Ex-Pakistan PM Khan, party erased from election campaign

Cyril BELAUD and Zain Zaman JANJUA
Fri, January 26, 2024 

A relentless crackdown widely attributed to Pakistan's powerful military has seen Imran Khan and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party almost erased from the election campaign ahead of the vote (Aamir QURESHI)


Pakistani cricketing legend turned world leader Imran Khan is wildly popular in his constituency and ancestral homeland of Mianwali, but the political posters that line the streets do not bear his face and flags do not fly his colours.

A relentless crackdown widely attributed to Pakistan's powerful military has seen him and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party almost erased from the election campaign ahead of the vote.

"Our party workers are facing harassment, and I personally have received death threats," says 61-year-old Jamal Ahsan Khan, who is standing for PTI in Mianwali in place of his leader.


"Throughout my life, I have never witnessed an election as intense and threatening as this one."

Khan, currently in jail facing dozens of legal challenges, is barred from contesting elections on February 8 because of a graft conviction -- cases he claims are politically motivated.

Across the country, PTI has been obstructed from holding rallies and the heavily censored media is restricted in its coverage of the opposition, pushing the party's campaign almost entirely online.

Dozens of candidates nationwide have also had their nomination papers rejected by the electoral commission.

Like many other party candidates, loyalist Ahsan Khan has been in near hiding in the build-up to the election, unable to hold meetings or distribute leaflets.

"It feels disheartening that as a candidate of Pakistan's leading political party, I am unable to conduct my campaign in a meaningful way," he told AFP.

With two weeks until the vote, there is none of the fervour and excitement that usually marks an election in the country of more than 240 million people.

- 'He is a hero' -

It was from Mianwali, a largely rural district in the central province of Punjab, that Khan built his political career and was elected three times as MP.

PTI's national victory in 2018, driven by its promises to put an end to corruption and the family dynasties which have ruled the country for generations, propelled him to prime minister.

In Mianwali, where he notably built a hospital and a university, the 71-year-old "is not just a political figure, he is a hero", Rana Amjad Iqbal, editor-in-chief of local newspaper Nawa-e-Sharar, or the Daily Spark, tells AFP.

"However, the primary and most significant reason for his enduring political relevance lies in his anti-establishment stance," underlines the journalist.

Khan was widely believed to have been backed by the military in his rise to power, but became emboldened during his leadership and began to push against the control of the mighty generals.

Eventually, he lost their favour and was ousted in a parliamentary no-confidence vote in 2022 after dozens of his MPs defected.

His subsequent arrest in May 2023 brought supporters onto the streets who protested against military symbols -- sparking the start of a widespread crackdown against PTI.

Thousands of supporters were arrested and around 100 -- half from Mianwali -- are awaiting trial before military courts, while senior party leaders were detained and forced underground before defecting in their dozens.

Khan "is still popular with the public, but he is unacceptable" to the army, retired schoolteacher Ijaz Khan said.

- Sidelined -

Earlier this month, PTI suffered a crucial blow when the Supreme Court banned it from contesting elections with its electoral symbol: the cricket bat.

In a country where millions of people cannot read or write, symbols are crucial for voters to identify their prefered party and candidate.

The election commission instead ordered Ahsan Khan to use a bottle, an emblem viewed with disdain in rural areas because it is associated with alcohol.

Khan's rival in Mianwali, Obaid Ullah Khan, is indifferent to the punishment meted out to his rival political party.

"When would it be justified if not now?" he said of the crackdown.

Unlike PTI candidates, Ullah Khan, who is standing for Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), meets openly with villagers, whose leaders assure him of the support of the entire community, in hope of future favours.

The PML-N is the party of another former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, who was jailed ahead of the 2018 election and later forced into self-imposed exile.

As Khan has fallen, Sharif has risen, returning to his country and into the arms of the military, analysts say.

Despite being sidelined from the election campaign, voters have not lost their lust for Khan.

Hanzala bin Shakeel, a 23-year-old computer science student, will vote for the first time and is making no secret of his choice.

"I will vote for (Imran Khan) because he is the only one who really cares about this country; the others prioritise their personal interests."

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Pakistani police use tear gas to disperse pre-election rally by supporters of former leader Khan

Associated Press
Sun, January 28, 2024 


Supporters of former prime minister Imran Khan and political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) attend an election campaign rally in Karachi, Pakistan, Sunday, Jan. 28, 2024. Pakistani police fired tear gas to disperse supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in the southern city of Karachi on Sunday, less than two weeks before a national parliamentary election that Khan was blocked from running in because of a criminal conviction.

 (AP Photo/Fareed Khan)

KARACHI, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistani police fired tear gas to disperse supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan in the southern city of Karachi on Sunday, less than two weeks before a national parliamentary election that Khan was blocked from running in because of a criminal conviction.

An Associated Press reporter at the scene saw between 20 and 30 people getting arrested at the rally. A dozen workers from Khan's political party were arrested for attacking officers and blocking the road, police said.

Although Khan will not be on the ballot for the Feb. 8 election, he remains a potent political force because of his grassroots following and anti-establishment rhetoric. He says the legal cases against him were a plot to sideline him ahead of the vote.

Senior police superintendent Sajid Siddozai said workers from Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or PTI party organized the rally without obtaining permission from authorities and blocked the road. Siddozai confirmed the use of tear gas.

“When police officials attempted to negotiate and persuade them not to block the road, they attacked the police," he said. "This resulted in injuries to five police officials, including a female officer. One of the wounded is in a critical condition.”

The police operation was ongoing, Siddozai added.

PTI worker Waheedullah Shah said Khan had called for rallies across the country and that Sunday's event in Karachi was peaceful. “But police dispersed our rally and arrested our workers,” Shah said. "We will not be deterred by such tactics. We stand by Khan and will always support him.”

There were violent demonstrations after Khan's May 2023 arrest. Authorities have cracked down on his supporters and party since then.

Pakistan's independent human rights commission has said there is little chance of a free and fair parliamentary election next month because of “pre-poll rigging.” It also expressed concern about authorities rejecting the candidacies of Khan and senior figures from his party.

US Pakistan Diplomat Accused of Murder CIA Agent

24/7 Cable news channels in the United States, massive well paid and financed media machines and not one of them could reveal the simple fact to the American people, their customers, that in fact the guy the Pakistani Police arrested for murder was trying to get off on diplomatic immunity, immunity provided for him by the U.S. Embassy because he was in fact a CIA operative out of the Embassy.

A CIA spy, a hail of bullets, three killed and a US-Pakistan diplomatic row

Did we learn this from CNN? MSNBC? Fox? CBS?ABC?NBC? Disney Channel? Nope we learn it from the Guardian, UK. So far to the left of the American media that they make liberal look; well, conservative.

In fact for the past two weeks of coverage the American media was under a WH imposed self censorship, not reporting on the known CIA connections of this accused murderer.

Pakistan Rejects US Diplomat's Self-Defense Claim

Pakistani police have rejected a detained U.S. diplomat's claim that he acted in self-defense when he shot dead two men last month in the eastern city of Lahore. Police are recommending the diplomat face murder charges.

Lahore Police Chief Aslam Tareen said Friday an investigation revealed Raymond Davis committed what the chief called "cold-blooded murder."

"The eyewitnesses [statements] and forensic reports showed that it has not been the self-defense case. So has tried to fire on them [and] 10 bullets were fired. Therefore, his self-defense plea was considered and that has been rejected by the investigators," Tareen said.

Washington's stance

Speaking to VOA on the latest developments in the case, U.S Embassy spokesperson Courtney Beale reiterated Washington's stance on the issue.

"We regret that this incident resulted in the loss of life. However, eyewitness accounts report [on the day of the incident] that the American acted in self-defense," Beale said. "There is no doubt that he has diplomatic immunity and we are working with the government of Pakistan to resolve this issue."

As American newspapers lifted a self-imposed gag on the CIA links of Raymond Davis, in place on the request of the US administration,

The New York Times reported on Monday that Davis “was part of a covert, CIA-led team of operatives conducting surveillance on militant groups deep inside the country, according to American government officials.”

This contradicts the US claim that Davis was a member of the ‘technical and administrative staff’ of its diplomatic mission in Pakistan.

Davis was arrested on January 27 after allegedly shooting dead two young motorcyclists at a crowded bus stop in Lahore. American officials say that the arrest came after a ‘botched robbery attempt’.

Now Raymond Davis the guy above identified as a CIA spy should not be confused with this 'private contractor'; which is a euphemism for 'mercenary', also arrested in Pakistan.

Pakistani Court Dismisses Bail Plea of US Man
A court in Pakistan Monday dismissed the bail application of an American national, who was arrested in northwest on Friday for illegal stay, court officials said.

Police sources said that Aaron Mark De Haven was working for a private security company.

Police said De Haven is from a security firm "Catalyst Services, " which provides security and accommodation to foreigners working on development projects in the region.

Catalyst Services

Your in-country solution for Middle East and South Asian Operations. You contact us and we do the rest.

Interesting that both these guys are working black ops in Pakistan. And have been outed by Pakistan's Secret Service. And yet in America neither the right wing or liberal media or mass media have covered this obvious coincidence. Not much for investigative journalism as a media standard in Amerika.

MAKING SENSE OF THE PAK-IRAN STAND-OFF

Why, when its list of allies is already so thin, did Iran choose to venture down this seemingly ill-conceived path?

Ejaz Haider 

Published January 28, 2024


In what was widely described as a surprise attack, Iran fired missiles at a compound in Sabz-Koh, a hamlet about 45 kilometres from the Pakistan-Iran border, on the night of January 16. After the declared attack, Iran’s foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, stated that Iran had targeted, “The so-called Jaish al-Adl group, which is an Iranian terrorist group.”

He further added while at the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, “On Pakistan, none of the nationals of the friendly and brotherly country of Pakistan were targeted by Iranian missiles and drones.”

Just hours before the attack, Amir-Abdollahian had had a bilateral meeting with Pakistan’s caretaker prime minister, Anwaarul Haq Kakar. Earlier, on January 16, Pakistan Navy had held a joint day-long exercise with Iran’s navy, which a Tehran Times report described as “demonstrating their commitment to enhancing cooperation and strengthening relations.”

Amir-Abdollahian also made it clear that the attack on “Pakistan’s soil” was in response to the Jaish al-Adl group’s recent attack on the Iranian city of Rask, in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, stating, “The group has taken shelter in some parts of Pakistan’s Balochistan province. We’ve talked with Pakistani officials several times on this matter.”

Iran’s post-attack position was that, while it respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, it would not “allow [Iran’s] national security to be compromised or played with.”


As Pakistan and Iran attempt to patch up their relationship in the aftermath of Iran’s unprovoked missile attack on Pakistani soil on January 16, one question remains unanswered: why, when its list of allies is already so thin, did Iran choose to venture down this seemingly ill-conceived path?

The logic did not wash with Pakistan. Pakistan downgraded its diplomatic relations with Iran, summoned Iran’s chargé d’affaires (since Iran’s ambassador was in Iran), issued a démarche and told the Pakistani ambassador to Iran, who was in Islamabad on official business, to not return to his post.


After this non-kinetic escalatory response, however, Pakistan decided to respond with a measured kinetic action, the reasons for which we shall discuss later. On January 18, Pakistan used drones and stand-off munitions to strike a compound in the village of Haq Abad in Saravan district in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province.

Underlying factors in Balochistan on Pakistan’s side and Sistan-Baluchestan on Iran’s side will continue to sour relations unless the two sides cooperate | AFP


Pakistan’s official statement said that the action was carried out on credible intelligence of an impending terrorist attack inside Pakistan by Baloch saramchar [fighters]. Iran also conceded that the 10 people killed in the three strikes were foreign nationals. To give Iran an off-ramp, Pakistan did not target any Iranian military facilities or missile launch sites.

While the international media made big of the exchange, since Iran had also struck targets in Syria and Iraq, the phone call between the two countries’ foreign ministers helped defuse tensions and the situation was de-escalated (more on that in a subsequent section).

Does this mean all is now well? Yes and no. ‘Yes’ because the signal to Iran is clear: if Pakistan’s territorial integrity is compromised, Islamabad will respond. Any escalation will then be the adversary’s option, who must understand the dynamics of escalation dominance.

‘No’ because the underlying factors in Balochistan on Pakistan’s side and Sistan-Baluchestan on Iran’s side would continue to sour relations unless the two sides cooperate and address them seriously. For that, one has to understand the ecosystem.

THE ECOSYSTEM OVERVIEW — IRAN’S CONCERNS

On December 15 last year, Jaish al-Adl (JaA), a reincarnation of the banned militant group Jundallah, in an early morning raid at a police station in Rask, killed 12 Iranian policemen and wounded eight.

Later the same day, Nasser Kanaani, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, “strongly condemned the crime by separatist terrorists and mercenaries of foreign adversaries of Iran.” Kanaani also promised that “the Foreign Ministry and other relevant bodies in Iran will act in concert to go after the murderous terrorists and bring them to justice.”

While JaA has been attacking Iran’s security forces on and off since 2013, when it reassembled in its present incarnation from Jundallah, the Rask attack was far more intense than anything in the previous years. The other three intense attacks were in 2013 (14 Iranian soldiers killed in an ambush) and April 26, 2017, when 10 Iranian border guards were killed in the town of Mirjaveh. The worst attack came in February 2019, when a suicide bomber killed 27 Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) personnel.

At the time of the 2017 attack, the Iranian state media quoted police officials as saying that “the Pakistani government bears the ultimate responsibility of [sic] the attack.”

Two weeks after the attack, Maj Gen Mohammad Bagheri, an IRGC commander who serves as Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, threatened to strike inside Pakistan: “We expect Pakistani officials to control the borders, arrest the terrorists and shut down their bases… If the terrorist attacks continue, we will hit their safe havens and cells, wherever they are.”

Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) summoned the Iranian ambassador over Bagheri’s ultimatum and noted that his comments went “against the spirit of brotherly relations.” Efforts were made at the diplomatic and military levels to defuse the tension and work out mechanisms for cooperation. When on October 16, 2018, JaA abducted 12 Iranian security personnel, including IRGC intelligence officers, Pakistan helped Iran to secure the release of at least five of them.

After the 2019 attack, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Mohammad Ali Jafari had issued Pakistan an ultimatum: “If Pakistan fails to punish them in the near future, Iran will do so based on international law and will retaliate against the terrorists.”

In the same statement, as reported by Al Jazeera, Jafari said Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are “conspiring” with the United States and the “Zionist regime” to foment attacks. “The patience that we have practised in the past towards Saudi Arabia and the UAE, who commit these actions, will change,” Jafari stated. Interestingly, Jafari’s comments came as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman landed in Pakistan on February 17 on a two-day official visit.

People gather near rubble in the aftermath of Pakistan’s strike on militant hideouts in an Iranian village near Saravan in Sistan-Baluchestan: Pakistan’s response was measured and targeted insurgents and not the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps launch pads | Reuters

REWINDING TO THE NOUGHTIES

Iran’s troubles in Sistan-Baluchestan are not new. The Sunni minority makes up about 10 percent of Iran’s population. While the majority of the Sunnis live in the Kurdish north, the Sunnis of Sistan-Baluchestan have traditionally faced persecution.

The area is underdeveloped and poor and religious freedom is restricted. For instance, while Christians and Zoroastrians have official prayer places in Tehran, the Sunni minority (about one million residents of Tehran) does not have a single official mosque in the city. Although they have several prayer places in the city, none is recognised as a mosque.

Tensions have always simmered in Sistan-Baluchestan, but the situation took a different turn in 2003 with the appearance on the scene of Jundallah, the precursor of JaA. Jundollah mounted a number of hit-and-run attacks on Iran’s security forces in the southeast, including in Zahedan.

The group’s young leader, Abdolmalek Rigi, became known as an elusive daredevil. As Alex Vatanka notes in his Iran and Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American Influence, Jundallah adopted radical Sunni slogans as part of its resistance to Shia Iran. Rigi himself had studied at a seminary and later at the Binori Town Mosque in Karachi. The noughties, with Al Qaeda, its various franchises across the Muslim world and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s borderlands, provided the radical Sunni habitat for Jundallah’s fight.

With Jundallah’s violent actions — resistance and Sunni radicalism — began the trouble between Pakistan and Iran. After the initial attacks, the IRGC decided to adopt a soft, two-pronged approach: reaching out to Sunni tribal elders and managing the border jointly with Pakistan. The first was also aimed at development initiatives. The second proved tougher, given clan linkages on both sides of the border and due to the activities of smugglers and other crime syndicates.

Vatanka notes that, while Iranian officials had begun to point fingers at Pakistan, “No one in Tehran could pinpoint the exact identity of the Pakistani backers of Jundallah, and Tehran never put forward concrete evidence to corroborate the charges levelled against Islamabad.”

Then came the assassination of Nur-Ali Shushtari, the deputy commander of the ground forces of IRGC. Shushtari had been given the task of dealing with Jundallah. On the morning of October 18, 2009, as he sat in a tent in Pishin, a town close to the border, meeting with local tribal leaders, a suicide bomber blew himself up, killing Shushtari, along with four other IRGC senior officers. The total toll was 41 dead.

As Vatanka narrates, IRGC Commander-in-Chief Jafari “issued a blanket indictment against the United States, Israel and Britain as the culprits.” He also said that, “Rigi took his orders not only from Pakistan but from [the] intelligence services of Britain and the US.” Later, Iran also threw Saudi Arabia and the UAE into the mix. Pakistan’s response was that it would help Iran in unearthing the people responsible.

After this attack, Iran “ratcheted up the pressure on Pakistan.” Iranian media also reported that Iran had shared evidence with Pakistan of the “links between Pakistani intelligence services and Jundallah.”

Pakistan refuted these allegations. It had its own concerns with Iran.

ECOSYSTEM — PAKISTAN’S CONCERNS

For all the outward rhetoric about brotherly relations, Pakistan has had many concerns with Iran since the revolution. Three stand out.

As part of ‘exporting the revolution’ with its Shia theocratic overtones, Iran has been reaching out overtly and covertly to Shia populations in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the greater Middle East. This, along with the rise of Sunni radicalism because of the Afghan wars, has introduced violent sectarianism in Pakistan. While Iran’s support for radical Shia groups goes back to the early ’80s, the IRGC and its Quds Force have added another element to it since the civil war in Syria: recruitment of Shia fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The rivalry in Afghanistan is another sore point, with Iran supporting the erstwhile Northern Alliance in that country. It is instructive that, after the American invasion of Afghanistan which ousted the Taliban, Pakistan was kept out of the Bonn process, while Iran was an essential part of the process, its delegates led by former foreign minister Kamal Kharazi.

James Dobbins, a former American ambassador and assistant secretary of state, notes, “In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, bilateral US-Iranian contacts produced the most significant cooperation since the 1979 revolution, as Iranian officials helped the US form a new Afghan government.”

Iran, Russia and India were the main backers of the Northern Alliance and Iran was in an excellent position to help with the Bonn Process and the formation of the new Afghan government. Later, as Dobbins states, Iran even offered to train the Afghan security forces. Tehran also tried to engage the US in stabilising Iraq, but the Bush administration spurned Tehran.

Iran’s close ties with India are another Pakistani concern. These ties have both broader implications for Pakistan-Iran relations and are also Balochistan-specific. Pakistan has repeatedly engaged Iran on the issue of Tehran’s support for Baloch sub-nationalism and about giving space to Indian intelligence agencies on its soil (especially through its consulate in Zahedan) to fund Baloch militant groups.

However, with the exception of one instance, unlike official Iranian statements, Pakistan has mostly discussed these issues with their Iranian counterparts behind closed doors. That one instance was in March 2016, during a visit to Pakistan by Iran President Hassan Rouhani.

Rouhani met the Pakistani leadership and also the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen Raheel Sharif. After he left for the airport to board the flight back to Tehran, former Lt Gen Asim Bajwa, who was then Director-General Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), tweeted that, during the meeting, Gen Sharif had told President Rouhani: “There is one concern that RAW [Indian external intelligence agency] is involved in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan, and sometimes it also uses the soil of our brother country Iran.”

This was an egregious miscalculation. As the late Sartaj Aziz, then adviser to the prime minister on foreign affairs, told me in a private meeting, the tweet took the civilian government by surprise. Aziz said, “We had to try and defuse the situation.” Rouhani, for his part, “rejected the claim that the issue of the Indian spy agency’s involvement in Pakistan was discussed during his meeting with the country’s leadership.”

The fact is that Pakistan had discussed the activities of India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). That was inevitable. Earlier, on March 3, a Pakistani counter-intelligence team had apprehended Kulbhushan Jadhav, an Indian naval officer, from Mashkel in Pakistani Balochistan. Jadhav had a passport that identified him as Hussain Mubarek Patel. He confessed to running agents in Balochistan and planning and handling subversive activities.

Pakistan has given dossiers to Iran, including one that was handed over by Shah Mehmood Qureshi in his last official appointment as foreign minister. India’s activities in assassinating people on foreign soil are no more a secret, after two cases in Canada and the US. Last year in October, a court in Qatar sentenced eight former Indian naval officers to death, on charges of spying for Israel. After much hectic diplomatic activity between Qatar and India, these sentences have been reduced, but India has refused to divulge any further details.

Pakistan, on its part, has handed over two dossiers to Western capitals and the United Nations on India’s state-sponsored terrorism inside Pakistan. There have also been increasing numbers of assassinations of Kashmiris on Pakistan’s soil. The essential point about referencing India is to establish that Pakistan’s concern over India-Iran relations in the context of Balochistan and Afghanistan is fact-based and not a case of paranoia.

It is important at this point to note that January 16 was not the first time Iran attacked a target inside Pakistan. Iran has done that before too, firing mortars and mounting shallow raids. But this was the first time that it used missiles and, more importantly, declared the attack.

Iran argues that the missile attack was in response to Jaish al-Adl’s recent attack on the Iranian city of Rask in Sistan-Baluchestan | Jaish al-Adl

WHY THE LATEST DECLARATORY ATTACK

One question that continues to bother Pakistan is about Iran’s calculus in conducting the January 16 attack. As noted above, Iran has previously fired mortars in Pakistani territory and occasionally mounted shallow raids inside Pakistani territory. But this was the first time that it used short-range missiles and also the first time it chose to go on record about having done so, invoking its sovereign right to defend itself.

Nor does Iran’s logic become any less opaque going by Tehran’s statements. It claimed that it struck terrorist cells of JaA, which it says has havens in Pakistani Balochistan. Iran also mentioned, as has been its motif, that JaA is linked with Zionists, even though it is a US-designated terrorist organisation.

It later said that the strike was made preemptively. That doesn’t square with the statement about the attack in Rask, which happened last year. That JaA enjoys sanctuaries in Pakistan, with alleged help from state actors hostile to Iran, has also been, as noted, a motif with Iran.

So, what changed?

One can only speculate. One possibility is that the operation was undertaken by some elements within the IRGC, without necessarily running it up the food chain. The IRGC is a parallel force and is responsible for recruiting and managing Iranian proxies in West Asia and the Mena (Middle East and North Africa) region. The nature of its work means giving its commanders carte blanche.

Iran had earlier struck targets in Syria and Iraq, justifying the strikes as a national security imperative. In combination with the factors mentioned above, someone decided to throw Pakistan into the mix. There’s also the possibility, in tandem with these factors, that Iran decided to put Pakistan on notice regarding its alignment with the US — especially with developments in the Middle East.

Be that as it may, it is still difficult to rationalise Iran’s action. One thing, though, is clear: in lumping Pakistan with Syria and Iraq, Iran miscalculated in a big way. As I wrote elsewhere, “Did Iran convince itself that Pakistan would not respond? If so, then Tehran obviously thought that its strategic objectives were holier than Pakistan’s. That’s magic, not policy.”

COULD PAKISTAN HAVE DONE WITHOUT A KINETIC RESPONSE?

The short answer is no. Here’s the long answer.

Over the past three to four years, relations between Pakistan and Iran have improved. Generally speaking, the two sides have had functional ties, neither always cold nor very warm. On the plus side, Iran and Pakistan began on the right foot with Iran recognising Pakistan immediately after the latter’s formation. This was vastly different from Afghanistan’s inimical behaviour.

Again, unlike Afghanistan’s continued irredentism regarding the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, Iran and Pakistan managed, rather amicably, to delineate their border after two years of negotiations. The two sides signed the agreement on February 6, 1958. Before that, leaving aside some hilarious ups and downs, the two sides signed a Treaty of Friendship in May 1950.

The situation took an undesirable turn after the 1979 revolution, as indicated above. But despite running issues on both sides, much good work has been done since 2020. Pakistan did not object to Iran building a wall on the border in early 2007. Pakistan has also begun to build a wall on its side. There are easement gates on both sides for the locals to pass through.

Taftan used to be the only crossing point between Pakistan and Iran. Two other crossing points have been added at Gabd (between Gwadar and Chahbahar) and Mand (between Gabd in the south and Taftan in the north). These points are official crossings with immigration facilities.

Six border sustenance marketplaces have been agreed upon, one of which is already functional. In May 2023, former Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi jointly inaugurated the Mand-Pishin Border Sustenance Marketplace and the 220 kV Polan-Gabd Electricity Transmission Line project.

Cooperation has increased across the entire spectrum of bilateral relations, including the political, economic, energy and cultural domains. As Pakistan’s MoFA notes, “Both countries are committed to increas[ing] economic cooperation…by leveraging existing institutional mechanisms, such as [the] Joint Economic Commission (JEC), Joint-Border Trade Committee (JBTC), Joint Trade Committee (JTC) and Joint Border Commission (JBC).”

To circumvent sanctions against Iran, the Quetta and Zahedan Chambers of Commerce have been declared the clearing agents for barter trade. The statutory regulatory orders (SRO) and the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the decision have been established and the cabinet has approved them.

On the diplomatic front, Pakistan has backed Iran at the UN rights bodies and whenever it gets into hot waters, which is generally frequently. On the security side, mechanisms (hotline etc) have been established for cooperation across a wide spectrum, including counter-terrorism.

This is not an exhaustive list of measures at multiple levels — from mid-ranking officials in the field to the highest levels of civilian and military leadership. Pakistan’s response, therefore, has to be seen in a context.

Put yourself in the position of the policymakers. Do you face a dilemma? The attack risks setting a dangerous precedent by violating Pakistan’s sovereignty, through Iran’s action on the ground, its public declaration of the attack and its iteration that it reserves the right to safeguard its security (in other words, a repeat). Two, India in the east is already publicly wedded to a muscular policy towards Pakistan and, in 2016 and 2019, has aggressed against Pakistan.

On the other hand, the borders with India and Afghanistan are already unstable and hostile. Do you want to add to that the Pakistan-Iran border too? Wouldn’t it complicate relations with all the neighbours, except China in the north? If you escalate against Iran, wouldn’t it get Pakistan into a three-front problem and bring Iran closer to India (India’s official statement supported the Iranian strike)?

Policymaking isn’t easy, after all! But in taking any course of action, it is important to understand that no policy is without a cost. What’s important is to balance the pluses with the minuses. For instance, it was important to show resolve, not just to signal to Iran but also to India, while giving the former the choice to escalate or quit.

For its part, Pakistan’s response was measured and targeted Pakistani Baloch insurgents and not the IRGC launch pads. That was both to manage escalatory pressure and give Iran an off-ramp. Iran understood the signal. Most probably also because, higher up the food chain, there was a better understanding of what was/is at stake. Does Iran want to go for escalation while Mena is already loaded against it? Clearly not.

As things stand, the ambassadors will be back at their stations by January 26 and, at the invitation of Pakistan’s caretaker foreign minister Jalil Abbas Jilani, the Iranian foreign minister will be visiting Pakistan on January 29.

Improved relations between Iran and Pakistan are an imperative for both sides. Given the situation in the Mena region, it’s time to close ranks. Equally, both sides need to sit down in earnest to address each other’s complaints on the thorny issues. That is the only way forward.

The writer is a journalist interested in security and
foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider

Header image: Iranian clergymen watch a missile being fired by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps: January 16 was the first time that Iran fired short-range missiles on Pakistani territory and also the first time it chose to go on record about having done so| AFP

Published in Dawn, EOS, January 28th, 2024

Condemned to Death for Blasphemy in Pakistan, She Lives a Life of Poverty in Exile

The first woman to be sentenced to execution under the country's notorious law, Asia Bibi, gives a rare interview about her new life in Canada

Ailia ZehraAilia Zehra is a Pakistani journalist based in New York

March 21, 2023

Asia Bibi, a Pakistani Christian woman sentenced to death for blasphemy in 2010, photographed in Paris on Feb. 25, 2020. (Martin Bureau/AFP via Getty Images)

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After spending more than eight years on death row over false blasphemy allegations in Pakistan, Asia Bibi, a Christian woman, managed to escape to Canada in 2019 following her acquittal by Pakistan’s supreme court. On social media, right-wing propagandists then claimed that a life of luxury awaited her abroad and that she was being backed by “anti-Pakistan” and “anti-Islam” powers. Nothing could be further from the truth. In exile, Bibi has been living a life of poverty, abandoned by both the state of Pakistan that wronged her and the human rights groups that once avidly advocated for her release.

Over the past two years, her health has deteriorated as she suffers from a joint ailment.

“I think I only have a few years left to live,” the 52-year-old Bibi told New Lines in her first public interview since 2020. Like many Pakistani dissidents and victims of extremism who are hounded out of the country, Bibi’s plight continues even in exile. She works a menial job, sometimes for over 14 hours a day, to cover her rent and her family’s expenses. The modest financial support the family initially received from the Canadian government was discontinued a year later. The authorities help refugees only for a year after their arrival, after which they are expected to fend for themselves.

In 2010, Bibi, a farm laborer who hails from a village near the Nankana Sahib district of Pakistan’s Punjab province, became the first woman to be sentenced to death under the country’s controversial blasphemy laws for allegedly insulting the Prophet Muhammad during an argument with Muslim neighbors over sharing a cup of water. She was arrested and imprisoned, then sentenced to be executed by the local court, a judgment that was upheld by the Lahore High Court.

When Salman Taseer, who was then the governor of Punjab province, visited Bibi in prison and vowed to persuade then-President Asif Ali Zardari to issue a presidential pardon for the woman on humanitarian grounds, a hateful campaign against Taseer ensued. He was himself accused of blasphemy by extremist clerics who declared him an apostate for supporting a “blasphemer.” Still, Taseer remained steadfast in his opposition to the blasphemy law. In 2011, one of his own bodyguards, Malik Mumtaz Qadri, shot him 27 times with an AK-47 assault rifle near his home in Islamabad, killing him.

Similarly, Shahbaz Bhatti, who was the federal minister for minorities affairs and belonged to the minority Christian community in Pakistan, had extended support to Bibi and condemned the misuse of blasphemy law. He too was assassinated in 2011, with the Pakistani Taliban claiming responsibility.

Pakistan inherited its blasphemy laws from the British, who codified them in 1860. More than a century later, in the 1980s, as part of his Islamization policy, Pakistan’s military dictator, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, introduced a number of clauses that made the laws more stringent. Following this, the number of blasphemy-related cases skyrocketed. Between 1987 and 2014, over 1,335 people were accused of blasphemy. Prior to the new clauses, only 14 such cases had been recorded.

After the murders of Taseer and Bhatti, Bibi’s case garnered global attention, highlighting the growing violence toward Pakistan’s religious minorities and those who stand up for them at the hands of uncontrollable mobs of extremists. Her fate, observers said, would in part determine the future of religious minorities in the country.

When Bibi was finally absolved of blasphemy charges in 2018, a wave of violent protests erupted across Pakistan, led by right-wing groups, most prominently the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP — “I Am Present Pakistan”). Protesters brought the country to a standstill, setting fire to rickshaws and cars. Traffic blockades due to the riots forced authorities to shut schools in most parts of the country. Shoes were hurled at pictures of the then-chief justice of Pakistan, Saqib Nisar, while extremist clerics leading the protests called for mutiny in the armed forces. Police were given no clear instructions by the government on how to deal with the protesters and seemed unable to handle the mobs.

Two days later, as the unrest expanded across the country, the government — led by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI – “Pakistan Movement for Justice”) party — signed an agreement with the TLP by which the government agreed to “initiate a legal process” to place Bibi’s name on the country’s Exit Control List, or ECL, a government-maintained roster of suspected criminals who are barred from leaving the country. It also vowed not to oppose a review petition filed against the supreme court’s verdict acquitting Bibi. The countrywide protests were then brought to an end and the TLP celebrated the agreement as its victory. The official actions were seen by many as an act of capitulation by the government.

Though the government did not put Bibi’s name on the ECL, it kept her in protective custody for six months after her release from prison. Posters calling for her execution continued to be displayed in public places, and the TLP’s social media team ran hateful hashtags against her.

Six months later, she was flown out of the country in secret and reunited with her husband and two daughters in Canada, where the family was granted asylum. International human rights watchdogs, as well as the European Union, were reportedly in touch with the government of Pakistan to ensure Bibi’s safe exit from the country. The government released no information about her departure.

Despite being cleared by the country’s highest court and having spent eight years in prison, Bibi was forced to leave Pakistan in the manner of a criminal.

“When I landed in Canada three years ago, the first thing I thought was that I am here because I was thrown out of the land of my birth,” Bibi tells New Lines, her voice breaking. Her husband is unemployed, as he is on heavy medication and cannot work without falling sick. Her two adolescent daughters are disabled. She also has three other children still in Pakistan. Bibi could not meet with them or her father, who is over 100 years old, before leaving Pakistan. Her mother passed away while Bibi was in prison.

“My biggest sorrow is that I could not get to meet my father before coming to Canada. I will carry this grief in my heart for the rest of my life,” she says, tears welling up in her eyes.

Bibi misses her three children who could not join her in Canada because the support she was offered at the time of her departure was limited. She now has no one to advise her on how to bring them to the country. “I wonder if I will ever see my children again,” she sighs.

Even after three years, Bibi and her family have not truly adjusted in Canada, due to the language barrier, cultural differences and an overall lack of support.

“My husband and I are illiterate,” Bibi says. “Our children could not get an education either. You could imagine how hard it would be for someone like us.” Neither Bibi nor her husband knows how to read and write in English or French. They speak Urdu but cannot write or read fluently in it.

Even though there are government-run programs available for her children and husband in Canada, it is all too overwhelming for her to handle on her own. Being a laborer on a farm in a small village in Pakistan, Bibi had never imagined she would be living and managing her family in a foreign country all by herself.

Her case also highlights how difficult it is for people who have fled violence and trauma to acclimatize to life in a completely different environment like Canada. The country grants asylum to high-profile oppressed individuals. Yet the care offered to such individuals in many instances does not extend to supporting them through their trauma and PTSD. This was highlighted when the Egyptian LGBTQ activist Sarah Hegazi died by suicide in 2020 after being given asylum in Canada.

Asked if the Pakistani Consulate in Canada ever reached out to her, Bibi says she does not expect them to offer her any support, because back home she is still considered a blasphemer. During the riots that broke out after her acquittal, banners seeking her execution were openly displayed as protesters chanted hateful slogans against her and the Christian community. Incitement to violence and hate speech is a crime in Pakistan, but extremists groups are able to get away with it.

“Tehreek-e-Labbaik was asking the government to kill me,” she says. “Under such circumstances, how can the government offer me support?”

Bibi’s death sentence drew international outrage, prompting strong condemnations from organizations defending persecuted Christians as well as human rights groups. Pope Benedict XVI issued a public call for clemency for Bibi. In addition to the extensive media coverage, a number of campaigns were organized through online petitions, social media trends and concerts the world over. There were songs dedicated to her, along with books and documentaries. Bibi’s acquittal and subsequent escape from Pakistan were likewise covered globally, but when the media attention eventually subsided, she was left with little or no support.

“Many individuals who used my name to make money have also forgotten me,” she says.

Bibi says she was uncertain as to whether she would gain freedom even after the acquittal. “After my release, I felt like I had been moved from a small jail to a bigger one. During the six months I spent in protective custody, I feared I would be killed or sent back to jail.”

The type of persecution Bibi survived is an ongoing phenomenon in Pakistan and continues regardless of the government in power. According to news reports, at least 80 people have been extrajudicially killed in connection with blasphemy allegations in the country since 1990. Last month, a mob in Punjab’s Nankana Sahib district lynched a prisoner accused of blasphemy after attacking the police station in which he was held. His body was later set on fire. In December 2021, the case of the Sri Lankan national Priyanta Kumara, who was burned to death in Sialkot over blasphemy allegations, sparked global outrage.

Governments in Pakistan tend to capitulate to extremist mobs every time they take to the streets. Public figures, including state officials, who are accused of blasphemy are quick to avow their faith and issue clarifications to avoid the dreadful fate of Taseer. The TLP, the group that led violent protests against Bibi’s release, is still going strong and continues to hold violent protests on a regular basis.

Far from doing anything to curb this violence, Pakistan has made efforts to strengthen the blasphemy law. In January, the National Assembly passed a bill seeking to increase the punishment for blasphemy committed against the prophet’s companions and his progeny, which is already a crime in Pakistani law under Section 298-A. The bill proposes an increase in the period of confinement from three years to at least 10 years, extendable up to lifetime imprisonment as well as a fine of 1 million rupees (about $3,600). If the bill is signed into law, blasphemy will become a non-bailable offense in Pakistan.

While rights defenders celebrated Bibi’s safe departure from Pakistan, the persecution once meted out to her remains a reality for many others. In January 2022, a 27-year-old woman, Aneeqa Ateeq, was sentenced to death by a court in Rawalpindi over a “blasphemous” message sent over WhatsApp and Facebook. She claims her accuser used the messages against her as revenge after she rejected his sexual advances.

Junaid Hafeez, a Fulbright scholar and academic who taught at a university in the city of Multan, has been languishing in prison on blasphemy charges for nine years. The blasphemy campaign against him was initiated by a religious group at his university opposed to his liberal ideas. In 2019, Hafeez was convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to death. About 40 people in Pakistan are currently on death row or serving life sentences after being convicted under the blasphemy law.

As the fate of the victims is left hanging in the balance, Bibi still longs to return home one day.

“I know the people who want to kill me are still very powerful in Pakistan, but I don’t want to stop hoping.”

I Was An IslamoFascist For MI6

My pal Rambling Socialist picked up on the fact that the master of self deception, President Musharraf of Pakistan in his new book claims that Omar Saeed Sheikh was a British Spy for MI6.

Now considering how many things he has said in his new autobiography that have been challenged for their truthfulness, which of course doesn't mean they aren't true, this would be a greater embarassment than his allegation the U.S. strong armed him into supporting their attack on Afghanistan.

Despite his show trial in Pakistan there is no evidence that Omar killed WSJ Reporter Daniel Pearl. The Hindu : Omar Sheikh arrested, says Pearl is alive

But true to form he had arranged his kidnapping, which was Omar's speciality, and until Pearl none of his victims had been harmed. Which does smack of the kind of black ops double cross that is typical of security agencies and their moles. And it is interesting that Omar got close to the leadership of Al Qaeda in Pakistan while working for Pakistan's Intelligence Service.

Indian authorities also told the US that the trail led back from Omar Sheikh to the then Chief of ISI, Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmad who was subsequently forced to retire by Pakistan resident Pervez Musharraf. The Indian authorities provided the FBI with the details, including Omar Sheikh’s mobile numbers. Mumbai Bomb Blasts – Intelligence And Counter-Intelligence

He was already under arrest when Pearl was killed. Which gives credence to this allegation obtained by rendition and torture.

U.S. Contends Qaeda Leader Executed Pearl

US officials say that Khalid Shaik Mohammed, then Al Qaeda's top operational commander, personally executed American reporter Daniel Pearl, who was abducted in Pakistan in January 2002; Mohammed is now in US custody but officials do not say if Mohammed has confessed to murder; British-born Islamic extremist Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh is appealing death sentence for role in kidnapping and three other extremists were also found guilty


His trial may have been more of a case of shutting up someone who could embarass the Pakistan security services using the murder of Daniel Pearl as a convinant excuse. Musharraf would know. As an editorial in the Tribune and Indian newspaper stated in 2002; Omar Sheikh’s bombshell

Omar Sheikh has been living in Pakistan for more than two years and he is a British citizen and hence should have been under close police watch. His claims of daring action could be an exaggerated boast to entrench his leadership in the so-called jehadi groups, as the Pakistani authorities say. But it could also be a government defence of distancing itself from the terrorists and shielding its lack of action during all these years when this British citizen was in Pakistan plotting terrorists attacks in an important neighbouring country. Any country interested in democracy will know the dilemma of a military dictatorship trying to damage India.

As fellow blogger Xymphora says;

Of course, Musharraf would say something like that, as it takes the heat off his own country for some of the things that Omar Sheikh has allegedly done, all supposedly on behalf of Pakistani military intelligence. On the other hand, Musharraf’s story fits. Omar Sheikh was from a well-to-do family, educated at a public school, and had excellent marks. Athletic, aggressive, and intelligent. A young Muslim male at a time when such an agent might well be useful. A text-book mark for British intelligence recruitment. Like all alleged terrorists, he suddenly turned into a violent Islamist religious extremist, and ended up in an Afghan training camp (where Aukai Collins knew him as Umar).

As usual with all these ‘terrorists’, all his old friends now say they have trouble imagining such a thing happening to him. He was supposedly radicalized in Bosnia, but Bosnia seems to have been both a school for Islamic terrorists, and the foundation for NATO/German/French/British/American shenanigans in manipulating Islamist terrorist groups in the proto-WarOnTerror phony fight as a ruse for the ClashOfCivilizations-leading-to-NewMiddleEast crapola. So either it is a legitimate 180 degree personality change, or he is fitting into the role he has to play to infiltrate Islamist terrorist organizations on behalf of British intelligence. Which do you think it is?

So lets take a look at who Omar is.....

BBC NEWS | UK | Profile: Omar Saeed Sheikh
Omar Sheikh, 27, was born in London, attended the London School of Economics and was a close associate of Maulana Azhar Masood - founder of the banned Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM) group, which India blames for an attack on its parliament in December 2001.Omar Sheikh was reportedly a contemporary of England cricket captain Nasser Hussain at the private Forest School, in Snaresbrook.

After passing four A-levels with good grades, Omar Sheikh enrolled at LSE in October 1992.

But he left before the end of his first year of an undergraduate degree in statistics.

Reports suggest he visited Bosnia as an aid worker and soon after, he moved to Pakistan

In 1999, while serving a prison sentence for terrorist offences, an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to Kandahar in Afghanistan.

And in exchange for the 155 hostages on the plane, Omar Sheikh was freed from jail.

A Sheikh and the money trail

After his release, Sheikh spent time making contact with several terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and Taliban head Mullah Mohammad Omar. While Azhar went on to form the Jaish-e-Mohammad, focussed on Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh concentrated on building international contacts for the Islamic Right through his old network in the U.K. Although he had received arms training at the Salam Fassi camp at Miranshah, Pakistan, in 1993, guns were no longer part of his job. Osama bin Laden, say Indian officials who have monitored Sheikh's career, played a key role in this career move. Indian intelligence believes that Sheikh, who helped set up a website propagating jehad, was also tasked to help create a secure, encrypted web-based communications system.

rediff.com: Omar Sheikh: A deadly whirlpool of terror

The story of Sheikh's father is typical of any successful Pakistani migrant to the west, and that of Sheikh typical of a modern day jihadi.

Saeed Ahmed Sheikh, Omar's father, was born in Dhoka Mandi village near Lahore and lived there till his early 20s before migrating to London sometime in 1968 to pursue Chartered Accountancy course.

After being an accountant with a record company for a short while, Saeed Ahmed Sheikh started his own wholesale garment business under the name 'Perfect Fashions'.

At present, his company earns over half a million pounds annually.

His family owns a house (bought in 1977) in London, some shops and land.

Omar Sheikh is the eldest of the three children, and was born on December 23, 1973 in London.

His younger sister, Hajira Sheikh, was confirmed to be a medicine student till recently at Oxford, while his younger brother, Awais Sheikh, was a student of A level in Oxford.

All the three children are known to be brilliant, and are recipients of scholarships.

Omar Sheikh did his schooling at Nightingale Primary School and later at Forest School at Snaresbrook. Present English cricket team captain Nasser Hussain was his classmate at school.

In 1987, Omar's father wound up his business and moved back to Lahore, but returned to London soon after in 1990, after he had a fall out with his cousins.

During his stay in Lahore, Omar went to Aitchison College. Indian agencies said that Omar was known for his temperamental behaviour and he had enough quarrels that forced his father to call him back to London. Omar went back to Forest School and finished his Senior Cambridge in 1992.

During his Forest School days, Omar had a short-lived romance with an English girl, Sarah, about whom he spoke affectionately to Indian interrogators.

Omar is a combination of complex interests, according to intelligence agencies.

He was a chess champion during his days at London School of Economics, where he was also reputed for his brilliant academic abilities. He is also a keen arm wrestler, and took part in the 1992 World Arm Wrestling Championships in Geneva.

A martial arts enthusiast, Omar's prowess was seen by Indian police officers, who nabbed him in mid 90s, when he was holding five foreigners captive outside Delhi.

While in a Ghaziabad hospital, after being arrested by Delhi and Uttar Pradesh Police, he punched a deputy superintendent of police, and threatened to track down and kill the constable who had slapped him back.

Later at the Meerut jail, he kicked the jail superintendent, and was shifted to high security Tihar jail in Delhi, after the Uttar Pradesh Police categorised him as 'dreaded'.

During his LSE days, Omar dabbled in shares and equities and was earning up to 1000 pounds a day from a chain of retail customers he had set up using his father's business base.

Moved by a documentary on Bosnia (Destruction of a Nation) in 1992, Omar Sheikh took to jihad and went to Bosnia on a trip with 'Convoy of Mercy'.

Indian officials believe that he had tacit support from his father.

According officials, Omar was in contact with Maulana Ismail of Clifton Mosque in North London, who inspired him to join Harkat-ul-Ansar and come to Kashmir.

An Indian intelligence official told rediff.com that psychologists who interacted with him during his stay in Indian jails believe that he is an 'anti-Zionist and anti-Christian who believes that Muslims can never be friends with Christians and Jews'.

"He feels it is the duty of every Muslim to take up jihad and strengthen the Muslims wherever they were in minority," the official said.

He certainly had the classic English School Boy upbringing so appealing to the British Secret Service historically. Of course their use of British Upper Class twits as the basis of the secret service has also backfired, as we saw during the Cold War. So why not set up a double agent/mole within the new Mujahedin movement.

DANIEL PEARL & THE LONDON BLASTS

Pearl 's kidnapping and murder was orchestrated by Omar Sheikh, a British citizen of Pakistani origin, who had studied for some time in the London School of Economics. He discontinued his studies and joined the HUA during the war in Bosnia , where the HUA had sent a contingent to help the Bosnian Muslims in their fight against the Serbs. This contingent was sent by the Government of Mrs.Benazir Bhutto, who was then the Prime Minister, at the request of the Clinton Administration.. The contingent, which was raised and got trained by Lt.Gen.(retd) Hamid Gul, former Director-General of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who himself used to visit Bosnia, had a large number of British Muslims of Pakistani origin.

Omar Sheikh surrendered to a former officer of the ISI and a close personal friend of Gen.Pervez Musharraf, who was posted as Home Secretary in Lahore , was tried along with other accomplices and sentenced to death by a lower court. The sentence has not so far been carried out. An appeal against the sentence filed by Omar is pending before a higher court, which has been adjourning the hearing again and again. On July 14, the hearing was adjourned for the 32nd time.

In the meanwhile, Omar continues to be as active from jail as he was when he was a free man. He reportedly keeps in touch with his friends and followers in the UK , advising them on their future course of action. Statements purported to have been issued by him from jail calling upon the Muslims of the world to retaliate against the US for its desecration of the Holy Koran are being disseminated every Friday in many Pakistani mosques controlled by jihadi terrorist organisations.

In fact the South Asia Analysis Group a non profit non commercial think tank speculates Omar was the source for the recent arrests in London.

Bojinka 2006:Focus on Omar Sheikh, Rashid Rauf & Prof. Sayeed ...

Pakistan and the Terror Nexus
There are those who might doubt the word of Musharraf, and who can blame them? But in fact I documented Omar Sheikh Saeed's simultaneous intelligence connections to the CIA, ISI and MI6 in The War on Truth and The London Bombings. Details have come forth from an intriguing combination of American, British and Pakistani government sources.

Readers of my 7/7 work will begin to see an unnervingly familiar pattern here. As I explained on "Generation 7/7", a Channel 4 learning documentary that has been aired several times since the 7/7 anniversary (including last week), the suspected 7/7 mastermind al-Qaeda fixer Haroon Rashid Aswat is also an MI6 double agent according to American intelligence officials. When former Justice Department prosecutor John Loftus came on Fox News last year and revealed the extent to which MI6 had been protecting Aswat from our own police services and the CIA, the official story shifted suddenly and inexplicably. Police spokesmen, who had previously described in detail the telephone records of Aswat's extensive conversations with alleged chief London bomber Mohammed Sidique Khan, summarily denied that Aswat had any connection at all to 7/7. The shift in reporting happened precisely to conceal the embarrassing revelation that the failure to apprehend Aswat, was due to the active obstruction of attempts to apprehend him, by our very own MI6. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed

See:

Musharraf

Pakistan


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