Türkiye: From the Kurdish movement to mass mobilizations
Saturday 6 September 2025, by Uraz Aydin
On the occasion of the agreement on the dissolution of the PKK, Uraz Aydin presents the history of this movement and the evolution of the protest against the Erdoğan regime.
Can you explain what the PKK is and its main orientations, and what differentiates it from other left-wing or nationalist political groups?
The founding of the PKK must be seen in a context of politicization and radicalization. The 1960s witnessed a development of the workers’ movement and revolutionary radicalization, particularly among the youth. But it was also a decade of awakening of Kurdish national consciousness. This Kurdish national politicization was largely achieved within the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP), which was the main political actor in the workers’ movement of that decade. It was towards the end of the 1960s, but especially after the amnesty of 1974, when the thousands of Turkish and Kurdish activists detained since the military intervention of 1971 were released , that Kurdish revolutionaries began to found their own independent organizations . [1]. The PKK was founded in the wake of this, but relatively late. Although the organization’s official history dates its origins back to 1973, the founding congress was not held until 1978. Before that, it was a core group of students and especially teachers gathered around Abdullah Öcalan. They called themselves the "Revolutionaries of Kurdistan" but were better known as "Apocu" ("Apo’s supporters" - short for Abdullah). Thus, from the very beginning, Öcalan’s personality had a central influence.
At the programmatic level, nothing specific differentiated it from the multitude of other Kurdish radical left organizations that advocated armed struggle for an "independent, unified, democratic and socialist Kurdistan" in a stagist perspective. [2]. But in the meantime, weapons were mainly used to defend against attacks by the fascist far-right "Grey Wolves" or in the fratricidal war that reigned within the revolutionary left. The PKK was one of the two main groups that did not hesitate to use weapons against other rival Kurdish (and Turkish) groups, but it was not alone in this. Thus, before the 1980 coup d’état [3], the PKK was a Kurdish revolutionary organization among others.
What justified the launch of an armed struggle strategy against the Turkish state in 1984?
In fact, it was mainly after 1984 that the PKK began to take root among the Kurdish plebeian and peasant population. Let’s go back a little. Öcalan left Turkey in 1979 during the state of emergency, but before the coup d’état. This was a decisive element in the construction of the organization. He thus had time to establish contacts with Palestinian resistance groups in Syria and Lebanon, to prepare the conditions of exile for his militants, conditions that would also be those of a real military apprenticeship. After the coup d’état of 1980, Apo thus called on his militants to return clandestinely to Syria. They were trained in the same camps as the Palestinians in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon under Syrian occupation. Some would participate in the resistance against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The PKK lost several dozen members, which also gave it a certain legitimacy.
The PKK launched the armed struggle in August 1984… because Öcalan considered that his army was now ready. The question of military combat as a method for the liberation of Kurdistan had been justified, not by conjunctural conditions or relationships of forces, but on a programmatic level, since 1978.
The offensive against the Turkish state was planned as early as 1982 but was postponed several times. Moreover, Öcalan was operating in the Middle East, where alliances and adversities between various states and Kurdish national movements (from Iraq and Iran) constituted a highly shifting terrain. This unstable context also weighed on the conditions of the struggle. The alliance he formed with Barzani’s group, dominant in Northern Iraq, a movement he previously considered feudal and reactionary, was, for example, decisive in building his camps in the mountains on the Turkish border and thus being able to launch his guerrilla war. Thus, while all the other Kurdish and Turkish groups tried to preserve their forces in exile, in Syria but especially in Europe, the PKK was the only one to engage in a real armed struggle. The legitimacy it gained through its offensives allowed it to recruit more and more, despite the significant losses of fighters suffered in the field.
40 years later, does the announcement of the dissolution not appear to be a failure, on the military and political levels?
I think that military objectives had already been non-existent for several decades. If for the Öcalan of the party’s founding and of the 1980s, any objective short of independence (various forms of autonomy, federative entities, etc.) was reactionary, the leader of the PKK had begun to revise his ideas from the beginning of the 1990s, particularly after the fall of the bureaucratic dictatorships. As we know, he would eventually come to criticize the nation-state form.
Öcalan had already attempted negotiations in 1993. After his arrest in 1999, he began to advocate a completely new direction, much to the surprise of PKK leaders and activists who were preparing to escalate the war and suicide attacks. This new direction aimed to end the armed struggle in favour of a permanent ceasefire, to pave the way for a political solution. He thus unquestionably renounced the strategic objective of an independent Kurdistan. Two further negotiation processes followed in 2007-2009 and 2013-2015, which unfortunately failed. However, the creation of the autonomous zone of Rojava in northeastern Syria must also be interpreted within this military and political framework. The existence of an administrative structure linked to the PKK on the Turkish border constitutes an important achievement for the organization, against the Turkish state and vis-à-vis its historical competitor in northern Iraq, the Barzani clan and its Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Where are we today in the new talks?
It should be clarified that the Kurdish movement is not only an armed movement. The PKK has managed to form a massive movement of several million people, with various civil structures that have sometimes developed with autonomous dynamics, despite the authoritarianism of the organization. Today, the civil-democratic base seems to be much more important and effective in its fight than the armed structure in terms of the objectives to be achieved for the Kurdish people. So, while there are certainly highly questionable aspects such as its authoritarianism, its excessive fetishism of the leader, the arbitrary internal mass executions (especially at the turn of the 80s and 90s), the dozens of indiscriminate attacks... it must be recognized that this movement, over time, has very strongly contributed to the consolidation of a national consciousness of the Kurdish people, and has largely anchored it on the left, with feminist, egalitarian values, and fraternity between peoples. From a historical point of view, this is an important asset.
At the level of the negotiations, everything started with the unexpected call from the far-right leader and main ally of Erdoğan, Devlet Bahçeli , on October 22, 2024, for Abdullah Öcalan to come and speak in parliament to declare the end of the armed struggle and the dissolution of the PKK. After a period of very opaque negotiations between the Turkish state and Öcalan, with the participation of a delegation from the DEM Party (a left-wing reformist party from the Kurdish movement) and the leadership of the PKK, the founder of the organization, from his prison on the island of Imrali, in the Marmara Sea, announced in a letter on February 27, 2025, that the PKK was to dissolve.
We don’t know what the debates were within the organization. There had already been tensions between Apo and the organization’s Presidential Council in previous negotiations. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that the PKK leadership would have quickly agreed on a process declared so abruptly. The organization’s leadership strongly emphasizes that the entire process must be led by Öcalan, which can be perceived as a desire not to take direct responsibility for it.
The disarmament of the PKK certainly constitutes an important basis for a demilitarization of the Kurdish question, even though the Erdoğan regime will undeniably try to steer this process according to its interests and in particular to break the alliance between the Kurdish movement and the bourgeois-democratic opposition led by the CHP [4] ,criminalized by the regime. However, we still do not know what democratic advances the Kurds will be able to benefit from with the dissolution of the PKK. A parliamentary commission will probably be formed to determine the measures to be taken. These should include, in a first step, the release of political prisoners (linked to the Kurdish movement), the withdrawal of the guardianship (kayyum) of Kurdish municipalities and the return of mayors to their functions, the reinstatement of "peace academics" to their work and the possibility for Öcalan to freely lead his movement, to be able to communicate with the outside world, to receive visits, etc.
According to the Kurdish movement, other, more structural reforms should follow, concerning the status of their national identity and culture within Turkish society, which would require a new constitution. Erdoğan is planning to change the constitution in order to be able to run in the next elections. Will it be a constitution that will guarantee rights to the Kurds while consolidating the autocratic nature of the regime? The question is controversial, but we are not there yet.
Another issue is the order in which the steps will be taken. Will the state wait until the complete surrender of arms is complete before implementing the supposed democratic reforms, or will the two processes overlap? It seems that Erdogan is opting for the first option—which is difficult for the PKK to accept—while Bahçeli seems more realistic on this point.
What political developments has Turkey experienced since the movement against the imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor İmamoğlu ?
After March 19, we witnessed a social mobilization the likes of which we hadn’t seen in a long time. Millions of citizens took to the streets to defend elected mayors, the right to vote, democracy, and freedom. Although the movement was extremely heterogeneous, there was a notable radicalization, particularly among university and high school students.
As is often the case after spontaneous outbursts, the movement’s momentum faded after a while. However, momentum persisted for a while thanks to boycott campaigns against certain capitalist groups that supported the AKP. But in the absence of sustainable social struggle bases, platforms, and coordination capable of prolonging resistance—aside from occasional calls for meetings launched by the CHP—it can be said that today the movement has lost its momentum in the streets, even though indignation remains very much present.
But the regime continues its crackdown on the CHP, with successive waves of arrests in various Istanbul municipalities. Eleven mayors are currently detained awaiting trial. A final "anti-corruption" wave has been launched against the former CHP mayor of İzmir and his staff (a total of 160 people in custody). Today is the hundredth day since İmamoğlu ’s arrest , and the indictment is still not ready. This clearly shows the extent to which the Erdoğan regime is acting in a completely arbitrary manner. Furthermore, there is also a legal attempt to split the CHP. A trial has been opened for alleged irregularities at the 2023 CHP congress, at which Özgür Özel , the new party chairman, was elected – a leader who, since İmamoğlu ’s arrest, has pursued an opposition policy of unusual firmness for the CHP.
However, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the former party chairman (and former presidential candidate, who lost to Erdogan in 2023), has suggested, in a spirit of revenge, that he could take over the party leadership if the congress were to be cancelled. He also claims that he believes the mobilization that began on March 19 was pointless, that it is a matter between Imamoglu and the judiciary. Thus, there is a clear and public tension between Kilicdaroglu’s team and those of Özel and Imamoglu . For the time being, the trial has been postponed until September.
What is the state of the labour movement today?
The labour movement’s trade union organizations played virtually no role in this protest movement. The working class did not identify with the movement. A significant portion of it remains receptive to Erdoğan’s propaganda, despite a dramatic deterioration in purchasing power over the past several years. And so far, very little effort has been made (particularly by the radical, anti-capitalist, revolutionary left) to make people understand that the democratic question and the social question are intimately linked.
Democratic aspirations must be fertilized with class content. The "proletarian shock" of which Ernst Bloch spoke is still the main thing missing from the fight against the regime. This is the most important, historically decisive, and difficult strategic task facing the revolutionary left. It is about breaking the cultural-religious divide, the maintenance and deepening of which is the AKP’s main weapon, and replacing it with class polarization.
But to return to the weakness of unions in the movement, there are several reasons for this. First of all, the rate of unionization is low in Turkey, at only around 15 per cent. And it must be taken into account that this percentage only includes "declared " workers , therefore not those who work illegally. Thus, the actual level of unionization is even lower.
Moreover, the largest union confederations are conservative and right-wing nationalist. Some are fully in the AKP fold. So we shouldn’t expect any strikes from them, especially in the current political climate. DISK and KESK are the most left-wing confederations. But here, as elsewhere, the links between unions and their members are not always very organic, and there are serious doubts that workers will participate massively in these strikes. Especially since this can represent a serious risk of losing one’s job, given that the laws, and even the Constitution, no longer mean anything in this country. For several years, every strike has been banned ("postponed") because it would undermine national security.
However, in June 2025 there was a strike of 23,000 workers at the Izmir city hall, with a main, very legitimate demand: to obtain wage increases and equal pay with colleagues who do the same work. The strike was led by the Genel-Iş union linked to DISK, organized mainly in the CHP city halls and in strong collusion with them. The strike lasted only less than a week and the workers obtained significant gains at the end of it [5]. But the rank and file of the CHP and the "white collar" fraction of the working class reacted to this strike in a very negative way: "you are playing into the hands of the AKP by weakening our city halls", "why are garbage collectors demanding the same salary as doctors?" This reaction has shown us once again how solidarity and class consciousness always need to be rebuilt even (and perhaps especially) in times of mobilization against a dictatorial regime.
What is the mood among the population regarding the wars waged by Israel?
Anti-Zionism is, by all accounts, a position shared almost unanimously by the population. But there are some difficulties in building a united movement in support of Palestine and against the Israeli offensive against Iran. Erdoğan’s Islamist and nationalist regime naturally adopts an anti-Israeli stance and organizes large rallies in solidarity with Palestine. But it has been shown that trade with Israel and financial and military relations with Tel Aviv continue! Recently, Selçuk Bayraktar , Erdoğan’s son-in-law and manufacturer of the famous Turkish drones, announced the creation of a joint venture with Leonardo, an Italian company criticized for its arms sales to Israel and targeted by protests in several cities around the world. Moreover, the Kürecik radar system, in the NATO military base in Malatya province, is directly integrated into the Israeli defence network. Therefore, Erdoğan’s anti-Zionism is more rhetoric than concrete facts.
Another difficulty is that the Kurdish movement rarely mobilizes on the Palestinian issue. Relations between the Kurdish movement and the Palestinian resistance—whether Öcalan and Arafat, the PKK with the PLO, or Hamas—have been marked by tensions and disagreements since the 1990s. More recently, Cemil Bayık, one of the PKK leaders, had criticized Hamas’s methods during Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and declared that the Palestinian and Jewish peoples must find ways to live in brotherhood. But a more circumstantial reason undoubtedly lies in Washington and Tel Aviv’s support for the YPG (included in the SDF), [6] seen as an ally in Syria. Öcalan had also strongly criticized this situation. During his meeting with the DEM delegation on April 21, 2025, he stated, speaking of the SDF, that "Israel has formed its own Hashd al- Shaabi" (pro-Iranian militias operating in Iraq).
Can there be a new convergence between the Kurdish movement and the opposition, despite Erdoğan’s manoeuvres?
It should be remembered that the convergence between the Kurdish movement and the secular bourgeois opposition worked especially well for the elections. These two opposition forces needed each other to triumph over the regime’s forces, both at the municipal and presidential levels. Ultimately, this was not enough to overthrow Erdoğan in 2023. It is very difficult to predict what the relationships of forces and the dispositions of each of these elements will be by the next election, scheduled for 2028 but which will most likely take place earlier. Will the peace process continue with all the instability and atmosphere of war that reigns in the Middle East? What state will the CHP be in after this immense attempt to criminalize it? Ekrem Will İmamoğlus be free and, above all, eligible to unite the opposition against Erdoğan?
But I think the key is to forge structures capable of guaranteeing the continuity of struggles against the regime in various areas. Whether it is the fight against the opening of olive groves to mining, the women’s movement, the housing crisis – which has become a major problem – the LGBTI movement, or the mobilization of parents against the commodification and Islamization of education, the fundamental objective for the revolutionary left must be to create structures, coordinations and committees in all these fields, to be prepared for the next mass social and/or democratic mobilizations, to prevent this dynamic of combat from evaporating in the space of a few weeks.
4 July 2025
Translated by International Viewpoint from Inprecor.It is an updated version of the one conducted for the Swiss site SolidaritéS .
Attached documentsturkiye-from-the-kurdish-movement-to-mass-mobilizations_a9158.pdf (PDF - 903.5 KiB)
Extraction PDF [->article9158]
Footnotes
[1] The memorandum of March 12, 1971, marked a "Turkish-style" military coup, in which the army, without directly seizing power, imposed an authoritarian government under the pretext of restoring order. This intervention aimed to crush the burgeoning labour and student movements, establishing a brutal repression against the revolutionary left. However, with the rise to power of Bülent Ecevit in 1973, an amnesty was proclaimed, allowing the release of many left-wing activists imprisoned after the coup.
[2] Our current considers as "stagist" the idea that the revolution in dominated or feudal countries should be achieved in two stages: first the national or bourgeois revolution, which would constitute a democratic capitalism independent of imperialism, and secondly the social revolution. To this conception, we oppose the theory of permanent revolution, which indicates that the two stages must be combined to succeed.
[3] On September 12, 1980, the military seized power, citing clashes between left-wing and right-wing nationalist political groups. This coup d’état destroyed the gains of workers’ and popular struggles, established a bloody military dictatorship, and laid the foundations for authoritarian neoliberalism in Türkiye.
[4] Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party, created in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, member of the Socialist International and associate member of the Party of European Socialists.
[5] A retroactive 30 per cent wage increase for the first six months of the year and a 19 per cent increase in July. Inflation is above 35 per cent a year in Türkiye, according to official figures.
[6] The People’s Protection Units (Kurdish: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) form the armed wing of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria. The SDF is the Syrian Democratic Forces, which includes the YPG.
Turkey
‘Well dug, old mole!": Mass resistance in Turkey
Kurdistan/Turkey: A Newroz of hope against a backdrop of coup d’état
Türkiye: Political Crisis and Democratic Movement
Turkey and the Neofascist Contagion
Turkey: a mass movement builds against Erdogan’s power grab
Kurdistan
Dissolution of the PKK and new perspectives
Kurdistan: ‘Turkey must choose between the status quo, endless war and peace with the Kurds’.
The Turkish State and the Kurdish Question: Contradictions and fragilities of a new hope
Syria: "The West is sacrificing dozens of peoples and faiths"
Kurds under attack on all fronts
Uraz Aydin
* Uraz Aydin is the editor of Yeniyol, the review of the Turkish section of the Fourth International, and one of many academics dismissed for having signed a petition in favour of peace with the Kurdish people, in the context of the state of emergency decreed after the attempted coup in 2016.
International Viewpoint is published under the responsibility of the Bureau of the Fourth International. Signed articles do not necessarily reflect editorial policy. Articles can be reprinted with acknowledgement, and a live link if possible.
