Dissecting Japan’s Defence White Paper 2026 – Analysis

Detail of Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper cover. Credit: Japan’s Defense Ministry

August 8, 2026
By Dr. Rajaram Panda


Key Takeaways:

Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper signals a major shift toward integrating commercial technology, AI, drones, space and electromagnetic domains into national defence, emphasising deeper partnerships with start-ups and the private sector.

The document portrays the regional security environment as the most severe since World War II, singling out China as an “unprecedented strategic challenge” alongside threats from North Korea and Russia.

It prepares the ground for revised core security strategies by year’s end and supports higher defence spending, industrial revitalisation and limited arms exports to strengthen Japan’s defence industrial base.

Featuring an anime-style cover of young people living in a futuristic city, Japan’s Defense Ministry released its annual 2026 Defense White Paper on 4 August 2026. The White Paper, themed Security For The Future, bears a manga-style cover by popular illustrator Hitomi Kariya, 30, who has 139,200 followers on X. The ministry framed the artwork as aspirational, meant to convey “a futuristic cityscape built through technological advancements and the smiles of the youth who will live in that future”. A major highlight of the White Paper is Japan plans to deepen partnerships with technology companies and start-ups as it prepares to what it described as a new era of warfare driven by artificial intelligence, drones and other emerging technologies. This dramatic shift in Japan’s defence outlook demonstrates that Japan has realised rapid changes on the battlefields require a stronger domestic defense industry and closer cooperation with the private sector.

The manga-style cover itself conveys a deeper message that young people living in a futuristic city, implying that they will have a “brighter Future Through Investment in Defense”. The report states “countries are striving to develop innovative technologies that can become so-called game changers.” It further states “the traditional military structure is undergoing fundamental changes, as are warfare tactics and strategies”. The glossy defence white paper received Cabinet approval the same day. It is packed with a record 598 pages of assessments detailing the increasingly volatile regional security environment.

What is new in this year’s White Paper from the previous years is that it places emphasis on emerging technologies, highlighting AI for battlefield decision-making and the growing importance of space and electromagnetic domains. There is also a new section that puts primacy on commercial technology sector essential to maintaining the country’s military edge. The report states that the enhancement of Japan’s scientific technologies and the creation of innovation are at the source of Japan’s economic and social development and constitute a key element of the country’s comprehensive national power integral to its security.


Japan’s Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi clarified that his ministry intends to work more closely with industry and other government agencies to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base. Writing in the forward of the report, Koizumi stressed that cooperation with startup companies is critical for Japan.

Japan seems to have realised the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, where inexpensive drones and rapidly evolving technologies reshaped combat. The strategic threats and the lessons of modern warfare, especially how Ukraine defending itself against a much larger adversary, as key reasons why Japan felt necessary to invest trillions of yen to transform a domestic defence sector long treated as an economic afterthought into a core engine national power. There is an increased realisation in Japan that a similar kind of situation like that of Ukraine could develop in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, which makes commercial technology inseparable from military applications, making civilian innovation an important component of national security.

The report adds a new chapter focused on defense personnel, emphasising the contributions of civilian employees, instructors and military families. While the report underlines the importance of the alliance relationship with the US, it warns that the regional security environment continues to deteriorate. It states that the inter-state competition between the US and China is likely to intensify even further in the future. The Defense Minister described Japan’s security environment as “increasingly severe” and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II, citing China’s military build-up, North Korea’s advancing weapons programs and closer cooperation among China, Russia and North Korea. The report called for enhanced development in unmanned systems and artificial intelligence. It was argued therefore that it is essential to build Japan’s own defense industrial shield to guarantee the country’s security. The sharp language described the three countries remained unchanged from 2025.


Earlier in June 2026, the Asahi Shimbun had argued based on the narrative of the 2025 edition that the international community had entered a “new era of crisis”, characterising the security environment in the “Indo-Pacific region” as “increasingly severe”, and hyping up the so-called “China threat” theory. It underscored that defense production and technological capabilities are directly linked to defense strength. It advocates creating an “environment of mutual support” by deploying the same defense equipment as allies and other “like-minded” countries. There is a section of people in Japan who express concern that the government’s continued efforts to justify changes in defense policy by citing a deteriorating security environment could heighten military tensions and increase the risk of conflict.

Like in 2025 report, the 2026 report singles out China as “an unprecedented strategic challenge”. It adds that as Beijing’s power grows, it is “expanding its activities throughout the area surrounding Japan”, including into the western Pacific near the Izu and Ogasawara islands. There is no denying the fact that Chinese military activities in the western Pacific have unnerved Japan, stoking concerns about the possibility of a close encounter triggering an accident that could erupt into a broader conflagration.

It may be recalled that the Sino-Japanese relations remain in a deep freeze since Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi angered China by saying in the Diet that the Self-Defense Forces could be deployed under the right to collective self-defense to counter a “worst-case” scenario, such as a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan. Takaichi had argued that such a move would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. Beijing reacted sharply but Takaichi did not retract her statement, further angering Beijing.

The main focus of the defense document was not surprising as weeks before Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Cabinet approved its annual honebuto (literally ‘big-boned’, or ‘solid’) economic policy document, which explicitly called for a “transformation of defence capabilities within five years”. What this meant in real terms that Japan was expected to spend beyond the current 2 per cent of gross domestic product on defence, if not matching with NATO’s target of 3.5 per cent by 2035, South Korea’s 3.5 per cent as soon as possible, and Australia’s 3 per cent by 2033.


In other words, this meant that Japan must first and foremost bolster its diplomatic power, proactively strengthen its defence power, and at the same time organically integrate its diplomatic, defence, economic, technological, intelligence, and human resource capabilities. Crucial to this vision is building a globally competitive defence sector that can position Japan as a vital player in international supply chains.

The 2026 White Paper serves as a prelude to Japan’s critical revision of its three core security documents – National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy and Defence Build-up Program – by the end of 2026. It was all clear that the main target was China, which was seen as presenting “an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge which Japan should respond with its comprehensive national power” together with the US and other like-minded countries. The underlying factor was the string of provocations including a December 2025 encounter in which a Chinese fighter jet had intermittently locked its radar on a Japan Air Self Defense Force aircraft for about 30 minutes.

North Korea was another factor. Pyongyang was seen to be posing a grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security. Russia was also another worrying factor as it was deploying the latest military equipment in the Far East, including surface-to-ship coastal missiles and advanced fighter jets. These alarmed Japan’s security planners.

Because of strict post-war arms export bans, Japanese defence contractors operated under severe structural limitations, with low procurements volumes as the Self Defence Forces was the only customer. This also meant slim profit margins that led major domestic manufacturers such as Komatsu and Sumitomo Heavy Industries to downsize or abandon their defence divisions altogether. The April 2026 decision to ease restrictions and allow the export of lethal weapons, subjected to strict vetting and limited to 17 countries with which Japan has defence transfer agreements, opens the door to new markets.


About Dr. Rajaram Panda

Dr. Rajaram Panda is former Senior Fellow at Pradhanmantri Memorial Museum and Library (PMML). Earlier Dr Panda was Senior Fellow at MP-IDSA and ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, JAPAN. His latest book "India and Japan: Past, Present and Future" was published in 2024 by Knowledge World. E-mail: rajaram.panda@gmail.com
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Basic Care Becomes Scarcity: Menstrual Product Restrictions & Myanmar’s Polycrisis – Analysis

August 8, 2026
Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

By Htay Su Wai

Restrictions on menstrual products in resistance-controlled areas demonstrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies everyday vulnerabilities.
Key TakeawaysMenstrual insecurity interacts with healthcare collapse, displacement, inflation, and gender inequality to create multidimensional social consequences.
The impacts extend beyond hygiene, contributing to deteriorating health outcomes, economic hardship, reduced mobility, and social exclusion.
Addressing menstrual health should be viewed as part of humanitarian resilience and social recovery rather than solely as a women’s health issue.

Myanmar’s ongoing conflict has led to a complex polycrisis in which political instability, armed violence, economic decline, humanitarian displacement, and institutional collapse reinforce one another. While much attention has focused on military operations, displacement, and humanitarian needs, less visible disruptions to everyday life are also producing significant social consequences.


One such example is the reported restriction on menstrual hygiene products in resistance-controlled areas. According to reports by The Guardian, Myanmar’s military authorities have increasingly restricted the transportation and distribution of menstrual products in conflict-affected regions, particularly in areas under resistance influence. Authorities have reportedly justified these restrictions by claiming that sanitary pads are being diverted to support resistance medical operations. Activists and humanitarian workers suggest that the measures form part of the broader “four cuts” strategy, which seeks to deprive resistance groups of supplies and support networks.

Although presented as a security measure, the reported restrictions have consequences that extend far beyond resistance actors. Limiting access to essential menstrual hygiene products disproportionately affects civilian women and girls, raising concerns regarding the protection of civilians and adherence to humanitarian principles. The policy also highlights how military decision-making can overlook gender-specific humanitarian needs. Despite the military’s public portrayal of itself as a modern professional force that includes women, senior command positions remain overwhelmingly occupied by men. This limited representation of women in senior leadership may contribute to the marginalisation of women’s health considerations in military planning, allowing policies to be implemented with insufficient attention to their gender-specific humanitarian consequences. More broadly, the reported restrictions illustrate how menstrual hygiene products, ordinarily recognised as essential health commodities, become reclassified as strategic resources during armed conflict, with disproportionate consequences for civilian women and girls.

Since August, the transportation of menstrual products has reportedly been blocked along certain routes connecting Sagaing Region and Mandalay. Although the military government has issued no official announcement, activists argue that the restrictions may be more widespread than publicly recognised due to the social stigma surrounding menstruation and the limited public discussion of menstrual health needs.

At first glance, the issue may appear to be a simple shortage of hygiene products. However, in a country already experiencing healthcare collapse, economic hardship, mass displacement, and weakened social protection systems, menstrual insecurity becomes much more than a supply problem. This article argues that menstrual product restrictions illustrate how Myanmar’s polycrisis amplifies existing vulnerabilities for women. By interacting with healthcare breakdown, inflation, displacement, and social stigma, menstrual insecurity becomes a multiplier of health risks, economic exclusion, reduced mobility, and social marginalisation for women and girls. Beyond its health and economic consequences, menstrual insecurity undermines the dignity of women and girls by depriving them of the privacy, safety, and confidence required to participate fully in everyday life.

Menstrual Insecurity and Healthcare Collapse

The first consequence emerges through the interaction between menstrual insecurity and Myanmar’s deteriorating healthcare system.

In many conflict-affected areas, healthcare infrastructure has been severely disrupted by armed conflict, displacement, and shortages of medical supplies. Clinics have been destroyed or abandoned, healthcare workers displaced, and access to medicine remains limited. Under these conditions, restrictions on menstrual products create risks that extend beyond discomfort. Women and girls who cannot access sanitary pads are often forced to rely on unsafe alternatives such as reused cloths, improvised materials, or prolonged use of disposable products. These coping strategies increase the likelihood of urinary tract infections (UTIs), reproductive tract infections, skin irritation, and other preventable health complications.

Under normal circumstances, many of these conditions are easily treatable. However, in areas where antibiotics, medical personnel, and healthcare facilities are scarce, minor infections can develop into chronic health problems. The resulting public health burden is therefore not caused by menstruation itself but by the interaction between material scarcity and healthcare collapse. This illustrates a defining characteristic of polycrisis: multiple vulnerabilities combine to produce outcomes more severe than any single crisis.
Menstrual Insecurity and Economic Hardship

The second pathway operates through Myanmar’s worsening economic crisis. Years of conflict, inflation, currency depreciation, and market disruption have significantly reduced household purchasing power. Within this environment, restrictions on menstrual products have contributed to supply shortages and increased dependence on informal markets.

Reports indicate that the price of sanitary pads has tripled from approximately 3,000 kyat to 9,000 kyat per packet. This exceeds Myanmar’s minimum daily wage of 7,800 kyat. For households already struggling to afford food, transportation, and basic necessities, menstrual products become increasingly inaccessible. As a result, many households in conflict-affected areas are forced to make impossible choices between purchasing menstrual hygiene products and meeting other essential needs, such as food. This dilemma highlights how the crisis compels families to choose between fundamental rights, including the right to adequate food and the right to health, dignity, and menstrual hygiene.

At the same time, Myanmar’s prolonged economic crisis has placed growing pressure on women to contribute financially through paid work alongside their male counterparts. Yet unlike many household expenses, menstrual health is both recurring and unavoidable. Women and girls cannot simply postpone the need for menstrual products during times of economic hardship. Consequently, families often resort to unsafe alternatives or divert scarce resources from other essential needs. For women who rely on paid employment to support their households, inadequate access to menstrual products may also affect their ability to work safely and consistently. What begins as a supply restriction therefore becomes a form of gendered economic exclusion, deepening existing inequalities while undermining household resilience during a period of economic crisis.

Menstrual Insecurity and Humanitarian Displacement

A third dimension of Myanmar’s polycrisis emerges through mass displacement. Since the 2021 military coup, millions of people have been internally displaced, many living in temporary shelters, monasteries, schools, or forest encampments with limited access to clean water, sanitation facilities, healthcare, and privacy. In these settings, menstrual hygiene management becomes not only a health issue but also a humanitarian and protection challenge.

Displacement disrupts the infrastructure needed for safe menstrual hygiene. Women and girls often lack private spaces to change menstrual products, wash reusable materials, or dispose of used pads safely. Many displaced women reportwaiting until nighttime to change menstrual products to avoid being seen, while others carry used pads with them because there is no safe place for disposal. Access to water is equally constrained, with some displaced communities prioritising drinking water over bathing or washing clothes. Although reusable menstrual products, such as menstrual cups and reusable cloth pads, are often promoted as sustainable alternatives during humanitarian crises, their use in Myanmar is constrained by both practical and sociocultural barriers. Limited access to clean water and private washing facilities makes it difficult to use and maintain reusable products safely, while persistent menstrual stigma, limited familiarity with menstrual cups, and cultural concerns surrounding their insertion reduce their acceptability among many women and girls. As a result, the loss of access to disposable menstrual products cannot be readily offset by switching to reusable alternatives.

These challenges are further intensified by conflict. Ongoing military operations, road blockages, and restrictions on humanitarian access make it difficult for aid organisations to deliver menstrual products to displaced communities. At the same time, insecurity limits women’s ability to travel to local markets even when products are available.

As a result, menstrual insecurity is intensified by the conditions of displacement. The interaction between forced displacement, inadequate sanitation, and restricted humanitarian access transforms what is ordinarily a manageable aspect of daily life into a multidimensional humanitarian challenge. This demonstrates how Myanmar’s displacement crisis magnifies the social consequences of menstrual product restrictions and further erodes the dignity, health, and well-being of women and girls.
Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement ultimately extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection.


This reduction in mobility can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community meetings, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in everyday governance and social support systems, but also the involvement of women engaged in political organizing and resistance activities, where sustained presence and mobility are essential. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether (see here). This cultural silence discourages women from seeking support, contributes to underreporting, and limits public recognition of menstrual insecurity as a humanitarian concern.

Menstrual Insecurity, Social Exclusion, and the Invisibility of Crisis

The cumulative effects of healthcare collapse, economic hardship, and displacement extend beyond women’s physical well-being to shape their participation in social, economic, and civic life. Menstrual insecurity affects not only how women manage their health but also their ability to remain active within their communities. Many women report feeling embarrassed or lacking confidence to attend school, work, displacement camps, or community spaces because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate menstrual protection.

Beyond its physical consequences, menstrual insecurity also imposes a significant psychological burden on women and girls living in conflict-affected areas. The constant uncertainty over whether menstrual products will be available each month, combined with the inability to manage menstruation safely and privately, can generate persistent stress and anxiety. Many women experience shame, fear of humiliation, and a loss of dignity when they are unable to manage menstruation according to accepted social norms. For women already coping with armed conflict, displacement, economic hardship, and the trauma of violence, menstrual insecurity becomes another source of emotional distress that compounds existing psychological pressures. Rather than being a temporary inconvenience, it contributes to a chronic state of insecurity in which women must continually worry about meeting a basic bodily need while navigating an increasingly precarious environment.


These psychological pressures often translate into behavioural changes that reduce women’s participation in everyday life. Women may avoid attending school, work, community meetings, displacement camp activities, or humanitarian distributions because they fear visible blood stains, odour, or inadequate protection. Such absences can limit participation in education, livelihood activities, community decision-making, and political engagement. In resistance-controlled areas, where communities increasingly depend on collective action and mutual support to sustain basic services, women’s reduced participation weakens both individual agency and community resilience. This includes not only civilian participation in local governance and social support networks but also the involvement of women engaged in political organising and resistance activities, where sustained mobility and physical presence are essential. For women participating in resistance movements, inadequate access to menstrual products may affect their ability to remain deployed, undertake physically demanding tasks, or participate consistently in political and military activities. What begins as a shortage of menstrual products therefore evolves into a broader form of social exclusion that limits women’s participation in both civilian and resistance contexts.

These challenges are further reinforced by persistent menstrual stigma. In many parts of Myanmar, menstruation remains a sensitive topic that is rarely discussed openly. Women often hesitate to request menstrual products from humanitarian volunteers because aid distribution is frequently managed by men, while camp managers may overlook menstrual needs altogether. This cultural silence not only discourages women from seeking assistance but also reinforces feelings of embarrassment and isolation, causing many women to internalise menstrual insecurity as a private problem rather than a humanitarian concern. As a result, menstrual needs remain underreported and frequently overlooked in humanitarian planning and response.

Within Myanmar’s polycrisis, stigma functions as a force multiplier. By obscuring the physical, psychological, and social consequences of menstrual insecurity, it allows armed conflict, displacement, healthcare collapse, and economic hardship to reinforce one another while limiting effective humanitarian intervention. Menstrual insecurity is therefore not simply a hidden health issue but a multidimensional humanitarian concern that undermines health, dignity, psychological well-being, and social participation. It illustrates how everyday forms of gendered vulnerability become embedded within broader patterns of conflict and social fragility.

Conclusion

The reported restriction of menstrual products in Myanmar’s resistance-controlled areas offers an important illustration of how polycrisis functions in practice. The issue is not merely a shortage of hygiene products. Rather, it reveals how multiple crises interact and reinforce one another.

Healthcare collapse transforms preventable infections into long-term health risks. Economic decline makes essential products unaffordable. Displacement intensifies difficulties in managing menstrual health safely. Social stigma keeps the resulting harms largely invisible. Together, these overlapping pressures create consequences that extend far beyond the original restriction.


Understanding menstrual insecurity through the lens of polycrisis highlights the importance of examining how everyday needs intersect with broader structural challenges. As Myanmar continues to navigate conflict, displacement, and economic instability, ensuring access to basic menstrual products should be recognised not only as a health concern but also as an essential component of social resilience, human dignity, and long-term recovery.

Policy Recommendations

Expand Community-Based Menstrual Health Support in Conflict Areas

Local civil society organisations, women’s groups, and humanitarian actors should strengthen the distribution of menstrual hygiene kits through community-based networks, particularly in displacement camps and conflict-affected areas. Where disposable products remain inaccessible, support should include reusable menstrual products alongside menstrual health education, soap, and sanitation materials to reduce health risks.

Strengthen International Advocacy And Cross-border Aid

The United Nations, ASEAN, and international partners should press Myanmar’s military to end inhumane restrictions on menstrual hygiene products and expand cross-border humanitarian assistance to ensure women and girls in conflict-affected areas have access to essential menstrual health supplies.

Integrate Menstrual Health into Humanitarian and Public Health Responses

Humanitarian agencies should treat menstrual health as an essential component of health and protection programming rather than a secondary hygiene concern. Menstrual products, antibiotics for common infections, and reproductive health services should be incorporated into emergency healthcare responses, especially in areas experiencing displacement and limited medical access.

Reduce Menstrual Stigma Through Community Awareness and Education

Local organisations, educators, and community leaders should promote menstrual health awareness to challenge stigma and improve access to information. Greater public discussion can help ensure that menstrual insecurity is recognised as a legitimate humanitarian and public health issue rather than a private concern that remains invisible in policy discussions.

About the author: 

Htay Su Wai is a Junior Research Fellow at the Sustainability Lab of the Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) and holds a Master of Public Policy (MPP) from the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany.
Source: This article was published by The Sabai


About Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre

The Shwetaungthagathu Reform Initiative Centre (SRIc) is a hybrid think tank (non-partisan) and consultancy firm that advances sustainable governance, policy innovation, and sustainability literacy in Myanmar. Through its Sustainability Lab, SRIc conducts in-depth public policy research and analysis to promote sustainable development and guide Myanmar toward a more resilient, equitable, and environmentally conscious future. SRIc provides strategic policy advocacy, CSR consultation, and the development of sustainability roadmaps grounded in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. These services support public institutions and private sector actors in aligning their operations with the Sustainable Development Goals. By integrating rigorous research with actionable consultancy, SRIc supports responsible business practices, fosters innovative CSR strategies, and designs impactful sustainability pathways. SRIc contributes to local transformation & global sustainability efforts through this dual approach.
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Scientists create first AI-designed viruses to fight drug-resistant superbugs

Copyright AP Photo/Petr David Josek

By Marta Iraola Iribarren

Published on 07/08/2026 - EURONEWS

Researchers in the United States have used artificial intelligence to create viruses, opening pathways for new drug development and raising biosecurity fears.

Scientists are using a new form of generative artificial intelligence to design specialised viruses that can hunt and kill harmful bacteria. This breakthrough could lead to a new generation of antibiotics designed to defeat drug-resistant "superbugs".

Using the AI model Evo 2, which can create new DNA, scientists at Stanford University created a series of viruses known as bacteriophages – microorganisms able to kill bacteria.

In lab tests, a mixture of 16 “exceptionally good” viruses designed by Evo 2 was able to rapidly kill E. coli bacteria that were already immune to natural phages.

E.coli is a group of bacteria that can cause gut infections and is increasingly resistant to available antibiotics.

Antibiotic resistance is rising worldwide, driven mainly by the mis- and overuse of these kinds of antibiotics, which cause bacteria to develop ways to survive them, making current medicines useless.

“If the bacteria gain resistance to a single phage, it’s game over for the medication,” said Brian Hie, chemical engineer at Stanford and co-author of the study.

“But if you have multiple genetically distinct phages in a mixture, it would be harder for the bacteria to develop resistance to the entire cocktail.”

The researchers noted that this technology could be used in the future to target other harmful bacteria, such as those that cause tuberculosis, or a common hospital-acquired infection (MRSA).

Model available for everyone

The researchers have made the Evo 2 AI model openly and freely available for everyone to download and use, which has raised safety concerns.

The study authors acknowledged that making the tool open source has raised discussions about safety and that one primary concern is that "bad actors" could potentially use modified versions of the tool to design harmful biological agents.

“As the authors highlight, this raises some serious regulatory and safety concerns, to say the very least,” said Simon Clarke, associate professor in cellular microbiology at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom, who did not participate in the study.

“While work of this nature is normally tightly regulated, it is reassuring that these scientists have shown further restraint in providing important guardrails, but there is no guarantee that every other scientist attempting to do something similar will be so careful,” he added.

He argued that naturally occurring pathogens currently pose a greater risk than AI-designed ones, as they are already easier to access and produce than to create new ones from scratch.

According to the authors, an advantage of AI-designed biology over natural evolution is the ability to build safety checks directly into the process.

Related

• Experts warn open access bio-data could help AI design dangerous pathogens

The future of biology AI models

The model, Evo 2, was trained on millions of natural genomes from all across the world, allowing it to learn the complex "grammar" and rules that make a DNA sequence functional.

As with other biology AI models, this dataset includes biological data such as genetic sequences and pathogen characteristics

Currently, no universal framework regulates these datasets, and while some developers voluntarily exclude high-risk data, researchers argue that clear and consistent rules should apply to all.

In February 2025, Evo 2’s team announced that they had excluded pathogens infecting humans and other complex organisms from their datasets due to ethical and safety risks, and to “preempt the use of Evo for the development of bioweapons”.

Earlier this year, more than 100 researchers across the world wrote an open letter arguing that while open access to scientific data has accelerated discovery, a small subset of new biological data poses biosecurity risks if misused.

“The stakes of biological data governance are high, as AI models could help create severe biological threats,” the authors wrote.

The researchers said that striking the right balance between openness and necessary security restrictions on high-risk data will be essential as AI systems become more powerful and widely available.

North Korea's sanctions-busting economy books a $22bn windfall since the Ukraine war began

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. New estimates put his regime's foreign currency earnings at up to $22bn since 2022 despite sanctions. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin August 7, 2026

North Korea earned as much as $22bn in foreign currency between 2022 and 2025, nearly four times the total for the previous four-year period, according to a Bloomberg Economics analysis of trade data and intelligence published August 7.

The windfall has coincided with a third straight year of North Korean GDP growth, at 3.5% in 2025, trade with China at its highest level since sanctions were imposed, a residential construction boom in Pyongyang and the rollout of mobile food-delivery and ride-hailing apps for residents.

"Pyongyang has proven its ability to adapt to sanctions, and as international norms and law erode, it has found allies in its resistance," Jenny Town, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, was quoted as saying.

From smuggling to statecraft

The regime has moved well beyond the small-scale sanctions evasion of the past - currency forgery, tobacco and coal smuggling - into far more lucrative channels. Cyber theft is now central to the model: hacking groups linked to Pyongyang account for more than 70% of all cryptocurrency stolen worldwide, according to blockchain-analytics firm TRM Labs, with the proceeds laundered through Chinese organised-crime networks. Separate reporting has put North Korea's cyber-operations earnings at upwards of $1bn a year.

Arms sales to Russia, and the technology transfers that have accompanied them, have allowed North Korea to accelerate its own weapons development. Kim has ordered the construction of two 5,000-tonne destroyers a year for the next five years - the largest warships in the country's history - and Pyongyang is reported to have folded some of that naval expertise back from Russian know-how shared in return for North Korean troops and munitions sent to support Moscow's war in Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal reported in late July that Kim plans to further strengthen North Korea's military intelligence apparatus and expand its foreign intelligence operations. Former North Korean officials say sanctions cutting the country off from the international banking system have pushed its intelligence services to fund themselves largely through cryptocurrency theft.

Diplomatic isolation eases

The financial windfall has been matched by a gradual thaw in North Korea's diplomatic isolation. As IntelliNews reported, North Korea has been welcomed into the steadily expanding CRINK alliance and China, Russia, and Iran, which are increasing expanding and deepening economic, military and cultural ties as a sort of anti-liberal alliance to oppose the Western hegemony.

All three of the Asian states are now openly supporting Iran in its existential fight with the US. For years, isolated from the rest of the world, Pyongyang is isolated no more.

Delegations from Singapore, Indonesia, Belarus and Vietnam have visited Pyongyang over the past year. In March, Kim hosted Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko for the first official visit by a Belarusian head of state to North Korea; in July, Russian President Vladimir Putin received North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui in the Kremlin and thanked Pyongyang for its help in retaking Russia's Kursk region.

 

Hungarian PM says Orban government failed to prepare energy system for climate change

Prime Minister Peter Magyar criticised the former government's energy strategy. / Peter Magyar via Facebook

By IntelliNews August 7, 2026

Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar has accused his predecessor Viktor Orbán's government of failing to prepare the country's energy system for the challenges exposed by the ongoing drought and heatwave, as low water levels and high temperatures have put pressure on the Paks nuclear power plant.

Magyar said the former government had been aware for years that Hungary's electricity system was under strain but had failed to address the risks.

"Viktor Orbán and his team knew in 2022 that the Hungarian energy system was reaching its final days and was on the verge of collapse. And yet they did nothing," Magyar wrote in a Facebook post.

He referred to a 2022 government proposal which, he said, warned that the electricity system was becoming unsustainable due to rising demand and insufficient investment in generation capacity.

"The maintenance of the system's balance will lead to its final days, with costs reaching unprecedented levels (from HUF50bn to HUF392bn per year), and without drastic measures, it will become unsustainable within a few months," Magyar quoted from the document.

The prime minister also criticised the government's reliance on nuclear power from the Paks plant while expanding energy-intensive industrial projects, including battery factories.

"They knew exactly that, as they calculated that they promised more electricity to large industrial (battery industry) investments than the system could safely supply," he said.

Hungary has been hit by an extended heatwave and drought, affecting agriculture, water supplies and energy production. The government said on August 4 it had extended a third-degree heat alert until August 7 as forecasts showed average daily temperatures would remain above 27 degrees Celsius.

High temperatures and low river levels have created challenges for thermal and nuclear power plants that rely on river water for cooling. The four operating reactors at the Paks nuclear plant, Hungary's only nuclear power station, are located on the Danube and have previously faced restrictions during periods of exceptionally warm weather and low river flows.

The government has said the country's energy supply remains stable. In a separate Facebook post, Magyar said the country's Defence Work Group had concluded that "the energy and water supply in our country is stable" and that "from now on, there is no need for voluntary consumption reduction."

"The Paks turbine produces stably. The Danube water level will rise by 20-30 centimetres on an interim basis due to the rainfall in Austria," he wrote.

Hungary's former government pushed to expand nuclear capacity through the planned Paks II project, being built with Russian technology and financing, while also increasing solar power generation.

However, Magyar said the government had failed to build sufficient flexible generation capacity or modernise the electricity network.

"In 2022, no new power generation capacity capable of being built at any time was constructed for more than ten years," he said. "The replacement or development of the old units was delayed, and neither the grid nor the storage system was able to keep up with the rapid spread of solar power. The construction of wind farms was hindered."

TRUMP FOLLOWS ORBAN

Zelenskiy falls to sixth in Ukraine's trust rankings as rivals crowd the top - poll

By Ben Aris in Berlin August 7, 2026

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has slipped to sixth place in a new public trust ranking of the country's political and military leaders, behind four military figures and his own former defence minister, according to a poll published on August 6 by the Center for Social Research Socis.

This is not a one-off wobble: Zelenskiy's own approval rating has been sliding through the summer as war fatigue deepens, and the new poll is the clearest evidence yet that public confidence has shifted decisively toward the military figures who have led the war rather than the politicians managing it - a dynamic with real consequences whenever wartime martial law eventually lifts and elections become possible.

A crowded field ahead of the president

Socis surveyed 2,000 people face-to-face between July 28 and August 2, with a margin of error of 2.6%; the poll excluded occupied territory and active combat zones. Former commander-in-chief Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, now Ukraine's ambassador to the UK, topped the ranking with 27.8% saying they fully trust him (37.1% more said they somewhat trust him). Mykhailo Fedorov, who resigned as defence minister on July 15 after a tenure marked by open conflict with the military over procurement reform, was second on 26.8%.

Robert "Madyar" Brovdi, commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, placed third (25.4%), followed by AFU commander-in-chief Mykhailo Drapatyi (24%) and Kyrylo Budanov, head of the Office of the President and former military intelligence chief (23.8%). Zelenskiy came sixth: 18% of respondents said they fully trust him, 24.5% somewhat trust him, 17% somewhat distrust him and 37% do not trust him at all - a net-negative balance no other figure in the top six shares.

Kharkiv mayor Ihor Terekhov (16%) and Third Army Corps commander Andriy Biletsky (14.5%) rounded out the next tier, ahead of ex-parliament speaker Dmytro Razumkov, boxer Oleksandr Usyk, Veterans Minister Vitaliy Klym, and, well down the list on 6%, former president Petro Poroshenko.

Zelenskiy leads the first round but loses almost every run-off

Socis also simulated a hypothetical presidential election. In a first-round vote among all declared and undeclared contenders, Zelenskiy would in fact lead the field - 17.8% to Zaluzhnyi's 17.1%, with Fedorov on 10.5% and Budanov on 6.7%, according to Interfax-Ukraine's report of the same survey; 15% of respondents were undecided and 5.4% said they would not vote.

The picture flips in a run-off. Zaluzhnyi would beat Zelenskiy 47.4% to 24.2%; Fedorov would win 43.4% to 24.7%; and Budanov would take 39.5% to Zelenskiy's 26%, with 14-17% of respondents opposed to both candidates in each scenario. Zelenskiy's only clear win among the tested pairings is against Poroshenko, 38.1% to 20.7%, and a narrower one against Biletsky, 32.8% to 24.9%.

No presidential election can legally take place while martial law remains in force, and IntelliNews has reported that Zelenskiy has himself sought to dissuade Zaluzhnyi from running should the option arise - a sign the numbers behind this poll are already shaping political calculations at Bankova, even with no vote scheduled.

A presidency squeezed from the flanks

The erosion in trust tracks a wider domestic squeeze on Zelenskiy's presidency this summer: IntelliNews reported in March that support was already melting within his own Servant of the People party over the handling of martial-law renewals, and in July a sweeping government reshuffle followed weeks of friction between Fedorov and the military over defence procurement - Fedorov was accused by his critics of obstructing graft, and by the military of obstructing operations, before he was pushed out and, per Financial Times reporting cited by Russian outlet Vedomosti, replaced in a reshuffle that also installed Drapatyi as AFU commander.

That reshuffle appears to have backfired in reputational terms: the two men most associated with the shake-up, Fedorov and Drapatyi, now rank second and fourth in public trust, both comfortably ahead of the president who promoted them. A separate Socis finding underlines the stakes - a third of Ukrainians say democracy is already lacking under wartime rule, a sentiment that a trust ranking topped by soldiers rather than politicians will do little to dispel.

 

COMMENT: Iran and the UAE are working together to outlast Trump

A container ship crosses the Strait of Hormuz. UAE-Iran trade has accelerated even as the wider Gulf war continues. / bne IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris August 7, 2026

A "truce" between the UAE and Iran, agreed after direct contacts between senior officials in mid-June, is helping both countries manage the fallout of the wider Gulf war and undermining Washington's strategy of economic pressure, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, founder of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, wrote in a note published August 7.

The de-escalation has spared Emirati cities and critical infrastructure from the direct attacks Iran has continued to level at other Gulf states, Batmanghelidj notes, citing a Financial Times report on the truce. The UAE exported more crude through the Strait of Hormuz than any other Gulf producer in July, with supertankers loading from secondary terminals at Zirku and Das islands and smaller vessels conducting ship-to-ship transfers off Fujairah before crossing the strait - a sign, he writes, that the FT's characterisation of the truce as a "bold gamble" is paying off.

Emirati officials deny making direct financial transfers to Iran, and Batmanghelidj is sceptical of reports the UAE paid Tehran "billions of dollars" to halt attacks, arguing any such inflow would show up immediately in Iran's foreign-exchange markets. What Iran needed, he argues, was not cash but the logistical and financial channels to procure goods.

Over 50 container ships crossed between the UAE and Iran in July, according to shipping-data provider Kpler, approaching pre-war levels - feeder services between the Iranian ports of Bandar Lengeh and Bandar Abbas and the Emirati ports of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali, carrying fruit and vegetables out and industrial intermediate goods back. At least eight bulk carriers crossed the strait in the past week to call at Bandar Imam Khomeini, delivering grain and animal feed to a country reliant on imports to cover its food-consumption shortfall; Iranian importers regained the dollar liquidity needed to pay for those cargoes through the UAE's financial system, reversing a block Emirati authorities imposed in early March after the first wave of Iranian strikes on Dubai and Abu Dhabi.

Not appeasement, but interdependence

Batmanghelidj pushes back on Western commentary that frames the UAE's continued economic engagement as a form of appeasement.

"It is a reflection of the deep and long-standing interdependence between the two countries," he writes. "As the war dragged on, Emirati officials needed to mitigate harm to key parts of the economy, ranging from the oil industry to the tourism sector. Likewise, Iranian officials needed to restore critical supply chains, sustaining manufacturing output and safeguarding food security to maintain stability during the war."

He argues the dynamic also explains why a reported Israeli push for a "land blockade" of Iran - convincing regional states to shut border crossings and ports to Tehran - has gone nowhere: neighbouring states' own economic engagement with Iran is what lets them manage the instability created, in his telling, by the Trump administration's oscillation between offering a deal and threatening further strikes.

"Six months on, it is clear that the war has no military solution, only a diplomatic one," Batmanghelidj concludes, framing the UAE's restored trade with Iran as evidence that regional actors, not Washington, are setting the terms of how the conflict actually winds down.