June 9, 2026
By Murray Hunter
In the wake of Iran’s recent missile barrages and the intense exchanges of 2025–2026, a striking development has emerged: the United States appeared to step back from fully committing to Israel’s defense in ways that once defined their alliance. While Washington has provided intelligence, defensive support, and conducted its own strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, reports and statements suggested limits on direct involvement during certain phases of Iranian retaliation. This perceived distancing amid other domestic U.S. priorities and war fatigue with the mid-term elections coming up has left Israel more exposed than in previous confrontations.
This moment arrives as global public opinion has soured dramatically on Israel’s military campaigns in Gaza, Lebanon, and against so-called Iranian proxies. Polls across many countries show unfavorable views of Israel reaching historic highs. Protests, boycotts, and diplomatic isolation have intensified. Even within Israel, Netanyahu faces deep polarization, with approval ratings hovering around 40% and significant segments of the public questioning prolonged conflicts.
These pressures in a nation with competing narratives raise a pivotal question: Could the Iran war mark the beginning of the end for the so-called “Greater Israel Project”?
What Is “Greater Israel”?
The concept of Eretz Yisrael HaShlema (“the Whole Land of Israel”) has biblical, historical, and political layers. It is not a single, universally agreed-upon policy but a spectrum of aspirations often invoked by religious Zionists, revisionist thinkers, and right-wing politicians.
Biblically, it draws from passages like Genesis 15:18–21, describing a covenant with Abraham promising land “from the river of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates.” Interpretations vary: some see it as a maximalist vision encompassing parts or all of modern Egypt ( the Nile to Brook of Egypt/Sinai), Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and into Iraq. Others limit it to the area “between the Sea and the Jordan River” as essentially Israel proper plus the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Gaza, and sometimes the Golan Heights.
From Israel’s Formation:
Pre-1948 Zionism: Theodor Herzl, founder of modern Zionism, focused primarily on establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine amid European antisemitism. Some early discussions referenced broader areas “from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates” in brainstorming sessions, but these were not core platforms. Revisionists like Ze’ev Jabotinsky advocated for a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan, influencing groups like Betar. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference saw Zionist proposals for expanded borders, but the 1922 Mandate for Palestine already separated Transjordan.
1948 War and Statehood: Israel declared independence within UN-partitioned borders. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War expanded its control. Armistice lines (Green Line) left the West Bank under Jordanian control and Gaza under Egypt.
1967 Six-Day War: A turning point. Israel captured the Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights. This fueled the modern Greater Israel movement (Movement for Greater Israel), which opposed territorial concessions and promoted settlement. Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1982 for peace. Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza in 2005.
Post-1967 to Today: Likud platforms emphasized sovereignty “between the Sea and the Jordan.” Settlement expansion in the West Bank has been a priority for right-wing governments. Netanyahu has referenced connections to broader visions, drawing condemnation.
The most expansive “Nile to Euphrates” map is often cited in criticism as evidence of expansionism, though many analysts call it a conspiracy theory or fringe interpretation rather than official policy. Israel has no formal annexation plans beyond the West Bank debate.
A Clarifying Map:
The classic visual shows a shaded region covering Israel, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Lebanon, much of Syria, parts of Egypt’s Sinai and beyond, and western Iraq. This is vastly larger than current Israel, about 20,770 km² vs. millions in the maximalist view. In practice, Israeli policy has focused on security buffers, settlements, and control of key areas rather than outright conquest of distant capitals.
Isolation, Failed Accords, and Internal Rejection
The Abraham Accords of 2020 under the previous Trump administration contained normalization deals with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. To many Zionists, this symbolized a new era of pragmatic Arab-Israeli ties bypassing the Palestinian issue. Economic and security cooperation grew. However, the Gaza war and subsequent conflicts have chilled momentum. Public opinion in Arab states turned sharply negative; new deals stalled, notably with Saudi Arabia. While formal ties have not fully collapsed, practical engagement has cooled significantly.
A prolonged or costly war with Iran risks further erosion. Arab states prioritizing stability may view an emboldened, expansionist Israel as a greater threat than Iran’s weakened position. Israel could face a future as a smaller, more isolated state, which may remain militarily strong but diplomatically constrained, economically strained by boycotts and regional hostility.
Inside Israel, divisions are stark. While annexation sentiment exists on the right, especially for the West Bank. Broader public support for endless conflict or maximalist goals is limited. Many Israelis prioritize security, economy, and normalcy over ideological expansion. Netanyahu’s coalition has relied on far-right partners, but polls show fatigue, polarization, and questions about leadership.
Israel as a Path to Prosperity Without Expansion
Critics argue Israel has been the primary obstacle to regional peace through settlement expansion, occupation policies, and rejection of comprehensive deals addressing Palestinian statehood. Supporters counter that Palestinian rejectionism, terrorism (Hamas, Hezbollah), and Iranian-backed rejection of Israel’s existence are the real barriers. Wars in 1948, 1967, 1973, intifadas, and ongoing rocket attacks shaped a security-first doctrine.
The thesis here is that clinging to Greater Israel designs perpetuates a cycle: perpetual conflict, isolation, and opportunity costs. An Israel that formally or de facto abandons maximalist territorial ambitions, focusing on defensible borders, technological/economic strength, and genuine two-state or confederation compromises could thrive. Normalized relations with a broader Arab world including Saudi Arabia, and the broader Sunni states could unlock trade, tourism, and security pacts against shared threats. A smaller, secure, prosperous Israel integrated regionally would likely enjoy greater long-term viability than one pursuing biblical maximalism amid demographic, diplomatic, and military strain.
The Iran conflicts of 2025–2026 may accelerate this reckoning. With U.S. support not unlimited, global opinion adverse, Arab normalization stalled, and internal Israeli debates intensifying, the vision of Greater Israel faces formidable headwinds. Whether it fails outright depends on Israeli choices, either to double down amid isolation, or pivot toward pragmatic security and integration.
A post-expansionist Israel need not be diminished. It could model success as a high-tech, culturally vibrant nation at peace with neighbors, proving that true strength lies in prosperity and acceptance rather than contested land. The coming years will test which path prevails.
About Murray Hunter
Murray Hunter has been involved in Asia-Pacific business for the last 30 years as an entrepreneur, consultant, academic, and researcher. As an entrepreneur he was involved in numerous start-ups, developing a lot of patented technology, where one of his enterprises was listed in 1992 as the 5th fastest going company on the BRW/Price Waterhouse Fast100 list in Australia. Murray is now an associate professor at the University Malaysia Perlis, spending a lot of time consulting to Asian governments on community development and village biotechnology, both at the strategic level and “on the ground”. He is also a visiting professor at a number of universities and regular speaker at conferences and workshops in the region. Murray is the author of a number of books, numerous research and conceptual papers in referred journals, and commentator on the issues of entrepreneurship, development, and politics in a number of magazines and online news sites around the world. Murray takes a trans-disciplinary view of issues and events, trying to relate this to the enrichment and empowerment of people in the region.
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