Thursday, August 13, 2026

 

How do you measure the age of a fungus? Scientists say it’s surprisingly difficult




Cell Press
Polypore growing on a snowy tree in winter 

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Polypore growing on a snowy tree in winter.

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Credit: Kristin Aleklett





Some of Earth’s oldest living organisms may be right beneath our feet: not ancient trees or coral reefs but fungi. Yet despite their ubiquity and importance, scientists still don’t know how long most fungi can live—or even how to define their age. 

In an opinion paper publishing in the Cell Press journal Trends in Microbiology on August 13, researchers examine why fungal longevity remains so difficult to study. To investigate the long-overlooked biological mystery, the team recommends leveraging new technologies such as “fungi-on-a-chip” and conducting long-term lab experiments with genetic tracking. 

“We don’t really know if 10 years or 500 years is ‘old’ for a fungus or how much it differs between fungal species and lifestyles,” says senior author Kristin Aleklett of Lund University, Sweden. 

A mushroom that decorates the forest floor is just a small part of a fungus. Beneath the surface lies its main body—a sprawling network of thread-like filaments called mycelium that spreads through soil or wood and sometimes connects with plant or tree roots. Some fungal networks are thought to live for hundreds to thousands of years.  

Because the mycelium continually branches, grows, recycles old tissues, and sometimes breaks off into new networks, "one of the biggest difficulties lies in being able to define where a fungal individual begins and ends," says Aleklett. 

That raises a series of questions: what exactly should scientists measure? Does a fungus' age begin when its underground network first forms, even if much of it is later replaced? If the underground network breaks apart into separate pieces that still share the same DNA, are they still one individual? 

Unlike animals or trees, scientists can’t simply count birthdays or growth rings. Instead, they often rely on genetic tools to identify individual fungi and estimate their age based on how quickly the mycelium grows in the lab. But researchers cannot directly observe how the mycelium expands and dies back over seasons and years in the real world. 

“I think it is thrilling that there is still so much basic research about fungi left to discover,” says Aleklett. “There is this large kingdom of organisms living alongside us that we still know so little about.” 

Aging may also differ from one fungal species to another. Yeasts have a relatively simple life cycle, while others are more complicated. The longevity of symbiotic fungi that partner with plants may depend on the life of their hosts. Decomposer fungi might outlive a rotting log by branching through the soil to reach new food sources. 

Rather than searching for a universal lifespan, the researchers argue that fungal longevity should be studied across different species and lifestyles. They propose combining genetic tracking, long-term lab experiments, and emerging technologies such as “fungi-on-a-chip” to observe fungal growth and persistence in unprecedented detail. That knowledge could deepen scientists’ understanding of the fungi that underpin the ecosystem, agriculture, and human health. 

“If we want to be able to preserve fungal biodiversity and ecosystem services, we need to better understand what their life cycles look like, including how or when their lives end,” says Aleklett.  

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This work was supported by funding from the V. Kann Rasmussen Foundation, the Swedish Research Council, and the Swedish government. 

Trends in Microbiology, Aleklett et al., "Exploring the concept of longevity in fungi" https://www.cell.com/trends/microbiology/fulltext/S0966-842X(26)00184-8

Trends in Microbiology, (@TrendsMicrobiol) published by Cell Press, is a monthly review journal that provides a multidisciplinary forum for the discussion of all aspects of microbiology—from cell biology and immunology to genetics and evolution—and ranges across virology, bacteriology, protozoology, and mycology. Visit http://www.cell.com/trends/microbiology. To receive Cell Press media alerts, please contact press@cell.com


Hemipholiota populnea mushroom growing on a log 

Hemipholiota populnea mushroom growing on a log.

 

Military-related toxic exposures and mental and physical health in US veterans



JAMA Network Open



About the Study

This cross-sectional study examines the prevalence of exposures to Agent Orange and open-air burn pits and their independent associations with mental and physical health outcomes among US veterans.



Corresponding Author: Ian C. Fischer, PhD, National Center for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, VA Connecticut Healthcare System, 950 Campbell Ave, West Haven, CT 06516 (ian.fischer@yale.edu).

10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2026.28803

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A few minutes of sprinting could make a bigger impact than 90 minutes of moderate running





Rockefeller University






Three minutes of sprinting can do something that 90 minutes of moderate exercise apparently cannot: dramatically reshape the molecular contents of the bloodstream.

Rockefeller researchers comparing different intensities of exercise found that six sets of 30-second, all-out sprints altered nearly a quarter of the proteins measured immediately afterward. Moderate, continuous cycling for 90 minutes altered fewer than one-quarter of one percent. And while moderate running on a treadmill changed more proteins than cycling, it still altered far fewer than a quick sprint.

Sprinting triggered changes in more than 200 metabolites. It also caused an immediate surge of proteins involved in blood-vessel growth, tissue remodeling, and hormonal signaling. Some of these proteins appear to enter the bloodstream through an expedited cell signaling process known as ectodomain shedding—rather than being newly made and secreted, portions of proteins already sitting on the cell surface were cleaved off and rapidly released into circulation. The researchers also found that human fat cells exposed to blood collected after sprinting underwent extensive changes in gene activity, shifting how the cells process fuel, respond to hormones, and sense nutrient availability.

Not so with moderate exercise which produced a more modest response. It was not until three hours after completing that exercise that a meaningful wave of the fatty acids and liver-derived proteins that typically appear in response to the demands of endurance exercise were found in the bloodstream. Human fat cells exposed to blood collected after moderate cycling had only minor changes in gene activity.

When the researchers compared the exercise-responsive proteins with health data from more than 53,000 people in the UK Biobank, they found that many of these proteins were associated with a lower risk of cardiovascular and metabolic disease. The connection was particularly striking for obesity, type 2 diabetes, and other metabolic disorders: of 33 proteins associated with lower risk, 32 were altered by sprinting, compared with just three by moderate exercise. More than a quarter of these proteins were also associated with slower biological aging.

“What’s exciting here is that just a few minutes of intense exercise can trigger a significant molecular response,” says Cohen. “And we still see it after eight weeks of training, which tells us this response isn’t simply a product of the body struggling to keep up with unfamiliar stress. It may be that the responses we observed are intrinsic to intense exercise.”

“It’s well appreciated that different intensities of exercise stimulate distinct body-wide adaptations,” notes Luke Olsen, the postdoctoral fellow who conducted the studies. “However, the molecular mechanisms linking these intensity-dependent adaptations have remained largely elusive. Our work suggests that exerkines–proteins and metabolites released into the bloodstream following exercise–are highly sensitive to exercise intensity and may be the key mediators of the health-promoting effects of short bursts of vigorous exercise”.

 

Researchers use a physical device to take over electronics in a Boeing 737 



Computer science researchers developed and tested a device that, if plugged into a hardwired communications channel connecting two key flight computers, can take over communications between these computers




University of California - San Diego

Picture of computer found in an airplane cockpit 

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This computer that displays this path information, along with other critical flight data for the pilots in the cockpit. The screen displays "bus driver" to show that the researchers have control of it. 

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Credit: Erik Jepsen/University of California San Diego






Video: https://youtu.be/t1_Xd9n0dGY?si=CwjImfGc1J5s9akJ

Physical access to an aircraft has not typically been considered a cybersecurity risk – but it should be, according to a team of computer scientists at the University of California San Diego. In a paper presented Aug. 13 at the USENIX Security Symposium in Baltimore, Md, former UC San Diego PhD student Sam Crow showed that physical access to an aircraft – even for a brief period of time – would allow an attacker equipped with a custom-made hardware device to take over the communications between two key onboard computers. 

The device needs to be plugged into a port inside the plane’s belly – an action that the researchers estimate would take under 60 seconds. This would require access to the aircraft either when parked at a gate or when in an airport hangar during regular maintenance. Access to these areas is controlled carefully but not always successfully, the computer scientists note in the new paper. 

The researchers successfully demonstrated the attack on a testbed made of actual Boeing 737 airplane parts and airplane software. The proof-of-concept attack allowed researchers to change the plane’s flight path and change data that could make takeoff conditions unsafe.  But they are careful to note that the attack requires someone to do significant planning and engineering work ahead of time.  The research team communicated closely with Boeing, disclosed the vulnerability in 2020, and further tested and validated their findings in Boeing’s own lab.

Of note, the Boeing 737 is one of the most used aircraft in commercial aviation, with 8000 in service today. It makes up about 25% of Delta’s existing fleet, 38% of American’s, 53% of United’s and all of Southwest Airlines’ fleet.  However, while the team’s implementation is designed for the Boeing 737 specifically, the researchers believe their findings are relevant for the aviation industry more generally. 

“Our goal with this research is to alert the aviation community to this class of risks, so they may be appropriately mitigated well before they become dangerous. All of the authors of this paper routinely travel on Boeing 737 aircraft and expect to continue doing so,” said UC San Diego computer scientist and cybersecurity expert Aaron Schulman, one of the senior authors of the work. 

The research team, led by Schulman and Stefan Savage, both professors in the UC San Diego Department of Computer Science and Engineering, presented their peer-reviewed work describing the vulnerability and attack Aug. 13 at the USENIX Security Symposium. 

How does the attack work? 

The researchers discovered an unused maintenance port located in the plane’s Electronics and Equipment bay, which houses key electronic systems. This bay is located just under the plane’s nose, can be reached from the ground, and isn’t locked. This maintenance port provides access to the data transmitted between two critical on-board computers. 

One computer is the flight management computer, which controls the plane’s flight path as well as approach path before landing and also supplies critical information at takeoff. The other is the computer that displays this flight path information, along with other critical flight data for the pilots in the cockpit. Information and instructions to and from these two computers is ferried by hard-wired communication systems known as buses – in this case, two ARINC 429 buses, which were invented in 1977.  

Buses, like the ARINC 429, convey data via current flowing through two wires and a set of resistors. Because the system is decades old, it does not have data security features, such as message authentication. 

The researchers designed, built and programmed a small hardware device, which acts as a third-party entity that takes over these buses. It does so by driving more current so it can override any legitimate transmissions with its own. This approach allows the device to covertly transmit new instructions to the flight management computer while suppressing indications that changes have been made.

Using their proof-of-concept demonstration, the researchers showed that their implant could  re-route a plane in flight or modify data about weight, balance and temperature, which could lead to an unsafe takeoff.  While pilots could override such changes, it would require that they detect that a compromise had occurred.

“We believe we have made a strong case that time-limited physical access (e.g., 60 seconds) represents a realistic goal for a motivated attacker and that the consequences of even such short access can be significant (and hence worthy of attention),” the researchers write.   

Design and Implementation of a Physical Implant Attack on the Boeing 737

San Crow, Pat Pannuto, Stefan Savage and Aaron Schulman, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of California San Diego Jacobs School of Engineering

Patrick Mercier, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California San Diego Jacobs School of Engineering

Stephen Checkoway, Oberlin College 



Picture of the device used in the take over 

The researchers designed, built and programmed a small hardware device, which acts as a third-party entity that takes over two key computers on a 737 aircraft. 

The custom-made hardware device plugged into a connector (center) acts as a third party that takes over between the communications from key computers in the cockpit (left) and the flight management computer (right). 

Aaron Schulman, a UC San Diego cybersecurity expert and computer science faculty member, interacts with one of the computers targeted by the attack the researchers developed. 

Credit

Erik Jepsen/University of California San Diego