Sunday, August 02, 2026

 

Solar car parks could cut electricity bills by €32,00 a year. Why is Europe so resistant?

People walk through a parking lot with solar panels near Lincoln Financial Field, Sept. 8, 2025, in Philadelphia.
Copyright Copyright 2025 The Associated Press. All rights reserved

By Liam Gilliver
Published on

Solar car parks are popping up across Europe, but not every country seems to think they’re a smart investment.

Europe’s car parks could be turned into mini solar farms to slash electricity bills and bolster decarbonisation targets – but not every country is on board.

Solar power has been described as a “shining star” of Europe’s clean energy transition, which is already helping cushion the continent from the soaring costs of oil and gas amid the war on Iran.

Thanks to plummeting costs and fast installation, solar has become the most competitive source of electricity in many parts of the EU. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), in 2024 solar panels were on average 41 per cent cheaper than the lowest-cost fossil fuel alternatives.

This has inspired a whole host of solar panel innovations beyond the traditional ground-mounted solar farms and rooftop installations. Europeans are already harnessing free electricity from their garden fences, while solar railways could soon pop up in Italy following a successful trial in Switzerland.

Are solar car parks a smart idea?

Car parks could be another way city infrastructure adapts to the renewables boom, and has become part of several European countries' long-term strategies.

“Car parks can generate electricity without taking up additional land, which is an important consideration given the planning challenges that ground-mounted solar can encounter,” Rob Stait of Alight, one of Europe’s leading solar developers, tells Euronews Earth.

“The infrastructure pairs with electric vehicle (EV) charging, making it easier and cheaper to install charge points where they’re required, which supports broader decarbonisation targets and creates a further benefit to car park users as well as the wider public.”

Stait adds that solar car ports can also provide sheltered parking to help reduce vehicle cabin temperatures in summer.

He says this is becoming “increasingly important” given Europe’s warming summers – which has already sweltered through a series of back-to-back heatwaves this year.

France leads the way with solar car parks

In 2022, France approved legislation to require all existing and new car parks with space for at least 80 vehicles to be covered by solar panels.

The owners of car parks with between 80 and 400 spaces were told they had five years (until 2027) to comply with the measures, while operators of those with more than 400 had just three years (2025). At least half of the area of the larger sites must be covered by solar panels

The French government said the measures could add 11 gigawatts of power to its grid, enough to power around 12 million homes. Operators ignoring the mandate risked fines of up to €40,000 a year.

You get the electricity generation without the land use trade-offs, and with the added benefit of EV charging integration built in.<br>
 Rob Stait 
Managing Director of Alight

Last year, France eased the solar mandate, allowing outdoor parking lots over 1,500 square metres to cover at least half the area with either solar panels, shade-providing trees, or a combination of both.

Similar rules exist in Slovenia, where all reconstructed and new parking lots of more than 1,000 square metres are obliged to install solar panels.

In Germany, new car parks in several regions, including Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate and Lower Saxony have solar mandates depending on the number of parking spaces provided.

UK U-turns on its solar car park plans

Last year, the UK government launched a call to evidence to understand how to “harness the untapped potential” of solar in car parks across the country.

Initial government estimates suggest that an 80-space car park could save around £28,000 (approximately €32,00) per year in electricity bills by installing solar carports and using all of the electricity generated.

Companies could also recover the costs of installing solar panels in car parks by selling energy generated back to the grid.

“Right now, the sun is shining on hundreds of thousands of car parking spaces across the country which could be used to power our homes and businesses,” former Energy Secretary Ed Miliband said last year.

“We want to work with businesses and car park operators to turn our car parks into solar carports to save families and businesses money with clean, homegrown British energy.”

The government pointed to several case studies that are already demonstrating the impact such a policy can have, including the UK’s first ever solar park and ride carport in Leeds.

The system is estimated to generate 852,000 kWh per year, offsetting 471 tonnes of carbon annually, which is the equivalent of removing 203 cars from the roads.

Because the park and ride can store excess energy harnessed from sunlight during the day, it provides lower cost electricity compared to buying energy from the grid. Payback for the EV charging points is estimated to be less than 10 years, based on an average of two charges per day in year one.

‘Huge missed opportunity’

However, following a call for evidence – which is used to collect data, research and expert views to shape new policies or laws – the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESZN) concluded that the policy “will not be taken any further at this point”.

Euronews Earth asked DESNZ why the plans have been shelved given the potential earnings.

“After careful consideration and close engagement with industry, we have decided against mandating solar panels on new car parks,” a spokesperson says.

DESZN says that solar remains “central” to its clean power mission, adding that it continues to support solar panels on new buildings, including car parks, through the Future Buildings Standard scheme.

Stait branded the decision a “huge missed opportunity”, telling Euronews Earth that relying on market forces rarely stacks up without policy support.

“The type of debates that typically slow solar deployment – visual impact, biodiversity, land use (despite such matters being comprehensively addressed by the industry) – largely disappear when you’re building on existing infrastructure like car parks,” he adds.

Stait says that France’s mandate has proven the model is “viable at scale”, arguing that there is a “strong case for the rest of Europe to follow”.

13 dead after Nazca Lines tourist flight crashes in Peru

Wreckage of a plane that crashed on Saturday, 1 August 2026, during a sightseeing flight over the Nazca Lines in Peru with tourists on board.
Copyright AP Photo
By Nela Heidner
Published on


The passengers reportedly included seven Italians, two Germans, and two Spaniards. Two crew members were also killed in the crash.

A light aircraft carrying tourists to view Peru's Nazca Lines crashed on Saturday, killing all 13 people on board, according to authorities and local media.

The Cessna Caravan C-208 involved in the incident, operated by Peruvian airline Aerodiana, had taken off at around 12:10 pm local time on Saturday from Pisco airport for a sightseeing flight over the world-famous geoglyphs.

"At approximately 1 pm, when the aircraft was flying near the town of Socos, the crew reported an emergency to the Nazca airfield control tower, after which all radio contact was lost," Peru's Ministry of Transport and Communications said in a statement.

Eleven tourists and two pilots were on board when the plane went down. According to the state-owned Peruvian news agency Andina, the passengers included seven Italians, two Germans, and two Spaniards.

"We have information that 11 passengers and two crew members have died," Police Major Jorge Andrade told reporters at the scene of the crash, per AFP.

"Given the severity of the accident, there are no survivors. We have recovered four bodies so far," he added.

Police officers recover the bodies of the victims who died when a sightseeing flight over the Nazca Lines in Peru crashed. Saturday 1 August 2026
Police officers recover the bodies of the victims who died when a sightseeing flight over the Nazca Lines in Peru crashed. Saturday 1 August 2026 AP Photo

Sightseeing flights over the attraction from the nearby airport had already been temporarily suspended on Friday due to wind speeds exceeding 40 kilometres per hour.

The Nazca Lines in southern Peru are a vast collection of geoglyphs etched into the desert floor around 2,000 years ago.

They depict animals, plants, and geometric shapes, among other figures, and are a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Best viewed from the air, sightseeing flights in small aircraft have become one of the most popular ways for visitors to view the ancient designs.

 

Italian Navy boards tanker from Russian shadow fleet

Operation IRINI: ship Thaon di Revel boards tanker belonging to Russia's "shadow fleet"
Copyright Ministero della Difesa italiano


By Fortunato Pinto
Published on

The Italian navy has boarded a Russian tanker in international waters off Pantelleria, an island located between Sicily and Tunisia. The operation was carried out as part of an arms and oil trafficking monitoring mission with the support of a Greek vessel and a Polish maritime patrol aircraft.

Italian vessel Thaon di Revel boarded a Russian shadow fleet tanker to inspect it in international waters near Pantelleria, an island located between Sicily and Tunisia.

The inspection was carried out by the Italian navy on Sunday morning, 2 August, as part of the Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, the European Union mission in the Mediterranean monitoring arms and oil trafficking.

The tanker Toa Payoh, which is subject to European Union sanctions and belongs to the so-called Russian 'shadow fleet', has undergone nationality verification, which for ships is determined by the flag they are authorised to fly. The Toa Payoh is sailing under the declared flag of Cameroon.

The tanker, which left the port of Cotonou in Benin on 16 July bound for Istanbul, was intercepted west of Pantelleria. According to the ministry's account, the tanker's master initially did not provide the requested cooperation. A team of Italian military personnel then reached the vessel by helicopter from the ship Thaon di Revel and carried out the planned checks.

Operation IRINI: ship Thaon di Revel boards tanker belonging to the Russian 'shadow fleet' Ministero della Difesa italiano

"I would like to congratulate the crew of the ship Thaon di Revel and all the service personnel involved in the operation for the professionalism, preparation and resolve they have shown. This activity too is a concrete demonstration of Italy's contribution to the security of the Mediterranean and to the European Union's action," said Defence Minister Guido Crosetto.

How the operation was carried out

The Ministry of Defence reported that the operation, carried out with the support of a Greek ship and a Polish patrol aircraft, lasted around two hours and was concluded routinely and in complete safety.

Operation IRINI: ship Thaon di Revel boards tanker belonging to the Russian 'shadow fleet' Ministero della Difesa italiano

The operation, conducted in international waters under the European mandate, was carried out, the ministry note says, in full compliance with Article 110 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which allows a naval vessel, when the conditions laid down are met, to carry out the necessary checks on the nationality of a merchant ship and the flag it is authorised to fly.

At the moment, the Italian authorities are reviewing the information and documentation obtained during the inspection.

 

Pentagon UFO files: what role Germany plays

On Friday, 8 May 2026, Pentagon-released files on UFOs will be photographed in Washington.
Copyright AP Photo

By Nela Heidner
Published on

For years, The New York Times has followed the release of US UFO files. The newly accessible documents go beyond sightings, tracing back to World War II and repeatedly mentioning Germany.

Glowing objects in the sky, mysterious military reports and files kept under lock and key for decades: newly released UFO documents offer a glimpse into some of the most baffling cases of recent decades.

A key focus of these historical files are reports by Allied pilots from the final months of the Second World War. They described glowing flying objects moving at high speed that accompanied their aircraft over Germany. These phenomena later became known as "Foo Fighters".

In the file (source in German) (source in English), it literally states:

On the night of 22 December 1944, two lights rose from the ground near an aircraft of the 415th Night Fighter Squadron, climbed to its altitude, took up position behind its tail for about two minutes and then 'peeled away again' – according to the crew, always under 'complete control'. Ground radar confirmed that there were no enemy aircraft in the vicinity.

Such encounters were reported repeatedly. Over a period of six weeks, crews of the 415th over Germany and France spoke of red, green, orange and amber-coloured lights that flew in formation with their aircraft, carried out evasive manoeuvres and came as close as around 30 metres. The pilots called these phenomena "Foo Fighters".

The British Air Ministry examined the reports and concluded in a memorandum classified as secret in March 1945 that 'the whole matter still remains something of an enigma'.

Independently of this, pilots also reported sighting an aluminium cylinder roughly 3.6 metres long at an altitude of around 2,700 metres. When fired upon by the aircraft, the object partially lost its shape and showed a red luminous effect, but did not break apart. Intelligence classified it as probably a German 'flak bomb'.

No one was able to provide a clear explanation for the mysterious lights. The file remained classified for 80 years.

1945: A file containing reports from combat pilots Department of War

The military examined several possible explanations. One idea was that they could be previously unknown German secret weapons or experimental aircraft with novel rocket or jet propulsion systems. However, the investigations found no conclusive evidence for this.

Declassified FBI reports, "Nazi UFOs"

The released material also includes historical FBI documents from the 1940s and 1950s, in which reports appear of alleged German developments of disc-shaped flying devices. Some of these references relate to possible secret research projects in the Berlin area and in regions near the Austrian border.

However, these reports do not come from technical investigations or confirmed military files, but are based mainly on statements from informants, rumours and intelligence tips from the immediate post-war period. They therefore primarily reflect which leads the authorities chose to follow at the time.

The documents do not provide evidence that Nazi Germany actually developed operational "flying discs" with extraordinary flight performance. Historians place many of these stories in the context of speculation about German secret weapons, psychological warfare and the Allies' search for advanced German technology.

In the SHAEF and Air Ministry memoranda of 1944/45, there are repeated descriptions of, among other things, red, green, orange and amber-coloured lights that appeared to move in a controlled way, flew in formation with aircraft and in some cases came within short range of them.

Some observers report arrowhead-shaped objects. Despite this variety, certain patterns recur: many of the described craft seem to have no visible wings, rotors or conventional propulsion. They are also said to possess unusual characteristics – such as apparently motionless hovering in the air, sudden bursts of acceleration or flight manoeuvres that are difficult to explain using known technologies.

Glowing shapes, unknown flight manoeuvres

Later investigations such as the US Air Force programme Project Blue Book (1947–1969) also documented a wide range of sighting reports. Observers described, among other things, glowing geometric shapes, disc-shaped or arrow-like objects, as well as phenomena without visible wings, rotors or conventional propulsion systems. Some reports spoke of objects that appeared to hover motionless in the air, accelerate abruptly or perform flight manoeuvres that were hard to reconcile with the aviation technologies known at the time.

Alongside the historical documents, the archives contain numerous files from more recent years. Since the public revelation of the Pentagon programme AATIP (Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program) in 2017, the United States has expanded its investigations into so-called UAP (Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena).

The Department of Defense has created new structures for recording and assessing unusual observations by military personnel. The Pentagon has also released several previously classified recordings of unknown flying objects, including videos taken by Navy pilots in 2004 and 2015, whose phenomena could not initially be clearly identified.

In some documents, military personnel also report physical complaints after close encounters, such as nausea, headaches, skin irritation or neurological symptoms. What lies behind these unexplained observations remains disputed to this day. Explanations range from known technological phenomena and misperceptions to far more far-reaching hypotheses.

Recorded by an F/A-18 on 21/01/2015 off the coast of California. The video shows an elongated object flying at high speed against the wind. Navy UAP

This new transparency in the handling of Pentagon files is being closely watched in Europe as well. Security and defence experts are following the US initiatives, as unusual phenomena in airspace are increasingly viewed as a potential security and intelligence issue.

Between history and speculation

The newly released files highlight above all one thing: interest in unusual aerial phenomena goes back a long way and is closely linked to historical events such as the Second World War. Germany does feature in the documents, but the files provide no proof of extraterrestrial spacecraft or secret German "flying discs".

Rather, they document how armed forces and intelligence services have spent decades trying to explain unusual observations – and how enduring myths have grown out of them right up to the present day.

"Social Movements And Democratization In North Africa, 1912–2024," by Moha Ennaji

A Century Of Contention, Provisionally Mapped: Notes Toward A Critical Reading Of Moha Ennaji’s Social Movements And Democratization In North Africa, 1912–2024 – Book Review



July 31, 2026
By Dr. Mohamed Chtatou

Key Takeaways:

Ennaji’s book offers a rare 112-year single-authored treatment of Maghrebi social movements. Covering 1912–2024 across Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, it links colonial-era nationalist resistance to post-2011 youth protest in one continuous analytical frame.

The structure organizes contention into six discrete movement types. Nationalist, human-rights/democratic, women’s, Islamist, Amazigh, and youth movements each receive chapters, raising questions about whether overlaps and long-term continuities are fully theorized.

Its distinctive contribution is longue-durée depth within a narrow Maghreb focus. Unlike broader or shorter-span works (Beinin & Vairel, Hill, Mako & Moghadam), the book’s ultimate value hinges on whether it delivers a synthetic theory of change rather than a chronological sequence of separate cases.


1. An Ambitious Act of Periodization


Ennaji’s title stakes a claim before the introduction begins. Framing a study of social movements across a 112-year span—from the eve of the French and Spanish protectorates in Morocco to the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings and their long tail—signals an ambition rarely attempted in single-authored treatments of Maghrebi contentious politics (Ennaji, 2026). Most comparable works either anchor themselves to a single rupture (Beinin & Vairel, 2013, organize their volume around the 2011 uprisings and their immediate antecedents) or to a policy-relevant window such as post-independence state formation (Waltz, 1995). Ennaji’s periodization instead treats 1912 as a hinge in a continuous history of mobilization, implicitly arguing that nationalist resistance to colonial rule and twenty-first-century youth protest belong to a single analytical lineage rather than to separate historical epochs requiring separate theoretical vocabularies.

This is a defensible and productive move, and one consistent with Ennaji’s earlier work, which has repeatedly argued that questions of cultural recognition, minority rights, and democratic governance in North Africa cannot be understood synchronically but must be traced through their colonial and immediate postcolonial origins (Ennaji, 2014). It also raises the central methodological question a full review must answer: does the book sustain a single explanatory framework across this span, or does it function more as a chronological anthology of six movement-types loosely bound by shared geography? The chapter architecture—nationalist, human-rights/democratic, women’s, Islamist, Amazigh, and youth movements, organized in sequence—suggests the latter risk is real. A century-long periodization is only as strong as the connective tissue the author builds between chapters; whether Ennaji’s introduction and conclusion supply a genuine theory of change linking 1912 to 2024, or whether the unity is asserted more than demonstrated, is the single most consequential question for assessing the book’s contribution.

2. The Architecture of Six Movements

The publisher’s description confirms eight chapters organized around six movement categories—nationalist, democratic/human-rights, women’s, Islamist, Amazigh (Berber), and youth—bookended by an introduction and conclusion, with confirmed chapter titles including “The Nationalist Movements” (Ennaji, 2026, Chapter 2), “The Islamist Movements” (Ennaji, 2026, Chapter 4), and “The Youth Movements,” appearing later in the sequence (Ennaji, 2026, Chapter 7). The book states its intention to trace how nationalism, language, religion, gender, and socioeconomic inequality each generate distinct mobilizational logics, while arguing more broadly that uneven development, political exclusion, and identity-based discourse continue to structure contention across the region (Morocco World News, 2026).


Two structural questions follow directly from this design, and both are answerable only once the chapters themselves are in hand. First, category boundaries in social movement scholarship are rarely as clean as a table of contents implies: Amazigh activism in Morocco has been substantially carried by women (Sadiqi, 2014), and youth mobilization after 2011 drew heavily on human-rights and constitutional-reform vocabularies inherited from earlier democracy movements (Beinin & Vairel, 2013). A chapter structure organized by discrete movement-type risks reproducing these movements as more separable than they were on the ground, artificially partitioning what were often overlapping coalitions and shared repertoires of contention. Whether Ennaji’s chapters acknowledge and theorize this overlap—rather than simply noting it in passing—will be decisive for judging the book’s analytical rigor.

Second, the relative textual weight given to each movement-type is itself an argument, even before a single claim is stated. A comparative reviewer will want to know, once pagination is available, whether the space allotted to the Amazigh movement matches its billing in the publisher’s own framing—which lists it alongside women’s, Islamist, human-rights, and youth movements as receiving “particular attention”—or whether, as has occurred in other single-authored regional surveys, the chapter functions as a coda rather than a full analytical unit comparable to the treatment given Islamist or nationalist movements. Given Ennaji’s own substantial prior corpus on Amazigh cultural and political questions, this is a natural point of continuity to verify rather than assume.

3. Positioning Within the Field

Ennaji’s book enters a crowded but unevenly distributed literature. Beinin and Vairel’s edited volume (2013) remains the most influential theoretical intervention on MENA social movements, explicitly challenging classical social-movement-theory concepts—political opportunity structures, framing, mobilizing structures, repertoires of contention—as insufficiently attentive to authoritarian contexts, and doing so through country case studies rather than a single connected narrative. Hill’s Democratisation in the Maghreb (2016) takes the opposite structural approach to Ennaji’s: a state-centered account of regime type and transition trajectories in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, with social movements treated largely as inputs to elite bargaining rather than as the primary unit of analysis—a book Ennaji has himself reviewed and implicitly positioned his own work against (Ennaji, 2017). Mako and Moghadam’s After the Arab Uprisings (2021) offers the most recent comparative synthesis, organized around four explanatory variables—state and institutions, civil society, gender and women’s mobilization, and international influence—applied across a wider MENA case set including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.

Against this backdrop, Ennaji’s contribution is distinctive on two axes rather than one. First, its three-country scope—Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, explicitly excluding Libya, Mauritania, and the broader Sahel—narrows the comparative frame relative to Mako and Moghadam or Beinin and Vairel, trading breadth for depth within the Maghreb proper. Second, its 112-year time depth is genuinely without close precedent among these comparators, all of which begin their empirical analysis at or after mid-twentieth-century independence movements at the earliest, and typically in the 1990s or 2000s. The claimed contribution, then, is not that North African social movements are unstudied—Ennaji’s own long publication record on the region’s minorities, women, and multiculturalism attests otherwise (Ennaji, 2014)—but that the region’s contentious politics have not previously been assembled into a single longue-durée narrative spanning colonial nationalism through post-Arab Spring youth mobilization within one authored volume.


Whether this trade-off—depth and duration purchased at the cost of comparative breadth—is vindicated by the analysis depends on execution the reviewer cannot yet assess: does the book’s three-country focus generate genuinely comparative insight into why Tunisian, Algerian, and Moroccan trajectories diverged despite shared colonial and Arab-Islamic inheritances, or does it default to a country-by-country compilation within each chapter, with comparison asserted in the introduction and conclusion but not sustained in the analytical chapters themselves? This is precisely the kind of question that separates a genuinely comparative-historical contribution from a well-organized descriptive survey, and it cannot be settled from the paratext alone.

4. Design Choices That Invite Scrutiny

Several choices visible even from the outside merit flagging as lines of inquiry for the full review, rather than as conclusions.

The exclusion of Libya and Mauritania. A book that takes “North Africa” as its geographic frame while restricting itself to Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia implicitly defines the Maghreb around its most institutionally continuous states, bracketing the cases—Libya’s state collapse, Mauritania’s distinct Sahelian-Arab hybridity—that might complicate a narrative organized around gradual, uneven democratization. This is a legitimate scoping decision common to much of the literature (Hill, 2016, makes a similar choice extending only marginally further), but it should be justified rather than left as an unstated convention, since the excluded cases are precisely the ones that test whether “North Africa” functions as a coherent unit of analysis or as a geographic label imposed on divergent trajectories.


“Movement” as the unit of analysis. Organizing chapters by movement-type (nationalist, Islamist, women’s, etc.) rather than by country or by mechanism (framing, resource mobilization, repression) commits the book to treating movements as relatively bounded, coherent actors persisting across decades. This is a stronger claim than it may appear: does Morocco’s Amazigh movement of the 1990s share enough organizational and ideological continuity with earlier Berber cultural associations of the 1960s to be narrated as a single movement, or is continuity itself part of what needs to be demonstrated rather than assumed by the chapter structure? Scholars working from a political-process framework, including contributors to Beinin and Vairel (2013), have generally been more cautious about movement coherence over multi-decade spans, treating organizational continuity as an empirical question rather than a structuring premise.

The state/civil-society framing. The publisher’s abstract commits the book to examining the roles of the state and civil society in enhancing civil rights and democracy, a formulation that presumes civil society’s function is fundamentally enhancing rather than, at times, co-opted, instrumentalized, or channeled by the state into managed rather than genuine liberalization—a dynamic well documented for Morocco’s associative sector specifically (Beinin & Vairel, 2013, describe Moroccan civil society as frequently serving as a field for professionalized activists to increase the value of their credentials as much as a vehicle of popular mobilization). Whether Ennaji’s chapters interrogate this ambiguity or adopt a more linear civil-society-builds-democracy logic will materially affect how the book’s normative stakes should be read.

5. What a Complete Review Must Still Establish


Four questions define the agenda for the fuller, chapter-engaged treatment this essay is meant to precede.

First, does the introduction articulate an explicit theoretical framework—whether political process theory, resource mobilization, framing analysis, or a synthetic alternative—robust enough to carry the analysis across six movement-types and eleven decades, or does the book’s theoretical commitment remain largely implicit, asserted through case selection rather than argued through method?

Second, how does each chapter handle the three-country comparison internally? A chapter that proceeds Morocco-then-Algeria-then-Tunisia in sequence, with a closing paragraph noting similarities and differences, performs a different kind of comparative work than one organized thematically across the three cases throughout.

Third, what primary and secondary sourcing underlies the historical chapters, particularly the earliest material (1912–1956), where the historiography on nationalist mobilization is uneven in quality and often shaped by the nationalist movements’ own retrospective self-narration—a methodological hazard familiar from Maghrebi historiography more broadly.

Fourth, and most consequentially: does the concluding chapter return to the century-long arc promised by the title and demonstrate a cumulative argument—a theory of how nationalist mobilization structurally enabled or constrained the women’s, Amazigh, and youth movements that followed—or does it summarize six chapters without fully synthesizing them into a single argument about the relationship between social movements and democratization in North Africa over time?

6. Provisional Assessment


On the evidence available before reading the manuscript, Ennaji’s Social Movements and Democratization in North Africa, 1912–2024 is best understood as a considered attempt to give the Maghreb’s contentious politics the kind of longue-durée, single-authored treatment that Middle Eastern and North African social-movement scholarship has generally reserved for edited, multi-contributor volumes (Beinin & Vairel, 2013) or narrower state-centered comparative studies (Hill, 2016; Mako & Moghadam, 2021). The ambition is genuine and the gap it targets is real: no existing English-language monograph attempts quite this span for quite this set of movements. Whether the book fully delivers a synthetic argument commensurate with that ambition—rather than a well-organized sequence of six strong but discretely bounded chapters—is the question on which its ultimate contribution will turn, and it is a question this reviewer looks forward to answering once the full manuscript is in hand.


References

Beinin, J., & Vairel, F. (Eds.). (2013). Social movements, mobilization, and contestation in the Middle East and North Africa (2nd ed.). Stanford University Press.

Ennaji, M. (2014). Multiculturalism and democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring. Routledge.

Ennaji, M. (2017). [Review of the book Democratisation in the Maghreb, by J. N. C. Hill]. Review of Middle East Studies.

Ennaji, M. (2026). Social movements and democratization in North Africa, 1912–2024. Palgrave Macmillan.

Hill, J. N. C. (2016). Democratisation in the Maghreb. Edinburgh University Press.

Mako, S., & Moghadam, V. M. (2021). After the Arab uprisings: Progress and stagnation in the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge University Press.

Morocco World News. (2026, July 28). Moha Ennaji explores North Africa’s social movements in new book. https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2026/07/331597/moha-ennaji-explores-north-africas-social-movements-in-new-book/

Sadiqi, F. (2014). Moroccan feminist discourses. Palgrave Macmillan.

Waltz, S. (1995). Human rights and reform: Changing the face of North African politics. University of California Press.


About Dr. Mohamed Chtatou
Dr. Mohamed Chtatou is a Professor of education science at the university in Rabat. He is currently a political analyst with Moroccan, Gulf, French, Italian and British media on politics and culture in the Middle East, Islam and Islamism as well as terrorism. He is, also, a specialist on political Islam in the MENA region with interest in the roots of terrorism and religious extremism.
View all posts by Dr. Mohamed Chtatou →
Taiwan Tests Economic Leverage After Papua New Guinea Closes Representative Office – Analysis


File photo of an LNG carrier

July 31, 2026
 RFA
By Taejun Kang


Key Takeaways:

Taiwan has halted spot purchases of LNG from Papua New Guinea. The move follows Port Moresby’s decision to close Taipei’s trade office in order to align more closely with Beijing’s One-China policy.

The step is framed as calibrated diplomatic signaling rather than full economic coercion. Analysts say it warns other partners that downgrading unofficial ties with Taiwan may carry costs, while stopping short of a complete trade rupture.

Energy security considerations limit how far Taiwan can escalate. PNG supplies about one-third of its own LNG exports but only around 8% of Taiwan’s imports; a full break would pose greater risks to Taiwan’s energy diversification than to PNG’s revenues.


Taiwan has halted spot purchases of natural gas from Papua New Guinea as a response to Port Moresby ordering the closure of Taipei’s trade office in the South Pacific country.

The decision followed Taipei’s review on imports originating from PNG of liquefied natural gas, or LNG, and the move amounts to a warning that countries with ties to Taiwan could face consequences rather than full-scale economic coercion, experts told Radio Free Asia.

“It functions as immediate diplomatic signaling, but also sits within an emerging, if still constrained, strategic adjustment,”Jozef Huljak, a PhD candidate in political science at Constantine the Philosopher University in Slovakia whose research examines Taiwan’s cultural and public diplomacy, told RFA when the decision was in its review stage.

Huljak explained the immediate message was that Papua New Guinea’s decision would not be “cost-free,” while also signaling to other governments that downgrading unofficial ties with Taiwan could carry consequences.

“The LNG review is primarily a signal, but one embedded in a gradual shift toward more calibrated responses as Taiwan’s informal diplomacy comes under sustained pressure,” he said.

Downgrading ties

Papua New Guinea on July 16 announced that it would close Taiwan’s representative office in Port Moresby, saying that the move was meant to align with its “One-China policy” and to deepen trust and economic ties with Beijing.

Port Moresby has never recognized Taiwan since gaining independence in 1975 and establishing relations with China the following year. The Taiwan trade office, which opened in 1990, served as Taipei’s de facto diplomatic mission while facilitating trade and investment.

Taipei blamed the decision on Chinese political and economic pressure, while the United States expressed concern. Beijing, meanwhile, praised the move.

Two days after the announcement, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung said the country was reviewing its broader economic exchanges with Papua New Guinea, including LNG imports of about 1.2 million metric tons a year – roughly one-third of Papua New Guinea’s LNG exports – while stressing that Taipei’s agricultural and fisheries cooperation had also supported local development.

On Tuesday, Lin said that the country would stop spot purchases of LNG from PNG, AFP reported. Spot purchases are one-off arrangements to cover immediate needs rather than long term agreements for periodic deliveries.

Liquefied natural gas, or LNG, is Papua New Guinea’s largest export commodity, accounting for roughly half of its overall exports.

While Taiwan is the destination for about a third of PNG’s LNG exports, that only accounts for about 8% of Taiwan’s imports of LNG.

Stopping the spot purchases is somewhat of a departure from Taipei’s previous course.

Taiwan has traditionally sought to distinguish itself from China by presenting itself as a reliable partner that does not use trade or investment as political leverage.

Beijing, meanwhile, has repeatedly been accused by Western governments and observers of employing economic coercion against countries that challenge its interests.

The stoppage of LNG spot purchases, however, is not the first such move by Taiwan – it also recently removed Cambodia from visa facilitation programs after Phnom Penh publicly backed Beijing’s position on Taiwan.

Together, these moves suggest Taipei is becoming more willing to attach consequences to governments that reduce cooperation with Taiwan, even if the measures stop short of outright retaliation, Huljak said.

Tit for tat?

Still, analysts cautioned that Taiwan’s options remain constrained.

“I think … comments made by Foreign Minister Lin still should be primarily viewed as first and foremost diplomatic signaling,” William Yang, a Northeast Asia analyst at the Belgium-based International Crisis Group, told RFA, also while the decision was still in the review stage.

“It’s a warning or it’s a reminder, rather than Taiwan already embracing the idea about weaponizing its existing trade link and relationship with other countries to counter their willingness to … give in to Chinese pressure,” he said.

Yang said Taiwan was also likely examining its energy relationship with Papua New Guinea not just as a form of leverage, but also as a legitimate precaution due to its heavy reliance on LNG.

Taiwan imports about 95% of its energy, and if Beijing is able to influence countries supplying critical resources, “Taiwan will have to also take a precautionary look and examination of its existing trade relationship with a particular country that has shown the willingness to actually bow to China’s pressure,” he said.

Despite PNG accounting for less than one-tenth of Taiwan’s LNG imports, it provides an important source of supply diversification at a time when natural gas generates nearly half of Taiwan’s electricity following the shutdown of its last nuclear reactor in 2025, according to Huljak.

“A full break would therefore carry higher costs for Taiwan’s energy security than for PNG’s export revenues,” Huljak said. “The review is real, but escalation is structurally constrained.”

Message to other partners

The episode nevertheless carries broader implications beyond Papua New Guinea, analysts told RFA.

The impending trade office closure suggests Beijing is increasingly targeting Taiwan’s informal international presence rather than focusing only on the island’s dwindling group of formal diplomatic allies, Huljak said.

“If left unanswered, Papua New Guinea risks becoming a template,” he said. “Governments could align with Beijing, accept economic incentives, and assume that Taiwan lacks the capacity to respond.”

Taiwan’s objective, he said, is to challenge that assumption by demonstrating that even unofficial relationships have value and that ending them may carry opportunity costs.

Meanwhile, Yang believes any decision by Taiwan to reduce LNG imports from Papua New Guinea would resonate beyond the immediate dispute.

“If Taipei does follow through on … reducing or ending its LNG trade with PNG, it obviously will be sending a signal to the rest of the Pacific countries,” he said.

“It would not simply just sit idly and allow these countries’ decisions to further shrink Taiwan’s international diplomatic space,” Yang added, describing it as a demonstration of Taipei’s resolve to protect its interests and sovereignty.


About RFA
Radio Free Asia’s mission is to provide accurate and timely news and information to Asian countries whose governments prohibit access to a free press. Content used with the permission of Radio Free Asia, 2025 M St. NW, Suite 300, Washington DC 20036.
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Graham Sanctions Bill Has Bite, Trump Will Use It To Terrorize India – OpEd


US President Donald Trump with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo Credit: POTUS, X

July 31, 2026
By M.K. Bhadrakumar

Key Takeaways:

A US Senate bill advancing secondary sanctions threatens 100% tariffs on major buyers of Russian oil, including India. The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 has strong bipartisan support and could soon reach Trump’s desk for discretionary enforcement.

India already faces competitive disadvantages under existing US tariffs. New Section 301 duties and the lack of textile quota exemptions leave Indian apparel and other exports more expensive than those from Bangladesh, Mexico, and some ASEAN competitors.

The measure is seen as pressure on India’s strategic autonomy. Critics argue the bill aims to force Delhi to cut Russian energy imports and that evasive official responses risk subordinating national interest to US demands.


The Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal’s characterisation of the reports suggesting the US could impose a 100 percent tariff on countries such as India that import Russian oil as speculative cannot be taken as a statement of fact. “We don’t comment on speculation,” he told the media. On closer look, it is an evasive remark.

What is absolutely certain is that the US Congress will pass the bill. In the amended form, the bill, named The Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, tightens US sanctions against Russia and Iran. It passed its second procedural vote in the US Senate on Wednesday. Eighty-four senators voted to launch debates on it, while 12 were against.

The final voting can even be expected by the end of the week. The bill envisages restrictions on Russia and Iran’s political and military leaders and state-owned companies as well as secondary sanctions against the two countries’ trade partners. Senators also proposed a 100% tariff for the five main buyers of Russian oil.


Earlier on Wednesday, President Donald Trump actually supported the bill and remarked that he saw no need for the House of Representatives to interrupt the parliamentary recess in August to review the bill. The bill is a veritable reality now. It is upto Trump’s discretion entirely to decide on the implementation of the sanctions.

Equally, it remains a pious hope still that the first tranche of India’s trade agreement with the US, announced by Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi on February 3, will materialise soon.

The catch is, Delhi is pinning hopes that Trump accedes to our wish to be granted a comparative advantage over our competitors, namely, countries in our neighbourhood, the ASEAN region “and other nations with whom we compete,” as Goyal remarked yesterday.

Meanwhile, although the US’ temporary 150-day 10% global tariff expired on July 24, Washington immediately replaced it with permanent Section 301 forced-labor duties of 10% to 12.5% targeting over 60 trading partners, including India.

Unlike competitors such as Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, India did not receive a textile and apparel tariff-rate quota (TRQ) exemption for using US-origin cotton, putting Indian apparel exports at a relative price disadvantage. Also, products already governed by Section 232 such as steel, aluminium, and copper continue to face separate existing structural tariffs ranging from 25% to 50%.


Curiously, under the new Section 301 rules effective July 24, India actually faces severe competitiveness disadvantages in its key export sectors when compared to Mexico and Bangladesh. While all three nations technically occupy the baseline 10% tariff tier, specific country exemptions for the other two countries leave India uniquely exposed.

Bangladesh has secured a specialised Textile TRQ Mechanism, whereby a specific volume of Bangladeshi apparel is allowed to enter the US free of tariff, provided they use US-sourced raw cotton and fibre. Whereas, India did not receive a textile mechanism or quota exception. Consequently, Indian ready-made garments face an additional 10% duty stacked on top of regular MFN rates, making Indian textiles significantly more expensive than Bangladeshi exports in the US market. So much for our insistence on preferential tariffs vis-a-vis competitors!

The most controversial element of the Russia sanctions bill in the Congress is the possibility of Washington imposing duties on countries purchasing Russian energy resources (so-called secondary duties). Indeed, Trump has already used secondary tariffs against Indian the past. On August 6, 2025, he signed an executive order “Countering Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation.” An additional punitive tariff of 25% was imposed on India, effectively increasing the then-current tariff rate on India to 50%. Therefore, in effect, the Graham bill effectively restores Trump’s ability to impose tariffs above 15%.

Ivan Timofeev, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council (an affiliate of Russian foreign ministry) has compared the bill to a gun that Trump could keep on the table and brandish to extract concessions from the other side. Timofeev emphasised: ”Trump’s support for the law is unlikely to have any impact on Russian policy. Perhaps it will add a psychological effect. Even from a purely pragmatic perspective, what’s the point of seriously considering this factor in political calculations if it doesn’t change anything de facto?”


Arguably, the bill is supposed to be another way to pressure Russia to extract further concessions in the Ukrainian conflict. However, the ground reality is that Russian policy has hardened lately and is now focusing on a military solution that ensures there won’t be another war. Trump cannot but be aware of it too.

Addressing a meeting of naval officers in St. Petersburg recently, Putin hinted at what Eurasia’s map would look like in a conceivable future: “I am confident that sooner or later Ukraine will lose these western territories [west of Dnieper River], lands that once belonged to Poland, Hungary and Romania. It may not happen tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. It may take one year, two years, 10 years or 15 years, but history will ultimately put everything back in its place.

“There was only one guarantor of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. It was Russia. But they decided it was necessary, possible and beneficial for them to declare Russia their enemy,” Putin sardonically noted.

It is plain to see that the bill’s real objective is to derail India’s strategic partnership with Russia and force Delhi to cut back its oil imports from Russia. Lindsey Graham never really cared to hide this unpleasant truth. Make no mistake, this is a bipartisan legislation which has had strong backing from members in both parties for over a year. And it advanced on an 86-12 vote in the 100-member senate.

Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), the co-author of the bill, said the measure is intended to punish China and India for financing Russia’s war with their purchases of Russian energy. As he put it, “To be really blunt, China and India are the main culprits here. They purchase the vast majority of oil and gas. They are fuelling Russia’s war machine and they are doing us no favours anywhere else in the world.”

China should have been a ‘natural ally’ for India in countering the US pressure going forward. On the contrary, the government threw its weight with gusto behind the recent US-led statement by a clutch of western countries to reaffirm the 2016 ruling against China’s South China Sea claims. What was the urgency? Beijing has reacted sharply.

Goyal’s evasive remark is shocking. A comprador mindset is tantamount to betraying national interest. India’s continued import of Russian oil once again becomes the litmus test of the country’s strategic autonomy and independent foreign policy.


About M.K. Bhadrakumar
M.K. Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.
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