Showing posts sorted by date for query Georges Bataille. Sort by relevance Show all posts
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Friday, June 19, 2026

Human Origins Destroys Core Fascist Mythology – OpEd


June 19, 2026 
By Yann Perreau


How deep history challenges fascist myths of purity, hierarchy, and identity.

The deeper we explore humanity’s past, the harder it becomes to sustain some of the most powerful political myths of the modern world.

For more than a century, authoritarian ideologies have sought legitimacy in origin stories: pure people, ancestral homelands, primordial hierarchies, and civilizational destinies. Fascism, in particular, has always been obsessed with beginnings. Whether in Nazi fantasies of Aryan ancestry, myths of ethnic continuity, or contemporary narratives of demographic replacement and civilizational decline, the past is transformed into a source of authority. History becomes destiny. Origins become a source of legitimacy.

Yet archaeology, anthropology, genetics, and evolutionary science increasingly tell a different story. Research across these fields has challenged older assumptions about purity, hierarchy, and human nature. Deep history reveals migration rather than isolation, cooperation rather than perpetual conflict, and experimentation rather than inevitability.

Few 20th-century thinkers saw this more clearly than Georges Bataille, who observed that competing visions of the past often conceal varying perspectives of humanity.

Better known today for his writings on eroticism, sacrifice, and transgression, French philosopher Bataille was also one of the first major European intellectuals to recognize that prehistory could serve as an antidote to fascist mythology. During the 1930s and 1940s, when fascist movements were mobilizing myths of origin on an unprecedented scale, he turned to cave art, ritual, and the earliest traces of human life, immersing himself in the latest archaeological, anthropological, paleontological, and sociological research.

His writings on prehistory drew extensively on the discoveries and debates of his time, delving into philosophical, anthropological, and political interests at once. What distinguishes humans from other animals? How did symbolic thought emerge? What forms of community existed before states, nations, and organized religions? These questions acquired a particular urgency during the rise of Benito Mussolini in Italy and Adolf Hitler in Germany, when competing visions of humanity became a matter of life and death.

Studying cave art and the discoveries emerging from sites such as the Lascaux Cave in France, Bataille became fascinated by a simple fact. The artists who painted the walls left no names. They founded no dynasties. They erected no monuments to rulers or conquerors. But they created some of the most extraordinary images in human history.

For Bataille, the lack of names was not a footnote; it was the point.


The caves revealed forms of collective creation that preceded authorship, ownership, and sovereignty. Art appeared not as an expression of individual genius or political authority but as a shared symbolic activity through which a community understood itself and its place in the world.

Instead of fascism’s cult of leadership, Bataille discovered a humanity whose earliest masterpieces emerged from participation rather than domination, anonymity rather than glory, and collective creation rather than the cult of personality.

The political implications of these observations became increasingly difficult to ignore during the rise of the totalitarian regimes that would engulf much of Europe and Asia. In his 1933 essay “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” Bataille analyzed the attraction to sovereignty, authority, and charismatic leadership. In 1936, he founded Acéphale, an anti-fascist intellectual group whose symbol was a headless human figure.

The image was deliberately provocative. Against the Führer, Il Duce, Stalin, and every cult of leadership, Bataille proposed a humanity without a head. The figure was less of a political statement than a symbolic reversal of the principles celebrated by totalitarian movements. Against sovereignty, he imagined forms of collective existence that could not be reduced to a single authority. Against hierarchy, he emphasized participation, reciprocity, and shared experiences.

Prehistory became important not because it provided an alternative mythology, but because it revealed a past that resisted mythological simplification. Bataille turned to caves such as Lascaux as they seemed to preserve traces of human existence before nations, before states, and before centralized authority. What he found there was not an original people or an ancestral race, but forms of collective life that escaped the categories through which modern politics often tends to understand itself.

Against Hobbes

In this sense, Bataille’s reading of prehistory amounted to a direct challenge to one of the founding myths of modern political thought. In Leviathan(1651), Thomas Hobbes famously described life before political authority as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Human beings, he argued, originally lived in a condition of universal conflict—a “war of all against all”—from which only a sovereign power could rescue them.

This image has shaped centuries of political theory. It continues to influence assumptions about human nature and social order. If conflict is primordial, hierarchy appears necessary. If competition is humanity’s defining characteristic, strong authority becomes easier to justify.

Yet few anthropologists, archaeologists, or evolutionary researchers today would recognize early human societies that were part of Hobbes’s description. Over the past century, discoveries from prehistory have gradually eroded the picture of humanity emerging from a primordial war of all against all. Instead, these findings have shed light on how the social bond preceded sovereignty.

Cooperation and Human Success


Research in the 21st century has begun to explain the reasoning behind this. Far from being a secondary achievement of civilization, cooperation was one of the conditions that made civilization possible. Human infants require years of care, and this knowledge needs to be transmitted across generations. Food sharing, communication, and reciprocity were not late cultural inventions. They were essential to survival.

Increasingly, researchers describe Homo sapiens as a uniquely hyper-cooperative species. In a landmark study published in the journal Nature in 2014, the authors argued that cooperative breeding and exceptional levels of social cooperation played a decisive role in the evolution of human cognition and culture. Shared childcare, collective learning, and social transmission enabled forms of cumulative culture unmatched elsewhere in the animal world.

Human beings did not become cooperative because civilization imposed cooperation upon them: civilization became possible because humans were already cooperative. American anthropologist Sarah Blaffer Hrdy makes a similar point in Mothers and Others, stating that networks of care extending far beyond biological parents helped shape human evolution. Humans survived because they learned to depend upon one another.

Developmental and comparative psychologist Michael Tomasello reaches a similar conclusion. In A Natural History of Human Morality, he argues that what distinguishes human cognition is not superior individual intelligence but the capacity for shared intentionality—the ability to coordinate attention, goals, and actions with others. Human intelligence, in this view, is fundamentally social.

A similar intuition reappears today in discussions about artificial intelligence (AI). Blaise Agüera y Arcas, an AI researcher, has argued that intelligence is not simply an individual property but something that emerges through communication, learning, and exchange. Language may be less of an instrument of individual advantage than a technology of collective intelligence.

While Hobbes saw society emerging from conflict, many contemporary scholars suggest that society was shaped by cooperation.

The Archaeology of Possibility


The same shift has transformed our understanding of political development. In The Dawn of Everything, authors David Graeber and David Wengrow challenge the familiar narrative of how human societies progressed through a fixed sequence—bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states—becoming more hierarchical at every stage.

Drawing on decades of archaeological research, they describe societies that repeatedly experimented with different political arrangements. Some adopted hierarchical structures only temporarily before abandoning them. Others alternated between centralized and decentralized forms of organization according to seasonal rhythms. Large populations sometimes existed without kings, standing armies, or centralized bureaucracies. These accounts make human history look less like a march toward the state and more like a field of political experimentation.

The implications of this outlook extend well beyond archaeology. If hierarchy is not inevitable, authoritarianism can no longer present itself as the culmination of human development. If human beings repeatedly invented different ways of organizing collective life, then political alternatives are not utopian fantasies. They are historical realities. The past does not reveal our destiny, but another possibility of how to exist.

Deep History Against Race


The anti-fascist implications of prehistory became especially visible during the 20th century.

As Nazi scholars attempted to transform archaeology into a science of racial origins, other researchers moved in the opposite direction. In Man Makes Himself, archaeologist V. Gordon Childe emphasized that human progress is a result of innovation, exchange, and collective invention, instead of a biological destiny. Anthropologist Franz Boas’s The Mind of Primitive Mandismantled theories of racial hierarchy and demonstrated that cultural differences were historical rather than biological. Ethnologist Paul Rivet’s studies of migration and the peopling of the Americas highlighted human circulation, encounter, and mixture over purity and permanence in the region. Working in different disciplines, these researchers arrived at a similar conclusion: the deeper one investigates human history, the less sustainable are the ideas of fixed origins and permanent identities.

Advances in the 21st century in genetics have further strengthened this conclusion. Ancient DNA research has transformed our understanding of the past as dramatically as the discovery of cave art transformed our understanding of prehistoric culture a century ago. Across Eurasia and beyond, genetic studies have revealed repeated episodes of migration, admixture, and exchange that challenge older narratives of stable and isolated populations.

Far from revealing isolated groups preserving fixed identities over millennia, genetics shows continuous movement and transformation. Even Homo sapiens bear the marks of encounters with other human groups, including Neanderthals and Denisovans.

The further we travel into the past, the harder it becomes to sustain fantasies of racial purity.

Why Bataille’s Thinking Remains Important

Prehistory does not provide a political program. It does not tell us how contemporary societies should be organized, nor does it reveal a lost golden age. The important point is not that prehistoric humanity was peaceful, egalitarian, or morally superior. Human violence is ancient. So are domination and conflict.

The lesson is something else.

Deep history undermines some of the stories authoritarian ideologies tell us about humanity. Against the myths of racial purity, it reveals a mixture of races. Against myths of primordial hierarchy, it reveals experimentation with political structure. Against myths of sovereign necessity, it reveals human cooperation. Against myths of fixed identity, it reveals transformation.

Bataille understood that prehistory was not simply about origins. It was also about what happens when origin stories lose their authority. Now, with nationalism and authoritarian politics again looking for acknowledgment in ancestry, identity, and destiny, deep history offers a different perspective. The further back we go, the harder it is for fascism to find validity in historical narratives. Instead, what comes into view is a history of movement and exchange, cooperation and shared invention.

Prehistory doesn’t excuse domination. It doesn’t erase it, either. It places domination in perspective. And at a moment when authoritarianism is once again on the rise, the deep past reveals something both humbling and reassuring: our greatest strength has never been purity or domination, but our capacity to cooperate, connect, and depend on one another.


Credit Line: This article was produced by Human Bridges.

About Yann Perreau
Yann Perreau is a writer, educator, contemporary art curator, and writing fellow for the Human Bridges project of the Independent Media Institute. He has published several books with French publishers on climate, anonymity, and more. His articles have appeared in many publications, including Le Monde, the London Review of Books, and Art Press. He has served as a cultural attaché for both the French Embassy in London and the French Consulate in Los Angeles. He holds an MPhil in art history from Paris's EHESS.
View all posts by Yann Perreau →








Ritual, Power, And The Weekend Arena – OpEd

President Donald J. Trump and UFC CEO Dana White arrive at UFC Freedom 250, the mixed martial arts event produced by the Ultimate Fighting Championship, Sunday, June 14, 2026, on the South Lawn of the White House. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)


June 18, 2026 
By Gary M. Feinman


In a March 2026 paper published in the journal Science Advances, which focused on variability in governance along the autocratic-democratic axis, my coauthors and I found that one of the strongest associations for the 40 case observations, which were part of our study, was between the nature of rituals and the concentration of power.

For this global sample, autocratically organized societies were characterized by spectacles that foment fear and awe, while participatory rituals predominated in more democratically organized contexts. For example, in the region where I study (Oaxaca, Mexico), when governance was typified by distributed power relations, the pre-Hispanic rubber ball game was played in a large court adjacent to a broad, flat open plaza, the Main Plaza at Monte Albán, a space that could accommodate many of the settlement’s inhabitants. Later, however, as political power became more concentrated, the size of ball courts was reduced, access to them became more restricted, and some were even built immediately adjacent to the houses or palaces of ruling families.

Social scientists have long recognized that communal rituals are a universal human experience that binds people together in various ways. Spectacles, often rich in disorienting noise, shock, and awe, tend to captivate observers through the powerful figures at the center of the spectacle, who inspire fear and wonderment, reinforcing authoritarian cults of personality. In contrast, participatory rituals like communal dancing, singing, or chanting tend to instill camaraderie among participants, solidarity, and trust among those involved. As a student of history and a sports fan, the mirrored reflections of the past provide an analytical perspective about the final Knicks game on June 13, a sports agenda that cannot be ignored.

During the 2026 National Basketball Association playoff between the New York Knicks and the San Antonio Spurs, Madison Square Garden, the storied home of the Knicks, once again became like a civic commons after a 53-year championship drought. The competitiveness of the Knicks during the playoffs elevated the space from merely being a site of entertainment to a participatory ritual arena. The crowd did not passively observe; it chanted, rose, groaned, anticipated, and collectively willed momentum into existence. One needed to only look at the faces in the stands—season ticket holders and first-timers, celebrities and subway riders alike—to notice that the sight was closer to what might be considered an integrative ritual: one in which meaning is not imposed from above but generated, often with spontaneity, among participants.


Basketball, by definition, is a team sport, but this is typified by the game that the Knicks currently play. It is not about consistent domination by a central figure. Even the most celebrated player, Jalen Brunson, depends on coordination, timing, and trust in his teammates. The drama unfolds collectively, and its outcome remains contingent on who makes a foul shot and who grabs a rebound. Participation matters—not just symbolically but materially. The arena amplifies the idea, however imperfectly enacted, that communal engagement shapes outcomes. And these outcomes transcended the arenas where the Knicks games were played, stimulating joy and collective actions, and bringing people together in the desire for a common outcome.

By contrast, the spectacle of an Ultimate Fighting Championship event, staged in a garish steel cage, on the grounds of the White House on June 14 operated on a fundamentally different ritual logic. It was not designed for mutual participation but for spectacle: with the concentration of attention onto a staged center, where one-on-one conflict and mayhem are distilled into physical dominance and symbolic submission. The audience’s role is not to join but to witness—to be awed, to see blood and hear pain, be unsettled, and ultimately to orient themselves toward the figures who command the stage and oversee the event.

The choice of venue was not incidental. The White House has long functioned as a site of state ritual. But traditionally, those rituals—press briefings, public ceremonies, even contentious protests beyond its gates—are tethered, at least aspirationally, to norms of decorum, accountability, and public engagement. Introducing a choreographed combat spectacle into that space shifts its symbolic significance. It recasts a locus of governance into an arena of performance, where the aesthetic of dominance and self-promotion, by a small network of cronies, overshadows any ethical prospect of leading to wider participation.


This is precisely the distinction our comparative work on governance and ritual helps illuminate. When power is broadly distributed, rituals tend to be inclusive, iterative, and co-constructed. They require participants to see one another as collaborators in a shared process, even when competition is involved. In contrast, when power is tightly concentrated, rituals often become spectacles—staged experiences that reinforce hierarchy, channel emotions toward a focal point, and reduce the audience to spectators instead of actors. The Knicks, for all the commercialism of modern sports, still lean toward the former model. Their playoff games invited identification not with an owner but with a collective—however abstract—called a team, a city, a fan base. Victory was widely shared across an entire metropolitan area, communally. The ritual binds laterally, person-to-person.

A UFC spectacle staged in the orbit of political power points in the other direction. It binds vertically. The emotional energy of the crowd is drawn upward and inward, toward a center that is insulated from participation. The unpredictability of sport is replaced by an orchestrated spectacle; even the violence, ostensibly raw, is framed and contained to produce maximum symbolic effect. None of this is to suggest that one form of ritual is wholly virtuous and the other entirely malign. Spectacle has always been part of human societies, and participatory rituals can exclude to the same extent as they can include. Madison Square Garden is not immune to hierarchy, nor is fandom evenly accessible. But the contrast remains as glaring as instructive because it reveals not just different entertainments, but different models of how people relate to power—and to one another.

At stake is more than this season’s recreational programming. Rituals, whether ancient ball games in Mesoamerica or modern sporting events in New York, are not peripheral to political life; they are constitutive of it. They shape how individuals experience belonging, authority, and agency. They encode assumptions about who acts and who is meant to watch. The event at the White House reinforces values such as “might makes right” and life is a “zero-sum game.”


Alternatively, in an era when democratic practices often feel attenuated, the spaces where participation is still enacted—even imperfectly—carry heightened significance, thereby fostering shared aims and emphasizing the potential win-win-win outcomes that interdependence and collaborative action can generate. The roar of a crowd that believes its collective voice matters stands in quiet contrast to spectacles that ask only for attention, passivity, and allegiance.

We would do well to recognize the difference.


Credit Line: This article was produced by Human Bridges, a project of the Independent Media Institute.


About Gary M. Feinman
Gary M. Feinman is the MacArthur curator of Mesoamerican, Central American, and East Asian anthropology, at the Negaunee Integrative Research Center.
View all posts by Gary M. Feinman →



Friday, April 17, 2026

AI Is Recreating a Colonial World Order

Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

The future of AI is increasingly described as a race between Washington and Beijing. Export controls, chip restrictions, and competing infrastructure projects now dominate the headlines. But the real contest in AI is not who wins the U.S.–China race. It is who gets to shape the systems everyone else must live with.

The deeper transformation already underway is that the AI economy is entrenching a global hierarchy. Silicon Valley, Europe, and China are positioned as sites of invention, while the Global South is cast as a site of labor and deployment – a colonial pattern now reproduced through data, compute, and capital.

Across Africa and Asia, millions of workers already help train AI models as coders, content moderators and data labelers, for companies like OpenAI and Samsung – often for as little as $2 per hour. Reports of poor labor practices are rife. San Francisco-based subcontractor Sama and its client Meta are facing a class action lawsuit for exploiting content moderators in Kenya. More than 140 workers claim that their role forced them to constantly view atrocities – including violence and abuse – that left them struggling with PTSD, depression, or anxiety.

Billions continue to flow into experimental Silicon Valley models. Yet, when builders from the Global South attempt to create systems of their own, they encounter a very different set of conditions. African startups receive less than 1–2% of global venture capital despite representing nearly a fifth of the world’s population, while operating under infrastructure constraints that would be unthinkable in established markets. Capital flows reflect more than risk—they encode assumptions about where credible innovation is expected to come from.

Organizations like Neem Capital—an AI-native investment firm connecting global capital with high-impact opportunities in emerging markets—argue that this bias is structural. As its co-founder Mo Marikar explains, “Founders outside established innovation hubs are often expected to prove legitimacy before they are even evaluated on merit.”

This dynamic becomes most visible when companies from beyond traditional tech centers attract global attention. It shaped the reception of InstaDeep, a Tunisia-founded AI firm later acquired by BioNTech. Despite developing advanced reinforcement learning systems applied to logistics, genomics, and pandemic response, its technical contributions were often secondary in coverage to the fact of its acquisition.

What transformed InstaDeep from a regional player into a globally credible AI company was not a sudden shift in its technology, but its incorporation into a European firm. For companies emerging from Africa, technical achievement alone is rarely sufficient to establish legitimacy.

These credibility gaps are reinforced by material ones. Governments across Africa have already spent more than $2 billion embedding Chinese AI-enabled surveillance systems into public infrastructure, while U.S. firms entrench dominance through cloud platforms and proprietary foundation models. Local economies increasingly run on infrastructure they do not own. Public decisions rely on systems they cannot fully audit. Data generated locally is extracted, processed elsewhere and monetized abroad.

This is not a gap the market will correct on its own. Systems built on narrow assumptions about who gets to invent will produce narrower outcomes. They will embed bias into technical standards, limit the diversity of solutions available to emerging markets and increase dependence on infrastructure controlled elsewhere. In an interconnected global economy, those distortions do not remain regional problems for long.

Some argue that this concentration of capability is simply the natural outcome of scale. Advanced AI systems require enormous compute resources, specialized talent pools and sustained investment. But that explanation mistakes a political settlement for an economic inevitability. Today’s hierarchy is being built through decisions about where capital flows, whose claims are trusted and which ecosystems are allowed to mature.

Addressing this imbalance requires more than expanding access—it requires rethinking how credibility and capital are assigned in the first place. That means backing institutions and investors willing to fund AI ecosystems in emerging markets on their own terms, rather than as extensions of existing hubs. However, scaling that model will require a broader shift: from viewing the Global South as a source of labor to recognizing it as a site of innovation.

Ultimately, AI systems are already reshaping how credit is allocated, how borders are managed, how health systems triage patients and how governments monitor citizens. If the authority to design those systems remains concentrated in a handful of regions, then their assumptions about risk, identity, language, and value will quietly become global defaults.

A global AI economy that excludes much of the world is not just unjust—it is unstable.

Therefore, the defining question of the AI era is not whether Washington or Beijing leads the next generation of models. It is whether the infrastructure shaping the future of work, governance, and opportunity will be built by a narrow set of actors—or by a genuinely global community of innovators.

Because if credibility continues to follow old geographic lines, AI will not just reproduce inequality—it will formalize it.

Aaliyah Vayez is an international relations analyst specializing in geopolitical risk and global power competition. Her writing has appeared in BBC Africa, the Guardian, and The Conversation, among others. She advises multinational firms on emerging market risk and holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics.Email

 

Source: The National

Dramatic Hollywood-style trailers, Lego parodies and fake images have gone viral as warring parties try to control media narrative.

US President Donald Trump went from warning about the demise of a “whole civilisation” to announcing a “big day for world peace” in a matter of hours.

It was not the first time he has used his Truth Social platform to make alarming statements during the course of the Iran war. He has used expletives and threats, often through conflicting messages over whether the conflict is escalating or winding down.

Provocative language and dramatic effect have played a big role in the media battle, even as a fragile two-week ceasefire comes into effect. But it is not only words. The White House has shared Hollywood-style trailers promoting US military operations.

Not to be outdone, official Iranian social media accounts and officials have also relentlessly been sharing wartime propaganda of their own, including AI-generated Lego videos and cartoon memes mocking Mr Trump and other US officials. These have gone viral, as have fake images and news of the war.

In this episode of Beyond the Headlines, host Nada AlTaher examines the high-tech propaganda and disinformation campaigns that have been conducted over the past six weeks – and explains how dangerously effective they have been.

We hear from Henry Giroux, professor at McMaster University and a cultural critic, and from Darren Linvill, co-director of the Media Forensics Hub at Clemson University.


Can Prospects for Nuclear War Get Any Worse? Sure, We Can Put AI in Charge



 April 17, 2026

Image by Nicolas Hippert.

Can we possibly get away from AI’s ubiquitous presence in our lives? But as long as AI is now in our faces 24/7, it’s time to seriously start pushing back about its outsized and overwhelming influence. Troubling stories tumble out of the media daily. Employees in a major fast-food chain must now wear AI headsets that tell them how friendly they’re being to customers and coaching them on their work. (AI is now posing as our servant, but in the years ahead will the dynamic be reversed?)

And then there is the looming data center controversy, with Big Tech companies rapidly taking over huge swaths of land across the US to build massive and environmentally unfriendly data centers. Fortunately, this trend is now emerging as a campaign issue given early and cascading effects on electricity prices. In general, AI is having a tough year in the court of public opinion. Witness this cover story in a recent issue of Time magazine: “The People vs AI.” The article noted that “a growing cross section of the public—from MAGA loyalists to Democratic socialists, pastors to policymakers, nurses to filmmakers—agree on at least one thing: AI is moving too fast…. A 2025 Pew poll found… the public thinks AI will worsen our ability to think creatively, form meaningful relationships, and make difficult decisions.” Along with Immigration and Customs Enforcement-related pushback, a spontaneous wellspring of grassroots activism appears to be bubbling up against the AI juggernaut and the patently undemocratic backdoor power grab by technocrats and the companies behind them.

One of the greatest concerns in the public sphere is AI’s rapid incorporation into present and future military campaigns. This is actively being encouraged by the Trump administration’s decision to give AI companies free reign to develop their products with minimal regulation and oversight. This is an existential train wreck waiting to happen, and it came into striking focus in the monthslong dispute between AI company Anthropic and the Pentagon. Although it was already using the Claude platform, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth was unhappy with the company’s refusal to use it to remove human decision-making from military operations and support accelerated mass surveillance of US citizens.

Anthropic’s move was that rarity in Big Tech circles, a strong and principled ethical stand against an administration that doesn’t seem to know what that is. Happy warrior Hegseth then branded the company as a “supply chain risk,” effectively banning further use by the Pentagon and punishing the company’s overall viability in the non-defense marketplace as well. Ever the opportunist, the CEO of OpenAI, Sam Altman, then jumped in to offer his AI platform to do what Anthropic wouldn’t. The matter is now in the courts.

Handing AI the “Nuclear Football”

Using AI to create what are called autonomous systems represents a quantum leap in the rapidly advancing business of modern weaponry. Paradoxically, weapons technology is being simultaneously downsized through the use of drones and smaller and sophisticated high-tech devices (such as mine sniffers) and upsized with the use of the AI systems designed to manage and control them.

This raises the very troubling picture of wars being conducted without much human oversight. It’s probably one reason even high- profile AI influencers and Big Tech CEOs have admitted (sometimes a little too casually) that the technology could destroy humanity given the right set of circumstances. While autonomous systems can apply to stand-alone weapons such as killer robots, the most worrying concern relates to the Pentagon’s desire to build and deploy command-and-control systems that remove military officers from the split-second decisions that need to be made in warfare. And yes, that includes nuclear weapons.

How quickly is the Pentagon moving toward handing the nuclear keys over to AI systems and Big Tech? No one really knows. When questioned by a reporter on the matter, one senior official in the Trump administration weakly demurred, “The administration supports the need to maintain human control over nuclear weapons.”

AI experts and strategic thinkers say that a big driver of this process is that America’s top nuclear adversaries—Russia and China—are already using AI in their command-and-control systems. These developments are happening at lightning speed and are being further propelled by Epic Fury, the first AI-fueled war in US history. And let’s not be too laudatory about Anthropic. Its Claude system has been integrated with Palantir’s Maven to identify military targets. The Pentagon is still investigating whether Maven played any part in the horrific event when a US Tomahawk missile struck a girls’ elementary school killing more than 165.

Sleepwalking Into Armageddon?

What madness is this? By what shallow calculus can a handful of powerful individuals or shadowy organizations decide or even risk the fate of humanity? How do we put all of this dangerous thinking at the highest levels of our government into some kind of perspective that correlates with common sense and basic human decency? In our trajectory toward what some have called techno-feudalism, we have this apparent plunge into barbarity coupled with a powerful array of tools to accelerate it. When nuclear activist Helen Caldicott warned that Western civilization is “sleepwalking into Armageddon,” it was perhaps this particular kind of blindness that she had in mind. And the brilliant socio-biologist E.O. Wilson’s profound observation also springs to mind: “The real problem of humanity is the following: We have Paleolithic emotions, medieval institutions, and godlike technology. And it is terrifically dangerous.”

The rush to deploy AI as large-scale weaponry with every bit as much destructive potential as our existing nuclear arsenal is a tip off to the deeper motivations behind its development. In the meantime, some obvious questions need to be asked. Why aren’t government and academic institutions eager to apply these advanced AI tools to the many intractable problems that characterize world polycrisis such as global climate change or better distribution of scarce resources including food and water? Where are the urgent calls from those who serve in Congress to do so? Or why don’t we see headlines like “Harvard Inaugurates $100 Million AI Project to Address Climate Change”?

It seems pretty clear that AI justifications coming from the both the administration and Congress (not to mention that the establishment commentariat that serves them) invariably gravitate to enhancing corporate productivity or military use. And it’s equally clear that AI will also serve as yet another powerful mechanism of wealth transfer to the 1% and either knowingly or unknowingly act as a chaos agent in an increasingly unstable multipolar geopolitical world. If AI is truly as superintelligent (and sentient) as its Big Tech proponents claim it is, then these systems should also be smart enough to refuse to participate in any projects that could degrade or destroy life on the planet. I don’t see any evidence of this. Sadly, it looks like we may have to once again learn the hard way that information, knowledge, and wisdom all are very different things. And that while knowledge can be appropriated by powerful computers, wisdom will never be.

This piece first appeared on CommonDreams.

Tom Valovic is a journalist and the author of Digital Mythologies (Rutgers University Press), a series of essays that explored emerging social and political issues raised by the advent of the Internet. He has served as a consultant to the former Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. Tom has written about the effects of technology on society for a variety of publications including Columbia University’s Media Studies Journal, the Boston Globe, and the San Francisco Examiner, among others.

The Political Culture of the Smartphone and the Cult of the Algorithm


 April 17, 2026

Photograph Source: J Stimp – CC BY 2.0

Art is everywhere, since artifice is at the very heart of reality. And so art is dead, not only because its critical transcendence is gone, but because reality itself, entirely impregnated by an aesthetic which is inseparable from its own structure, has been confused with its own image.

Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation (1981)

The French social theorist and philosopher Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) memorably argued, “We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning.” Today, we might see the advent of smartphone culture as a kind of coup for the ruling class. It installed an incredibly pervasive infrastructure that captures attention and commodifies subjectivity; it embedded new tools of diffuse, apparently voluntary social control through which people actively, almost obsessively, pursue their own erasure. Today, under digitized capitalism, the logic of the slot machine has come to dominate almost the entire social experience, with rewards spooned out variably and an uneasy sense that one must compulsively reengage the system. It is unfortunate enough that slot machines exist, but their logic is no longer confined to casino games. That logic now colonizes our communications, work, and even our friendships and intimate relationships.

Digital environments like social media platforms are designed to deliver rewards intermittently and unpredictably, imitating the psychologically addictive qualities of slot machines. The randomness, opacity, and variability are all there on purpose to provoke compulsive engagement. If we take a step back and consider this system, it is strange beyond words: the system links the most personal, private aspects of life and identity to a gambling mechanism, co-opting the most fundamental human feelings and motivations. It has colonized life’s inherent uncertainty and unpredictability, leveraging these fundamental features of existence to generate anxiety and disciplinary power. Digital capitalism has changed the concept of uncertainty itself. Past social and cultural systems entailed bounded and circumscribed uncertainties in the form of gambling, sports, some forms of traditional ritual practice, and the like. The stakes were limited and generally you could leave whenever you chose.

In this kind of cultural practice, while uncertainty bears narrative or symbolic power, there is, perhaps, a sense of shared meaning and social bonding, where uncertainty is temporary rather than totalizing. In today’s digital world, uncertainty seems to saturate everything, as platforms leverage it by making the system of outcomes and rewards totally opaque and stochastic. The result of this is that it turns random chance into a tool for behavioral control. Baudrillard’s work introduced a concept of hyperreality, a state in which there has been a breakdown in the distinction between reality and representation or symbol, when signs and symbols no longer have to refer back to anything real.

In hyperreality, these simulations, the symbols of nothing, as it were, come to replace direct experiences to the point where they start to reference each other in an endless process, and reality is functionally replaced. The internet’s engagement and attention economies represent something similar to or approaching Baudrillard’s idea of hyperreality. He writes:

Abstraction today is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror or the concept. Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor survives it. Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory – precession of simulacra – it is the map that engenders the territory and if we were to revive the fable today, it would be the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map.

There is a strong current of the hyperreal in the culture of mutual bullshitting that has overtaken today’s internet. Everyone agrees to participate in the self-referential system of validation, in which what is rewarded is the appearance of something (success, happiness, authority, etc). The clicks and likes are based on how well you perform to create that appearance, so everyone is frantically chasing each other’s carefully framed images. Hyperreality’s endless flood of circulating signs becomes a source of structural anxiety, as individuals chase differentiation and recognition within a system that continuously and intentionally erodes these values, that is designed to dissolve and replace them as quickly as possible. Hyperreality is something worse than mere pretense; it is the collapse of the very difference between truth and falsehood. Baudrillard writes:

Pretending, or dissimulating, leaves the principle of reality intact: the difference is always clear, it is simply masked, whereas simulation threatens the difference between the “true” and the “false,” the “real” and the “imaginary.”

At the macro level, this hyperreal world of influencers and followers allows capital to manipulate desire and perception in new, more direct ways, commodifying social life and individual subjectivity. An important aspect of Baudrillard’s thought is his argument that we use consumption not only to satisfy our needs, but also to send out certain signals about our identity and social position. As within today’s capitalist systems, commodities often do more signifying than serving. The object itself is really beside the point, as it is desired for what it represents in a complex, layered field of social codes showing status, taste, and other desirable attributes. An item’s uniqueness will increase its desirability, but only to the extent that the surrounding system recognizes the uniqueness and makes it comprehensible or legible (take luxury brands, limited collaborations, etc.). The simulations work because they’re able to repeat and manage difference in a comfortable, consumable form.

Underneath this is the fact that we don’t actually want true uniqueness, but now prefer a mass-mediated simulation of it, some way to distinguish ourselves within sameness. Many of the most successful commodities give the impression or feeling or being personal or expressive, despite being consumables made to throw away. For the philosopher Georges Bataille, true excess, associated with irrecuperable loss, waste, and sacrifice, belongs to the sacred. Unable to leave this behind completely, commodity culture comes to simulate true, sacred excess in its production of surplus as a lifestyle defined by fashion cycles, premium pricing, and intentional obsolescence. In our culture, a truly singular object appears as almost rude in its unwillingness to enter the system of sign or code exchanges. The best thing is something rare and expensive, but branded and reproduced in a limited number: rare but conspicuous, exclusive but reproducible in meaning.

By definition, a genuinely singular, unique object can’t circulate, and in resisting exchange it would, in these terms, destabilize representation and carry excess. Consumer-capitalist society, by contrast, traffics in carefully framed and codified simulacra of singularity or uniqueness. What is prized is the thing that only signals luxury, rarity, and limitedness, the kind of difference that doesn’t actually disrupt or destabilize. A singular object as such, something like a sacred relic, an act of sacrifice, a hand-made gift, resists abstraction (abstraction into price, function, etc.). A truly unique thing disrupts exchange by its very nature, which makes it inherently suspect, even repellent, within our system. What’s the point if it can’t be consumed, bought, and showcased? At the same time, truly singular objects are interesting in that they may hint at conceptions of value that cannot be contained by capitalism. What Baudrillard’s work stresses is that consumption is never just about the use of an object, but includes also a performance of symbolic meaning within the context of a system of ranking and difference.

In a system defined by and organized around difference, the act of consuming a sign or symbol undermines its distinctiveness just by definition. Once a symbolic marker is sufficiently watered down, it becomes less valuable as a signifier of difference and distinction. We get a strange paradox whereby consumption means both acquiring value and destroying it. Baudrillard explains:

The principle of analysis remains as follows: you never consume the object in itself (in its use-value); you are always manipulating objects (in the broadest sense) as signs which distinguish you either by affiliating you to your own group taken as an ideal reference or by marking you off from your group by reference to a group of higher status.

In the digital world, we approach a seemingly pure form of Baudrillard’s sign economy. Smartphone culture’s approach to advertisements further highlights many of his insights about the symbolic import of these dynamics. The promise of advertisements is always much more than the featured products. The advertisement offers a point of respite or stability in that it reorients you to the inevitability of the concrete relationships involved, inuring you to the oppressive and exploitative features of those relationships. Arguably, the respite is bound up in the fact that advertising has helped to produce a reality where consumption and identity are almost coextensive, where the promise of the commercial becomes an operative “reality” for the subject that is more potent than the underlying social relations. Advertisements function as a kind of regulator of affect, offering short-term affective relief through a combination of promise, aspiration, and belonging. The process reduces the subject’s motivation to examine or contest the structural causes of the felt distress, a kind of habituation. Subjectivity itself becomes impossibly tangled in the relations of mindless consumption and permanent indebtedness to the system. Advertisement stabilizes identities tied to this system and thus puts them at ease.

Advertisement leads you on, never fulfilling or resolving desire. Even when you have the thing, the commercial is orienting you in the direction of the next point of consumption, the next upgrade or event or thing to obtain. This is important because satisfaction is never finalized, always a mirage on a moving horizon. Studies have shown that this endless horizon is psychologically measurable, that exposure to “aspirational” advertising decreases our subjective satisfaction with our own lives as it increases our desire to acquire. The form of respite being hawked by the advertisement is the prospect of acceptance in a symbolic community. Thus in advertisements, we have ideological interpellation or hailing in a relatively pure form, in that there is the invitation of belonging at the price of buying the thing, and the call is to act in a particular way, not to think in a particular way.

Looking for evidence of this phenomenon empirically, studies have confirmed that today people often feel as strongly or more strongly about their brand communities than they do about many of the more traditional indications of group belonging, for example, religious or civic organizations. It doesn’t take much imagination to see how such dynamics serve important social and class functions, stabilizing capitalist economic relations and reproducing consent. Once your belonging is conditioned on your continuing to buy the right things, you can never fully arrive but must continue to buy back into the game, anteing up over and over. In this way, the promise of belonging reassures us that the abyss of uncertainty can be overcome. Your alienated, anxious striving becomes your participation and belonging.

In much of the video “content” online today, it is almost impossible to distinguish the content from the ad. But this stands to reason given the logic of the major platforms: the content is situated as a commodity from the word go, to be evaluated in terms of engagement and revenue from ads. At the end of the day, it doesn’t matter to you whether you’re watching an ad or a show, does it? Most influencer content is so corny and exaggerated that it feels like an advertisement anyway. But it does feel insidious, because one can’t really tell whether or when creators are in ad mode. On the other hand, there really is no other mode today, is there? In the hyperreal digital world where reality is uncertain and constantly mediated by signs and symbols, advertising is able to assume an even more central role in shaping desire. No longer able to brace themselves against anything stable or solid, with no authentic point of reference on which to hang meaning or value, consumers look to ads for their identities and ideals. These are always held just out of reach, meant to stoke desire rather than fulfill any real need. The digital tokens we exchange produce a simulation of connection, but as signs without a reference point, they don’t produce authentic interactions. We have counterfeit, commodified sociality and solidarity, with isolated people performing sociality for sign-value. A structural critique would show the way to solidarity, so the political and economic system prefers individualized shame and confusion. Today there is almost constant exposure to carefully curated, hyperreal personas and imagery, encouraging unrealistic expectations and self-doubt.

Likes and followers are close to pure simulacra in Baudrillard’s terms. They generate symbolic capital even as they’re totally detached from authentic interpersonal connection, fueling anxious, compulsive use. The commodification of everything, even romance, where you are a commodity and a hyperreal set of signs. The process commodifies and thus fragments identity, turning the search for love and partnership into a transaction whereby people are products to be judged and selected based on superficial factors. It is one of our more perverse and self-disciplining technological and cultural inventions. “Look through our wares and see if there’s anything you like! Oh, good choice. But you could do better.” Because the value of anything is about its place within a series, nothing means anything. You prefer something of relatively greater value if you can get it. Thus uncertainty is a totalizing condition of existence under our current political and economic system.

We can see digital uncertainty and algorithmic anxiety as extensions of the kinds of structural instability the economic system has created in the past. For example, Taylorism and the progressive deskilling of labor subjected working people to new forms of constant pressure, measurement, and monitoring. This increased ability to monitor and control work, to treat workers as themselves instruments, generated an upswell of new anxieties and uncertainties, now more impossible than ever to escape or neutralize. How do we explain rising rates of loneliness, depression, and alienation next to the promise of perpetual connectedness and ever-expanding consumer choice? It’s almost as if the steady reduction of every last feature of life to a neat, salable commodity, subscription, or in-app purchase is not actually helpful for the human being.

Within the dominant cultural and ideological system, major social problems like rampant loneliness and hopelessness are treated as individual shortcomings. The state is at the gravitational center of this cultural and ideological complex, and it uses every available resource to reproduce the dominant ideology and divert attention from structural questions. What the state wants to do is to flip your critical energy back at you, so that you push yourself just a little harder. And in organizing society around empty, grotesque consumption and wild, cutthroat scrambles for money, the state has managed to get us to perform its disciplining duties for it. The digital world’s new symbolic economy only pushes us further into this self-disciplining mode, to the point where a level of social control is embedded in almost every aspect of life. Through social media algorithms, the sign economy permeates mundane experience, everyone always looking, even if only casually, for engagements, likes, comments, shares, and whatever else counts for internet clout that week (that day? hour? minute?). In the digital age, monopoly capitalism is able to turn desire into a mechanism of discipline, as people are compelled to ceaselessly strive for symbolic recognition. You can work harder and consume more if you just start monitoring your performance.

Under such all-embracing pressures, people have started to concoct completely made-up accounts of what is driving their feed, insisting that posting in certain ways or at certain times will enable the user to game the algorithm. These folk stories and myths about the algorithms and how they work are quite useful from a class perspective, driving users to try to optimize for measures or targets that are at least partly illusory or manipulable, aiding engagement. While we aim at moving targets, we’re spending more time on the platforms. As within this structure of user manipulation, such myths about algorithms appear almost like religious beliefs, creating a sense of order or meaning while also disciplining the subject and channeling their behavior toward ruling class goals. At the same time, people naturally recognize that the internet is not real, that it is a series of simulations. This is part of the reason that people behave so unmannerly online, the sense of simulation created by an environment where reality is mediated by images, symbols, signs, and thirsty performances, not direct, unmediated experience of reality. The logic of the economic system has become something almost like Aristotle’s hylomorphism, under which matter has to be imprinted with form before something can be made real. In today’s version, something isn’t really real until it has taken the form of something to be sold. Capital sees everything as uncapitalized versions of itself. To that extent, everything can be capitalizable upon; everything can be made to make more value.

If it seems over-dramatic to call this system insidious, consider how far-reaching its powers over us really are and how they can serve to lock us into authoritarian and exploitative social forms. Our smartphones place us in curated virtual environments, shaped fundamentally by surveillance, data extraction, and algorithmic manipulation. These virtual environments are versions of hyperreality mediated by the tech giants and the state. This smartphone culture unthinkingly normalizes Orwellian surveillance and data commodification, integrating everyone into a system of constant monitoring and profiling – and all for the sake of convenience. It’s almost unbelievable. Where Taylorism segments labor into time-controlled units, digital platforms try to break user attention into quantifiable interactions, in the form of clicks, likes, shares, time spent watching, etc. These short interactions are tracked in real time, as the system gathers its own data, and are mined to further optimize user engagement. The overarching sense of being watched or manipulated online stokes a state of hypervisibility combined with powerlessness, not unlike Baudrillard’s idea of individuals becoming “pure screens” absorbing and re-absorbing media influences without control over the narrative. The subject, he says, “becomes a pure screen, a pure absorption and re-absorption surface of the influent networks.” Nothing could be more naive and misguided than the belief that the state will rescue us from the world of algorithmic anxiety, alienation, and meaningless striving.

The state does not operate outside of the economic system. Its role is to stabilize that system and ensure its continuity, along with the structural integrity of the hierarchies necessary for amassing the wealth of the ruling class. Chance, fate, and uncertainty, once treated as sacred and unknowable, have been harnessed as a weapon to keep us locked in perpetual engagement, waiting for respite. Uncertainty could be socially and culturally productive, as a site of the sacred and unknowable, but through the apps and algorithms, it is chopped up and commodified in an agitated world of never-ending competition and comparison, conditional belonging, and mindless, meaningless consumption. This of course serves to make people disciplined and productive without the need for force or coercion. If you want to rely on the state, good luck to you. It is the state that gives this whole system its power. If today’s political and economic system has turned daily life into a slot machine, then perhaps the task is to reclaim forms of life that are not playable or monetizable, not reducible to a quid pro quo or exchange of quantifiable value.

David S. D’Amato is an attorney, businessman, and independent researcher. He is a Policy Advisor to the Future of Freedom Foundation and a regular opinion contributor to The Hill. His writing has appeared in Forbes, Newsweek, Investor’s Business Daily, RealClearPolitics, The Washington Examiner, and many other publications, both popular and scholarly. His work has been cited by the ACLU and Human Rights Watch, among others.