US-Israel Rift Has Been Brewing For Some Time – OpEd

June 30, 2026 
Arab News
By Yossi Mekelberg

There is perhaps nowhere further removed from the horrors of war unfolding across the Middle East than the tranquility of Lake Geneva, its surrounding mountains and the city itself, where negotiations between the US and Iran have been proceeding at a painfully slow pace in an effort to reach a deal that could end the conflict. Yet, alongside these talks, another development has emerged that could significantly influence their outcome and reshape the political and security architecture of the Middle East in both the short and long term: the growing rift between the US administration and the Israeli government.

This divide reflects a genuine divergence of interests over whether the war should continue or end. It also mirrors a gradual shift in American attitudes away from unquestioning support for Israel. Equally, it is a product of the personalities of the leaders of both governments: leaders who tend to be tactical, transactional and self-serving rather than strategic.

There has long been an element of predictability to this growing tension, as it has been brewing for some time. At the outset of the latest round of hostilities with Iran, both countries operated on the assumption that the campaign would be short, lasting days or at most weeks, and would fatally weaken the Iranian regime. This, in turn, was expected to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program, its long-range ballistic missile capabilities and its support of a network of regional allies and proxies. Needless to say, these assumptions were unrealistic from the outset.

More importantly, there was no Plan B when Plan A failed. While Israel never appeared to regard the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz or Iranian attacks against neighboring Gulf states as decisive factors in either launching or ending the war, these should have been critical considerations for American policymakers when deciding whether to join the campaign or how to conduct it.

The absence of an alternative strategy beyond the best-case scenario of a rapid and total victory exposed a striking lack of strategic thinking. Little consideration was given to the consequences for the global economy if one of the world’s most important maritime arteries were to be disrupted. The desperate manner in which Washington is conducting negotiations with Tehran derives directly from this strategic failure.

Yet the current crisis between the US and Israel over the latter’s conduct in Lebanon, which is seen in America as obstructing progress in the negotiations, is only the immediate manifestation of a broader political and societal reassessment of the “special relationship” that has been gathering pace for years.

For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, particularly since Oct. 7, 2023, a perpetual state of war has become both a political objective and a governing strategy. It enables him to remain in office while delaying any state commission of inquiry into the failures surrounding the Hamas attacks. An endless war, in which tactical successes are repeatedly portrayed as strategic breakthroughs or steps toward “absolute victory,” serves primarily to keep a failed government in power.

This approach stands in sharp contrast to President Donald Trump’s political instincts. Trump is impatient, seeks immediate results and appears to place little value on enduring alliances or long-term strategic partnerships. At the outset of the conflict, Trump and those around him embraced the idea that a swift military victory could permanently resolve the Iranian challenge. Once the economic, political and diplomatic costs became apparent, however, the administration shifted toward limiting the damage as quickly as possible, with relatively little regard for the long-term consequences.

The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018 followed a similar logic. Influenced in large part by Netanyahu, Trump also sought to dismantle one of Barack Obama’s signature foreign policy achievements. The result was that Iran, no longer constrained by the agreement, accelerated significant aspects of its nuclear program.

More recent understandings between Washington and Tehran may have reduced immediate tensions but they also contain the seeds of future instability and an Iranian attempt at hegemony. Despite suffering extensive military losses, the Iranian leadership has survived and may emerge believing that it is the US and Israel, not Tehran, that will ultimately be forced to make concessions.

Netanyahu should perhaps have drawn lessons from the way Trump has treated other foreign leaders. His administration has repeatedly demonstrated how quickly long-standing relationships can be discarded once they cease to serve immediate political interests. Personal loyalty matters only so long as it remains useful, while criticism is often delivered in deliberately harsh, public terms to exert political pressure.

When Vice President J.D. Vance reportedly remarked that “you can’t just kill your way out” of problems and argued that the US was effectively the only friend Israel has left — suggesting that Trump remained the only major world leader still openly sympathetic toward Israel — he was articulating an uncomfortable reality. Yet it was successive US administrations, including the current one, that helped create this situation. In Iran, Washington aligned itself closely with Israeli military objectives rather than pursuing durable political settlements through negotiations.

None of this, however, absolves the Israeli government of responsibility for the manner in which it has conducted its wars, often with little regard for civilian lives. Hence, Netanyahu’s approach to conflict over the past several years has left Israel increasingly isolated internationally. Now, growing tensions with Washington risk undermining Israel’s own long-term security and prosperity.

Since its founding, Israel has been the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance, receiving well over $300 billion (adjusted for inflation) in economic and military aid. Nearly 70 percent of Israel’s imported weaponry originates in America. Moreover, Washington remains Israel’s principal diplomatic defender in international institutions, particularly at the UN Security Council.

American administrations come and go but broader shifts within US public opinion appear increasingly significant. Israel’s reputation as a like-minded democracy committed to liberal values and human rights has weakened, particularly among younger and more progressive Americans. At the same time, the “America First” wing of the Republican Party has become increasingly skeptical of foreign interventions and long-term overseas commitments.

With the midterm elections approaching and the political costs of another unpopular conflict mounting, Netanyahu and, to some extent, Israel itself risk becoming collateral damage as Washington seeks both a quick agreement with Iran and a recalibration of its regional priorities.

Equally, this moment may mark the beginning of a different phase in US-Israeli relations, one in which Washington seeks not only to protect Israel but also to prevent Israeli policies from damaging its own interests and destabilizing the region, which ultimately harms Israel itself.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House.