Sunday, May 03, 2026

Internationalism Is Not a Luxury, but a Survival Mechanism

Friday 1 May 2026, by Leila Al-Shami , Oleksandr Kyselov



WOZ: Leila al-Shami, Oleksandr Kyselov, in international politics it seems that only might makes right anymore. The World Economic Forum (WEF), taking place this week in Davos, also stands for this. [1] Are we witnessing a new wave of imperialist expansion?

Leila al-Shami: We are undoubtedly heading towards a multipolar world order in which various imperialisms compete with one another. [2] It is sad that a large part of the Western left regards non-Western forms of imperialism as alternatives and fails to recognise their imperialist nature. A world in which imperial powers fight to establish spheres of influence only leads to greater instability.

Oleksandr Kyselov: I did not live through the wave of imperialist competition during the Cold War, but I certainly feel reminded of it. Of course, Western imperialism always strove for expansion too, but at least there was an attempt to disguise this striving with a commitment to international law. Today, the entire system is being openly questioned. When Donald Trump says Europe is weak, he is right: not only is Ukraine dependent on the USA, Europe is too. And the Russian threat is real – at least for those territories in Eastern Europe that the Kremlin considers part of its sphere of influence – whilst Trump attempts to wrest Greenland from his most important ally.

Al-Shami: We are currently witnessing the complete collapse of international norms, a politics essentially determined by raw violence and power. This is not least because Russia, Iran and the Assad regime were never held accountable for their atrocities in Syria or Ukraine. [3] The consequences of this impunity can be seen in Gaza or Venezuela. The terrible thing is: the collapse of the liberal order is not producing a left-wing alternative, but rather helping fascism and authoritarianism to power.

WOZ: Anti-imperialist criticism usually still centres on US imperialism. You both, however, have experienced the consequences of Russian imperialism first-hand: before Russian aggression escalated in Ukraine from 2014, Syria was a testing ground for Russian weapons and tactics. How has imperialist strategy changed over time?

Al-Shami: The main difference is that Russia claims Ukraine as part of its own empire, whereas the conflict in Syria was geopolitical in nature: Russia wanted influence in the region. Whilst Iranian troops were deployed on the ground, the Russian air force controlled the airspace; the Kremlin asserted its influence in international negotiations, thwarting every attempt by the UN to hold the Assad regime accountable. The brutal Russian approach against civilians was, incidentally, always also an instrument in the struggle against the West: Russia devastated Syrian cities and thereby caused a massive wave of refugees towards Europe. At the same time, it funded far-right groups there so they would agitate against refugees. A deliberate policy of destabilisation.

Kyselov: Russian media at that time displayed almost schizophrenic symptoms: they defended the intervention in Syria by claiming they were standing by "Syrian brothers" in the struggle against US imperialism. But the moment these brothers crossed the border fleeing the war, they immediately became "Islamist terrorists" supposedly trying to destroy European civilisation. The same media spread two completely opposing narratives.

WOZ: Leila al-Shami, in 2018 you wrote a much-discussed text about the "anti-imperialism of idiots". How did you arrive at this term?

Al-Shami: At that time, Western states attacked Syrian military installations and chemical weapons facilities after the Assad regime had attacked its own population with chemical weapons. This limited intervention to protect the population led to massive mobilisation on the Western left – which was very frustrating for me, because these people had never taken to the streets to condemn the regime’s attacks on schools and hospitals. In total, there were three mobilisations of Western leftists regarding Syria – and they always criticised targeted Western interventions against military targets. But when there was later a major Western intervention in Syria against the so-called Islamic State, during which the city of Raqqa was completely destroyed, mobilisation was absent. [4] There was no outcry whatsoever, not even a demand for the protection of the civilian population. [5]

Kyselov: The position of the anti-imperialist left in the West reflects for me a kind of Eurocentrism – simply inverted: one regards oneself as the greatest global wrongdoer, nothing can be compared to one’s own evil deeds. Essentially, they deny others even the possibility of being evil. In this sense, one cannot oppose Russian and Iranian imperialism either, or the Assad regime – because these are opponents of the main villain, the USA.

WOZ: How do you explain this narrow focus?

Al-Shami: It is a return to Cold War ideology, when the world was divided into two blocs. But this world no longer exists. I also see in it a Western narcissism: the idea that only white men can influence history and everyone else is irrelevant. This attitude is coupled with an unwillingness to listen to voices from the ground – which is also evident in Iran at present. People are suffering so much under the repressive regime that they really have other concerns than potential US attacks. Not everything that happens in the world can be traced back to the geopolitical chess game. Instead, a class analysis would be appropriate, looking at internal dynamics and social conflicts within a state. The authoritarian regimes will not liberate us, so we must bring back a revolutionary perspective, learn again to believe that liberation can only come from below.

Kyselov: Take the example of Venezuela: of course Maduro’s overthrow alone will not bring radical changes, of course his removal is problematic from an international law perspective. But one should nevertheless show more empathy, not proceed from abstract geopolitical concepts, but from those affected. Of course, the context is important. I come from Ukraine, I have my prejudices and traumas that I project. I imagine myself in the place of Venezuelans: if Trump were to remove Putin, that could lead to an escalation. But for a moment I would still be relieved. That is a human feeling when it concerns someone who has inflicted so much suffering on your compatriots.

WOZ: Is it not the case that military strikes from outside weaken social movement building inside in any case?

Al-Shami: To return to Syria once more: the Western left even opposed Syrian demands for a no-fly zone. Nobody in Syria was demanding US ground troops or an American occupation of the country – precisely in this region people know more about US imperialism than anyone in the West; Syrians strongly identify with the people in Iraq or Palestine. They merely wanted an intervention to protect the civilian population. And the Western left wanted them to keep quiet and die rather than support such an intervention. That is not even a political principle, but basic humanity. What troubles me is the inability to put oneself in the position of others, to understand their traumas.

Kyselov: The Ukrainian tragedy is that one wishes for intervention from outside because one is completely powerless oneself. And the task of the left would surely be to organise around a common sense of injustice – not to look down on people. I have often dealt with Iranians in the past: they have protested against the regime in the country itself, have tried to leave the country. Now the regime is openly executing people in the streets. But the left is merely obsessed with US imperialism.

Al-Shami: In Syria, I always spoke out against interference from outside, that of the West as much as that of Iran and Russia. But in the early days of the revolution, I supported the call of the Free Syrian Army [6] for weapons, which at that time still represented the democratic movement. But even this call for weapons for self-defence was criticised by the Western left. So one does not allow Syrians to defend themselves, but also does not support other states in their defence. People are left with no choice but to die.

WOZ: And what is your position on Western arms deliveries to Ukraine?

Al-Shami: I have complete understanding for the Ukrainian position. Defending oneself is not an ideological question for Ukrainians, but an existential struggle for survival. It is about whether they can continue to exist as a society or not.

Kyselov: The rejection of arms deliveries seems to me merely a helplessly moral attitude that conceals the absence of a viable strategy. I recently met a Lithuanian leftist who had engaged with Die Linke [7] in Germany because he wanted to convince his compatriots to vote for them. And then the party positioned itself against sending Bundeswehr soldiers to Lithuania, a country that is openly threatened by Russia. What are leftists in Lithuania supposed to think about the actions of the Left Party? It is similar with Ukraine: Die Linke says weapons will not bring peace. Yet the ability to negotiate is based on being able to reject demands – and for that one simply needs weapons. [8]

WOZ: One of the major issues preoccupying leftists here is rearmament in Europe, which is supposed to serve defence and is primarily financed through austerity policies in the social sector. How should one deal with this?

Kyselov: In this context, I would not speak of defence, but of readiness. If a crisis occurs in one of your neighbouring countries, whether an ecological catastrophe or a war, thousands will set off. This in turn will become a challenge for the social systems of the destination countries. Accordingly, one must be able to organise this emergency situation. Against the background of my Ukrainian experience, it seems absurd to me to take the money for security from the social sector. It may be that one really does have to spend money on defence including weapons. But in the event of war, functioning hospitals are also needed; one must be able to significantly scale up provision. Whether one can treat war victims in addition to regular patients depends on whether one has enough personnel.

WOZ: So instead of austerity programmes, investments in infrastructure are needed?

Kyselov: Ukrainian infrastructure currently depends heavily on the railways – and in certain European countries, these do not even work in peacetime. And the energy infrastructure in Europe already has so many problems due to minor natural events that it would scarcely survive a war. Ukraine probably survives partly because the infrastructure was built in Soviet times – when we were preparing for a world war – and is therefore resilient. Much also depends on whether people are ready to defend. Why should one risk one’s life if one has no interest in a community, a place, a country? Why go to the front if one knows that, should something happen to you, there is no social support? Talking about security is important, but if one focuses solely on buying weapons and makes savings elsewhere, that will not bring security. This criticism of incompetent government action should be the left position – not that security in general is unimportant, because people’s security concerns are justified. [9]

WOZ: You advocate for dialogue between Eastern and Western European leftists. What experiences have you had?

Kyselov: In the Nordic states, it is easier to enter into an exchange: whilst all left positions that exist in other European countries are represented there, they are not so dominant; the contributions to debates on security policy are also more diverse. The problem, however, is that even those leftists who support Ukraine have no concrete idea of what that means. The pacifist-left camp favours peace without knowing how this peace can be achieved. And those who support Ukraine see themselves as morally right in their claim to the realisation of justice, but also have no idea how this justice can be achieved and what it would even mean in the Ukrainian context.

Al-Shami: In the Syrian context, for example, being leftist is completely discredited – and for two reasons. Firstly, because the Assad regime rhetorically presented itself as a socialist, secular regime. And secondly, because of the defamation by Western leftists. Today it is therefore very difficult in Syria to represent a left position, because for people it is associated with nothing positive.

WOZ: Have you also perceived a learning process among anti-imperialists?

Kyselov: Definitely! In the last ten years, much more and much more openly has been discussed about the problems of bloc thinking. I also believe that many who rejected the struggle of Syrians changed their minds regarding Ukraine because they identified more strongly with Ukrainians, because there were better connections there. I do see a greater willingness to listen than ten years ago.

Al-Shami: It is as if every new crisis reveals the bankruptcy of the old approach – when confronted with it, one is forced to formulate an alternative.

WOZ: Leila al-Shami, you are part of the network The Peoples Want. What is it about?

Al-Shami: It was originally an initiative of Syrian refugees and exiles from different countries who came together to discuss precisely the questions we have now discussed – and to think about what a progressive internationalism for the 21st century might look like. Between 2009 and 2019, a decade of mass global uprisings, we repeatedly brought together revolutionaries and people involved in social struggles everywhere in the world. A network has emerged from this in which ways are sought to live practical solidarity and help each other. Our recently published manifesto analyses the last decade and presents a proposal for a new internationalism.

WOZ: And what do you propose?

Al-Shami: Essentially it is simple: away from the geopolitical view, towards the perspectives of people on the ground. One of our focuses is to create a space for discussion and collaboration, through festivals or online formats. To build real connections, discuss complexities, understand each other better. And – this is most important – to be solidary and support each other, so that people do not get stuck in those uncomfortable tactical alliances we spoke about: that they have to accept weapons or money from other states. And to ask how we can strengthen the movements themselves.

WOZ: Who could be the main actors of the new internationalism?

Kyselov: I do not believe different people are needed, but rather a new approach: instead of imposing one’s own ideas on others, one should bring people together around the questions that are important to them, from everyday social issues to security. From this common struggle, sustainable connections can then be built – and from that in turn something political can be formulated. In Sweden, where I live, there is a good example of organising migrant communities. The Solidariska Byggare [10], a syndicalist trade union, says: okay, perhaps people do not want to talk about syndicalism, but about wages. So they began organising migrants, most of them from Ukraine – first men from the construction industry, because they were easier to reach, now many cleaners, most of whom are female. Over time, they have also learned more about the political context of those affected, their working conditions. A very inspiring struggle.

WOZ: That may work locally. But what could be a unifying factor internationally?

Al-Shami: Through joint discussions, people quickly discover that they have more in common than separates them. Problems like the climate crisis are global, the enemies are also the same – and well organised: we are confronted with a global fascist international. So we too must organise ourselves, otherwise we are in a weak position. Internationalism is not a luxury that adds something extra to the national and local struggle – it is a survival mechanism. This can also be seen in the fact that movements that have made internationalism a key strategy are the only ones that have survived long-term – the Kurds, the Palestinians or the Zapatistas. [11]

Kyselov: What counts are common interests. Often the left has a very elaborate vocabulary to describe the situation in the world. One that is barely comprehensible even to me with a degree in sociology. Instead, one should begin one’s analysis with what is important for people. I like the idea of knocking on doors. The left in the USA does this; meanwhile, the practice is being adopted more and more often in Europe too. One does not go there to agitate people, but to ask what is important in their neighbourhood. One builds a connection by listening. Based on that, ideas can be formulated in which people recognise themselves.

WOZ: What can the Syrian exile movement and the Ukrainian resistance learn from each other?

Al-Shami: I believe we have already learned a great deal from each other. The extent of mutual solidarity is really beautiful to see – and part of it comes from the fact that we have a common enemy in Russia. The other is a kind of trauma bond that has arisen through the reaction of large parts of the Western left to our situation. I know many Syrians who have been in Ukraine in recent years, medics, civil defence people. I still remember how the Syrian White Helmets [12] informed the Ukrainians about Russia’s "double tap" attacks: that the army bombs a building and then waits for the arrival of rescue workers to strike again, so there are as many victims as possible. Such connections will only increase. Actually, I am quite optimistic at the moment. The worse the situation becomes, the more people understand that they must organise themselves.

Kyselov: That is what I base my hope on too. In a crisis situation, it is very difficult to change anything because most people are occupied with survival. But the crises do not occur everywhere simultaneously – so there is still time to prepare. [13]

22 January 2026

Translated by ESSF from WOZ, Anna Jikhareva (interview) and Caroline Minjolle (photo).

Footnotes

[1The World Economic Forum is an annual gathering in Davos, Switzerland, where political leaders, business executives, and selected intellectuals discuss global economic issues. Critics view it as a symbol of elite consensus-building that serves corporate and neoliberal interests.

[2On the challenges of analysing imperialism in a multipolar world, see Gilbert Achcar, "’Campism’ versus internationalism: On Gutter Journalism and Purported ’Anti-Imperialism’", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, October 2019. Available at: https://europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article50740

[3On the lessons from Syria for understanding the Ukrainian resistance, see Syrian Exiles, "War in Ukraine: Ten Lessons from Syria", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, March 2022. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article61512

[4Raqqa, a city in northern Syria, served as the de facto capital of the Islamic State from 2014 until its recapture by US-backed forces in October 2017. The battle to retake the city caused extensive civilian casualties and left much of the urban area in ruins.

[5On the "anti-imperialism of idiots" debate and its implications, see "The bankruptcy of a one-sided ’anti-imperialism’", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, October 2022. Available at: https://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article63562

[6The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was formed in July 2011 by defecting Syrian military officers. In its early phase, it represented an armed wing of the democratic uprising against the Assad regime before the conflict became increasingly fragmented and militarised.

[7Die Linke (The Left) is a democratic socialist political party in Germany, formed in 2007 through a merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism (successor to East Germany’s ruling party) and the Electoral Alternative for Social Justice.

[8On the dilemmas facing the left regarding Ukraine, see Oleksandr Kyselov, "Ukraine: The left’s dilemma amid a crumbling world order: Prepare to fight or let others determine the outcome?", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, February 2025. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article73842

[9See Oleksandr Kyselov, "Ukrainian Activist to European Left: ’You Cannot Fight Fascism With Flowers’", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, June 2025. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article75457

[10Solidariska Byggare (Solidarity Builders) is a Swedish syndicalist trade union affiliated with the SAC (Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation), which organises workers regardless of immigration status and has been particularly active in defending migrant workers’ rights.

[11On the Zapatista position on Ukraine, see "No concessions to any imperialism! The Zapatistas’ Clear Stand on Ukraine", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, July 2025. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article76176

[12The White Helmets, officially known as the Syria Civil Defence, is a volunteer organisation operating in opposition-held areas of Syria. Founded in 2014, they conduct urban search and rescue in response to bombing, and have been credited with saving thousands of lives.

[13For Kyselov’s analysis of crisis preparedness and the left, see Nataliia Lomonosova and Oleksandr Kyselov, "Social Movement (Ukraine): What’s going on in Ukraine and why left solidarity is important", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontières, May 2022. Available at: http://www.europe-solidaire.org/spip.php?article62543

Bangladesh

The Role of CPB-ML Since August 5, 2024: A Marxist-Leninist Analysis

Friday 1 May 2026, by Badrul Alam



The Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist–Leninist), or CPB-ML, has re-emerged in a new light following the mass upheavals of August 5, 2024. Rooted in Dhaka and drawing on deep traditions of left-wing militancy and peasant struggle, CPB-ML’s role since this pivotal moment has taken on strategic significance—especially when analyzed through Leon Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution and Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and the war of position. This article explores how a once-fragmented party has become a key force in shaping revolutionary dynamics in contemporary Bangladesh.

Note: in Bangladesh unlike in many other countries, "ML" means "not Maoist", which are "MLMTT" (Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tsétoung Thought".

Historical Background of CPB-ML in Dhaka

CPB-ML emerged out of ideological dissatisfaction with the revisionist Communist Party of Bangladesh during the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing from Maoist, anti-revisionist, and third-worldist influences, the Dhaka-based leadership cultivated underground networks, particularly within slum settlements, student circles, and rural districts surrounding the capital.

Throughout the 1980s to early 2000s, the party oscillated between urban agitation and peasant mobilization. However, factional splits, state repression, and the collapse of international socialist allies pushed CPB-ML to the margins. In the lead-up to 2024, however, the party had quietly begun rebuilding, focusing on cadre development among university students, informal workers, and rural landless peasants, particularly in collaboration with the Bangladesh Krishok Federation (BKF).

August 5, 2024: The Breaking Point

The general strike and spontaneous uprising of August 5, 2024, erupted in response to a confluence of crises—fuel price hikes, mass evictions, ecological disasters, and systemic unemployment. As millions poured into the streets of Dhaka and beyond, what began as a reactive revolt quickly turned into a revolutionary opening.

Despite its modest size, CPB-ML played a disproportionate ideological and tactical role. Its organizers provided disciplined slogans, coordinated barricades in key zones such as Jatrabari, Mirpur, and Mohammadpur, and established crucial urban-rural linkages. Years of clandestine cadre-building bore fruit as CPB-ML redirected popular anger toward the creation of dual power structures: people’s defense committees, occupied land offices, and grassroots food distribution centers.

Trotsky’s Theory of Permanent Revolution and CPB-ML

Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution argues that in semi-colonial and unevenly developed societies, the national bourgeoisie is too compromised to lead a democratic revolution. Instead, the working class, in alliance with the peasantry, must take up democratic and socialist tasks simultaneously, leading toward a socialist transition without deferring to "bourgeois stages."
CPB-ML’s orientation during and after August 5 reflects this framework:

Rejection of Stageism: Unlike liberal and NGO-aligned forces calling for a transitional "National Unity Government," CPB-ML insisted on immediate working-class leadership and peasant control over land, labor, and resources.

Synthesis of Demands: Land occupation was linked to broader calls for public ownership, climate justice, and dismantling state-backed elite institutions.

Internationalism: CPB-ML framed its struggle within a global anti-imperialist lens, aligning itself with movements in India, Palestine, Philippine and the Global South, emphasizing Trotsky’s vision of international revolution over narrow nationalism.

Gramsci and the War of Position

Gramsci’s concept of the war of position—a long-term strategy to build counter-hegemonic institutions and challenge ruling class ideology before direct political confrontation—is equally vital for understanding CPB-ML’s post-uprising strategy.

Following brutal state repression after August 2024, CPB-ML transitioned from open confrontation to an embedded struggle within the spaces of civil society:

Cultural Resistance: Through radical street theatre, popular song, and locally printed pamphlets, CPB-ML youth organizations began shaping political consciousness in slums and factory zones.
Constructing Alternative Institutions: The party initiated food cooperatives, informal land dispute committees, and mutual aid networks—substituting state services with people-led structures.

Organic Intellectuals: Embracing Gramsci’s concept, CPB-ML cultivated cadre-intellectuals from within working-class and peasant communities—activists capable of interpreting Marxist thought in local idioms, thus reshaping political common sense.

Current Role and Strategic Dilemmas (2024–2025)

Since August 2024, CPB-ML has emerged as a central node in the revolutionary left, but this growth has not been without contradictions and dilemmas:

Repression: The state has responded with intelligence infiltration, arrests, and targeted disappearances of district-level organizers, especially in the garment sector and peasant fronts.
Sectarianism: Internal rifts have emerged over key strategic questions: Should the party participate in national elections? Should it align with pro-China currents? How should feminist and queer perspectives be integrated into a Leninist framework?

Mass Line vs Vanguardism: As its mass base grows, CPB-ML struggles to maintain Leninist organizational discipline while embracing grassroots participation. The risk of bureaucratic drift remains, even as the party promotes decentralized initiative.

Conclusion: Toward a Dialectical Praxis

The trajectory of CPB-ML since August 5, 2024 reveals a dynamic and dialectical evolution. Rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology, yet deeply proactive to Bangladesh’s specific class formations and geopolitical position, the party has begun forging a revolutionary strategy that is both principled and adaptable.

By blending Trotsky’s urgency with Gramsci’s patience, CPB-ML is articulating a vision of socialism that is militant, popular, and rooted in the lived struggles of Bangladesh’s oppressed classes.
Whether it can survive the state’s counteroffensive, internal divisions, and ideological tensions remains yet to be seen. But one thing is clear: since August 2024, CPB-ML has decisively altered the contours of the revolutionary left in Bangladesh.

“The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters.”
— Antonio Gramsci

5 July 2025

Source ESSF

Trump vs. Anthropic: Does the U.S. Want Killer Robots?

Monday 27 April 2026, by Léonard Brice



“I fired them like dogs.” This is the formula that US president Donald Trump, with the elegance we know him for, used to sum up his battle with the American company Anthropic. He will have to wait a little longer before bragging: in a first order issued on 27 March 2026, the court suspended the blacklisting of the artificial intelligence (AI) giant, whose tools can therefore still be used by administrations, contrary to the president’s wishes. But the tug-of-war is not over, and we must take the measure of what is at stake: the United States’ use of AI in the service of a regime of terror.

Founded by former employees of Open AI, the company that designed the famous chatbot ChatGPT, Anthropic is one of the main challengers in the field of large language models (LLMs). Its model, Claude, had reached 30 million users by mid-2025. In its communication, it emphasizes reliability and security and advances the concept of "constitutional AI", i.e. AI trained to act in accordance with founding texts such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. An approach that is intended to be wise and reasonable, but which did not prevent it from becoming, in November 2024, the official supplier of AI software for the US Department of Defense.

The Pentagon is using Claude, in particular, as part of a partnership that also involves the scandalous big data company Palantir, owned by far-right billionaire Peter Thiel. Palantir provides the tools to collect and process large amounts of data, and Anthropic makes it possible to use them to design action plans. In the context of the war in the Middle East, these tools have made it possible to automate the search for targets, which explains the exceptional pace of strikes. The Wall Street Journal also revealed that Claude had been used to plan the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in January.

At the end of 2025, the Pentagon began negotiations to revise the terms of these contracts. At issue: restrictions on the frameworks of use, which Secretary of State Pete Hegseth wanted to sweep away in favour of the formula “any legitimate use”. Anthropic was then open to discussion, but set two red lines: mass surveillance of American citizens, and fully autonomous weapons. While claiming that these uses were prohibited by American law anyway (which is highly questionable), the Pentagon was offended, set an ultimatum, and then broke off collaboration with the company. On 4 March, Anthropic received a letter informing it of the punishment that Donald Trump had chosen for it: it would now be considered a “supply chain risk”, a status usually reserved for companies from enemy or unreliable countries, which prohibits any administration from using its services. And it was this decision that, three weeks later, was suspended by the courts – a welcome rescue for a company now in disgrace, designated as “woke radical left” by the US president.

Settling of scores and petty cronyism

In the meantime, the competition has rubbed its hands. With calculated cynicism, OpenAI and Google published an amicus curiae at the beginning of the legal proceedings, an external opinion intended to enlighten the judge: in it, they defend their rival, and affirm the legitimacy of the concerns raised by Anthropic. At the same time, OpenAI was negotiating a contract to take over their place while it was still warm; and while it claims to have reaffirmed Anthropic’s two red lines, and to have had them accepted by the US administration, the agreement actually reached seems rather flexible. In an internal message to his employees, Anthropic’s CEO, Dario Amodei, accuses OpenAI’s CEO, Sam Altman (who is also its former boss) of having engaged in a pure and simple staging to hide his opportunism. A little later, the sinister Elon Musk joined the game with his company XAI, which concluded another agreement with the Pentagon whose terms, this time, clearly no longer contain any restrictions.

Is Anthropic therefore a “woke radical left”" company, committed to resisting Trumpian fascism? The chances are slim. In all the spaces where he is handed a microphone, Dario Amodei reaffirms his commitment to “national security”, and worries that the U.S. army will lose efficiency because of this affair (imagine that for several days, it could not bomb any school). His scruples about mass surveillance seem to concern only American citizens; and as far as fully autonomous weapons are concerned, his only argument is that AI is not yet reliable enough, clearly suggesting that it could become so tomorrow. In reality, setting limits on these hazardous uses is above all a way to protect himself from possible scandals, which could cause Anthropic’s rating to plummet, in an AI market that is still very speculative.

From the viewpoint of view of the Trump administration, this operation is mainly about rewarding loyalties and punishing infidelities. We know the relationship, sometimes stormy but always very real, between Elon Musk and Donald Trump. What is less known is that Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI, was also among the Republican’s donors; and Anthropic, for its part, made the mistake of supporting Kamala Harris. In the internal message already cited, Dario Amodei himself said that this was the main reason why the Pentagon was so closed in the negotiations – implying that he himself would have been ready to make a lot of concessions.

The subject is nevertheless serious, and merits being taken up by our social camp, without letting the Trumps and the Amodei define the terms of the debate. The rise of AI opens up new possibilities for mass surveillance, which the far right has already made a dogma. Palantir, Anthropic’s former partner in collaborations with the Pentagon, has also distinguished itself in recent months for the help it has provided to ICE, the US immigration police: its software that has been used to identify and track migrants, with the consequences that we know. Amnesty International has also shown that Palantir’s AIs have been used to identify leaders of the Palestine solidarity movement.

In the amicus curiae of OpenAI and Google, the two multinationals explain that their technologies have the potential to completely transform the type of surveillance that a state can put in place: “In 2018, there were about 70 million surveillance cameras in use in the United States, spread across airports, subway stations, parking lots, in front of stores, and on street corners. Each smartphone continuously transmits location data to carriers and dozens of apps. Credit and debit cards generate a time-stamped history of almost every business transaction made by Americans. […] What doesn’t yet exist is the AI layer that transforms this sprawling, fragmented data landscape into a unified, real-time surveillance apparatus.” How will social change activists cope?

Opposing the deployment of these tools is obviously the beginning of the answer. In the European Union, the AI Act adopted in March 2024 already prohibits states from using some of the most sordid forms of AI, such as real-time facial recognition, or software that claims to predict how likely an individual is to commit crimes – two safeguards that do not exist in the United States. But while these provisions are gains to be defended, their limits are obvious: there is actually no way to ensure that, in the secrecy of intelligence offices, these technologies are never really used. The AI Act also authorises the use of facial recognition for specific cases (search for missing children, human trafficking, terrorism), which means that the police have these tools – and can actually use them as they wish, as long as they don’t do so in too obvious a way. The best way to avoid state repression boosted by facial recognition is still not to have cameras in the streets. And this is undoubtedly the reasoning that will now have to be applied to counter this “unified surveillance apparatus” that frightens even Google and Open AI: to fight step by step all the levers that states – or companies – have at their disposal to collect data, from restrictions on encrypted messaging to the systematization of card payments.

An international treaty against killer robots?

As far as armaments are concerned, this is not a good time to welcome innovations in this sector with enthusiasm. At this stage, fully autonomous weapons, piloted by AI, still seem to be used only in very specific cases, generally defensive and without human casualties (the interception of a missile, for example). However, the Anthropic affair shows that killer robots are no longer science fiction.

Characterizing the current situation is a difficult task, as autonomous weapons are difficult to characterize. Many weapons already deployed, in particular the drones massively used in the war in Ukraine, have a significant level of autonomy. Officially, the armies of the major powers, including those of the United States, all claim the doctrine of “man in the loop”". But this expression is subject to interpretation: what is the role of the human in question? To set a target? To validate the one proposed by the system? To monitor the system and regain control if it makes mistakes? To activate the system and let it engage in combat without a specific target? And of course, claims of this nature are not always verifiable in practice. In 2021, a UN report established that a Turkish drone in Libya had opened fire entirely autonomously.

These developments trigger concerns on several levels. The first level is mainly a fantasy: that of machines with a will of their own, beyond the control of their designers. Abundantly fed by science fiction, but also by ambiguous lexical choices (“killer robots”, or even the term “autonomous”), this apocalyptic figure makes it possible to deflect the debate and reassure populations at low cost – as the French Minister of the Armed Forces said, “Terminator will not parade on the Champs-Élysées”. No army, in reality, has an interest in developing a weapons system that sets its own objectives independently of the state’s strategies and tactics: the autonomy in question always consists of following a program written in advance, with well-defined objectives, while introducing a certain degree of adaptability to changing conditions.

The most commonly accepted red line is the ability of a weapons system to choose a target itself – this is what Anthropic refuses to contribute to, with a technical argument: current AIs are not (yet) capable of making such a choice reliably. Clearly, the risk of killing civilians by mistake is too great. This is a second level of concern, largely legitimate; after all, it is for this reason that anti-personnel mines, which can be considered as a first form of autonomous weapon, were banned by an international treaty in 1997 (signed by 161 states, but not the United States, Russia or China). But arguments of this kind can also represent a trap, because they open the way to a deployment of these technologies once they have become efficient enough to make as many or fewer mistakes as human soldiers, which could well be possible tomorrow.

Our rejection of these systems must mobilize a third level: the automation of warfare, whether it is autonomous weapons or the applications of AI to intelligence, simply gives too much power to states. The shift, at the end of the twentieth century, from conscript armies to professional armies, was already a giant step towards the concentration of the power to kill: where the former, deeply linked to the population, were often the scene of protests and mutinies that were sometimes difficult to quell, the latter have become much more disciplined – and much more capable of committing atrocities without batting an eyelid. Far from the imaginary of the robot turning against its creator, military AIs are dangerous precisely because they are the ultimate disciplined soldier. Add to this the fact that the development of these technologies to their full potential, which requires gigantic resources, will probably only be accessible to a few great powers: we have a world where they will be able to take the decision to engage in totally asymmetrical conflicts, ravaging countries with very few human losses.

Humanity already has international treaties limiting the use of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. They are largely insufficient, and the horizon must remain that of the total dismantling of arsenals in these three areas; but they have the merit of existing, and it is reasonable to think that they have made it possible to avoid some disasters.

A few years ago, the UN began negotiations for a similar treaty on lethal autonomous weapons systems, following the positions taken by many countries (especially from the Global South), a broad coalition of NGOs, a large part of the AI research community, the UN Secretary-General, and even the Catholic Church. They came to nothing. And the list of countries that blocked the process will come as no surprise: mainly the United Kingdom, Australia, India, the United States, Russia and Israel.

At a time when the imperialist powers are seeking to reassert their domination in blood and suffering, curbing the race for the most nightmarish weapons technologies is a political priority. And for this, it is better not to rely on private multinationals.

21 April 2026

Translated by International Viewpoint from Gauche Anticapitaliste.