Burger money: what the world’s biggest economies can really buy with a Big Mac

There is a long running debate of the best way to compare the value of emerging markets' economies with the developed world: nominal GDP in dollars, or the price adjusted PPP version. What if you just valued them in burgers and looked at what your could buy with a wallet full of Big Macs? / bne IntelliNews

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By Ben Aris in Berlin September 26, 2026

This month the Big Mac index turns 40. The Economist launched it in September 1986 as a joke with a serious point: if a burger costs $6.22 in New York and the equivalent of $2.45 in Mumbai, then either the rupee is badly undervalued or the dollar measures something other than what people can actually afford. Four decades on, the burger has become the most famous shorthand for purchasing power parity (PPP), the economists’ attempt to compare living standards once you strip out the distortions of market exchange rates.

IntelliNews has taken the joke one step further. Imagine that dollars, euros and rubles did not exist and that everyone was paid, taxed and priced in Big Macs. A country’s GDP would be counted in burgers. Wages would be counted in burgers. A kilogram of potatoes, an iPhone and a new Lada would all carry a burger price tag. What would the world economy look like?

The answer is that the burger turns the rankings upside down, and then halfway back again. Anything grown and sold locally, such as rice, potatoes and a flat in town, is cheap in burger money in the poorer countries, so an Indian or Egyptian household looks far better off than its dollar income suggests. Anything that trades at a world price, such as an iPhone or an imported car, costs the same in dollars everywhere, so in burger money it is ruinously expensive exactly where people are poorest. Burger money flatters you at the market stall and humiliates you at the Apple store.

Two ways to count the world economy

Start with the conventional numbers. The IMF’s April 2026 World Economic Outlook ranks economies two ways. Nominal GDP converts local output into dollars at market exchange rates. GDP at PPP adjusts for the fact that a dollar goes much further in Delhi than in Dallas. The two lists overlap heavily, but the order changes a lot. China is already the biggest economy in the world at PPP, at $44.3 trillion against America’s $32.4 trillion. India jumps from sixth to third. Russia rises from ninth to fourth, ahead of Japan and Germany, while Indonesia and Turkey, 17th and 16th in dollars, break into the PPP top 15.

The last column of Table 1 is the key to what follows. It shows how much further a dollar’s worth of local currency stretches at home, according to the IMF. In the US it is 1.0 by definition. In Egypt it is 6.0 and in India 4.6: a dollar changed into Egyptian pounds buys six times as much in Cairo as it does in Cleveland.

Table 1. Nominal v PPP GDP, 2026 estimates

Country	Nominal GDP $bn	Rank	PPP GDP $bn	Rank	GDP/head $	PPP GDP/head $	PPP / nominal
US	32,384	1	32,384	2	94,430	94,430	1.00
China	20,852	2	44,295	1	14,874	31,596	2.12
Germany	5,453	3	6,408	6	65,303	76,747	1.18
Japan	4,379	4	7,262	5	35,703	59,207	1.66
UK	4,265	5	4,721	10	61,056	67,585	1.11
India	4,153	6	18,902	3	2,813	12,801	4.55
France	3,596	7	4,734	9	52,083	68,567	1.32
Italy	2,738	8	3,872	12	46,505	65,761	1.41
Russia	2,656	9	7,525	4	18,525	52,479	2.83
Brazil	2,636	10	5,230	8	12,313	24,428	1.98
Canada	2,507	11	2,911	16	60,305	70,006	1.16
Australia	2,124	12	2,099	22	75,648	74,755	0.99
Mexico	2,121	13	3,582	13	15,779	26,643	1.69
Spain	2,091	14	2,978	15	41,563	59,187	1.42
South Korea	1,931	15	3,541	14	37,412	68,624	1.83
Turkey	1,640	16	4,025	11	19,018	46,672	2.45
Indonesia	1,540	17	5,449	7	5,362	18,973	3.54
Saudi Arabia	1,389	19	2,895	17	37,811	78,815	2.08
Egypt	430	>25	2,567	18	3,904	23,321	5.97
Nigeria	377	>25	2,424	19	1,556	9,994	6.42
Poland	1,134	21	2,164	21	31,336	59,792	1.91

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2026 (2026 estimates). The countries are the union of the top 15 by nominal GDP and the top 15 at PPP, plus Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Nigeria and Poland, the next largest at PPP.

The burger exchange rate

The Big Mac index turns a burger into an exchange rate. Divide the local price by the American price and you get the “burger rate”, the exchange rate at which a Big Mac would cost the same everywhere. In July 2026 a Big Mac cost CNY26.50 in China and $6.22 in the US, which implies a burger rate of CNY4.26 to the dollar. The market rate this year has averaged CNY6.82, so by burger logic the yuan is 38% undervalued.

Table 2 applies the same arithmetic to every country and compares the burger rate with the average market rate so far in 2026. It also shows how far each currency has moved against the dollar since January 2, because the answer depends heavily on the day you ask. The euro countries are priced separately, using the national prices in The Economist’s source data rather than the euro-area average of EUR6.19, which is why Germany at EUR6.99 looks much more overvalued than France at EUR5.60.

Two countries need special handling. McDonald’s left Russia in 2022 and The Economist dropped it from the index; we use the RUB221 Big Hit sold by its successor, Vkusno i Tochka. India has never sold a beef Big Mac, so the index uses the chicken Maharaja Mac. Nigeria has no McDonald’s at all and drops out of the burger tables.

Table 2. The burger exchange rate v the market, 2026

Country	Big Mac, local	Burger rate (local per $)	2026 avg market rate	Currency v $, Jan 2-Sep 25	Over(+)/under(-) valued at 2026 avg	Range over 2026
US	$6.22	1.00	1.00	+0.0%	+0.0%	-
China	CNY26.50	4.26	6.82	+4.2%	-37.6%	-39% to -36%
Germany	EUR6.99	1.12	0.86	-2.9%	+30.5%	+28% to +35%
Japan	JPY500	80.39	159	-0.3%	-49.3%	-51% to -47%
UK	GBP5.49	0.88	0.74	-1.6%	+18.7%	+16% to +22%
India	INR236	37.98	93.93	-6.1%	-59.6%	-61% to -58%
France	EUR5.60	0.90	0.86	-2.9%	+4.6%	+2% to +8%
Italy	EUR6.56	1.05	0.86	-2.9%	+22.5%	+20% to +27%
Russia	RUB221	35.53	78.27	-4.7%	-54.6%	-59% to -50%
Brazil	BRL23.90	3.84	5.15	+4.7%	-25.5%	-30% to -22%
Canada	CAD8.17	1.31	1.39	-2.9%	-5.2%	-8% to -3%
Australia	AUD8.50	1.37	1.42	+5.0%	-3.9%	-9% to -1%
Mexico	MXN109	17.52	17.40	+1.2%	+0.7%	-3% to +4%
Spain	EUR5.90	0.95	0.86	-2.9%	+10.2%	+8% to +14%
South Korea	KRW5,700	916	1,463	+5.6%	-37.4%	-41% to -32%
Turkey	TRY325	52.25	45.69	-12.1%	+14.4%	+7% to +22%
Indonesia	IDR43,000	6,913	17,421	-6.8%	-60.3%	-62% to -59%
Saudi Arabia	SAR19.00	3.05	3.75	+0.0%	-18.5%	-19% to -19%
Egypt	EGP145	23.31	50.56	-8.0%	-53.9%	-57% to -50%
Poland	PLN23.50	3.78	3.68	-6.5%	+2.8%	-2% to +8%

Source: The Economist Big Mac index, July 2026 (national euro-area prices from its source file); Russia: Vkusno i Tochka Big Hit; India: Maharaja Mac. Exchange rates: exchange-rates.org daily data to September 25, 2026. The range shows the valuation at the currency’s weakest and strongest 2026 rates. bne IntelliNews calculations.

Chart 1. Most currencies have moved 5-10% against the dollar this year; the ruble swung 23% between its May high and its September low.

How much the exchange rate matters

Currency swings are exactly the noise burger money is designed to remove, and 2026 has been a noisy year. The Turkish lira has lost 12% against the dollar since January. The rupee, the rupiah, the zloty and the Egyptian pound have each lost 6-8%. The won, the Australian dollar, the real and the yuan have gained 4-6%. The ruble has been the most volatile: it strengthened to RUB70.85 per dollar in late May and then slid to RUB87.30 by early September, a 23% swing inside four months.

In dollar terms those swings reorder the league table without a single extra tonne of steel being made. At the exchange rates of January 2, India’s 2026 GDP comes to $4.33 trillion, putting it fifth, ahead of the UK. At September’s rates it is $4.07 trillion and back in sixth. Russia was ninth at January rates but has slipped to tenth behind Brazil, whose real has strengthened. At the ruble’s May peak Russia would have been the world’s eighth-largest economy, ahead of Italy, at $2.94 trillion. At its September low it would have been 11th, behind Canada, at $2.38 trillion. The same Russian economy was worth $550bn more or less depending on the week. Spain dropped from 12th to 15th between January and September, while Australia climbed from 14th to 12th. Turkey’s dollar GDP shrank by $210bn with no change in real output.

The burger ranking does not move at all when currencies move, because it never touches an exchange rate: local GDP is divided by the local price of a local burger. What does move it is the burger price itself. Between the January and July 2026 editions the US Big Mac rose from $6.12 to $6.22, and Turkish burger prices have risen 23-fold since 2020. Inflation can distort burger money; currency speculation cannot. That is its great virtue. Its weakness, discussed below, is that a burger is not a basket.

Table 3. How the exchange rate reorders the league table

Country	Nominal GDP at Jan 2 FX, $bn	Rank	At Sep 25 FX, $bn	Rank	At weakest 2026 FX	At strongest 2026 FX	Burger GDP rank (FX-proof)
US	32,384	1	32,384	1	32,384	32,384	2
China	20,346	2	21,197	2	20,336	21,253	1
Germany	5,505	3	5,348	3	5,331	5,643	6
Japan	4,428	4	4,414	4	4,238	4,550	4
UK	4,271	6	4,203	5	4,174	4,383	8
India	4,334	5	4,071	6	4,027	4,341	3
France	3,631	7	3,527	7	3,516	3,721	10
Italy	2,764	8	2,686	8	2,677	2,834	13
Russia	2,584	9	2,464	10	2,382	2,935	5
Brazil	2,505	11	2,622	9	2,461	2,768	9
Canada	2,528	10	2,456	11	2,440	2,574	12
Australia	2,021	14	2,123	12	2,015	2,192	14
Mexico	2,061	13	2,086	13	2,036	2,185	15
Spain	2,111	12	2,051	15	2,045	2,164	16
South Korea	1,959	15	2,068	14	1,812	2,109	11
Turkey	1,741	16	1,531	16	1,531	1,744	18
Indonesia	1,606	17	1,497	17	1,465	1,609	7
Saudi Arabia	1,389	18	1,389	18	1,389	1,389	17
Egypt	455	20	419	20	397	465	20
Nigeria	360	21	388	21	357	391	-
Poland	1,161	19	1,086	19	1,082	1,194	19

Local-currency GDP is taken as the IMF dollar estimate converted at the 2026 year-to-date average rate, then reconverted at each date. Ranks are within these 21 countries. Source: IMF WEO April 2026; exchange-rates.org; bne IntelliNews calculations.

The world economy in burgers

Now convert every economy into burgers. Divide each country’s local-currency GDP by its local Big Mac price and multiply by the American price, so that the result reads in “burger dollars”. Chart 2 and Table 4 show the result.

China edges past the US to become the biggest burger economy in the world, at $33.4 trillion of burger dollars against $32.4 trillion. India comes third at $10.3 trillion. Japan is the big mover: its Big Mac costs just JPY500, half the American price at market rates, the cheapest burger in the rich world, so Japan’s burger GDP of $8.6 trillion is almost double its dollar GDP and more than the IMF’s PPP estimate. Russia rises to fifth. Germany falls to sixth and shrinks: its EUR6.99 Big Mac is 30% dearer than an American one, so in burger money Germany’s economy is smaller than in dollars. Turkey is the most striking case. At TRY325 its Big Mac costs more than an American one, so burger money gives Turkey no PPP bonus at all, although the IMF says a dollar goes 2.5 times further there.

The burger is a half-hearted version of PPP. For rich countries it tracks the IMF numbers closely. For poor countries it captures only part of the gap. By the IMF’s reckoning a dollar goes six times as far in Egypt; by burger reckoning barely twice as far. The reason is that in Cairo, Jakarta or Mumbai a Big Mac is not a cheap everyday meal but a modest middle-class treat, priced for air-conditioned malls and paid for partly in imported beef, buns and franchise fees. The burger is too expensive to be a fair yardstick for the poorest.

In burgers per person the gap between rich and poor narrows but does not close. The average American’s share of national output is worth 15,182 Big Macs a year, or 42 a day. An Indian’s share buys 1,118 a year, barely three a day; an Egyptian’s 1,361. A Russian’s share of national output, 6,561 burgers a year, puts Russia level with Italy and Spain in burger money, where in dollars it sits alongside Mexico and China.

Table 4. GDP in burger money, 2026

Country	Nominal GDP $bn	Rank	Burger GDP, burger $bn	Rank	IMF PPP GDP $bn	Rank	Big Macs per head per year	Per day
China	20,852	2	33,400	1	44,295	1	3,830	10.5
US	32,384	1	32,384	2	32,384	2	15,182	41.6
India	4,153	6	10,271	3	18,902	3	1,118	3.1
Japan	4,379	4	8,637	4	7,262	5	11,321	31.0
Russia	2,656	9	5,852	5	7,525	4	6,561	18.0
Germany	5,453	3	4,178	6	6,408	6	8,044	22.0
Indonesia	1,540	17	3,880	7	5,449	7	2,172	6.0
UK	4,265	5	3,593	8	4,721	10	8,269	22.7
Brazil	2,636	10	3,536	9	5,230	8	2,655	7.3
France	3,596	7	3,439	10	4,734	9	8,008	21.9
South Korea	1,931	15	3,083	11	3,541	14	9,603	26.3
Canada	2,507	11	2,644	12	2,911	16	10,223	28.0
Italy	2,738	8	2,235	13	3,872	12	6,104	16.7
Australia	2,124	12	2,209	14	2,099	22	12,650	34.7
Mexico	2,121	13	2,105	15	3,582	13	2,518	6.9
Spain	2,091	14	1,898	16	2,978	15	6,065	16.6
Saudi Arabia	1,389	19	1,705	17	2,895	17	7,463	20.4
Turkey	1,640	16	1,434	18	4,025	11	2,673	7.3
Poland	1,134	21	1,104	19	2,164	21	4,902	13.4
Egypt	430	>25	932	20	2,567	18	1,361	3.7

Burger GDP = local-currency GDP / local Big Mac price x US Big Mac price ($6.22). Nominal and PPP ranks are global IMF ranks. Source: IMF WEO April 2026; The Economist Big Mac index, July 2026; bne IntelliNews calculations.

Chart 2. Burger money pulls the emerging markets up towards their IMF PPP values, but only part of the way.

Who wants to be a burger millionaire?

Being a millionaire means very different things in different currencies. Table 5 shows how many Big Macs a local-currency millionaire can buy, and how many an American dollar millionaire could buy after changing the money at today’s exchange rate.

A dollar millionaire can buy 160,772 Big Macs at home. A British pound millionaire does better, with 182,149, and a euro millionaire in France 178,571. A ruble millionaire, by contrast, can afford 4,525 Big Hits, a yen millionaire 2,000 burgers and a won millionaire only 175. In Indonesia almost everyone is a millionaire: a million rupiah buys 23 Big Macs, enough for a month of lunches but hardly a fortune.

The more interesting column is the last one. Take $1mn to Jakarta and change it into rupiah, and you can buy 416,605 Big Macs, two and a half times as many as at home. The same million buys 405,578 burgers in India and 381,842 Big Hits in Russia. That is the burger version of an undervalued currency: an arbitrage opportunity for anyone paid in dollars and eating in rupiah. Only in the UK, the euro countries and Turkey does the dollar millionaire lose out, because their burgers are dearer than America’s.

Table 5. How many Big Macs can a millionaire buy?

Country	Currency	Big Macs for 1mn in local currency	Big Macs for $1mn changed at Sep 25 rate	v a dollarmnaire at home
Indonesia	IDR	23	416,605	2.59x
India	INR	4,233	405,578	2.52x
Russia	RUB	4,525	381,842	2.38x
Egypt	EGP	6,897	357,528	2.22x
Japan	JPY	2,000	314,590	1.96x
China	CNY	37,736	253,328	1.58x
South Korea	KRW	175	239,637	1.49x
Brazil	BRL	41,841	216,787	1.35x
Saudi Arabia	SAR	52,632	197,368	1.23x
Canada	CAD	122,399	173,097	1.08x
Australia	AUD	117,647	167,282	1.04x
Poland	PLN	42,553	163,374	1.02x
Mexico	MXN	9,174	162,239	1.01x
US	$	160,772	160,772	1.00x
France	EUR	178,571	156,757	0.98x
Turkey	TRY	3,077	150,592	0.94x
Spain	EUR	169,492	148,786	0.93x
UK	GBP	182,149	137,432	0.85x
Italy	EUR	152,439	133,817	0.83x
Germany	EUR	143,062	125,585	0.78x

Source: The Economist Big Mac index, July 2026 local prices (Russia: Big Hit RUB221); exchange-rates.org, September 25, 2026; bne IntelliNews calculations.

The burger shopping basket

So, what can you buy with your burger money? We priced three staples in every country: 10kg of sugar, 10kg of potatoes and 10kg of rice. The thinking was that potatoes and rice are grown locally and so should be cheap in poorer countries, while sugar is an internationally traded commodity with a roughly common world price, and so should be relatively expensive wherever wages are low.

The data broadly bear this out, with some surprises. In dollars the retail price of a kilogram of sugar varies about fourfold across our 20 countries, from $0.68 in India to $2.71 in Japan. Potatoes vary elevenfold, from $0.40 in India to $4.40 in South Korea, and rice nearly eightfold, from $0.73 in India to $5.60 in Japan. The more local the product, the wider the price range.

Translate into burgers and the pattern sharpens. In India 10kg of potatoes costs 1.6 Big Macs but 10kg of sugar costs 2.8, almost twice as much. In the US it is the other way round: potatoes cost 5.3 Big Macs and sugar 3.1. In Egypt potatoes cost 1.6 burgers and sugar 2.9. In Turkey 10kg of potatoes costs less than one Big Mac. The traded good costs relatively more where people are poor, and the home-grown food relatively less.

The most expensive basket in burger money is Japan’s, at 36 Big Macs, and almost half of that is rice. Japan protects its rice farmers with steep tariffs and suffered a rice shortage that roughly doubled prices in 2025; 10kg of rice costs 17.6 Big Macs there, against 2.7 in China and 3.0 in India. South Korea, another rice-protecting Asian economy with expensive farmland, comes second at 23.9 burgers.

The cheapest baskets are in Turkey (6.2 burgers), Poland (6.7), Egypt (7.2) and India (7.3). Russia, at 17.2 burgers, is slightly dearer than the US: its cheap Big Hit makes everything else look expensive, and 10kg of sugar costs 7.4 burgers, more than anywhere except Japan.

Table 6. The burger basket: what 10kg of staples costs in Big Macs

Country	Sugar $/kg	Potatoes $/kg	Rice $/kg	10kg sugar, Big Macs	10kg potatoes, Big Macs	10kg rice, Big Macs	Basket, Big Macs
Turkey	$1.02	$0.63	$2.49	1.5	0.9	3.7	6.2
Poland	$1.43	$0.98	$1.68	2.3	1.6	2.7	6.7
Egypt	$0.81	$0.44	$0.76	2.9	1.6	2.7	7.2
India	$0.68	$0.40	$0.73	2.8	1.6	3.0	7.3
Spain	$1.14	$2.09	$1.88	1.7	3.1	2.8	7.6
UK	$1.46	$2.02	$2.50	2.0	2.8	3.4	8.2
Brazil	$1.11	$1.33	$1.43	2.4	2.9	3.1	8.4
Germany	$1.14	$1.71	$4.06	1.4	2.1	5.1	8.7
Mexico	$1.88	$2.38	$2.05	3.1	3.9	3.3	10.3
Saudi Arabia	$1.25	$1.52	$2.49	2.5	3.0	4.9	10.4
France	$1.14	$2.59	$3.02	1.8	4.1	4.7	10.6
Italy	$2.28	$2.28	$3.40	3.0	3.0	4.5	10.6
China	$2.65	$0.84	$1.08	6.7	2.1	2.7	11.6
Australia	$1.26	$3.22	$2.60	2.1	5.4	4.4	11.8
Indonesia	$0.98	$1.45	$0.97	4.1	6.0	4.0	14.2
Canada	$1.20	$3.00	$4.08	2.1	5.2	7.1	14.3
US	$1.90	$3.30	$5.22	3.1	5.3	8.4	16.8
Russia	$1.95	$0.88	$1.68	7.4	3.4	6.4	17.2
South Korea	$1.81	$4.40	$3.83	4.3	10.5	9.1	23.9
Japan	$2.71	$3.12	$5.60	8.5	9.8	17.6	36.0

Source: Numbeo market prices, September 2026; sugar: GlobalProductPrices, January 2026; The Economist Big Mac index, July 2026; bne IntelliNews calculations. Dollar prices at late-September exchange rates.

Chart 3. Japan’s expensive rice makes its burger basket the dearest; Turkey’s cheap potatoes make its basket the cheapest.

The iPhone test: where burger money runs out

Imported manufactured goods are where the burger world becomes brutal. An iPhone 17 with 256GB of storage costs between $929, in the US after Apple raised the price by $100 on September 9, and about $2,044 in Turkey, where taxes and duties push the price up. That is barely a twofold range, narrower even than for sugar. Apple sets what is in effect a world price.

In burger money it is anything but uniform. An American pays 149 Big Macs for the phone and a German 157. An Indian pays 423 Big Macs, an Indonesian 413 and an Egyptian 534, three and a half times as many burgers as an American. Measured against the average monthly salary the gap is starker still: the iPhone costs a US worker a fifth of a month’s take-home pay, a Brazilian 2.7 months, an Indonesian 3.3 months and an Egyptian almost nine months. A Nigerian on the average net wage would have to work for more than 11 months.

Russia offers the exception that proves the rule. Apple left in 2022, but iPhones still arrive through “parallel imports” via Central Asia and the Gulf. The street price of about RUB55,000 ($652) is well below the US list price, because grey importers pay no Apple margin and little duty. Even so, the phone costs 249 Big Hits, two-thirds more burgers than in America.

Cars: the best-seller in burgers

Cars give the clearest split between what a country makes for itself and what it has to buy abroad. China’s best-selling car at retail in 2025 was the Wuling Hongguang Mini EV, a tiny electric runabout made in Liuzhou that costs CNY44,800. That is 1,691 Big Macs, the cheapest best-seller in burger money in our sample. China’s fourth-most popular car, the Tesla Model Y, costs 9,770 burgers, nearly six times as much. It is built in Shanghai, but its price is set with one eye on world markets. In South Korea the locally built Kia Sorento costs 6,281 Big Macs against 8,770 for the imported Model Y, which in May became the first import ever to top Korea’s monthly sales chart.

The world price shows up most clearly when the same car is sold in two countries. The Renault Clio is the best-selling car in both France and Turkey, and every one is built at the Oyak-Renault plant in Bursa. In France the new Clio starts at EUR19,900, or 3,554 Big Macs. In Turkey it starts at TRY1.83mn, which at the current rate is $37,400, some $14,700 more than in France, largely because of Turkey’s heavy special consumption tax on cars. That is 5,631 burgers: the Turks pay 60% more burgers for a car they make themselves.

The most expensive best-seller in burger money is Indonesia’s Toyota Kijang Innova, a family people-carrier built locally that costs IDR437.7mn, or 10,179 Big Macs. Russia’s Lada Granta, still the country’s most popular car, costs RUB771,000, or 3,489 Big Hits, cheaper in burger money than a Ford Puma in Britain (4,944) or an F-150 pickup in America (6,445). Mexico offers a twist: the Chinese-built Chevrolet Aveo, which overtook the locally made Nissan Versa as the country’s best-seller in March, costs 2,890 Big Macs against 3,513 for the Nissan. Chinese exports are now undercutting the local industry on price.

Table 7. Imports and cars in burger money

Country	iPhone 17 256GB, Big Macs	iPhone, months of avg net salary	Best-selling car 2025	Made	List price	Car, Big Macs
US	149	0.2	Ford F-Series pickup	local	$40,085	6,445
China	257	0.8	Wuling Hongguang Mini EV	local	CNY44,800	1,691
Germany	157	0.3	VW Golf	local	EUR29,835	4,268
Japan	320	0.4	Honda N-Box kei car	local	JPY1,768,800	3,538
UK	164	0.3	Ford Puma	imported	GBP27,145	4,944
India	423	2.1	Maruti Suzuki Dzire	local	INR630,600	2,669
France	200	0.4	Renault Clio 5	imported	EUR19,900	3,554
Italy	172	0.6	Fiat Panda/Pandina	local	EUR15,950	2,431
Russia	249	0.6	Lada Granta	local	RUB771,000	3,489
Brazil	347	2.7	Fiat Strada pickup	local	BRL111,990	4,686
Canada	167	0.3	Ford F-Series	imported from US	CAD55,485	6,791
Australia	182	0.2	Ford Ranger ute	imported	AUD49,230	5,792
Mexico	202	1.4	Nissan Versa	local	MXN382,900	3,513
Spain	188	0.6	Dacia Sandero	imported	EUR15,490	2,625
South Korea	254	0.4	Kia Sorento	local	KRW35,800,000	6,281
Turkey	308	1.7	Renault Clio	local	TRY1,830,000	5,631
Indonesia	413	3.3	Toyota Kijang Innova	local	IDR437,700,000	10,179
Saudi Arabia	226	0.5	Toyota Camry	imported	SAR106,950	5,629
Egypt	534	8.8	Nissan Sunny	reported locally assembled	EGP765,000	5,276
Poland	191	0.6	Toyota Corolla	imported	PLN114,100	4,855

Source: Apple country stores and retailers, August-September 2026 (Russia: parallel-import street price, June 2026); Numbeo average net salary, September 2026; best-selling-cars.com, bestsellingcarsblog.com, national associations and dealer list prices, 2026; bne IntelliNews calculations. Where made to be checked before publication for Brazil, Poland, Egypt and Canada.

Chart 4. The iPhone costs roughly the same in dollars everywhere, so in burger money it is dearest where burgers are cheapest.

Chart 5. Locally made cars are cheap in burger money; imports and cars priced for world markets are not.

Paid in burgers

The final test is the pay packet. Table 8 converts each country’s minimum wage and its average net salary into burgers per month, and adds two other everyday measures: the rent on a one-bedroom flat in a city centre and the number of litres of petrol one Big Mac would buy.

A worker on Australia’s national minimum wage earns 512 Big Macs a month, and a British worker on the national living wage 401. An American on the federal minimum of $7.25 an hour, unchanged since 2009, earns just 202, about the same as a Pole. At the bottom, the Indian national floor wage buys only 20 Big Macs a month, although most states set higher rates, and the Egyptian private-sector minimum 55. On the average take-home salary, an American can buy a Big Mac with 13 minutes’ work; a Chinese worker needs 33 minutes, a Russian 26, a Brazilian 81, an Indonesian 83 and an Egyptian nearly three hours.

Rent works the other way from the iPhone. Housing cannot be imported, so in burger money a city-centre flat is cheapest where incomes are lowest: 63 Big Macs a month in Egypt and 67 in India, against 302 in the US. Russia is the outlier again: at 258 Big Hits a month, a flat in a Russian city costs almost as many burgers as one in America. Petrol reflects subsidies more than anything: in Saudi Arabia a Big Mac buys 7.2 litres, in India just 2.0.

Table 8. Wages, rent and petrol in burger money

Country	Minimum wage, Big Macs/month	Avg net salary, Big Macs/month	Minutes of work per Big Mac	1-bed city-centre rent, Big Macs/month	Litres of petrol per Big Mac
US	202	792	13	302	5.4
Australia	512	763	14	300	4.1
Japan	389	749	14	211	2.5
South Korea	378	622	17	159	2.8
Canada	381	587	18	252	4.3
UK	401	522	20	209	3.3
France	333	494	21	158	2.7
Germany	345	478	22	132	3.3
Saudi Arabia	211	426	24	137	7.2
Russia	123	402	26	258	2.8
Spain	242	340	31	175	3.4
China	103	312	33	113	2.8
Poland	205	304	34	135	3.4
Italy	-	293	36	126	3.2
India	20	203	51	67	2.0
Turkey	102	184	57	103	4.5
Mexico	88	147	71	135	3.7
Brazil	68	129	81	94	3.3
Indonesia	133	125	83	140	2.8
Egypt	55	61	171	63	5.7

Minimum wages: Trading Economics, September 2026 (US federal; China: Shanghai; India: national floor level; Indonesia: Jakarta; Saudi Arabia: nationals only; Italy has no statutory minimum). Hourly rates converted at 173.3 hours a month (South Korea 209). Salary, rent and petrol: Numbeo, September 2026. Minutes of work assume 173.3 hours a month. bne IntelliNews calculations.

Russia’s borscht index

Russians have their own version of the burger test, and it predates McDonald’s departure. The borscht index tracks the cost of the “borscht set” of vegetables: beetroot, cabbage, potatoes, carrots and onions. It is compiled from Rosstat’s weekly price survey by retailers’ associations, brokers and the press, and IntelliNews has called it Russia’s answer to the Big Mac index. Unlike the burger, it is made entirely of local produce, so it measures the harvest and the cost of living rather than the currency.

We have covered it several times. In August 2021 our analysis found that the number of borscht portions an average Russian income could buy had fallen in the first half of the year in 64 of the country’s 85 regions. By February 2022 the index had doubled in five years, and packet sizes were shrinking. In December 2025 the cost of the Olivier salad, the other Russian New Year staple, was up 4% on the year. In January we reported that a strong 2025 harvest would bring borscht prices down.

It did, spectacularly, and then prices came back. A poor 2024 harvest drove the potato price up by 166.5% year on year by spring 2025, with onions up 87% and cabbage up 57%. Farmers responded by planting more, a good 2025 harvest followed, and by May 2026 the borscht set was 24.8% cheaper than a year earlier, with potatoes down 38.7% and cabbage down 37.3%. Potato producer prices fell by more than 60%. Burned by the collapse, farmers cut their plantings this spring, and by late August retail prices were rising again, potatoes and cabbage both up 35% year on year according to Rosstat. The potato harvest is forecast to be 11.5% smaller. It is a textbook “cobweb” cycle, and its swings have dwarfed consumer price inflation of under 5%.

The index is also seasonal. According to Rosstat the national average cost of a borscht set rose from RUB205 in December 2025 to RUB320 in June 2026, up 56% in six months as the stored harvest ran down, against annual inflation of 4.64%. In burger money that is a jump from 0.9 to 1.4 Big Hits. In Moscow the set cost RUB370; in remote Chukotka, where everything is flown in, RUB1,675, or 7.6 Big Hits.

Table 9. The borscht index: boom, bust and boom

Period	Borscht set	Source
2024 full year	Beef borscht set RUB90.5 per portion, +28%; chicken +31.6%	AKORT via Kommersant
Spring 2025	Potatoes +166.5% y/y, onions +87.2%, cabbage +56.8%, beets +11.9%	Rosstat via The Moscow Times
Dec 2025	Borscht set RUB205; Olivier salad for four RUB618 (Rosstat), +4% y/y	Rosstat; TASS
May 2026	Borscht set -24.8% y/y: potatoes -38.7%, cabbage -37.3%, onions -34.3%, beets -33.4%	Rusprodsoyuz via TASS
Jun 2026	Borscht set RUB320, +56% since December; Moscow RUB370; Chukotka RUB1,675	Rosstat via NeMoskva
Late Aug 2026	Potatoes and cabbage +35.3% y/y, onions +27.2%, beets +20.4%, carrots +17.7%	Rosstat via Kommersant

Methods differ: Rosstat national retail averages, retail-chain minimum prices (AKORT, Rusprodsoyuz) and producer prices are not strictly comparable.

Chart 6. The borscht vegetables went from falls of up to 39% in May to rises of up to 35% by late August.

What about China?

China has no single folk index to rival the borscht set, and we found no evidence of a recognised “jianbing index” or “malatang index”, despite the popularity of both street foods. What Chinese households, officials and economists actually watch is pork. Pork makes up about an eighth of the food basket and around 2.5% of headline CPI, and the “pig cycle” (zhu zhouqi) of overbreeding, price collapse, culling and shortage has driven food inflation for two decades, most violently after African swine fever wiped out much of the herd in 2018-19.

The latest numbers show how weak demand remains. In August 2026 headline CPI rose just 0.8% year on year, with pork down 11.8% while eggs rose 15%. The breeding-sow herd stood at 37.8mn head at the end of June, 6.5% smaller than a year earlier and close to the government’s 37.5mn benchmark, so traders expect hog prices to recover in the autumn.

For a real-time read on consumer sentiment, Chinese commentators have also used instant-noodle sales and the price of a cup of coffee. The “9.9 yuan coffee” war between Luckin and Cotti became a byword for consumption downgrade until both chains scaled back their discounts from February 1 this year under pressure from anti-monopoly regulators. In burger money, a Chinese Big Mac at CNY26.50 now costs about as much as two cups of discounted coffee.

Other ways to measure a currency

Table 10. The alternative indices

Index	What it measures	Latest
KFC index	Price of a KFC bucket in about 20 African countries, where McDonald’s is scarce	Sagaci Research; last edition found 2016: rand 48% undervalued
IKEA Billy index	Price of the same bookcase worldwide	September 2026: $57 in Japan, $79 in the US, $141 in Morocco
iPhone index	Apple’s price in dollars across about 50 countries	CommSec since 2007; see Table 7 for our 2026 update
Starbucks latte index	Price of a tall latte	April 2026 aggregator data: US $5.45, Switzerland $6.70, Brazil $2.12
Minutes of work	Working time on the average wage needed to buy a Big Mac	UBS, 2009: 12 minutes in Chicago, Toronto, Tokyo; over 2 hours in Nairobi. See Table 8
Borscht index	Cost of the Russian borscht vegetable set	See above

Is the Big Mac the right burger?

The Big Mac was chosen because it is the closest thing to an identical product sold almost everywhere. It is not a perfect yardstick, and its flaws explain most of our results. Most of what goes into a burger’s price is not beef and bread but rent, wages and local taxes, which are cheap in poor countries. That is why burgers cost less there, a pattern economists call the Balassa-Samuelson or Penn effect, and it means a cheap Big Mac does not by itself prove a currency is undervalued. The Economist has published a GDP-adjusted version of the index since 2011 to correct for this. On that measure the yuan is 24% undervalued rather than 37%, while the Turkish lira looks 39% overvalued rather than 11%.

Taxes and politics matter too. Russia’s Big Hit jumped from RUB165 to RUB180 overnight when VAT on restaurant food rose from 10% to 20% in October 2023, with no change in the ruble. McDonald’s positions itself as a premium brand in poor countries and a budget one in rich ones. And the burger simply is not available in Russia, Iran or Nigeria. A basket of staples, like the borscht set, measures real living costs better; a single burger measures them more memorably. Forty years on, that is still why the Big Mac wins.

Concern grows over Algeria's plans to end moratorium on death penalty

Algeria is moving towards ending its 33-year moratorium on executions, with proposed changes to the penal code now before the country's parliament. The new measures would provide for the death penalty for those convicted of abuses against children and arson. Human rights organisations have signed a petition against the move, saying it will not act as a deterrent.


Issued on: 24/09/2026 - RFI

A woman inspects her damaged house after it was burned down in a forest fire in Bordj T'har, a town and commune in Algeria's northeastern Jijel Province, 27 August. AFP - -

While Algeria has not carried out an execution since 1993, it has handed down the death sentence since that time, including in terror-related cases, but without carrying it out.

In 2023 more than 50 people were sentenced to death – some in absentia – over the lynching of a 38-year-old man who was falsely accused of starting deadly forest fires two years earlier.

Justice Minister Lotfi Boudjemaa presented the changes to a parliamentary committee on Monday, after President Abdelmadjid Tebboune called for tougher penalties following deadly wildfires in August.

These crimes "directly threaten security, public order, and social stability," Boudjemaa said.

Algeria struggled to tackle the fires, which swept through the northeast of the country and killed 12 people according to an official tally.

The second article of the law concerns crimes against children – specifically the perpetrators of kidnapping and acts of abuse or mutilation against minors.

Tebboune said those sentenced to death should be executed immediately after exhausting their right to appeal.

'Institutional responsibilities'

Aissa Rahmoune, secretary-general of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and president of the Collective for the Safeguarding of the Algerian League for Human Rights, told RFI the country is neglecting its responsibilities when it comes to the crimes behind the proposed changes to the penal code.

"There is the authorities' withdrawal from the moratorium signed in 1993, but also the fact that the Algerian regime is failing to shoulder its institutional responsibilities regarding the recent fires that caused loss of life and material damage."

The expanded death penalty would specifically target the instigators, planners, and perpetrators of acts of deliberate fire-starting.

Forest fires occur regularly in northern Algeria during the summer, but climate change is amplifying their impact by causing increasingly frequent droughts and intense heat. However, Tebboune alleged that there was "something criminal" about the blazes.

Human rights

Several human rights organisations signed an open letter this week calling on Algerian authorities to halt any legislative changes and maintain the moratorium on the death penalty – and move towards abolishing it altogether.

They point out that the death penalty has "never deterred arsonists from committing their crimes, and that, out of respect for the memory of those who perished in the fires, the perpetrators must indeed face the law to answer for their actions and make amends for the damage caused, including the loss of human life."

Earlier this month, human rights group Amnesty International also voiced its concern.

"Algeria's authorities must immediately abandon any plans to expand the scope of the death penalty or resume executions after more than three decades without carrying one out," it said in a statement.

It called for the country to impose an official moratorium "as a first step towards fully abolishing the death penalty".

According to data collected by Amnesty International, there were at least 273 people on death row in Algeria at the end of 2025.

The NGO recorded at least 2,707 executions in 2025 in 17 countries, a sharp increase of 78 percent from the 1,518 known executions in 2024.

(with AFP)

Nigeria faces world’s highest heat death toll as El Nino bears down on Sahel

Extreme heat generated by this year's El Nino is projected to cause up to 67,000 additional deaths across the Sahel over the next six months, with Nigeria facing the highest death toll of any country in the world.


Issued on: 24/09/2026 - RFI
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A boy carries drinking water for sale at a street market in Abuja, Nigeria. Scientists estimate Nigeria could face the world's highest heat-related death toll from the current El Nino. AP - Ben Curtis

The Climate Impact Lab, a research group based at the University of Chicago, predicts there will be 66,800 extra deaths across the Sahel, the dry belt along the southern edge of the Sahara, between September and February compared with a normal year.

Nigeria alone accounts for 31,400 of these, followed by Sudan with 17,500, Niger with 10,000 and Chad with 8,000.

Worldwide, around 239,000 more heat-related deaths are likely to be seen over the same six months. Counting from June, when the current El Nino began, the estimated global toll rises to 451,000 by the end of February.

“This is such a large number that it can be numbing, but it is made up of parents and children, grandparents and neighbours, people going to work, caring for families and living their lives,” said Michael Greenstone, a University of Chicago economist and co-founder of the Climate Impact Lab.


Emergency measures

The El Nino phenomenon is marked by unusually warm waters in the tropical Pacific and can disrupt weather around the world. This year's could become the strongest on record.

The projections cover deaths caused by extreme heat alone, but they come in addition to the death toll from droughts, wildfires and flooding linked to higher temperatures and shifting rainfall, said the report, which was published on Wednesday.

Some of the heaviest losses will come later in the six-month period. Nigeria could record 15,400 additional heat deaths between December and February – leaving more time to act.

Heat warnings, cooling centres, hydration stations and protection for outdoor workers are among measures that could help reduce the toll, the researchers found.

“This report allows decision-makers to see exactly where emergency actions can be taken now to save tens of thousands of lives in the coming months,” Greenstone said.

Some of these measures are already under way to protect communities.

“Increasing emergency response and better targeting our efforts can save many lives this year,” said Tamma Carleton, the lab's faculty head of research and an assistant professor at the University of California, Berkeley.

“But 20 years from now, once today's extreme temperatures become the new normal, we don't want to be in a constant state of emergency.”

The projections will be updated as El Nino develops, the lab added.

A call to action

The analysis has not yet been independently peer reviewed, although the methods behind it have.

Scientists calculated the projections using research into the relationship between temperature and deaths in more than 24,000 regions worldwide, combined with seasonal temperature forecasts.

The findings should be treated as a call to action rather than simply another warning about extreme heat, Abhiyant Tiwari, a heat expert at the Natural Resources Defence Council India who was not involved in the research, told the Associated Press.

“The real measure of our preparedness is not how many heat warnings we issue, but how effectively we protect people and reduce preventable deaths,” he said.

El Nino is forecast to last until the northern hemisphere spring of 2027, while heat-related deaths could remain high into June or July, researchers said.

France to send military to protect Saudi Arabia on Red Sea oil route

France will send troops and defence systems to Saudi Arabia to help protect the Red Sea port city of Yanbu, which is key for energy transport, French President Emmanuel Macron has said in a TV interview. He also denied a report by Spanish newspaper El Mundo that the US Central Intelligence Agency had warned European governments of possible Russian drone attacks from the Mediterranean.


Issued on: 25/09/2026 - RFI

"The situation is serious", President Emmanuel Macron said in an live interview on Thursday on the international situation. © LUDOVIC MARIN / AFP

"We are going to send military resources, that is to say, soldiers, radar systems and defence systems, to protect this site – not to get us involved in any conflicts, but to protect this site," Macron told TF1 and France 2 on Thursday in a wide-ranging primetime interview on the international situation.

Crude oil prices have surged recently as the main alternative route for Saudi oil exports through Yanbu has come under missile attacks from Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis.

Facing growing pressure at home over high fuel prices, Macron sought to reassure the French people that France has adequate gas and oil supplies as winter approaches.

He said Paris was actively working to ensure flows were not disrupted.


On the subject of a 90-day US ban on diesel exports, under consideration by the White House but which Washington denies, the president said it would be "catastrophic" both globally and for the US economy.

“I think all the experts around [President Donald Trump] and all the American refiners can only tell him the same thing: 'this decision would be a bad one – not just for the rest of the world, but for the US economy as well'," he said

No CIA warning

President Macron also talked about possible Russian attacks on French soil.

He denied a report in Spanish newspaper El Mundo that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had warned European governments about the threat of potential drone attacks from the Mediterranean.

"I can deny it. The CIA did not inform French services," he said.

Macron nonetheless said Russia is multiplying its hostile and criminal acts against European countries, and France could face strikes similar to the failed attack in Leipzig airport in August, which Germany has blamed on Russia.


Growing Russian threat

Macron gathered French party chiefs at the Elysée last week to brief them on the growing threat from Russia. He later said he had ordered his government to draw up a plan to protect critical infrastructure against drone and cyber attacks.

Macron said Moscow was seeking to intimidate Europe and break the continent's resolve in supporting Ukraine.

On Monday , rance's interior minister said the hybrid warfare threat being waged by Russia is "real and documented".

Russia says European allegations of hybrid attacks are baseless and the result of anti-Russian hysteria.

Macron's position on Russia was weakened this week after France persuaded EU members to get Russian-Uzbek metals tycoon Alisher Usmanov exempted from EU sanctions, citing national security concerns.

That prompted Azerbaijan to pardon a French national jailed for espionage.

What Washington’s Defense Pledge To Saudi Arabia Means As Houthi Attacks Intensify – Analysis

SWEET FUCK ALL!


September 25, 2026
Arab News
By Gabriele Malvisi

Key Takeaways:

Gulf Research Center chair Abdulaziz Sager tells Arab News that Rubio’s Wednesday pledge to honor the Nov. 2025 U.S.–Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement will be judged on kit, operational know-how, and intel—not an automatic U.S. fight on Riyadh’s behalf.

 Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Maliki: six ballistic missiles toward Taif and Yanbu intercepted Thursday; Houthis claimed strikes on Jazan sites without evidence.

Sager wants planning help, timely imagery, and treating Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb as one problem. Chatham House’s Neil Quilliam calls Rubio’s line a “sop”: reassurance without promising intervention if the waterways worsen. Tests he names: a major strike on energy/civilians, or a lasting Red Sea shipping campaign. 

CENTCOM’s Adm. Cooper (May): 6,000+ drones and 1,500+ ballistic missiles intercepted since the Feb. 28 war began; an Arab News tally had GCC states taking 83% of early Iranian missiles/drones vs. 17% at Israel.

Sept. 8–19: reported hits and intercepts from energy sites to Riyadh; East–West pipeline shut Sept. 11 (Saudi blame on Iraqi militias), restart reported this week. July civilian nuclear cooperation deal is background. Quilliam: “America First” and Gulf self-help.

From the perspective of Saudi Arabia, the value of Washington’s renewed defense assurances will lie in the support they deliver as Houthi attacks intensify, according to Abdulaziz Sager, founder and chairperson of the Gulf Research Center.

“For Riyadh, that support rests on three areas: military equipment, operational expertise and intelligence,” he told Arab News.

A partnership intended to strengthen deterrence is now being tested by attacks on Saudi territory and threats to the waterways on which regional trade depends. The immediate question, Sager said, was how Washington would put its commitments into practice.

On Thursday, the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen said Saudi air defenses had intercepted six ballistic missiles fired by the Houthis toward Taif and Yanbu. Damage or casualties were not immediately clear, Reuters reported.

“Escalations and violations by the terrorist Houthi militia will be dealt with firmly,” the coalition’s spokesperson, Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Maliki, said.

The Houthis separately claimed, without providing evidence, that they had used missiles and drones to attack military sites in Jazan.

The latest developments followed an assurance from US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday that Washington would honor its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia, and was closely monitoring the regional situation.


“We have a very strong defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, and we will live up to our commitments in that agreement,” Rubio said when asked whether President Donald Trump was prepared to take further action against the Houthis.

Rubio declined to specify what further military action Trump might take, while reiterating Washington’s commitments to Riyadh.

“The US has made commitments to them. We will live up to those commitments. We are living up to those commitments now,” he said, adding that Trump had “many options available” without specifying what they might be.

The distinction between practical defense assistance and direct US intervention is central to understanding that pledge, Sager said.

“Rubio’s remarks should be understood as a commitment to continue the defense support Saudi Arabia expects from the US, rather than a promise that American forces would fight on its behalf,” he explained.

The US-Saudi Strategic Defense Agreement, signed in November 2025, built on more than eight decades of defense cooperation. The White House described its aims as a strengthening of the partnership, and reinforced deterrence across the Middle East.

According to Sager, the immediate question was not whether Washington would honor the agreement, but how it would do so, particularly in terms of strengthening readiness and coordinating defense capabilities.

“Saudi Arabia would expect assistance with planning and identifying threats, alongside timely intelligence and satellite imagery to help it defend its territory and critical infrastructure,” he said.


“Rubio’s words offer reassurance on those practical forms of cooperation, but they leave open the question of whether Washington would take a direct military role if the crises in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea escalate.”

Neil Quilliam, an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, offered a slightly different reading of the scope of Washington’s assurances.

“Rubio’s remarks were essentially a sop to Riyadh, offering reassurance without removing the ambiguity that surrounds US support for Saudi Arabia,” he told Arab News.

“He reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to the 2025 defense agreement, but avoided any promise of automatic military intervention should the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea crises intensify.”

Those questions have become more pressing as the war with Iran increasingly places Gulf states under sustained security and economic pressure, despite their efforts to contain the conflict through diplomacy.

The scale of the pressure was apparent even early in the war. An Arab News analysis published on March 26 found that Gulf Cooperation Council member states had faced 83 percent of the Iranian missile and drone attacks tallied since the conflict began on Feb. 28, compared with 17 percent directed at Israel.

The defensive response has also been substantial. Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of US Central Command, told Congress in May that regional missile defenses had intercepted more than 6,000 attack drones and more than 1,500 ballistic missiles targeting US and partner forces, according to reporting on a subsequent Pentagon inspector general’s review.

Houthi attacks have intensified over the past month, targeting Saudi cities and energy infrastructure. On Sept. 8, a wave of strikes wounded 73 people and caused fires that halted operations at some energy facilities, Saudi authorities said.

The following day, the Coalition to Support Legitimacy in Yemen reported further ballistic missile and drone attacks on Abha, Khamis Mushayt and Jazan.

By Sept. 19, the escalation had reached Riyadh, with the coalition reporting it intercepted a ballistic missile aimed at the capital, and thwarted attacks on Yanbu, Taif, Baish and Farasan.

The expanding geographic reach of the attacks underscored the challenge of protecting population centers and critical infrastructure while also safeguarding the Kingdom’s Red Sea export route.

The pressure on energy infrastructure has come from more than one direction; Saudi Arabia attributed a drone attack that forced its East-West Pipeline to close on Sept. 11 to Iraqi militias. Reuters reported on Tuesday that pipeline operations had restarted, citing sources briefed on the matter.

The pipeline provides an alternative delivery route to the Red Sea for Saudi crude when passage through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted. Protection of that route therefore requires security for both the infrastructure that carries the oil and the shipping lanes used to export it.


Rubio did not directly address media reports of requests to Trump for US intervention, but described attacks on regional energy infrastructure as “very disturbing.” His remarks came as a Houthi military adviser told news agency Agence France-Presse that the group would target US interests in the region if Washington intervened in the conflict in Yemen.

Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and the escalation in the Red Sea have underscored how closely interconnected are the Gulf’s territorial security and economic interests. Attacks on energy facilities or shipping can affect regional revenues, international supply chains and global markets.

Sager said a key test of the US-Saudi defense agreement would be whether Washington treated Hormuz and Bab Al-Mandab as parts of the same security challenge.

“If Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia or shipping near Bab Al-Mandab intensify while Washington remains focused primarily on Hormuz, Rubio’s pledge will come under scrutiny,” he said.

Quilliam said there were several scenarios that could test the US commitment.

“The most immediate test would be a major Iranian or Houthi strike that causes substantial damage to energy infrastructure or results in significant civilian casualties,” he said.

“A second scenario would be a sustained campaign against shipping in the Red Sea that disrupts Saudi exports and impacts global energy markets.”

He suggested that Washington might act before either scenario fully materialized, although Rubio had announced no such decision.

“The US appears to be preparing for another round of escalation against Iran and may use that opportunity to intensify military operations against the Houthis,” Quilliam said.

“Rubio’s remarks may therefore have been intended to reassure Riyadh ahead of a possible expansion of US military activity in the region.”

The security debate is unfolding alongside broader bilateral collaboration. In July, Washington and Riyadh signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement, providing a legal foundation for US participation in Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear energy program.

That expanding relationship provides context for Rubio’s assurances, but does not in itself define at what point Washington would commit forces to another military campaign. Quilliam said any such decision would be shaped by the administration’s approach.

“We should bear in mind that the Trump administration is focused on ‘America First’ and it will only intervene if to do so serves that interest,” he added.


According to Quilliam, Gulf “decision-makers have learned over the past decade — and even more so during the current Trump administration — that US policy is now unpredictable and poorly served by an overarching strategy, and so must plan for all eventualities and take regional security into its own hands and share the burden with regional partners.”

Sager said the most immediate measure of the partnership remains the practical support available to Saudi Arabia across the connected threats it faces.

“Riyadh would expect its defense partner to recognize the links between the threats and provide timely intelligence, equipment and operational support where they are needed,” he added.

“Protecting navigation in the Gulf while leaving the Red Sea exposed would address only part of the security challenge.”

The test, then, is how assurances from Washington translate into the capabilities Sager identified — and whether those capabilities help protect Saudi territory, critical infrastructure and access to both waterways.

America’s Arsenal: While Supplies Last

American imperial overstretch is coming home to roost in Saudi Arabia.

by Nolan Denaro | Sep 25, 2026

Smoke rose over Riyadh last week as Houthi forces launched strikes on the Saudi capital, as well as on crucial oil infrastructure in major coastal cities.

It has been a disastrous month for Saudi Arabia as Houthi forces have made substantial gains along the west coast of Yemen. The Yemeni group scored massive victories in early September, capturing the port city of Mocha along with other key islands in the Red Sea. This will allow the Houthis to more effectively restrict Saudi transit through the Bab Al-Mandeb strait, dealing a severe blow to the already battered global oil market.

The problems for Saudi Arabia don’t come solely from their south, however. Militia groups in Iraq have gotten involved, and they’ve begun launching missiles from Saudi Arabia’s north. Targets have included crucial oil infrastructure, most notably the East-West Pipeline – a crucial means of getting oil trapped in the Persian Gulf across the country to the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia is in a moment of serious peril. Pinched between militias from Yemen in the south and Iraq in the north, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has sought the assistance of President Donald Trump. MBS called Trump two times on September 10 urging him to take military action against the Houthis, a request Trump has refused thus far.

Mohammed bin Salman’s plea for help highlights a broader dynamic in his relationship with the U.S., one which places Saudi Arabia in the position of relying heavily on America for their military. This is not only true offensively for Saudi, but also defensively. Their ability to shoot down incoming missile fire is reliant on American-made defensive systems, such as Patriot interceptors. Their supply of these systems has been dramatically reduced in recent months due to the conflict in Iran.

With America being similarly low on crucial defensive systems, which are needed to protect U.S. bases, Saudi Arabia is now left unable to effectively defend key oil and military sites. Iran – which is aligned with the Yemeni and Iraqi militias in a coalition known as the Axis of Resistance – is able to watch as economic pressure builds on Saudi Arabia, and by extension the United States.

Conventional strategic thinking is being thrown into question due to this war. America’s military bases in the region have been a burden rather than an asset. They’ve served as easy targets for Iran to strike, helping them climb the escalation ladder at their own pace. The Gulf Arab nations – who were under the impression that these bases would deter Iranian attacks on their soil – are now reconsidering their close ties to the United States. The decision by these nations to become reliant on America for their defense is also being questioned. They’ve been battered by Iranian missiles and drones all throughout the conflict, and have been left largely defenseless due to the shortage of American-made interceptor systems.

America has served as the world’s arms salesman for decades. Our government has built up a long list of clients who rely on our country for their defense, as Patrick Buchanan pointed out in his book A Republic, Not an Empire. After going down a list of the many foreign entanglements Washington has roped us into, Buchanan pointed out that we have become, in effect, a global empire.

“Nothing can destroy this country except the overextension of our resources, Republican Senator Robert A. Taft once said. Indeed, it would be an understatement to describe the commitments above as an overextension of our resources. In their totality, they make the nineteenth-century British Empire look isolationist; truly, this is imperial overstretch.”

“Our situation is unsustainable. The steady expansion of global commitments, as relative national power declines, is a prescription for endless wars and eventual disaster.”

Buchanan’s decades-old assessment has been proven correct.

What has been made apparent by the shortage of defensive weapons is that we cannot maintain this posture of perpetually arming nations across the globe. Not only are we being tasked with ensuring the defense of nations in the Middle East amid the Iran war, but we also must protect our own troops – stationed at U.S. military bases – from incoming fire.

Of course, we must also supply Israel with the defensive systems necessary to strike at Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and elsewhere while enjoying protection guaranteed by the United States.

Escalation also continues in eastern Europe, as Ukraine’s provocative strikes on Moscow will undoubtedly lead to a Russian response. America will once again feel obligated to ensure Kyiv’s defense, not only by supplying them with weapons, but also intelligence assistance. In the Pacific, American weapons stationed in South Korea and Japan were relocated at the beginning of the Iran war due to the lack of defensive systems in the Middle East, further proving that American attempts to police the entire world are futile. The U.S. does not possess infinite resources.

American troops at bases across the Middle East have tragically been killed by Iranian strikes, as the military is forced to ration the remaining stockpile of defensive weapons. Just days into the war, America’s client-states in the Gulf were said to have depleted years worth of munitions. In the months of conflict that followed these dire reports, the effects of what Buchanan called “imperial overstretch” were being felt. Bases faced an onslaught of Iranian missiles and drones. Damage was so severe that many will likely not be returned to by the U.S. military. A chaotic withdrawal, of sorts.

The American regional order in the Middle East is collapsing in real time. In this period of chaos, there is the option to change course. Our leaders could realize the errors of their ways and bring the troops home.

This is not what Washington is known for, however.

My fear is that rather than acknowledge the failures of imperialism and chart a new path of restraint, the War Party will dig its heels in. The tendency of those at the helm of all failed government programs – especially war – is to blame every factor but themselves for the disaster. We often hear “if only we stayed longer,” or “we just needed more funds.” Many war hawks are more appalled at the act of leaving a war than they are at the decision to launch one unnecessarily. Take the neoconservative’s response to Biden’s Afghanistan withdrawal or Trump’s attempts to leave Syria, for example.

If every crisis is met with another new foreign commitment, this cycle of imperial overstretch will never end. Eventually, something has to give. We can only hope that somebody in power can recognize that the empire is decaying, accept this reality, and guide us back to a sane foreign policy with grace.

It would be delusional and reckless of me, however, to tell you that I am hopeful. Our leaders possess no such humility.

Nolan Denaro is a political analyst, writer, and host of “The Quest For Clarity” podcast, available on YouTube and Spotify. He is a columnist at Antiwar.com, and his work has been published by Responsible Statecraft, the Libertarian Institute, The Daily Caller, and the Ludwig von Mises Institute. He writes on U.S. foreign policy, economics, and current events, with a particular focus on war and imperialism. He maintains a personal Substack blog, and you can follow him on X @nolandenaro. Nolan can be reached for correspondence at nolansdenaro@icloud.com.