The US-Saudi Nuclear Deal: Abandoning The Gold Standard – Analysis

US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman meet in Riyadh. (SPA)

September 2, 2026

Published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute

By Michael Duitsman

Key Takeaways:

Energy Secretary Wright signed a U.S.–Saudi 123 nuclear-cooperation deal on July 22 that, reports say, drops the 2009 UAE-style “Gold Standard” ban on enrichment and reprocessing and does not require an IAEA Additional Protocol—despite MBS’s public “if Iran, then we” line.

The pact (not yet before Congress; Trump has mixed messages on enrichment vs. Abraham Accords) includes a two-year enrichment-viability study and possible U.S. reactor buys; the author says that weakens other 123 no-enrichment pledges.

U.S. industry cannot readily deliver: large vessels and steam generators for recent U.S. plants came from Korea and Italy; commercial enrichment is Urenco/European centrifuges, with Centrus, BWX DEUCE, and General Matter still thin—so Riyadh may still shop Russia or China.

(FPRI) — Donald Trump is famous for his love of gold. His agreement with Saudi Arabia, however, has undermined the so-called “Gold Standard” for nuclear nonproliferation: the American insistence, for more than a decade, that countries that reach agreements with Washington for nuclear cooperation forgo domestic uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing. While these technologies are important parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, they are also critical for the development of nuclear weapons.

On July 22, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright signed the 123 Agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Required under Section 123 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the agreement outlines the types of nuclear cooperation expected between the two countries as well as the security measures and safeguards that Saudi Arabia must apply to any nuclear technology and material it receives from the United States.

The agreement reached by the Trump administration deviates from the established norms of American nonproliferation policy in ways that significantly undermine decades of previous work. Even worse, American industry is ill-equipped to deliver the uranium enrichment technology that Saudi Arabia wants, meaning these diplomatic concessions could produce very little economic benefit.

Negotiations for a Saudi 123 Agreement lasted for more than a decade before making significant progress during the Biden administration and reaching a final agreement this year. While the terms of the agreement are not public yet, they reportedly include a two-year study to determine commercial viability of uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia and a possible commitment to purchase American nuclear reactors. The negotiations were historically held up by Saudi objections to restrictions on its right to enrich uranium and Riyadh’s refusal to adopt the so-called “Gold Standard.” This standard was formalized in 2009 in the US-UAE 123 Agreement, in which the UAE agreed to forgo any future uranium enrichment or spent-fuel reprocessing in return for US nuclear assistance. The United States has since sought to incorporate similar requirements into its agreements with other countries, with varying levels of success. While the UAE commitment to not pursue enrichment is legally binding, Vietnam’s 123 Agreement renounces enrichment only in the preamble, which is not legally binding. Vietnam is only legally bound to not enrich material received under the US agreement.


The administration’s ultimate concession to Saudi Arabia on this issue raises significant proliferation concerns. Not only does it open the door for Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium with US approval, it also calls into question the durability of other countries’ agreements to forgo enrichment as part of their 123 Agreements. The US-Saudi agreement has not yet been submitted to Congress for review, the final major hurdle before the agreement enters into force. Developments after the agreement was announced have also raised questions about its viability, with members of Congress questioning its timing and contents, while President Trump has demanded that Saudi Arabia join the Abraham Accords and claimed that uranium enrichment is not included. Nonetheless, the agreement’s reported contents are worth considering, both for how it reflects on nuclear safeguards and what it means for US industrial capacity.

Safeguards and Standards

International nuclear safeguards are, with few exceptions, the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Traditionally, the application of safeguards in an IAEA member state is governed by a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement as outlined in IAEA Information Circular 153 (INFCIRC/153).

The findings in Iraq following the Gulf War in the 1990s underscored the need for reform. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein presided over an admittedly unsuccessful nuclear weapons program that used suboptimal uranium enrichment technologies and undeclared facilities to successfully evade IAEA safeguards. These circumstances demonstrated that the provisions of INFCIRC/153 were insufficient for safeguards inspectors to detect illicit activity in a country determined to develop nuclear weapons. This oversight led to the creation of the Additional Protocol, outlined in INFCIRC/540.


The Additional Protocol is intended to provide IAEA safeguards inspectors with the tools necessary to verify that a country is not engaged in the diversion or weaponization of nuclear material and technology. Since the approval of INFCIRC/540 in 1997, almost all IAEA member states have ratified the Additional Protocol, and its ratification has been a provision of most recent 123 Agreements.

It is thus peculiar that the US-Saudi Arabia 123 Agreement not only does not require the ratification of the Additional Protocol, but also contains provisions allowing Saudi Arabia to acquire uranium enrichment capabilities. In line with long-standing American nuclear nonproliferation goals, US policymakers have historically sought to minimize the spread of uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing technology.

Given Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s stated willingness to respond in kind to any Iranian development of nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia arguably constitutes a significant proliferation risk, and any transfer of nuclear technology or equipment should require the strongest possible safeguards. The decision to consider Saudi uranium enrichment without requiring ratification of the Additional Protocol is thus perplexing.

Checks US Industry Can’t Cash

All of this, however, overlooks a bigger issue: the United States is in no position to deliver what Saudi Arabia wants. While Westinghouse and GE in the United States design reactors, they do not actually manufacture many of the parts. Some of the most important reactor components require specialized manufacturing capabilities that don’t exist domestically. For example, Plant Vogtle units 3 and 4, the most recent power reactors to enter service in the US, use reactor vessels and steam generators made in South Korea and pressurizers made in Italy. The lead times between initial contract and final receipt of these enormous components are often measured in years. The growing small modular reactor (SMR) industry in the US may offer some respite, as domestic manufacturers may be able to produce the smaller reactor vessels and other systems used for SMRs. American manufacturers do produce turbines for generating electricity, but these are, again, long-lead-time items with few manufacturers. Nuclear reactors in particular require different high-pressure turbines than those used in normal fossil fuel plants.

The enrichment situation is even more woeful. The primary uranium enrichment facility operating in the US is part of Urenco, a European company, and uses European centrifuge technology. Centrus, a descendant of the privatized US Enrichment Corporation, has centrifuge manufacturing capabilities, operates a demonstration cascade, and is planning to expand, but has limited commercial operational experience. BWXis working with Oak Ridge National Laboratory to scale up the DEUCE centrifuge for defense purposes, but is only just beginning to build manufacturing capacity. Peter Thiel-backed General Matter intends to enrich uranium and produce nuclear fuel, but it’s unclear whether the company has built anything.

Conclusion

The US nuclear industry has struggled for relevance and profitability in the twenty-first century. Nuclear renaissances have repeatedly failed to materialize. The Saudi 123 Agreement, however, does not offer any respite, as US industry is not prepared to supply what Saudi Arabia wants. If Saudi Arabia seeks uranium enrichment capabilities in the near term, they are more likely to turn to cooperation with Russia or China, much as they did when they bought a ballistic missile development and production facility from the Chinese. Instead of a boon to US nuclear industry and diplomacy, Saudi Arabia’s 123 Agreement is a black mark, endangering decades of US nonproliferation policy and diplomatic efforts.

About the author: Michael Duitsman is a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and an expert on open source techniques and weapons technology.

Source: This article was published by FPRI


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