New York’s $75 Billion Climate Liability Law Faces an Uncertain Future

By Felicity Bradstock - Sep 20, 2026

• New York’s Climate Change Superfund program sought a combined $75 billion from qualifying fossil fuel producers and refiners to fund climate-adaptation infrastructure.
• 
  
• On August 31, 2026, Chief Judge Brenda Sannes ruled that the law was preempted by federal law, including the Clean Air Act, and could not be enforced.
• 
  
• The legal battle is continuing: on September 14, New York and the challengers jointly requested entry of final judgment in a procedural move that would allow an immediate appeal to the Second Circuit.
• 
  

In 2024, New York Governor Kathy Hochul signed a law requiring large fossil fuel polluters to pay up to $75 billion in damages. However, after two years, a federal judge has ruled that the law conflicts with federal law and cannot proceed. The law that Hochul signed in December 2024 would have required companies that contribute heavily to fossil fuel pollution to pay to repair damage caused by extreme weather events, which have become increasingly common as global warming intensifies.

The law focuses on pollution produced by the combustion of fossil fuels. A study published in 2025 in the journal Nature linked more than 200 severe heat waves directly to carbon pollution from the world’s largest fossil fuel producers.

The legislation, known as the Climate Change Superfund Act, mandated that firms responsible for most of the accumulation of carbon emissions between 2000 and 2024 would pay around $3 billion a year for 25 years. The legislation was based on the original Superfund law, established in 1980, which requires companies to pay for toxic waste cleanup activities following incidents such as oil and chemical spills.

Upon signing the law, Hochul stated, “With nearly every record rainfall, heat wave, and coastal storm, New Yorkers are increasingly burdened with billions of dollars in health, safety, and environmental consequences due to polluters that have historically harmed our environment.”

The aim of the law was to reduce the burden on taxpayers by addressing the challenges that big corporations, particularly oil and gas companies, have played a major role in creating, with these companies producing over 1 billion tons of greenhouse gas emissions globally over the 24-year period. The funds would contribute to restoring and protecting coastal wetlands; upgrading roads and bridges; improving stormwater drainage systems; elevating and retrofitting structures; and investing in recovery efforts from natural disasters. 

However, last month, a federal judge ruled that the New York law conflicted with federal law and therefore could not take effect. The chief judge of the US District Court for the Northern District of New York, Brenda Sannes, ruled that the state could not enforce its “climate superfund” law in a 63-page decision deeming the law “unusual and sweeping”. Sannes cited the Second Circuit’s 2021 decision in City of New York v. Chevron, a case in which New York sued oil companies seeking climate-change damages, as precedent. 

Cassidy DiPaola, communications director for organisation Make Polluters Pay, stressed, “This decision rests on contested precedent from a fundamentally different case, and Attorney General Tish James must appeal immediately.”

Meanwhile, State Senator Liz Krueger, a sponsor of the law, said the ruling was “unfortunate” and emphasised that Judge Sannes had not recognised a distinction between a claim like New York City’s and “a state legislature exercising its constitutional powers to raise revenues and protect its citizens.” Krueger added that she had expected “many rounds of legal wrangling” before the law could take effect.

However, several Republican states and business organisations have criticised the “climate superfund” law over the last two years, arguing that people benefited from the use of fossil fuels during the period in question, during which time renewable alternatives were not readily available. The U.S. Justice Department also argued in support of the lawsuit against the New York law last month, filing its own litigation against it in the Southern District of New York; a suit that is still pending.

JB McCuskey, the attorney general of West Virginia, whose office led the challenge against the New York law, stated, “This is a major victory in the fight against liberal states, trying to balance their budgets on the backs of our hard-working men and women in the coal, oil and gas industries.”

Hochul has not yet said whether New York state plans to appeal the decision. However, Ken Lovett, the senior communications adviser on energy and environment for Governor Hochul, said, “Taxpayers shouldn’t have to foot the bill for damages caused by polluters.” Lovett added, “We are reviewing the decision to determine possible next steps.”

Vermont is the only other state to have passed a climate superfund law, and it is now facing a similar lawsuit. While some other states have explored the introduction of a similar fund, no other state has yet announced a formal payment scheme against major emitters. The New York law was originally proposed following years of still-unresolved litigation by state and local governments against fossil fuel companies seeking damages. Many of the suits argue that the firms covered up what they knew about the dangers of global warming for decades.

The New York “Superfund” Law will not take effect any time soon, given the recent ruling, and it remains uncertain whether the state government will appeal the decision. Meanwhile, the results of the ongoing legal challenge to a similar law in Vermont could determine whether other states introduce similar legislation.

By Felicity Bradstock for Oilprice.com

Michigan Judge Tosses State's Antitrust Suit Against Big Oil

By Irina Slav - Sep 23, 2026

A district judge in Grand Rapids has dismissed a lawsuit brought against several oil supermajors that accused the companies of conspiring to interfere with competition in alternative energy and electric cars.

The lawsuit was filed by Michigan Attorney General Dan Nessel, alleging Exxon, Chevron, Shell, BP, and the American Petroleum Institute colluded to try to “restrain the emergence of electric vehicles and ‌renewable primary energy technologies in the United States,” as quoted by Reuters.

According to Judge Jane Beckering, however, antitrust legislation does not provide a remedy for such grievances, except one—an allegation that Big Oil overcharged Michigan citizens. Yet she dismissed the allegation of a concerted effort to overcharge Michiganders.

“The distance is too great between the alleged conspiracy and Michigan’s and its residents’ overcharges to find that the conspiracy proximately caused the overcharges,” Judge Beckering said. An attorney for Chevron had described the case as “baseless as demonstrated by multiple related court dismissals,” Reuters noted in its report on the news.

Climate litigation has in recent years become a favoured tactic by various environmentalist groups in a bid to punish the oil and gas industry for alleged violations based on climate science research, which has recently faced growing criticism and revisions; the IPCC itself admitted recently that its worst-case scenario about CO2 emissions was unrealistic.

However, while in some cases courts have sided with such plaintiffs, in others, the judges have ruled in favour of Big Oil, especially in the United States. In Europe, the most notable Big Oil case was the suit that environmentalists brought against Shell, where the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Shell to slash its emissions by 45% by 2030. Shell appealed. The case reached the Netherlands’ Supreme Court in May this year. The court is yet to announce its ruling.

By Irina Slav for Oilprice.com

India’s Russian Oil Imports Slide as Refiners Hunt for Alternatives

By Julianne Geiger - Sep 22, 2026

India’s imports of Russian crude fell 16.5% in August and are expected to decline again in September, just as a new U.S. sanctions law gives Washington authority to hit major Russian oil buyers with tariffs of up to 100%.

Russian shipments to India dropped to about 2.1 million barrels per day in August from July’s record levels, according to trade data cited by Reuters. Preliminary Kpler data puts September imports at 1.9 million bpd. Russia remains India’s largest crude supplier.

The August decline predates the new U.S. law, so calling it a sanctions retreat would be a stretch.

Indian refiners were already shifting barrels around as Middle Eastern supply routes improved. Purchases of Iraqi crude jumped roughly 25% to 171,000 bpd in August. Saudi imports rose 1.5% to 328,000 bpd. UAE shipments fell 5.4% to 620,000 bpd, although ADNOC has expanded its ability to move crude from inside Hormuz to export points outside the strait.

India’s total crude imports fell 8.8% in August to 4.44 million bpd.

October and November buying could tell a different story.

Indian refiners are tapping spot markets for replacement barrels as they weigh the risk attached to future Russian purchases. President Donald Trump signed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act on Friday, giving the administration authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from qualifying major buyers of Russian energy. The law does not automatically impose those tariffs.

India also has a very expensive reason to shop carefully.

Its crude import bill jumped 48.4% year over year to $74.8 billion between April and August even though import volumes slipped 0.4%. Higher crude prices and freight costs have eaten away at the savings India spent years extracting from discounted Russian barrels.

Russian crude still makes economic sense for Indian refiners, but the calculation gets considerably uglier if the discount on the oil comes attached to a potential tariff on everything else India sells to the United States.

By Julianne Geiger for Oilprice.com

Trade Tensions Tear at Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union

By Eurasianet - Sep 21, 2026

• Russia imposed extensive restrictions on Armenian imports in 2026 as relations deteriorated over Yerevan’s closer ties with the EU.
• 
  
• Kazakhstan responded to Russia’s higher automobile recycling fees with plans for higher fees on vehicles imported from Russia and Belarus.
• 
  
• Kazakhstan has temporarily banned apple imports from both third countries and fellow EAEU members through December 31, explicitly citing Article 29 of the EAEU treaty among its legal grounds.

While the Russian army is on its heels in Ukraine, the Kremlin is engaging in trade wars with fellow members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). 

The EAEU is ostensibly supposed to promote free trade among the five member states, not hinder it. But that has never really been the case. Russia has tended to circumvent the spirit of the organization’s intent when politically expedient. 

The most prominent example is Moscow’s imposition of a variety of trade bans and barriers on Armenian goods in 2026, moves widely seen as retribution for Yerevan’s efforts to draw closer to the European Union.

The economic pressure has extended to key sectors of Armenia’s economy. For instance, the Russian state-controlled natural gas supplier, Gazprom Armenia, recently imposed an abrupt 10-day cutoff of supplies. And on September 17, Russian National Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu accused the Armenian government of trying, in effect, to expropriate Russian businesses in Armenia, hinting at further punitive measures on Moscow’s part. “Russia is not ready and will not finance Armenia's European integration, and every step in this direction has objective consequences,” the Tass news agency quoted him as saying.

Lately, reports have also started circulating that Kazakhstan and Russia are tangling over automobiles. Kazakhstan imported Russian autos worth $9.8 million during the first half of 2026. Since then, imports have gone to near zero, according to data published by Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics.

The cause of the fall-off, according to Kazakh officials, is Russia’s readjustment in 2024 of “recycling fees” for imported autos. The new five-year schedule of increasing fees is widely seen as a backhanded tariff designed to protect Russia’s auto industry. Russian leader Vladimir Putin reportedly said as much in late 2025 when he stated the higher recycling fees “generated additional revenue for technological development and indirectly supported the domestic auto industry,” the Agentsvo News outlet reported.

Last December, a Russian fee hike raised the overall cost of autos imported from Kazakhstan by an estimated 7 percent.

Kazakh Industry Minister Yersayin Nagaspayev indicated in March that Astana would retaliate if Russia did not reconsider the fee schedule. Kazakh officials followed through on Nagaspayev’s pledge in May, introducing a reciprocal recycling fee structure on Russian and Belarusian imports. 

In another, more recent move underscoring the EAEU’s shambolic nature as a vehicle for economic integration, Kazakhstan has banned imports of apples from foreign states, including EAEU members, to protect domestic growers. Kazakh officials took the unusual and dubious step of invoking Article 29 of the EAEU treaty to justify the ban.

Article 29 allows member states to ban imports in cases where the measure is clearly intended to either protect human life, public morals and public order; ensure environmental standards; protect animal and plant species and cultural values; uphold international obligations and/or guarantee the national security of the member state. The treaty provision expressly states that any ban should not “serve as unjustifiable discrimination or a covered restriction on trade.”

By Eurasianet

Where Is OPEC+? Riyadh and Moscow’s Silence Is Becoming Deafening

By Cyril Widdershoven - Sep 21, 2026

• OPEC+ is losing its grip on oil markets, with wars, sanctions, infrastructure attacks and shipping constraints increasingly determining prices rather than production quotas.
• 
  
• Internal strains are growing, as quota disputes, market-share pressures and diverging Saudi-Russian interests weaken the alliance’s ability to coordinate supply effectively.
• 
  
• OPEC+ remains powerful but increasingly reactive, and restoring credibility will require transparent production baselines, stronger compliance and greater attention to energy infrastructure and export security.
• 
  

“The roar of the engines does not herald true dominance, but the absolute silence that precedes the strike."

“Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt."

The last decades of silence from the world’s leading oil group, OPEC, or its derivative, OPEC+, were always linked to the above-mentioned military strategic statements. However, that is no longer the case: an OPEC+ meeting now moves oil prices before ministers even enter the room. A carefully placed Saudi comment, a Russian signal, or a leaked production proposal can add several dollars to Brent. Traders watched Vienna, Riyadh and Moscow because the producer alliance appeared capable of removing barrels, restoring them and, last but not least, presenting a united political front.

This market power has not disappeared but has become badly diluted. OPEC+ still controls enormous reserves, substantial production and most of the world’s immediately available spare capacity. However, at present, the market increasingly resembles an institution reacting to events rather than shaping them. Its public language remains confident, but its internal structure is becoming narrower. Its quota system is more contentious, while its capability to translate announced production policy into actual market control has severely weakened.

The silence from Riyadh and Moscow is therefore not reassuring. It is worrying, especially for those who rely on stable markets, as it may undermine their confidence in the alliance's effectiveness.

It takes only four years to see a huge contrast. When Russia invaded Ukraine (2022), the world waited for OPEC+ to respond. As an Arab News report (1 March 2022) put it, the mood was captured perfectly. All eyes were on the next OPEC+ meeting: Brent had moved above $105 per barrel, sanctions threatened Russian exports, and the alliance was debating whether to maintain its scheduled 400,000-barrel-per-day increase. This was critical, as it was clear that even in a geopolitical crisis involving one of its two principal powers, OPEC+ remained the recognized center of oil-market decision-making.

At present, we see a different story. The present crisis is arguably more threatening to physical Middle Eastern supply, yet OPEC+ appears less commanding. There is no collective leadership shown by the group, even with a war around Iran, impaired flows through the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure, reduced Red Sea security, disruption to Russian production and exports, and extreme pressure on tanker availability. Throughout the crisis, markets have seen only short virtual meetings, technical communiqués, and repeated commitments to “market stability” and “full conformity.”

On September 6, seven countries, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria and Oman, decided to keep to their September production requirements for October.  Their next meeting is scheduled for October 4. The message, but also the lack of clear assessments and political analysis, is revealing. OPEC+ is confronting one of the most dangerous combinations of geopolitical, maritime and infrastructure risks in its history, but its visible response has been administrative continuity.

There are still no signs that Riyadh and Moscow have stopped coordinating. Analysts still expect quiet bilateral contact to be extensive. For the market, this, however, is something totally different. Oil-market power depends partly on perception, signaling and credibility. When Riyadh and Moscow do not articulate a joint assessment during a supply crisis, silence becomes a market signal in itself. To most parties, it suggests strategic disagreement, reduced operational freedom, or an unwillingness to make commitments that events may quickly render obsolete.

The first fracture is institutional: a smaller core group now makes the most consequential production decisions. This shift may make the audience feel cautious about the alliance's unity and future influence.

It is also clear that the UAE's departure in May was more than the loss of one member. It demonstrated that a large producer with expanding capacity could conclude that freedom outside OPEC+ was worth more than influence within it. Iraq is also pushing for a higher quota reflecting increased capacity, while Venezuela, largely under pressure from the Trump Administration, has reportedly considered its own future in the organization. It is very good to realize that the battle over 2027 production baselines will not be a technical discussion. The 2027 figures will decide which countries are permitted to monetize investment, and which must continue subsidizing collective price management through restraint. This will likely lead to difficult negotiations.

The second fracture ongoing at present is between quota policy and physical reality. OPEC+ spent much of 2026 raising production requirements, while unwinding the 1.65 million bpd layer of voluntary cuts introduced in 2023. On paper, this represents a deliberate return of supply and an attempt to defend market share. However, in reality, actual output has lagged because wars, sanctions, damaged infrastructure, and export constraints have prevented several producers from delivering their allocated increases.

Because credibility is devastated, the audience should feel the urgency of restoring trust, as market power now depends on physical supply and operational transparency, not just announcements.

The current crisis has made that transition brutally clear. Oil availability at the wellhead is no longer the only issue. Export routes have become decisive. Hormuz traffic has fallen far below pre-war norms; Saudi Arabia has been forced to redirect volumes after attacks on the East–West pipeline; Yanbu loadings have been interrupted; ship-to-ship transfers around Fujairah and Oman are under strain; and tanker capacity is becoming a supply constraint in its own right. A nominal production increase inside the Gulf means little if the additional barrel cannot safely, economically, and predictably reach a refinery.

OPEC+ was designed to manage production, not to command chokepoints, protect tankers, repair pipelines, or guarantee marine insurance. OPEC+’s barrels still exist; it cannot manage the security system through which those barrels move. Maritime disruption has partially displaced production policy as the principal price-setting mechanism.

The third weakness is the increasingly uncomfortable Saudi–Russian bargain. Riyadh traditionally sought price stability, spare-capacity credibility and sufficient revenue to finance domestic transformation. Moscow at the same time clearly needs, and even more at present, export income, geopolitical leverage and room to redirect sanctioned barrels through opaque trading and shipping networks. Riyadh’s and Moscow’s interests overlapped when coordinated cuts supported prices without seriously threatening either producer’s market position.

Today they don’t anymore. Russia faces war-related damage, sanctions, logistics constraints, and pressure on refining and exports. Moscow’s production decisions cannot be separated from military financing and sanctions evasion. The Kingdom faces direct threats to its energy infrastructure while needing to protect both oil income and its reputation as the world’s most reliable supplier. It is increasingly clear that Riyadh cannot indefinitely make shoulder cuts while other producers overproduce, under-report, or fail to compensate. Moscow, however, cannot easily accept additional restrictions, as fewer barrels mean less income.

The alliance consequently risks becoming a marriage in which neither party wants a divorce, but neither can enforce the original agreement.

OPEC+ also faces a market-share challenge it helped to create. Years of supply restraint supported competing production from the United States, Brazil, Guyana, Canada and other non-OPEC sources. Every existing or future voluntary cut protects prices but surrenders physical space to rivals. The subsequent attempt to reclaim market share by restoring production has arrived just as geopolitical events prevent several members from supplying what they promised. OPEC+ is now caught between two losing options: cut production and concede more market share or raise quotas and expose its inability to deliver.

Where does OPEC+ go from here? It has three possible paths. It can remain a loose political umbrella, issuing increasingly irrelevant quota statements. It can shrink operational decision-making around Saudi Arabia and a handful of capable producers, effectively acknowledging that most members are spectators. Or it can rebuild credibility through transparent baselines, independently verifiable production, enforceable compensation mechanisms and a broader security discussion covering export corridors and infrastructure resilience.

The third path is the only one capable of restoring authority, but it is also the hardest. It would force members to admit their real capacity, expose chronic non-compliance and accept that production security now includes pipelines, ports, storage, tankers, insurance and naval protection. At the same time, it would require Riyadh and Moscow to explain whether their strategic partnership still extends beyond avoiding an open rupture.

OPEC is not dead; OPEC+ is not powerless. At present, Saudi spare capacity remains critical, while Moscow’s supply remains systemically important. Coordinated action still could move the market. From a power perspective, however, it is clear that power not exercised coherently only deteriorates. At present, OPEC+, the organization that once moved markets, is now waiting to see what wars, sanctions, infrastructure attacks, and shipping constraints will allow it to do.

OPEC+ faces no danger of sudden collapse. It will survive institutionally while becoming strategically hollow. The organization still meets, publishes, and talks about stability. However, it no longer sets the market terms. Riyadh and Moscow may believe that silence preserves flexibility. At this stage, however, their silence increasingly looks like uncertainty. Oil markets punish uncertainty long before organizations acknowledge weakness.

By Cyril Widdershoven for Oilprice.com

Climate Startup Signs CO2 Deals With Three U.S. Oil Producers

By Charles Kennedy - Sep 23, 2026

Cuts to U.S. federal incentives for carbon capture projects and an uncertain regulatory environment going forward have prompted some start-ups to move from solely capturing and storing carbon dioxide to selling it to oil companies to help them boost oil recovery.  

Carbon management engineering company Spiritus, for example, has recently signed preliminary agreements with three U.S. oil and gas producers to sell them the captured CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR). 

The injection of CO2 into reservoirs could help unlock an additional 70 million barrels of oil from wells in Texas, the Rockies, and the Midwest, the CEO of Spiritus, Charles Cadieu, told Bloomberg in an interview published on Wednesday. 

“The removal market is challenged right now,” Cadieu told Bloomberg, adding that “The pull is just great in the EOR space and that’s part of what it is to be a company: to go where the commercial traction is.”    

After an initial momentum of carbon capture technologies, including the still not-matured direct air capture, the economic and commercial feasibility of projects has worsened amid insufficient government support and high costs. 

In the U.S., the Trump Administration removed many projects from funding and the biggest buyers of carbon credits, such as the tech giants, have scaled back carbon credit purchases as they pursue investments in AI development.

The challenging market for carbon removal has led some businesses to fold while others, including Spiritus, have pivoted to providing CO2 to boost oil recovery at U.S. producers. 

A University of Houston report from last month found that as many as 

137 billion barrels of U.S. oil are technically recoverable using carbon dioxide-enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Texas and the U.S. Gulf Coast contain more than half of the U.S. oil resources considered technically favorable for this technology, according to the University of Houston white paper. 

“Injected CO2 works to revitalize mature oil fields by reducing oil viscosity, improving sweep efficiency and restoring reservoir pressure, resulting in incremental oil production beyond primary and secondary recovery,” the report reads. 

“CO2-EOR also supports permanent carbon storage and by virtue of this will produce uniquely low-carbon intensity oil for global markets.”

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Dangote's Kenya Refinery Project Launches This Week at Up to $20B

By Charles Kennedy - Sep 23, 2026

Kenya breaks ground September 30 on the Dangote-backed East Africa Oil Refinery in Lamu, a project priced at $17 billion by Kenyan officials and $20 billion by Aliko Dangote himself, and designed to process 700,000 barrels of crude oil a day at Lamu's deep-water port. It would serve Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Disclosed financing for the project totals $1.6 billion against a price tag of $17 billion to $20 billion. Tanzanian billionaire Mohammed Dewji has committed $100 million to the project. Dangote Group offered East African nations a combined 30% equity stake valued at $1.5 billion on August 21; Kenya's economic adviser David Ndii put Kenya's individual 10% allocation at about $500 million.

Additionally, two separate pipelines, not one, are tied to the Kenya project, and neither has a disclosed cost, capacity or completion date. Ruto told Dangote he is discussing construction of a line from Turkana's oil fields to Lamu "to unlock the oil that we have in Turkana," according to Kenyans.co.ke. This would be an inbound route for the refinery's own crude supply. 

Dangote is building two more pipelines unrelated to Kenya. A Djibouti-Ethiopia gas and petroleum pipeline starts construction within two months. A separate $3.5 billion, 2,650-kilometer corridor will connect Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. Dangote has described the combined program, Kenya included, as $46 billion to $50 billion and roughly 4,000 kilometers of pipeline across the continent.

Kenya's refinery faces a competing regional project of similar scale. Tanzania and Uganda have partnered with Vitol Bahrain on a $20-billion energy hub in Tanga, built around the nearly complete East African Crude Oil Pipeline. Uganda is backing both the Lamu and Tanga projects simultaneously, while separately advancing a UAE-backed, 60,000-barrel-per-day refinery of its own in Hoima. Back in 2016, Uganda abandoned a joint pipeline route with Kenya in favor of Tanzania's.

Dangote anticipates completion around 2029 to 2030, with construction beginning in October and running roughly three years from groundbreaking.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Glencore Joins Project Vault With $500 Million Cobalt Commitment

By Charles Kennedy - Sep 23, 2026

Glencore committed $500 million to VaultCo, the Export-Import Bank public-private partnership sourcing critical minerals for a US government stockpile, Reuters reported Wednesday. The commitment makes Glencore the fourth supplier named to Project Vault, joining Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas and Traxys seven months after EXIM's board approved the program's underlying loan.

EXIM's board approved a $10-billion direct loan for Project Vault on February 2, 2026, paired with roughly $2 billion in private capital for a $12-billion total that finances a partnership between original equipment manufacturers and private capital providers. The original roster named Clarios, GE Vernova, Western Digital and Boeing as offtakers and Hartree Partners, Mercuria Americas and Traxys as suppliers.

Glencore told investors during its February 2026 earnings call it planned cobalt purchases tailored to fulfilling commitments to the US stockpile, months before VaultCo's structure took it on as a fourth supplier. 

Glencore holds major cobalt assets in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which produces most of the world's mined cobalt. Delivering material directly into VaultCo lets Glencore bypass the Chinese refining capacity that dominates the processing side of that supply chain.

Project Vault's stated purpose is shielding U.S. manufacturers from foreign supply chain disruptions across every mineral the US Geological Survey designates critical. 

So far, none of the direct-sourcing efforts meant to route DRC cobalt to the U.S. without Chinese refining has moved past setting targets. EGC-EVelution Energy is targeting up to 40% of US cobalt demand with a 1,775-tonne 2026 quota. Virtus Minerals is acquiring Chemaf SA, aimed at roughly 20,000 tonnes of annual capacity. Orion Critical Minerals is pursuing a 40% stake alongside Glencore.

By Charles Kennedy for Oilprice.com

Global Energy Demand Set to Jump 60% by 2060 as Developing Nations Power Up

By Haley Zaremba - Sep 22, 2026

• S&P Global projects emerging economies could push global energy demand up more than 60 percent by 2060, the equivalent of adding another China's worth of consumption.
• 
  
• Developing nations from Brazil to Namibia are outpacing the US on solar adoption, but S&P's Dan Yergin says oil, gas and even coal will still grab a bigger share of the mix.
• 
  
• Rich countries' broken promises on climate finance are pushing emerging economies to reject the “leapfrog” narrative in favor of an all-of-the-above energy strategy.
• 
  

Emerging economies are going to see an explosion of energy demand over the coming decades. Countries like Brazil, India, Nigeria, and Indonesia are racing to expand their energy production and imports in order to keep up with rapid economic development. While the leaders of these and other emerging economies are making a concerted effort to expand their renewable energy capacity, meeting demand will require an all-of-the-above approach to energy that will extend the life of oil and gas, according to a new report from S&P Global.

According to the study, published last week, emerging economies could increase the world’s total energy demand by more than 60 percent by 2060. “That’s comparable to adding another China to world consumption,” a recent Marketplace report illustrates.

Speaking of China, the global superpower has become, by a gaping margin, the world’s biggest manufacturer of the clean energy infrastructure that is going to power a lot of that growth. Many of the world’s developing countries have seen their solar power installations skyrocket in recent months thanks to a flood of cheap clean energy tech coming out of China, paired with volatility in oil and gas markets driven by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Against this backdrop, emerging economies have emerged as the new face of the renewable revolution. Over the last several years, countries including Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Morocco, Kenya, and Namibia have overtaken the world’s largest economy in their clean energy transitions. As of the close of 2025, 63 percent of emerging markets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America sourced more of their power generation from solar power than the United States.

But while a renewable revolution is picking up speed in the Global South, S&P says not to expect a clean energy takeover. “This demand growth is going to be met with a multiplicity of different energies,” said Dan Yergin, vice chairman of S&P Global. “Renewables will be an important part of it. You're going to see perhaps more coal now … and oil and gas will continue to be part of the demand picture for longer than many people think.”

While this reality is going to make climate goals incredibly hard to achieve, emerging economies have pushed back against the expectation that they “leapfrog” over fossil fuel development and straight into a 100 percent renewable grid to make up for the greenhouse gas emissions that developed nations had the opportunity to enrich themselves on carte blanche. Rich nations have promised to right this injustice by funding decarbonization in poorer countries, but the history of climate finance is riddled with broken promises.

While Chinese manufacturing has made renewables much cheaper and more attainable, that still requires massive investments on the part of countries that don’t already have a well-established clean energy sector. “Emerging economies can’t wait on renewables getting cheaper to grow their energy systems,” Marketplace writes based on an interview with deputy executive director at the Energy for Growth Hub, Katie Auth said.

Furthermore, despite the growing threat of climate change, energy demand growth is a net positive for developing nations, Auth points out. “It's being driven by economic development, rising incomes, job creation,” she said. “Right now, the average Liberian consumes less electricity in a year than my refrigerator does. So the scale of energy poverty is far worse than I imagine most Americans would ever think about,” Katie Auth, deputy executive director at the Energy for Growth Hub, told Marketplace. This argument is only made more powerful by the recent explosion in energy demand and carbon footprint in the developed world driven by artificial intelligence. 

By Haley Zaremba for Oilprice.com