June 27, 2026
By Simon Hutagalung
For nearly eight decades, Japan’s international identity was defined by Article 9 of its 1947 Constitution, which renounced war. This was Japan’s post-World War II pacifist stance, initially imposed by others and later adopted as a moral principle by the Japanese themselves. However, as the 21st century has progressed, this strictly pacifist strategy has become unsustainable as a number of new threats have emerged in the region. Today, Japan is undertaking its most significant strategic review since 1945, moving from a strictly defensive to a more proactive deterrence posture through remilitarization and defence modernisation. While these new military capabilities will enhance Japan’s deterrence, they will also increase the security dilemma in the region, requiring a delicate balance between the two.
To understand the defence transformation that is currently underway, it is first necessary to outline the postwar “bargain” that Japan has maintained for so long. The Yoshida Doctrine, which was a pact between Japan and the US that was devised after the end of the Second World War, saw Japan exchange military autonomy for the protection of the US, with the latter providing a nuclear umbrella to allow Japan to concentrate on economic growth and development. It enabled Japan to become one of the world’s leading industrial economies in record time. For decades, a unique cultural and democratic identity of Japan as a “Pacifist State” was intertwined with this policy. The Self-Defence Forces (SDF) had been constrained by a very narrow set of parameters, including a ban on possessing military assets that would project power, an unofficial spending cap of 1% of GDP, and an interpretation of the Constitution that prohibited the SDF from exercising collective defence. This meant that an economic superpower was effectively denied a military to match its size and influence.
In the face of increasing security threats to the region, such as an assertive China and a nuclear-armed North Korea, several factors are behind the growing need for Japan to defend itself and change its security policy to overcome the restrictions imposed by the post–World War II peace-bargain. The changing nature of the US role in regional security, including recent demands for greater burden sharing by Washington, has also prompted Japan to transform into a more capable and active military partner.
As already noted, Japan’s defence policy has changed dramatically since the late Prime Minister Abe returned to office in 2012. To deal with the unprecedented security challenges facing Japan, the late Prime Minister Abe was willing to challenge the historical legacy of the country. In 2014, during his term in office, Abe’s administration did what had previously been considered to be impossible and changed the constitution in order to permit collective self-defence. A few years later, in 2022, in the National Security Strategy issued in September of that year, Japan, for the first time in its postwar history, outlined the scope of a range of matters needing to be addressed on the part of the country. Since that time, based on the said National Security Strategy, the spending ceiling of 1% of the country’s Gross National Income that for decades had been followed by the country’s defense policy has been officially abrogated, and a decision has been made to increase defense spending to 2% of the country’s GDP, the third highest in the world, to strengthen the ability of Japan to play the role of a “full-fledged” member of the international community. Development of a long-range counterstrike capability is now actively underway. Several Tomahawk cruise missiles that can be launched from the sea are to be acquired from the United States. Destroyers in the Maritime Self-Defence Force are to be transformed into “aircraft carriers” to carry stealth fighter aircraft. At the same time, the development of the Quad and other forms of cooperation with several other countries is being actively pursued. All of this is something entirely new for postwar Japan.
In contrast, Japan’s military evolution into a more capable force has created a classic security dilemma. The growth of Japan’s military has caused Beijing to perceive the country as being contained by the US, and has thus prompted the country to continue to enhance its naval capabilities in order to achieve its historic claims to territories such as the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, from Tokyo’s perspective, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would be a matter of survival for Japan, thus making the country a primary target in the event of such a conflict. For these reasons, while Tokyo’s military evolution is increasing deterrence against potential adversaries, it is also increasing the security dilemma in the region. As mentioned above, the regional reactions to Japan’s military evolution are deeply nuanced, and a mix of support and historical ambivalence towards Japan currently exists across the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, back in Japan, the country’s deeply rooted pacifist identity continues to create much friction with the country’s Constitution, Article 9. Furthermore, there is also a vital economic paradox that Tokyo must address. China is currently Japan’s largest trading partner. Japan must engage in tech de-risking in order to reduce its exposure to potential risks, but at the same time, Japan cannot afford to engage in a decoupling with China that could be potentially catastrophic for the country.
To avoid military modernisation being translated into war, Japan has to develop a corresponding diplomacy, sophisticated and geared to an appropriate degree of assertiveness. In dialogue with Beijing, Tokyo needs to establish higher-level military hotlines in order to prevent the danger of miscalculation. Japan must also make it clear that the new capabilities for a counterstrike are aimed at the preservation of the status quo and are to be used only in the event of an attack being launched. At the same time, Japan’s role as a benign actor in the region must be consistently strengthened by means of regional infrastructure projects. Last but not least, the changes in Japanese security policy can only be maintained with democratic legitimacy if they are subject to open and transparent debate at home. The emerging new defensive identity of Japan will have a major impact on the strategic considerations of other countries in East Asia. A balance must be struck between the “sword” of a deterrent military and the “chrysanthemum” of diplomatic efforts.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.Venti, M. D. S., & Sato, Y. (2026). Japan’s proactive security policy after Abe: Strategic rhetoric and practical limitations. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 13(1), 54–76. SAGE Publications. Shirato, S. (2026).
Changes in the Japan–U.S. relationship concerning security and Japan’s defence industry. Journal of the Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer, 2026(21), 55–78. Meiji University Press.
About Simon Hutagalung
Simon Hutagalung is a retired diplomat from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and received his master's degree in political science and comparative politics from the City University of New York. The opinions expressed in his articles are his own.
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