With Eyes On Sahel, Russia Shifts From Syria To Libya
After the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Russia has scrambled to transfer military equipment to other areas, including eastern Libya.
Experts question Russia’s long-term strategic goals and fear the expanded presence of mercenaries and military personnel could further destabilize Libya, Sudan and other nations in the region.
The Kremlin increasingly has used Al-Khadim air base, about 100 kilometers east of Benghazi, as a hub for conducting operations, supplying arms, and trafficking resources in and out of the restive Sahel region.
“One of former Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s greatest foreign policy failures was undoubtedly his 1980s attempt to use his Soviet-armed military to spread Libyan rule and influence in the African Sahel region,” researcher Andrew McGregor of the Jamestown Foundation think tank wrote in an April 17 analysis.
“Now, Russia is focused on a similar effort in the Sahel, using the same remote airbase in south-eastern Libya that Qaddafi used to launch his offensive into neighboring Chad.”
Using satellite imagery, flight logs and radar information, multiple news outlets have traced the movements of Russian military assets from Syria to Libya.
In May, an Antonov-124 cargo plane left a base in Syria and embarked on a nearly 10,000-kilometer journey to Sub-Saharan Africa. Its first stop was Al-Khadim. From there it traveled to Bamako, Mali’s capital, and Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, according to flight logs seen by Radio France International (RFI).
Although the type of equipment that was loaded and unloaded during this trip was unclear, the aircraft’s cargo bay is large enough to carry several aircraft or armored vehicles. Russian cargo planes have been known to deliver aircraft, helicopters, radars and surface-to-air systems to Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, where Russian mercenaries continue to help military juntas maintain power.
Between December 2024 and January 2025, French newspaper Le Monde documented eight flights from Syria to Al-Khadim. RFI reviewed several Telegram messaging app channels linked to Russian paramilitary groups and found references to Russian weapons deliveries to Al-Khadim, including heavy weapons and armored vehicles — the same type used by Russia in Syria.
One video message read: “New organizations. New technology. Old places. Remember your roots!” Moscow’s on-again, off-again ties with Libya pre-date the Cold War. According to RFI, the footage was shot at Al-Khadim.
Lou Osborn, of the All Eyes On Wagner investigative group, said Russia’s presence at Al-Khadim is the product of an effort to bolster ties with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who leads the Libyan National Army (LNA) and has controlled eastern Libya since 2017.
“We saw a kind of logistical ballet of Russian planes towards Libya,” Osborn told RFI. “There is a fairly strong rapprochement, political and military, between Haftar’s Libya and the Kremlin.”
Moscow also has tried to forge ties with the officially recognized government in Tripoli by opening embassies, and it has made overtures to do the same in Algeria and Tunisia. These countries are “very aware of what is happening in the region, with military attachés, particularly in Algeria, who travel back and forth to Libya,” Osborn said.
Russia’s presence in Libya is not limited to Al-Khadim. In December 2024, Russia moved troops from Syria to revive the Matan al-Sarra air base near the borders with Chad and Sudan, according to Italian news Agency Nova. The base had been abandoned since 2011.
Anas El Gomati, director of Libyan think tank the Sadeq Institute, said that disengaging from Syria was just one factor in Russia’s use of the air base.
“Matan al-Sarra isn’t just another airbase renovation, it’s Russia repositioning its chess pieces in Africa,” he told The New Arab website. “The timing is telling: as they lose Syrian bases, they’re rapidly developing this strategic location near Chad’s and Sudan’s borders. But this isn’t about replacing Syria; it’s about creating something potentially more valuable: a new network of influence stretching from the Mediterranean deep into Africa.”
From Maaten al-Sarra, Russia can directly supply Burkina Faso, Mali and Sudan. Russian technicians and troops have restored runways and warehouses at the base. Haftar’s LNA secured the area and protects routes that supply Sudan with weapons and fuel from the northeastern Libya port of Tobruk.
Some members of Libya’s divided government oppose Russia’s activities. Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, prime minister of the Tripoli government, said he rejected any attempt to turn Libya into a center for major-power conflicts and warned that the transfer of Russian weapons to Libya would complicate the country’s internal crisis.
“No one with an ounce of patriotism wants a foreign power to impose its hegemony and authority on the country and the people,” Dabaiba told The Guardian.
Jalel Harchaoui, associate fellow at the defense think tank RUSI, characterized Dabaiba’s remarks as a “watershed moment.”
“Just him saying those words is deeply problematic to Russia because part of the Russian doctrine in the Middle East is never to be perceived as being completely 100% on one side against the other,” Harchaoui told The Guardian. “So Russia was supposed to be this magical actor that was basically eliciting the active approval of both sides of the Libyan crisis. And all of that is gone.”
Africa Defense Forum
The Africa Defense Forum (ADF) magazine is a security affairs journal that focuses on all issues affecting peace, stability, and good governance in Africa. ADF is published by the U.S. Africa Command.
