Bangladesh's Nuclear Power Play Is a Test for Emerging Economies

By Alex Kimani - Jul 14, 2026

• Bangladesh is betting on nuclear power with the $12.65 billion, 2.4-GW Rooppur plant to strengthen energy security and reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels and Indian electricity.
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• The Russian-built project has faced years of delays due to the pandemic, sanctions, currency pressures, and global conflicts.
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• While Rooppur will supply up to 15% of Bangladesh's electricity, the country is already looking to smaller, cheaper SMRs for future nuclear expansion.
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Previously, we reported that India is betting big on solar energy to power its industrialization drive, abandoning earlier plans to rely on coal. Indeed, India is going off the beaten path by attempting to become the first country to industrialize using clean energy instead of fossil fuels by traditional industrial superpowers. And, India’s smaller neighbor is making an equally high-stakes bet on nuclear energy, another low-carbon resource. Bangladesh is currently developing the giant Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, its biggest infrastructure project in history, with the 2.4-gigawatt plant expected to come online as early as the current year. Located on the banks of the Padma River in western Bangladesh, the $12.65-billion, Russian-built facility is attracting a fair amount of attention because it’s a litmus test for atomic energy in developing nations, as reported by Livemint.

Specifically, the world will be watching to see whether Bangladesh can successfully integrate a complex, high-capital nuclear asset into an emerging economy without suffering catastrophic financial strain. After all, Rooppur is a major financial undertaking considering that Bangladesh's GDP in 2025 clocked in at ~$510 billion.

For Bangladesh, the primary motivation is simply long-term and reliable energy supplies. Recent conflicts (the Middle East war and Russia-Ukraine) have disrupted global energy flows, leading to expensive fuel imports, long queues at filling stations, and widespread rolling blackouts for a country that relies heavily on oil and gas.

When fully operational, the nuclear plant will provide stable, low-carbon baseload electricity, meeting nearly 15% of Bangladesh's national power demand.

But it also took conflict to ignite a fire under this massive project, which has faced multiple delays over the past decade, starting with the supply challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, Western sanctions impacting this Russian-built (Rosatom) plant, currency fluctuations driving up costs by ~25%, and then two major conflicts affecting shipping.

Currently, Bangladesh is highly dependent on India for its electricity, relying on imports to meet a significant portion of its daily power demand. India is currently Bangladesh's largest electricity supplier, with about 2.5 GW to 2.8 GW of daily capacity contracted from Indian power conglomerates, notably Adani Power (which operates a large dedicated coal-fired plant in Godda, Jharkhand) as well as state-owned NTPC and PTC, according to Reuters.

The massive energy reliance has led to frequent tensions between the two countries, particularly concerning pricing and delayed payments by Dhaka due to foreign exchange constraints.

It also leaves Bangladesh at India's mercy: two years ago, India's Adani Power cut electricity exports to Bangladesh by over 60% due to an outstanding payment dispute. Bangladesh's accumulated arrears to Adani Power reached roughly $800 million, largely driven by the PDB's financial constraints and a nationwide shortage of foreign reserves. The cut from the dedicated 1,600 MW Godda plant in Jharkhand significantly impacted Bangladesh's power grid, creating severe energy shortages. Adani Power supplies roughly 10% of Bangladesh's total electricity demand.

The heavy financial burden and the political controversy are likely to render Rooppur the last large-scale nuclear plant Bangladesh builds. Moving forward, Dhaka is shifting its attention to Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), with the government already in talks with Western and Chinese firms, signaling a quiet realignment away from total reliance on Russian energy partnerships, Bloomberg reports.

Typically generating 300 to 400 MW per plant, SMRs are highly appealing to the country's policymakers for several key reasons. First off, SMRs can cost as little as $500 million to $1 billion compared to more than $10 billion for conventional nuclear plants. However, the larger plants enjoy the upper hand in economies of scale, with capital costs typically ranging from $6,600 to $8,000 per kW of capacity compared to $8,000 to over $10,000 per kW for SMRs. Second, SMRs can be deployed along coastal belts and riverbanks much faster than conventional reactors, directly serving concentrated industrial zones without relying on long-distance grid transmission. 

The first reactor is expected to begin supplying 300 MW to Bangladesh’s grid in August before increasing to more than 1,000 MW by the end of 2026. Fuel loading for the second reactor is scheduled for 2027, with the full 2.4 GW Rooppur station expected to enter service in 2028. Once both units are online, nuclear power will rank alongside domestic gas as one of Bangladesh’s largest sources of baseload electricity. 

By Alex Kimani for Oilprice.com

Bangladesh should strengthen nuclear expertise before investing in SMRs

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By IntelliNews July 13, 2026

In May, Bangladesh’s first nuclear power plant moved a step closer to confirming power generation after fuel loading was completed at the first unit of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. The plant is located about 160 kilometres from Dhaka. Construction of Unit 1 started in November 2017, while work on Unit 2 commenced in July 2018. The plant is now likely to come online in 2028.

As Bangladesh moves closer to attaining the status of a nuclear power-generating country, policymakers have begun weighing the option of setting up Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) or adding two more large reactors to the energy portfolio. However, according to Md Shafiqul Islam, professor of nuclear engineering at the University of Dhaka, the ambition is understandable but the timing demands far greater caution.

Writing an opinion piece in The Daily Star, a local Bangladeshi publication, Islam says that four key issues make an immediate SMR commitment premature. The first is quite simply Bangladesh’s lack of experience in operating a nuclear power plant. Building the skilled workforce and operational management needed to ensure the safe operation of a nuclear power plant is a long-term process that takes years. The second issue, according to Islam, is the lack of capacity to set up licensing and regulatory frameworks by the relatively young Bangladesh Atomic Energy Regulatory Authority (BAERA). SMRs are a special class of advanced nuclear technologies and require specific safety evaluations, regulatory approvals and inspection procedures, Islam says.

The third issue and pehaps most obvious is that of the limited number of commercially operational SMRs worldwide as only two are functional out of over 72 SMR designs under development. Most of these SMRs have not even secured a regulatory green light from their domestic nuclear regulators. The fourth is vendor selection complexity, whereby Dhaka will need to choose what technology to deploy, and to manage radioactive waste and geopolitical risk in the current international landscape.

A three-stage roadmap

Islam makes it clear that he is not arguing against SMRs outright, but is advocating a structured approach. According to the IAEA milestone approach, a nuclear programme requires a minimum 10 to 15 years of structured development to attain maturity. Islam says that at present, Bangladesh is in the very initial stages of this nuclear journey.

To begin with, Dhaka needs to successfully commission both units of the Rooppur power project and run it successfully for at least three to five years. This will help Bangladesh in acquiring operational and regulatory know-how. At the same time, concerted efforts are required to strengthen the regulatory body to bring it up to par with global standards. The South Asian country also needs to nurture fresh nuclear engineers and regulatory specialists.

Once these measures are in place, Bangladesh should then, but only then, move ahead with setting up two additional large reactors of 1,000 MW each as the third and fourth units of the Rooppur plant. Islam believes that the two units that are under construction alone will not solve Bangladesh’s energy deficit.

Also, expanding the power plant to four units will unlock economies of scale that maximise the long-term profitability of the initial $14bn investment. All four units can share the existing infrastructure like cooling systems, transmission lines and a trained workforce, which should result in a substantial reduction in per-unit costs. However, Dhaka should also be aiming to look beyond using just a single supplier to hedge geopolitical risks.

SMR’s come into the picture only in the third stage. However, this option should only be explored when the technology has matured, supply chains have been established and a robust regulatory system is in place.

Islam says that though SMRs are only the final option, Bangladesh should begin work in parallel on feasibility studies, global partnerships, technology assessment and specific workforce so that the country is ready when all the conditions are in place.

As a new generation of nuclear reactors that are much smaller than traditional nuclear plants, they are easy to build and easy to deploy. SMRs typically generate up to 300 MW of power as against 1,000 MW generated by a traditional nuclear power plant. Some of the advantages of SMRs include lower capital costs, faster construction and the theory that they can replace aging coal-based or gas-based power plants.

Once deployed, distributed SMR networks could then help to replace aging fossil fuel facilities, provide dependable electricity to remote coastal areas and deliver stable baseload power to export processing zones.

From the point of view of Bangladesh’s long-term energy requirements, there is a need to shift away from imported fossil fuels towards domestically produced clean energy. According to Islam, large nuclear reactors today and SMRs in the future must be central to the country’s energy planning.

Bangladesh will be best placed to realise the full benefits of nuclear energy by first operating Rooppur Units 1 and 2 successfully, strengthening its institutions, training technical personnel and building a robust regulatory framework. Energy security cannot be achieved overnight; it requires a deliberate, phased strategy and sustained commitment in Bangladesh, just as anywhere else.

 

The super El Nino is here

The super El Nino is here and seas are heating up to bath temperature levels. / IntelliNewsFacebook

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By Ben Aris in Berlin July 13, 2026

The planet’s seas are on their way to being as warm as bath water as the predicted super El Niño arrives. It is already clear that this year’s oceanic heating event will be the most powerful on record.

Global sea temperatures have already climbed past their previous all-time high, smashing records on their way, and forecasters warn that this year's El Niño could bring devastating extreme weather events.

The seas are running a fever. June was the hottest on record for the world's oceans as well as the land, according to Copernicus. Nearly 40% of ocean area worldwide is in the midst of a marine heatwave, with intense hot patches in the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean more than 10°C hotter than usual. It's the latest in a wave of ocean warming that began in 2023.

Oceans absorb more than 90% of the excess heat trapped by the greenhouse gases released when fossil fuels are burnt. Waters at the surface also exchange heat and moisture with the atmosphere, helping to drive hotter temperatures and more extreme weather. For every one degree Celsius of warming, the atmosphere can hold about 7% more moisture. It also holds onto the water for longer. That means more time between rainfall, and heavier, more dangerous deluges when rain does fall.

A recent study found that at least a fifth of heatwaves on land begin in the ocean. Last year, more people died from extreme heat than from road crashes in Europe, according to the World Resources Institute.

Scientists have been warning of a super charged El Niño that will go into full swing as the summer ends, but nine of ten forecast models are already describing a “strong-to-historic” event. The single most likely outcome by late 2026 is a "very strong" El Niño — the top tier of the scale, reserved for the handful of events since the 1950s in which the central Pacific warms by more than 2°C above normal.

El Niño is the warm phase of a natural climate cycle, the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO), driven by temperature swings in the central and eastern Pacific. It recurs roughly every two to seven years, typically emerges during the northern autumn, and can persist into the following year.

In general, El Niño years are associated with heavier rainfall in places like California and South America and drier conditions across Australia and Southeast Asia. And although El Niño tends to suppress hurricanes near the United States, other regions tend to see stronger cyclones with more rainfall.

This year the impact is expected to peak from late 2026 into 2027, as what scientists often call Earth's most important "control knob" for year-to-year climate variability is turned up to the maximum setting on record. On a scale of one to ten, it’s going to be an eleven.

NOAA's Climate Prediction Center, which moved to an El Niño Advisory on June 11, puts the probability of the event reaching "very strong" intensity by the November–January peak at around 63%, with a near-certain chance that some form of El Niño persists through the northern winter. Ocean temperatures are already at record levels, Europe has endured a record-breaking heatwave, and marine heatwaves have flared across the western Mediterranean and the Atlantic seaboard.

During El Niño, above-average water temperatures in the central and eastern Pacific shift the position and strength of the subtropical jet stream, with effects that reach into the Caribbean and the Atlantic. Because the phenomenon concentrates its deepest pool of warm water — and its lowest wind shear — across that basin, it turns the Pacific into a hyper-fuelled engine for major hurricanes and powerful typhoons. Tellingly, Taiwan, China and Vietnam are all already being battered this weekend by Typhoon Bavi, forecast to be among the most powerful storms to ever strike Asia.

The numbers are already extreme. As of early July, the Niño-region sea-surface temperature anomaly had crossed 1.8°C above the 1991–2020 average — more than three standard deviations above the mean. In statistical terms, anything beyond two standard deviations is treated as an extreme aberration; this is, quite literally, an off-the-chart event.

Desperate measures

El Niño Is not going to smash previous records, scientists say it will break them by a huge margin. Some are starting to suggest desperate measures. 

"With all the July model runs now in, it is very likely that 2026 will see the largest El Niño event since records began in the late 1800s – and potentially by a truly mind-blowing margin. The median estimate is now 3.6C, roughly 0.8C hotter than the prior record (2.75C)," climatologist Zeke Hausfather said in a newsletter post. 

 

The proposal involves spraying microscopic sea salt particles into low-lying clouds over the Pacific Ocean. The salt particles would make the clouds brighter, allowing them to reflect more sunlight back into space. By reducing the amount of solar energy reaching the ocean's surface, researchers believe the technique could cool Pacific waters enough to reduce the strength of a developing Super El Niño.

Computer simulations suggest that, under the right conditions, the approach could cut the intensity of a Super El Niño by as much as 40%.

However, scientists stress that the idea remains purely theoretical and is not being recommended for real-world deployment. The Earth's climate system is extraordinarily complex, and no one fully understands the long-term consequences of deliberately altering cloud cover over the Pacific.

Even relatively small changes could disrupt the natural El Niño-La Niña cycle, with potentially far-reaching effects on global agriculture, rainfall patterns, heatwaves, floods, droughts and ultimately food and commodity prices.

For now, researchers see marine cloud brightening as an area for further study rather than an immediate climate solution. Nevertheless, the fact that geoengineering proposals are increasingly being discussed illustrates the growing concern among scientists over the scale of future climate risks and the possibility that conventional emissions reductions alone may not be sufficient to limit their impact.

Seas heating up

The clearest sign that something unusual is under way lies not in the tropics alone but in the oceans around the world. In June, the average sea-surface temperature for the extra-polar ocean — the vast band between 60°S and 60°N that excludes the ice-affected poles — was the highest ever recorded for the month, edging past the previous June record set in 2024 by 0.01°C, according to the Copernicus Climate Change Service.

That margin sounds trivial, but it matters for two reasons. First, it is a global average across an enormous area, so shifting it even a hundredth of a degree requires a colossal amount of additional heat spread across tens of millions of square kilometres of sea. Second, it comes on top of 2024's record, which was itself an outlier — meaning the ocean is not merely warm but setting fresh highs from an already elevated baseline, with little sign of the "cooling-off" that would normally follow a record year.

The heat is not evenly spread. It pools in hotspots where the numbers become genuinely startling: parts of the Mediterranean, the Gulf, and shallow tropical seas have pushed into the low 30s°C, temperatures at which coral bleaches, fish stocks flee or die, and the water gives up ever more moisture to feed storms. Marine heatwaves — prolonged spells of anomalously warm water — have become more frequent, more intense and longer-lasting worldwide, and this year's have struck close to home for Europe, scorching the western Mediterranean and reaching up the Atlantic coasts.

Those warm waters cause their own related damage. An unusually hot Mediterranean fuelled Storm Daniel in September 2023, a rare subtropical storm that ripped through Libya leaving more than 2,000 dead in its wake as a precursor to what this year’s super El Niño could cause.

Two forces are stacking up this year. One is El Niño itself, a natural redistribution of heat that temporarily warms the surface Pacific and nudges up the global average. The other is the long-term, human-driven warming trend on which El Niño now rides. The oceans have absorbed the overwhelming majority of the extra heat trapped by greenhouse gases — well over 90% — and each El Niño therefore breaks records from a higher starting line than the last. The result is a temporary but significant boost to global mean surface temperature layered on top of a rising floor: El Niño supplies the spike, climate change supplies the staircase.

The practical upshot is that the coming twelve months are likely to be exceptionally bad. This year's disaster season is likely to be worse than last year’s with a new batch of global temperature records, heightened risks of drought, flooding, coral bleaching and intense tropical cyclones running into 2027.

 

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Heatwaves plague Europe

June 2026 was the hottest June recorded for western Europe and the second warmest globally, driven by the highest sea surface temperatures (SSTs) on record for the month, according to the monthly update from the Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S), implemented by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF).

Europe also saw widespread dryness that, together with extreme heat, contributed to wildfire activity, particularly in the Iberian Peninsula and southern France, and heightened drought risk in parts of eastern Europe. The June heatwave occurred against a backdrop of increasingly dry soils across western and central Europe, further exacerbating drought conditions that had begun to develop during May's heatwave.

Globally June 2026 was the second-warmest in the ERA5 dataset, with an average surface air temperature of 16.54°C, 0.56°C above the 1991-2020 average for the month, behind June 2024.

The average temperature over European land in June 2026 was the second-highest on record for the month. Western Europe, the region most affected by the heatwave, experienced its warmest June on record, with an average temperature of 20.74°C, 3.05°C above the 1991–2020 average for June, surpassing the previous record set in June 2025.

The heat in parts of Western Europe is continuing in July, fuelling devastating wildfires in France and the Iberian Peninsula. Last year saw wildfires in Europe pass 1mn hectares for the first time. This year is likely to be worse.

Spain’s Fabra Observatory in Barcelona - one of WMO’s long-term weather observing stations - recorded 40.5°C on July 8 - the highest temperature in more than one century of data. France had a widespread amber alert (the second highest level) for heat as well as a high fire danger level because of drought, high temperatures and low humidity, according to Meteo-France.

WMO, its members and partners are mobilizing with early warnings and coordinated heat-health action plans to try to save lives and inform decision-making on how to minimise economic and ecosystem damage and disruption to infrastructure and labour productivity. It is accompanied by localized violent storms and in some areas by worsening drought and the risk of wildfires.

Extreme heat is expected to occur at increasing frequency and intensity and duration, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.  

“Heatwaves like this are what we expect to see in a changing climate,” said John Kennedy, head of climate information at WMO. “In the 50 years since the historic heatwave in 1976, Europe as a whole has warmed by around two degrees. It’s the fastest warming continent and extremes of temperature have increased too,” he said.

 

Poland records third-warmest June since 1951 as scientists urge climate action

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By bne IntelliNews July 14, 2026

Poland recorded its third-warmest June since measurements began in 1951, with the nationwide average temperature reaching 18.8°C, the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management (IMGW) said on July 13.

The figure was 2°C above the 1991-2020 average and 1.2°C higher than in June 2025, leading IMGW to classify the month as extremely warm. Average temperatures across most of the country ranged from 17°C to 20°C.

The warmest region was Podkarpacie in south-eastern Poland, where the monthly average reached 19.8°C, or 2.1°C above normal. The coolest were the Baltic coastal areas, but their average of 17.7°C was still 1.8°C above the long-term norm.

Słubice in western Poland recorded 40.5°C on June 28, the highest temperature measured by a Polish synoptic weather station since records began.

IMGW said the strong warming trend observed in Poland had continued, with the average June temperature rising by an estimated 1.95°C since 1951.

The data were published two weeks after more than 80 Polish scientists urged lawmakers to hold an urgent parliamentary debate on the climate crisis and accelerate both emissions reductions and adaptation measures.

The scientists said Poland lacked a coherent, science-based strategy to protect residents from overheating, improve water retention, strengthen infrastructure and support communities most exposed to extreme weather. They offered to help prepare a roadmap for decarbonisation and climate adaptation.

Poland eyes offshore wind to power AI and data centres, Tusk says

PM Donald Tusk addresses a briefing in Choczewo, northern Poland. / Donald Tusk via FacebookFacebook

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By IntelliNews July 13, 2026

Poland’s expanding offshore wind sector could supply the electricity needed for energy-intensive artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centres, Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on July 10, while warning investors that power generated at sea must remain competitively priced.

“The scale allows us to think ambitiously about projects essential for the development of artificial intelligence, the entire cyberspace and data centres,” Tusk said during a briefing in Choczewo, northern Poland, state news agency PAP reported.

Tusk's comments followed the first delivery of electricity from the Baltic Power offshore wind farm to Poland’s national grid via the Choczewo substation.

Poland’s growing economy will require increasing amounts of electricity, Tusk said, adding that the government was pursuing a diverse energy mix with a strong emphasis on renewable sources.

Price would be the decisive criterion in future auctions supporting the second phase of Poland’s offshore wind development, he said.

“I am very pleased with these achievements at sea. Offshore wind is a source of satisfaction and pride, but investors must remember that this electricity has to be competitive,” Tusk said.

Baltic Power, developed by Polish energy group Orlen and Canada’s Northland Power, will have a capacity of about 1.2 GW once all 76 turbines are operating. Fifty-four turbines have been installed so far.

The wind farm is expected to produce around 4 TWh of electricity annually, equivalent to about 3% of Poland’s current demand or the consumption of more than 1.5mn households. It could reduce Poland's CO2 emissions from power generation by as much as 2.8mn tonnes a year compared with conventional sources.

Baltic Power is the first of several offshore projects due to connect through Choczewo. The infrastructure is ultimately expected to receive electricity from six wind farms with combined capacity exceeding 6 GW, more than the capacity of the Bełchatów lignite-fired power station.

Poland aims to have about 5.9 GW of offshore wind capacity installed by 2030, with potential capacity rising to around 18 GW by 2040.

Choczewo is also where Poland is building its first nuclear power plant, expected to start operation in the late 2030s.

Force Multipliers: Autonomous Weapons Systems And The Ukraine And Gaza Conflicts – Analysis


A Ukrainian soldier prepares to launch a combat drone. (Photo: gov.ua)

July 14, 2026
Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
By Vinayak Rajpurohit

Key Takeaways:

Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) reshaping modern warfare: AI-enabled platforms like loitering munitions, drones, and swarm systems are transforming combat through speed, persistence, precision, and expendability, as seen in Ukraine and Gaza conflicts.

Ukraine conflict highlights attritional warfare: Both sides use low-cost FPV drones, loitering munitions, and AI targeting systems (e.g., Delta) to counter traditional military assets, demonstrating adaptability and force multiplication in conventional war.

Gaza conflict showcases urban AI targeting: Israel’s use of systems like Lavender for rapid target identification raises concerns about proportionality, collateral damage, and accountability, highlighting ethical and legal challenges in dense urban environments.

The use of Autonomous Weapon Systems has changed the dynamics of warfare in recent times. The rise of Artificial Intelligence has reshaped military power, strategies and decision-making in war. AI is transforming modern combat through greater speed, precision and low-cost deployment.

Introduction

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS) are changing the nature of modern warfare through AI-enabled decision-making. As per the United States Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, autonomous weapons systems are platforms capable of ‘selecting and engaging targets without further intervention by a human operator’, a definition that anchors the concept of autonomy specifically to the targeting functions.[1] AWS combines artificial intelligence with lethal platforms like loitering munitions, drones, AI-powered surveillance systems, and swarm drones that have capabilities to identify and strike targets with limited human control. The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza have become testing grounds for AWS, showing how these technologies operate in both high-intensity and asymmetric conflicts.

Autonomous weapons systems are mainly considered in two key respects: how much control humans have over decisions to use lethal force, and how much autonomy the system itself has. AWS are commonly grouped into three categories: ‘human-in-the-loop’, ‘human-on-the-loop’ and ‘human-out-of-the-loop, ‘ depending on the degree of human involvement. Many autonomous systems currently in use fall into the ‘human-on-the-loop’ category; even though they can carry out pre-planned actions involving lethal force, human control can intervene if needed.[2] This classification raises significant International Humanitarian Law concerns regarding accountability, proportionality and compliance.

AWS as Force Multipliers

A Force multiplier is a term used in military doctrine that refers to the capacity of a technology, technique, or organisational arrangement to expand and amplify the combat effectiveness of a given force well beyond its numerical strength alone.[3] The force-multiplication effect of AWS operates across four distinct and interconnected dimensions: speed, persistence, precision and expendability. Speed refers to the capacity of autonomous weapons to execute targeting cycles at machine speed, overcoming the physiological and cognitive delays in human decision-making on the battlefield. Loitering munitions with AI guidance can detect and engage a target in a much shorter time than those controlled by humans. AWS acts faster because it doesn’t get tired or confused as humans do.[4]


Persistence is the second dimension. As humans need rest, resupply, and rotation, autonomous platforms can conduct continuous surveillance of targets for longer durations, in hours or days. A persistent autonomous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) system can reduce intelligence collection gaps. As observed in Ukraine, persistent drone surveillance has made it really hard for either side to move a group of people on the ground without being seen. Similarly in Gaza, persistent aerial surveillance enabled Israel Defense Forces to keep an eye on designated targets across urban areas, creating a challenge for the Gaza military. This has changed the way wars are traditionally fought.[5]

Precision and expendability are the third and fourth dimensions, respectively. Compared to traditional guided munitions, AI-guided loitering munitions deliver superior precision at a significantly lower cost.[6] Expendability changes the cost equation for high-risk missions. An expendable autonomous platform can target highly defended areas without the fear of losing a pilot.[7] Collectively, these four aspects illustrate the importance of AWS as a force multiplier.

Ukraine: Attrition Warfare and Autonomous Scale

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has emerged as one of the prime examples for testing autonomous and semi-autonomous systems in a conventional war against a peer adversary since World War II. Ukraine’s early deployment of the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) demonstrated that AI-enabled unmanned systems, when combined with real-time ISR and precise targeting data, could effectively weaken the enemy’s conventional armoured units. In the first week of the full-scale invasion, TB2 operations struck Russian Buk surface-to-air missile systems, armoured vehicles, and other military targets, highlighting the operational value of integrating AWSs with real-time battlefield intelligence.[8]

As the war escalated between Russia and Ukraine, both sides started making adaptive changes to the situation. Russia swiftly acquired and deployed the Iranian-made Shahed-136 loitering munitions to target Ukraine’s critical infrastructure because of their low cost and high destructive potential. Each of these drones costs them approximately US$ 20,000 to US$ 50,000 per unit.[9] Russia has been deploying these drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences, and later this number rose approximately from 80–100 to 100–200.[10] To overcome this challenge, Ukraine developed a domestic manufacturing unit of substantial scale during wartime. Ukraine planned to produce around 1 million first-person view (FPV) drones in 2024. These FPV drones became an important weapon against Russian tanks and soldiers on the front itself.[11]

Ukraine has also developed and deployed AI-enabled command-and-targeting software to reduce sensor-to-shooter time. This includes the Delta battlefield management system, developed by Ukraine and designed to operate in accordance with NATO interoperability standards. It uses multiple sources of information, such as satellite images, signals intelligence, and drone reconnaissance, to find targets quickly and precisely. This helps soldiers make decisions faster without depending on higher headquarters’ processing cycle.[12] This system has cut the kill chain interval from target identification to engagement.

Before the implementation of Delta, the Ukrainian military took up to 72 hours for the entire process of identifying and engaging the target. However, with Delta, that cycle has been shortened to two minutes.[13] Russia has responded with electronic warfare countermeasures, which include GPS jamming, radio-frequency jamming and physical destruction of drones.[14] This has created a dynamic contest between measures and countermeasures that shapes the conflict’s technological nature.

The Russia–Ukraine conflict exemplifies how autonomous and semi-autonomous technologies are transforming modern warfare. The two states deployed low-cost drones, AI-enabled targeting systems, and loitering munitions. These help them counter traditional military disadvantages and boost their efficiency.

Gaza: Urban Warfare and AI-Enabled Targets

The Israeli military campaigns in Gaza started in October 2023 and introduced a new aspect of using AI-enabled targeting in urban warfare. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) developed an AI-based programme known as ‘Lavender’, which was unveiled for the first time. According to +972, this system identifies individuals suspected of being affiliated with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), including those of lower rank, as potential targets for bombing. Lavender is said to have clocked tens of thousands of individuals affiliated with Hamas and PIJ and reduced target suggestion time to seconds, thereby streamlining the decision-making process.[15]

Apart from an AI-based targeting system, the IDF also deployed quad-copter drones and other UAVs across Gaza’s urban battlespace. The disclosure of ground forces would have heavy casualties due to the high density of buildings and tunnel networks. In this case, small tactical drones capable of operating in dense urban airspace played an important role. They provided reconnaissance, target identification, and real-time battlefield awareness, enabling more precise operations while reducing the exposure of ground forces. The tactical utility of this system in urban combat was significant. These systems can enter buildings, avoid obstacles, and search spaces where traditional ground options lead to casualties.[16]


The situation in Gaza revealed some operational and reputational issues with the AI-enabled targeting cycle. Reports also indicated that the use of the Lavender system to identify lower-ranking operatives, together with associated targeting decisions, raised concerns about increased collateral damage.[17] According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, the reported death toll reached 37,877 by mid-2024, though independent analysis estimated it at approx. 64,260.[18] This became a major international debate regarding the legal and ethical limits of AI-assisted warfare. These results show that the advantage of AWS involves legal and ethical challenges. These challenges must be incorporated into states’ operational planning, rules of engagement, and military decision-making.[19]

Comparative Analysis: Ukraine and Gaza

Comparative Element Ukraine Theatre Gaza Theatre

Conflict Typology Industrial-scale warfare across frontlines High-density urban warfare

Primary Function of AWS Attrition-destruction of armour, logistics, command nodes, and infrastructure Intelligence-kinetic targeting and compressed targeting cycles in urban areas

Operational Emphasis Mass, persistence, scalability, and cost-effectiveness Precision, surveillance integration, and rapid response

Battlefield Environment Open and semi-open battlefronts Populated urban area

Type of AWS Used FPV drones, loitering munitions, autonomous reconnaissance systems AI-enabled commercial quad-copters and surveillance-strike drones

Cost-Exchange Ratio Low-cost drones destroying expensive tanks Commercial quad-copters replacing special operations forces

Relevance for India Supports indigenous low-cost autonomous warfare capability Highlights utility in urban and counterinsurgency operations

Electronic Warfare Challenges Jamming, spoofing, signal disruption, and counter-drone adaptation Optical, acoustic, and sensor limitations in urban environment

Technological Sustainability Continuous innovation is necessary Constant sensor and targeting adaptation are necessary

Strategic Limitation of AWS No single platform remains dominant for long Sophisticated systems face operational and sensor limitations

Strategic Conclusion AWS act as force multipliers within integrated warfare systems AWS enhance operational efficiency but require doctrinal alignment

Source: Compiled by the author from RUSI, ICRC, Business Insider, LSHTM, +972 Magazine, and CEPA reports.

The conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza collectively illustrate that AWS have transformed modern warfare, accelerating the shift from single-platform to system-of-systems warfare. Ukraine showcases the effectiveness of low-cost autonomous systems in large-scale attritional warfare. In contrast, Gaza highlights the growing importance of AI-enabled precision targeting, ISR and urban operations. Together, these conflicts indicate that future warfare will depend primarily on the combined use of AI-enabled ISR, autonomous targeting assistance, and networked battlefield systems rather than on fully independent lethal autonomy.[20]

Strategic Implications

As seen above, the deployment of AWS in the Ukraine and Gaza conflicts holds major strategic implications for controlling escalation, maintaining deterrence stability, and ensuring global security. One of the major strategic concerns relates to escalation dynamics. In this regard, AI-driven drones, loitering munitions systems, and automated target technologies have shortened the sensor-to-shooter cycle, enabling faster military responses.[21] As operational decision-making time decreases, human deliberation and political control also decrease. This increases the risk of escalation. Paul Scharr’s book Army of None warns that a high degree of automation may lead to miscalculation, accidental engagements and escalation during conflict.[22]


Furthermore, AWS is a challenge to traditional deterrence and conventional warfare. Low-cost drones and AI-assisted systems allow weaker states to impose serious military and economic repercussions on stronger opponents through continuous surveillance and targeted strikes.[23] For example, in Ukraine, FPVs played an important role, showcasing how low-cost technologies can neutralise expensive armour and logistics networks.

A further consequence is the risk of proliferation associated with accessible drone technologies and open-source AI tools. The diffusion of autonomous weapons into the hands of non-state actors, proxy groups and militant organisations increases regional unrest and asymmetric assaults.[24] The above case study of the Gaza conflict explains how autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems can be deployed in irregular warfare environments, thereby increasing the complexity of achieving escalation control and ensuring civilian protection.[25]

Ethical and Legal Dimension

The ethical and legal aspects of AWS have emerged as major issues in contemporary international law and applied ethics. Distinction, proportionality and precaution are the three core principles of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). They are at risk because of the shift in lethal decision-making of autonomous systems. The principle of Distinction requires that the hostile should always differentiate between combatants and civilians. The principle of Proportionality states that civilian casualties must not exceed the military advantage. The principle of Precaution means that all possible measures should be taken to minimise civilian casualties before and during an attack.[26]

Current AWS, including those examined in the Ukraine and Gaza case studies, generally rely on sensors and automated target-recognition functions to identify and classify targets. However, their reliability in the electromagnetic, visual and cognitive complexity of real combat is still debated. There is no recognised international standard for testing or certifying the target discrimination capability of AWSs.[27] The ICRC has consistently maintained that there must be meaningful human control in all lethal decision-making processes, arguing that increasing autonomy in targeting systems raises significant legal and ethical concerns.[28] The use of AI-generated target lists in Gaza raises questions about the efficacy of algorithm-based recommendations to make split-second decisions where IHL requires human intervention to authorise lethal engagement.[29]

The question of legal accountability further poses a structural challenge. According to existing IHL, criminal responsibility for violations is attributed to individuals, such as commanders, soldiers and policymakers. When an autonomous system commits an act that would constitute a war crime if committed by a human operator, the chain of legal responsibility becomes diffuse, contested, and potentially unenforceable. According to legal experts, this problem is termed the “responsibility gap”, which poses challenges for existing IHL accountability frameworks.[30] For military powers aiming to operate AWS responsibly, it is important to build a strong internal accountability system, well-defined rules of engagement for autonomous lethal actions, and operational guidelines that ensure human intervention. It is not only a legal necessity but also an important positive strategic reputation in an age when state conduct on the battlefield is intensified.[31]

Lessons for India

The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate that future military engagements will heavily depend on autonomous technologies, AI-enabled intelligence networks, and low-cost strike capabilities. A major takeaway for India is the growing use of drones, loitering munitions, AI-enabled targeting systems, autonomous surveillance networks, and drone-centric operations in dense urban warfare environments.[32] This is especially pertinent for India in counterterrorism and urban combat environments, where swift intelligence integration and timely situational awareness are essential. These developments suggest that India should focus on developing integrated drone warfare capabilities, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) strategies, and electronic warfare capabilities, especially in the context of high-intensity potential risk along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and Line of Control (LOC).[33]

Furthermore, the conflict highlighted how traditional military resources can be compromised by autonomous and semi-autonomous technologies. Relatively low-cost drones and AI-enabled targeting systems have demonstrated the ability to destroy tanks, artillery, command posts and infrastructure sites.[34] This suggests that India’s military doctrine should focus on mobility, concealment, low-cost drones, AI-driven weapon systems and counter-electronic warfare. India should also keep a check on the proliferation of commercial drones and open-source AI tools, which raises the risk of their acquisition by terrorist groups.

These conflicts underscore the growing importance of indigenous innovation, AI-driven targeting capabilities and autonomous systems. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will play a crucial role in future military preparedness by developing indigenous drones, loitering munitions, counter-UAS systems, AI-assisted surveillance platforms, and autonomous battlefield technologies. Future warfare will depend on rapid technological adaptation, network-centric operations, and cost-effective precision strike capabilities.

DRDO’s ongoing projects in swarm drone technologies, autonomous surveillance systems, electronic warfare platforms, and anti-drone systems are therefore of significant strategic importance for India’s future defence modernisation.[35] The strategic collaboration between DRDO and India’s leading academic institutions, such as IISc and other premier academic institutes, will help deepen foundational research in AI algorithm development, robotic systems, advanced aerospace systems and materials, and other emerging defence technologies.[36]Strengthening domestic research and development will also reduce dependence on foreign military technologies and enhance operational self-reliance during prolonged conflicts.

“Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, Department of Defense, United States of America, 25 January 2023, p. 14.
“Autonomy, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics: Technical Aspects of Human Control”, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), August 2019.
“Joint Publication 3-05.1: Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Training and Certification”, Joint Chiefs of Staff, NDU Press, 26 April 2007.
Michael C. Horowitz, “When Speed Kills: Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Deterrence and Stability”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 6, 2019, pp. 764–88.
Aosheng Pusztaszeri and Emily Harding, “Technological Evolution on the Battlefield”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 16 September 2025.
Paul O’Neill, Sam Cranny-Evans and Sarah Ashbridge, “Assessing Autonomous Weapons as a Proliferation Risk: The Future Has Not Been Written”, Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 8 February 2024.
Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels, “War and the Modern Battlefield: Insights from Ukraine and the Middle East”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 16 September 2025.
Lauren Kahn, “How Ukraine is Using Drones Against Russia”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2022.
Benjamin Jensen and Yasir Atalan, “Drone Saturation: Russia’s Shahed Campaign”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 13 May 2025.
“Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 3, 2025”, Critical Threats Project, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 3 March 2025.
“Fedorov: Ukraine to Produce 1 Million Drones per Year”, The Kyiv Independent, 25 February 2024.
Jake Epstein, “Ukraine’s Digital War Tool Cut the Time Between Finding and Striking Russian Targets From Days to Minutes”, Business Insider, 24 November 2025.
Ibid.
Brig Jaideep Agarkar, “Russia-Ukraine War: Lessons from an Electronic Warfare (EW) Perspective”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), 31 May 2025.
Yuval Abraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI Machine Directing Israel’s Bombing Spree in Gaza”, +972 Magazine, 3 April 2024.
Dov Lieber, “Small Drones Are Helping Israel Navigate the Urban Battlefield in Gaza”, The Wall Street Journal, 29 December 2023.
Yuval Abraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI Machine Directing Israel’s Bombing Spree in Gaza”, no. 15.
“Gaza: 64,000 Deaths Due to Violence Between October 2023 and June 2024, Analysis Shows”, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), 2025.
“Expert Consultation Report on AI and Related Technologies in Military Decision-Making on the Use of Force in Armed Conflicts”, ICRC and Geneva Academy, March 2024.
Lt Gen Karanbir Singh Brar (Retd), “Technology and the Future of Warfare”, Issue Brief, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), 2025.
Vladislav Chernavskikh and Jules Palayer, “Impact of Military Artificial Intelligence on Nuclear Escalation Risk”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2025/06, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), June 2025.
Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2018.
Matthew N. Slusher, “Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict: Modern Warfare in the Age of Autonomy, Information, and Resilience”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2 May 2025.
Paul O’Neill CBE, Sam Cranny-Evans and Sarah Ashbridge, “Assessing Autonomous Weapons as a Proliferation Risk”, no. 6.
“Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Armed Conflict: A Human-Centred Approach”, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 6 June 2019.
Lieutenant Colonel Andre Haider, “Autonomous Weapon Systems in International Humanitarian Law”, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) Journal, Edition 27, December 2018.
Vincent Boulanin, “Limits on Autonomy in Weapon Systems: Identifying Practical Elements of Human Control”, SIPRI and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), June 2020.
“Autonomous Weapons: Decisions to Kill and Destroy Are a Human Responsibility”, Statement of the ICRC to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, Geneva, 11 April 2016.
Jessica Dorsey, “Israel’s AI-Enabled Targeting of Hamas Members Jeopardizes Moral and Legal Standards of Warfare”, Utrecht University, 18 July 2024.
Robert Sparrow, “Killer Robots”, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 62–77.
“Autonomous Weapon Systems: Implications of Increasing Autonomy in the Critical Functions of Weapons”, Expert meeting, ICRC, 15–16 March 2016.
Noah Sylvia, “Israel’s Targeting AI: How Capable Is It?”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 8 February 2024.
Pintu Kumar Mahla, “Military Drones in India: New Frontier of Warfare”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, October–December 2022, pp. 253–261,.
David Kirichenko, “Artificial Intelligence’s Growing Role in Modern Warfare”, War Room: The Online Journal of the U.S. Army War College, 21 August 2025.
“Operation Sindoor: Indigenous Defence Technologies Demonstrate India’s Strategic Capability”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 14 May 2025.
“MoU between DRDO and IISc for Joint Advanced Technology Program”, Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 8 February 2021.



About the author: Mr Vinayak Rajpurohit; former Intern, Centre for Military Affairs, MP-IDSA
Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrikar IDSA

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

About Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).
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Ukraine launched a first-of-its-kind robotic amphibious assault, deploying a gun-toting robot from a drone boat

Chris Panella
Mon, July 13, 2026 


Ukrainian forces sailed a naval drone carrying a ground robot into Russian-held territory.

Ukraine said it was the first known fully robotic amphibious assault mission.

Video footage shows the ground robot firing its machine gun at a target.

Ukraine's military launched a fully robotic amphibious assault, using a naval drone to transport a ground robot into Russian-occupied territory.

Ukraine said the robotic deployment was the first known combat mission of its type. It's the latest example of how uncrewed systems can be employed in highly dangerous situations and environments instead of troops, keeping humans out of harm's way.

On Monday, Ukraine's 123rd Separate Territorial Defense Brigade announced it had executed the mission, revealing that it had remotely guided a naval drone across the Black Sea to a position behind Russian lines on the Kinburn Spit at the end of Ukraine's Kinburn Peninsula. The peninsula is directly west of Kherson. Ukrainian officials have called this area a key strategic foothold for Russian forces to restrict maritime access to the Black Sea.

When the Ukrainian naval drone reached the coast, it deployed a ground robot, an uncrewed ground vehicle. Per footage shared by the 123rd on Telegram, the ground drone was wielding a mounted machine gun. Once it reached the shore, the drone began firing shots at an unidentified target. Ukraine didn't identify which robotic platforms were involved in the amphibious assault, their capabilities, or the mission objective.



The brigade said in its statement that this was "the first known combat mission of this format in the world," adding that "the ground robotic complex was delivered to the enemy shore using an unmanned maritime platform, landed on occupied Ukrainian territory, and employed to accomplish a combat task."

The use of drones for this amphibious assault is a significant development in the use of uncrewed systems in the war. Ukraine has used naval drones to target Russian Black Sea Fleet ships and uncrewed ground vehicles for front-line missions that are too deadly for human soldiers. Now, it's merging the two, as it has with naval drones and first-person-view drones, among other uncrewed systems.

Ground robots, or uncrewed ground vehicles, are fast becoming the face of Ukrainian battlefield logistics and missions. As mines, artillery, and drone-saturated skies threaten troops, Ukraine has focused on building more drone vehicles that can be remotely operated to transport ammunition and supplies, evacuate wounded troops, lay mines, launch other drones, or attack.

Ukraine said in April it cleared Russian-held territory using only ground robots and drones for the first time.

The rising reliance on these systems is changing how Ukrainian drone manufacturers are building new vehicles. They're focusing on low-cost systems that can be deployed in large numbers should they be targeted and destroyed.

Russian Ministry of Defense Records Sharp Increase in Ukrainian Drone Strikes

Will Neal
Mon, July 13, 2026 
The Daily Beast


Photo Illustration by Elizabeth Brockway/The Daily Beast/Getty/Reuters

Vladimir Putin's own military has let slip just how much damage Ukraine's devastating drone strikes are doing to Russia.

Russian Defense Ministry briefings, compiled by state news agency RIA Novosti, reveal that Putin's regime has been forced to shoot down a staggering 64,000 Ukrainian drones over its own territory during the first six months of this year.

Total downings have surged across the spring, rising from around 5,400 in January to an astonishing high of 18,000 in June.

Kyiv's fast-growing drone fleet has hammered oil refineries and energy sites hundreds of miles beyond the frontline and deep into Russia.

The barrage has knocked more than 25 percent of refining capacity offline, The Wall Street Journal reported Monday, triggering a spiraling fuel crisis that has forced the Kremlin to ration supplies and left citizens often waiting in lines outside gas stations for up to two days.

By late June, rationing was in place across 56 regions, according to independent outlet Mediazona. Putin, 73, has said his government is racing to stabilize supplies as Moscow moves to halt diesel exports.

The mounting damage has shifted Washington's posture. President Donald Trump, 80, who has otherwise proven hostile toward Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, 48, threw his weight behind the deep strikes during last week's NATO summit in Turkey. Trump called the attacks "an escalation that could help lead to an end" to the war.

Trump vowed to end the now four-year conflict within 24 hours of retaking office. Eighteen months in, no settlement exists.

He and Putin are understood to have spoken by phone in early July, but diplomacy has largely stalled as the White House remains preoccupied with ending Trump's own war with Iran.

The White House has its own fuel headache. U.S. gas prices have climbed back to $3.88 a gallon, marking their sharpest weekly jump since mid-May, after Trump reignited tensions with Iran last week.