul in 2022, for which the ISKP claimed responsibility, was the first sign of this fast-developing risk.


In 2024, the ISKP attacked Crocus City Hall, resulting in more than 140 fatalities. The attack highlighted the group’s ability to undertake transnational strikes. The perpetrators were from Central Asia, which further underscored Russia’s fears about the spillover. In the past year, there has been an uptick in armed incidentsat the Afghan-Tajikistan border, with more than 17 incidents reported in 2025 alone. At a security conference hosted by Moscow (26-29 May), the country’s security chief reiterated concerns about ISKP’s recruitment from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, its preparation for attacks, and its attempts to destabilise Taliban rule within the country, particularly in the north. Furthermore, in 2025, around 2,742 kilograms of drugs were confiscated; the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation has led to an increase in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs like methamphetamine, increasingly concentrated in Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Without the Taliban pursuing a proactive policy of eliminating the terror threat and demonstrating its ability to police its borders, the risks of instability percolating into Central Asia remain high.

Against this backdrop, removing the Taliban from Russia’s terror list emerged as a priority. In 2025, the Russian Supreme Court removed the Taliban from its terror list, suspending the ban on its activities. In the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin called the Taliban an “ally” in the fight against terror. In July 2025, Russia became the first country to recognise the Taliban government and subsequently accepted the credentials of Afghanistan’s new ambassador to Russia, Gul Hassan Hassan. This pivot towards a “full-fledged partnership” indicated the solidification of Moscow’s policy shift vis-à-vis Afghanistan. While there were reports of Russia’s possible interest in supplying weapons to the Taliban in the fight against ISKP, the two sides recently signed a military-technical agreement on the sidelines of a conference in Moscow, reflecting a shared commitment to containing the potential spillover from the regional security situation.


Pakistan and Afghanistan have been engaged in a crisis since February 2026, with attacks on each other’s military and border infrastructure. The rift is a double-edged sword for Moscow. On one hand, the persisting hostilities have implications for the regional balance of power; on the other, any resolution of fundamental differences — contingent on the Taliban outlawing the TTP — could result in the further fragmentation of the Taliban and the creation of a “new Taliban”. Moreover, this situation would inevitably lead to Afghan and Pakistani cadres defecting to the Afghan branch of the Islamic State, which is banned in Russia. The possibility of this seems remote, as the Taliban have refrained from taking any major action against the group even under immense pressure. Amid Islamabad’s coercive attempts — reflected in strikes and sanctions — Moscow’s interest lies in the cessation of hostilities, and it has also offered to mediate in resolving the crisis. However, its leverage remains limited. The persisting instability across the Durand Line reduces the impetus for implementing transport corridors and critical connectivity linking Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.

The Taliban’s Calculus

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate will complete half a decade in power in 2026. In the past five years, Russia has been the only country to grant de jure recognition to the regime. Notwithstanding the absence of formal recognition, other regional countries, including India, China, the Central Asian Republics, and Iran, have opened channels of communication with the Taliban and expanded pragmatic cooperation.

The rationale for engagement hovers between concerns about the proliferation of militant groups within Afghanistan and doubts about the Taliban’s capability and willingness to control them. For the Islamic Emirate, a major source of legitimacy has been its engagement with other countries. Russia’s support thus lends a veneer of legitimacy to the Taliban, which uses Moscow’s position against sanctions as a counter to the persistence of Western sanctions. The Emirate emphasises the principles of a balanced and economy-oriented foreign policy, with a focus on developing practical cooperation in trade and transit infrastructure, and positions itself as a crucial vector in facilitating regional connectivity. While Moscow is advancing the relationship to fulfil its objectives of ensuring regional security and furthering economic development, Russia’s support lends credence to the Emirate’s legitimisation process.

Economic Engagement as a Pillar of Regional Stability

For Moscow, the rationale for engagement transcends the underlying security threats and carries a degree of urgency around integrating Afghanistan into Eurasian supply chains by strengthening regional connectivity. For the latter to be possible, a stable Afghanistan remains critical. In this context, Russia has called upon regional states to formally recognise the regime. Strategic stability in the region remains a critical discussion point in platforms such as the SCO and the Moscow Format talks. In November 2025, Gul Hassan Hassan met Russia’s representative to the SCO to discuss the prospect of granting Afghanistan observer status in the grouping, with the understanding that Afghanistan’s integration into institutional regional agreements could pave the way for a new regionalism in Eurasia.

During the Russia-Afghanistan business forum last year, five MoUs were concluded in the areas of trade, transportation, and energy exploration, indicative of an appetite for enhanced engagement with the Islamic Emirate. Trade between the two countries currently stands at somewhere between US$300-400 million. Between April and May 2026, delegations from both sides held multiple engagements at the ministerial, ambassadorial, and business-to-business levels. Talks on expanding banking and economic cooperation are also underway.

Much of Russia’s economic engagement with Afghanistan has been routed through Tatarstan, with the region’s trade with Afghanistan reaching US$51 million in the first eleven months of 2025, accounting for ten percent of overall trade between the two countries. Investors from Tatarstan have shown interest in Afghanistan, while the Russian Chamber of Commerce has been exploring opportunities for cooperation in the agriculture, fertilisers, and oil extraction sectors. Projects such as the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway (connecting Termez to the Arabian Sea), the Torgundi-Herat-Spin Boldak railway network, the Khaf-Herat railway network, and the Wakhan Corridor highways offer an alternative to Central Asian states’ dependence on Iranian ports for maritime transit.

With growing exasperation over the slow progress on China’s Mes Aynak mine, the Emirate is also looking to diversify its investments. The Taliban’s Minister of Mines and Petroleum has invited Russian firms to invest in Afghanistan’s hydrocarbon projects, with talks of Russian investment in water transfer projects as well. However, despite growing interest, no large-scale projects have been concluded between the two countries.

The Way Forward

The Taliban’s official position refuses to acknowledge the presence of any terror group within the country, with the Emirate’s leaders doubling down on their claimed success in eviscerating the ISKP’s presence inside Afghanistan — asserting that this has compelled the group to regroup in neighbouring Pakistan. While the ISKP has expanded its presence in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, it continues to remain active within Afghanistan. The attack on a Chinese restaurant in Kabul in January this year is a case in point. Russia’s posture towards the Taliban has shifted in light of the evolving regional security environment, prompting a strategic recalibration across Eurasia. As the Taliban’s consolidation of power exacerbated security risks in the region — with the threat of terror percolating into Central Asia and Russia — a stable Afghanistan came to be seen as being in the interest of all regional actors, as reflected in Moscow’s recent actions. Moving forward, while the two countries will continue to cooperate economically at a moderate level, the focus of the relationship will be on counterterrorism and security-related cooperation, keeping in mind the broader regional security situation.

About the authors:

Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation.

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.


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