Sectarian slaughter of Alawites on Syria's coast must not be downplayed
There is no justification for downplaying the gravity of the crimes committed by 'rogue' elements in Syria's coastal region. They were sectarian massacres.
Perspectives
Maen al-Bayyari
13 Mar, 2025
The New Arab
Members of security forces loyal to the interim Syrian government pose together with their firearms as they stand by the Mediterranean sea coast in Syria's western city of Latakia on March 9, 2025 [Omar Haj Kadour/AFP via Getty]
There is no excuse for any hesitation or evasion in describing what happened, and could still be happening, in the towns and villages along the Syrian coast as a sectarian slaughter.
Moreover it cannot be denied that the country will be on a suicidal trajectory – an outcome which will of course be welcomed by Bashar al-Assad, Israel and others. This is unless all Syrians urgently rise up in a mammoth and practical effort to contain both the visible and hidden infernos raging in the streets, forests and alleys of this country, and, most importantly, inside people's souls.
If some see this as an exaggeration, and say this issue is confined only to those who participated in the mass slaughter of hundreds of unarmed Syrian civilians - who happened to be Alawite - then the response is that it also applies to those who couldn't tolerate losing the power and influence they once held under Assad's rule and who took up arms against the new security and military forces.
Of course, it is in the nature of states to show no mercy to those who rebel against their authority through armed resistance, but that is not what unfolded.
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Post-Assad Syria
Robin Yassin-Kassab
What happened here was that around 5,000 well-armed fighters (according to the governor of Latakia when interviewed by Al Araby TV) embarked on a "revenge" operation, aiming to destabilise the emerging authority, and possibly even attempt a foreign-backed military coup (though not confirmed).
Within hours, these fighters (who were Alawite) managed to kill over 100 security and army personnel, and in an act of pure malice and sick sectarianism, they burned the corpses of many of those killed (who were Sunnis).
As for the massacres then committed against Alawite Syrian civilians in their homes, these were perpetrated by members of "rogue" factions. The killings were based solely on the Alawite identity of the victims – this must not be forgotten.
The interim government's defence ministry and general security directorate stating that the perpetrators weren't under their command only increases the responsibility of the new rulers and that of Ahmed al-Sharaa's leadership for what took place on the coast.
Efforts to bring an end to the atrocities, and recover looted property, while essential, don't eliminate the urgent need for clear responses from the interim government on key questions, like why these factions were permitted to remain outside the new military and security institutions. Furthermore, why were they stationed along sectarian frontlines in the coastal region? How did they manage to carry out such crimes, details of which are increasingly horrifying? And finally, how many victims were there?
Some sources have estimated a thousand killed, while others have more cautiously stated around five hundred or fewer. The victims include women, children, and young men who are known to have supported the Syrian revolution
The extremist Islamist (Sunni) affiliations of the members of these "rogue" elements are known, as is the fact that they previously fought against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in past battles that occurred in northeast Syria.
The fear is that the de facto authorities have no control over these elements, nor the ability to disarm them, nor to take them to military courts (a matter of urgency) where they can be tried and punished appropriately for carrying out what are well-documented, sectarian killings - some of which saw entire families slaughtered.
While it may be true that exaggerations occurred in the chaotic media coverage, in terms of the portrayal of what happened as a "genocide" against Alawite Syrians on the coast, and in the circulation of unverified casualty figures, none of that justifies downplaying the enormity and horror of the crimes committed.
Furthermore, we aren't simply talking about criminal gangs exploiting an unstable security situation – what's at stake is the future of Syria after Assad.
The desired vision for a post-Assad Syria must be one free of the sectarian hatreds that have gnawed at the country's diverse social fabric. This means a Syria healed from the sicknesses that have become endemic in a nation still struggling to find a unified national identity—an identity shattered by decades of injustice under Assad's rule.
There are many wise and rational figures among the Syrians of the coastal region, and Sunni and Alawite religious leaders are making visible reconciliation efforts. However, while these local efforts are essential, they require a political framework and commitment from decision-makers and those in government to integrate them within a broader initiative.
There should be no illusions that these efforts will see overnight successes, or that they will immediately pull the country back from what could be a suicidal trajectory. We already see this reality crystallising with the mounting exodus from the coastal region alongside a sense of deepening despair - feeding the lack of trust that already exists towards the ruling authorities.
This is due to their choices, their lack of knowledge on governance and administration, and their reckless discourse on core issues such as national unity and rebuilding the military, as well as their sectarian categorisation of citizens.
The writer of these lines has no ready-made solution to offer Syria's rulers. However, any serious search for a solution must begin with a clear acknowledgment: that what just happened on Syria's coast were sectarian massacres – an abhorrent crime for which there is no justification.
Maen al-Bayyari is a writer and journalist from Jordan. He is the Editor in Chief of The New Arab's Arabic Edition, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition. To read the original article click here.
Translated by Rose Chacko
Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.
Syria Insight: Bloodbath on the coast underlines deep anger and mistrust
The bloodshed in Syria's coastal region is the worst since the fall of the Assad regime in December.
Inside MENA
Paul McLoughlin
13 March, 2025
The New Arab
For 13 years, the discourse of the Assad regime was that once it collapsed, so too would Syria’s diverse demographic mosaic.
When Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) fighters marched toward Damascus last December, many, particularly minorities, believed that Syria was entering an apocalyptic moment. Yet when the capital fell no sectarian massacres took place, no minorities were expelled, and an Islamist regime that oppressed Alawites and Christians never emerged.
Three months later, Syria's coast erupted into a frenzy of bloodletting, as the region's two main sects - the Sunnis and Alawites - appeared on course for a localised civil war following a wave of attacks on security forces by remnants of the former regime.
While details of the events in Latakia and Tartous are still unclear, the assault and brutal three-day counter-insurgency campaign by government forces resulted in hundreds of civilians killed in cold blood.
Syria is now in a moment of soul-searching and mourning as Syrians reject sectarianism, including Ahmed Al-Sharaa who spoke to the families of Alawi victims and pledged to bring perpetrators of the killings to justice.
Unrest
In the past weeks, sources have told The New Arab that Latakia was hurtling toward an explosion of violence due to anger about the remnants of the regime still walking free - including the feared shabbiha - and some even taking to social media to gloat about evading justice.
Although much of the coast was spared the worst of the violence during the Syrian war, Sunnis there probably endured the worst of the regime's brutality, with scarcely a family not having a loved one disappeared, killed in sectarian massacres, or eloped to the hills of Jabel Akrad to fight with the rebels.
Dima Wannous, a Syrian novelist, said that given the harrowing experiences all Syrians have endured over the years, and with the euphoria of 8 December now eclipsed by the harsher realities of life, an eruption of frustrations was inevitable.
"First, the years of revolution and the war waged by the Assad regime against its people have left the Alawites psychologically, physically, and economically exhausted," Wannous told The New Arab.
"The regime used them as a tool to kill other Syrians, staining their reputation while failing to provide them with any material or moral compensation after years of fighting on the front lines and dying in battles to keep Assad in power."
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Sectarianism
While no sectarian massacres took place after the HTS takeover, many Alawites - even those unconnected to the Assad regime - felt that reprisals against their Islamic sect were inevitable, and the weekend's episodes of violence appeared to vindicate those fears.
"A significant portion of the Alawite community - including intellectuals, open-minded individuals, and even opposition figures - believe in the idea of 'minority protection'. They are deeply influenced by a historic fear of 'slaughter' and ‘genocide', harbouring a strong fear of Islamists," said Wannous.
"This fear is now even greater because they are not just a minority sect with religious practices entirely different from the Sunni majority, but they have also become entangled in Syrian bloodshed. There is widespread hatred against them, and the legitimate desire for revenge is strong and growing."
Many Alawites enjoyed certain privileges under the Assad regime, including 'phantom jobs' which allowed them to pick up monthly paycheques while staying at home.
When these positions were abolished it fed into the resentment toward the new government about their increasingly bleak financial situation, despite the dire economic reality faced by all Syrians.
"Today, most of them have been dismissed from these positions, leaving them with limited choices: either find another job - an extremely difficult task due to a lack of skills and education - or join what is now called the remnants of the regime and fight against the new state's security forces in exchange for funding from external parties," said Wannous.
"The Alawite sect ruled Syria for over five decades, making arrogance a part of its social fabric and modern memory - that feeling of power, superiority, impunity, and privilege in all aspects of daily life. How can all of that disappear in just three months? It’s difficult."
The assault by former regime elements on security forces and a brutal three-day counter-insurgency campaign resulted in hundreds of civilians being killed in cold blood. [Getty]
Disinformation
There are indications that the violence goes beyond local grievances with suspicions that Iran and Russia might have played a role in the weekend's highly organised insurgency campaign against security forces, all in a bid to destabilise the government.
While there is no denying that mass extra-judicial killings of civilians and unarmed fighters did take place by government forces, social media has also been awash with disinformation, including US figures such as Elon Musk who promoted fake news about the mass slaughter of Christians - something that has done little to ease tensions on the coast and done huge harm to the government as it seeks international outreach.
"Social media has become a battleground for competing narratives, strategically exploited by remnants of the Assad regime, and external actors like Russia and Iran," Fadel Abdul-Ghany, director of the Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR), told The New Arab.
"Pro-Assad factions weaponised sectarian fears, portraying the rebellion as an existential threat to the Alawite minority to mobilise support and undermine reconciliation efforts. Russian-aligned media amplified this messaging, using propaganda to justify loyalist militias and discredit the transitional government."
Both countries were key allies of the former regime with Russia's Hmeimim airbase in Latakia used as refuge for Alawite locals over the weekend and Iran deeply embedded within the former Syrian military apparatus, particularly the notorious Fourth Division, led by Maher Al-Assad, where some of the militants who targeted security forces are believed to be from.
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Organisers
The three men thought to be the masterminds of the attacks on security forces were all previous key figures in the Syrian regime: Suheil Hassan, Ghiath Dalle, and Miqdad Fteha - the first two natives of Jableh, one of the Latakia cities where the violence first erupted.
Videos emerged over the weekend, supposedly of Fteha with his face partially concealed, threatening Alawites who had collaborated with the new regime and security forces.
Dalle is close to the Iranians via his involvement in the Fourth Division, while Hassan, the highly visible head of the notorious Tiger Forces, was not directly implicated in the violence but is widely believed to have played a key role.
"What unites the three people is certainly their ability to mobilise local fighters, specifically more than other matters such as loyalty to Assad or the loyalty of the fighters to them," Suhail Al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher, told The New Arab.
These former regime elements took advantage of the General Security Forces' lack of training and knowledge of the coastal terrain after they replaced a previous more experienced military contingent at the request of local figures two months ago.
"The number of fighters loyal to Assad, who in some areas outnumbered the General Security Forces, and their ability to hide among civilians and the weapons they possessed gave them the upper hand at the beginning of the attack," said Al-Ghazi.
Disinformation
There are indications that the violence goes beyond local grievances with suspicions that Iran and Russia might have played a role in the weekend's highly organised insurgency campaign against security forces, all in a bid to destabilise the government.
While there is no denying that mass extra-judicial killings of civilians and unarmed fighters did take place by government forces, social media has also been awash with disinformation, including US figures such as Elon Musk who promoted fake news about the mass slaughter of Christians - something that has done little to ease tensions on the coast and done huge harm to the government as it seeks international outreach.
"Social media has become a battleground for competing narratives, strategically exploited by remnants of the Assad regime, and external actors like Russia and Iran," Fadel Abdul-Ghany, director of the Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR), told The New Arab.
"Pro-Assad factions weaponised sectarian fears, portraying the rebellion as an existential threat to the Alawite minority to mobilise support and undermine reconciliation efforts. Russian-aligned media amplified this messaging, using propaganda to justify loyalist militias and discredit the transitional government."
Both countries were key allies of the former regime with Russia's Hmeimim airbase in Latakia used as refuge for Alawite locals over the weekend and Iran deeply embedded within the former Syrian military apparatus, particularly the notorious Fourth Division, led by Maher Al-Assad, where some of the militants who targeted security forces are believed to be from.
Related
Organisers
The three men thought to be the masterminds of the attacks on security forces were all previous key figures in the Syrian regime: Suheil Hassan, Ghiath Dalle, and Miqdad Fteha - the first two natives of Jableh, one of the Latakia cities where the violence first erupted.
Videos emerged over the weekend, supposedly of Fteha with his face partially concealed, threatening Alawites who had collaborated with the new regime and security forces.
Dalle is close to the Iranians via his involvement in the Fourth Division, while Hassan, the highly visible head of the notorious Tiger Forces, was not directly implicated in the violence but is widely believed to have played a key role.
"What unites the three people is certainly their ability to mobilise local fighters, specifically more than other matters such as loyalty to Assad or the loyalty of the fighters to them," Suhail Al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher, told The New Arab.
These former regime elements took advantage of the General Security Forces' lack of training and knowledge of the coastal terrain after they replaced a previous more experienced military contingent at the request of local figures two months ago.
"The number of fighters loyal to Assad, who in some areas outnumbered the General Security Forces, and their ability to hide among civilians and the weapons they possessed gave them the upper hand at the beginning of the attack," said Al-Ghazi.
There are indications that the violence goes beyond local grievances with suspicions that Iran and Russia might have played a role in the weekend's highly organised insurgency campaign against security forces. [Getty]
Bloodbath
Clashes and ambushes by regime remnants with government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 172 members of local security and the police, while 211 civilians were killed in attacks by non-state actors, according to the SNHR.
When former rebel groups entered the coastal region from elsewhere in Syria - including the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, Hamza Division, and Ahrar Al-Sharqiya - to reinforce the embattled government units the situation descended into mayhem, with at least 420 civilians and disarmed militants, predominantly from the Alawite community, killed as fighters raided homes and summarily executed people.
It is unclear how the damage and pain can be mended, but it is evident that the government must now rethink how military units operate in civilian areas, to maintain security and regain the trust of all Syrians.
"In the future, the government should use better-trained security forces inside cities and towns, keep the military forces in military bases, and train soldiers and security personnel to prevent crimes and violations while carrying out security missions, in addition to a comprehensive solution to the issue of former soldiers," said Al-Ghazi.
Paul McLoughlin is the Head of News at The New Arab
Follow him on Twitter: @PaullMcLoughlin
Bloodbath
Clashes and ambushes by regime remnants with government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 172 members of local security and the police, while 211 civilians were killed in attacks by non-state actors, according to the SNHR.
When former rebel groups entered the coastal region from elsewhere in Syria - including the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, Hamza Division, and Ahrar Al-Sharqiya - to reinforce the embattled government units the situation descended into mayhem, with at least 420 civilians and disarmed militants, predominantly from the Alawite community, killed as fighters raided homes and summarily executed people.
It is unclear how the damage and pain can be mended, but it is evident that the government must now rethink how military units operate in civilian areas, to maintain security and regain the trust of all Syrians.
"In the future, the government should use better-trained security forces inside cities and towns, keep the military forces in military bases, and train soldiers and security personnel to prevent crimes and violations while carrying out security missions, in addition to a comprehensive solution to the issue of former soldiers," said Al-Ghazi.
Paul McLoughlin is the Head of News at The New Arab
Follow him on Twitter: @PaullMcLoughlin
Opinion
As a Syrian rights monitor, an independent coastal investigation is needed after sectarian scare
Syrian national unity is hanging by a thread. Without real transitional justice, fears of sectarian mob rule will continue to loom, writes Fadel Abdulghany.
Fadel Abdulghany
12 Mar, 2025
The New Arab
The March 2025 violence is yet another painful chapter in the country's prolonged tragedy, highlighting the essential role of accountability in the pursuit of peace, writes Fadel Abdulghany
As a Syrian rights monitor, an independent coastal investigation is needed after sectarian scare
Syrian national unity is hanging by a thread. Without real transitional justice, fears of sectarian mob rule will continue to loom, writes Fadel Abdulghany.
Fadel Abdulghany
12 Mar, 2025
The New Arab
The March 2025 violence is yet another painful chapter in the country's prolonged tragedy, highlighting the essential role of accountability in the pursuit of peace, writes Fadel Abdulghany
[photo credit: Getty Images]
Between March 6 and 10, Syria was plunged into darkness as the Syrian coastal cities of Latakia, Tartous, and Hama became battlegrounds in a violent sectarian struggle, fueled by armed "remnants" of the Assad regime.
For four days, the nation was consumed by chaos, as these rogue elements — operating outside the state’s authority — unleashed brutality. In just 96 hours, 803 people were killed, marking the deadliest and most troubling surge of violence since the fall of the house of Assad on December 8.
This resurgence of bloodshed highlights the reality of Syria's fragile transition under its new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.
While the Assad regime may have crumbled, the forces that sustained it have not been eradicated; they persist, entrenched in the coastal regions, refusing to disarm or engage in the political process.
Syria is far from emerging from the shadows of its past. The country remains trapped in a precarious and unfinished transition, with armed groups that refuse to bow to the new government’s authority, standing as a constant threat to peace.
The spectre of Syrian sectarianism
The landscape of conflict is currently defined by a volatile triangle of power. On one side, there is the transitional government, represented by the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the Internal Security Forces, and the Transitional Army. Loyalist armed factions exist — nominally incorporated under these two bodies — but operate with limited military and organisational discipline.
Against them stand the armed groups that operate beyond the state's reach and are directly linked to the former Assad regime. Comprised largely of former military officers, security personnel, and pro-regime militias, these groups — often referred to as "remnants" in local discourse — represent the ghosts of the deposed Assad regime.
Adding to the complexity is the rise of armed civilian groups from the affected or neighbouring areas. These factions are split in their loyalty, with some rallying behind the transitional government while others continue to pledge allegiance to the loyalist forces of the former regime.
The intersection of sectarian, political, and social identities within these groups has only deepened the divisions, creating an unstable security environment.
This tangled web of actors — the transitional government with its disorganised loyalist factions, the remnants of the former regime, and the independent armed civilian groups — has dramatically escalated the conflict, leading to widespread violence and gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
The organisation I founded, The Syrian Network for Human Rights, meticulously documented the deaths of 803 individuals over the four days. Of these, 383 were killed by "remnants" of the Assad regime — including 211 civilians.
Meanwhile, Syrian military forces were directly responsible for the deaths of at least 420 people, a number that includes both civilians and disarmed members of pro-regime factions.
The majority of these killings were carried out by military units that had recently integrated into the General Security Administration, underscoring a lack of discipline within the state's security apparatus.
Mass killings were particularly rampant during this period, especially in areas like Jableh, Baniyas, and surrounding villages in the governorates of Latakia and Tartous. Armed groups affiliated with the former regime launched sporadic attacks and ambushes, leaving a trail of civilian casualties among those who had no part in the conflict.
On the other side, armed forces loyal to the transitional government — often local and foreign factions operating with alarming indiscipline under the Ministry of Defense — conducted violent raids, executing civilians in large numbers simply for their perceived sympathies with or affiliations to the former regime's armed groups.
In response to the events between March 6 and 10, 2025, the transitional government formed an independent national investigation committee to probe the violations and hold perpetrators accountable. While this is a positive step, I urge for greater independence and transparency in the committee’s work.
The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) has recommended including independent human rights representatives, members of the Alawite community, and local residents in the investigation to ensure credibility and reduce bias. We also call for the committee’s mandate to be extended beyond the initial 30 days and to cover all affected regions, not just the coastal areas.
To promote justice and stability, SNHR has urged the government to strengthen oversight of allied armed groups and ensure transparent investigations leading to fair trials. The network also called for immediate civilian protection, security reforms, and better training to ensure adherence to international human rights laws. Furthermore, we emphasise the need for security forces to protect hospitals and media personnel during operations, with perpetrators of sectarian or politically motivated violence held accountable.
On the societal level, SNHR advocates for grassroots efforts to reduce sectarian tensions, promote national dialogue, and support documentation of violations. We also urge international support for both national and international investigations, humanitarian aid, and efforts to foster reconciliation.
Syria remains mired in the struggle for justice amid the ongoing devastation. The March 2025 violence is yet another painful chapter in the country's prolonged tragedy, highlighting the essential role of accountability in the pursuit of peace. Justice is not merely a promise; it is the key to restoring dignity and healing the deep wounds left by years of conflict.
Fadel Abdulghany is the founder and executive director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) which he established in 2011.
Follow him on X: @FADELABDULGHANY
Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.
Between March 6 and 10, Syria was plunged into darkness as the Syrian coastal cities of Latakia, Tartous, and Hama became battlegrounds in a violent sectarian struggle, fueled by armed "remnants" of the Assad regime.
For four days, the nation was consumed by chaos, as these rogue elements — operating outside the state’s authority — unleashed brutality. In just 96 hours, 803 people were killed, marking the deadliest and most troubling surge of violence since the fall of the house of Assad on December 8.
This resurgence of bloodshed highlights the reality of Syria's fragile transition under its new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa.
While the Assad regime may have crumbled, the forces that sustained it have not been eradicated; they persist, entrenched in the coastal regions, refusing to disarm or engage in the political process.
Syria is far from emerging from the shadows of its past. The country remains trapped in a precarious and unfinished transition, with armed groups that refuse to bow to the new government’s authority, standing as a constant threat to peace.
The spectre of Syrian sectarianism
The landscape of conflict is currently defined by a volatile triangle of power. On one side, there is the transitional government, represented by the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the Internal Security Forces, and the Transitional Army. Loyalist armed factions exist — nominally incorporated under these two bodies — but operate with limited military and organisational discipline.
Against them stand the armed groups that operate beyond the state's reach and are directly linked to the former Assad regime. Comprised largely of former military officers, security personnel, and pro-regime militias, these groups — often referred to as "remnants" in local discourse — represent the ghosts of the deposed Assad regime.
Adding to the complexity is the rise of armed civilian groups from the affected or neighbouring areas. These factions are split in their loyalty, with some rallying behind the transitional government while others continue to pledge allegiance to the loyalist forces of the former regime.
The intersection of sectarian, political, and social identities within these groups has only deepened the divisions, creating an unstable security environment.
This tangled web of actors — the transitional government with its disorganised loyalist factions, the remnants of the former regime, and the independent armed civilian groups — has dramatically escalated the conflict, leading to widespread violence and gross violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
The organisation I founded, The Syrian Network for Human Rights, meticulously documented the deaths of 803 individuals over the four days. Of these, 383 were killed by "remnants" of the Assad regime — including 211 civilians.
Meanwhile, Syrian military forces were directly responsible for the deaths of at least 420 people, a number that includes both civilians and disarmed members of pro-regime factions.
The majority of these killings were carried out by military units that had recently integrated into the General Security Administration, underscoring a lack of discipline within the state's security apparatus.
Mass killings were particularly rampant during this period, especially in areas like Jableh, Baniyas, and surrounding villages in the governorates of Latakia and Tartous. Armed groups affiliated with the former regime launched sporadic attacks and ambushes, leaving a trail of civilian casualties among those who had no part in the conflict.
On the other side, armed forces loyal to the transitional government — often local and foreign factions operating with alarming indiscipline under the Ministry of Defense — conducted violent raids, executing civilians in large numbers simply for their perceived sympathies with or affiliations to the former regime's armed groups.
In response to the events between March 6 and 10, 2025, the transitional government formed an independent national investigation committee to probe the violations and hold perpetrators accountable. While this is a positive step, I urge for greater independence and transparency in the committee’s work.
The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) has recommended including independent human rights representatives, members of the Alawite community, and local residents in the investigation to ensure credibility and reduce bias. We also call for the committee’s mandate to be extended beyond the initial 30 days and to cover all affected regions, not just the coastal areas.
To promote justice and stability, SNHR has urged the government to strengthen oversight of allied armed groups and ensure transparent investigations leading to fair trials. The network also called for immediate civilian protection, security reforms, and better training to ensure adherence to international human rights laws. Furthermore, we emphasise the need for security forces to protect hospitals and media personnel during operations, with perpetrators of sectarian or politically motivated violence held accountable.
On the societal level, SNHR advocates for grassroots efforts to reduce sectarian tensions, promote national dialogue, and support documentation of violations. We also urge international support for both national and international investigations, humanitarian aid, and efforts to foster reconciliation.
Syria remains mired in the struggle for justice amid the ongoing devastation. The March 2025 violence is yet another painful chapter in the country's prolonged tragedy, highlighting the essential role of accountability in the pursuit of peace. Justice is not merely a promise; it is the key to restoring dignity and healing the deep wounds left by years of conflict.
Fadel Abdulghany is the founder and executive director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) which he established in 2011.
Follow him on X: @FADELABDULGHANY
Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.
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