MULTIPOLAR WORLD
Handshake between Lee-Jae Myung, President of South Korea (on the right), and Ursula Von der Leyen, in the presence of Antonio Costa (on the left). Photo: Dati Bendo – EC Audiovisual Services / ©European Union, 2025.
October 20, 2025
Elcano Royal Institute
By Yun Byung-se
1. Introduction: navigating a fragmented global order
The 21st century global order is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by a convergence of systemic crises: geopolitical rivalries, geo-economic fragmentation, technological disruption and leadership deficit. The rules-based international order (RBIO), which emerged after World War II and was reinforced by the post-Cold War liberal democracy, is under unprecedented stress.
The return of great-power competition –exemplified by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the worsening US-Chinese strategic competition across domains and across regions, especially in the Indo-Pacific– is reshaping the international landscape. Simultaneously, internal strains within Western alliances and the revival of populist and unilateralist policies are eroding the cohesion and leadership of traditional democratic powers.
In this context, South Korea and Europe, led by the EU, are increasingly recognised not only as regional actors but as global players capable of contributing to systemic stability. Both are pivotal powers with strong stakes in preserving multilateralism, open markets and democratic values. Their cooperation has matured over decades and now holds the potential to shape the future of global governance reform.
2. The evolving nature of the Korean-EU partnership
The formal foundation of Korean-EU relations was laid in 2010 through three landmark instruments: the Framework Agreement, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the establishment of a ‘Strategic Partnership’. This was followed by the Framework Participation Agreement on Crisis Management in 2014. Particularly since the agreement on the Strategic Partnership, relations have been growing by leaps and bounds. It is deep and addresses a wide range of political, security, trade, economic, environmental, scientific and cultural issues.
The initial focus was primarily economic and institutional but, over time, the relationship has evolved to address a broad array of global concerns, including security, development, climate change, digital governance and democracy. This expansion is grounded in shared values –democracy, human rights, the rule of law and multilateralism– and a convergence of strategic outlooks.
In 2023 the two partners marked the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations with a comprehensive joint statement consisting of 45 paragraphs. More than one-third of them addressed global governance cooperation through multilateral platforms such as the UN and the G20. The statement underscored a shared commitment to addressing transnational threats –from climate change to pandemics to digital disruption– through inclusive, rules-based and forward-looking governance mechanisms.
3. Why Korea and the EU need each other more than ever
There are several compelling reasons for Korea and the EU to deepen cooperation on global governance: (1) the collapse of old certainties; (2) the leadership vacuum; (3) the rise of minilateralism and regionalism; (4) the strategic convergence of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions; and (5) the complementarity of strengths.
3.1. The collapse of old certainties
Institutions like the UN Security Council, WTO and Paris Climate Agreement are no longer delivering predictable, fair or enforceable outcomes. The rules-based order is fragmenting into spheres of influence, while critical global issues –climate, AI and pandemics– require coordinated responses that unilateral actors cannot deliver alone.
In this era of Shock and Awe, a threat to the rules-based order anywhere undermines respect for it everywhere.
3.2. The leadership vacuum
The US is no longer perceived as a reliable champion of multilateralism, particularly under the MAGA doctrine. China, while expanding its influence, promotes an alternative governance model aimed at many in the Global South, but which is increasingly regarded as a threat or as interventionist by recipient states. When the provision of public collective goods is needed most, global leadership is in a deep deficit and global governance is in great turmoil.
Under these circumstances, the EU and Korea, as stable democracies with a global reach, can help fill the leadership vacuum through principled and pragmatic engagement.
3.3. The rise of minilateralism and regionalism
As universal institutions falter, issue-based coalitions and regional/cross-regional compacts are proliferating. Korea and the EU are active participants in these formats –ranging from MIKTA and the Global Gateway to the Indo-Pacific Strategy and NATO’s partnership with four Indo-Pacific countries, namely South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand–. Coordinated engagement across such mechanisms enhances their global leverage.
3.4. The strategic convergence of the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions
Increasingly, challenges in one region reverberate across the other. NATO’s Strategic Concept, the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and the US National Security Strategy all highlight the interdependence of these two theatres.
China, which declared a no limit partnership with Russia just before the latter’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, made it clear recently that it cannot accept a Russian defeat in Ukraine, fearing it would free up Western resources to contain Beijing, especially as regards the Taiwan Strait crisis. The NATO Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, also envisaged this two-front war scenario in a recent interview with The New York Times.
The 2024 treaty on ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ between Russia and North Korea and the latter’s participation in the Russian-Ukrainian war reinforces this aspect, having further implications on any future inter-Korean armed confrontation. Under these circumstances, war in Ukraine or other spots in NATO territories, the Taiwan Strait crisis and inter-Korean tension are likely to affect each other in one way or another: by intention, miscalculation or escalation.
This geopolitical calculus reinforces the need for cross-regional cooperation between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Korea, positioned at the heart of North-East Asia and deeply engaged with the Euro-Atlantic community, is uniquely placed to serve as a bridge and linchpin.
3.5. The complementarity of strengths
Korea’s technological capabilities (AI, semiconductors, quantum), soft power and strategic geography complement the EU’s institutional depth, normative influence and regulatory reach. Together, they form a powerful coalition capable of proposing and implementing reforms in global governance.
4. The guiding tenets of Korean-EU strategic cooperation
At the heart of Korean-EU cooperation is the 2010 Framework Agreement, which outlines shared principles and modalities for engagement. Article 1, in particular, provides three foundational tenets:A mutual attachment to democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and multilateralism.
A recognition of the comprehensive nature of bilateral relations.
A commitment to raising ties to the regional and global levels.
These principles have been reinforced through multiple joint declarations, ministerial dialogues and bilateral agreements with EU member states. Korea’s recent strategic partnerships with countries like Spain and its enhanced participation in EU-led programmes demonstrate the growing institutional density of the relationship.
Moreover, both sides are committed to aligning their respective Indo-Pacific strategies, particularly in areas such as climate resilience, digital transformation, sustainable development and maritime security. This alignment is especially significant given China’s growing influence in the Global South and the intensifying strategic competition across the Indo-Pacific.
5. Current mechanisms for global governance cooperation
Korea and the EU are already deeply engaged in a range of multilateral and minilateral mechanisms:The UN system, with active coordination in the UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council and peacekeeping operations.
The G20 and G7, with Korea having been invited regularly to G7 summits and being an active member of the G20, working with EU members on issues such as pandemic response, economic resilience and energy transition.
Digital governance, with the 2022 Digital Partnership between Korea and the EU providing a platform for coordination on AI regulation, cybersecurity and semiconductor policy.
Climate governance, with joint initiatives to promote carbon neutrality, green finance and technology transfers to developing countries.
Development cooperation, engaging with ASEAN, Africa and the Pacific Islands through mechanisms such as the EU’s Global Gateway and Korea’s Official Development Assistance programmes.
Together, these mechanisms constitute a web of cooperation that allows Korea and the EU to act not just as bilateral partners but as coalition-builders in broader global governance frameworks.
6. Priority areas for future Korean-EU cooperation on global governance
In response to mounting global challenges, Korea and the EU are strategically aligned to act in nine key domains that define the agenda for global governance reform: (1) global health governance; (2) climate and energy transition/green partnership; (3) digital and AI governance; (4) the security and defence partnership; (5) economic security and supply-chain resilience; (6) development cooperation and Global South engagement; (7) democratic resilience and human rights; (8) UN system reform; and (9) trade and WTO reform.
(6.1) Global health governance
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the limitations of global preparedness and coordination. Korea and the EU can jointly empower the World Health Organisation (WHO) with greater funding and enforcement capacity. By supporting binding frameworks for data sharing, pandemic preparedness and equitable vaccine distribution they can lead the institutionalisation of global health norms.
6.2. Climate and energy transition/green partnership
As frontrunners in carbon neutrality and green technology, Korea and the EU can work together to accelerate the Paris Agreement’s implementation. Reforming international climate finance –especially to better serve developing countries– is a shared goal. Both partners can push for global carbon-pricing mechanisms, green infrastructure investment and joint R&D on clean energy.
6.3. Digital and AI governance
Korea’s strength in AI, semiconductors and digital platforms pairs naturally with the EU’s global leadership in regulation and digital rights. The 2022 Digital Partnership provides a foundation for cooperation on AI ethics, data governance, cybersecurity and emerging technologies. Joint initiatives in responsible military AI, framed by the REAIM summit platform and other related initiatives, can shape global norms in military technology.
6.4. The security and defence partnership
Security is not limited to traditional military and defence-related issues but increasingly encompasses a broader range of closely linked areas, ranging from the cyber and hybrid spheres to maritime and outer space.
In November 2024, Korea and the EU agreed on 15 specific areas of security cooperation. These include international peace and crisis management, maritime security, cyber security (EDT), hybrid threats, countering foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), counterterrorism, WMD non-proliferation, space security, peace mediation and conflict prevention.
EU participation in Indo-Pacific security frameworks and Korea’s engagement with NATO enhance cross-regional stability. Joint projects on maritime governance and cyber defence can be expanded under the Indo-Pacific strategies of both partners.
6.5. Economic security and supply-chain resilience
Korea and the EU are leading voices in the emerging field of economic security. Coordination on critical materials, rare earths and semiconductor value chains is essential. They can jointly invest in transparency and strategic stockpiling, while also shaping international norms on economic coercion and technology controls.
6.6. Development cooperation and Global South engagement
China’s expanding role in global governance presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Through platforms like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and expanded BRICS membership, China is intent on offering an alternative model of multilateralism. Absence of US leadership or MAGA 2.0 is even feared to inadvertently Make China Great Again (MCGA).
Korea and the EU can work actively to compete for influence in the Global South. Through initiatives like the Global Gateway (EU) and Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and ODA, they can pool resources and align development policies. This includes policy dialogue on SDGs, climate resilience, food and energy access, and inclusive growth.
Their collaboration on supply chain resilience, infrastructure investment, development cooperation and digital standards can serve as a counterbalance to Chinese influence –particularly in Africa, South-East Asia and the Pacific–. Their shared commitment to sustainability and transparency offers a compelling alternative to opaque or conditional development models.
In the Indo-Pacific this coalition can be reinforced by the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
6.7. Democratic resilience and human rights
Amidst growing autocracy and retreating democracy worldwide, Korea and the EU can jointly promote democratic norms. This includes media freedom, civic participation, electoral integrity and gender equality. By leading initiatives through the UN Human Rights Council and bilateral aid programmes, they can support democratic institutions in fragile states and serve as global role models of inclusive governance.
6.8. UN system reform
Korea and the EU support expanding the Security Council to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities. Strengthening the General Assembly’s authority, reforming ECOSOC and modernising the UN Development System are also high on the agenda. Both actors can coordinate to ensure that underrepresented countries have a greater voice in decision-making.
6.9. Trade and WTO reform
The ongoing tariff war between the US and the rest of the world has awakened the urgency of reformed trade rules. The paralysis of the WTO’s dispute settlement system threatens global economic stability. Korea and the EU can jointly support reform of the Appellate Body, advocate updated trade rules reflecting the digital economy and champion plurilateral agreements in areas where full consensus is elusive. Promoting sustainable trade and fighting protectionism should be a core part of their joint platform.
Last September, UN Summit for the Future hosted by the UN Secretary-General adopted the Pact for the Future which listed several dozen action plans on transforming global governance. Several elements of this pact have salience for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the ROK. That includes peace and security, sustainable development, climate and financing for development, digital cooperation and human rights, etc. Most of these elements are in sync with the above nine priorities.
Robust implementation of these priority areas in the future will make Korea-EU relations a model that other bilateral partnerships could aspire to achieve.
7. Structured engagement with the G7: a strategic imperative
The G7 –comprising the most advanced democracies– has become a critically important venue for shaping global standards and the new international order, particularly as existing multilateral institutions struggle. It is now redefining its role on global leadership.
Korea has been regularly invited as a guest to G7 summits, but the current geopolitical climate calls for more structured and sustained engagement for similar reasons explained above with regard to the need for further cooperation between Korea and the EU.
Korea is one of few countries who are like-minded with the G-7. They are most like-minded on many daunting challenges and crises in the evolving international order, fragmenting into Global West, Global East and Global South. We are more aligned, synchronised and in lockstep than ever. Such convergence between the two sides explains why Korea fits in the G7 framework:First, value alignment. Korea shares the G7’s foundational values, such as liberal democracy, RBIO and the rule of law, human rights and respect for international norms.
Secondly, strategic relevance. We are like-minded in strategic interests across regions and across domains, such as geopolitical and geo-economic issues. That includes Ukraine, the Middle East, the DPRK, Indo-Pacific Strategy, climate change, economic security and supply chain resilience, tech security, cyber security, maritime and space security, energy and food security, health and human security, etc.
We have adopted a series of joint statements on common visions and values, strategies and roadmap for the future over the last couple of years: bilaterally, minilaterally, regionally, inter-regionally (NATO) and globally (G20, UN).
Individually, EU G7 members, US, Canada, Japan and Korea all adopted Indo-Pacific Strategy and complement each other. EU G7’s strengthened presence in the Indo-Pacific is in alignment with EU’s Strategic Compass, NATO’s New Concept, National Security Strategies of US, Japan and Korea. Especially, there is a decisive convergence between the ROK and G7 countries in the domain of international security and economic security.Third, institutional strategic framework. Korea is a frequently invited guest to the expanded G7 and NATO summits (the ITPP partnership and IP-4). It is one of the EU’s 10 strategic partners. It is the US’s global comprehensive strategic partner and one pillar of trilateral summit mechanism of the US, Japan and the ROK. Korea is also a strategic partner of the UK and Canada. G7 members are connected through the UN Command in Korea and Japan since the end of the Korean War in 1953, as well as the UN Security Council.
Fourth, representation balance. Korea’s inclusion would enhance Asian representation and strengthen the G7’s legitimacy, particularly in light of expanded BRICS and Global South engagement.
Recent summits –such as the 2023 Camp David Trilateral (US-Japan-Korea)– demonstrate Korea’s capacity for sustained, high-level strategic alignment. This includes its commitment to consultative mechanisms, cross-domain cooperation and deterrence postures in the Indo-Pacific. These arrangements echo the very principles underpinning the G7’s role as a pillar of the global governance order. A more institutionalised role –what might be termed ‘G7+1’ or a ‘G7 Plus’ structure– would allow Korea to co-shape the group’s agenda in not only traditional agendas, but also in emerging areas.
8. Building a new pragmatic multilateralism
Korea is uniquely situated to serve as a connector between the Global West and the Indo-Pacific, and between traditional institutions and emerging coalitions. This is not only due to geography but also because of its diplomatic posture and economic capacity to harmonise interests between the US, China, Japan, the EU and other powers.
Korea participates in:Trilateral US-Japan-Korea cooperation (summit).
Trilateral Korea-Japan-China cooperation (summit).
NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships (IP4).
Digital, trade, and climate compacts with EU members.
G20 and MIKTA (a coalition of middle powers).
EAS, APEC and ASEM (founding member).
UN Command and peacekeeping operations.
These linkages position Korea as a system-shaping actor, capable of building bridges between regions, values and governance models.
The reform of global governance will not be achieved through abstract declarations or hegemonic imposition. It will emerge from coalitions of like-minded actors who share both values and interests. Korea and the G7 are natural leaders in such coalitions.
Together they will be able to focus on:Flexible, issue-based coalitions on global governance (eg, REAIM, Digital Partnerships).
Inclusive engagement with the Global South.
Balancing universal norms with regional realities.
Gradual institutional reform, not revolutionary overhaul.
Korea’s cooperation with G7 countries in forums such as the G20, the UN, the Human Rights Council and emerging AI governance bodies is a good example of how this can be operationalised. Both parties can play leadership roles, coordinate policy positions, and shape new regimes on global public goods.
Conclusions: The responsibility of system-shaping states
South Korea’s strategic alignment with the EU and G7 will strengthen the roles of ‘system-shaping’ actors: states that possess the normative legitimacy, operational expertise and capability, and institutional reach to drive global agenda-setting and reform. The challenges of our time –geopolitical confrontation, climate collapse, digital revolution and authoritarian resurgence– require exactly this kind of principled, collaborative leadership.
Korea’s potential structured engagement with the G7, its convergence with the EU across strategic domains, and its commitment to an open, inclusive world order will be able to position it as a key driver of global governance reform in the 21st century.
At a time when the world is returning to spheres of influence and a zero-sum logic of power, Korea and the EU, as well as the G7 plus, remind us that multilateralism –if reinvented and reinvigorated– remains not only viable, but indispensable. Their cooperation would bolster the collective capacity to address global challenges of the fragmented multipolar world and reaffirm the value of rules-based cooperation, rejecting a world in which might makes right. Korea, Europe and the G7, united in purpose, can serve as guardians and architects of a new global order.
About the author: Yun Byung-se is Chairman of the Seoul International Law Academy (SILA), co-Chair of the GC REAIM (The Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain) and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea from March 2013 to June 2017.
Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute in association with the Korea Foundation
Elcano Royal Institute
The Elcano Royal Institute (Real Instituto Elcano) is a private entity, independent of both the Public Administration and the companies that provide most of its funding. It was established, under the honorary presidency of HRH the Prince of Asturias, on 2 December 2001 as a forum for analysis and debate on international affairs and particularly on Spain’s international relations. Its output aims to be of use to Spain’s decision-makers, both public and private, active on the international scene. Its work should similarly promote the knowledge of Spain in the strategic scenarios in which the country’s interests are at stake.
Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute in association with the Korea Foundation
Elcano Royal Institute
The Elcano Royal Institute (Real Instituto Elcano) is a private entity, independent of both the Public Administration and the companies that provide most of its funding. It was established, under the honorary presidency of HRH the Prince of Asturias, on 2 December 2001 as a forum for analysis and debate on international affairs and particularly on Spain’s international relations. Its output aims to be of use to Spain’s decision-makers, both public and private, active on the international scene. Its work should similarly promote the knowledge of Spain in the strategic scenarios in which the country’s interests are at stake.
