By Mick Ryan
Putin wants the subjugation of the Ukrainian people and the end of their sovereignty, according to his pre-invasion eve speech.
(Reuters: Sputnik/Aleksey Nikolskyi/Kremlin)
All wars, the longer they drag on, evolve in their conduct.
As the belligerents commit more resources, suffer gains and losses of people and territory, and interact with each other, they adapt their objectives. As war objectives evolve, so too must the strategies to achieve them.
Throughout the war in Ukraine, however, Russia has maintained a singular objective. The objective Putin seeks is the subjugation of the Ukrainian people, and the extinguishment of their sovereignty. This is what Putin described in his pre-invasion eve speech.
This objective was slightly muddled in the wake of Putin's May 9 Victory Day speech, where he focused just on the Donbas region. But more recently though, Putin has been "back on message".
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At an event last month, casually reclining in an armchair, President Putin confirmed that in Ukraine, he is leading a war of imperialist conquest.
He and his nation were not, as he described on May 9, defending themselves against NATO aggression and encirclement. He described how, like the conquests of Peter the Great, it was Russia's "lot to return and strengthen".
Last week, Putin doubled down on this noting that the war might drag on to "the last Ukrainian left standing".
The Russians have also implemented measures in the Luhansk and Zaporizhia regions, such as the introduction of the Russian Rubel and appointment of Russian administrators, that indicate their desire to annex these areas.
Throughout Putin's war against Ukraine, his primary objective has not shifted. What has evolved since February 24 has been the ways and means he has used to achieve it.
Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.
At an event last month, casually reclining in an armchair, President Putin confirmed that in Ukraine, he is leading a war of imperialist conquest.
He and his nation were not, as he described on May 9, defending themselves against NATO aggression and encirclement. He described how, like the conquests of Peter the Great, it was Russia's "lot to return and strengthen".
Last week, Putin doubled down on this noting that the war might drag on to "the last Ukrainian left standing".
The Russians have also implemented measures in the Luhansk and Zaporizhia regions, such as the introduction of the Russian Rubel and appointment of Russian administrators, that indicate their desire to annex these areas.
Throughout Putin's war against Ukraine, his primary objective has not shifted. What has evolved since February 24 has been the ways and means he has used to achieve it.
Space to play or pause, M to mute, left and right arrows to seek, up and down arrows for volume.
WATCH
Duration: 41 seconds41s
Plan A failed
Putin's Plan A was for a lightning military operation conducted on multiple fronts to shock the Ukrainian military into submission. This would facilitate the removal of the democratically elected government and the installation of Quislings who would do the bidding of Putin and his oligarchs.
This approach failed. But despite their battlefield setbacks, Putin and his defence and intelligence chiefs have cobbled together an alternative theory of victory for Ukraine. It goes something like this.
First, they have prioritised their military operations, and eschewed concurrent, multi-front offensives. Deciding Kyiv and Kharkiv were too difficult, they have instead focused on an eastern offensive and southern defensive campaigns.
This allows the Russians to husband the military forces that remain from the original invasion while building follow on echelons for operations in the coming months. And, it has drawn the Ukrainians into a war of attrition, something they avoided in the Battles of Kyiv and Kharkiv.
As such, this is the first element of the Russian theory of victory: destroy the Ukrainian Army faster than it can be rebuilt.
Holding the south
Next, Russia aims to hold Ukraine's south, which includes its only seaports. This is a productive agricultural region and is also the site of heavy industry including steel making and ship building.
And while the Ukrainian resistance movement corrodes Russian morale in the south, and Ukrainian counter attacks slowly regain territory in Kherson, holding the south is the second key element of Putin's theory of victory because it slowly strangles Ukraine economically, removing its ability to fund itself as a sovereign state.
Third, Russia now sees benefit in drawing out the war. Having lured the Ukrainians into an attritional conflict in the east, they are now reliant on western weapons and munitions. And with Russia occupying the southern regions, the Ukrainians are becoming increasingly dependent on international economic aid.
This is where Putin sees opportunity. He believes that the lack of strategic patience that the populations of western nations have shown in places like Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan will occur in Ukraine if he can hold out to the northern winter.
Then, with increasing energy costs, rising inflation and a general weariness with the war (among populations who are sacrificing nothing), Putin is counting on assistance to Ukraine declining. And he is betting on greater pressure on Ukraine from the old European powers for some form of accommodation.
Finally, Russia is using continued energy exports to generate revenue to support its war in Ukraine. It has continued to export fossil fuels to many nations. This has allowed it to generate almost 1 billion Euros per day since the beginning of the invasion. And this vast some continues to wash into Russian accounts.
We need to understand how Putin thinks
The aim of exploring Putin's revised theory of victory is not academic, however.
If western nations can understand just how Putin thinks he might win this war, defeat mechanisms can be developed that attack each element of Putin's approach.
Olha was raped by a Russian soldier. Can she get justice?
Across Ukraine, accounts of rape by Russian soldiers are growing. It is the 'most hidden' war crime and as the first rape case of the war begins in a Ukrainian court, human rights lawyers are working out how victims like Olha can get justice, and even if Vladimir Putin himself could be charged with the crime.
So far, there has been some success. Western long-range rockets have allowed the Ukrainians to degrade Russia's artillery, the main killer on the battlefield. It has also allowed them to support southern counter attacks with the aim of taking back their coastline and seaports.
Importantly, many nations have made political and strategic commitments to support Ukraine "to the end" to address the challenge of strategic patience. And sanctions on Russia continue to evolve to cover loopholes.
Just as Putin has evolved his theory of victory for Ukraine, so too must the nations of the west continue to revise and adapt their approach in supporting Ukraine.
The West is in a battle to out-think and out-adapt Russia. It is a fight that can absolutely be won, but will require strategic patience, and the ongoing commitment of military, intelligence, economic and humanitarian aid to the nation of Ukraine. To the end.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.
Putin's Plan A was for a lightning military operation conducted on multiple fronts to shock the Ukrainian military into submission. This would facilitate the removal of the democratically elected government and the installation of Quislings who would do the bidding of Putin and his oligarchs.
This approach failed. But despite their battlefield setbacks, Putin and his defence and intelligence chiefs have cobbled together an alternative theory of victory for Ukraine. It goes something like this.
First, they have prioritised their military operations, and eschewed concurrent, multi-front offensives. Deciding Kyiv and Kharkiv were too difficult, they have instead focused on an eastern offensive and southern defensive campaigns.
This allows the Russians to husband the military forces that remain from the original invasion while building follow on echelons for operations in the coming months. And, it has drawn the Ukrainians into a war of attrition, something they avoided in the Battles of Kyiv and Kharkiv.
As such, this is the first element of the Russian theory of victory: destroy the Ukrainian Army faster than it can be rebuilt.
Holding the south
Next, Russia aims to hold Ukraine's south, which includes its only seaports. This is a productive agricultural region and is also the site of heavy industry including steel making and ship building.
And while the Ukrainian resistance movement corrodes Russian morale in the south, and Ukrainian counter attacks slowly regain territory in Kherson, holding the south is the second key element of Putin's theory of victory because it slowly strangles Ukraine economically, removing its ability to fund itself as a sovereign state.
Third, Russia now sees benefit in drawing out the war. Having lured the Ukrainians into an attritional conflict in the east, they are now reliant on western weapons and munitions. And with Russia occupying the southern regions, the Ukrainians are becoming increasingly dependent on international economic aid.
This is where Putin sees opportunity. He believes that the lack of strategic patience that the populations of western nations have shown in places like Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan will occur in Ukraine if he can hold out to the northern winter.
Then, with increasing energy costs, rising inflation and a general weariness with the war (among populations who are sacrificing nothing), Putin is counting on assistance to Ukraine declining. And he is betting on greater pressure on Ukraine from the old European powers for some form of accommodation.
Finally, Russia is using continued energy exports to generate revenue to support its war in Ukraine. It has continued to export fossil fuels to many nations. This has allowed it to generate almost 1 billion Euros per day since the beginning of the invasion. And this vast some continues to wash into Russian accounts.
We need to understand how Putin thinks
The aim of exploring Putin's revised theory of victory is not academic, however.
If western nations can understand just how Putin thinks he might win this war, defeat mechanisms can be developed that attack each element of Putin's approach.
Olha was raped by a Russian soldier. Can she get justice?
Across Ukraine, accounts of rape by Russian soldiers are growing. It is the 'most hidden' war crime and as the first rape case of the war begins in a Ukrainian court, human rights lawyers are working out how victims like Olha can get justice, and even if Vladimir Putin himself could be charged with the crime.
So far, there has been some success. Western long-range rockets have allowed the Ukrainians to degrade Russia's artillery, the main killer on the battlefield. It has also allowed them to support southern counter attacks with the aim of taking back their coastline and seaports.
Importantly, many nations have made political and strategic commitments to support Ukraine "to the end" to address the challenge of strategic patience. And sanctions on Russia continue to evolve to cover loopholes.
Just as Putin has evolved his theory of victory for Ukraine, so too must the nations of the west continue to revise and adapt their approach in supporting Ukraine.
The West is in a battle to out-think and out-adapt Russia. It is a fight that can absolutely be won, but will require strategic patience, and the ongoing commitment of military, intelligence, economic and humanitarian aid to the nation of Ukraine. To the end.
Mick Ryan is a strategist and recently retired Australian Army major general. He served in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, and as a strategist on the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. His first book, War Transformed, is about 21st century warfare.
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