June 18, 2026
By P. K. Balachandran
The Foreign Ministers of the QUAD countries — the US, Japan, Australia, and India — met in New Delhi on May 26 and vowed to collectively safeguard undersea cable networks from threats and sabotage by both non-State and State actors.
Spanning around 1.4 million kilometres across every ocean, these undersea cables carry nearly 100% of global internet traffic. They form the backbone of the modern economy, enabling instantaneous financial transactions, real-time diplomatic exchanges, and military communications.
In warfare, severing them could isolate a nation’s command structures from intelligence feeds, sensor data, and deployed forces. For a nuclear-armed state, the loss of reliable communications could prove catastrophic, undermining control over strategic weapons.
West Sees Threat from China and Russia
While undersea cable disruptions can stem from various causes, the QUAD’s primary concern centres on China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific. In “The Conversation”, John Calabrese highlighted how Chinese researchers unveiled a new deep-sea tool capable of cutting even the world’s most secure subsea cables.
First revealed in February 2025 and promoted as a civilian salvage and seabed mining device, the tool can operate at depths of 4,000 metres — far beyond most existing infrastructure. This capability raises serious implications for global communications and security.
Taiwan has repeatedly accused Chinese vessels of sabotage. In 2023, two Chinese ships were blamed for cutting the only two cables serving the Matsu Islands, isolating 14,000 residents for six weeks. Taiwan documented 27 such disruptions since 2018. In January 2025, its coast guard linked another incident off the northeastern coast to a vessel operated by a Hong Kong company with Chinese crew. These actions coincide with intensified Chinese military drills around Taiwan.
Russia has also demonstrated interest in such tactics. In 2023, a cable between Sweden and Estonia was damaged alongside a gas pipeline. In January 2025, a Latvia-Sweden cable was breached, prompting NATO patrols and the seizure of a suspect vessel. Dmitry Medvedev hinted at targeting undersea cables in retaliation for incidents like the 2023 Nord Stream explosions.
Need to Internationalise Protection
The roughly 650 operational undersea fibre-optic cable systems, which facilitate daily transactions worth US$10 trillion, lack robust international protection. This stems from competing national security interests and heavy private-sector involvement.
Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter note in an article in “Science Direct” that in January 2023, US Assistant Secretary of Defence Ely Ratner announced enhanced satellite monitoring via Hawkeye-360 Cluster 6 to track illicit activities, including threats to cables. The US pledged to share this data with QUAD partners. This was followed by the May 2023 QUAD Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, which leverages member expertise in manufacturing, deploying, and maintaining cable infrastructure.
A core goal is to avoid routing traffic through Chinese-owned or operated cables, given Beijing’s laws requiring firms to hand over data to the government. China’s “Digital Silk Road” initiative further aims to align global cable networks with its strategic interests.
Pattern of Cable Ownership
Traditionally, cables were owned by consortia of telecom firms. Leading players include Japan’s NEC Corporation, France’s Alcatel Submarine Networks, and the US’s SubCom, now joined by tech giants like Google and Meta. Chinese entities such as HMN Tech (linked to Huawei) and China Unicom have rapidly expanded through state support, heightening espionage and sabotage risks amid broader geopolitical rivalries.
Australia’s Leadership Role
The QUAD assigned Australia a leading role in cable security following the 2023 partnership launch. Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) coordinates technical and policy research while providing regional support. Members rotate contributions based on strengths, with Australia convening workshops. Collaboration can extend bilaterally, trilaterally, or plurilaterally.
The US supports efforts through its CABLES program. Australia, the US, and Japan are jointly investing US$95 million in a cable project linking Micronesia, Nauru, and Kiribati to counter Chinese dominance in the Pacific.
Washington urges partners to exclude “unreliable suppliers” from networks and has withheld licences for cables involving Hong Kong or mainland China. It has promoted alternatives like the Apricot, Bifrost, and Echo consortia, rerouting through trusted locations such as Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Guam. Since 2019, the US has offered training grants to discourage engagement with Chinese firms.
QUAD’s Informal Structure
The QUAD has evolved with annual summits and joint statements but remains informal, lacking binding commitments, budgets, or enforcement mechanisms. This flexibility offers advantages: it enables coordination on shared maritime interests while preserving member sovereignty. However, it can slow decisive action on threats.
Informality suits States wary of ceding autonomy. It fosters trust-based alignment without rigid hierarchies, though history shows collective action often faces impediments even among allies.
Impediments to Action
Private companies prioritise operations over security, while public entities face regulatory hurdles. Unilateral measures are simpler, but multilateral efforts require aligned legal and governmental frameworks. Jurisdictional limits — states control territorial waters but not the high seas — add reluctance, particularly among some Asian nations.
Towards Collective Action
QUAD countries should first map inter-agency coordination (navies, coast guards, marine police, telecom regulators) within their governments. This embeds cable protection into broader maritime strategies and clarifies tensions between public and private interests.
Each QUAD country should designate a lead agency to coordinate domestically, aligning with International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) best practices. Cross-sector dialogue between officials, cable owners, suppliers, and operators is essential for policy alignment.
India’s Vital Role
Enhanced Indian participation is crucial given its growing global influence and inclusive multilateral approach. The QUAD should also engage the Global South, emphasising that secure cable connectivity underpins communications and economic development for vulnerable states.
Cable Repair Vessels
Repair remains largely a private endeavour. Cannon and Rossiter recommend that the QUAD consider a dedicated fleet of strategically deployed cable repair ships across the Indo-Pacific to enhance resilience.
By strengthening cooperation, the QUAD can better protect these critical information superhighways against state-sponsored threats, particularly from China, while promoting a more secure and resilient digital infrastructure in the region.
About P. K. Balachandran
P. K. Balachandran is a senior Indian journalist working in Sri Lanka for local and international media and has been writing on South Asian issues for the past 21 years.
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