Monday, September 23, 2024

Georgian President attends funeral of murdered trans woman Kesaria Abramidze

23 September 2024

Left photo: Mindia Gabadze/Publika; right photo via Tabula.

Multiple Explosions Rock Industrial Town in Iran

September 23, 2024

Multiple explosions and a large fire have been reported at an industrial town in Iran's central Semnan province.

According to local officials and media reports, the incident, which happened on Monday afternoon, has prompted a response from emergency services.

Hossein Derakhshan, CEO of the Red Crescent Society of Semnan Province, confirmed to Iranian media that the explosions took place in one of the industrial and production units within the Fajr Garmsar Industrial Town.

Hamid Majidi, head of the Garmsar Red Crescent Society, reported that three explosions have occurred so far, with the fire's intensity described as high.

Majidi warned of the potential for further explosions, noting the presence of 12 oil condensate tanks at the factory site.

In response to the emergency, an operational team from the Red Crescent Society has been dispatched to the scene.

The rescue team from a nearby base was among the first responders sent to manage the situation.

The cause of the explosions and the full extent of the damage remain unclear.

Iran walls off part of border with Afghanistan: Media

TEHRAN

September 23 2024

Iran's military has built a wall along more than 10 kilometers (6 miles) of its eastern border with Afghanistan, the main entry point for immigrants, local media reported on Monday.

Haberin Devamı

"More than 10 kilometers of walls have been built on the border and another 50 kilometers are ready to be walled off," ISNA news agency said, citing General Nozar Nemati, deputy commander of army ground forces.

Iran shares a more than 900-kilometre (560-mile) border with Afghanistan, and the Islamic republic hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world.

This comprises mostly well-integrated Afghans who arrived over the past 40 years after fleeing conflict in their home country.

The flow of Afghan immigrants has increased since the Taliban took over in August 2021 after U.S. forces withdrew.

Tehran has not given official figures for the number of Afghan immigrants, but member of parliament Abolfazl Torabi has estimated their number at "between six and seven million".

The authorities have recently increased pressure on "illegal" refugees, regularly announcing expulsions through the eastern border.

"By blocking the border, we want to control the country's entries and exits" and "better increase the security of border areas", General Nemati said.

In September, Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni said Iran will employ other methods including barbed wire and water-filled ditches in addition to the wall to block the border.

On Sept. 13, the spokesman for the parliamentary National Security Committee, Ebrahim Rezaei, said police plan to "expel more than two million illegal citizens in the near future.”

According to the official IRNA news agency, Afghanis represent "more than 90 percent of foreign nationals" in Iran, and "most of them enter the country without identity papers.”

President Masoud Pezeshkian has said his government plans to "repatriate illegal nationals to their country in a respectful manner.”

In the year starting in March 2023 Iran hosted more than 2.7 million documented Afghan refugees, according to the Statistics Centre.

That figure represents 97 percent of legal migrants in the country.

11 months into the war, hunger persists for Palestinians in Gaza

Accusation of “starvation campaign”

The AP. All rights reserved.
By Rédaction Africanews

In a camp in Deir al-Balah, central Gaza Strip, adults and children rush to secure a meagre portion of food.

Since October 7, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and others have documented the destruction of the territory’s fsood system, including farmland and fishing.

“Life here is very difficult. We suffered in all aspects, from providing nylon, tents, water, and food. Today we get food from charity, which some days are not good. But were grateful to God our situation is better than others."

"Water is available for an hour and is cut off for an hour. A whole year of suffering, The suffering that only God knows about ”

In a war that has left many cashless, food donations are a lifeline.

However, Israel allows trucks of aid just through three crossings,including two small ones in the north of the enclave and one in the south, Kerem Shalom.

UN experts said in July that "famine had spread from northern Gaza to reach central and southern Gaza".

Accordign to Palestinian news agency Wafa, the Israeli operation in the territory has killed 41,431 Palestinians and wounded 95,818 others.

Months of cease-fire talks have failed to find common ground between the warring sides.

Accusation of “starvation campaign”

The U.N. independent investigator on the right to food accused Israel of carrying out a “starvation campaign” against Palestinians during the war in Gaza, an allegation that Israel vehemently denies.

In a report circulated on September 4, investigator Michael Fakhri said he found that it began two days after Hamas’ surprise attack in southern Israel that killed some 1,200 people, when Israel’s military offensive in response blocked all food, water, fuel and other supplies into Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said accusations of Israel limiting humanitarian aid were “outrageously false.”

Earlier this year, the Internationa lCourt of Justice ordered Israel to ensure "unhindered" food aid into Gaza.

Following intense international pressure Netanyahu’s government gradually has opened several border crossings for tightly controlled deliveries. Fakhri said limited aid initially went mostly to southern and central Gaza, not to the north where Israel had ordered Palestinians to go.

“By December, Palestinians in Gaza made up 80% of the people in the world experiencing famine or catastrophic hunger,” Fakhri said. “Never in post-war history had a population been made to go hungry so quickly and so completely as was the case for the 2.3 million Palestinians living in Gaza.”

The University professor claims it goes back to 1948 and Israel's continuous dislocation of Palestinians. Since then, he accused Israel of deploying “the full range of techniques of hunger and starvation against the Palestinians, perfecting the degree of control, suffering and death that it can cause through food systems.”

Additional sources • OCHA

Ruto settles with Odinga to quell unrest in Kenya

Over the summer, Kenya’s ‘Generation Z’ demonstrations against the government’s 2024 Finance Bill grew to encompass concerns about elite politics, corruption, and inequality. Operating without a recognizable figurehead and organizing online, the movement presented a significant challenge to the status quo. The protest movement scored a quick win when President William Ruto refused to sign the 2024 Finance Bill, sending it back to parliament on 26 June.1 Two weeks after that, he had dismissed all but one of his ministers.2 Through a combination of old-school elite bargaining, intimidation, and heavy-handed policing, President Ruto has broken the youth protest movement wave for now. Yet, these successes turned out to be short-lived. The debt crisis that the Finance Bill was supposed to address remains, and Kenya will likely need to borrow more just to maintain domestic and international debt repayments.3 At this stage, it is unclear whether popular discontent can be contained when public finances are under such strain.
Gen Z protests decrease

Youth demonstrations fell significantly in July and August. Demonstrations fell overall in July, notwithstanding demonstrations and street violence outbreaks on 2 and 16 July (see graph below). Events on 2 July were driven by dissatisfaction with the Finance Bill. By 16 July, the demonstrators’ concerns were more varied, encompassing corruption and lack of police accountability. Ruto’s cabinet reshuffling the previous week may have dampened protest.4 Following the withdrawal of the Finance Bill, that move likely diffused protestors’ concerns, contributing to a fall-off in events. The 16 July demonstrations occurred in 27 counties. The number of counties affected illustrates that, despite the initial crackdown, the movement retained some organizational capacity. Nevertheless, this was a contraction from 25 July, when 40 of Kenya’s 47 counties were affected. An attempted mobilization on 8 August — the day President Ruto swore in his new cabinet — was modest, with just nine events recorded in eight counties. Security forces successfully prevented protests planned across the country for that day by putting in place roadblocks and carrying out passenger checks outside main towns. In Nairobi, dozens of protestors at most turned out and were met with police force.5

Yet, nationwide mobilization declined only slightly. By August, demonstrations and protests organized by the Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers strike outnumbered Gen Z protests by almost 10 to one. The strike was quickly resolved.6 This indicated a return to politics as mediating the interests of well-defined, organized interest groups, something the youth protests had challenged.
Elite bargaining, cooption, and intimidation

President Ruto’s response to the youth demonstrations was to build a coalition of political elites, co-opt influential individuals and groups, and intimidate organizers and participants. Building a traditional political coalition meant reaching out to his principal opponent, Raila Odinga. Taxation’s impact on the cost of living has been the issue around which opposition to President Ruto has organized since early 2023. Odinga, who was defeated as leader of the Azimio la Umoja coalition by less than 2% of the vote in the August 2022 presidential election, claimed Ruto’s government was illegitimate in January 2023.7 By the end of that year, he had identified taxation and the cost of living as the key issues for Azimio la Umoja.8 Street demonstrations led by Azimio la Umoja featured in 2023, with demonstrations spiking in July 2023 in response to that year’s Finance Bill. The state response to the 2023 demonstrations was notably violent, and President Ruto made no significant political compromise. However, the debt crisis facing the government and its domestic and international lenders heightened the urgency for political stability in the face of the Gen Z demonstrations of 2024. For Odinga, this presented an opportunity to move his own political party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), to the center of the administration and to satisfy his own ambition to secure the chair of the African Union Commission (AUC).

In 2024, President Ruto’s first response to the demonstrations was to send the Finance Bill back to parliament on 26 June, following the storming of parliament the previous day. By 24 July, a newly nominated cabinet included John Mbadi as finance minister.9 Mbadi had been a member of parliament from Homa Bay county and is the chairman of Odinga’s ODM party. The decision to share power with political elites has been viewed as a cynical move by President Ruto.10 However, there were no significant protests in immediate response to the appointments.

Odinga had signaled his willingness to shore up President Ruto’s administration on 9 July, when he agreed to participate in a National Multi-Sectoral Dialogue Forum established by President Ruto to address the crisis.11 Furthermore, the installation of Mbadi as finance minister signaled that Odinga’s political weight was being put behind President Ruto. In return, in August, President Ruto ensured Odinga’s endorsement as the agreed East Africa region candidate for the position of chair of the AUC.12 Data suggest the demonstrations presented a threat to Raila Odinga as much as they did to President Ruto. Azimio la Umoja dominated the demonstrations in 2023. In July 2023, it was involved in almost all such events. However, in July 2024, it was entirely absent. In opposing President Ruto, the youth demonstrators also took Odinga’s political ground, challenging the traditional dominance of Kenya’s elite politics.

Policing protest — through excessive force against demonstrators and abductions — was a key element of the response to the demonstrations against the 2024 Finance Bill, followed by efforts to co-opt or otherwise intimidate opponents. Through June, July, and August, there was a steady stream of targeted abductions (see graph below). Of 27 abductions recorded by ACLED for June, July, and August, at least 19 were likely related to the protests and were likely undertaken by police. Most of these were on or around 25 June, the day the parliament was overrun. The abductions are currently being investigated by the Police Oversight Investigations Authority.13 In a case brought by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK), acting Inspector General of Police, Gilbert Masengele, has been found to be in contempt of court for not appearing to answer questions about the abductions of protestors, as ordered by the High Court on 23 August.14

On the morning of 25 June, the personal assistant to Faith Odhiambo, president of the LSK, was abducted. In the week before his abduction, the LSK had objected to police banning anti-tax protests.15 The LSK had emerged as a key player in the demonstrations, establishing a legal aid fund to support a network of lawyers it put in place to provide legal representation to arrested demonstrators and others targeted by the state during the unrest.16 Others targeted included social media influencers and people providing medical assistance to demonstrators.17

In July, President Ruto took a different approach and offered LSK’s Odhiambo a position on a proposed Presidential Task Force on Forensic Audit of Public Debt. Odhiambo refused the offer, arguing it would usurp the constitutional role of the Auditor-General.18

This suite of extra-legal and potentially extra-constitutional measures has slowed the Gen Z movement and the organizations that supported it. The cabinet’s dismissal and the Finance Bill’s withdrawal were quick wins, but maintaining such momentum was unlikely. Simply coordinating between the various organizations and individuals involved would be hard to maintain: the Police Reforms Working Group alone, which protested the initial disappearances in June, comprises at least 20 member organizations.19

A budget deficit means protests will re-emerge

The new taxes introduced in the original 2024 Finance Bill were a crude way of addressing the country’s debt crisis. Expenditure cutbacks introduced in the supplementary budget that replaced the act are not enough to stave off increased borrowing needed to pay off old debts.20 Protests by teachers and the related strike were mostly peaceful, and the dispute was resolved.21 However, as the budget deficit is likely to worsen in the coming year, President Ruto’s administration will have less fiscal space to meet such demands from other organized groups.22 Furthermore, he will have no room to improve expenditure on public services, which has been declining in recent years and fueled popular discontent with the Finance Bill this year.

The bargain between Odinga and President Ruto may turn out to be destabilizing. Not all members of the Azimio la Umoja coalition agreed with Odinga’s recent stance toward Ruto, and support was not universal within Odinga’s ODM party, either.23 If Odinga is successful in his AUC campaign, the arrangement may not hold. If unsuccessful, he may appear weakened on return and less capable of dealing with the divisions he left behind.

As the cost of living pressures remain, protests will remain a feature of Kenya’s political life. As for the youth movement, civil society organizations and individual leaders who were involved in the demonstrations will have learned much about organization, protest, and how to channel popular discontent. How this shapes political protest in the future remains to be seen.

In Iran, the old-time US radio detective 'Johnny Dollar' returns to the airwaves

“Yours Truly, Johnny Dollar,” a radio program created by CBS in 1949 that found a devoted listenership in Farsi, has returned to Iranian radio

By NASSER KARIMI Associated Press and JON GAMBRELL Associated Press
September 22, 2024,

TEHRAN, Iran -- While tensions remain high between the U.S. and Iran, there's at least one American that state radio in Tehran invites on the air each week for its millions of listeners. It's just that he's a fictional insurance fraud detective who's been on the case since 1949.

“Yours Truly, Johnny Dollar,” a radio program created by CBS that later found a devoted listenership in Iran for a Farsi-language version under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 1960s, has returned to Iranian radio.

It's not clear why exactly the network controlled by hard-liners have decided to bring back “the man with the action-packed expense account,” but his reappearance harkens back to an era when Iran and the U.S. enjoyed incredibly close relations.

And the newly produced episodes introduce younger generations to a character that many older Iranians still have a decades-old fondness for, their ears perking up with show’s signature start with three gunshots and Johnny Dollar answering a ringing phone with its title.

“It is amazing, it reminds me of the ‘60s and ’70s, when I listened to the episodes with my parents through a vacuum tube radio," said Masoud Kouchaki, 73. "We did not have any worries except for guessing how Johnny Dollar would find the murderer.”

The original CBS radio show ran from 1949 until 1962 and focused on the cases of Johnny Dollar, an investigator from Hartford, Connecticut. The serial relied on the investigator's expenses account entries — like “$10 deposit on the car I rented" or "one dollar, one drink for me" — to propel the story forward as Dollar interviewed witnesses and suspects in the transatlantic accent common to detective stories of the era.

“CBS steadfastly resisted moving it to television when television was peeling off lots of radio programing, lots of radio content, lots of radio actors," said John F. Barber, a professor in the digital technology and culture program at Washington State University Vancouver and expert on “Johnny Dollar” and other radio dramas of the era.

“They took a gamble that radio drama would continue to attract audiences. ... It does come at the end of the golden age of radio, before television became the primary entertainment source in America.”

For Iranians, state radio first went on the air in 1940, part of the efforts by then-ruler Reza Shah to rapidly modernize the country. His son, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, took over in 1941, and for several decades radio remained the key media consumed in his growing country, with the number of stations few and all state-controlled.

Iran's version of “Yours Truly, Johnny Dollar" dropped the expense account format but kept the noir-light vibe, dramatic music and U.S. location. Instead, the shows would end with Iranian state radio inviting the public to write in to explain what clue gave away the guilty party, with those getting it right having a chance to win a prize.

Mostafa Nasiri, a 76-year-old retired engineer, remembered winning a watch as a teenager in 1966 for answering correctly.

“It was a precious gift," he wistfully recounted. "I got it from the office of the radio broadcaster, and I was publicly honored in the school for that. Some years later I sold it for some $70.”

After Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, the country's state radio and television broadcaster soon found itself controlled by hard-line adherents to the country's Shiite theocracy. Any program celebrating America found itself removed after the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis saw relations collapse. Tehran will celebrate the 45th anniversary of the takeover this November.

In recent years, pirated Hollywood blockbusters have found their way on air in Iran's state-controlled channels. However, hard-liners remain suspicious of Western shows, dismissing them as a “cultural invasion” targeting Iran's people. But many homes have illegal satellite dishes allowing them to watch channels abroad, while the internet and virtual private networks help Iranians circumvent censorship.

That interest in the outside world likely would extend to a hard-boiled American investigator as well.

“You’ve got some guy he’s out there, you know, buying drinks, taking cabs, doing all this wonderful stuff," said John C. Abbott, who wrote a three-volume history of the U.S. "Johnny Dollar" series. “Maybe it was an escape.”

Despite that, Johnny Dollar seems to have passed the test, though the state-run Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcast hasn't explained its reasoning for allowing it on air on its Radio Namayesh channel. Ayoub Aghakhani, the director of the newly produced episodes, told state TV that he decided to make the episodes based on available Farsi translations to “attract more audiences” to radio broadcasts.

People have “heard about (Johnny Dollar) from either their father or grandfather,” Aghakhani reportedly said. “I learned that 20-, 30-year-old students are familiar with the opening phrase."

So far, state radio has broadcast nine episodes and plans to air 17 more. State radio officials did not respond to The Associated Press' questions about the show, nor did CBS in New York.

Among the young, there's a collective shrug at Johnny Dollar's rebirth as many remain focused on their mobile phones.

“It is a shame that a radio station of the Islamic Republic is broadcasting an American show,” said Hamid Mohseni, a 29-year-old taxi driver. “I will call the radio station to ask them to stop the unpleasant program.”

But for those old enough to remember him, they're glad he's back on the case.

“It is beautiful to listen to the stories that revive many memories,” said Mehri Bagheri, a 68-year-old homemaker. "Then I went to one of my friends’ homes to listen to the show and have a good time.”

___

Gambrell reported from Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

Vegetable analogue of fish meat printed on 3D printer in China

23 September 2024

By Alimat Aliyeva

A group of Chinese scientists from Zhejiang University has created vegetable imitations of yellow humpback meat that can be produced using a 3D printer, Azernews reports.

According to experts, the finished products turned out to be very similar to real fish. To achieve similarity with the structure of the yellow humpback's flesh, the team performed a CT scan and obtained a three-dimensional model of the distribution of muscle and fat. The scientists then used soy protein isolate, cantane copper and starch to recreate the texture of animal tissues.

"In the end, a 3D printed product was successfully created from vegetable fish flesh with a printing accuracy of more than 90% for a composite structure," the authors of the development noted.

The researchers added that the texture, moisture distribution and nutrient content of the simulated meat turned out to be close to the characteristics of real fish.

According to scientists, their development will reduce the burden on the fishing industry, which has almost exhausted the possibilities for extracting aquatic biological resources in environmentally safe volumes.

BIRDS OF A FEATHER

Austria’s far right woos anti-vaxxers with fund for vaccine ‘victims’

Herbert Kickl, former Austria's Interior Minister and member of FPOe (Austrian Freedom Party) speaks during the 33rd Ordinary Federal Party Congress in the Graz, Austria on September 14, 2019.

Monday, 23 Sep 2024

VIENNA, Sept 23 — Anti-vaxxer Martin Rutter is delighted he has been able to apply for public funds for “vaccination victims” from his far-right allies who run the province around Vienna.

The controversial project, pushed through by the Freedom Party (FPOe) — which looks set to win this week’s Austrian elections—has raised the ire of other parties but has drawn thousands of applications.

“I have an association that takes care of vaccination victims,” said Rutter, who is known for spreading conspiracy theories online.

The 41-year-old helped organise massive demonstrations against the conservative-led government’s Covid measures, which were also attended by the FPOe’s leader Herbert Kickl.

The far right is tapping into still seething voter anger about restrictions during the Covid pandemic, which it hopes will propel them to power on Sunday.

“The FPOe was the only party that did not support these measures,” Rutter told AFP, describing them as an “orgy” of restrictions.

Cash for jab refuseniks

Rutter—who peddles conspiracy narratives online, including recommending fruits to cure cancer—has applied for money from a €31.3 million (RM146 million) fund set up by the Lower Austria region, which the FPOe co-governs, for “information events” he organises.

The fund was set up last year to “repair” the “poor crisis management” of the pandemic, according to Maximilian Fender-Tarczaly, who works for the FPOe state councillor in charge of the project.

The project is meant to support “victims... who are suffering from the various consequences of the disease, the measures and the vaccination”, he said in a written reply to AFP.

“The spectrum is broad... mental health problems, isolation, vaccination impairments, fines for non-compliance with health measures,” he wrote.

Some 5,700 applications had been approved and €3.7 million paid out by July, but “until now no money has been paid” to Rutter, Fender-Tarczaly said then.

The FPOe is keen to roll out the project nationally, railing in its election manifesto against the government’s “unprecedented indoctrination and brainwashing” during the pandemic.

‘Irresponsible’

Health Minister Johannes Rauch of the Greens party described the project as “irresponsible”, arguing that out of 20 million vaccinations, just 200 people have suffered side effects.

“Vaccination has saved millions of lives, and if the willingness to be vaccinated against measles, mumps and rubella also decreases, this jeopardises the lives of children,” he said in May.

The opposition Social Democrats have accused the FPOe of “losing all moral sense” by offering a “bonus” to those who “attack elected officials”, while the opposition liberal NEOS party has slammed the far right for pandering to its base.

The pandemic—and in particular the government’s move to make vaccination mandatory, which was later scrapped—have led to lasting “polarisation” in the Alpine nation of nine million people, according to Julia Partheymueller, a political scientist from Vienna University.

The vaccinations “victims” project was a means to criticise “the government’s mistakes” and has come from a “desire for revenge” rather than reconciliation,” she argued. — AFP

KASHMIR ELECTION, HOW'S THAT GOING

Jammu & Kashmir: Encore for Engineer poll X-factor?

It must mean something that former chief ministers and bitter foes Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti, not to speak of his diminished mentor Sajad, have a common peeve this election — that Engineer Rashid has been let loose on the campaign

Sankarshan Thakur Pulwama Published 23.09.24

Engineer Rashid campaigning in Pulwama in south Kashmir.Picture by Muzaffar Raina

Abdul Rashid Sheikh, Independent member of the Lok Sabha from Baramulla, goes by a widely known alias: Engineer Rashid. He has recently come to deserve another: Engineer X — alias attached to alias, engineer of X factors, coupling and decoupling electoral equations across the Valley and, many reckon, across the Banihal in the Chenab and Jammu regions as well.

Rashid’s home borough is Langate up in north Kashmir, the pivot on which he spun his startling Baramulla victory this summer; few believed he would skittle former chief minister Omar Abdullah and his former political boss, Sajad Lone of the People’s Conference, from behind the Tihar bars.

Few are now ready to bet that Rashid, bailed out on a court fiat for three weeks to barnstorm the Valley, will not cast his maverick fingerprint on the ballot beyond Baramulla.

It must mean something that former chief ministers and bitter foes Omar Abdullah and Mehbooba Mufti, not to speak of his diminished mentor Sajad, have a common peeve this election — that Engineer Rashid has been let loose on the campaign.

Their jointly stapled perception is that the leader of the fledgling and unrecognised Awami Ittehad Party (AIP) can trigger imponderable changes in conventional voter behaviour and wreak ravage on the outcome.

“Rashid has no organisation to speak of nor any resources,” said a senior Kashmiri bureaucrat whose job it is to daily assess prospects, “but what he has, and few others do, is the perception that he is a victim of the State and yet he remains unafraid, a man in chains who will not stop barking grouses on behalf of Kashmiris, a man who speaks closest to Kashmiri mindset and sensibility.”

We run into the Engineer X caravan almost accidentally one balmy morning in the rural innards of south Kashmir, on a winding lane arriving from Pampore and running towards Pulwama, where the orchards are voluptuous with ripening apple and the rice fields golden with crop demanding to be taken down.

This is not Engineer territory, far from it. But the chaotic trail of pickups and tractor-trailers and jeeps and bikes is a sight to behold, and actually seek escape from. He sits in a dust-laden car, at the head of a convoy several kilometres long. Megaphones blare away, dust swirls from under the twisting wheels, the faithful — the Rashid faithful — rush about trying to cadge a handshake, or if not that, just and eye-to-eye moment.

“How many seats are you winning?” I ask, barely audible to him. “Winning? But I am going back to jail, I have come here to make other people win, may Kashmir win, that is why I am here.”

He pulls up the pane on the car window, the caravan glides on.

There’s a cold shiver running up and down Kashmir’s established nativist parties — the National Conference, the Peoples Democratic Party, even the People’s Conference — on what Rashid’s Baramulla victory and his physical presence on the battleground now could inspire elsewhere in Jammu and Kashmir.

A typical Rashid campaign vehicle depicting their leader behind bars in Pulwama in south Kashmir.Picture by Sankarshan Thakur

Rashid represents a sentiment and a constituency over which there can be little confusion — it is deeply, and fundamentally, anti-State.

The swollen voter numbers in the parliamentary elections, not just in Baramulla but across the Valley, indicated not an endorsement of the diminishment imposed in August 2019 as some claim but bubbling anger against the measure and what has
followed.

Rashid, or ideological outliers of his kind, may well be seen by the electorate as those who best represent public grouse and indignation. The core slogan of Rashid’s runaway Lok Sabha campaign — “Jail ka badla vote se lenge!” — probably comes
closest to capturing the predominant mood on the ground.

His Assembly campaign has been shrill and unrestrained. He speaks of “teaching a lesson” to (Narendra) Modi and (Amit) Shah, of “the will to grab back Kashmiri pride and rights”; he mocks Omar and Mehbooba alike for being “collaborators” against the Kashmiri people; he speaks in glowing terms of the slain Hizbul Mujahideen poster boy, Burhan Wani.

The unfettered defiance of his anti-New Delhi tone on the trail has led many to suspect that he is speaking out of “freedoms strategically granted to him by the powers”, from a guarantee that no harm will come to him.

“The fact that he was suddenly given bail and allowed to come to Kashmir, Rashid’s visible abundance of funds and resources for electioneering, that he can dare Delhi in the bluntest language, all of this makes us suspicious,” a senior National Conference leader told me.

“Our leaders (Farooq and Omar Abdullah) have spoken openly about this. Many believe Rashid has been planted by Delhi to queer this election, play their game. The more anti-India venom he spits, the more the BJP is able to consolidate the Hindu vote in the Jammu region. He is the Kashmiri enemy the BJP desperately needs in order to secure Jammu. Don’t lose sight of that. Rashid is casting his shadow beyond the Banihal.”

Rashid set out on his political journey in 2008. He rebelled against the People’s Conference — still flying the secessionist flag at the time — and decided to contest the Assembly elections as an Independent from Langate, his native patch in Baramulla.

He was then, as he remains in many ways, an oddball character convinced of an especially destined role. He had no party or followers. He had no resources of his own. He lived in a ramshackle shack whose floor was strewn hay and which shared a mud wall with a cowshed. He made it a statement of not wearing shoes and he reeked of bovine things.

Quite literally an unwashed entity, convinced he was on course to becoming a phenomenon. He exuded the sense of a man who had nothing to lose, particularly from his unvarnished and often too forthright and provocative manner of speaking.

He told me back in 2008: “We have become accustomed to being reduced to whatever the State wants to reduce us to; we have lost the shame of having ourselves reduced, that is who we are.”

At that time, everyone he met on his barefoot walking campaign, he asked for one rupee, no more. “I am not contesting this election,” he would tell me, “the people of Langate are.”

Nobody gave him a chance. He won Langate and went on to put a deeper emboss on the pocket than the Lones of the People’s Conference whose fiefdom it used to be. This summer, having felled Omar and Sajad, Rashid grabbed all of Baramulla, the only north Kashmir seat in Parliament. And now, many reckon, he has set himself for scoring bigger upsets.

“He may or may not win too many Assembly seats,” one elderly observer of Kashmiri politics told me in Srinagar. “But he will leave an imprint larger than the number of seats he takes; he will eat into chunks of votes here and there in a way that few would be able to tell what damage Engineer Rashid caused to who, especially now that he has formally allied with the Jamaat-e-Islami.”

As Jammu and Kashmir drifts towards an emaciated Assembly, it cannot be that many more, especially in the Valley, wouldn’t be tempted to embrace the Rashid example. Contest on a grievance ticket and make it a poll that few expected it to become — a flash-mob poll of unsung, unknown Kashmiri Independents.

India’s Diplomatic Doublespeak: Modi’s Hollow Commitment To The ‘Two-State Solution’ – OpEd

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo Credit: narendramodi.in

India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Photo Credit: narendramodi.in

September 23, 2024

By Debashis Chakrabarti

In the corridors of the United Nations last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed India’s enduring support for a ‘two-state solution’ in the Israel-Palestine conflict.”. Modi’s words, delivered during a meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, may seem like a diplomatic commitment to peace, but a closer inspection reveals a cynical contradiction between India’s rhetoric and its actions. The doublespeak in Modi’s diplomacy has never been clearer.

India’s position on the Israel-Palestine issue has traditionally been one of careful equilibrium. As a nation that was once a staunch supporter of Palestinian self-determination, India’s diplomatic positioning has undergone a seismic shift under the Modi government. Today, India claims to champion the cause of peace and Palestinian sovereignty while simultaneously deepening its ties with Israel, including providing military assistance to a regime that has been repeatedly accused of committing war crimes against Palestinians.

A Two-State Solution or Hollow Lip Service?

During his meeting with Abbas, Modi reiterated his support for a two-state solution, a formula that envisions an independent Palestinian state coexisting with Israel. On paper, it aligns with the aspirations of the Palestinian leadership and the international community. However, Modi’s declarations ring hollow against the backdrop of India’s recent abstentions at the United Nations.

Just days before Modi’s meeting with Abbas, India abstained from a crucial UN General Assembly vote demanding that Israel end its ‘unlawful presence’ in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) within 12 months. The resolution, which passed with 124 votes in favor, 14 against, and 43 abstentions, was based on a ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that found Israel’s ongoing presence in the OPT to be a violation of international law. Modi’s government, by refusing to support this resolution, not only undermined its professed commitment to Palestinian statehood but also tacitly condoned Israel’s illegal settlements, which are at the heart of the conflict.

Modi’s carefully crafted statements of support for a two-state solution are more performative than substantive. It’s a classic example of diplomatic doublespeak—a rhetorical dance that creates the illusion of moral high ground while doing little to challenge the status quo of occupation and violence. Modi’s words, framed in the language of peace and dialogue, obscure India’s growing military and strategic cooperation with Israel.

The Arms Deal Hypocrisy

Perhaps the most glaring contradiction in Modi’s diplomatic posture is India’s arms trade with Israel. Since Modi took office in 2014, defense ties between the two countries have strengthened dramatically. India is now one of the largest importers of Israeli arms, and the two nations regularly conduct joint military exercises. This deepening military relationship is particularly troubling given Israel’s widely documented use of force against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

Israel’s recent military offensive in Gaza, which began in October last year, has left more than 40,000 people dead, including 16,500 children. These numbers represent a grim reality that the world cannot ignore, yet India’s response has been conspicuously muted. Modi’s government has consistently avoided condemning Israel’s actions, even as the death toll in Gaza continues to climb.

The irony here is palpable. While Modi was meeting with Abbas and reiterating India’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, his government was likely finalizing deals for Israeli drones and missile systems—tools that could potentially be used in the very conflict India claims to want to resolve through peaceful means. Critics have pointed out the absurdity of Modi’s volte-face: how can India advocate for a two-state solution while enabling the military capacity of the very regime that is systematically undermining it?

Abstaining from Accountability

India’s abstention at the UN vote is not an isolated incident. It is part of a broader trend of fence-sitting that has characterized Modi’s foreign policy on sensitive international issues. In recent years, India has abstained from numerous UN resolutions critical of Israeli actions, signalling a reluctance to alienate a valuable strategic partner. While the Modi government couches these abstentions in the language of neutrality, they are, in reality, acts of complicity.

New Delhi’s refusal to take a clear stance on the Palestine issue is rooted in its desire to maintain strong ties with both Israel and the Arab world. However, under Modi, the balance has tipped decisively in favor of Israel. This shift is not just a matter of realpolitik; it reflects a broader ideological alignment. Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has long viewed Israel as a model for how a nation can aggressively assert its identity in the face of external threats, real or perceived. The BJP’s Hindu nationalist base sees parallels between Israel’s policies towards Palestinians and India’s own approach to its Muslim minority, particularly in Kashmir.

The abstentions at the UN and the arms deals with Israel are emblematic of a foreign policy that prioritizes economic and strategic interests over human rights and international law. By continuing to abstain from holding Israel accountable for its actions, Modi’s government is sending a clear message: India’s support for Palestinian sovereignty is conditional, and its commitment to a just resolution of the conflict is largely rhetorical.

The Global Implications of India’s Doublespeak

Modi’s diplomatic doublespeak is not without consequences. As India seeks to position itself as a global leader, particularly in multilateral forums like the UN, its credibility is being called into question. Countries in the Global South, which have traditionally looked to India as a champion of anti-colonial struggles and a voice for the oppressed, are increasingly sceptical of its shifting allegiances.

India’s failure to take a firm stand on the Palestine issue undermines its claim to moral leadership in global affairs. It also risks alienating the Arab world, which has been a critical partner in India’s energy security and economic growth. While Modi’s government has worked hard to maintain strong ties with Gulf states, its growing closeness to Israel could strain these relationships, particularly as the situation in Gaza deteriorates.

Moving Forward

Prime Minister Modi’s reiteration of support for the two-state solution is a classic case of diplomatic doublespeak—an empty gesture meant to placate international opinion while avoiding any meaningful action. As India deepens its military and economic ties with Israel, its claims to support Palestinian self-determination become increasingly hollow. In abstaining from key votes at the UN, Modi’s government is not merely sitting on the fence; it is actively enabling a regime that continues to perpetuate violence and occupation.

India’s global aspirations will ultimately be shaped by its actions, not its rhetoric. If Modi wants to position India as a responsible global power, he must reconcile the contradictions in his foreign policy and take a principled stand on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Until then, India’s doublespeak will continue to erode its credibility on the world stage.

Debashis Chakrabarti

Debashis Chakrabarti is an international media scholar and social scientist, currently serving as the Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Politics and Media. With extensive experience spanning 35 years, he has held key academic positions, including Professor and Dean at Assam University, Silchar. Prior to academia, Chakrabarti excelled as a journalist with The Indian Express. He has conducted impactful research and teaching in renowned universities across the UK, Middle East, and Africa, demonstrating a commitment to advancing media scholarship and fostering global dialogue.

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