By Ulviyya Asadzade
(RFE/RL) — As Russia remains preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, its influence is weakening along its southern border, particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
This power shift is opening the door for other players, including Turkey, the European Union, and the United States, to expand their presence in the region, analysts told RFE/RL.
On July 10, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev met in Abu Dhabi to discuss a potential peace deal, notably without any mediators — including Russia.
Although no breakthrough was reached, a joint statement reaffirmed both countries’ commitment to bilateral negotiations and continuing “confidence-building measures.”
Just five years ago, however, the dynamics were starkly different.
After a 44-day war between the two countries in 2020 over Nagorno-Karabakh — a mostly ethnic Armenian region internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan and long at the center of the two countries’ mutual animosity — Russian President Vladimir Putin mediated a cease-fire, reinforcing Moscow’s traditional role as the region’s power broker.
But the truce has since contributed to what Rauf Mirgadirov, an analyst with the Ayna-Zerkalo newspaper in Baku, calls “a historic shift.”
“The two countries — after more than 30 years of conflict over Karabakh — are now closer to one another and distancing themselves from Russia,” he told RFE/RL. “Both want to be free from Russian influence, and this is their opportunity, as Russia is very busy with the war in Ukraine.”
Ruben Mehrabian, an analyst at the Armenian Institute of International Relations and Security, agrees that Yerevan views the current situation as a chance to loosen Moscow’s hold on the country.
“Russia wanted Armenia to remain in eternal conflict so that it could continually rescue us to justify its indefinite presence,” he said. “But Armenia wants to resolve these disputes and remove any Russian presence from our country. Now Russia doesn’t like that.”
Mounting Tensions And Accusations
In the eyes of some analysts, Yerevan’s ties with Moscow began to deteriorate in 2016 during a brief bout of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh.
The conflict concluded with a Russian-brokered cease-fire and some territorial gains for Azerbaijan, fueling Armenian frustration over Moscow’s limited support for its traditional ally.
According to Richard Giragosian, founding director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, this moment marked “the beginning of Armenian erosion and loss of confidence in Russia as a security partner.”
“Russia’s position and policy beginning with the 2016 war began to shift to Azerbaijan,” he said.
Relations plunged further after the 2020 conflict, when Baku regained control over Nagorno-Karabakh and Russia again failed to back Yerevan.
Recent events have highlighted how strained the bond between the two countries has grown.
On June 17, Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetian was arrested on charges of calling for the unlawful seizure of power.
In Giragosian’s view, the arrest was “a move by the Armenian government to preempt any Russian interference” in next year’s parliamentary elections.
“But at the same time, it was more about pushing against Russian interest or influence within Armenia itself,” he added. “This man is a product of Moscow; he is widely perceived as pro-Putin.”
Just days later, on June 25, Armenian authorities arrested Archbishop Bagrat Galstanian, a prominent cleric in the Armenian Apostolic Church, accusing him of plotting to overthrow the government.
Russia responded angrily, with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov calling for an end to “unjustified attacks” against the church, describing it as “one of the key pillars of Armenian society.”
Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan fired back, accusing Moscow of meddling in Armenia’s internal affairs.
Azerbaijan Also Turns Away From Moscow
The shifts aren’t limited to Armenia.
Relations between Baku and Moscow have also deteriorated sharply this summer.
In late June, Aliyev suspended high-level meetings, barred Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk from visiting and canceled Russian cultural events in Baku.
These actions followed the deaths of two ethnic Azeris during a police raid in Yekaterinburg, Russia, amid allegations of torture.
Russia’s Zangezur Dilemma
Five years ago, Russia had other ambitions for maintaining influence in the region — specifically through a military presence.
The 2020 cease-fire agreement signed by Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan called for reopening economic and transportation routes. It also stipulated that Armenia would ensure secure transit between Azerbaijan proper and its Naxcivan exclave via the so-called Zangezur corridor, with Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) assigned to oversee it.
“Perhaps the Zangezur corridor is Russia’s only viable option for maintaining a presence in the region,” Kirill Krivosheev, a Russian analyst at the Carnegie Foundation, told RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service in 2023.
However, Armenia sees the corridor as a threat to its sovereignty.
While negotiations continue, it remains unclear whether Russian FSB oversight will be part of any final deal.
In March, Pashinian said there would be no foreign deployments along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border after a treaty is signed, and the idea is also not really attractive to the Azerbaijanis either, according to Vadim Dubnov, a correspondent for RFE/RL’s Echo of the Caucasus.
Deploying FSB forces may have made sense for Azerbaijan before the Karabakh conflict was resolved,” he said. “But now, direct negotiations with Armenia — and not Russian involvement — are more beneficial to Baku.”
Control over Zangezur also ties into a larger geopolitical picture: the Middle Corridor, a route linking China to Europe and bypassing Russia.
“Zangezur is part of the Middle Corridor,” Mirgadirov explained. “Russia doesn’t just want to control Zangezur; it wants to dominate all land and air routes in the South Caucasus. But I think Turkey is well-positioned to lead regional security efforts.”
New Regional Players
While analysts agree that Russia’s influence is waning, they caution that deep economic and historical ties cannot be severed overnight.
However, since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this economic dependence has also begun to shift, Russian analyst Krivosheev noted in his 2023 interview with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service.
“Turkey has become a key import partner for Russia. Many goods are transported via Turkey and Azerbaijan,” he said. “The Istanbul straits are vital, and Azerbaijan is now a crucial hub for Russian gas. We sell oil and gas to Azerbaijan, which then sells it to Europe. This is legal and does not violate sanctions.”
Paul Goble, senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation, highlighted Azerbaijan’s rising importance.
“Aliyev has finally realized that Moscow needs Azerbaijan at least as much as Azerbaijan needs Russia,” he said. “When you realize that the other side needs you more than you need it, that changes how you make calculations.”
Meanwhile, Yerevan is rebuilding ties with Istanbul while distancing itself from Moscow.
Long strained over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict — in which Turkey supported Azerbaijan, closing its borders with Armenia in the 1990s — and historical grievances, relations between the two countries are cautiously improving.
In June, Pashinian visited Turkey and met President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan — the first political working visit aimed at bilateral negotiations.
“Armenia is economically dependent on Russia because most of our communication with external markets runs through Georgia to the Russian market,” said Mehrabian. “Our border with Iran is open but limited in capacity. Opening the Turkish border would allow Armenia access to European markets.”
Yet Armenia is not putting all its hopes on Turkey. Mehrabian said Yerevan is also strengthening ties with the US and EU.
“We are working with the EU and the US to elevate cooperation,” he said. “With the US, we have already signed a charter of strategic partnership. With the EU, we have passed legislation aligned with potential membership — even though we know it’s a long road ahead.”
- Ulviyya Asadzade works as a journalist in RFE/RL’s Central Newsroom. Prior to this role, she spent nearly two decades with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, where she reported extensively on corruption, human rights, and the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Iran. In addition to her work with RFE/RL, Asadzade has contributed to Eurasianet.org, The Bulletin, and Caucasus Edition, covering regional politics and cross-border issues.
